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**MILITARY PLANNING
IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS**

by

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This paper uses some British terminology and outlines a number of British practices; they are explained where their meaning is not self evident. While the detail of the processes may vary from one country to another, the underlying principles remain valid for any particular situation.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be taken to represent the policy of either the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda or the British government.

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

1. There is a growing body of literature dealing with the demobilization process, based mainly on the study of exercises to reduce armed forces in countries which have recently passed through internal struggles. This literature appears to assume that the objectives of demobilization are purely social and economic, with the emphasis on the latter. Yet it is an implicit assumption in all this work that not every soldier will be demobilized and, ergo, the countries concerned will continue to have armed forces. None of the works reviewed addresses the issues relating to this aspect of the topic - other than a few passing references to *professionalization* of the remaining armed forces. It may be that, in countries which are emerging from internal security problems, of whatever kind, there is a reluctance on the part of the military authorities to discuss matters which they consider might compromise national security and this could explain why the literature pays scant regard to these topics.

2. Matters such as the appropriate role, size, organization, equipment and level of training of the armed forces for the circumstances of the country concerned are equally as important for future national security - in the widest sense as well as the narrow meaning of the word - of that country as the successful reintegration into society of those who are demobilized. Indeed, such matters must be addressed to some degree before detailed work on the demobilization process can begin because it is only from an examination of them that it becomes possible to begin to calculate how many soldiers are to be demobilized. This work is not only relevant to the demobilization process, it also forms the basis of coherent defence planning; the introduction of mechanisms necessary for planning demobilization will provide a firm framework for much subsequent work.

3. It is possible to identify and discuss the issues involved without reference to any particular situation and, hence, without addressing, still less compromising, the security of any particular state.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider in outline the military aspects of demobilization of armed forces.

5. The context in which the paper is written is the newly emerging state in a troubled region of the world, a state which will be relying heavily on external advice and funding. But the processes described are essentially the same as those adopted by any state when it carries out a defence review.

6. It is hoped that this work will assist the economic and development communities by demonstrating that:

- a. There are valid military concerns which have significance equal to that of the economic and social issues and, like those economic and social issues, their proper resolution is vital for the future well-being and stability of the country concerned.
- b. It is essential that appropriate military planning staff are fully involved in the demobilization process.
- c. While the processes involved are not difficult to understand, their application does require the use of specialized skills and techniques. It is as appropriate for institutions, aid agencies and donors to provide teams of advisors to assist in this work as it is in the areas in which advice is more traditionally given. Indeed, if such agencies are encouraging demobilisation, they may be considered to have a responsibility to fund that advice.

THE THREAT

- 7. All military planning takes as its starting point 'the Threat' and the approach to demobilization can not be an exception. It is only by having a thorough understanding of the potential for aggression against the state, whether external or internal, that it becomes possible to start designing the forces necessary to counter that threat and, hence, calculate the numbers for demobilization.
- 8. Accurate identification of the Threat is fundamental to the success of the exercise yet inevitably involves a considerable degree of speculation, hypothesis and, less sophisticatedly, sheer guesswork, based upon information which may be of dubious accuracy. There is a tendency among some threat analysts to overestimate the Threat; they build in a safety margin so that future events cannot be worse than they have predicted. At the least, prudence demands that they err on the side of caution.
- 9. The Threat is also dynamic and must be subjected to continual review to ensure that the military planning which depends upon it remains appropriate to the developing circumstances. Once a demobilization programme has been established, however, the consequences of such reviews should result in minor adjustments to numbers rather than radical reappraisals unless, of course, there is a major change in international relationships within the region; such changes would be likely to affect programmes other than those which are essentially military-related and, hence, will probably precipitate policy reviews in other areas as well.
- 10. There are 2 elements to the Threat: capability and intention¹. For example, if a neighbouring state has strong, well equipped and trained Armed Forces but enjoys excellent relationships with the country under consideration, considerable commonality of interest exists between the 2 states and there are no border disputes, the military might of that neighbouring country presents little threat. On the other hand, if the

1 I am grateful to my British Army colleague, Captain Sean Moorhouse, for his assistance with capabilities and intentions.

neighbouring country has small, poorly equipped Armed Forces but there are fundamental policy disagreements, cross-border ethnic tensions and/or long-standing territorial disputes, the threat of a major attack, limited incursions or a counter-insurgency campaign is clearly greater than in the first example. Consideration of capability is naturally a matter in which the military staffs should lead while substantial political advice is necessary when intentions are being assessed; it needs always to be remembered that intentions are effectively limited by capability.

11. It is necessary to carry out a Threat Analysis for each neighbouring country and any other state within the region which might pose a strategic threat. The countries must be considered alone and in the form of potential alliances. It will also be necessary to consider internal elements who may wish to see changes in the constitution, borders or policy of the state. The work must clearly be soundly based in the present but, to have any value, it must make forward projections. It is suggested that for the purposes under consideration the optimal period for review is likely to be in the order of 5 years.

12. **Current Capability.** The assessment of current capabilities is the easiest element of the analysis, despite the fact that many details may be shrouded under a blanket of security. There are published data relating to the armed forces of all states and these may form a useful starting point. Further information will come from observation of a country's military training and ceremonial events and by monitoring the international arms trade to determine what military hardware a country has acquired.

13. **Future Capability.** Projections into the future are clearly more speculative but there will be information available from which inferences may reasonably be drawn. There is a link between perceived intentions and future capability, clearly demonstrating that the political and military aspects of this work are interdependent. The types of indicator which may be used to assess future capability include: the development of a manufacturing base with the potential to produce weapons, the signing of arms deals with other nations and the recruitment of weapons design specialists from more advanced countries.

14. **Current Intentions.** Current intentions may be explicit, such as a publicly announced aim, as in the case of territorial disputes, or they may be more subtle. Intentions are determined by the political leaders of a state but are carried out by the military staff. Purely military indicators which help to determine intentions include the build up of military forces in a particular area or the stockpiling of military materiel. Indicators of a political nature include the deterioration of diplomatic relations between states or the signing of an alliance with a hostile power.

15. **Future Intentions.** As with the assessment of future capabilities, the assessment of future intentions is speculative. Thorough research and an in depth knowledge of the surrounding countries, internally and in regard to the regional situation, is essential in order to produce an assessment of those countries' likely intentions. Given the political nature of intentions, any change of leadership, particularly if it occurs by force, will precipitate a review in this area.

16. **The Threat Document.** From consideration of these aspects of capability and intention, the Threat Document is synthesized. It will contain an assessment of the likelihood of armed aggression (and whether this is likely to be a major or minor incursion), insurrection or civil disorder against the state. It is unlikely that there will be an unequivocal statement of the Threat but, rather, the identification of a spectrum - a low threat best case up to the high threat worst case and, in between, implicitly or explicitly, a most likely worst case.

17. **Need for Regular Review.** The production of such a document involves a considerable amount of skilled and detailed work by many agencies and this needs to continue. It was previously noted that the Threat will change; even in a relatively stable environment, there will be changes of detail and emphasis. The current capabilities and intentions are no more than foundations on which the more important, and much more difficult, future capabilities and intentions are based and, no matter how skillfully the Threat is analyzed, it is unlikely that the Threat Document will be accurate in every detail. These considerations do not invalidate the work but they emphasize the need for regular reviews of the situation. Any fundamental, unforeseen change in the political environment affecting the state will force an immediate Threat Review to consider the new circumstances. While Intelligence staffs should constantly monitor the situation and note relevant information, there should not normally be full reviews more than once each year; even full reviews are unlikely to produce major, unexpected changes from year to year but there will inevitably be changes in detail which will need to be addressed. Ideally, these full reviews will be timed to precede the preparation of the defence element of the national budget by a sufficient amount to allow any changes in the Threat which may be considered sufficiently significant to affect the defence programme to be addressed as part of the budgetary process. It is important that non-defence agencies understand that this process may affect the numbers of soldiers to be demobilized over the planned programme and that this is not because the military planning was faulty; rather that the military decision makers are adapting their plan to meet developing circumstances.

DESIGN OF APPROPRIATE ARMED FORCES TO MEET THE THREAT

SIZE AND SHAPE

18. Once the Threat has been defined, it becomes possible to begin the design of armed forces capable of meeting it. The first step in this design, and all that is necessary for broad budget planning, is the so-called 'size and shape' or structure of the armed forces - size is self-explanatory but shape refers to the division between the branches of the service - navy, army and air force - and within those branches eg, for the army, the proportion which will be infantry, armoured, artillery, military engineers, logistic troops etc (called the capbadge split in many armies²).

19. States may be able to rely, to a greater or lesser extent, upon the support of allies or United Nations protection and this support may reduce the need for armed

2 This is a convenient shorthand, used later in this paper, which derives from those armies in which different arms and services wear distinctive capbadges.

forces of their own. In considering this, it needs to be remembered that alliances may be transient and United Nations protection temporary. The defence of the homeland is both the right and duty of a sovereign state, some would argue that it is the primary responsibility; the Government must be allowed to devote adequate resources to this task.

20. It is not axiomatic that all the forces considered necessary need be fully-mobilized. The Threat Document will identify Warning Periods and it may be possible to mobilize reserve forces (ie civilians with a liability to be called up to full time military service) so that they can be ready where required within the Warning Period. This may also open the way to the employment of formed bodies of troops on non-Defence tasks. It should be noted that systems will be required to activate and deploy the reserve forces, they will be less militarily skilled than full time soldiers (although they may well bring additional skills into the armed forces and may particularly be a source of certain types of specialist), they will require planned training periods and there will be little saving in equipment costs. There are social and other wider matters to be considered (which fall outside the scope of this paper). Clearly, there are many issues to be addressed before this option can be adopted but it can be a valid approach to the provision of adequate defence at minimum cost.

21. It has been noted previously that there may be internal and external threats to security. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the extent to which the military will be involved in internal security matters. There may be political and presentational advantages in placing as much of this task as possible under the police and, hence, outside the defence budget.

22. The armed forces of developing countries tend to assume that defence capability should rely wholly on military personnel. In the developed world, the trend is in the other direction - military personnel are increasingly being used solely for tasks in which military training and experience are necessary, while civilians, employed directly or through a commercial contractor, are used to provide as much support as possible. Military personnel are generally more flexible than civilians but time spent on military activities reduces their productivity if they are engaged in technical activities; They also tend to be more expensive. Of course, in developing countries, there may not be the necessary pool of qualified civilians who could fill all of the posts appropriate for them. Here, too, there may be political and social considerations to take into account when the balance is struck between military and civilian staff.

23. Taking these and other factors into account, and from consideration of the Threat Analysis, it is possible to design armed forces capable of meeting and containing the Threat, together with all their necessary support functions. This is not a precise science and considerable judgement is required but there are a number of yardsticks and military axioms which are available to assist. Two simple examples: if a well equipped, hostile neighbour has strong armoured forces, there will need to be an anti-tank capability; an attack is usually planned on a 3:1 ratio - a defended position occupied by 100 soldiers will need not less than 300 soldiers to seize it and it follows that if a divisional attack (> 10,000 troops) on the country is considered probable, a minimum of a brigade (ca 5,000 troops) will be needed to resist, although qualitative comparisons will also be necessary.

24. It is not necessary in this paper to explain the detail of how the process is carried out, but it will be appreciated that it is inevitably long and detailed, requiring a high level of military expertise and judgement, together with a sound understanding of the forces to which the process is being applied and the personnel and logistic support functions which will be necessary to support those deployed in the field.

25. The development of a size and shape is inevitably an iterative process. It is almost a foregone conclusion that the first attempt will produce a design - probably providing ample capability to deal with at least the realistic worst case - which will far exceed anything which can remotely be afforded and so it will be necessary to apply judgement, compromise and take considered risks. It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply profligacy to be inherent in the military planning process; rather that military staffs are entrusted with substantial responsibilities for the defence of the homeland and, like most other professionals, do not wish to fail; indeed, they recognize that failure on their part would be more drastic than is the case in many other professions. This first, as it were ideal, design is a necessary part of the work as it is only by constant reference back to it that a sensible view can be taken on the compromises and risks necessary and acceptable to bring the design within budgetary reality.

26. Once developed, the size and shape of the armed forces provides a detailed basis on which a wide range of more specific planning can take place, much of which will have wider, social implications as well as affecting the defence budget. In many cases, some preparatory work can be carried out in parallel with the Threat Analysis and structural work but it cannot be finalized until that has been completed. For example:

- a. An operational concept and tactical doctrine - produced in conjunction with the Threat Document to describe how the armed forces will operate in the field.
- b. Detailed organization tables for each unit in the armed forces, listing the number of personnel, by rank, capbadge and qualification, together with the major and minor equipment requirements. These may be different for peace and war, to reflect the use of reserves or the redeployment of troops which may take place on mobilization.
- c. An equipment programme - what equipment is required and in what quantity, including war reserves; phasing of purchase of that which needs to be procured to match budgetary planning; replacement parts, tools, test equipment etc for existing and planned equipments; disposal of surplus equipment etc.
- d. A training programme - individual basic military skills; collective training; functional training to reflect new roles for the armed forces, particularly if those forces have moved from fighting a liberation struggle to keeping the peace; technical and special to arm or equipment training;

e. An accommodation plan - how many troops and their equipment are to be housed, where they would best be located having due regard to likely threats and other considerations, policy on family housing etc.

f. A terms and conditions of service policy - pay and allowances, leave, welfare etc.

g. A manning plan - career patterns, postings, promotion, personal records, indeed, everything relating to an individuals career - the most important document in the demobilization context and thus now examined in more detail.

27. It should, however, first be noted that many of the areas of work are interrelated. The training plan, for example, will need to reflect the manning plan and to feed into the accommodation plan, which will also be affected by the conditions of service policy.

THE MANNING PLAN

28. From a consolidation of the individual unit organization tables, the total military manpower³ requirement is produced, showing the numbers of troops required under each capbadge, by rank and qualification. This becomes one of the foundations of the manning plan. Before declaring this as the size of the armed forces, it will be necessary to consider the need for additional manpower:

a. **Working Margin.** The Working Margin provides a small reserve of manpower which is available to meet new or temporary commitments.

b. **Supernumerary Allowance.** The Supernumerary Allowance provides manpower cover for personnel who, for whatever reason, are not filling established posts. During a handover/takeover period, for example, both the incumbent and his relief are effectively filling one post and there is only the cover for one. Unless some recognition of this is made in the overall manpower plan, effective handovers will only be possible by creating manning gaps elsewhere in the organization. Other situations covered by this allowance include attendance on long courses, long term sickness and travelling time on posting.

3. It may be helpful to explain that, in this paper, manpower and manning have distinctly different meanings:

Manpower Planning relates to personnel in the abstract - how many are required and where they are to be employed, ie size and shape or structural issues.

Manning, on the other hand, relates to the filling of the posts listed in the structure by suitable individuals and their career management as they move through those posts.

29. The total manpower requirement, by capbadge, rank and qualification, is collected together in a Manpower Conspectus, the basic document on which all manning matters are based.

30. In parallel with all of the Threat Analysis and size and shape work, a manning policy should be developed, although it is one of the many policies which cannot be finalized until the processes above have been completed. It is unlikely that the manning policy will be contained in one, simple document; for example: there are likely to be separate policy considerations affecting officers and other ranks; certain specialists may require different treatment from the majority, and so on.

31. A number of considerations arise when the manning policy is being considered. The overall aim of this policy is to ensure that all authorized posts are filled by suitably qualified and experienced personnel, while ensuring that those individuals have a satisfying career in the armed forces, during which their abilities are developed and rewarded, leading to their eventual discharge back into civilian life as useful citizens with skills which will be of value to the community.

THE RECRUITING AND REDUNDANCY APPROACH

32. In the context of this paper, the most important decision to be made is whether, and to what extent, there will be a flow of personnel into the armed forces, through the ranks and back into civilian life; in other words, will positive efforts be made to recruit and train new soldiers, with a compensating redundancy programme (affecting say 5% of the post-demobilization armed forces each year) becoming a feature of the manning policy for a number of years⁴? This will obviously affect the resettlement activities in a necessarily extended programme. While the recruiting and redundancy approach may be more expensive but has a number of social, political and military advantages:

- a. Post-revolutionary armed forces, and particularly armies, tend to consist of predominantly young men, indeed often children, whose education has probably not been completed and who are thus not ideal material for military service. Among those who are not demobilized, there will be little natural retirement on grounds of age; natural opportunities for promotion will not arise, meaning that merit will not be rewarded and individuals will become frustrated. A resentful army is not an ingredient for stability within the country. Alternatively, if promotions are manufactured, the armed forces will become over-ranked and more expensive to no useful purpose, without the individuals gaining the enhanced job satisfaction which should come from filling appointments of greater responsibility on each successive promotion.

4 Although not in the situation covered by the context of this paper, Nigeria has adopted this approach in its current Revitalization Programme. In 1989, the Nigerian Army was some 100,000 strong and, under the programme will reduce to about 60,000 by 1995.

b. The age profile will lead to the armed forces becoming less effective over time. Although the level of military expertise might increase, staleness is a potential problem. More seriously, while there is a place for older men within the armed forces, it is not appropriate for infantry riflemen to be in their late 30s as would happen 15-20 years after the establishment of the armed forces in this context.

c. There will come a time, perhaps some 20 years downstream, when a large proportion of the armed forces will reach retirement age within a short period. Assuming that they will need to be replaced - and if they do not they should previously have been demobilized - this will result in a huge recruiting and training programme. The armed forces will have little or no experience in the management of such activities and there will obviously be considerable turbulence, leading to the formation of essentially new, inexperienced armed forces.

d. Simultaneously with this development, the retiring veterans will all be precipitated onto the job market within a short period. Despite the comments on the aim of the Manning Policy including the return of useful citizens to civilian life, the low level of education of the majority of the veterans will mean that expensive education and resettlement programmes will be necessary, ideally throughout the period of their service but certainly as it nears its end. Even with such programmes, the market may not be able to absorb so many at one time, leading to a potentially destabilizing situation; indeed, a repetition of just the problem which demobilization itself would cause if not carefully managed in the manner described in the literature.

e. The adoption of a recruiting and redundancy policy could, itself, become a destabilizing influence. This disadvantage would be negated if it became clear that those discharged as redundant received the best possible preparation for discharge. This should include remedial education, vocational training and social skills.

f. Having the processes in place will allow the structure of the armed forces to be conveniently and easily adjusted as the work described above is refined and in the event of any significant change in threat.

g. Armed forces should reflect the society which they serve and from which they are drawn, yet in almost all countries they tend to be alienated, or at least set apart, from that society. There are many reasons for this (outside the scope of the paper) but a constant flow of new blood into the armed forces and a steady rate of discharge of personnel into the civilian community would foster greater mutual understanding and prevent the development of the dangerous situation of a military clique or sub-society within society as a whole.

33. Once this basic decision is taken, it becomes possible to complete the development of the manning policy itself. This should lead to the construction of simple mathematical models which will indicate ideal or target age, rank and length of service profiles for the numbers contained in the manpower conspectus.

34. It is typical of liberation armies that administration is at best informal. An essential tool in the administration of the personnel of the armed forces is basic personal documentation and the capture of the necessary data must be achieved as quickly as possible. This will take the form of personal profiles of every soldier, including educational background, previous careers etc, which when collated, will provide much useful management information on which many planning activities can be based.

35. Not only will this provide a basis on which selections for demobilization can be made, the requirement is more fundamental than that. It is only by collecting and collating the data that it will become possible to determine the current size of the armed forces and hence, in due course, how many are to be demobilized. But more immediately, and with significant security implications, it allows for the proper administration of pay (including a reduction in the potential for fraud by paymasters and commanders).

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

36. It is only when all of the work described above has been completed that it becomes possible to start addressing the quantitative aspects of the demobilization policy. The following basic information should have become available:

- a. The number of personnel within the armed forces, together with at least basic personal details about each individual.
- b. The number required for the long term, by capbadge, rank and qualification, with an indication of the target age, rank and length of service profiles.
- c. Hence the number to be demobilized immediately.
- d. An estimate of the numbers to be declared redundant in any follow up programmes, such as long term recruiting and redundancy, and the time scale over which this will take place.

37. It would be facile to pretend that a liberation army, converting into a conventional force, will have the infrastructure and experience necessary to carry out this planning process, and certainly not to do it quickly enough to satisfy the donor countries and organizations which will be wanting to see speedy progress towards demobilization. This gives rise to the following considerations:

- a. The work which needs to be carried out to prepare for demobilization will be necessary to produce the design for appropriate, balanced and properly structured forces to meet the legitimate security concerns of the country. Demobilization considerations may force the pace but many other issues will be resolved through the process.
- b. In reality, even developed nations with much experience of similar processes do not complete them quickly - and they have a corpus of policies

covering all the key areas, rather than having to start ab initio.

c. The provision of suitable advisors will thus be essential. They will necessarily become privy to much information which will rightly be regarded as vital to the security of the state. If they are to be effective, they must be acceptable to and trusted by the government; and the command group and strategic and corporate planning elements of the armed forces. Clearly they will need to be selected with care.

d. The development of the necessary policies will be iterative. It will be necessary to first carry out crude analyses of the various issues - thus allowing some broad estimates to be made - and then refine the policies, leading to more accurate figures of those to be demobilized. This strengthens the case for the adoption of the long term recruiting and redundancy approach discussed above, as its adoption would provide the means of adjusting numbers over the long term if the estimates were found to be wildly inaccurate.

e. The start of demobilization does not, however, need to wait for almost any of this work to be completed. There will be priority cases - individuals who should be discharged regardless of the outcome of the full planning process.

PRIORITY CASES

38. There are 2 obvious categories who demand priority treatment: the disabled and underage soldiers. While all veterans may be regarded as belonging to 'a specially disadvantaged group'⁵ these 2 groups present particular problems and challenges. In addition, veterans' dependents have also been identified as a special/vulnerable group,⁶ but consideration of them falls outside the scope of this paper. In any event, dependents need to be considered at the same time as the heads of their families and they are not, in themselves, priority cases.

39. **Disabled Veterans.** The literature contains much comment on the manner in which disabled veterans might be treated on demobilization and whether they should attract a priority above that of war-disabled civilians. For the purposes of this paper, suffice it to note that these personnel have no long term future within the armed forces, regardless of the overall numbers to be discharged, and it might be beneficial to them to be released ahead of the able-bodied, as soon as they can be supported by appropriate rehabilitation programmes.

40. **Underage Soldiers.** A feature of modern liberation struggles is the youth of many of the combat hardened soldiers - fighters as young as 10 or 12 are not

5. Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel - Case Studies, Chapter VIII, The Case of Uganda, paragraphs 9 and 10. Nat Colletta and Nicole Ball, World Bank; date not shown.

6. World Bank Discussion Paper: Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies. World Bank, October 1993.

uncommon; many of them are actually or effectively orphans and the army has become their family. It is not clear whether any demobilization exercises have addressed the particular needs of underage soldiers but they obviously represent a group which needs to be demobilized quickly so that their education can be resumed, psychological damage can be repaired and they can be taught social skills and attitudes different from the inappropriate ones they may have acquired during their service. If it is not possible to demobilize all of them, special attention must be directed at the needs of those who remain; perhaps some form of partial demobilization in which military activity is combined with a programme of education and vocational training. Given the recent UNICEF initiative on the employment of underage soldiers⁷, donors might be particularly well disposed to fund the necessary programmes for this group as a matter of urgency.

SELECTION FOR DEMOBILIZATION

41. For the balance, it will be necessary to consider which individuals are to be demobilized. On 5 Jun 92 the Ugandan Army Council published the criteria which they had adopted for their demobilization programme:

- a. 'Voluntary resignation is accepted from all officers and men. The Army reserves the right to retain anybody for his or her skills, profession or special talent.
- b. Age as contained in the terms and conditions of service.
- c. Non-citizens.
- d. Services no longer required; this will cover all those who are undisciplined, malingerers, incompetent ones, drug abusers etc.
- e. Local defence units: Those interested in the army must be on active service now and have contributed to counter-insurgency operations for at least one year. They will be screened, like the rest of the army, and taken on provided there is room in the establishment. Those found unfit for health reasons shall be discharged.
- f. There are officers and men seconded to institutions outside the army. Whereas the secondment of officers will continue, they shall however cease to depend on all army resources. Only officers and specialists will be seconded. those affected [who] are interested will report back to the army for screening.'⁸

7. Details not yet to hand.

8 'Army Council Issues Criteria for Reducing Army', Kampala Radio, 5 Jun 92, reproduced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-AFR-91-110, 8 Jun 92, p11.

42. A number of useful points arise from these criteria:

a. In general, any soldier who wishes to be demobilized should be allowed to do so. The armed forces will, however, invariably reserve the right to retain individuals with particular qualifications for which they foresee a need, in order to prevent the depletion of necessary skills, in order to allow the new armed forces to remain effective. Many of the skills likely to be under consideration will be those for which there is a ready market, and high pay, in the commercial sector; it will be necessary to ensure that the terms and conditions of service policy allows for those with such qualifications to be adequately rewarded within the armed forces. In considering the retention of skilled personnel, it may be appropriate to take account of whether the individuals gained their qualifications before or after joining the armed forces.

b. Underage soldiers have previously been considered as priority cases for demobilization. While the age criterion was absolute in the Ugandan demobilization exercise, ie governed by the terms and conditions of service policy, the ideal manning profiles will also tend to indicate groups of personnel who become prime candidates for redundancy on grounds of age.

c. In moving to smaller and, it is hoped, more professional armed forces, there is a natural and proper wish to remove non-effective personnel and the Ugandan criteria indicate the type of individual who has little to offer the armed forces. These and similar groups are easily identified and should be discharged.

d. There may be auxiliary forces associated with the armed forces who will need to be considered; this will clearly depend on circumstances and any roles they perform will need to be considered as part of the size and shape processes. If, however, such forces are to be demobilized, it is unlikely to be acceptable for all their members to be discharged and, anyway, doing so would eliminate a potential source of the good quality personnel required for the new armed forces.

43. It has been previously recommended that disabled veterans should be demobilized as priority cases but a health criterion might also be adopted for non-disabled personnel. The armed forces should have medical minimum standards; these might usefully be reviewed in preparation for the demobilization programme and enforced as a means of improving the overall standard of health of the forces. This will, in due course, lead to significant savings to the defence budget.

44. It is important to consider the extent to which is necessary or desirable to have ethnically mixed or balanced armed forces. This is essentially a political matter and beyond the scope of this paper but guidance must be obtained before any selection for demobilization can take place beyond those who fail to meet specified criteria.

45. Agreed criteria for selection for demobilization form the final requirement for the implementation of the demobilization plan. Certain groups will have been identified for automatic selection but it is unlikely that there will be sufficient volunteers to meet the balance of the total number required to be demobilized; compulsory demobilization

will be required. Although there is some evidence that, even shortly after leaving the armed forces, 'no matter how difficult economic circumstances may [have been], for both men and women, army life [no longer] seems attractive'⁹ it is unrealistic to expect personnel to accept this ante facto. There will need to be an information campaign within the armed forces, stating the facts fairly and honestly, but in such a manner that it does not give rise to alarm or discontent; emphasis must clearly be given to the resettlement package. A published timetable will also be of assistance.

46. It will be necessary for selection boards to be convened to decide which volunteers are to be retained in the armed forces and to select personnel for compulsory demobilization. In the absence of comprehensive records of service, prepared to common standards, it will be difficult to achieve the levels of scrupulous fairness to which the armed forces of developed states would aspire during periods of military retrenchment. Nonetheless, great care should be taken so that the process is as fair as possible and this may be another activity in which the use of external advisors could be beneficial, not least in the presentational aspects of the programme.

MANAGEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION

47. The scope of this paper is effectively bounded by the discharge of personnel from the armed forces, but the management of programmes for the re-integration of veterans into the civilian community is a subject in which the military authorities have a legitimate interest. The literature reviews the available options and concludes that such programmes are best conducted by private organizations and NGOs; further, the military authorities have much else to do and may consider that they would not wish to assume full responsibility for another major task. But the demobilization process is a continuum and it is clear that considerable coordination and cooperation between the military authorities and the organizations (for there will inevitably be more than one) which will carry out the subsequent work is a vital ingredient for success.

48. The coordination and cooperation cannot begin too early. As soon as the need for a demobilization programme is identified, contact should be established between the defence authorities and potential partners so that possibilities can be identified and appropriate research and planning commenced. There will need to be openness and mutual trust on both sides; they share a common aim.

49. Liaison between the authorities and the implementing organizations will need to continue throughout the demobilization process. This will include discussion of major policy issues, such as the timing of demobilization, management of the transition from military to civilian life, the types of vocational training to be offered, finance etc, but there will also be many minor administrative matters which will need close coordination. If the programme is to be a success, it is essential that discussions take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation rather than one of suspicion.

9 Preliminary Report on the Evaluation of the Uganda Veterans' Assistance Programme by the Evaluation Mission of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Kampala, 26 Jul 94, p13.

50. Once the selections for demobilization have been announced, the implementing organizations may need to have access to those concerned, in order to discuss their individual plans and aspirations.

51. If demobilization is to be carried out in phases (and, indeed, the implementing bodies may need to be involved in such decisions), there must be a system of feedback to the military authorities so that problems, which will inevitably arise, can be discussed frankly to identify how they can be avoided in subsequent phases. Information on the successes of the programme should be passed to those still serving to reassure them that life outside the defence forces is not as frightening as they may fear.

INTEGRATION OF PREVIOUSLY WARRING FACTIONS

52. It is perhaps unfortunate that, in the literature relating to demobilization, integration has 2 distinct meanings:

- a. Generally, it refers to the reintegration (which is also used) of ex-military personnel into civilian life.
- b. But it is a feature of post-independence struggles that at least a measure of integration of the previously warring armies takes place. This section of the paper considers this integration.

53. Integration is a powerful symbol of reconciliation and unity of the new state. It may be defined as the creation of military units which contain a balanced mixture of the previously warring factions, subsequent to a process in which all personnel have received training to the same standards and been inculcated with a common ethos of service and loyalty to the new government and the whole community.

54. The principle and scope of integration are essentially political matters (and hence outside the scope of this paper; indeed, topics worthy of a paper of their own) but from the military perspective, integration provides a greater pool of training, experience and expertise from which to draw for the new armed forces.

55. If integration is to take place, it is a joint political/military matter to consider its timing in relation to demobilization. From a narrow military position, it might be argued that it will be a waste of resources to bring people together for military training, only to discharge them shortly afterwards. But there are other aspects which should be considered:

- a. It is clear from this paper that it will take some time before the armed forces will be in a position to declare who is to be demobilized and, probably before it will be possible to deliver resettlement packages. Integration should involve confidence building measures between the various factions and, if the programme is successful, it would be beneficial for some of those who passed through it to take that experience into the civilian community.

b. In the meantime, the integration programme provides a constructive activity in which the larger than now required armed forces can engage and gain a sense of purpose different from those previously held by the different factions. Even if one faction can be seen as having won, it is likely that there will need to be a change of ethos; from liberation army to servants of the new state, its community and, indeed, the country.

c. If one faction can be seen as having won, there will also be a losing side. Many fighters on that side will feel a greater loyalty to their country than to any particular cause and will wish to continue to serve that country in some way. Willing participation in the integration process provides them with an opportunity to demonstrate this, so that they may make a new beginning, whether their eventual post-war career is to be in the armed forces or not.

d. Government will not want the factions to remain apart any longer than necessary, particularly if they remain armed; the political imperative may therefore be to press on with integration so that one, unified defence force is created as quickly as possible.

e. The process of integration may allow better informed selection of individuals for demobilization as training to common standards allows more valid comparisons to be made. Appropriate assessment procedures must be included in the integration training package but this must not be taken to the extent that those passing through the programme come to believe that their performance during that period is the sole, or even main, determinant of their future. It will also be necessary to ensure that the assessments are fair and undertaken by a team in which all factions are represented.

56. It is considered that if the programme for the integration of previously warring factions is well designed and properly conducted, the balance of advantage lies in taking it forward independently of demobilization. This is not to imply that there is not a need for close coordination between the 2 programmes.

CONCLUSIONS

57. While economic and social benefits may result from a demobilization programme, the need for such a programme is primarily driven by military considerations. In the context of this paper, the Threat will normally have reduced and hence armed forces can be reduced commensurately.

58. Before it is possible to produce a definitive figure of personnel to be demobilized, the size and shape of the armed forces of the future need to be defined. This is a complex process and external, independent advisors may need to be provided. But the decision-making responsibility rests with the government as the final structure will be a compromise between perceived defence needs and budgetary reality.

59. In parallel with the design of the structure of the armed forces, a wide range of other policy matters will need to be addressed, although it is unlikely that this work can be concluded before an outline structure is developed. One of these is a manning plan, leading to the identification of target age, rank and length of service profiles for each capbadge within the defence forces.
60. A key decision to be made is whether planned redundancy will become a long term feature of military life.
61. It is important that formal personal documentation of all military personnel is introduced at the earliest opportunity. Inter alia, this will accurately identify the size of the defence forces.
62. Based upon the defined size and shape, it becomes possible to identify the future manpower requirement and, hence, the size of the demobilization programme.
63. Clear, well publicized criteria must be developed for the selection of those to be demobilized. The selection process must be as fair as possible, particularly if ethnic considerations are involved.
64. Fair and honest publicity will alleviate many of the worries felt by those vulnerable for selection for demobilization.
65. If the social aspects of demobilization are to be achieved, it is essential that a close, cooperative relationship is established between the military authorities and any outside organizations who will take on the work of reintegrating veterans into the community. Fundamentally, both sides share a commonality of interest.
66. Two particular groups, disabled veterans and underage soldiers, should be demobilized as soon as the necessary programmes can be put in place.
67. If there is to be an integration of formerly warring factions, this may better take place before demobilization. However integration is conducted, it must be carefully coordinated with the demobilization programme.
68. Demobilization programmes serve many interests and their success may be vital for the future well being of the country. It is essential that they are properly planned and conducted. Much military planning must take place before a programme can begin.

UN Peace-keeping Handbook
for Junior Ranks



NAME:

UNIT:

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING HANDBOOK FOR JUNIOR RANKS:

The second draft of the United Nations Peace-keeping Handbook for Junior Ranks is prepared by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations Training Unit. The present edition is issued in connection with the United Nations Regional Peace-keeping Training Workshops.

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PREFACE

United Nations Peace-keeping is growing in importance. In recent years there have been more Peace-keeping Operations than ever before and the range of tasks has increased enormously. Peace-keeping is no longer a military concern; it also has become a civilian and a police activity. Moreover, the number of personnel and contributing countries in Peace-keeping Operations has expanded.

This increase in numbers and complexity makes the **training and preparation for future peace-keepers** at all ranks more important. Since you, as a peace-keeping soldier, will work with a great number of military and civilian personnel of diverse nationalities, it is important that you share the same training background and that you understand the rules and the guidelines of the United Nations. Therefore, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations Training Unit has developed this handbook for junior ranks. The Handbook is intended for use by peace-keepers earmarked for a mission who will be actively involved at the ground level of peace-keeping.

In this handbook, you will find information about the United Nations and its rules and guidelines. The handbook will give you general guidance about how to behave as a peace-keeping soldier. It will inform you concerning the difficulties you might experience in another culture, and how to deal with them. You will find information about patrolling, observing and reporting - major responsibilities of a peace-keeping mission. It will also tell you how to deal with difficult and unusual military situations in general, such as hijacking.

A-W-A-R-E-N-E-S-S is the keyword. This handbook will not tell you what to do in every situation you might encounter, but it will provide you with a framework for your behaviour in general. It will be an addition to the training you receive in your own country. Please read and study all the information carefully and thoroughly and ask your instructors for further information. This book is not meant to supplement military handbooks and sometimes provides a training checklist only.


Remember, there is nothing better than practical exercises and the experience of your instructors. This handbook does not relieve the home nation of its responsibility to train its personnel to the standard deemed necessary by the UN.

The Department of Peace-keeping Operations hopes that you will find the handbook useful and readable. We received many comments by ongoing UN Peace-keeping Operations and National and Regional Peace-keeping Training Institutes, which we implemented in the 2nd draft.

If you have any comments or additional questions, do not hesitate to contact us or your superiors.

We hope that this handbook will help you to become a solid part of the legion of 'Blue Helmets' that have helped to keep and promote the peace in many regions of the world.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.



Contents

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

SECTIONS		Page
1	MANUAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS	4
2	TRAINING AND INFORMATION STRUCTURES	5

CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND TO UN PEACE-KEEPING

SECTIONS		
1	THE UN CHARTER	7
2	PEACE - KEEPING PRINCIPLES	11
3	COMPOSITION OF PKOs	12
4	PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES	15
5	HUMAN RIGHTS	17

CHAPTER 3 CODE OF CONDUCT

SECTIONS		
1	INTRODUCTION	19
2	GUIDING PRINCIPLES	20
3	CULTURAL AWARENESS	22
4	HABIT	24

	DO'S AND DON'TS	

CHAPTER 4
GENERAL SKILLS

SECTIONS		Page
1	EQUIPMENT AND WEAPON	27
2	MINE AWARENESS	28
3	FIRST AID, HEALTH, HYGIENE AND SANITATION	29
4	MAP READING	29
5	BCW PROTECTION	30
6	FIRE PREVENTION/FIGHTING TECHNIQUES	30
7	SECURITY	31
8	GENERAL SURVIVAL SKILLS	35
9	MEDIA	36
10	COMMUNICATION AND VOICE PROCEDURE	37

and Middle Pages

CHAPTER 5
UN OPERATIONAL SUBJECTS

SECTIONS		Page
1	INTRODUCTION	38
2	OBSERVATION POSTS AND POSITIONS	39
3	CHECKPOINTS	42
4	PATROLS	46
5	ESCORTS	48
6	DE-ESCALATION DEPLOYMENT	51
7	REPORTS	53
8	USE OF FORCE/ RULES OF ENGAGEMENT	54

CHAPTER 6
PERSONAL AFFAIRS

SECTIONS		Page
1	LEAVE AND OFF DUTY	59
2	PAY AND ALLOWANCES	60
3	POSTAL SYSTEM	60
4	RECREATION, WELFARE AND PX FACILITIES	61

CHAPTER 7
MANDATE AND TASK

SECTIONS		Page
1	MANDATE OF YOUR MISSION	62
2	YOUR TASK - YOUR BRIEFING	63
3	YOUR AWARD - OUR PRIDE	64
4	YOUR TROUBLES - OUR CONCERN	65
5	SPECIFIC DRIVING REGULATIONS	66

CHAPTER 8
MISCELLANEOUS

SECTIONS		Page
1	UN-ABBREVIATIONS	67
2	IMPORTANT MILITARY SYMBOLS	70
3	CALL- SIGNS, TELEPHONE NUMBERS, ADDRESSES	77
4	YOUR PHYSICAL RECORD	78
5	RULES OF FOOD PREPARATION	79

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The purpose for this basic information manual is to set forth and describe the requirements for junior ranks assigned to UN Peace-keeping Operations.

As the requisite knowledge and experience for Peace-keeping is continually changing, this manual should be viewed as a flexible and expandable "peace-keeper's handbook".

SECTION 1 MANUAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Focus:

- civilian junior ranks, private soldiers and junior NCOs
- peace-keeping only
- standardisation, simplicity, overall relevance/ applicability
- no substitute for military or other special manual

Intention:

- easy to read and translate
- international

SECTION 2 TRAINING AND INFORMATION STRUCTURES

This section will discuss:

- The types of preparation
- The sources of information
- The subjects to be offered

Types and sources of preparation:

- Specific preparation for UN Peace-keeping
Topic of this manual and the pre-mission training program
- Personal preparation
Prepare checklists, questions
- Training in the mission area
Your commander's responsibility
- Personal familiarisation and share of experience
Open your eyes and ears and do not hesitate to ask your team-mates
- Information about national characteristics
You get a briefing by your national trainers and commanders
- Information about particulars of the individual mission
You get a briefing by your trainers and commanders
- Additional recommended reading and teaching material :
 - *The UN Charter
 - *Guidelines for UN Peace-keeping
 - *Extracts of Standing Operating Procedures
 - *UN Peace-keeping Training Manual (UN HQ DPKO)
 - *Extracts of the basic rules of the Geneva Conventions, Law of War and Human Rights
 - *First aid manuals , military manuals (weapon, equipment, map reading, BCW, MAT, fire fighting, shelter construction and maintenance, driving, weapon and equipment recognition) and geographic publications of the mission area.

MY UN TRAINING (Mark when done):

• Phase 1 Basic Preparation and UN Training

- ☐ Selection and concentration of personnel
- ☐ Personal administration
- ☐ Kitting and medical documentation
- ☐ Background of UN Peace-keeping
- ☐ Code of conduct

• Phase 2 General Skills and Safety Training

- ☐ Initial physical / weapon skill tests ¹
- ☐ General weapon /equipment training ¹
- ☐ First Aid
- ☐ Hygiene and sanitation
- ☐ Map reading
- ☐ Biological/chemical warfare (BCW) training
- ☐ Physical training
- ☐ Basic mine awareness training (MAT1)
- ☐ Fire-fighting and protection techniques
- ☐ Field routine, daily life
- ☐ Shelters and other fortifications
- ☐ Driving skills, automotive maintenance

• Phase 3 UN Operational Training

- ☐ Use of force, Rules of Engagement (ROE)
- ☐ Observation and establishment of OPs, Posn, CP
- ☐ Patrols
- ☐ Escorts
- ☐ De-escalation techniques
- ☐ Reports
- ☐ UN communications and voice procedure
- ☐ Weapons and equipment identification¹
- ☐ In theatre mine awareness training (MAT2)

¹ In the case of the civilian component this training would be replaced by other refresher courses.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND TO UN PEACE-KEEPING

SECTION 1 THE UN CHARTER

This section will discuss:

- The text of the preamble of the UN Charter
- The aim, means, main bodies of the organization
- The definitions of the various efforts to establish peace

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED

*to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,*

AND FOR THESE ENDS

*to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,*

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH
THESE AIMS

....and do hereby establish an international organisation to be known as
the United Nations.

UN Peace-keeping Handbook for Junior Ranks

The United Nations was:

- founded in San Francisco, 26 June 1945, when the UN Charter was drawn up by the representatives of 50 countries and officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified.
- established in the wake of the second world war
- and its predecessor organisation was the League of Nations (1920).

Some of the aims of the UN Charter related to peace-keeping are:

- to unify the Member States for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security
- to prevent threats to international peace and security
- to deter acts of aggression


The means of achieving the aims of the Charter are:

- negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation
- actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression

The main bodies for achieving these aims are¹:

- **The General Assembly** (Main deliberative organ)
Composed of representatives of all the Member States of the UN, each of which has one vote. Decisions on important questions, such as recommendations on peace and security, admission of new Members and budgetary matters require a two-thirds majority.
- **The Security Council**
Composed of
5 permanent members (China, France, Russia, UK, USA)
10 non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly for 2 years. The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
- **The Secretariat**
Services the other organs of the UN and administers the programmes and policies and is headed by the Secretary-General.

¹ Recommended to read: "Basic Facts about the UN"



DEFINITIONS:

"Preventive Diplomacy":

is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

"Peace-making":

is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

"Peace-building":

is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

"Peace-enforcement":

May be necessary when peaceful means fail. It consists of action described in Chapter VII of the Charter and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

"Peace-keeping":

is a United Nations presence in the field (usually involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.

Peace-keeping is thus based on two provisions in the UN Charter:

- **Chapter VII, Article 40**

The Security Council may "call on the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the parties concerned".

- **Chapter V, Article 29**

"The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for their performance of its functions".

SECTION 2 PEACE-KEEPING PRINCIPLES

This section will discuss:

- The principles which should apply for all Peace-keeping Operations
- The conditions of establishment for PKOs
- The legal basis of PKOs

Principles of PKO :

- International legitimacy
- International political support
- Consent, resulting in co-operation of the parties and freedom of movement in the area of operation
- Persuasion and construction
- Impartiality
- Transparency
- Co-ordination
- Liaison
- Use of force to the minimum extent possible
(further explanation is given in the Guidelines for PK, UN HQ DPKO)

Peace-keeping - what is needed ?

- **Resolution** (decision) of the Security Council
- **Consent of the parties** to accept troops on their territories
- **Consent of states** not involved in the conflict to **contribute troops**

UN-PKOs/Legal Basis

- **Mandate**
Resolution of the Security Council (or General Assembly) stating the mission in general terms
- **Terms of Reference**
Directive to the Force Commander from the Secretary-General
- **Status of Force / Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA)***
Treaty between the UN and the host countries/parties :
co-operation
freedom of movement
immunity of UN-territory
- **Participating State Agreement (PSA)***
Treaty between the UN and the troop-contributing countries
*(In fact SOFA/SOMA, PSA often do not exist in PKOs !)

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SECTION 3 COMPOSITION OF PKOs

This section will discuss:

- The components of PKOs, their functions and tasks
- The command in the field

<u>Component</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Effort</u>
Civilian Administration	UN administration (beyond national admin.)	
Military	Security, de-escalation	Peace-keeping
Police	Public security (law etc.)	Peace-keeping
Electoral	Elections, polling	Peace-building
Humanitarian	Human Rights and aid	Peace-building
Diplomatic/Political	Conflict settlement	Peace-making

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION COMPONENT

- Headed by the Chief Administrative Officer
- UN employees and local recruited staff
- Managerial, administrative and clerical support
- Supply support, procurement and re-supply
- Food services
- Transportation
- Maintenance of vehicles and equipment
- Field construction engineering and technical services
- Aviation and air services
- Signals and communications
- Personnel administration and services
- Security services
- Budgeting and financial services
- Health services
- Postal and courier services
- Staff assistance

MILITARY COMPONENT :

Forces

Normally battalion size units (officers, NCOs and men):

- Armed (though under strict constraints)
- Organised in military style under a Force Commander
- Provide a large number of small armed detachments for manning positions, observation posts, check points, patrols, escorts

Observers

Group of officers:

- Unarmed
- Organised in groups/teams
- Under a Chief Military Observer
- Conduct fact-finding, supervision of agreements, borders, cease-fire lines, liaison, negotiation

CIVILIAN POLICE COMPONENT

Organised in groups/teams, under a Police Commissioner:

- Ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially
- Ensure that human rights and criminal justice standards are fully respected
- Monitor law enforcement activities of local officials
- Supervise or control the local civil police
- Carry out general police duties, such as investigation of incidents
- Provide security for UN personnel
- Supervise the return of refugees and POWs
- Supervise the demobilisation of local police forces
- Assist in registration and election procedures
- Assist in the (re-)training of local police forces

ELECTORAL MONITOR COMPONENT

Small groups of civilians:

- Monitor the process of elections
- Verify for the international community that the election is free and fair

HUMANITARIAN AID COMPONENT

Small groups of civilians

(UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP and Non Governmental Organisations):

- Food distribution
- Medical and shelter supply
- Other necessities for living
- Development projects

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR COMPONENT

Small groups of civilians:

- Investigate and follow up incidents of violation of human rights

DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL COMPONENT

Representatives, mediators:

- Ongoing diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict

Command in the field, discipline

- To be exercised by the Special Representative and /or the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer
- Responsible to the Secretary General ultimately
- Full command authority over the operation, except for disciplinary questions (see below)
- Internationally staffed HQ
- Good order and discipline is Commander's responsibility
- Right to carry out investigations, inquiries, make reports and hold consultations
- Disciplinary action is responsibility of respective national contingents

SECTION 4 PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES

This section will discuss:

- UN Peace-keeping Activities and some examples

Typical UN PK Activities that have proven effective for similar operations include (but are not limited to) :


- **Separation of Forces** (Interposition with the agreement of the parties)
- **Policing of Agreements**
- **Supervision of Withdrawal**



in order to :

- ☐ check that all parties are conforming to the terms agreed
- ☐ monitor the agreed cease-fire,
- ☐ create Buffer Zones (BZ), such as Area of Separations (AOS), Demilitarised Zones (DMZ), Protected Areas (UNPA) or other Monitoring Zones;
- ☐ monitor the agreement on the parties' forward defence position and/or
- ☐ restriction on numbers of troops and restriction on number of armaments, etc.;

Normally PKOs will combine two or more activities specified within the Security Council Resolution - and subsequently referred to as the Mandate.

EXAMPLES (schematic):





SECTION 5 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

This section will discuss:

- Selections from articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relevant to PKOs

*Article 1 All human beings are born **free and equal** in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.*

*Article 2 Everyone is entitled to all the **rights and freedoms** .. **without distinction** of any kind, race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction.. on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs,...*

*Article 3 Everyone has the **right to life, liberty and security** of person.*

*Article 4 No one shall be held in **slavery or servitude**.*

*Article 5 No one shall be subjected to **torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment**.*

*Article 6 Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a **person before the law**.*

*Article 7 All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to **equal protection of the law**...*

*Article 8 Everyone has the right of an **effective remedy** by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.*

*Article 9 No one shall be subjected to **arbitrary arrest, detention or exile**.*

UN Peace-keeping Handbook for Junior Ranks

Article 13 Everyone has the **right to freedom of movement and residence** within the borders of each state....**to leave** any country, including his own .and **to return** to his country.

Article 14 Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries **asylum from persecution**.

Article 17 Everyone has the **right to own property**...
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property

Article 18 ...right to **freedom of thought**, conscience and religion...

Article 19 ...right to **freedom of opinion and expression**.. to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20 ...right to **freedom of peaceful assembly and association**
No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21 right to **take part in the government** of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
...right of **equal access to public service**..
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government... expressed in **periodic and genuine elections**... **universal and equal suffrage**...**secret vote** or equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22 ...right to **social security**...**free development** of his **personality**

Article 23 ...right to **work, to free choice of employment**, to just and **favourable conditions** of work and to protection against unemployment.
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to **equal pay for equal work**...

As these excerpts are fragmentary, discuss with your superiors/instructors how much of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" one should have memorised prior to mission deployment.

CHAPTER 3 CODE OF CONDUCT

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

Following sections will discuss:

- The correct behaviour and conduct required as a UN Peace-keeper.
 - ☐ Good behaviour and self-discipline are your security.
 - ☐ A peace-keeper is on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
 - ☐ Your behaviour and speech will be closely observed.
 - ☐ You are an ambassador of UN and your nation.
 - ☐ Your behaviour will reflect upon the UN organisation as a whole.

UN-Soldier

While the professional soldier has been trained to fight for objectives and to meet force with forces, the attitude and approach required of a **Peace-keeping soldier** deserves **special clarification**.

UN soldiers do **not** come **as occupying forces but as third-parties** to a conflict. United Nations Peace-keeping missions are **political, rather than military operations**, however most often carried out by military personnel.

- **Flexibility, patience, and sensitivity** in your daily dealings will count more than combat training in determining the success or failure of a mission.
- A peace-keeper's strongest **weapon is not the rifle** but rather the **art of mediation and negotiation**.
- Even though these activities are usually the concern of diplomats and politicians, situations often arise spontaneously when the peace-keepers will need to play the role of diplomats:
Settling disputes, bringing opposing parties together, calming tempers, observing and reporting-these are the activities a soldier is most likely to participate in, rather than a military action.
- It is more often at the young platoon officer's level, rather than at the level of top command, that crisis situations are held in check, are resolved and, **an escalation of conflict may be avoided**.

(The necessary mind set applies to civilian peace-keepers as well).

UN Peace-keeping Handbook for Junior Ranks

THE OATH OF OFFICE

"I solemnly swear to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other authority external to the Organisation."

SECTION 2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES

- Impartiality
- Integrity
- Loyalty
- Independence
- Subordination of private or national affiliations and interests to the UN organisation.

Adherence to such principles will help to ensure the credibility and moral authority of the UN, which may be your only defence if caught in the crossfire of warring factions.

Impartiality

The credibility of the UN is based upon its assurance of impartiality. Therefore:

- As the third party, be impartial and fair and do not favour to one party over the other:
- "Act as a bridge planted firmly on both sides over which the parties to the dispute may walk across to talk to each other".

- Be aware that building a lasting peace is a slow, painstaking process: Be patient and diplomatic. Subordinate your feelings in order to achieve desired results. Project a cool, rational and trustworthy demeanour. Never react emotionally or violently to one or another party in a conflict.
- Never miss an opportunity for mediation and dialogue. Be aware of the fact that you are in a former war zone, where disputes over political aims, territory, religious and ethnic differences have existed for years. Although a UN soldier is familiar with the language of guns, his responsibility is to set example through the use of language and understanding.

Integrity

- Pursue the ideals of the UN organisation and devote yourself fully to the work of the UN.
- Expect and accept special constraints in public and private life.
- Avoid activities which by their very nature reflect poorly on the dignity of your position or the Organisation.
- Refrain from accepting any gifts, honours, favours or remuneration from sources outside the UN.
- Meet rents, bills and all other obligations before the end of your tour of duty.
- Always abide by the laws and police regulations of the host state.

Loyalty

- Be loyal to the goals of the UN.
- Try to understand and be tolerant of different points of view, cultural patterns and work habits both within and outside the UN.
- Work with all persons without prejudice or bias toward any nationality, religion, culture or political persuasion.
- Exercise restraint at all times in the expression of personal views.

Independence

- Do not seek or accept instructions from any government or from any authority other than the UN.
- Refrain from all political activity.

SECTION 3 CULTURAL AWARENESS

- You will experience a certain degree of culture shock upon arrival in the mission area
- You will be confronted with new geographical and cultural circumstances, changes in climate and food and may experience problems of communication with the local population
- You will require flexibility and adaptability to new situations; your receptivity and tolerance will be challenged.
- Recognise that all cultures are to be viewed from the standpoint of equality
- Reject stereotypes and consider to the meaning or intent behind culturally diverse practices and beliefs.
- Rules of etiquette vary widely from one culture to another, so that what may be acceptable or even polite behaviour in one cultural context might appear offensive or deviant in another.
- Social rules governing relations between men and women often have very different norms from one culture to the next, so that what may be interpreted as innocent behaviour in one cultural context may be taken as an offence against the accepted mores in another.
- Learn about the customs, religious beliefs, history and mythology, and practices governing work, family and gender relations in the mission area.
- Try to minimise personal disapproval, disagreement, disappointment, anxiety or irritation so that such feelings do not prevent you from maintaining friendly and co-operative relationships with the people among whom you carry out your daily duties.
- Acknowledge the fact that you are the "stranger" in a foreign country in which you are considered a "guest"

A number of variables will affect the response of the host population to your presence in their country:

- Have they been informed of the UN mandate and what the United Nations operation means for their country?
- What has been their experience with foreign intervention in the past?
- What expectations -- positive or negative -- do they have from the UN presence in their country?

Therefore:

- Do not assume the host population will view your arrival positively or will always exercise tact, courtesy and restraint.
- Work toward winning the trust and respect of all parties to the dispute in question and reinforcing the credibility of the UN presence in their country.

One matter of extreme sensitivity is the frequent disparity of wealth between UN personnel and the inhabitants of mission areas, who often live in conditions of dire poverty.

Relation Among National Contingents

Very often you'll hear whispers: "The ... do this, -...always do that...,- what else did you expect from a ..., - that's typical of the .."

- Do not generalise.
- Do not "label" others.
- Do not display xenophobic attitudes.
- Do not display a sense of superiority in respect to your own status, social system or way of life.
- Do not speak disparagingly of the politics of others.
- Do not display envy toward others because you think they are in a better situation.
- Remember - you are there to get the job done, not to enjoy life.

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SECTION 4 HABIT

Timely and precise conduct

- Be punctual
- Be mentally prepared to start your daily work
- Be aware that you sometimes need to give "120 % and more" particularly in life-threatening situations.

Neat appearance

- Although you are at times living in the field where accommodations are not up to the same standards to which you are accustomed, this is not an invitation to allow your appearance to become shabby.

Good manners

- Good manners can help to accomplish results which otherwise could not have been achieved. This is particularly important when dealing with the representatives of the local authorities. Much will depend on how you present yourself.

Sense of humour

- Try to maintain a sense of humour without allowing room for misunderstandings. Never make light of people who are excited or angry. This could cause them to lose face, thereby creating a potentially explosive situation.

Use of alcohol

- Use of alcohol must be restricted to off-duty periods and you are strongly advised to limit your consumption while off-duty.
- Stay away from drugs!

Personal aspects

- Peace-keeping tours should not be viewed as a means for escaping from one's problems at home.
- Discuss problems with your superiors. They are there to counsel.
- Be mindful of the fact that you will be away from your family and friends for an extended period and try to enlist the support of your family and friends during this time.
- You should be advised that during your tour of duty, you are likely to encounter:
 - ☐ personal threats
 - ☐ monotony
 - ☐ lack of privacy
 - ☐ the strain of strict discipline
 - ☐ unpleasant climate and environment.

Gender issues

- Be aware of the Human Rights of women and children and never violate them.
- Behave in a way that you do not exacerbate violence of the Human Rights of women and children in the host country.
- Be forewarned of facing long sexual abstinence.
- Do not involve yourself in any sexual relationship which may create long-lasting complications for you and others.
- Do not involve yourself in any sexual affair with any member of the local population. This may have the effect of jeopardising your personal integrity as well as the honour of your unit.
- Do not view fellow UN personnel or members of the local population as objects to be trifled with. In both cases this could have serious consequences for your career.
- Be aware of sexually transmitted diseases (e.g. AIDS)

Every member of a Peace-keeping operation or field mission is expected to understand and follow the principles outlined in the Code of Conduct.

SECTION 2 MINE AWARENESS

This section will discuss:

- What you should be told and trained before deployment in regard to mine recognition and immediate action drill
- q Are you able to recognise a mine and other explosive devices ?
- q Have you been instructed in the different types of mines, how they function and how they are generally employed in the mission area?
- q Have you received general instructions in safety measures with regard to mines?

Here is some advice as what to do when confronted with this problem:

Immediate Action Drill:

WARN - REPORT - LOCATE - MARK - AVOID

In areas which may be mined:

- ☐ Do not enter any area or route if you are not positive that it is clear of mines or unexploded device!
- ☐ Move with eyes open!
- ☐ Avoid handling or approach of any suspicious object!
- ☐ Be on guard for constant changes in local techniques!
- ☐ Do not move over any terrain before searching!
- ☐ Try to remain on hard standing!
- ☐ If you suspect a mine, put in an EOD call for engineers!

Casualty Immediate Action Drill (with no engineer support):

LOOK - FEEL - PROCEED

- ☐ One person clears the route to the casualty.
- ☐ Clear the area immediately around the casualty.
- ☐ Administer a minimum of first aid.
- ☐ Drag casualty down cleared route to a safe area.
- ☐ Carry out full first aid.
- ☐ Evacuate casualty as soon as possible.
- ☐ Remember that mistake may kill you or your comrades.
- ☐ Be most careful when suffering from fatigue.
- ☐ Never pull a slack wire or cut any taut or slack wire.
- ☐ Examine both ends of any wire before touching it.

SECTION 3 FIRST AID, HEALTH, HYGIENE, SANITATION

This section will discuss:

- What you should be told and trained before deployment regarding first aid, health, hygiene and sanitation.
- The principles of first aid
- Use and application of field dressings on wounds
- Use of slings, knots and tourniquets
- Haemorrhage control
- Treatment for shock, fainting
- Treatment of fractures
- Treatment for poison
- Artificial respiration
- Personal hygiene and sanitation
- Food and water hygiene
- Prevention and treatment of heat stroke
- Recognition of stress in yourself and others
- Sexually transmitted diseases

SECTION 4 MAP READING

This chapter will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding map reading and navigation.
- q Have you been adequately instructed in the use of maps and compass ?
- q Do you know how to locate terrain features, places and sites by using grid systems ?
- q Do you know how to log them ?
- q Are you comfortable using binoculars, range card and other means of estimating distance?
- q Do you know how to distinguish terrain features ?
- q Do you know how to report located features ?
- q Are you able to give a briefing on the ground ?

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SECTION 5 BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE (BCW) PROTECTION

This chapter you will learn about:

- What you must know before deployment regarding BCW Protection
- The general characteristics of chemicals and biological agents
- The symptoms of toxination
- The precautions you must take
- The use of protective clothing and monitoring equipment

SECTION 6 FIRE PREVENTION / FIGHTING TECHNIQUES

This chapter will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding fire prevention and fighting techniques.

Do you know:

- ☐ How to prevent fires while using stove, heater, burning garbage
- ☐ How to handle the various types of flammable POL, their flash point and danger classification
- ☐ How to use fire fighting equipment and extinguisher
- ☐ How to issue warnings and reports in case of fire



SECTION 7 SECURITY AND RELATED SUBJECTS

This chapter will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding both your security and protection and that of the unit.

Range of Security:

- Personal Awareness (suspicious activities and out-of-place objects)
- Configuration of your position and bunker
- Condition of line/radio equipment
- Condition of your weapon and equipment
- Being armed in accordance with your appointment
- Wearing fragmentation jackets and helmets when exposed
- Restricted movement in location and minimum number
- Possession of BCW protection or other special equipment in times of assessed risk
- Definition of places and locations which are out of bounds
- Limitation and operational precautions, e.g. access to information, escorts, radio movement control
- Avoiding a "fall-asleep-routine"

General Protection Measures :

Neutrality:

A display of neutrality contributes to you own protection, as well as to the protection of the force.

It further ensures that you do not become a target of needless hostility.

Restraint of curiosity:

Photography may become a point of concern as well as friction.

Do not photograph military installations, equipment and personnel or any other sensitive area or object. Once deployed to the mission area you will receive further briefing on this matter.

Weapons

Unofficial armed groups are continually on the lookout for carelessly guarded weapons. Be careful with your weapon.

Never allow it out of your hands.

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Sites and accommodation

A force must always remain alert to the possibility of attack by extremist fringe groups.

Personnel

Exercise extreme caution when discussing contingent matters and, in particular, when handling documents in the presence of local staff and non-UN Personnel.


Expect the unexpected!**UN ID CARDS:**

You are requested to carry your ID cards at all times to ensure the accurate identification of individuals as a member of the UN PKO.

Presentation:

You must show your ID card whenever requested by:

- any local authority acting within the scope of official duties;
- any member of the PKO performing guard or police duty;
- any member of the PKO senior in rank to the ID card holder.

Do not lose your ID card.**Under FIRE:****First reaction:**

- Take immediate cover (DRILL!); employ smoke; protect wounded; identify location of originator; REPORT;
- Make clear, if possible that you are a member of UN;
- Shout clearly in English as well in local language "*United Nations-do not shoot at me*";

If possible:

- Wave the UN flag, try to negotiate.

Last means:

- Respond according ROE.

Hijack: (General)

Events have demonstrated that UN personnel are potential targets. It is imperative that immediate action can be taken by the PKO in case of hijack.

Initial alert:

- Reaction can only be efficient if it is initiated by a timely and accurate alert, if possible passed by the potential victim -if the situation allows- or by a witness to the incident. This message and subsequent traffic pertaining to it will be given absolute priority by operations.

The following is the hijack message text:

"HIJACK"

"HIJACK"

"HIJACK"

- Incident location: An Approximate Map Reference (AMR) is the most useful indicator but this may not always be possible.
- Other simple indicators may be utilised (e.g.km N/S/W/E of UN Posn, road junction, village etc.)

Information on hijackers:

If available, details such as number of hijackers; vehicle colour/make/registration number; description of hijackers, if armed etc.; direction of flight etc.

Example: "All stations, this is, Hijack! Hijack! Hijack!"

At 1100Z one xxx soldier at xxx taken by 4 armed elements in a brown Mercedes toward xxxx....."

Precautions:

- Never carry too much money or any other values with you so that you easily become attractive for hijacker.
- Avoid any political behaviour or speech which could turn you in a potential target. Never pretend to be any kind of expert who could be useful for extreme political factions.

Behaviour when hijacked:

When facing a hijacking situation:

- Stay calm, do not provoke, try to negotiate;
- Do whatever you are forced to do;
- Watch your body language, move slowly, try to calm down the situation;
- Appear to be innocent, don't try to save anything but your life;
- Never try to hide items, to swindle, to throw away the key of the car or to obliterate any property.

Detainment:

There is no reason to conceal anything, make clear that you are a member of UN and your duty is a peaceful one.

Explain the mandate of your mission and that it has the support of all Member States of UN and the consent of all parties of the conflict in question.

- Do not hide who you are or fear any punishment because of saying something you were forced to.
- Under these circumstances your first task is to survive!
- Try to find out the reason of your detainment and act accordingly.
- Be aware that everything possible will be done by UN to save your life.
- Do not provoke your "detainers" and try to find out what their interests in you are.
- Never do anything what could lead to de-evaluation of the fact that you are a UN-member.
- Avoid any resistance which could be misinterpreted by your "detainers". They know how to break resistance and to find out what they want.
- Trust in the efforts of UN and all other nations involved to achieve your release.
- Fight your fear and try to improve your misery.
- Try to stay as healthy as possible.

SECTION 8 GENERAL SURVIVAL SKILLS

This section will discuss:

- The key points and principles of survival.

General: Finding yourself isolated without any support by your unit, in a desolate area, or in hostile hands, can be eased or even avoided if you remember that the key word is S-U-R-V-I-V-A-L:

- S Size up the situation** by considering yourself, the country and possible hostilities.
- U Undue haste makes waste.**
 - Don't be too eager to move.
 - Don't lose your temper.
 - Face the facts--danger exists.
- R Remember where you are.**
- V Vanquish fear and panic.**
 - To feel fear is normal.
 - When you are injured, it is difficult to control fear.
 - Panic can be caused by loneliness.
 - Planning your escape will help keep your mind busy.
- I Improving.**
 - You can always improve the situation.
 - Learn to put up with new and unpleasant conditions.
- V Value living.**
 - Hope, and a real plan for escape, reduces your fear and increases your chances of survival.
 - Conserve your health and strength.
 - Hunger, cold and fatigue lower your efficiency and stamina.
 - Remember your goal-getting out alive.
- A Act like the natives and according to the environment.**
- L Learn basic skills.**

Remember that the human body's limitations are:

- 4 minutes without oxygen.
- 4 days without water.
- 40 days without food.

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SECTION 9 MEDIA :

This section will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding media relations.

Remember that the media influences political leaders and policy makers. Members of the media will often seek commentary from among the junior ranks.

- Always note and report the presence of news media.
- Speak only on factual matters within your area of responsibility.
- Refer all other questions to info staff.
- Think before you speak. Try to be polite and helpful.
- Be honest and positive, while remaining professional.
- Do not give any formal interviews without any prior clearance from info staff.
- Do not discuss UN operations, plans or procedures.
- Do not give any information about local forces which might be of use to opponents.
- Do not speculate, do not provide an opinion as to what might or might not happen.
- Do not mislead or take sides.
- Do not give any information about local forces.
- Do not allow the media to pressure you into saying things you would rather not say or should not discuss.



SECTION 10 COMMUNICATION AND VOICE PROCEDURE

This section will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding radio communications

The UN personnel at unit level will operate radio communication in their mother tongue, using national voice procedure.

At a minimum, personnel should be familiar with :

- Equipment
- UN call sign system
- Net orders
- Basic UN communication

However, if you belong to signal personnel you have to know:

- Phonetic alphabet, spelling procedures, figure codes, punctuation marks;
- Basic radio communication procedures, incl. appropriate terminology, the single call; the multiple call, the all-stations call; *roger, over, out* and *radio check*; report of signal strength and readability; time check; reporting into a net; and closing down procedures;
- Use of procedural words, for example *wait out, read back - I read back, say again - I say again, correction, speak slower, words twice, unknown station, disregard, acknowledge - wilco, verify - I verify, relay to - message passed to*;
- Plain procedure, *long message, roger so far - roger send over, text begins - end of text*;

CHAPTER 5 UN OPERATIONAL SUBJECTS


SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

This section will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding operational matters of your unit and how *you* fit in Peace-keeping

In the case of breaches of cease-fire the general task of your unit will be :

- To observe and report
- To initiate contact with the parties
- To negotiate a cease-fire



PROCEDURE FOR RADIO COMMUNICATION

1. PREPARING THE SET FOR OPERATION

- Make sure that there is a power source, that it is sufficient and ensure correct connection to the radio set.
- Check the antenna and all cable assemblies ensuring tight and correct connection to the set.
- Connect the audio accessories and check proper operation of function switches.

2. TRANSMITTING, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- Decide what you are going to say ensuring that it will be clear and brief.
- Make sure no-one else is speaking on the net when you start.
- Remember to divide your message into sensible phrases, make pauses and maintain a natural rhythm to your speech.
- Avoid excessive calling and unofficial transmissions.
- Use standard pronunciation. Emphasise vowels sufficiently. Avoid extreme pitch, speak in a moderately strong voice, do not shout.
- Keep a distance of about 5 cm between the mic and your lips. Shield your microphone from background noises.

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3. PHONETICS

The following international phonetic alphabet shall be used:

Letter	Phonetic Equivalent	Numeral	Spoken as
A	ALFA	Ø	ZERO
B	BRAVO	1	WUN
C	CHARLIE	2	TOO
D	DELTA	3	THU-RRE
E	ECHO	4	FO-WER
F	FOXTROT	5	FI-YIV
G	GOLF	6	SIX
H	HOTEL	7	SEVEN
I	INDIA	8	ATE
J	JULIETT	9	NINER
K	KILO
L	LIMA		
M	MIKE		
N	NOVEMBER	Examples :	
O	OSCAR		
P	PAPA	12	TWELVE
Q	QUEBEC	44	FO-WER FO-WER
R	ROMEO	90	NINER ZERO
S	SIERRA	136	WUN THUH-REE SIX
T	TANGO	500	FI-YIV HUNDRED
U	UNIFORM	7000	SEVEN THOUSAND
V	VICTOR	16000	WUN SIX THOUSAND
W	WHISKEY	1478	WUN FO-WER SEVEN
X	XRAY		ATE
Y	YANKEE	19A	WUN NINER ALFA
Z	ZULU		

In general numbers are transmitted digit by digit except that multiples of hundreds and thousands are spoken as such

4. PROCEDURE WORDS

The following is the list of most common prowords (except precedence prowords) to be used and their meanings:

PROWORD	MEANING
ACKNOWLEDGE!	Confirm that you have received my message and will comply. (WILCO)
AFFIRMATIVE	Yes/Correct
NEGATIVE	No/Incorrect
ALL AFTER ... ALL BEFORE ...	Everything that you (I) transmitted after ... (Keyword) Everything that you (I) transmitted before ... (Keyword)
CORRECT (THAT IS CORRECT)	What you have transmitted is correct, you are correct.
CORRECTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An error has been made in this transmission. It will continue with the last word (group) correctly transmitted. An error has been made in this transmission. The correct version is That which follows is a corrected version in answer to your request for verification.
WRONG	Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version is ...
DISREGARD THIS TRANSMISSION - OUT	This transmission is an error. Disregard it. (This proword shall not be used to cancel any message that has been already completely transmitted and for which receipt or acknowledgement has been received).
DO NOT ANSWER - OUT	Station(s) called are not to answer this call, acknowledge this message, or otherwise to transmit in connection with this transmission.

PROWORD	MEANING
SILENCE -SILENCE -SILENCE !	Cease all transmissions on this net immediately. Will be maintained until lifted.
SILENCE LIFTED	Silence is lifted. The net is free for traffic.
END OF MESSAGE - OVER (OUT)	This concludes the message just transmitted (and the message instructions pertaining to a formal message).
END OF TEXT	The textual part of a formal message ends. Stand by for the message instructions immediately following.
FETCH ...!	I wish to speak on the radio to that person (appointment title).
...SPEAKING	Requested person is now using the radio by himself.
FIGURES	Numerals or numbers will follow. (This proword is not used with the callsigns, time definitions, grid references, bearings, distances, etc., especially in fixed-form reports).
FROM	• THIS IS ...
TO	• The originator of this formal message is indicated by the address designation immediately following. The addressees whose designations will immediately follow are to take action on this formal message.
THIS IS ...	This transmission is from the station whose designation immediately follows.
MESSAGE MESSAGE FOLLOWS	I have an informal message for you. A formal message which requires recording is about to follow.
OVER	This is the end of my turn of transmitting. A response is expected. Go ahead, transmit.

PROWORD	MEANING
OUT	This is the end of my transmission to you. No answer or acknowledgement is expected.
OUT TO YOU -	Do not answer, I have nothing more for you, I shall now call some other station on the net.
READ BACK!	Repeat the entire following transmission back to me exactly as received.
I READ BACK	The following is my reply to your request to read back.
SAY AGAIN	• Repeat all of your last transmission. • Followed by identification data
I SAY AGAIN	ALL AFTER, ALL BEFORE, WORD AFTER, WORD BEFORE it means: Repeat...(portion indicated). I am repeating my transmission or portion indicated
SEND! SEND YOUR MESSAGE!	Go ahead with your transmission. Go ahead transmit: I am ready to copy.
....SPEAK SLOWER!	Reduce the speed of your transmission. (Normally used in connection with request for repetition.)
I SPELL	I shall spell the next word, group or equivalent phonetically (Not used when transmitting coded groups only.)
RELAY TO...	Transmit the following message to all addressees or to the address designation immediately following.
RELAY THROUGH	Send this message by way of callsign.

PROWORD	MEANING
THROUGH ME	I am in contact with the station you are calling. I can act as a relay station.
MESSAGE PASSED TO ...	Your message has been passed to ...
ROGER	I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.
ROGER SO FAR?	Have you received this part of my message satisfactorily?
WILCO	I have received your message, understand it, and will comply. (to be used only by the addressee) ROGER and WILCO are never used together.
UNKNOWN STATION	The identity of the station calling or with whom I am attempting to establish communication is unknown.
VERIFY	Verify entire message (or portion indicated) with the originator and send correct version. To be used only at discretion of or by the addressee to which the questioned message was directed.
I VERIFY	That which follows has been verified at your request and is repeated. To be used only as reply to VERIFY
WAIT (WAIT - WAIT) WAIT - OUT	I must pause for a few seconds. I must pause longer than some seconds, and I will call you again when ready.
WORD AFTER...	The word of the message to which I have reference is that which follows...
WORD BEFORE	The word of the message to which I have reference is that which precedes...
WORDS TWICE	Communication is difficult. Transmit (ting) each phrase (group) twice. This proword can be used as a order, request or as information.

5. EXAMPLE OF CONVERSATION

The proword THIS IS or FROM is used to indicate the calling station.
 ALFA - THIS IS CHARLIE - MESSAGE - OVER
 FROM ALFA - SEND - OVER
 THIS IS CHARLIE - WATCH FOR FALLEN ROCKS ON ROAD
 BIRKET - I SPELL - BRAVO INDIA ROMEO KILO ECHO
 TANGO - BIRKET - OVER
 FROM ALFA - WILCO - OUT

6. REPORT OF RECEPTION

The following phrases are for use when initiating and answering queries concerning signal strength and readability.

RADIO CHECK	What is my signal strength and readability, how to you read me?
YOU ARE (I READ YOU)	You signal strength and readability is as follows...

Reports of signal strength:

LOUD	Your signal is strong
GOOD	Your signal is good
WEAK	I can hear you only with difficulty.
VERY WEAK	I can hear you only with great difficulty.
NOTHING HEARD	I cannot hear you at all.

Reports of signal readability:

CLEAR	Excellent quality
READABLE	Good quality. No difficulties in reading you.
DISTORTED	I have troubles in reading you.
WITH INTERFERENCE	I have troubles in reading you due to interference
NOT READABLE	I can hear that you transmit but I cannot read you at all.

Example:

52 THIS IS 11 - RADIO CHECK - OVER
 THIS IS 52 - YOU ARE LOUD AND CLEAR - OVER
 THIS IS 11 - YOU ARE LOUD AND CLEAR AS WELL - OUT

7. FORMAL MESSAGE

Formal message parts should be transmitted in the following order:

- Preliminary call.
- Proword MESSAGE FOLLOWS (SEND YOUR MESSAGE).
- Abbreviated call with relay and transmission instructions, if any (READ BACK, RELAY TO etc).
- Message handling order = precedence (normally one of the following: FLASH, OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE, PRIORITY or ROUTINE).
- Date and time group (14 0630 Z Jan).
- Proword FROM followed by originator's callsign.
- Proword TO followed by action addressee's call.
- Proword INFO followed by info addressee's call.
- Proword TEXT BEGINS.
- Security classification (normally one of the following: UNCLASSIFIED, RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, or SECRET).
- The originator and the number of the message.
- The actual text.
- Proword END OF TEXT if final instructions are to follow, otherwise END OF MESSAGE.

SECTION 2 OBSERVATION, POSTS AND POSITIONS

This section will discuss:

- Definitions and features of OPs and Posn
- Daily routine and observing techniques
- The content of an OP/Posn Order and the task of the OP/Posn crew

Definitions:

A **Position** (Posn) is a **tactically sited** location, permanently occupied by military members of a PKO from where they carry out various operational tasks such as checkpoints, roadblocks, observation, patrols.

A Posn is normally occupied by **armed troops**.

An **Observation Post** (OP) is a permanently occupied location from where UN peace-keepers carry out "observe and report" missions.

In locating OPs one may often have to sacrifice good tactical siting in favour of **good observation**.

An OP can be occupied by **armed troops or unarmed observers**.


Temporary Posn, OP are manned as required on a **temporary basis** for a limited period of time for the purpose of carrying out an observation or control task. They are not administratively self-contained but may be located in old permanent positions or OPs.

Marking and Protection

All Posns/ OPs must have the following features

- well-delineated and illuminated, surroundings included
- distinctively marked
- protection for the occupants
- surrounded by a protective barrier
- extensive wire entanglements
- zig-zagged entrance gate
- white background with "UN" markings in black or blue
- Posn/OP number prominently displayed
- markings visible from the air
- UN flag flown all times from a prominently placed flagpole and well lit at night
- incorporated shelter

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The layout of compounds, posts, etc. will always depend on availability of infrastructure (buildings, material) and more important, on the tactical deployment. Expect worse!

Daily Routine and Observing Techniques

Duties of a UN OP/Posn crew: **OBSERVE** **VERIFY** **REPORT**
Content of reports (typical significant incidents):

- Movements
- Shooting, hostile acts or threats
- Any improvement of defence positions
- Over flight of cease-fire lines or lines of the Area of Operation
- Violations of armistice or cease-fire agreement

Daily routine:

- Maintain Log
- Carry out patrols and investigations for further observation as ordered
- Maintain line and radio communications to next highest HQ
- Maintain specified minimum of strength

There are specific written orders on OPs Posn (read and learn them by heart)

Observing techniques (learn and refresh):

- searching ground by day and night
- use of binoculars and night vision equipment
- use and drawing sketches, taking up features and providing briefings
- determination of distance by various means

OP/Posn Order:

1. Task, incl. local situation and current alert status
2. Length of stay/time and method of relief
3. Where to load/unload weapons and how supervised
4. Dress, arms and equipment needed
5. Areas of observation including positions of the parties
6. Action on suspicious activity
7. Method of alerting commander/operations
8. Method of challenging
9. Orders for opening fire/Rules of engagement
10. Action when attacked/proxy bomb/mortar
11. Friendly patrols - times out and in
12. Check entry/exit of mil and civ vehicles

13. Equipment:

Binoculars/ NVD	Alarm device	Map
Compass	Log-pen	Range card
Radio equipment	Torch / filter	Panoramic photo
Orders	Personality	Fire extinguisher
Photos (if available)		

ýYou must know and exercise:

- How to observe and report
- How to reinforce the Posn
- Action when attacked
- How to protect yourself against small arms fire and shrapnel
- How to maintain equipment and shelter

SECTION 3 CHECKPOINTS (CP)

This section will discuss:

- Definitions, purpose and features of CP
- Method of search, principles, general considerations, training content
- General definition:
A manned point used as a means of controlling movement by checking vehicles and pedestrians, in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations. "Closed checkpoints" are called roadblocks. These form the basis of blocking positions.
- Static CP:
A CP that is permanently placed on a road or major track, crossroad or junction, at an entrance to a controlled area.
- Mobile CP
Used when there are difficulties covering all roads and tracks with static CPs. One mobile CP is manned by a minimum of two armoured vehicles, usually employed for short periods.

Purpose of CPs:

- To show presence of UN
- To survey all activities in the terrain, along roads and in inhabited areas
- To check/inspect and register all traffic of personnel, vehicles into and out of the UN zone
- To prevent the smuggling of weapons, ammunition and explosives into or out of the AO by searching
- To count special traffic, such as military vehicles, tanks, APCs, artillery
- To act as an OP/Posn
- To operate in the surveillance net with other OPs and CHPs
- On specific order, to be able to close the CP and block different types of traffic

ýYou must know and exercise:


- The method of search (vehicle and body search, metal detector)
- What to do when individuals:
 - ☐ refuse to produce ID card
 - ☐ refuse access to the object to be searched
 - ☐ produce a weapon
- How to control traffic;
- How to apply safety procedures;
- How to react to threats.

Principles:


- **Isolate problems quickly**
- **Prevent their escalation**
- **Resolve them quickly**
- **Slow down movement**
- **Maintain constant and complete surveillance and security**
- **Request reinforcement if necessary**

The main reason for checking is to identify persons and goods in order to prevent illegal items being brought into the Area of Operation through the checkpoint.





A sign must be placed ahead of the CP, saying:



Note on the logging form:

Time	Name/driver	Type/car	License number	Destination	Direction


According to orders you must consider who may or may not pass the checkpoint as follows:

No entrance:	Free entrance:
Armed elements	UN personnel
Civilians without valid ID-card	UN Observers
Prohibited persons	Red Cross personnel
During curfew nobody	Local police and authorities

Additional precautions at night:

All cars must be stopped.

Monitoring and registration of traffic from one CP (OP, Posn) to the other.



SECTION 4 PATROLS

This section will discuss:


- Types, purpose and principles of patrols;
- The content of a Patrol Order and what needs to be done after the patrol.

Types of patrols:

- Foot patrols;
- Vehicle patrols;
- Air patrols;
- Sea patrols;
- Special patrols (river/marsh, ski, etc.)

Purpose of patrols:

- To confirm/supervise a cease-fire;
- To gain information;
- To check on areas which cannot be observed from OPs;
- To indicate a UN presence to parties;
- To reassure isolated communities;
- To carry out mobile CPs;
- To inspect infiltration lanes;
- To carry out observation from isolated and unoccupied OPs;
- To provide a physical link between adjoining but isolated Posns;
- To provide protection for parties/local population where travelling without UN coverage might provoke an incident;
- To establish standing reconnaissance teams between parties during a period of tension;
- To ensure full control in the AO and to keep infiltrators out;

**Principles to be adhered to by patrols :**

- Comply with the patrol plan
- Maintain a written record of all observations-sketches
- Halt when challenged, report at once by radio
- Maintain continuous radio contact and report your location by using Vehicle Report Points (VRP)
- Observe:
 - Condition of roads and tracks
 - Nature of terrain
 - Presence of obstacles and minefields
- Record any changes in the disposition of armed forces
- Ensure security of all maps, documents
- Record any changes in environmental or civilian activity
- Refrain from diverging from the original patrol plan

Patrol order (content):

1. Objective, task
 2. General and local situation, special incidents, alert status
 3. Reports from previous patrols
 4. Other patrols and UN activity in the area
 5. Local procedures used by the other parties or by civilian authorities
 6. Alternative tasks if the primary mission cannot be carried out
 7. Patrol route
 8. Link to flanking units, OPs or Posns
 9. Time of departure, time of arrival at different objects
 10. Latest time of return, code words for communication and emergency
 11. MEDEVAC procedure
 12. Weather forecast
 13. Debrief and patrol report, where and when
- Questions

After the patrol:

- Report immediately after debriefing
- Prepare a detailed written report with sketches.
- Check vehicles and equipment taken on patrol and report damages
- Report any patrol member requiring medical attention

SECTION 5 ESCORTS

This section will discuss:

- Definitions, purpose of escorts.
- Action on ambush.

Definitions

Escort: A UN unit assigned to accompany and protect other UN troops/elements or convoys.

Convoy: A group of vehicles organised for the purpose of control and orderly movement with or without escort protection.

Convoy Escort: An escort to protect a convoy of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured.

Column: A group of vehicles moving under a single commander over the same route, in the same direction.

Packet: Subdivision of a large column, each having its own commander.

Purpose of escorts

Escorts are required for:

- ☐ Humanitarian convoys
- ☐ Personnel protection
- ☐ Transport of supply
- ☐ Refugee escort
- ☐ POW escort
- ☐ Rescue operations
- ☐ Other convoys

Organisations to co-operate with:

UN Agencies and NGOs, (UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC etc.)

**Action on ambush:**

(To read in context with Roles of Engagement, ROE!)

Ambush seen first:

- Halt outside killing area, disperse and take cover.
- Turret crews remain mounted and scan for targets.
- Armoured infantry dismount on order.
- Contact report to HQ, followed by regular SITREPs.
- Combat appreciation/estimate, plan and orders. Options:
 - ☐ Ignore and press on.
 - ☐ Negotiate safe passage.
 - ☐ Take appropriate aggressive action (subject to policy).
 - ☐ Stop and wait for resolution at higher level.
 - ☐ Detour.
 - ☐ Turn back.

Ambush fires first:


- Single warning shot or burst:
 - ☐ Halt immediately and investigate
 - ☐ If firing has stopped, continue as in para 1 above.
- Intermittent but ineffective firing continues:
 - ☐ Extricate soft skin vehicle crews using empty APC.
 - ☐ Withdraw from killing area. Use smoke if necessary.
 - ☐ Further action as in para 1 above.
- Convoy sustains effective fire:
 - ☐ Return aimed fire immediately
 - ☐ Drive out of killing area. Then proceed as in para 1 above.
 - ☐ If caught in killing area, dismount and take appropriate aggressive action (subject to policy)
 - ☐ CASEVAC. Extricate soft skin vehicle crews.

Vehicles halted away from ambush basic drill:

- Take cover in APC/ ditches/ under vehicle.
- Prepare to support those in fire fight.
- Mount sentries, allocate arcs and stand to positions.
- Check area for mines, mark clear areas
- Establish liaison with local forces, if possible
- Ensure road clear for passage of prior vehicles.

CONVOY ESCORT - Illustrative Example

Convoy escorted by Armoured Infantry Platoon



SECTION 6 DE-ESCALATION DEPLOYMENT

This section will discuss:

- Possible scenarios in which concentrated deployment is necessary.
- Possible reactions at trouble spots.

These measures are subject of extensive exercises in the Area of Operations.

Scenarios:

Demonstrations of masses
Enduring ground violations
Advancing troops

Constant sniping


Measures:

Crowd control activities, Show of Force
Tightening Line Procedure, Show of Force
Reinforcement of positions, blocking,
Tightening Area Procedure, Show of Force
Interpositioning, Show of Force,

Arming Order Levels regulate how to carry rifles, pistols, batons, bayonets, place entanglements, handle ammunition and use the protection equipment as well as orders to be given. Loudspeakers, flares, searchlights, cameras and other surveillance means might be used.

Means of deployment are reserves (Ready Reaction Groups, RRG)

Use of force must be the last resource.



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Example Report Form:

UN REPORT FORM

Date:
Time:

Type and number of report remarks: NBC1/CHEM and NBC2/CHEM are to be extended to UN HQ and all the units Report No (daily chronological order reported by starting from 0000Z to 2400Z) Fill in only when this report refers to a previous report:	Firing close to OP/Posn report.[] Shooting report.[] Aircraft activity report.[] Ground incursion report.[] Situation report.[] NBC1/CHEM.[] NBC2/CHEM.[] No. OP: Posn: Patrol: Reference to:
Time 1. Time first observed, first violated, first crossed 2. Time last observed as violation, recrossed 3. Still in progress	Para A 1. Z 2. Z 3. SIP []
Identification and description of incident 1. A - Party C - Unidentified 2. B - Party D - Others 2. Numbers, objects: soldiers, armed/unarmed, description of uniform/clothing, equipment, shepherds, civilians, aircraft, model, weapons used, rounds, vehicles, type, license plates, activity, direction of travel type of Chemical Agent	Para B 1. A - [] C - [] B - [] D - [] 2.
Location 1. crossed, violated first, fired from, attacked from, first observed 2. recrossed, stopped violating, fired to, impacted in, last observed 3. AMR of chemical incident if observed or estimated	Para C 1. - X [] FO [] 2. - RX [] LO [] 3. - OBS [] ES []
Action taken by UN Investigation started, RRG sent, LO/MP/MED section informed etc.	Para D
Additional information Max penetration, general flight-path, altitude: low < 300m, medium 300-3000m, high > 3000m Distance and direction if AMR not available, confirmed by for NBC2/CHEM: casualties, symptoms, needs, residual operational efficiency, any other helpful information or NIL	Para E

SECTION 7 REPORTS

This section will discuss:

- The principles of issuing a report
- The conceivable types of reports and their content

Principles:

- Accurate and checked statement of facts only
- Unclear observations should be cross-checked
- Clear and concise content, avoiding ambiguity
- Count (planes, vehicles and the number of people)

Type of Reports: (general, varies in any Area of Operations!)

- Activity forecast, vehicle movement
- Warning report
- Situation report
- Ground incursion; Shooting; Firing-close-to-OP/Posn report
- Air activity report
- BCW chemical incident report, successive report

Type of Requests:

MEDEVAC/CASEVAC

Supply request

Contents of reports:

- When report was sent, name and logging of report:

Date	Time	Type	Number
------	------	------	--------

- Originator and relation of report:

Name of OP, Posn, CP, Patrol	Reference previous reports
------------------------------	----------------------------

- Time of incident (When):

Beginning	End	Progress
-----------	-----	----------

- Identification and description of incident (Who and What):

Originator of incident	Numbers	Objects
------------------------	---------	---------

- Location and Action (Where was what observed):

Grid Map Reference	Observation of Incident
--------------------	-------------------------

- Action taken by UN:

Investigation	Reinforcement	Information to others
---------------	---------------	-----------------------

- Additional Information:

Anything that might be helpful for further assessments ☐

SECTION 8 USE OF FORCE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

This section will discuss:

- What you must know before deployment regarding use of force

One of the principles of peace-keeping is that it be achieved without use of military force

".. shall not use force except in self-defence"

Definition of force:

Force is the use of physical means to impose one's will.

"Self-defence includes resistance to attempts discharging the duties under the mandate of the Security Council."

Force can be applied in these situations:

- Direct attacks
- Threats to the lives of UN personnel
- Jeopardy to UN security in general
- Forceful entry into UN positions for use as a fire base by one party
- Attempts by force to disarm UN troops

Principles in the application of force:

- Only minimum of force
- Prevention by negotiation or persuasion should precede force
- Prior warning:
(oral, firing of flares, warning shots in the air, firing short)

After procedures above have been exhausted: "fire for effect"

- No escalation in type of fire, like with like return
- Fire must be controlled, and cease once the aim has been achieved
- After incident **immediately** transmit a full SITREP, including type and number of rounds fired.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

ROE define when and how force may be used.

Remember:

- You are not at war.
- Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
- Use minimum force to carry out the mission.
- Always be prepared to act in self-defence.

Rules for individuals:

- Use common sense to assess the situation.
- If fired upon, fire back if necessary in self-defence.
- If it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that you are about to be fired upon, take cover and fire in self-defence when fired at.
- When firing avoid causing casualties, fire so close that your opponent knows that you mean it.
- When returning fire, aim directly at its source; do not spray your fire into a general area.
- Cease fire when the threat is over.
- Allow anyone trying to surrender to do so.
- Treat innocent civilians with respect.

In the Mission Area ROE cards will be distributed to you by your superiors.

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**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL
AUTHORISED TO CARRY ARMS AND AMMUNITION ON DUTY
IN A UN OPERATION**

- EXAMPLE -

(Check the ROE of the actual PKO if this example in fact applies, otherwise replace!)

GENERAL RULES

1. *In all situations you are to use the minimum of force necessary.*
FIREARMS MUST BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT.
Only weapons with a single shot capability should be issued and only the single-shot mode should be used.
2. *In principle your weapon must always be unloaded:*
that is, NO live round is to be carried in the breech and in the case of automatic weapons the working parts are to be forward,
unless you are ordered to carry a live round in the breech.

CHALLENGING

3. *A challenge MUST be given before opening fire unless:*
 - To do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or any other person:

OR

- You or others in the immediate vicinity are under armed attack.
4. *You are to challenge by shouting in English and then in local language:*

UNITED NATIONS - HALT OR I SHOOT!
AND
(LOCAL LANGUAGE)

OPENING FIRE

5. *You may open fire against an individual or group of individuals only:*
 1. If he/she is committing or is about to commit an act
LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIFE and
 2. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO PREVENT THE DANGER.
(Depending on the circumstances, the following are some examples of such life-threatening acts:)
 - Firing a weapon
 - Planting, detonation or throwing an explosive device
 - Deliberately driving a vehicle at a person, where there is no other way of stopping him/her

OR

If you know that:

- He/she has just killed or injured any person by such means
- AND**
- He/she does not surrender if challenged
- AND**
- THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO MAKE AN ARREST

6. *If you must open fire, you should:*

- Fire only single aimed shots
- AND**
- Fire no more rounds than are necessary
- AND**
- Take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target.

7. *The extra following rule holds ONLY when you have been told by your superior that it applies to a specific property or installation which you are guarding. You may open fire against a person even though the conditions of Rule 5 are not met if:*

- He/she attempts to take possession of that property or installation or attempts to damage or destroy it
- AND**
- THERE IS NO OTHER WAY OF PREVENTING THIS.

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EXAMPLES FOR USE FORCE

Self Defence

Unarmed Response

- Infiltration or encirclement without firing
- Unarmed attempts to arrest UN personnel
- Unarmed attacks

Armed Response

- Safety of UN personnel and property
- Attempts to abduct or detain UN personnel
- Attempts to disarm UN personnel
- Violation of rules/regulations pertaining to UN premises (forced entry)

Mission Defence

- Attempts by force to compel UN personnel to withdraw
- Infiltration or encirclement by means of force
- Attempts to prevent UN personnel from carrying out their orders

Be aware, that these examples are simplified, further detailed explanation is needed for the specific Peace-keeping Operation.

CHAPTER 6 PERSONAL AFFAIRS

SECTION 1 LEAVE AND OFF DUTY

This section will discuss:

- Something very important for you!

Leave **will not** be granted by **national authorities** while you are serving with UN.

However, the UN grants military personnel a maximum of two and one-half working days of leave for each calendar month of service.

This may only be taken **during the tour of duty** and **prior to repatriation**.

Sundays and UN Force holidays which fall during the period of home leave will not be charged as leave.

Conditions for granting leave are:

Subject to the exigencies of UN service, which demand that the effective strength of the mission not to fall below 75 per cent of the authorised strength.

Travel documents, visas, etc., however, are the responsibility of the individual. If you have questions, ask for assistance in welfare office.

Do not overstay your leave period.

In case sickness or any other unforeseen reason prevents you from returning to the Mission Area, report to your superiors as soon as possible.

In exceptional circumstances, special leave requests may be granted.

SECTION 2 PAY AND ALLOWANCES

This section will discuss:

- What is at least as important as the section before

For contingents/units home pay and national overseas allowance for UN service at national levels is a **national responsibility** and is paid as arranged between the individual and his home authorities. In addition, there is a UN-paid United Nations Daily Allowance for Troops. Requisitioning, drawing, paying as well as accounting of pay and allowances is a **national contingent responsibility**.

SECTION 3 POSTAL SYSTEM

This section will discuss:

- The restrictions on postal system usage

The Base Post Office will handle your mail.

Limitations and prohibited articles include

- coins, bank notes, jewellery, archaeological specimens
- articles which, by their content or packaging may expose mail handlers to danger or may soil or damage the mail
- explosives, ammunition, inflammable or corrosive materials
- animals or insects
- all narcotic drugs
- obscene or immoral reading material (printed material), photographs
- earth, sand, grass, seeds or plants
- weapons or military hardware souvenirs

My postal address while in the service of UN, will be/ is:

.....

SECTION 4 RECREATION WELFARE AND PX FACILITIES

This section will discuss:



Recreation and sports play very important parts in upholding of morale. There are **competitive activities** as well as non-competitive recreation in which contingents take part.

Welfare schemes provide tours, library facilities, TVs and videos for UN positions, etc.

PX Amenities

For UN personnel only.

Provided through a duty-free store or through direct duty-free importation. Ration cards for spirits and tobacco and registration cards for attractive items will be made available.

Breaches of this privilege, such as resale to the local population, could undermine the whole system and are therefore strictly forbidden.

CHAPTER 7

MANDATE AND TASK

SECTIONS 1 MANDATE OF YOUR MISSION

Fill in on your assignment:

I am a member of theUN Contingent.

The name of the Peace-keeping Mission is.....

This abbreviation stands for.....

The mandate of this Peace-keeping Operation is:

The main components and contingents (other nations) are:

The conflict in the Area of Operation was/is between:

SECTION 2 YOUR TASK - YOUR BRIEFING

I am a UN.....
(function)

I am.....

Name	Rank	Function	Unit
------	------	----------	------

I was trained to be a

My function in the UN-Operation will be/is:.....

My basic duties will be/are:

As a my task will be/is:

1.....

2.....

3.....

4.....

My Commander's name:.....

His duty will be/is.....

SECTION 3 YOUR AWARD - OUR PRIDE

This section will discuss:

- How you get your UN Medal

UN Medal

The United Nations Medal contributes to morale and pride among all ranks who serve with UN PKOs in the service of peace.

The colour/design of the ribbon for each mission is unique.

Qualification for medals and numerals (more than one tour of duty) is based on a combination of :

- tour of duty (6 months for forces, 12 for observers) and
- qualifying service (after half of tour of duty).

Presentation:

The Secretary-General delegates authority to the FC/CMO to present the United Nations medal. This may be delegated to Contingent Commanders. Medals will be presented at a formal medal parade.

SECTION 4 YOUR TROUBLES - OUR CONCERN

This section will discuss:

- Stress awareness
- Support given to you in case of problems

Some inferior and infantile defence mechanisms to stress are harmful in UN-service, such as denial, projection and regression. Coping can be improved by training in stress management techniques before deployment.

Psychological stress factors:

The special stresses in UN service are mainly associated with:

- the need to retain neutrality
- the limited amount of self-defence allowed
- the unfamiliar environment (absence from family, spouse)

There is a conflict between aggressive impulses and the inability to express them (neither fight nor flight is possible).

Social stress factors:

Social and interpersonal problems occur when there is a lack of unit cohesion and spirit, communication, group and buddy support, poor leadership and loss of confidence.

Personal stress factors:

Personal stress can occur because of **inexperience and lack of education and training, lack of physical fitness**, age, lack of commitment to the mission, witnessing death or severe injury for first time and perception of no end in sight.

All the above problems require help.

If you recognise stress disorders in yourself or your comrades, do not hesitate seeking assistance from one of the persons below (it is their duty to help):

- your commander
- medical personnel of your unit
- your chaplain or other clerical staff
- your friend (at least)

Communicate, it helps a lot!

SECTION 5 SPECIFIC DRIVING REGULATIONS

Apart from the regulations of my home country in the mission area following specific driving regulations apply:

1.
2.
3.

CHAPTER 8 MISCELLANEOUS

SECTION 1 UN-ABBREVIATIONS

This section will discuss:

• The most common abbreviations used in PKOs

Administrative	- admin	Chief Administrative Officer	- CAO
Advance	- adv	Chief Communications Officer	- CCO
Ambulance	- amb	Chief Finance Officer	- CFO
Amendment	- amdt	Chief General Service Officer	- CGSO
Ammunition	- ammo	Chief Logistics Officer	- CLO
Annex	- anx	Chief Military Personnel Officer	- CMPO
Approximate Map Reference	- AMR	Chief of Staff	- COS
Approximately	- Approx	Chief Operations Officer	- COO
Area of Operations	- AO	Chief Procurement Officer	- CPO
Area of Responsibility	- AOR	Chief Transport Officer	- CTO
Area of Separation	- AOS	Circulate, circulation	- circ
Armoured personnel carrier	- APC	Civilian	- civ
Artillery	- arty	Class, classification	- cl
As soon as possible	- ASAP	Colonel	- Col
Assistant	- asst	Command Post Exercise	- CPX
Attached	- att	Commander	- Cdr
Attention	- attn	Commanding Officer	- CO
Available	- aval	Communications	- comms
Biological and Chemical Warfare	- BCW	Company	- coy
Battalion	- Batt	Compensatory Time Off	- CTO
Boundary	- bdry	Confirm, confirmation	- cfm
Brigade	- bde	Construction Engineering Officer	- CEO
Brigadier General	- BGEN	Continued	- cont
Captain	- Capt	Control	- con
Casualty	- cas	Coordinate, co-ordination	- coord
Chemical	- chem	Corporal	- Cpl


Demarcation Line	- D/L	Force Routine Order	- FRO
Demolition	- dml	Force Signals Officer	- FSO
Department	- dept	Forward, forwarded	- fwd
Deputy Chief of Staff	- DCOS	Fragment, fragmentation	- frag
Deputy Commanding Officer	- DCO	General Services Officer	- GSO
Detached, detachment	- det	Greenwich Mean Time	- GMT
Direct, direction	- dir	Guard	- gd
Distribute, distribution	- distr	Headquarters	- HQ
Duty Officer	- DO	Heavy Machine Gun	- HMG
Effective	- eff	Helicopter	- hel
Engineer	- engr	Hospital	- hosp
Equipment	- eqpt	Hygiene Officer	- HygO
Established	- estb	Identification	- ident
Estimated time of arrival	- ETA	Illuminate, illuminate	- illum
Estimated time of completion	- ETC	Immediate Operational Requirement	- IOR
Estimated time of departure	- ETD	Immediate, immediately	- immed
Evacuate, evacuated, evacuation	- evac	In charge of	- IC
Execute, execution, executive	- exec	Infantry	- inf
Explosive	- expl	Information	- info
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	- EOD	Information Officer	- IO
Field Admin & Logistics Division	- FALD	Inspection	- insp
Field Service Officer	- FSO	International Committee of the Red Cross	- ICRC
Follow, following	- fol	Introduce, introduction	- intro
Force Commander	- FC	Leader	- ldr
Force Construction Engineering Officer	- FCEO	Letter of Assist	- LOA
Force Dental Officer	- FDO	Liaison Officer	- LO
Force Engineer Officer	- FEO	Lieutenant	- Lt
Force Legal Officer	- FLO	Local Time	- LT
Force Medical Officer	- FMO	Location	- loc
Force Provost Marshal	- FPM	Logistics	- log

SECTION 2 IMPORTANT MILITARY SYMBOLS


A unit




A field headquarters or headquarter echelon




An observation or position



Administrative support elements



A logistical installation or activity


SIZE INDICATION

Team, party	.
Squad, section	. . .
Platoon or detachment
Company, battery, troop	I
Battalion, squadron	I I
Regiment, Group	I I I
Brigade or equivalent command	x
Division	x x
Corps	x x x


DESIGNATION BY ARM OR BRANCH OF SERVICE

Infantry	
Cavalry (reconnaissance)	
Armoured	
Artillery	
Engineer	


Signal



Military Police




Airborne




Parachute




Ordnance



Quartermaster



Transportation



Medical




Veterinary




Postal




Military Government / Civil Affairs

**DESIGNATION BY DUTY PERFORMED**

Air defence




Air Force



Temporarily motorized



Repair and Maintenance



Supply




Irregular Forces

**BASIC WEAPON SYMBOLS**

Basic infantry weapon




Basic artillery weapon



One bar for medium and two bars for heavy are added to state approximate size. A ring is used to show a high trajectory.



Heavy mortar




Medium arty gun


Another method of indication of the size of a weapon is to write the caliber to the right of the symbol.

SYMBOLS FOR VEHICLES, TANKS AND ARMoured CARS

Light armoured car




Wheeled personnel and/or cargo carrying vehicle



Light tank



Medium armoured car




Tracked or half-tracked operational armoured vehicle

**UNIT DESIGNATION**

To indicate a particular unit or installation, the parent unit designation is placed to the right of the symbol.

To the left of the symbol the subunit is shown.



LOGISTICAL INSTALLATIONS

Ammunition, all types




Food supplies (with opening time)




0900 - 1100


Petroleum, oils, lubricants




Hospital, aid station



Traffic




Water



Civilian collection point


**MISCELLANEOUS**

A solid line represents a present or actual location.
A broken line indicates a future or projected location.
Future location of HQ (NORDIC) Brigade.



Colours are used as appropriate, for example black for UN units, installations etc., and blue and red colour for other forces. If only one colour is available, symbols representing other than own units are outlined with double lines, or with solid lines but marked with letter(s) for identification.

Boundaries are marked by a solid line with the size indication of the unit shown at intervals. The designation of units are placed on either side of the size indication. When separating units of different size the size indication for the larger units will be used.



Separates 1st Bn (DA) and 2nd Bn (FIN)


A route of march or direction of advance



Convoy of vehicles



Convoy is halted



SECTION 3 CALL-SIGNS, TELEPHONE NUMBERS, ADDRESSES

The Callsign of my Posn is.....

The Callsign of my Commander is.....

The address of my Training/ Administration unit is

SECTION 4 YOUR PHYSICAL RECORD

Date of Examination	Age	Time on 2400 m or 2 mile run min : sec	No. of push-ups	No. of sit-ups

Recommended minimum norms of physical examination:

Age up to	2400m	Push-ups no stops	Sit-ups no stops
35	12:00	20	35
40	12:45	18	30
45	13:30	16	25
50	14:15	14	20
55	15:00	12	15
60	15:45	10	10

SECTION 5 RULES FOR FOOD PREPARATION

THE GOLDEN RULES FOR SAFE FOOD PREPARATION

1. CHOOSE FOODS PROCESSED FOR SAFETY
2. COOK FOOD THOROUGHLY
3. EAT COOKED FOODS IMMEDIATELY
4. STORE COOKED FOODS CAREFULLY
5. REHEAT COOKED FOODS THOROUGHLY
6. AVOID CONTACT BETWEEN RAW AND COOKED FOODS
7. ALWAYS WASH FOOD AND HANDS PRIOR TO EATING
8. KEEP ALL KITCHEN SURFACES CLEAN
9. PROTECT FOOD FROM

INSECTS
RODENTS
OTHER ANIMALS

10. USE PURIFIED WATER

Final remark:

"Getting information to the soldier was more important than food. How did it manifest itself? In morale!"

(A Battalion Commander in Operation Desert Shield)

THE ADDRESS OF MY TRAINING UNIT IS:

.....

MY TRAINER'S NAME:

.....

MY ADMINISTRATOR'S NAME:

.....

MY UNIT ADDRESS IS:

.....

.....

.....

MY BLOOD GROUP IS:

.....

MY HOME ADDRESS:

.....

.....



From: Colonel K P O'Kelly
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

4000.1/Log 28

See Distribution

28 Nov 94

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

1. In situations such as those in which we find ourselves in Rwanda, there is often an understandable desire on the part of many to see an immediate move towards demobilization of the armed forces, in order to release resources from defence to what are perceived as more constructive activities. The armed forces themselves often share this aspiration, so that they can concentrate on their role of providing the best possible forces for the defence of the country against internal or external aggression.
2. In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of study into the demobilization process, leading to the publication of a number of papers. This literature concentrates on the economic and social aspects of the demobilization process, with much useful information on how veterans have been successfully re-integrated into the civilian community in a number of countries and, inevitably, examination of some less successful programmes.
3. As a soldier, I naturally share the concern that the veterans, recognized as a *specially disadvantaged group*, receive as much appropriate assistance as possible in their transition back to civilian life. But it also concerns me that there is little or no published material available on the military aspects of demobilization; for the defence forces, it should come at the end of a long planning process and it is only as a result of that process that the numbers to be demobilized can be determined.
4. I suspect that the non-military community has little understanding of the issues which need to be considered in this process and why governments will see them as important; indeed, important enough to delay demobilization. I have, therefore, produced the attached paper with the aim of explaining what I see as the military considerations involved in demobilization. I must stress that the paper is a personal view and the views expressed should not be attributed in any way to UNAMIR nor to my own national authorities.

5. The paper does not include an executive summary as such but, as it is written in the form of a military service paper, a reading of the introduction, aim and conclusions sections will serve the same purpose.

6. I would be grateful if, as UNAMIR's link with the UN agencies and NGOs, you would circulate the paper to those organizations which you feel may have an interest in any aspect of the demobilization process, including the reintegration of veterans into the civilian community. I would also be happy to discuss any aspect of the paper with you or any other organization and can provide a limited number of further copies, if required.

7. The paper is not specific to any particular situation and certainly does not pretend to address the problems faced by the Government of Rwanda; none the less, I hope that it will be a useful contribution to the current debate on demobilization. In particular, I would draw attention to the need for close cooperation between the armed forces and other bodies which may be involved in the integration of veterans into the civilian community; this cooperation can, and should, begin well before it is possible to start calculating the numbers to be demobilized.

K P O'KELLY
Colonel

Distribution:

Action:

External:

UNREO

Information:

External:

RPA Liaison Officer

Internal:

Office of SRSG
Force Commander
DFC/COS/CMO



From: Colonel K P O'Kelly
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

4000.1/Log 28

See Distribution

28 Nov 94

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

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Colonel

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Force Commander
DFC/COS/CMO



Présidence de la République

Le Président

Réf. n° :

Annexe :

Objet :

**Ambassador SHAHARYAR KHAN
The Spécial Representative of the
UN Secretary General in Rwanda
KIGALI**

Dear Mr Ambassador,

I received the last report of Human Rights Monitors covering the period from February 10 to February 24, 1995; as well as the report of the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Peter HANSEN, of March 9, 1995.

I would highly appreciated if some clarification could be made on the following facts :

1. In the report of the Human Rights monitors, it is stipulated : "In Butare, there is a great number of arrests and false imprisonments as well as ill-treatments of detainees. The monitors informed the Head of Gendarmerie about that situation and he promised to enquire about these facts in collaboration with all competent local authorities."

It should be helpful to have the names, circumstances of arrest of these people, and proofs that these arrests were arbitrary. If the investigations have not yet proven that those arrests were arbitrary, how come that the report is so affirmative ?

2. In Gitarama : "The Human Rights situation is characterised by reports of frequent arrests and false imprisonments by RPA soldiers. Most of the victims are people denounced as having participated in genocide carried out between April 6 and July 15, 1994... The exact dates of arrests and detentions are not yet available."

Once again, it is obvious that the allegations of the report need to be corroborated by evidences.

3. In Kibuye, "there have been many cases of arbitrary arrests of people denounced for having participated in genocide". This allegation is also lacking evidence and needs to be substantiated by facts.

Such grave accusations which are so many in the report articulated without substantiating facts sound like rumours and ill-intended : which would be the opposite of the Human Rights Monitors' mission. Therefore, it would be helpful to the Gouvernement and the Rwandese society to have detailed reports of those allegations.

The report of Mr. Peter HANSEN is characterised by the same style and groundless judgements. Just as a matter of example, one can point out the following : "there is a growing atmosphere of tension and xenophobia ... Many of the detainees are reported to be innocent Rwandese who had returned from Camps seeking to reclaim their properties, others are said to be professionals".

Evidences on these allegations would be in the general interest of Rwanda and in the interest of those who are working for the rebuilding of the Rwandese Nation.

I hope that the principle that those who carried out genocide must be arrested and face trials will not be confused with "arbitrariness".

Please accept, Dear Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my high consideration.


Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
President of the Republic of Rwanda



CC.

- H.E The Vice-President and
Minister of Defence
Kigali
- Honorable Prime Minister
Kigali



Présidence de la République
Le Président

Réf. n° :

Annexe :

Objet :

Ambassador SHAHARYAR KHAN
The Special Representative
of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda
KIGALI

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

The mission entrusted to the Human Rights Field Officers is to report "on the root causes and responsibilities for the genocide and on the on-going human rights situation in Rwanda." More particularly, they have to report to the UN Security Council and Secretary General "credible information on violations of human rights, humanitarian laws, war crimes, and genocide."

The purpose of the Human Rights Field Operation is therefore to help in promoting reconciliation by, in particular, helping justice and the establishment of the rule of law. We are surprised to notice that on the field, those responsible for the operation have deliberately and constantly chosen to ignore its aspects relating to genocide and masskillings to the extent that they voluntarily distort the mandate of their mission.

To our greatest concern, we are shocked that some of the Human Rights Field Officers who dare propose that the mandate be fulfilled as it has been stipulated, entirely and without malice or ill-intention, are rather sacked and deprived of their rights (cfr the letter of Dr. Christian Scherrer of February 14, 1995).

How can we expect the attainment of the operation with such flagrant malpractices? We certainly think that the situation must be redressed.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be a stylized 'R' or similar character.

Please accept, Dear Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my high consideration.

Pasteur Bizimungu
Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
President of the Republic of Rwanda



cc:

- HE the Vice-President and Minister of Defence
Kigali
- Honorable the Prime Minister
Kigali
- Mr. José Ayala Lasso, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
- Mr. Mauntnier Markof, Chief of Special Procedures Branch
Centre for Human Rights,
Geneva, Switzerland
- William Clarence, Chief HRFOR,
Kigali
- Mr. Abdou Essaied, Deputy Chief HRFOR
Kigali
- Dr. Christian Scherrer, HRFO,
Butare
- Patricia van Nispen, HRFO,
Cyangugu

03/05/95

REUNION DE SUIVI

SECTEUR DE LA JUSTICE

PROPOSITION D'AGENDA

- ✓ 1. i) *Présentation de la "Structure de mise en oeuvre du Plan d'action du Ministère de la Justice" (Ministre de la Justice)*
- ii) *Commentaires / Adoption*

- ✓ 2. i) *Appel aux donateurs pour le financement du projet "Réhabilitation du système de la Justice - Phase II" - (Ministre de la Justice)*
- ii) *Commentaires*

3. *Présentation des besoins de financement pour la construction de nouveaux lieux de détention. (M. Lorenzo Jimenez de LUIS)*

① UNDP (ResRep) (Chair)

- Mr Justice

- USA

- Netherlands

- France

- UK

- Switzerland

- Germany

- Canada

- Belgium

= UNAMIR

= UNHCR

- UNICEF

- ICRC


- DDSHS

next: 7 July?

02/05/95

STRUCTURE DE COORDINATION PROPOSEE

SECTEUR DE LA JUSTICE



Version corrigée/ 02.05.95

PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT
(PNUD)

DOCUMENT DE PROJET

Titre du Projet : **APPUI À LA RÉHABILITATION DU SYSTÈME DE LA JUSTICE - PHASE II**

Numéro du Projet : RWA/95/007/A/91/01

Secteur : Justice

Durée du Projet : 12 mois

Date démarrage : 1 mai 1995

Agence Gouvernementale : Ministère de la Justice

Agence d'Exécution : DDSMS - Département d'Appui au Développement et Services de Gestion

Agence Réalisation : Haut Commissaire aux Droits l'Homme (UNHCDH),

BUDGET TOTAL : 5.265.000 \$ US

DONATEURS POTENTIELS Allemagne, Belgique, Canada, Danemark, Espagne, Etats-Unis, Grande Bretagne, Hollande, Irlande, Japon, Suisse, Suède.

Description succincte:

Compte tenu de l'urgence des besoins en ressources humaines dans le secteur de la justice et de l'importance de rendre les instances juridiques fonctionnelles rapidement, une seconde phase est ajoutée au projet "réhabilitation des instances juridiques et désengorgement des prisons" déjà approuvé et en cours d'exécution (RWA/95/003). Ce nouveau projet vise d'une part, un appui aux formations du personnel local dans le domaine juridique et de l'administration pénitentiaire, et d'autre part, de permettre la venue rapide (mois de mai, juin et juillet) de 50 expatriés juges, substituts aux procureurs et enquêteurs afin de faciliter la préparation des premiers procès. Ces interventions s'intègrent dans le Plan d'action du Ministère de la Justice élaboré en mars 1995.

<u>Au nom</u>	<u>Titre et Signature</u>	<u>Date</u>
Du Gouvernement :	_____ Ministre du PLAN	_____
Agence Exécution :	_____ DDSMS, Agence d'Exécution	_____
Du PNUD :	_____ Représentant Résident	_____

I. CONTEXTE

Les événements dramatiques qu'a connus le Rwanda récemment ont abouti à la destruction quasi-totale de l'Appareil Judiciaire pré-existant. Les estimations du Ministère de la Justice montrent que seuls sont disponibles moins de 20 % des juristes de formation d'avant guerre. La majorité sont réfugiés ou encore ont été tués. Ce manque en personnel de formation juridique se fait d'autant plus ressentir que l'ensemble de l'infrastructure du système judiciaire a été endommagé ou encore volé, d'où la nécessité immédiate de le réhabiliter et de le rendre fonctionnel.

Aujourd'hui, la situation au Rwanda en matière de justice est préoccupante. Sur les 17 prisons existantes avant la guerre, treize fonctionnent actuellement et leur situation est précaire. En date du 12 avril 1995, la population carcérale est estimée à 32,000 prisonniers. Elle était de 25,000 quelques semaines plus tôt, soit le 01 mars 1995. La prison centrale de Kigali compte plus de 7000 détenus alors qu'elle a la capacité officielle d'en recevoir un maximum de 2 mille. Moins d'un mètre carré est donc alloué par détenu. La prison de Gitarama comprend plus de 4500 prisonniers alors qu'elle a une capacité officielle de 750. Il en va de même pour la prison de Butare qui contient également plus de 4.500 prisonniers, alors que sa capacité est de 1.000 détenus. La réhabilitation ou l'extension des centres de détention existants et l'ouverture immédiate de nouveaux centres de détention sont des solutions envisagées à travers le premier projet de réhabilitation déjà en cours d'exécution.

Les magistrats instructeurs qui ont la charge de la prison centrale de Kigali sont au nombre de sept, y inclus le Procureur de la République. Le nombre de dossiers à traiter constitue une charge impossible compte tenu du peu de moyens dont disposent ces magistrats. Le palliatif à la crise actuelle en personnel consiste à l'envoi d'experts qualifiés qui pourraient assurer une sorte d'intérim en attendant la formation de Rwandais. Les Parquets ne disposent pas de véhicules pour faire les enquêtes sur le terrain, ni d'appareils photographiques pour l'identification des prévenus ni de machines à écrire pour la rédaction des procès-verbaux. Bref, l'institution judiciaire n'est pas à même de mener à bien les enquêtes dans des conditions acceptables au regard des normes nationales et internationales des droits de l'homme.

II. JUSTIFICATION DE L'ASSISTANCE

En réponse à l'appel du Gouvernement Rwandais à l'assistance internationale pour la réhabilitation du système de la Justice lancé au mois de novembre 1994, une mission conjointe d'experts avait été organisée dans un premier temps en décembre 1994, sous les auspices du PNUD et du Haut Commissariat aux Droits de l'Homme des Nations Unies. Face aux besoins criants de ce secteur, la mission a dégagé, outre les solutions de long terme, des solutions à court terme et de portée immédiate. Il s'agit notamment des actions suivantes:

a) LES ACTIONS PRIORITAIRES A COURT TERME ET MOYEN TERME :

1. Réhabilitation des bâtiments endommagés et approvisionnement en matériel de bureau et de fonctionnement pour les cours, parquets et autres administrations judiciaires .
2. Appui au système carcéral pour améliorer le traitement des prisonniers.
3. Recrutement de Juges, Magistrats, Avocat de la défense, et enquêteurs de pays étrangers à système juridique compatible pour assister le gouvernement et former de nouveaux juges.
4. Formation de nouveaux Magistrats, Juges, Procureurs et Enquêteurs rwandais afin de permettre au système de la justice de fonctionner normalement.
5. Appui aux procureurs et à la police judiciaire enquêtant sur les suspects détenus en prison qui attendent d'être jugés.
6. Appui aux organisations du système judiciaire telles que le Barreau et le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.
7. Appui à la police judiciaire dans le cadre de ses activités et promotion d'une police équitable pour redonner un sentiment de sécurité à la population.
8. Etude de mécanismes permettant de trouver des solutions alternatives au litiges, ainsi que des solutions traditionnelles lorsqu'elles sont applicables.

Le présent projet vise les actions 3 et 4 de même que l'extension de l'activité démarrée dans le projet phase I, soit la réhabilitation des bâtiments juridiques.

b) LE PROGRAMME NATIONAL

En accord avec le Gouvernement rwandais, le premier projet approuvé et en cours d'exécution vise les actions de portée immédiate suivantes : la réhabilitation minimale des instances juridiques et l'amélioration des conditions des détenus par le désengorgement des prisons surpeuplées.

Le projet actuel vient poursuivre de manière logique la démarche déjà entreprise. Il vise à terme le fonctionnement des instances juridiques par d'une part, la venue d'expatriés juristes et enquêteurs, et d'autre part la formation de personnel local de magistrature et de gestion pénitentiaire.

Ce projet couvre en partie des interventions proposées dans le cadre du "Plan d'Action du Ministère de la Justice", plan élaboré en mars 1995.

c) LA STRATÉGIE DU PROJET

La stratégie visée à travers ce projet est d'appuyer le :

Renforcement de la capacité des instances judiciaires Parquets, Tribunaux de première instance et Cantons, afin de leur permettre de mener à bien les enquêtes juridiques en leur attribuant les moyens et les ressources humaines nécessaires à l'accomplissement de leurs fonctions.

Les Parquets ainsi que les Tribunaux de première instance se trouvent à l'heure actuelle dans une situation de blocage. Le travail est rendu impossible par manque de personnel qualifié et manque de matériel minimum nécessaire pour leur permettre de fonctionner.

Le Parquet est l'institution chargée d'enquêter et de mettre en accusation les responsables du génocide. Le manque de ressources du Procureur de la République par exemple empêche la conduite systématique des enquêtes, créant ainsi des difficultés quant à la détermination des affaires prioritaires à traiter et permettant par la même occasion, la pratique de procédures illégales d'arrestation et de détention. D'où la nécessité d'intervenir le plus rapidement possible dans le renforcement des capacités nationales à gérer la situation particulièrement difficile dans laquelle se trouve les autorités responsables de la justice à l'heure actuelle.

III. ASSISTANCE EN COURS ET PROGRAMMÉE

L'USAID a engagé 450,000 \$ US pour l'achat de matériel pour l'Administration Centrale du Ministère de la Justice et les Parquets. Cette assistance comprend notamment des véhicules et ordinateurs. Le Gouvernement des Etats Unies entend également accorder une aide de 4 millions de dollars pour le système de la justice. Une mission de programmation est arrivée à Kigali le 15 mars. Le programme sera défini suite aux recommandations de cette mission.

La Coopération canadienne et la Coopération Belge, en coopération avec **l'Union européenne** ont déjà accordé une assistance pour le paiement des salaires des fonctionnaires du Ministère de la Justice pour une période de 2 mois ainsi que pour l'alimentation des prisonniers (distribution effectuée par le PAM) et quelques travaux de reconstruction. Cette assistance devraient être renouvelée pour les quatre premiers mois de l'année 1995.

Une mission canadienne s'est rendue à Kigali du 02 au 26 mars 1995 afin de déterminer quelles actions seront entreprises par la **Coopération Canadienne**. Le programme doit comprendre notamment une assistance technique au Gouvernement pour la coordination et la formation du personnel local.

La Coopération Belge entend également accroître son soutien aux établissements carcéraux par notamment la fourniture de médicaments et de nourriture ainsi qu'une assistance juridique pour les détenus. La Belgique est intéressée à la formation de magistrats rwandais non-juristes et éventuellement à la mise à disposition de magistrats internationaux pour les instances juridiques. La formation des magistrats est en cours de préparation et un appui est également donné à l'ONG Citizen Network pour la formation notamment des IPJ. (L'assistance sera détaillée ultérieurement). Un expert en législation et gestion de l'administration fourni un appui institutionnel actuellement au Ministère de la Justice.

Le **Gouvernement Allemand** a alloué la somme de 26,000 \$ US (94-95) au Ministère de la justice pour la réforme législative. Lors de la Commission mixte germano-rwandaise à Kigali, le Gouvernement Allemand a annoncé une contribution au secteur de la Justice de 3 millions de Mark. Ces fonds seront dirigés entre autre pour la réhabilitation du Ministère et le soutien aux formations du personnel rwandais.

Le **Gouvernement Français** apportera un appui à l'appareil judiciaire par la mise à disposition de magistrats pour un montant d'environ 600,000 \$ US, ceci par l'entremise de l'ACCT. L'ACCT recrutera les magistrats étrangers en provenance de différents pays obtenant l'agrément du Gouvernement rwandais. Le Gouvernement Français va également appuyer le Ministère de la Justice en matière de documentation et de formation du personnel national.

Le Gouvernement Suisse envisage d'entreprendre plusieurs actions dans le secteur de la Justice: appui à la réhabilitation de l'école de magistrature de Nyabisindu, appui à des séminaires de formation/sensibilisation, participation à la formation de

la police judiciaire, etc.. Une appui considérable reste encore à définir.

Le **Gouvernement Hollandais** entend, sur les 30 millions de dollars américains accordés au Gouvernement Rwandais, utiliser 15 millions pour le Fonds fiduciaire des NU et 15 autres millions pour la Coopération Bilatérale, dont une somme variant entre 1 et 5 millions de dollars pourrait être réservée pour le secteur de la Justice.

Le **Gouvernement de Norvège** entend réhabiliter, dans la préfecture de Cyangugu, le Tribunal de 1ère instance et le Parquet de la République .

Le **Gouvernement du R. U.** entend apporter une assistance au Tribunal International de 200 000 £ pour la mise à disposition de procureurs. Du matériel de bureau et des machines à écrire (200) pour l'équivalent de 0,5 million de dollars américains ont été commandés. Ce matériel est attendu début avril. 1.3 Millions de Dollars ont été alloués au Fonds fiduciaire des Nations Unies dont une partie pourrait être affectée au secteur de la justice.

L'**UNICEF** a engagé 500,000 \$US afin de mettre sur pieds des facilités de détention pour les enfants et faciliter l'élaboration du code juridique pour les mineurs.

La **Banque Mondiale** est intéressée à participer au renforcement des capacités institutionnelles et logistiques du Ministère de la Justice. A moyen terme, la BM envisage la mise sur pieds d'un tribunal de commerce. Un expert serait chargé, auprès du Ministère, d'étudier la mise en place d'une structure de règlement du contentieux commercial.

Le **HCR** a fourni un lot de 5 motos aux IPJ et 3 véhicules ont été attribués au Ministère de la Justice. Un de ces véhicules sera attribué au Parquet de Kigali (commission de triage) et un autre au Parquet de Butare. Un financement de 154,000 \$ US sera accordé à la seconde formation des IPJ et enfin un budget global de 100,000 \$US est accordé aux bureaux sur le terrain pour l'appui aux initiatives locales. A ce titre, 15,000 \$ US seront accordés à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Butare.

UNHCHR fournira au Ministère de la Justice 6 experts juristes de domaines différents. Trois sont en place. Le Ministère a également reçu 3 Minibus et un appui logistique et technique a également été fourni pour l'évaluation des besoins de réhabilitation et la livraison du matériel dans les préfectures.

La **Police Civile de la MINUAR** est engagée dans la formation des Gendarmes. En juin 1995, environ 450 gendarmes seront formés.

La **MINUAR** mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement des ingénieurs civils afin d'appuyer les travaux de réhabilitation.

Citizens Network a assuré pendant trois mois la formation de 150 Inspecteurs de

Police Judiciaire et la formation des directeurs et directeurs adjoints des établissements carcéraux. Ces dernières ont pris fin au début du mois d'avril. Une deuxième formation des IPJ est en cours et d'autres formations sont également planifiées.

IV. COORDINATION DE L'ASSISTANCE

Ce projet s'insère dans le cadre des priorités énoncées par le Gouvernement rwandais lors de la Conférence de la Table Ronde tenue à Genève en janvier 1995, et également des priorités énoncées dans le cadre de son Plan d'Action élaboré en mars 1995. Il participe aux efforts de réhabilitation de l'appareil et du système judiciaire rwandais.

Le Ministère de la Justice, chargé de l'exécution du premier projet RWA/95/003, phase I, et par ailleurs responsable de l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre de la politique gouvernementale en matière de justice, assurera la parfaite coordination de cette intervention avec celles en cours et/ou à venir d'autres donateurs, ceci à travers le suivi et l'exécution de son plan d'action.

Afin d'appuyer le Ministère de la justice dans le suivi et la gestion de ce nouveau projet et du projet du PNUD déjà en cours, une Cellule de Gestion et de suivi de Projets (CGP) sera mis sur pieds au sein même du Ministère.

V. STRATEGIE ET MODALITÉS D'EXÉCUTION

Le Gouvernement :

Le Gouvernement, à travers le **Ministère de la Justice**, assurera la coordination de ce projet avec les autres interventions dans le secteur afin d'arriver à une utilisation optimale et efficace des ressources que les Donateurs ont engagés pour ce secteur sous leur responsabilité. Le Ministère de la Justice est responsable de la sélection des candidatures de magistrats étrangers et du recrutement du personnel d'appui relevant de la fonction publique (greffiers, secrétaires de Parquets, d'IPJ et TPI).

Le **Ministère de la Défense**, ainsi que la MINUAR, sera responsable de la sécurité du personnel local et des magistrats étrangers au sein des diverses préfectures.

DDSMS :

L'exécution de ce projet est confiée à DDSMS (Département d'Appui aux Projets des Nations Unies et Service de gestion). DDSMS est responsable vis-à-vis du Gouvernement et du PNUD de l'obtention des résultats et de la gestion optimale des fonds que les donateurs ont placés sous la

responsabilité du PNUD. Cette exécution se fera en accord avec les règles et procédures établies par le PNUD.

L'Agence **DDSMS** procédera à l'identification des magistrats étrangers en collaboration avec le Centre des Droits de l'Homme et UNV et procédera également à leur recrutement. Conformément aux procédures en vigueur, les candidatures seront remises au Gouvernement pour avis et sélection. DDSMS sera également chargé de procéder aux achats des équipements à l'étranger.

L'Opération des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda

L'Opération des Droits de l'Homme, à travers l'Unité de Coopération Technique (UCT), agira en tant qu'Agence de réalisation pour la mise en œuvre de ce projet. Elle est responsable de la logistique relative à la mise en place des magistrats étrangers dans les préfectures, de leur formation à leur arrivée à Kigali, ainsi que de la disponibilisation du matériel nécessaire à leur travail au niveau local.

Plus spécifiquement, le personnel de l'UCT apportera un soutien au Gouvernement en ce qui a trait au renforcement des instances juridiques en ressources matérielles et humaines, c'est-à-dire:

- . En concertation avec DDSMS, l'ACCT, UNV, les ONGs **Citizen Network** et **Synergie**, et les autres partenaires concernés, appui à l'identification et au recrutement d'expatriés juristes.
- . Avec la collaboration du PNUD, achat du matériel essentiel à leur travail.

Le PNUD

Avec l'assentiment des parties concernées, le PNUD rendra les ressources du Fonds Fiduciaire disponibles et apportera son appui en facilitant l'accès aux fonds destinés au projet afin de remplir rapidement les engagements en termes de recrutement du personnel étranger et d'achat des équipements et du matériel.

Afin d'assurer une gestion efficace de ces fonds, le projet sera revu et suivi périodiquement sous la présidence du PNUD, avec la participation des donateurs qui auront contribué au financement de ce projet à travers le Trust Fund et les organisations internationales impliquées de façon active dans le secteur de la justice.

Le PNUD fera appel à l'Agence **DDSMS** (Department for Development Support & Management Services) pour ce qui a trait au volet formation et appui technique au Ministère au besoin. Une évaluation des priorités et besoins dans ce domaine devra être faite (TSS2). DDSMS procédera également au recrutement des membres de la cellule de gestion financés par le PNUD.

VI. OBJECTIFS, PRODUITS ET ACTIVITES

OBJECTIF DE DEVELOPPEMENT

Rétablissement de la confiance de la population rwandaise envers le système judiciaire en appuyant la mise sur pieds rapide d'un système judiciaire efficient, transparent et qui soit apte à engager les procédures légales adéquates.

OBJECTIF IMMEDIAT 1 :

Répondre à l'urgent besoin en ressources humaines auquel fait face le système de la Justice, par la mise à disposition rapide d'expatriés Juges, Magistrats, Enquêteurs (50 personnes), ainsi que du personnel de soutien local (150)¹.

PRODUIT 1.1: Ressources humaines locales et internationales identifiées et mises en place.

Activités:

- 1.1. Recruter et mettre en place des enquêteurs et des Substituts au Procureur (30), au plus tard à la fin du mois de mai. Ces enquêteurs seront basés aux Parquets ou encore aux bureaux des IPJ.
- 1.2. Recruter et mettre en place des Juges pour les Tribunaux de Première Instance (20). Arrivée prévue en juillet. Ces Juges seront basés dans les Tribunaux de Première Instance.
- 1.3. Recruter et mettre en place le personnel local de soutien au projet par préfecture selon les besoins : 1 personne Logistique/logement, interprète, chauffeur, secrétaires, réceptionniste.
- 1.4. Appuyer le recrutement et la mise en place le personnel d'appui aux magistrats par instance juridique, le personnel qui sera versé à terme dans la fonction publique sera recruté par le Gouvernement sur base de contrat de pret remboursable (Greffiers, secrétaires de

¹ La venue des juges est prévue en juillet. Entre temps pourra avoir lieu la signature du texte de loi portant sur des mesures transitoires de nomination des magistrats.

Parquets-IPJ-TPI, planton).

Le nombre total du personnel rattaché au projet et éventuellement à la fonction publique est estimé à 150 personnes.

PRODUIT 1.2 Les instances juridiques sont réhabilitées et le personnel local et international est opérationnel.

- 1.1. S'assurer que la restauration minimale des instances juridiques (Parquets, Tribunaux de Première instance, Bureaux des IPJ), dans lesquelles sera basé ce personnel, soit effectuée afin de faciliter leur travail.
- 1.2. Achat et mise en place du matériel nécessaire à leur fonctionnement.
- 1.3. Assurer pendant une semaine et demie l'initiation du personnel expatrié à la situation au Rwanda, à la justice rwandaise en fonction des tâches à accomplir, au Droit International, etc. L'Opération des Droits de l'Homme apportera son concours entre autres par la disponibilisation de personnes ressources.

OBJECTIF IMMEDIAT 2 :

Appui à la formation du personnel judiciaire national intervenant à divers niveaux au sein du Système de la Justice.

Produit 2.1 : Les magistrats, Juges, Procureurs, enquêteurs rwandais et personnels de soutien formés assurent le fonctionnement minimal du Système de la Justice.

Activités :

- 2.1. Evaluer les besoins de formation prioritaires avec le Ministère de la Justice et en concertation avec Citizen Network et la Coopération Belge, tous deux intervenants dans ce domaine.
- 2.2. Appuyer, selon les besoins, la formation des magistrats, juges, procureurs et enquêteurs par l'entremise de sous-contrats à des ONGs.
- 2.3. Appuyer la formation de greffiers et secrétaires de parquet,

pour permettre aux magistrats d'assurer leur fonction efficacement. Cette formation doit comprendre notamment l'apprentissage des techniques d'archivage et d'informatisation.

PRODUIT 2.2 : Le personnel de l'administration pénitentiaire est formé et permet une gestion des pénitenciers efficace (Directeurs et directeurs adjoints des prisons, Gardiens de prison, Police Judiciaire, Personnel de soutien).

Activités :

- 2.1 Appuyer, selon les besoins, la formation :
- . de la Police Judiciaire.
 - . des Directeurs et directeurs adjoints des prisons et des centres de rééducation et de production.
 - . des Gardiens de prison sur la notion des droits de l'homme.

OBJECTIF IMMEDIAT 3 :

Etablissement d'une structure de Gestion du projet (CGP) afin d'appuyer le Ministère de la Justice dans le suivi et la gestion des activités de ce projet.

PRODUIT 3.1 : Une "Cellule de Gestion du Projet" (CGP) est créée au sein du Ministère de la Justice et veille au bon déroulement des activités en cours.

Activités :

- 3.1 Mise en place de la cellule composée de:

- 1 Directeur National (Ministère)
et Coordinatrice Nationale (projet 1)
- 1 Expert Conseiller Technique Principal (DDSMS)
- 1 Expert gestionnaire

Le personnel d'appui administratif (2 chauffeurs et une secrétaire) apportera son soutien à cette unité basée au sein du Ministère de la Justice.

- 3.2 Programmer, Orienter, gérer et suivre les activités du projet et apporter un appui au suivi de l'assistance en cours.
- 3.3 Elaborer et mettre en oeuvre le plan de travail et le chronogramme des activités du projet.

- 3.4 Appui à l'organisation des Formations du personnel International (1 semaine et demie).
- 3.5 Achats, mise en place et maintenance du matériel roulant et de bureau.
- 3.6 Rédiger des rapports d'activités trimestriels et un rapport annuel.

VII. APPORTS DES PARTIES

1) APPORTS DU PNUD (Fonds Fiduciaire)

a) *Personnel International:*

Un Conseiller Technique Principal et un Gestionnaire (12 H/M), seront engagés dans le cadre du projet afin d'appuyer le Gouvernement dans le suivi du projet et rendre compte de l'exécution des activités grâce à la production de rapports d'avancement, ceci au bénéfice des diverses parties impliquées. L'agence DDSMS s'occupera du recrutement de ces Experts, en accord avec le Ministère de la Justice et le PNUD.

b) *Personnel Local :*

- 1) une provision de 10 000 \$ est prévue pour le recrutement durant une année de deux chauffeurs, et d'une secrétaire en appui à la cellule de Gestion basée auprès du Ministère de la Justice.
- 2) une provision de 180,000 \$ est prévue pour le traitement salarial du personnel de soutien aux magistrats (150 personnes) sur une année.

c) *Sous-traitance:*

- A. Une provision de 450,000 US \$ est prévue pour la réhabilitation des instances juridiques.
- B. Une somme de 1,800,000 \$ US est affectée pour le déploiement de juges, procureurs et enquêteurs expatriés (36,000\$ x 50H / 12 mois = 1,800,000\$).
- C. Une provision de 450,000 \$ est prévue pour l'appui à des formations du personnel local juridique et de l'administration pénitentiaire, et une somme de 20,000 \$ est allouée pour la formation des magistrats

étrangers lors de leur arrivée.

d) Missions :

Une provision de 30,000 \$ est prévue pour les missions sur le terrain, missions de programmation et évaluation.

e) Equipement:

Somme toute, une provision de 1,540,000 US \$ est prévue pour l'achat d'équipement non-consommable et matériel consommable.

f) Divers et maintenance:

Une provision globale de 85,000 \$ est prévue pour la maintenance et les divers.

2) APPORTS DU GOUVERNEMENT

La contribution du Gouvernement Rwandais consistera notamment :

1. à la mise à disposition des homologues qui travailleront en collaboration avec les magistrats étrangers et les experts dans le cadre de la cellule de Gestion afin d'assurer le soutien nécessaire au travail de suivi du projet et,
2. à la mise à disposition d'un local au sein du Ministère de la Justice pour abriter la Cellule de Gestion.

3) APPORTS DE L'OPÉRATION DROITS DE L'HOMME AU RWANDA

L'Opération Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda met au service de ce projet l'unité de Coopération Technique. Cette unité fournira une assistance technique pour la réhabilitation et l'équipement des instances judiciaires par l'entremise des membres de l'unité en place sur le terrain. Elle fournira un appui au recrutement du personnel local d'appui au projet, sera responsable de la formation/orientation des magistrats étrangers à leur arrivée et apportera son concours pour la logistique lors du déploiement des magistrats étrangers dans les préfectures, notamment par la mise à disposition de voitures (8) déjà sur place qui devront être au préalable réparées. Une personne détachée de l'Opération des Droits de l'Homme fera la liaison entre le Centre et la cellule de gestion et permettra ainsi l'échange d'information.

VIII. SUIVI DU PROJET

1. Le projet fera l'objet d'un *examen "Tripartite"* au cours de son exécution: Gouvernement, DDSMS/PNUD, Agence de réalisation. Deux rencontres tripartites sont programmées au cours de la durée du projet: une de démarrage, et une autre d'évaluation finale.
2. Un *Comité de Gestion* se réunira également deux fois durant l'exécution du projet afin de s'assurer de l'utilisation optimale des ressources. Ce Comité sera composée des parties intéressées à savoir: Gouvernement, DDSMS/PNUD, Agence de réalisation et Donateurs.
3. La *Cellule de Gestion (CGP) et suivi* du projet, dont font partie le Directeur National, la Coordinatrice Nationale et les experts internationaux devront également s'assurer du suivi et rendement des contrats de sous-traitance pour la réhabilitation et les formations les plus urgentes ainsi que de la logistique relative aux juristes sur le terrain.

La Cellule de Gestion du projet est responsable également:

De fournir l'appui technique et logistique nécessaire à la gestion et le suivi des activités, et de transmettre un rapport mensuel d'avancement des activités au Gouvernement et parties intéressées. Le PNUD de son côté sera redevant envers les Pays donateurs.

4. L'expert en gestion est responsable de fournir un appui à la cellule de gestion du programme: en collaboration avec le MINIJUST et le Centre des Droits de l'Homme, suivi des travaux de réhabilitation, achat de matériel et gestion du personnel local.

L'expert conseiller technique (CTP) représentant DDSMS, et l'expert en gestion de projet, assureront l'allocation optimale des ressources auprès des donateurs.

Ils devront élaborer les rapports d'avancement périodiques. Les autres parties leur assurent leur collaboration et leur soutien dans leurs fonctions.

ANNEXE A

BUDGET PREVISIONNEL DU PROJET

SUR UNE ANNEE

et

ORGANIGRAMME


RECAPITULATIF BUDGETAIRE PREVISIONNEL

MAI 1995 - MAI 1996

RUBRIQUES	RESPONSABLE	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL
Personnel International			
Experts	DDSMS/PNUD	Expert CTP Expert gestion	120,000\$ 100,000 \$
Personnel Local (150 x 100\$ x 12 m) Fonction Publique	MINIJUST/	Greffiers, Secrét. Parquets	180,000 \$
Appui au Projet/Préfect.	CDH/DDSMS	Interprètes, chauffeurs	10,000 \$
Cellule Gestion	PNUD/MINIJUST	2 Chauff. 1 secr.	
Sous traitance			
1. Réhabilitation	MINIJUST/CDH	Instances Juridi.	450,000 \$
2. Magistrats étrang. (50 pour 12 mois)	DDSMS	Juges, Magistrats Enquêteurs (50 x 36,000 \$/12 Mois)	1,800,000 \$
3. Formations	ONGs/MINIJUST CDH/MINIJUST	Form. Per. Local Form. Per. Inter.	450,000 \$ 20,000 \$
Missions	DDSMS/PNUD	Programmation, évaluation, Mission terrain	30,000 \$
Equipements			
Achats Etranger	DDSMS/PNUD/	Voitures, Motos,... Maté. Cell. gestion	1,200,000 \$ 65,000 \$
Achats locaux	CDH	Meubles, Papeterie,	280,000 \$
Divers et maintenance	DDSMS/CDH	Location de locaux, Achats divers, rapports, Réparation	85,000 \$
Frais d'Agence	DDSMS/CDH	(10%)	475,000 \$
TOTAL			5,265,000 \$

ORGANIGRAMME

PHASE II



TANSLATED LOCAL PUBLICATION

- LE MESSENGER N° 53
April/1995
journal privé

By EDITIONS CENTRALES
(S.A.R.L.)
B.P. 948 Tél: 74224
KIGALI

MAYBE IF THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WERE STOPPED

**SOME PEOPLE WOULD HAVE PEACE.
(LE MESSENGER N° 53/APRIL 1995)**

Rwandese people are afraid of truth and I don't know whether it is part of our nature or not. We don't want to acknowledge that we can't do everything. It is high time we changed in action and in words. However, since we have been unavailingly preaching this, let us seek moderation and the welfare of the majority of the Rwandese population. We have the government and the authorities. We have always had them but all of them are the same. Very few among them struggle for the welfare of the Rwandese population but they don't have the means. A lot of authorities look, first of all, for their interests and those of their relatives and friends. And when this is not possible, they engage conflicts with those who don't help them.

This is how conflicts are born among the authorities and are extended to the population. Back to multiparty system, we can ask ourselves whether this system is not the cause of insecurity prevailing in the countryside. They started calling people interahamwe and thus arresting them. Now this word is out of date. They are asking the political party people belonged to before the war. When someone belonged to MDR they immediately arrest him saying that he is a " Parmehutu" which made them flee and they immediately take him to prison.

These days, as you have been reading, some authorities through many articles published in newspapers like Imvaho, argue that multiparty system is not democracy. This is how they understand the issue and they are our leaders. You can struggle to explain but they will not understand. Instead, they will call you "IGIPINGA" (opponent). Those who say that we are in the multiparty system aim at misleading people since political parties instead of ensuring the welfare of the population, are endangering them.

If this multiparty system cannot be practised, better stop it and give the ministries, belonging to parties, to individuals. RPF should be frank to acknowledge that it doesn't respect the Arusha Peace Accords. In this respect, the population can maybe have peace. Those who call themselves leaders of political parties should carefully ponder upon the issue. They should understand that without the population no political party can exist. By reasoning in that way, they would take appropriate measures.

These parties would join RPF family and the five years would be for the military regime which would bring back security. In the same vein, it would be better if the President of the Republic were a soldier. This would avoid the suspicion that Military Authorities don't abide by the decisions taken by Civilian Authorities. It is obvious that no democracy can be achieved in this country and no one should tell us that we have it. Because we are hungry for democracy, we behave as if we have it, which leads to conflicts between citizens and the authorities. We want open and full dictatorship to which we will clap our hands provided we live in a well-defined situation. We must acknowledge that the "weapon" is powerful

WHY DOESN'T TWAGIRAMUNGU RESIGN ?

Some people are asking themselves this question. They say that TWAGIRAMUNGU should resign and take rest otherwise he will carry the responsibility of what is being done in this country. Thus in history they will say that the first governments which excelled in the killings are those of KAMBANDA, from April to July 1994, and TWAGIRAMUNGU since July up to the present. However, some people don't want to accept that killings are still being committed. They should accept the truth. People are being kidnapped and they disappear (read Le Tribun issue N° 34 October II 94 Page 5)

Another reason which should make TWAGIRAMUNGU resign is that the followers of his party are leaving him. Some died during the massacres except that there are people (extremists) who don't accept this reality. They say that members of MDR who died are only the two ministers : Agatha UWILINGIYIMANA and Faustin RUCOGOZA. I don't know whether they don't know of other people who died because they adhered to the branch of MDR which sided with TWAGIRAMUNGU. We may mention people like Déo HAVUGIMANA, Viateur KALINDA, Emmanuel RUKUNDO to name only a few. Many people have died because their identity cards showed that they were coming from GISHOMA, the same commune as TWAGIRAMUNGU, or they were his relatives.

However, as it happens, some of his followers participated in bad acts, they ate cows, destroyed houses and some even may have killed! This category fled to Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania (I don't mean here that all those who fled are criminals.

Another category of his followers didn't participate in the killings but are now being scolded simply because they are Hutus. They are called "Parmehutus". Any young man in the countryside is not well considered by people who ask him why he wasn't killed, why his family is still living. In addition, they say that he belongs to the party which originates from Parmehutu.

Old people are scolded too. They are accused of having belonged to "Parmehutu". So, if they didn't kill, they ate other people's cows. This category is persecuted, jailed and in some regions men live in the bush. If you have the authority get up and go to the countryside and reassure innocent people who are afraid. Tell those who mistreat them that they fall in the trap of RTLM.

RTLM was preaching that RPF aimed at killing any Hutu and the same thing is happening in some places. If you don't fight against this when it is still early, you will fall in the trap of RTLM (here I address RPF). The majority of MDR members are being killed and those who have means to flee, don't hesitate. How do you see the jailing of people from your region. Did you, you and Minister Nkubito, ever tried to know why these people are suffering? The last category is composed by people for whom to belong to MDR has become like a sin. They thus quit their party to seek safety in RPF.

These people are against you and they want to get rid of you. 100% of them base themselves on the document your party wrote in November 1994, and on some authorities of MDR who made themselves more democratic than others ignoring that we live the after war period, to declare that they cannot accept all this, that they want to dis sever from the "Power Wing".

This is dangerous. If your followers are called "Powers" you too will be accused of being a "power" and all the posts you hold in the government, the National Assembly and in the Embassies will be left to them. Since there will be more posts than people they will invite others who want to eat or who are afraid of being called opponents to join them.

You should resign before you are removed. After the publication of the document I mentioned above, some newspapers whenever you cough, whenever you spit, write about you. Does it mean that you are the only guilty authority in this country? It is true that someone who doesn't work can't commit mistakes but why don't they acknowledge the good things you do? If you don't pay attention, your followers will abandon you to seek safety elsewhere. They will spoil your image and thus you will be removed from your post of Prime Minister. Another reason which makes me ask you to resign is that you are not respected. Your orders are not obeyed and the one you thought to blame is openly condemning you. I am afraid that sooner or later even the younger soldiers will disobey you!

HOWEVER SOME PEOPLE WANT YOU TO STAY !

When you talk to people you realise that some are sad because of some acts done and which are attributed to the Prime Minister, Minister Nkubito and to the prosecutor of the Republic. These people say : Minister Nkubito formerly hated injustice. Now that he is Minister for Justice people are summarily arrested. Prisons are swarmed with people the majority of whom doesn't have dossiers and they ask themselves why he doesn't react, whether he is tired or not good willing. If there are people who weaken him he should follow the example of MBONAMPEKA and resign.

Other people say that prosecutor NSANZUWERA had told the journalist of Le TRIBUN that he would resign if the situation didn't change but it seems that he came back to his decision. It seems that he cannot resign when the country has got problems. Maybe TWAGIRAMUNGU has got the same reasons as his. Any way I think that the problems of this country are difficult to solve even though we shouldn't despair.

Do the population know why you turn a deaf ear to their problems? Could you ask the population that you abandoned to vote for you if elections were to take place now? Do what you should do. You only once depicted the problems of the population and maybe you got threatened since you didn't say anything later on. Don't accept to pay for what you are not responsible for. This is how I see things if someone doesn't agree with me, his reaction is welcome. I hope that many people are concerned about this issue.

WHY NO ONE CONFIDES IN TWAGIRAMUNGU AND HIS FOLLOWERS?

I read the article of HITIMANA Chromos N° 51 of LE MESSENGER INTUMWA where he said : "TWAGIRAMUNGU'S FOLLOWERS ARE DISAPPOINTED" The ideas included in this article are founded. I thus, in the following points, decide to complete him.

1. HIS FOLLOWERS ARE NOT PARMEHUTU.

When you read IMBONI, LE TRIBUN, KIBERINKA and other newspapers which praise the present regime, you notice that they are enthusiastic at convincing people that the current MDR is not different from PARMEHUTU of 1959 and 1960. Even IMBONI doesn't accept that MDR-PARMEHUTU was stopped in 1973 because MRND was PARMEHUTU!

To say such things is to mislead the population and ignore willingly the truth. MDR we have in the country belongs to TWAGIRAMUNGU and his followers. It is thus different from MDR-PARMEHUTU and from what has been termed "POWER". Here are our explanations :

MDR of Twagiramungu is the genuine MDR since it has been founded in July 1991 when thousands and thousands of people were disgusted with HABYARIMANA and his MRND. They decided to restart and renovate MDR-PARMEHUTU and thus adapt it to the present times.

In this renovation, the party became MDR simply in order to strengthen the principle of true unity between Rwandese so that no one could be excluded due to his ethnic group. The new MDR is not thus a party of Hutus as some people want to affirm. It is known that there are Tutsis who adhered to this party (we can mention their names when necessary)

However no one can deny that at a certain time, division erupted in this party due to people who wanted to serve personal interests even though it had become clear that they had lost confidence of people. One part which was guided by NSENGIYAREMYE, KARAMIRA, MUREGO, SEBATWARE condemned TWAGIRAMUNGU, the president of the party because he had decided to stick to the ideology of the party whereas his opponents preached that their programme was PARMEHUTU's and that TWAGIRAMUNGU and his followers were INYENZI-INKOTANYI(enemies), people of LUNARI and other names which aimed at convincing the population that they disregarded the interests of Hutus. They felt that it was a good way of having many followers on their side. However, TWAGIRAMUNGU, got followers because his ideas fitted the new Rwanda, the country where Hutus and Tutsis live in mutual-respect where every one enjoys his rights.

People like : MUREGO, SEBATWARE, MBONYUMUTWA, SHINGIRO, NKEZABERA J.M.V, BICAMUMPAKA Jérôme and many others who became "Powers" and killers, were against TWAGIRAMUNGU because they saw him as a great politician who would lead the country whereas they would feel uneasy due to the hatred they nourished towards KAYIBANDA, his father-in-law.

The conflict in MDR grew more tense when NSENGIYAREMYE was removed from the Prime Ministry. He and his followers (they called themselves Parmehutu) took this occasion to get rid of TWAGIRAMUNGU dismissing him from the party alleging that he was a betrayer. But they didn't succeed. This conflict was strengthened by what is known as the KABUSUNZU congress (23-24/07/1993. This congress led TWAGIRAMUNGU and his followers to work together and that was how AMAJYOJYI (his followers) were born in MDR.

As they were teaching true unity and reconciliation within the party based on respecting its ideology, they got new followers. This led those who called themselves Parmehutu to get discouraged. They joined MRND-CDR but they called themselves "powers" to mislead people as they were ashamed of going back to what they had refused.

It is thus true that Twagiramungu followers and POWERS (who formerly called themselves Parmehutus) followed a different political line. It was even believed that these two groups were simply disputing posts. Another thing which shows that they were totally different is that many people, including religious people, tried to unite them but to no avail. This difference was also shown during the massacres in which the POWERS, Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi participated but in general TWAGIRAMUNGU followers didn't dirty their hands. Even some of them, mainly politicians, have been chased because they were called Inyenzi or accomplices.

2. THEY, TOO, LOST THEIR RELATIVES

The atrocities committed in this country in April-July 1994 were done in two ways: Genocide and massacres and when the two are joined they are called "mass killings". What is astonishing in these days is that people of one ethnic group think they are the only ones to have lost relatives whereas other Rwandese, even though they didn't die due to their ethnic belonging, lost their lives simply because of their ideas they shared with RPF.

Here are names of TWAGIRAMUNGU followers who died during the mass killings :

- Madam Agatha UWIRINGIYIMANA : We all know her since she was Prime Minister. She struggled, without reserve, against MRND-CDR dictatorship. She was president of MDR in BUTARE and thus she was among the people who formed the Political Bureau of the party. She has been courageous and the country should always remember her. She died with her husband Ignace BARAHIRA.

- Faustin RUCOGOZA : He was Minister for Information and president of MDR in BYUMBA and thus in Political Bureau of the party.

- Zacharie SERUBYOGO : He was a great businessman and Vice-President of MDR in Cyangugu. He was in the Political Bureau of the party. Members of CDR had called him a Tutsi who changed his identity.

- Stanislas SINIBAGIWE : He was director of the School Press (IMPRISCO) and Vice-President of MDR in Byumba. He was ipso facto a member of the Political Bureau of the party.

- Stanislas BUSHAYIJA : He was a medical assistant and member of MDR political Bureau since he was secretary of the party in

Byumba.

- There are other members of the party who were killed and who were in the leading organs at the prefectorial, communal and cell levels. These are people like : Charles NTAZINDA (BUTARE-NYABISINDU), Straton SEBANYAMBO (KIGALI-KANZENZE), Michel TWAGIRUMUKIZA (GITARAMA-MUSAMBIRA), Jean-Marie NTOYIRYO (KIGALI BIRYOGO) GASAMAGERA Alias LOCOMOTIVE RWA MDR (KIGALI-SHYORONGI), Vicent HABYARIMANA (GIKONGORO-MUBUGA), Viateur KARINDA and Tarcisse RUBWIRIZA (BYUMBA) and other people, we cannot name, especially young men who belonged to the JDR-INKUBA family.

In these days, we remember the last year killings. It is not fair to insist only on the genocide of Tutsis. It is true that many people died in it, but we shouldn't forget that many Hutus, especially the authorities who belonged to MDR and PSD parties, died in these massacres of April 1994. It is astonishing to see that some widows are excluded from associations of the massacres widows under the allegation that Hutu were not killed. Another sad thing is that on the Women's Day (8 March 1995) no speech delivered on that day praised the courage of Agatha UWIRINGIYIMANA whereas she struggled for the country and for women in particular. We hope that this mistake will be avoided during the burial ceremony (scheduled on 7 April 1995) of the former authorities of this country who have been victims of the massacres.

3. TWAGIRAMUNGU'S FOLLOWERS HAVE LOST ON BOTH SIDES.

When the new government was created on 19 July 1994, MDR followers jumped with happiness that finally their TWAGIRAMUNGU was appointed Prime Minister in respect of Arusha Peace Accords. They hoped that this post would enable him to change the administration of this country in a way to eradicate dictatorship, corruption, ethnic division and other ills the country was suffering from during the regime of HABYARIMANA. However, they soon got

disappointed.

In fact, no one can condemn TWAGIRAMUNGU. He doesn't actually hold the authority as accorded by Arusha Peace Accords. When you hear him on the radio you realise that his ideas are still the same except that he has no occasion to put them in action. This issue is very frustrating to his followers who notice that their chief has no clear role to play in this country.

Much more frustrating for them is that some RPF members consider them as enemies especially since when they issued that document of November 1994 which criticised the administration of the country but also gave advice to the government on what can be done to normalise the situation.

What is sad is that some MDR members, seeing that the document didn't please RPF, went to tell the latter that they were not responsible for what the Political Bureau declared. They added that the document was written by people who shared Parmehutu ideas with TWAGIRAMUNGU.

Actually, apart from some people who call their colleagues "Powers" and "Parmehutu" because they want to curry favours with RPF as they are afraid of losing their posts, there is no "power wing" nor "Parmehutu" in MDR TWAGIRAMUNGU. We explained this in the beginning. It is said that those who spread these rumours are the tools of those who want MDR to be divided and this would give occasion to exclude TWAGIRAMUNGU and his companions of struggle and their posts would be given to people said to belong to MDR whereas in fact they are like puppets. Beyond the understanding is the fact that those who accuse others of being "Powers" are those opportunists or people who had attended the Kabusunzu congress which gave birth to "Power Wing".

This fact of mistaking MDR TWAGIRAMUNGU for Parmehutu, killers ,powers and other things which aim at making people enemies of the nation, serves as a basis for security people to arrest any one who was in the MDR organs in sectors, communes and cells. We are informed that many of MDR members who didn't flee because they were innocent have been arrested accused allegedly of being Interahamwe. When they think that someone may become burgomaster it becomes worse. They immediately look for people who falsely accuse him of the killing he didn't commit.

4. CONCLUSION

Up to now, we don't understand why members of MDR are still being persecuted whereas actually they are not against the regime of BIZIMUNGU and KAGAME. If they dared to show the government what is not going well this should not be the reason to call them Parmehutus or to imprison them. Except if this is a pretext some people found to carry out their plan of taking the power alone. It is said that in RPF, some members (rather family members) didn't appreciate the good decision of power sharing taken by their leaders.

It would be better if a meeting of confidence building and mutual-criticism was held between RPF and political parties existing in this country. In this meeting, they would frankly say the truth on what they see as a hindrance to the cooperation they promised when they created the government of National Unity and if necessary some members would leave but in a democratic way. This would put an end to the suspicion. In any case, to persecute someone basing oneself on ethnic or political belonging, should be stopped because it would encourage the true enemies of the country.

François RENZAHU

THE NEWSPAPER "LE MESSENGER INTUMWA" IS UNJUSTLY PERSECUTED

These days, every where in this town of Kigali, there are two divergent criticisms about LE MESSENGER-INTUMWA. One group says that the newspaper is no longer following its ideology (Radio Rwanda on 30/03 1995 in the emission "music and ideas" delivered by Néron BIZIMANA). This journalist convinced Rwandese people that he doesn't know why the journalists of Le Messenger are not yet arrested. He accused us! It is normal since we don't have justice yet. This journalist profits by the distraction of the authorities, to point with finger and insult anyone of his choice especially anyone he doesn't share political ideas with.

When he said this, his colleagues with whom he shares ideas, had on the previous day torn 37 copies of Le Messenger. My colleague journalist told me that this country is still behind. We have stepped backwards. We criticised Habyarimana and very often wrongly but they didn't tear our copies. They instead wanted to arrest us but our accomplice warned us and we hid ourselves. My colleagues are convinced that they are not only extremists but also ignorant. Another group lives on fear. When they remember what has been done on their director MUTSINZI they say that Le Messenger will disappear since all its journalists will be killed.

Some advises me to flee and others tell me to stop writing. When we issue a number they are astonished to see me around whereas I should be in hide-out. All this is said and those who are concerned have got reasons. They don't want us to say the truth on the current situation and some willingly ignore how the Newspaper started because it goes against their egoistic interests.

In any case, our writings aim at constructing the country and we publish what we hear from the population. We don't want to flee so that we may not be killed by our opponents. We must collaborate with others to build this country. It is said that no one can challenge his fate!

Remember those who fled the war and Interahamwe who ran to Zaire to escape from death. When they arrived there they died of diarrhoea. If they kill me I will not be the first to be victim of injustice and as they themselves say, from April to July many innocent people have been killed! I would however like to ask rwandese and mainly the authorities not to be afraid of newspapers. We point out mistakes so that they can be corrected. We have no intention to discourage them. They should know that to flatter them would serve them no good.

Our readers, when they think about how the authorities persecute us using, this time, Radio Rwanda, are concerned because the persecuted newspapers belong to Hutu journalists : NYABARONGO, LE MESSENGER, LE PARTISAN. The redaction staff of LE MESSENGER doesn't see things this way. Many people add that these newspapers are condemned because they were on the side of MDR, so to say that they have Parmehutu ideology. Since anyone who was in MDR is considered as a parmehutu, these newspapers aim at defending Hutus!

This is not true. We defend the wronged people we don't care whether they are Hutus, Tutsis, or Twas. Why did they call us Inyenzi (enemies) before? You should be familiar with our writings since we didn't change. I invite you to read the article issued in N° 28 on 5/3/1993 page 7 and see whether we changed. We will speak for anyone who is wronged. We will combat injustice no matter how we can be persecuted. We will sometimes issue some of our articles already published so as to show you that we didn't abandon our ideology. The article we are going to issue for the second time is

January 1995. When you discuss the incident with some people, they reply that it served him right, commenting that he should know the environment for which he is writing. It did not stop there, the paper for which he is the editor continued to come out; but the children selling it in town often meet with trouble. They are sometimes attacked by youngsters who snatched the papers out of their hands.

commodities through the paper, I tell them that five thousand copies do come out."

On top of treading on thread due to poverty, there is lack of qualifications in journalism. The quality and validity of the written media are nowhere to be seen. As a consequence, it is not surprising to read a paper and not find any news in it. How can it be collected if there are no means available to do so? That is why so many papers are full of commentaries, the few news items being mingled with opinions or sheer rumours.

THAT IS NO REASON FOR HAVING ONE'S HEAD HACKED TO PIECES

Mistakes are not made by the press alone. Government and military authorities and various organizations are accountable as well. A newsperson reports the truth if he/she has got it. Yet there are various authorities or individuals who stand in their way, thus preventing them to carry out their functions properly. It is then here that you find everything classified "as Government, military or professional confidential". Some situations are complicated for unknown reasons. For example, a journalist with KINYAMATEKA has tried to visit Rilima three times, but to no avail. Despite that he had all the required documents from the Minister of Justice, not a single time was he allowed in.

No media can work properly if there is not enough freedom of press which guarantees that people can view things differently. Someone who thinks differently from you should not be deemed as your enemy. But, this seems to have become a principle in Rwanda. Starting from earlier, journalists have been persecuted due to their opinions. Under the former government, journalists would be beaten to death, put in jail and even killed. Even today the prospects for an improved situation are not high. The journalist MUTSINZI had his head hacked to pieces with a small hatchet on 29

little by little to such a point that journalists worthy of the name ended up emerging. But in the meantime, incendiary papers also came into being. These were inciting Rwandese to division based on political parties, ethnic or regional belonging and ideological differences. We can cite the magazine KANGURA and Radio RTLM. These are some of the media which set fire on Rwanda, causing indescribable killings throughout the country. Most of the professional journalists were killed in the process, others fled to far-away countries and refused to come back for various reasons.

PAPERS HAVE TO BE BORN AGAIN

In the aftermath of genocide and massacres, some of the papers have resumed thanks to assistance from donors one of whom is "Reporters sans Frontières", an organization defending the rights of the press. There are quite new papers, though. At present there are 18 publications in Rwanda plus others coming out from neighbouring countries.

When examined carefully, the press suffer from the same problems as earlier, which have even increased. Often you find that a paper is run by one or two persons. I discussed with one who confirmed he was at the same time the editor and journalist of his paper. When asked about his equipment, he replied: " Apart from my pen and notebook, there is nothing more". No photocopier, no office, no address, nothing. He collects information on foot, or catches a taxi when there is extra money over the printing fees. He has recourse to friends to type his articles. Do not ask him about computer he who sometimes cannot afford a pen. When it comes out, his paper is sold by children roaming the city or at stalls at "Gare routi re" or the roundabout in Kigali. Sending it out in prefectures is out of question as he cannot afford the postal costs. When asked about the number of copies printed per issue, the journalist (who requested anonymity) said: "I never go beyond a thousand, but when people want to pass advertisements of their

TANSLATED LOCAL PUBLICATION

- KINYAMATEKA/SPECIAL

April/1995

journal de l'Eglise Catholique

By EDITIONS CENTRALES
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KIGALI

THE JOURNALISTS IN RWANDA ARE TREADING ON EGGS
WITH A HEAP OF PROBLEMS.
(KINYAMATEKA/SPECIAL /APRIL 1995)

Journalism is a difficult profession all over the world in general, and in Africa in particular. Numberless are journalists who have been killed, imprisoned, persecuted or kept in perpetual fear on account of their articles. Those who died in Rwanda are themselves many. Last year's massacres alone claimed lives of about 48 of them. In addition to profession-related problems, the Rwandan journalist is faced up with problems pertaining to poverty, lack of professional training, lack of democratic background and freedom of speech for the individual. All these handicaps are traceable to all stages of information processing: collecting, writing and distribution.

THEIR HISTORY IS SHORT.

Papers have mushroomed since the advent of multiparty system. They came from nearly zero to almost sixty. Some were pretending to support this or that political agenda or this or that politician. Most of the time they would be sponsored by those for whom the support was intended. Other people would create papers just to earn money. Often people have launched papers following a badly-studied project; these would usually stop shortly after, due to bankruptcy. There are also papers which came into being because their owners wanted to get their ideas across especially that they were finally allowed to. However, those who initiated papers were mere apprentices. As a result, mistakes were many: we can cite the case of stories totally different from the truth, defamatory articles normally punishable by law.

There were even people who, on behalf of journalism, indulged in blackmail by charging on certain persons under pain of being written upon. Fortunately, all those setbacks went on dwindling

the role played by the Church in genocide.

Just recently, the paper Imboni in its issue n° 6 has published the following: "starting from 1952, only four bishops have been abiding by the principle of the Gospel. These are: Bishops Aloys BIGIRUMWAMI, Joseph SIBOMANA, Wenceslas KALIBUSHI and Bishop RUBWEJANGA". As for the others, "all of them were accomplices of the killers". One way of highlighting the nature of the press in our country is to show how the media review the problems facing Rwanda. However, Kinyamateka does not agree with all the ideas published by the various papers, even if this article has compiled those ideas. Concerning the fact there are no articles from such big papers as KINYAMATEKA and IMVAHO, it is simply because the current crucial problems facing the country have been discussed by both papers in their issues of the past months, and our focus has been on the issues that were coming out by the time we were writing this article.

themselves, they feel like refugees in their own country. The problem of property is also reflected in the Rwandese legal system whereby no one may appropriate oneself with property belonging to a third party. This was also substantiated in the letter N° 10/06.01 dated 20 Jan 1995 sent to the Prime Minister by the Minister of Justice stipulating that "the property of those who committed genocidal acts remain theirs or that of their lawful successors as long as the justice has not seized it". (Le Tribun n° 44)

He also indicated that selling that property might make it impossible to pay compensation for the damage for which the owners of the property in question are responsible. The issue of property, land and houses has so far not been addressed properly. What the Prime Minister said in his Speech on the Government's Agenda regarding the property belonging to the perpetrators of the genocide was never implemented, i.e the conversion of such property into compensation in favour of the successors of the victims. In any case, it is not apparent that the kind of definite settlement of that conflict expected by "Libération" has been reached. Another problem troubling both the population and the Government is that the University and the secondary schools have not reopened yet. The dates for reopening have been postponed indefinitely.

The Catholic Church which played a big role in education has to revise the agreement that had been passed between them and the Government. In this respect, now a joint commission of both parties has been set up to establish a revised agreement. The requirements for the schools to reopen are many. The relevant Ministry estimates that a total outlay of 849,000,000 RwF is needed (see Arc-en-ciel n° 6 on page 7). While schools have not reopened yet, there are also problems in the public service. The law says that when somebody dies, his/her successors are entitled to a one-time three-month salary. This has not applied yet. It is a serious problem as published by "Libération" n° 4. Other recurrent issues that are common today and which are taking much place relate

The report discloses the killings committed by RPF from a little before April 1994 up to the period after it took over the power in Kigali.

The killings revealed by Amnesty International and imputed to RPF had been denounced by the former defeated Government. John KAMBANDA, the former Prime Minister in his refuge in Bukavu declared in an interview to the paper "JUA" published in Zaire that "the prefecture of Byumba was counting 800,000 inhabitants; now the number has been reduced to 200,000. Could we possibly know where the others have gone?" This interview was translated in Kinyarwanda and published by "KIBERA" in its special issue dated 25 Feb 1995, showing that even if KAMBANDA does not state it openly, he however confirms that the people missing in that prefecture were not killed by RGF, thus attributing them to RPF. Even though the population feels concerned by those political problems as they still remember how unsolved political issues have resulted in genocide, they have other day-to-day problems that are nonetheless serious.

THE ISSUE OF PROPERTY

Today the issue of property, houses and land is at its height. "Libération" in its issue n° 4 published in Rwanda is of the opinion that the problem at issue should be met with an overall solution. Upon their return, the genocide survivors rescued by RPF, found their houses destroyed and their property looted. When Rwandese refugees who had fled before April 1994 came back, they occupied the houses and land left by the population which fled to Zaire from the war, especially those who have not returned because they participated in massacres.

In addition, "Libération" talks of the problem of caseload refugees who took refuge outside the country in 1960 and 1973, also leaving their property, land and houses behind. When this category of refugees comes back in Rwanda and fail to find where to settle

BURUNDI and TANZANIA." (UMUHUZA, December 1994, p.22)

While the commanders of the defeated army are of the opinion that Arusha Peace Accords should be literally implemented, for Paul KAGAME, the essential is to abide by "the main principles contained in the Accords, and not article by article". On the question regarding the fusion of armies, only those who did not take part in the killings will be mingled with RPA. (Speech by Major General KAGAME at Gako on 25 Jan 1995)

As of now, out of the total defeated army, only 1011 have joined RPA. "Le TRIBUN" in its issue n° 44 of early March 1995 discloses that 80 soldiers trained at Gako are currently in detention. They are accused of having participated in genocide. "Le TRIBUN" that releases the information shows that there should be no sensationalism over the issue while " around 500 RPA soldiers are in prison together with the 80 in question." The information comes in to contradict rumours spread alleging that the 80 soldiers were killed.

VERY FEW NEWSPAPERS HAVE PUBLISHED

ARTICLES ABOUT MASSACRES COMMITTED BY RPA

Information as to which the 80 military had been killed never appeared in any paper. It was circulated only as a grapevine. The killings much reported upon and still widely talked about are the genocide. It is estimated that between 500,000 and one million people perished on account of their ethnicity. However, practically no paper has related the killings attributed to RPA. The paper "NYABARONGO"(Le canard déchaîné), in its unnumbered issue which came out in late Feb 1995, published a report by Amnesty International (an international organization that monitors the respect of human rights by Governments) on "killings, disappearances of people allegedly imputed to RPA". The report by Amnesty International published by "Nyabarongo" is written in French; it was not translated to Kinyarwanda for the readership.

RWANDA'S CURRENT PROBLEMS AS REVIEWED BY THE PRESS.
(KINYAMATEKA/ SPECIAL /APRIL 1995)

Rwanda is currently facing various problems. The authorities are confronted with thorny issues of socio-political nature. Presenting the manner in which the press analyses those problems is essential as the media express ideas shared by the population, and shape their future viewpoints on issues facing the country.

THE DEFEATED ARMY WOULD BE TRAINING TO ATTACK

There is talk of military drills carried out by former RGF (national army before 7 April 1994) currently living as refugees in Goma and Bukavu, in Zaire. The paper KIBERA in its issue of 25 Dec 1995 reproduces an article in French by Colette Braeckman published in "The Guardian" in England. The article confirms that "thousands of Rwandese military refugees were transferred from Mugunga camp in the vicinity of Goma to Chimanga camp in Bukavu, where they undergo military training, at 50 km from Rwandan border".

Even though the article confirms that military preparations are under way at the named locations, the journalists of UMUHUZA, a periodical published in Brussels, Belgium have approached Generals Augustin BIZIMUNGU and Gratian KABILIGI, commanders of the defeated army. Both generals stated that there was no military training exercised by their army (UMUHUZA, issue of December 1994). However, they added that "war could resume if there is no other remedy". The other remedy General BIZIMUNGU refers to is peace talks that would take place between the Government of KAMBANDA and the commanders of the defeated army on the one hand, and RPF on the other. The Government of Kigali is totally against such talks. Paul KAGAME, Vice-President of the Republic and Defence Minister says: "...No one could talk with people who set up gangs of criminals which continue killing people by launching attacks from

Secondly, people mistake Arusha Peace Accords for either one's capacity to perform a job or patriotism! Those who are thirsty for peace follow the criterion of competence because they aim at having all capable Rwandese take part in the reconstruction of our country. But for those who do not want to follow the procedure, it is not necessary for them to continue invoking Arusha Accords to win them posts in the administration. Just an example: if UNAR party followers apply for posts for which they are truly qualified, would they be denied just because their political party is not mentioned in Arusha Accords? A new Rwanda should not be equated with new trees and grass jutting out after the war, but with genuine constructive ideas apart from setting obstacles, or seeking elections and other bragging acts that are only good at reviving the sorrow of the bereaved. Journalists will always make noise unless you obstruct your ears by thrusting trees therein!

The authority (the Prime Minister) held us for some time and went on giving orders to us as to how to publish information. Due to indignation, some of us went back home without having asked a single question. Major RUTAYISIRE, ORINFOR Director, in his interview with Radio Rwanda was not less astonished with the Prime Minister's conference. But more importantly, he explained what journalism is in an accurate way. He said: "the problem at present is that there is a change in the functioning of Radio Rwanda, and some officials are not quite happy with the change. Formerly, Radio Rwanda was instrumental to the Government in organizing animation sessions and worshipping the authorities. Whether they have been killing or embezzling public funds, the message is the same: there is development in Rwanda. May God prevent Rwanda from media that are always praising the authorities. Long live X or Y, we support you 100%! Praising the authorities even when they have misbehaved is doing a disservice to the country. A good press is the one that presents the Government's good achievements and at the same time discloses its misdoings. He summarized his explanation in a traditional saying: 'he who announces the death of a chief of household should not be held responsible for the latter death'. When a journalist collects information from a competent source and broadcasts it thereafter, he/she should not be blamed for it. In so doing, the journalist will have used the necessary research techniques because he/she will have checked with those concerned by the news item". Once bitten, twice shy! Those who did not understand will never do.

The Accords signed in Arusha, Tanzania, are not instrumental to Rwandese! Firstly, when they were signed, one of the parties, pretending to act on behalf of all Rwandese, was harbouring a hidden agenda of decimating part of the population! He lied wittingly as he was using CDR Party and RTLM (former extremist radio) to repudiate the Accords!

TANSLATED LOCAL PUBLICATION

- INTAREMARA N° 005/8
April/1995
journal privé

By EDITIONS CENTRALES
(S.A.R.L.)
B.P. 948 Tél: 74224
KIGALI

THE PRESS ARE MAKING NOISE TO THE PRIME MINISTER
(Intaremarara N° 005 8/ April 1995)

In his press conference held on 23 march 1995, the Prime Minister criticized and even threatened the media though the latter seemed to not be frightened anyhow. In fact, journalists are not frightened at all, they simply let the speaker deliver his/her speech, making him/her believe that he/she has subdued them! "We thought that the media that used to revile the authorities had gone away with Kangura (a former extremist publication)! It is the latter which would publish cartoons representing naked Government officials! Naked! But Radio Rwanda is even more appalling!", the Prime Minister said. He added that "because journalists think that the national radio belongs to them while it has actually its owners (meaning authorities), they broadcast whatever they wish to the point that the information released causes misunderstanding among people". The Prime Minister went as far as saying that Radio-Rwanda was behaving as a Public Prosecutor or his office!

Such a speech was a reaction to a news item broadcast by Radio Rwanda according to which 122,000,000 Rwf had been embezzled from the Ministry of Finance; the information had been obtained from the General Inspector of Finance in the Ministry of Finance. What the Prime Minister refrained from disclosing was the reason behind the escape of one of the officials accused of the fund embezzlement in question! His accomplice was not that lucky since he has been arrested on account of a similar crime before the information on embezzlement was released: he requested a five hundred thousand-franc bribe in exchange of a cheque to be paid to a firewood supplier for the Ministry of Defence. The accused is no one else than Philemon who is known for similar malpractice; proof is that, at present, we know of many businessmen who have delayed getting their cheques for fear of being obliged to cede to the said official half of the amount due to them!

... it! He however went on to say that he did not know of any government or country that would be supplying those arms! So , every Wednesday we will go there for a briefing as if we were his soldiers or employees. Let him tell lies to his kin!

HE WILL TELL US LIES EVERY WEDNESDAY

(Intaremarara N° 005/8 April 1995)

On 28 March 1995 at AMAHORO hotel, UNAMIR Headquarters, there was a press conference convened by Ambassador SHAHARYAR KHAN. He started by telling us about his visit to Kibungo and Byumba. He found out that the security situation was all right. He said: "What I saw is quite different from what I had heard, I saw the population was in good condition. Some were busy doing their field work, others doing business. Apart from people who came and found their houses occupied by others, everything is okay. (Here we should not exaggerate, we have already said it: people can share the land and even the house; after all the new occupants did own houses formerly!) He went on commenting on certain UNAMIR soldiers' misbehaviour; we have only individual cases and the blame should not be put on UNAMIR as whole! That is fine, we agree! But, is UNAMIR made of buildings? Is it made of paper or cars they spend most of their time driving? They cannot offer a lift to Rwandese even if you are being beaten by a heavy storm! Then what assistance did they come to provide ? The press continued besetting him with questions- sometimes very sharp ones- until he suddenly became angry with Chantal from Radio Rwanda and Kayitana Charles from Rwanda-Weekly on the grounds that he would not answer "stupid questions". That Indian does not want to hear of the word "Interahamwe"! Is this out of antipathy towards them? Is this out of sympathy and support for them? Does he know them at all? If so, what the hell would he have come to do?

What surprised me most is his answer to the question posed by Kamanzi Innocent of Radio-Rwanda whether he knew something about the planes that landed in Goma, Zaire, loaded with arms destined to attack Rwanda! He replied: "Bulgarian arms! I heard about them, I won't comment on that until the press have broadcasted or written

who can do something about it, spare no efforts to have those devilish people punished.

This date marking the beginning of the mourning period of three months should be no opportunity to avenge one's victims just as certain people expect it with fear. I figure no one can go in for that kind of stupidity and wickedness. Those who indulge in spreading such rumours are the very ones who committed genocide. By so doing, they hope that something like their crime can be staged, thus annulling the prospect of being punished for their crimes. You always hear the phrase "double genocide" from their mouths. May they keep quiet, that will never happen again. The date of 7th April should not be the only reference; each family should set its own date to commemorate or rather mourn its beloved ones and pray for them as the majority were christians. Ten months ago RPF stopped the killings in the country; the expatriates supposed to help us with reconstruction of the country feel first concerned with the "problem of people who occupy houses and land belonging to others". Had they truly wanted to help us, they would have constructed cheap houses and let the Government collect rents from the occupants. There is no shame in so doing; on the contrary, that would be genuine assistance different from condescending relief thrown to us as if we were unable to achieve anything on our own. Who would fail to achieve something on their own if they enjoyed peace? Give us peace and you shall see!

It will be good for us if Inkotanyi accepted the negotiations. As those who fight for ruling this country, we will not give them a chance because they are telling lies on the radio.

I don't mean that innocent people died starting from 1973. During the first Republic and during the Monarchy Rule, people died. You shouldn't advance that you fight RPF because it is fighting. Inkotanyi should know that if they come to take the power without caring for the democratic process the population will not accept. The holders of the authority know how it is good especially when they come from war! Don't sow misunderstanding between soldiers, sergeants and commandants plunging them into war with Inkotanyi whereas you are enjoying the regime you got by means of weapons.

TO END THE WAR IS NOT TO DEFEAT INKOTANYI!

The lesson we should draw from the recent event: we jumped with joy, we drank beer, and sang the song SERUBUGA and his group composed when we heard that General RWIGEMA was dead. He died but Inkotanyi are still fighting. Always there have been slogans that Inyenzi should be killed in Bweyeye, Butama, Birunga and Bugarama! It would be a mistake if leaders of political parties thought to kill HABYARIMANA would solve our problems. Instead of killing Inkotanyi, you should kill what made them Inkotanyi! I am not going to dirty myself by condemning or approving of the attack of Inkotanyi on 7-8/January 1993. I cannot condemn Inkotanyi sparing HABYARIMANA because he belongs to the " MAJORITY POPULATION". If you don't abandon this habit of insulting them they will, in one night, arrive in Kigali and I don't know where we will hide our flat noses saying that we are Hutus! I warn you! Wherever you are dream of Negotiations, when you eat, eat with negotiations and when you drink, do it with negotiations. You can even defeat them, it would be useless since you will not defeat the reason be

EDITORIAL
(INTAREMARA N° 005/8 April 1995)

From 7 April 1994 to 7 April 1995: a whole year has elapsed. The year leaves us with sorrow that is yet to last unless the justice administration does its best to punish the perpetrators of genocide (those who left us bereaved) soon. And the punishment must be administered here in Rwanda so that we can witness it and feel relieved! Even if no one can assure that all those who are guilty of genocide have met their punishment, at least our hearts will feel relieved from anguish.

It is very regrettable that a whole year has elapsed while all planners and perpetrators of genocide are still given asylum by countries with whom we are supposed to hold bilateral cooperation, extended even to the Embassy level. Instead of extraditing those criminals, they rather treat them with more care and envisage even to defend them. We strongly need to know our true friend countries apart from the common hypocrisy practised in diplomacy. This would enable us to distinguish our true friends from sheer hypocrites.

Since 1959, the national policy has taught the population that Tutsis people are hypocritical, wicked and the like. As a consequence, this has downgraded the thinking of the victims who were always reluctant to take initiatives for fear of matching this or that description! This of course is no excuse for preventing those who killed their families from being punished. It would even be better if the killers were denounced by their relatives.

We do not wish to commemorate the 7th April 1996 while the killers are still going unpunished. The date is extremely wounding, and we would like the wounds to heal to leave scars. again we request that nobody should wound the scars as a w scar proves to be more painful than a fresh wound. You P

them from the battle field or go and arrest those who live in
Meridian Hotel

Edouard MUTSINZI

attack. You cannot kill them all. Mister NGURUBE would be witness, you killed him many times but now he is with them!

STOP ARRESTING ACCOMPLICES!

To ask Inkotanyi to stop fighting whereas we don't give them any thing is not good. I remind you that we have been living the calm thanks to leaders of political parties: Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU (MDR), Dr Théoneste GAFARANGA (PSD), Justin MUGENZI (PL) who accepted to go to Brussels to meet Inkotanyi! This meeting gave us peace except that HABYARIMANA and his disciples continued to sabotage the outcome of this meeting. They needed war! HABYARIMANA's people said : "Those leaders of have parties betrayed the country". The accomplices of HABYARIMANA in MDR said : "If TWAGIRAMUNGU and his colleagues decide to negotiate with Inkotanyi as they did in Belgium, they should sign durable accords which will lead us until the war and the negotiations are over".

The bad habit of arresting accomplices goes with asking the residence permit. When you have a new identity card, they call you Inkotanyi and when you are a Tutsi it becomes worse. I don't blame the Gendarmes who do it because they have been taught that the enemy of this country is a Tutsi.

When you ask those who come from the same region as HABYARIMANA, which ethnic group do KANYARENGWE, Major RIZINDE, Commandant BISERUKA and Pasteur BIZIMUNGU belong to (the first is the chairman of RPF the last leads RPF delegation in Arusha negotiations and these come from the same region as HABYARIMANA!), they respond that they are like covers! I don't know why only Tutsis and some Hutus from the south are called accomplices. To detect Inkotanyi from identity cards and ethnic belonging is not good for us. If you want Inkotanyi go and arrest

Why
kil

entitled:

TO END THE WAR IS NOT TO DEFEAT INKOTANYI!

When two armies who know each other are at war, they make people laugh! These days they are appealing to every rwandese to support the army by any means so as to defeat the "enemy" that is Inkotanyi! They are no longer even calling them Inkotanyi. The names like Inyenzi, enemy, are now heard on Radio whereas the Arusha Negotiations have forbidden this insulting language. Inkotanyi are being insulted on Radio Rwanda. However, I have never heard Inkotanyi insulting the government on their Radio MUHABURA !

When you ask those who support HABYARIMANA why they have resumed the habit on insulting Inkotanyi they tell you that Inkotanyi disregarded the negotiations and attacked! We don't know the relationship between insults and opening fire.

INSULT WILL NOT DEFEAT INKOTANYI

If those Inkotanyi attacked our country, which is also theirs, don't think that you love it more than them. Before the war broke out, HABYARIMANA had been in contacts with president MUSEVENI of UGANDA. HABYARIMANA announced to the world that MUSEVENI had cheated him since he failed to the promise of not allowing Inkotanyi to attack Rwanda. When Inkotanyi attacked MUSEVENI justified himself saying that Uganda was not a prison for Rwandese refugees. Inkotanyi said : "We stole the arms of Uganda and attacked Rwanda". We thought that Radio Rwanda had abandoned insulting words against Inkotanyi but they were hidden some where waiting for Inkotanyi to attack so as to insult them again as if this would defeat them.

**Sample of incidents constituting violations of the Status of Mission Agreement (re: UNAMIR)
and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations**

5.1 Searches of UNAMIR property and privileged personnel

The most recent examples include incidents documented by UNAMIR Military Observers (MILOBs) on 2 February 1995 (Kigali airport), 2 and 16 March 1995 (Ruhengeri), 13 March 1995 (Kigali-Gisenyi road), 23 March 1995 (Gitarama-Kigali road); by UNAMIR Air Operations staff (a catalogue of incidents reported on 7 and 12 February 1995); by UNICEF (2, 4, 10, 12 and 14 March 1995); and by UNHCR (search of diplomatic bag on 1 March 1995); among many others.

5.2 Detention of UNAMIR imports and supplies

The incidents include the detention of 40 United Nations vehicles at Gatuna border post since 27 February 1995 in demand for the payment of customs duties; the detention of UNAMIR communications equipment at Kigali airport since 20 February 1995, and similarly of UNDP communications equipment since January 1995; the detention of other UNAMIR imports normally handled by UNAMIR's contractors (recurrent incidents); among several others. The continued detention of UNAMIR's communications equipment is also in violation of section 9 of the Convention and paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Agreement, on UNAMIR's right to install and operate communications facilities. This violation currently poses the threat of a complete breakdown of UNAMIR's communications network, with potentially serious repercussions for the security and safety of UNAMIR personnel in the field.

5.3 Movement restrictions

One example here was the restriction and eventual prohibition of UNAMIR's use of a barge on Lake Kivu to transport equipment and supplies to our troops in the Kibuye area, which had been arranged in view of the difficulties of land transportation by heavy trucks in that area. That restriction severely curtailed the operational flexibility and freedom of movement of UNAMIR.

More-recent documented cases of such restrictions include: restrictions at Gashora checkpoint (9 February 1995), restrictions reported by Ghanbatt (21 February 1995), MILOBs (9 and 28 February 1995, two incidents on 2 March 1995, 10, 23 and 25 March 1995), Malawi Coy (6 March 1995), AUSMED (23 March 1995), Tunbatt (2 February and 6 March 1995), Human Rights Operations (26 February 1995, 8 March 1995, 18 March 1995), the holding-up at Rusizi-2 border post of 23 trucks carrying relief supplies, with the risk of looting, reported on 4 April 1995 by UNAMIR forces providing convoy security; and restrictions on UNAMIR patrols at Ruhengeri (4 April 1995) among numerous others.

5.4 Ejection from premises

We note here that the Government's obligation to provide UNAMIR with premises for operational, administrative and accommodation purposes, as required under paragraph 16 of the Agreement, is not an absolute obligation. It is understandable that with the gradual return of normalcy, the Government would require UNAMIR to relinquish certain premises to permit their normal use. However, in such instances we should not be ejected forcibly (as occurred with respect to CIVPOL headquarters in September 1994) or by ultimatum (as occurred with respect to warehouse premises at Kigali airport in October 1994), or without the offer of alternative accommodation (as is the case with regard to

current demands for UNAMIR to vacate the former UNICEF premises, part of the Military Academy in Kigali, and Tunbatt base in Sector 5).

5.5 Passport restrictions (see letter)

5.6 Seizure/Impoundment of UNAMIR vehicles

There have been about 10 such seizures over the past several months; vehicles are released only after protracted negotiations with the National Gendarmerie, sometimes after the summary imposition of fines against the United Nations personnel involved. In this connection, we have always offered our cooperation in regard to joint investigations of such cases, as required under paragraph 44 of the Agreement. In addition, we have issued instructions and we take disciplinary measures against UNAMIR personnel and troops in respect of violations of local traffic regulations.

5.7 Arrests/detention of local staff

We do not here question legitimate law-enforcement actions by Government agents. However, these need not be accompanied by forcible entry into United Nations premises - which violates section 3 of the Convention and paragraphs 16 and 19 of the Agreement. The manner in which the arrests are carried out is also often in violation of fundamental principles of human rights on the notification of reasons and the existence of evidence for an arrest. If the reasons for an arrest -- which are usually not revealed until after persistent enquiries subsequent to the arrest -- were to relate to the staff member's employment with the United Nations, such arrest would be in violation of Section 18 (a) of the Convention and paragraphs 28 and 46 of the Agreement.

5.8 Harassment/intimidation of Rwandese nationals in contact with UNAMIR

These acts of intimidation or harassment impede the effective implementation of the mandates of UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies, and are consequently in violation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 965 (1994), among other resolutions. Among the numerous examples of such incidents, one of the most serious occurred on 5 February 1995, in Kigali, when Human Rights personnel investigating the attempted murder of a prominent journalist were surrounded by armed RPA soldiers, who prevented them from interviewing local residents. The acts of intimidation by the RPA troops also greatly influenced the willingness of witnesses to come forward with information.

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More-recent documented cases of such restrictions include: restrictions at Gashora checkpoint (9 February 1995), restrictions reported by Ghanbatt (21 February 1995), MILOBs (9 and 28 February 1995, two incidents on 2 March 1995, 10, 23 and 25 March 1995), Malawi Coy (6 March 1995), AUSMED (23 March 1995), Tunbatt (2 February and 6 March 1995), Human Rights Operations (26 February 1995, 8 March 1995, 18 March 1995), the holding-up at Rusizi-2 border post of 23 trucks carrying relief supplies, with the risk of looting, reported on 4 April 1995 by UNAMIR forces providing convoy security; and restrictions on UNAMIR patrols at Ruhengeri (4 April 1995) among numerous others.

5.4 Ejection from premises

We note here that the Government's obligation to provide UNAMIR with premises for operational, administrative and accommodation purposes, as required under paragraph 16 of the Agreement, is not an absolute obligation. It is understandable that with the gradual return of normalcy, the Government would require UNAMIR to relinquish certain premises to permit their normal use. However, in such instances we should not be ejected forcibly (as occurred with respect to CIVPOL headquarters in September 1994) or by ultimatum (as occurred with respect to warehouse premises at Kigali airport in October 1994), or without the offer of alternative accommodation (as is the case with regard to

current demands for UNAMIR to vacate the former UNICEF premises, part of the Military Academy in Kigali, and Tunbatt base in Sector 5).

5.5 Passport restrictions (see letter)

5.6 Seizure/Impoundment of UNAMIR vehicles

There have been about 10 such seizures over the past several months; vehicles are released only after protracted negotiations with the National Gendarmerie, sometimes after the summary imposition of fines against the United Nations personnel involved. In this connection, we have always offered our cooperation in regard to joint investigations of such cases, as required under paragraph 44 of the Agreement. In addition, we have issued instructions and we take disciplinary measures against UNAMIR personnel and troops in respect of violations of local traffic regulations.

5.7 Arrests/detention of local staff

We do not here question legitimate law-enforcement actions by Government agents. However, these need not be accompanied by forcible entry into United Nations premises - which violates section 3 of the Convention and paragraphs 16 and 19 of the Agreement. The manner in which the arrests are carried out is also often in violation of fundamental principles of human rights on the notification of reasons and the existence of evidence for an arrest. If the reasons for an arrest -- which are usually not revealed until after persistent enquiries subsequent to the arrest -- were to relate to the staff member's employment with the United Nations, such arrest would be in violation of Section 18 (a) of the Convention and paragraphs 28 and 46 of the Agreement.

5.8 Harassment/intimidation of Rwandese nationals in contact with UNAMIR

These acts of intimidation or harassment impede the effective implementation of the mandates of UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies, and are consequently in violation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 965 (1994), among other resolutions. Among the numerous examples of such incidents, one of the most serious occurred on 5 February 1995, in Kigali, when Human Rights personnel investigating the attempted murder of a prominent journalist were surrounded by armed RPA soldiers, who prevented them from interviewing local residents. The acts of intimidation by the RPA troops also greatly influenced the willingness of witnesses to come forward with information.

**Sample of incidents constituting violations of the Status of Mission Agreement (re: UNAMIR)
and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations**

5.1 Searches of UNAMIR property and privileged personnel

The most recent examples include incidents documented by UNAMIR Military Observers (MILOBs) on 2 February 1995 (Kigali airport), 2 and 16 March 1995 (Ruhengeri), 13 March 1995 (Kigali-Gisenyi road), 23 March 1995 (Gitarama-Kigali road); by UNAMIR Air Operations staff (a catalogue of incidents reported on 7 and 12 February 1995); by UNICEF (2, 4, 10, 12 and 14 March 1995); and by UNHCR (search of diplomatic bag on 1 March 1995); among many others.

5.2 Detention of UNAMIR imports and supplies

The incidents include the detention of 40 United Nations vehicles at Gatuna border post since 27 February 1995 in demand for the payment of customs duties; the detention of UNAMIR communications equipment at Kigali airport since 20 February 1995, and similarly of UNDP communications equipment since January 1995; the detention of other UNAMIR imports normally handled by UNAMIR's contractors (recurrent incidents); among several others. The continued detention of UNAMIR's communications equipment is also in violation of section 9 of the Convention and paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Agreement, on UNAMIR's right to install and operate communications facilities. This violation currently poses the threat of a complete breakdown of UNAMIR's communications network, with potentially serious repercussions for the security and safety of UNAMIR personnel in the field.

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