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1000.1(FC)

Kigali  
July 1994

PROPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE FOR UNAMIR

1. Attached is a list of infrastructure UNAMIR intends to occupy by 15 July 1994. Some of the buildings are already occupied.
2. It is requested that the RPA High Command initiates the mechanism for negotiating contracts on the infrastructure.
3. Your response to this request by 12 July 1994 will be very highly appreciated.

R DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Maj Gen Paul Kagame  
Chairman  
Rwandese Patriotic Army  
MULINDI

INFRASTRUCTURE RECCE-KIGALI AREA:

REF: Z922 KIGALI CITY MAP

1. The table outlined below is self-explanatory:

AREA	DESCRIPTION	USE	OWNERSHIP	REMARKS
1	Amahoro Stadium Complex	Force HQ and Signal Sqn	Govt	Already occupied
2	Centre Chritos	Ghanbatt HQ and HQ Coy	Catholic Church	Occupied by RPA media unit
3	Chez Lando	MILOB GP HQ, MILOB Sector 2 HQ and CIVPOL HQ	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
4	Hotel Meridien	Admin and Mov Staff quarters	Govt	Already occupied
5	Former Belgian Bn HQ	Ghanbatt A Coy HQ and Pl location	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
6	Former Kigali Sector HQ	Ghanbatt A Coy Pl Location	Private	Required by 15 Jul 1994
7	Faycal Hospital	MSF, RPF and Pl of Ghanbatt	Govt	Already occupied
8	Former CIVPOL HQ	Alternate to Faycal Pl of Ghanbatt	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
9	KABUGA Hotel	Ghanbatt B Coy loc	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
10	Military Academy	Ghanbatt C Coy location	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994- Priority 1
11	Hotel Diplomat	Ghanbatt C Coy location	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994- Priority 2
12	KIA Presidential Hanger and Fire pt	Ghanbatt Cbt Sp Coy / Maint Cell, Food Cell	Govt	Already occupied
13	Military Training Area	Ghanbatt dry trg. Area for Heli. Camp under tents for 500 pers.	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994
14	KIGALI Hospital	AUSTRALIAN Contingent	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994

## UN RESTRICTED

15	Gendarmerie	MP Coy, Heli Wing	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994
16	IVECO	UNAMIR Maintenance facility	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
17	RWANDEX	UNAMIR Sup Depot	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
18	Old Bangladesh Log Base - Industrial Area	UNAMIR Log Base	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
19	Hotel Mille Collines	Accn for Civilian Staff and NGO's	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
20	Village URUGWIRO	Accn for Staff	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994
21	UNDP Building	NGO's, UNAMIR HAC & RPA Humanitarian LO's	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
22	UNICEF Building	UNICEF	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
23	Effets Scolaire	Depot and quarters		Required by 15 July 1994
24	Printing Company Near Stadium	QM for HQ Sig Sqn	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
25	Belgian Coperative Village	Civilian and military staff quarters	Govt	Required by 15 July 1994
26	Trafipro	Depot for Contractor	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
27	Old SRSG's House	Sector 2 MILOB and CIVPOL HQ	Private	Required by 15 July 1994
28	GITARAMA	Bn HQ and Log Coy		
29	BUTARE	Coy Location		
30	BYUMBA Old Sector HQ	Sector HQ		
31	Byumba School	Engr Coy		
32	BUGESERA	Coy Location		
33	KIBONGO	Coy Location		

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5200.1(FC)

21 May, 1994

Major-General Paul Kagame  
Chairman High Command  
Rwandese Patriotic Army

DRAFT 2 OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS NEUTRAL TERRITORY  
AT KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Reference: Minutes of Meeting DFC UNAMIR/RPF 20 April, 1994

Enclosed you will find the second draft of the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a United Nations Neutral Territory at Kigali International Airport. The concerns that you expressed at the 20th of April meeting have been incorporated in this new document.

I would like to express my appreciation for your cooperation in this important matter and to express my desire to continue this process of consultation with your staff. I look forward to your comments on this draft agreement.

Respectfully,

Romeo A. Dallaire  
Major-General  
Force Commander



UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

Reference : Ops Directive No 2 / 19 Nov 93.

1. UNAMIR Installations

a. UNAMIR installations are described as all UNAMIR military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfill its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted. Access may be granted only on the prior permission of the Force Commander of UNAMIR.

2. UNAMIR troops will adhere to following specific guidelines whilst guarding or defending the installations:

a. Hostile Intent. It is an action which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against :

- (1) The UN - installation or
- (2) The UN personnel guarding/defending it or
- (3) Any person who has access to it or
- (4) Equipment contained in it.

b. Hostile Act. Any aggressive action against as under paragraph 2,a. above.

c. Authority. The commander of the guard/defence unit is authorized to use all available weapons or means needed to respond to the threat to which the installation, the own troops, the persons authorized to accede or the stored equipments are exposed. Still, the principles of Minimum Force and collateral damage to be avoided (ref 7. e. and f) will be adhered to.

d. Threats.

(1) Any installation of weapon directed to the installation has to be considered as a hostile intent and will lead to preparedness to respond fire by the guarding unit.

(2) Any firing at the defending/guarding troops, authorized persons or stored equipments has to be considered as a hostile act and will lead to immediate reaction by fire and even to offensive actions in order to dislodge the threat.

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english, french and kinyarwanda and be clearly visible from a distance. No vehicles, arms or personnel of either force will be allowed to enter KIA UNNT.

12. Search. Search operation can cause unnecessary harassment. These operations, therefore, have to be short, methodical and accurate. The behaviour of the soldiers carrying out the search must be above reproach. The following principles will be employed during search operations:

a. Due care will be taken to avoid damage to vehicles or the property being searched.

b. All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and a receipt given to the individual.

c. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the battalion commander may authorize a personal search of local civilians working at KIA. It must be carried out in dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual.

13. Area of Defence. BYUBAT will take up an area defence in and around terminal building and air-field to ensure air flow and road movement. It will also counter any air threat. Detailed deployment is to be carried out the by BYUBAT Battalion Comd.

14. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of KIA UNNT operations. This will be done by both the infantry battalion, UN police services and the UN military observers.

a. Type of Patrols. The following types of patrols may be carried out depending on the terrain and intensity of operations:

(1) Foot patrol.

(2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol.

(3) Air patrol (whenever possible)

b. Aim of Patrolling

(1) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or truce violation.

(2) To locate and confiscate arms, ammunition and explosives etc.

(3) To demonstrate a UN presence.

(4) To provide protection UNAMIR forces in defence.

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(5) To prevent infiltration of prohibited elements into controlled area/zone.

c. **Strength.** Under no circumstances will a foot patrol be less than section strength (10 men) or a vehicle patrol consist of less than two vehicles.

d. **Security.** Contrary to conventional patrols, security of UN patrols requires prior information about factions or parties. This information will normally be provided through the LOs. However, the following aspects require consideration:

(1) Patrol routes should be free from cross firing and hostile shelling.

(2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag, white painted UN marked equipment and UN headgear are clearly visible during patrolling.

Pre-condition for Enforcement Plan

15. The enforcement plan of KIA UNNT will depend on fulfillment of the following conditions:

a. RGF and RPF must withdraw their troops and direct fire weapons entirely from within 500 meters of the KIA. No indirect fire weapons will be located closer than 1000 meters of the KIA. This area is shown on the sketch (Annex A).

b. RGF and RPF must stop all shelling and firing in KIA UNNT.

c. RGF and RPF must not use force to break through the KIA UNNT.

d. RGF and RPF should provide their detailed deployment around KIA.

e. Use of KIA by either of the factional forces must be cleared by all three RGF, RPF and UNAMIR.

f. Local civilians working at KIA must be allowed by both the forces to come to KIA for work.

g. Daily monitoring is to be done in the presence of UNAMIR, RGF and RPF LOs.

16. After the UN's reinforced infantry battalion has been deployed in KIA area, the following control measures will be to be adhered to by both RGF and RPF political/military leaders:

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- a. Government forces withdraw from all static check points, piquet and guards within KIA. The process of withdrawal of all forces is to start within two hours from the tri-lateral decision.
- b. All forces of both factions will cease their patrolling activities in the KIA UNNT.
- c. There will be no movement of formed units/contingents of any factional forces within 500 meters from of the exclusion zone of the KIA UNNT.
- d. The Air Defence (AD) system. Air Defence systems may stay but must be made in-operative/no-ammunition.

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Modus Operandi

17. The UNAMIR military component i.e. the reinforced infantry battalion and the UN military observers will ensure that pre-conditions set out in the fore-going paragraphs are implemented.

18. To establish KIA UNNT and to enforce the control measures, both the infantry battalion and the military observers of Kigali Sector will carry out the following operations:

- a. Establishment of Check Points. Both mobile and static check points will be established on all major road junctions, entry and exit points of KIA. Static check points must be established on the entry and exit points of KIA by at least one-half section strength (five men).
- b. Search. Search operation will be carried out at all mobile and static check points. It shall be done at irregular intervals of time.
- c. Patrolling. An elaborate patrol programme shall be prepared both by the infantry battlion and the UN military observers to cover the terminal building, air-field and exclusion zone. Military observers shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night.
- d. Aircraft Rules of Engagement. Attached as Annex C.
- e. UNAMIR Rules of Engagement Attached as Annex D.

C

19. UN military observers shall constantly monitor, observe, investigate and report about:

- a. RGF and RPF deployment and any changes to their already existing deployed troops/weapon systems in and around KIA UNNT.

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b. Deployment and re-deployment (if any) of major weapon systems like field and anti-aircraft guns, tanks/APCs and armed helicopters etc of all factions in and around KIA.

20. Public Relation/Media Coverage. Positive public relation and correct media coverage is a major factor in the over all success in establishing and controlling KIA UNNT. All concerned parties should state the facts to the media/press on the establishment of this very positive gesture by both sides as an important nature of this agreement.

Conclusion



21. Establishment of KIA UNNT is vital to the success of UNAMIR operations regarding the humanitarian and peace keeping mandates by the UN. It depends on cooperation, good communication and goodwill by all parties concerned.

22. The degree and intensity of imposing control measures, restrictions will ultimately rest on cooperation between UNAMIR military components deployed on ground and the factional armies. Utmost caution must be exercised and absolute neutrality should be maintained in handling both the opposing factions, so that all parties are confident that UNAMIR is impartial.

ANNEXES

- ANNEX A - Diagram of KIA UNNT
- ANNEX B - Procedure for Air Traffic Control at KIA
- ANNEX C - Aircraft Rules of Engagement
- ANNEX D - UNAMIR Rules of Engagement

NIA UNNT



KIA UNNT : ○

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PROCEDURE FOR AIR TRAFFIC OPERATION  
AT KIGALI AIRPORT

1. GENERAL. Under the existing situation in Rwanda, it is felt necessary to keep the Kigali Airport usable by UN aircraft or aircraft chartered by UN or by any other aircraft that may take part for the expatriation of the different nationals and for humanitarian reasons in Rwanda. The following procedure is laid down for the safe conduct of air traffic operation to and from Kigali:

a. Arrival Procedure.

(1) All traffic must contact Kigali HF at least 10 minutes prior to entry FIR boundary. If HF contact can not be established, then the aircraft must contact Kigali Approach as soon as possible.

(2) Traffic coming from DARES SALAM, MOMBASA, NAIROBI and ENTEBEE will report at respective FIR boundary at assigned flight level ( FL ) given by the appropriate ATS authority.

(3) Traffic from FIR reporting point will report 20 NM/DME from Kigali DME on VOR radial (R) 103 at or above FL 120.

(4). Traffic from 20 NM will remain in a corridor of 05 miles width upto 08 NM / DME and report 08 NM / DME on radial 103 at or above altitude 7,500 ft for final approach.

(5) Traffic from BURUNDI and ZAIRE will follow the existing procedure.

b. Departure Procedure.

(1) All aircraft are to submit their flight plan as per existing procedure. If none is available at pre-flight information center, flight plan may be submitted at the tower.

(2) All traffic towards east are to climb to FL 120 or above at or before 20 NM / DME.

(3) All other traffic will turn right and climb to assigned level.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Identification of Friendly Aircraft. All aircraft following the procedure laid down in annex B will always be treated as friendly aircraft by both the parties.
2. Co-ordination Between Air Defence System and Air Traffic Control
  - a. A point to point land line is to be established for the necessary co-ordination between Air Defence System and Control Tower for identification of aircraft.
  - b. Land line communication or any other suitable communication system should be available with LO of RGF and RPF with the Air Traffic Control Tower.
3. Declaration of Hostile Aircraft. No commercial or transport ( Be it civil or military ) aircraft is to be declared as hostile by either side without properly counter-check with Kigali approach / tower.
4. No aircraft is to be engaged without properly identified as foe.
5. Aircraft within approach funnel and take off path will have free passage to operate.
6. No aircraft can be engaged within the circuit area.
7. Aircraft if in doubt must be warned with at least 03 warning shots. After warning shots, if the aircraft's manoeuvre does not indicate hostile, aircraft is not to be engaged.
8. No small arms firing is to be conducted within and immediate vicinity ( within 05 miles ) of Kigali airport pointing towards the airfield or aircraft.
9. Out side Kigali airport circuit area, all aircraft should fly above 3,000 ft AGL to avoid small arms fire.
10. No indirect weapon is to be released pointing towards the air field or aircraft and its path.
11. Air Defence Arty unit should inform their gun conditions ( Gun tight or gun free ) to Kigali airport to facilitate safe conduct of air traffic.
12. Should air Defence Arty need to open fire to any hostile aircraft or to any object they must inform tower in order to allow time for the friendly aircraft to climb to a safe level.



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UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

014/FC-

Kigali, 2 May 1994

Major General Paul Kagame  
Chief of Staff  
Rwandese Patriotic Front

Dear General,

My staff in MULUNDI have indicated that there has been a very definite change of attitude and even cooperation on the part of your staff towards us. This is most troublesome as those observers are my only dependable link with you and the political element of the Movement. New restrictions of movement behind RPF lines have proven to also be troublesome. When this recent refugee affair in the South-East broke open, accusations were flying as to RPF atrocities and RPF closing the border. Your staff prevented my UNMOs from going to that area and getting the right information back in order to clarify rapidly the situation. In a letter signed on 30 April 94 in New York by your Movement representatives ( Mr Gerald Gahima), it was stated that the international community is invited to visit all areas in RPF control to assess and verify that no atrocities were being conducted. I do hope this invitation still includes UNAMIR. This sudden turn of events must not prevent our lines of communication from continuing to be open and frank.


I am most concerned with the war of words coming from Mulindi and New York on the subject of an "Intervention Force". I wholeheartedly agree that such a UN Force is not needed nor pertinent to the Rwandan situation. However, as we discussed at our last meeting, a security force with teeth, dedicated to assisting, to implementing a secure humanitarian relief program, coupled with the establishment of safe heavens for those still alive and in need of help, to be a credible deterrence force to offset the militias and armed gangs is what is urgently needed.

All the above are tasks that should have been implemented weeks ago. I am not in a position to go over the limitations of the UN decision process nor its responses to the international community lobbying power. I am however in a position to significantly influence the decisions on what UNAMIR should/could do in the immediate and near term.

I am most anxious to go over details of my future concept of operations with you in order to clarify the proposed Force structure and possible mandate. We have, throughout my stay in your country, been in a position to ensure that when the need for Commander level decisions or discussions of pertinent subjects did arise, we made it our mutual duty to try and communicate with each other at the briefest of delay. Because the situation in UNHQ New York is very fluid and currently in a state of flux on the plight of Rwanda, I

consider most important, nay essential, that we meet soonest, say even tomorrow morning. I am most sorry for not being able to give you more warning. I propose to move north towards Mulindi after my daily orders group of 0700 hours. I will wait for your response deep in RPF territory.

Respectfully yours,

  
Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major General  
Commander UNAMIR