

ESS RELEASES OF THE S-G: UTHANT  
CEPTS FROM FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION  
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTAINING REFERENCES TO S-G AND WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF, A/PN/1829-1959

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EXCERPTS FROM THE VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE  
FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
CONTAINING REFERENCES TO THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF

Opening Meeting

President PAZHWAQ, Afghanistan (A/PV. 1525 at pages 6-10):

"...If we are to judge from the terrible toll of human lives and loss of property which resulted from just the short period of military operations, we must consider that the achievement of the cease-fire, which brought a halt to this destruction, represented a measure of success for the United Nations. In speaking of the cease-fire, tribute is due to our Secretary-General for his prompt and untiring efforts and to the efficiency and devotion shown by the United Nations personnel in the area, who performed their duties under the most difficult circumstances..."

Mr. GOLDBERG, United States (A/PV. 1525 at pages 18 to 20):

"...My delegation -- and, I earnestly hope, all Member States which jointly share with us the power and responsibility for peace under the Charter -- will seek to use this session only for the pursuit of what the Secretary-General in his recent report has called "reasonable, peaceful and just solutions" (S/7906, para. 19) to the problems of the Near East. This is the proper business, the only proper business, of the present session of the General Assembly..."

General Debate

Mr. EBAN, Israel (A/PV.1526 at pages 27-30):

"...But many Members of the United Nations hoped, and some believed, that relative stability would ensue from the arrangements discussed in the General Assembly in March 1957. An attempt was then made to inaugurate a period of non-belligerency and coexistence in the relations between Egypt and Israel. A United Nations Emergency Force was to separate the armies in Sinai and Gaza.

(A/PV.1526 at page 37):

"...By 9 May the Secretary-General of the United Nations from his own sources on the ground had ascertained that no such Israeli troop concentrations existed..."

(A/PV. 1526 at page 38):

"... On 14 May Egyptian forces began to move in strength into Sinai. On 16 May the Egyptian Command ordered the United Nations Emergency Force to leave the border. The following morning the reason became clear. For on 17 May, at 6 in the morning, Radio Cairo broadcast that Field Marshal Amer had issued alert orders to the Egyptian armed forces. Nor did he mention Syria as the excuse. His orders read:

- '1. The state of preparedness of the Egyptian Armed Forces will increase to the full level of preparedness for war, beginning 14.30 hours last Sunday.
- '2. Formations and units allocated in accordance with the operational plans will advance from their present locations to the designated positions.
- '3. The armed forces are to be in full preparedness to carry out any combat tasks on the Israel front in accordance with developments.'

On 18 May, Egypt called for the total removal of the United Nations Emergency Force. The Secretary-General of the United Nations acceded to this request and moved to carry it out, without reference to the Security Council or the General Assembly;

without carrying out the procedures indicated by Secretary-General Hammarskjold in the event of a request for a withdrawal being made; without heeding the protesting voices of some of the permanent members of the Security Council and of the Government at whose initiative the Force had been established; without consulting Israel on the consequent prejudice to its military security and its vital maritime freedom; and without seeking such delay as would enable alternative measures to be concerted for preventing belligerency by sea and a dangerous confrontation of forces by land.

"It is often said that United Nations procedures are painfully slow. This one, in our view, was disastrously swift. Its effect was to make Sinai safe for belligerency from north and south; to create a sudden disruption of the local security balance; and to leave an international maritime interest exposed to almost certain threat. I will not say anything of the compulsions which may have led to those steps; I speak only of consequences. I have already said that Israel's attitude to the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations has been traumatically affected by this experience. What is the use of a fire brigade which vanished from the scene as soon as the first smoke and flames appear? Is it surprising that we are resolved never again to allow a vital Israeli interest and our very security to rest on such a fragile foundation?

(A/PV. 1526 at pages 43-45):

"...Those who write this story in years to come will give a special place in their narrative to the blatant decision to close the Strait of Tiran in Israel's face. It is not difficult to understand why that outrage had such a drastic impact. In 1957 the maritime nations, within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly, correctly enunciated the doctrine of free and innocent passage through the Strait. When that doctrine was proclaimed -- and incidentally, not challenged by Egypt at the time -- it was little more than an abstract principle for the maritime world. For Israel it was a great but unfulfilled

prospect; it was not yet a reality. But during the ten years in which we and the other States of the maritime community have relied upon that doctrine and upon established usage, the principle has become a reality consecrated by hundreds of sailings under dozens of flags and the establishment of a whole complex of commerce and industry and communication. A new dimension has been added to the map of the world's communications, and on that dimension we have constructed Israel's bridge towards the friendly States of Asia and East Africa, a network of relationships which is the chief pride of Israel in its second decade and on which its economic future largely depends.

"All this, then, has grown up as an effective usage under the United Nations flag. Does Mr. Nasser really think that he can come upon the scene in ten minutes and cancel the established legal usage and interests of ten years?

(A/PV. 1526 at page 53):

"...On June 9 President Nasser said:

'Our friends in the USSR warned the visiting parliamentary delegation in Moscow at the beginning of last month, that there exists a plan of attack against Syria.'

"A great Power is telling Egypt that Israel is about to attack Syria. This is ten days after the Secretary-General of the United Nations has published a report stating that there are no troop concentrations at all in northern Israel against Syria..."

Mr. BAROODY, Saudi Arabia (A/PV. 1526 at page 71):

"...That is not what I, or you, Mr. President, or the Secretary-General, or any one of us who are dedicated to peace would want to see -- war and strife..."

Mr. GOLDBERG, United States (A/PV. 1527 at pages 12-13):

"...The essential facts are clear. In the spring of this year the tension of many years became even greater; acts of violence

became more frequent; threats and declarations became more ominous and bellicose. Then, on 17 May, President Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and immediately moved large United Arab Republic forces into the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and Sharm el Sheikh. Within a few days thereafter, the United Arab Republic declared a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, which had been open to free and innocent passage by the ships of all nations under accepted principles of international law.

"The major insulator, the United Nations Emergency Force, by which the United Nations had for so many years protected the Middle East against full-scale war, was stripped away. Hostile forces stood in direct confrontation within plain sight of each other. Threats of war filled the air. Peace hung suspended by a thread.

"At this point the Secretary-General made a journey to Cairo in the interest of maintaining peace. He reported to the Security Council on 26 May that he had "called to the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran," and that he had expressed his "hope that no precipitate action would be taken" (S/7906, para. 10). In the same report, the Secretary-General made his plea to all the parties for a breathing spell which would allow tension to subside from its explosive level. He urged all concerned "to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions." (Ibid., para. 14).

"In the spirit of this wise and sagacious plea, my Government and some others made strenuous efforts both inside and outside the United Nations to find ways to avert a clash. In the Security Council on 30 May, the United States delegation proposed a draft resolution to provide the "breathing spell" which the Secretary-General had so urgently requested. It is a matter of profound regret that this proposal, aimed at preventing bloodshed and suffering, was not agreed to by others..."

Mr. ATASSI, Syrian Arab Republic (A/PV. 1527 at page 27):

"...While the invasion was progressing the Israeli representative was submitting to the Security Council false information, categorically denying the occupation of Syrian territory as well as the bombing of Damascus. These Israeli assertions were clearly contradicted by the reports of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and by those of the Secretary-General, which pointed to the continuation of the invasion after the cease-fire order..."

Mr. LENART, Czechoslovakia (A/PV. 1527 at page 51):

"...We also reject the criticism of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in connexion with the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic to withdraw United Nations Forces from its territory. His decision on this matter was and is fully consonant with the Charter and with respect for the sovereignty of Member States of the United Nations..."

Mr. ZHIVKOV, Bulgaria (A/PV. 1528 at page 11):

"...At the same time, patient and persistent efforts were being made in the Security Council to forestall an armed clash between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The President of the United Arab Republic assured the Secretary-General that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel. The other Arab countries likewise expressed the same attitude. However, the appeals for common sense and restraint were disregarded by the Israeli Government and by its instigators and protectors..."

Mr. EBAN, Israel (A/PV. 1528 at pages 28-33):

"...I should like to refer to some other matters which have been raised in the discussion and in connexion with which Israel's name has been mentioned. Yesterday morning, I gave a detailed account of the events leading to the outbreak of hostilities, and in that detailed survey I said a few sentences about the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force on 18 May. I said in effect that

that withdrawal, unaccompanied by effective measures by the General Assembly or the Security Council to prevent belligerency by sea and land, was one of the stages leading to the recent intensification of tension. My object was to suggest that the legal and political aspects of United Nations peace-keeping functions need to be explored in the light of this experience, whether with reference to the Middle East or to other areas of the world.

"Now, this is not an unusual view. It is not an Israeli view alone. It expresses a very broad international and public consensus. I doubt whether anyone will ever write the history of the recent crisis without giving the full weight to the Egyptian request for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force on 18 May, a request made with such urgency as to give no adequate time and effort to meet the consequences of that withdrawal. I said yesterday that I was not concerned with the compulsions which led to those steps, but only with their consequences. I described those consequences as they evolved. I said that there took place a sudden disruption of the local security balance and that an international maritime interest was exposed to almost certain threat.

"Those were the consequences of the sudden change in the status quo which had existed in March 1967. Security was weakened. A maritime interest was threatened with what were authoritatively called "dangerous consequences." These were not unforeseen consequences. The Government of the United Arab Republic could have had no misunderstanding about what the anticipated results of its request would be. For, in the report of the Secretary-General on 7 September 1966, it is explicitly stated that if the United Nations Emergency Force were removed, Syria's fighting would quite likely soon be resumed.

"It would have seemed logical, therefore, that some United Nations organ would, if confronted by the prospect of a withdrawal, do something to meet the anticipated consequences. Whether the organ should have been the General Assembly or the Security Council is not a matter

into which I shall enter.

"Now, this did not happen. I am certain that everything was done in good faith. Some believe that nothing else could be done. But this does not alter the fact that a weakness in the United Nations peace-keeping texture must rank amongst the factors which are universally admitted to have led to the situation we are now discussing. If we are to tell the truth of recent developments, we cannot avoid reference to that fact. The United Nations is still young in years and in peace-keeping experience. If some Governments like my own do not believe that everything in this field is perfect, then it is their duty to say so. Our object is not recriminatory but constructive. By learning from the past we may help to save the future.

"My point is that the issue is not in any sense a debate between our eminent Secretary-General and myself. He knows the personal friendship and the deep respect in which all my countrymen and I hold him. There is an objective substantive issue here to be considered, namely, to what extent the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations, as now envisaged, have an adequate stability for the fulfilment of their objectives.

"Many Governments, hundreds of commentators in law and journalism, and, I have no doubt, multitudes of people throughout the world were disturbed by the events of 18 May and 19 May. And many who look back on those events see in them a link which has led to our present situation.

"It was in this sense, for example, that the President of the United States, President Johnson, said on 23 May:

'We are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after ten years of steadfast service without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council.'

"On 18 May, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom expressed his views in characteristically trenchant terms. I even found on reference that he, and not I, is the author of the fire brigade simile. I acknowledge this, as I would have done yesterday, if my memory and my files had been in better order. Referring to the decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to call for the immediate withdrawal of UNEF from its territory, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom stated:

'It would really make a mockery of the peace-keeping work of the United Nations if as soon as the tension rises the United Nations Force is told to leave. Indeed, this might well have repercussions on other United Nations peace-keeping forces and the credibility of the United Nations efforts in this field would be thrown into question.'

"On the same day, the Minister of Information of the French Republic said that it was no doubt perfectly legal to request and

and to carry out the withdrawal of the Force, but it would have been politically wiser if the Powers had first been consulted.

"On 25 May, the Foreign Minister of Canada stated objectively in reference to the action of the United Arab Republic:

'I will simply state again that I believe it was regrettable that the Force was withdrawn. I do not question the sovereignty of the host country that asked for its withdrawal, but I am firmly of the view that there was no clear legal basis for the way in which it was withdrawn.'

"In other words, in the light of this wide range of comment, certainly inspired by a positive attitude towards our Organization's peace-keeping functions, there is surely no need to present the issue as a sudden controversy or Israel's view as being an Israel view. There is not a specifically Israel view. There is a wide international consensus in favour of examining past experience in an effort to draw some better legal and political provisions for future peace-keeping work of our Organization.

"It is true that Israel's interests were affected, as our Permanent Representative informed the United Nations on 19 May, but the discussion is of international, and indeed of historic scope. Israel is only one of the many States which have enunciated views to which I gave very brief expression yesterday, and the spirit of our comments is one of concern for the better working of this Organization. It is also an effort to explain why, at the present stage in the evolution of international machinery, it seems to me that agreements for peace-keeping are likely to be more effective if they rely on bilateral enforcement agreements rather than on arrangements such as emergency forces which are at the mercy of the host country and which can, therefore, apparently be dismissed without notice.

"Nor is our understanding of what would occur in the event of a request for withdrawal peculiar to ourselves. In general, we had felt that the country which was the host to UNEF would not face the

United Nations and the world with a fait accompli and that if it did, then the consequent situation, especially at the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, would bring about a possibility for consultation.

"It was in this spirit that the architect of UNEF, the Prime Minister of Canada, explained in an address on 9 June:

"The expectations that had been held in 1957, namely, that if Egypt should at any time make a request for withdrawal, the appropriate procedure would be for that request to go first to the Advisory Committee, there to be discussed by the Committee which had been set up for that purpose by the Assembly, and if necessary and desirable, the whole matter could then be referred to the full Assembly for decision, and therefore any question of whether the Force should be withdrawn would become a matter for discussion with, and decision by, the United Nations.

"In the context of which I speak, this is perhaps an academic question. It is a historic question; the past cannot be recaptured. But since there is still a great deal of discussion about the hope of solving certain regional problems by a United Nations presence, I think it is essential that we should understand what are the capacities and what are the limitations of that presence. The United Nations Emergency Force rendered great service to the international community during the decade of its tenure, but the ease with which the host Government could expel it, could require its removal, shows that perhaps we lived those ten years on a much more fragile basis than some of us believed at the time..."

. . . . .

President PAZHWAQ, Afghanistan (A/PV. 1528 at page 37):

"...There is one more representative who has asked to exercise his right of reply. Before calling on him, however, I should like to request the Assembly to permit me to take the liberty of making a very brief observation on the statement we have just heard from the

representative of Israel. I do so because I feel it is necessary. And in saying that I feel it is necessary, I base myself on the fact that in the past there has been a certain confusion as to the interpretation given in the Press and in public opinion with regard to the real intent of statements made during the deliberations of the General Assembly.

"I think that when we are confident that the General Assembly has a very clear understanding of a matter, we should make that clear, also, to those who are not in this Hall. By this I mean, in the particular case before the Assembly, that we should avoid any confusion as to the interpretation of the statement made this morning by the Secretary-General and that part of the statement of the representative of Israel in which he referred to the statement made this morning by the Secretary-General.

"In that connexion, it is my impression that it is the general understanding of the entire membership that, to use the words of the representative of Israel, the "good faith" (supra., p. 29-30) of the Secretary-General has not been questioned. I take note of that, and I also take note of the following observation in the statement made this morning by the Secretary-General: 'I seek only to restore in that picture the balance which the facts warrant' (1527th meeting, p. 2-5)..."

Mr. TOMEH, Syrian Arab Republic (A/PV. 1528 at pages 38-40):

"...It took place while the Security Council was seized of the question of Palestine, while the Security Council was discussing various aspects of the problem, on the basis of two reports submitted by the Secretary-General. I am referring to his two reports contained in documents S/7896 of 19 May 1967 and S/7906 of 26 May 1967. Paragraph 14 of the latter report is very relevant to the debate that

we are discussing right now. The Secretary-General said this:

'In my view, a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level. I therefore urge all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions.' (S/7906, para. 14)

"Therefore, at the very time when the Security Council was discussing that report of the Secretary-General, and his appeal for restraint, Israeli forces started their perfidious, sneaky attack against the United Arab Republic, and later against Jordan and Syria..."

.....

Mr. TOMEH, Syrian Arab Republic (A/PV. 1528 at page 51):

"...But I have another source. When this whole crisis started, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his report of 19 May 1967. This is what he said:

'Intemperate and bellicose utterances, by other officials and non-officials, eagerly reported by Press and radio, are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that State statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines.' (S/7896, para. 8)..."

Mr. Brown, United Kingdom (A/PV.1529 at page 6):

"... For the last ten years there has been an uneasy calm broken at frequent intervals by frontier incidents and conflicts. We all hoped that the peace might be maintained by the United Nations Emergency Force. But we have been brought face to face with problems that we can no longer ignore. This is the background against which our discussions have to take place.

(A/PV.1529 at pages 16-17)

"... But when we have done all we can to relieve suffering, it is still our main task in this Organization to keep the peace. There cannot be any greater issue for the United Nations. And this brings me to the main recommendation I want to make. I believe that the Secretary-General should nominate a representative, whose standing should be unchallenged, to go at once to the area. This representative should have a proper staff and full facilities. He should advise the Secretary-General on the whole conduct of relations arising from the cease-fire and the subsequent keeping of the peace on the frontiers. His task would be both to report to the Secretary-General and to play an active part in relations with all the parties in the area itself.

"... The first task of the Secretary-General's representative would be to make recommendations, in consultation with the Chief of Staff, about the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. May I say here that the whole world

community has every reason to feel and to express the sincerest admiration and gratitude for what the present UNTSO team has done under the leadership of General Odd Bull. General Bull has, in circumstances of the greatest danger and difficulty, conducted his operations with outstanding courage and efficiency.

"... It seems clear, however, that General Bull could do with urgent reinforcement of both men and material. I suggest that the Secretary-General should be authorized to recruit and dispatch at once any extra personnel General Bull may need. He will also need better communications, and the Government of Israel should allow him without delay to reoccupy the headquarters from which he was excluded during the fighting around Jerusalem.

"... This operation and its expansion should be conducted under the direction of the new representative to be appointed by the Secretary-General. But this operation deals only with the cease-fire and the arrangements which follow immediately from disengagement. There is the much bigger and more lasting problem of future peace-keeping in the area. It is clear that for this a new form of United Nations military presence will be necessary which will give reality to the preservation of peace in an area which may well be troubled for some time to come. One of the most urgent duties of the Secretary-General's repre-

sentative should be to advise the United Nations on the form which a future United Nations presence should take. Needless to say, it should be set up in a form which sets out precisely the conditions under which it operates..."

Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic (A/PV.1529 at page 26):

"... At the same time, as we assured the Secretary-General when he came to Cairo, and as he later mentioned in his report to the Security Council about his visit there, it was our firm policy not to take the offensive, nor did we spare any effort to avoid any eruption of the situation; and we have been in continuous consultations with many capitals in the world, including Washington, with the same objective in view.

(A/PV.1529 at pages 28-30):

"... The Secretary-General has been nastily and repeatedly criticized by President Johnson, by some other Western leaders and by Mr. Eban for what they have termed his "hurried" action in relation to the withdrawal from the United Arab Republic of the United Nations Emergency Force. They have been taking this thoroughly unwarranted position against U Thant for obvious reasons, but he proved himself, yesterday and before, quite capable of defending his actions and truth. His critics have taken their position unjustly and mischievously — and they have not done anything at all, or even recommended anything at all, in order to deal with the misery, the debris and the mess brought

about by the treachery, the results of which we are dealing with now.

(A/PV.1529 at page 31):

"... May I refer in this connexion to a statement made on 2 February 1957, in which the representative of my Government, who happens to be the same as the present speaker, reiterated the position of my Government, and submitted that:

"The entry, the stationing and the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force must be with the consent of the Egyptian Government as an indispensable prerequisite, for the United Nations Emergency Force is in Egypt not as an occupation force, not as a replacement for the invaders, not to resolve any question or to settle any problems, be those problems in relation to the Suez Canal, to Palestine or to freedom of passage in territorial waters. It is not there to infringe upon Egyptian sovereignty in any fashion or to any extent but, on the contrary, it is there for the sole purpose of giving expression to the determination of the United Nations to put an end to the aggression committed against Egypt and to secure the withdrawal of Israel behind the Armistice Demarcation Line."

(A/PV.1529 at page 32):

"... These atrocities, among many others — I am not giving

a full list - - have been reported to the Red Cross and to the Secretary-General by the Government of the United Arab Republic..."

Mr. Spiljak, Yugoslavia (A/PV.1529 at page 48):

"... It is absurd, within the context of such a policy, to try to make the Secretary-General of the United Nations also responsible. The Secretary-General acted in conformity with the demand of the Government of the United Arab Republic, a demand based on the sovereign right to have the United Nations forces withdrawn from the territory where they were stationed exclusively with the consent of the host country.

"My Government wishes to reiterate, on this occasion also, its support of the efforts which the Secretary-General has exerted in the discharge of his difficult and responsible functions..."

Mr. Eban, Israel (A/PV.1529 at page 56):

"... For ten years there had existed in the relationships between Egypt and Israel a relative tranquillity based on the arrangements announced at this rostrum on 1 March 1957. There was to be an effective non-belligerency. United Nations Emergency Forces were to separate the parties in Sinai and Gaza. There was to be a cessation of raids into Israel from the Gaza Strip. Although no change had taken place in the basic juridical relationship between Egypt and Israel, many then hoped and some believed that a certain tranquillity might prevail.

(A/PV.1529 at page 57):

"... It was his Government which expelled the United Nations Emergency Force, not to assert its own sovereignty, which is legitimate but to facilitate an aggressive encirclement and assault..."

Mr. Mgonja, United Republic of Tanzania (A/PV.1530 at pages 22-25):

"... I should not like to conclude my statement without paying tribute to our eminent Secretary-General for the noble and tireless efforts he has made in trying to keep peace in the Middle East..."

Mr. Mahgoub, Sudan (A/PV.1530 at page 27):

"... On 6 June, Israel's Foreign Minister, glowing with the flush of victory, came in haste to the Security Council to announce success and to dictate his terms. The Foreign Minister of Israel, in his apologia for aggression before the Security Council, on 6 June 1967, cited the following reasons:

"First, the declaration by the United Arab Republic that it would block the passage of Israeli ships as well as foreign ships carrying strategic material to Israel along the Gulf of Aqaba;

"Second, the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force; and

"Third, the concentration of Arab troops in Sinai.

"In his words, "These acts taken together ... effectively

disrupted the status quo which had ensured a relative stability on the Egyptian-Israeli frontier for ten years", (S/PV.1348, p. 83-85).

(A/PV.1530 at page 31):

"... It was not the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, or the blocking of the gulf, as Israel claims, that precipitated Israel's aggression. It was actually the declaration by Israel of its intention and determination to invade Syria and the raid on Syria in April that led the Government of the United Arab Republic to ask for UNEF's withdrawal and to assert its undisputed right to deny the passage through its territory of war material to its enemy. How could the United Arab Republic have done otherwise? How could the Arab States have remained aloof?

(A/PV.1530 at page 32):

"... What were the Arab countries expected to do in the face of that aggression? What were they to do in the face of the threat to risk an all-out war? They had to stand together because the threat to Syria was a threat to all of them. They had to be prepared. That was why they rallied their forces and proclaimed their determination to defend themselves.

"Those were the circumstances that led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and the blockade of the Strait of Tiran against Israeli ships. Those were the conditions that led to the mobilization of the Arab armies.

(A/PV.1530 at page 33):

"... The experience that had this traumatic effect on the Foreign Minister and his colleagues was the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force whose presence Israel never accepted on its own territory. We now have some recent indisputable evidence of this in what Secretary-General Thant stated before this Assembly on 20 June 1967 in connexion with the possibility of deployment of some elements of UNEF on Israeli territory. The Secretary-General reported that he had raised the question with the Permanent Representative of Israel who told him that the idea was unacceptable..."

Mr. Moro, Italy (A/PV.1530 at page 62):

"... The task now, as the Secretary-General stated in his report to the Security Council of 26 May, is to lay the foundations for "reasonable, peaceful and just solutions" (S/7906) to the basic problems which have beset the Middle East for so many years. The task is to settle a conflict, while safeguarding the rights and expectations of the parties concerned and of the international community and to create, with the free acceptance of the parties, the necessary conditions for co-operation and the development of the whole region..."

Mr. Chagla, India (A/PV.1530 at page 76):

"... I shall not dwell, in detail, on this sorry record. But I wish to refer to one tragic consequence of the disregard

of General Assembly resolutions in respect of Palestine refugees. It has neither allowed them to return to their homes nor compensated them. But I must dwell at some length on Israel's attitude to the United Nations Emergency Force, which is relevant to the present crisis. Having refused to allow the stationing of a United Nations force on its soil, and having later enjoyed the full benefits of its presence on Egyptian territory for more than ten years, Israel has now proceeded to defame the United Nations and to criticize Secretary-General Thant's correct decision to withdraw UNEF, on the ground that he did not first consult Israel. What are the facts?

(A/PV.1530 at pages 77-80):

"On 18 May 1967, the Secretary-General agreed to a request from the Government of the United Arab Republic asking for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. The presence of the Force in the region had been made possible in 1956-57 by the United Arab Republic Government agreeing to have UNEF based on its soil. This had been done at a time when Israel had refused to have any United Nations peace-keeping force on its own soil. As the Assembly will recall, the original proposal in this context, at that time, had been to locate elements of an international emergency force on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line, that is, both on the soil of the United Arab Republic and that of Israel. U Thant's report to the Security

Council, dated 26 May 1967, in its paragraph 7 makes the situation clear. He says there:

"If UNEF had been deployed on both sides of the Line as originally envisaged in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution, its buffer function would not necessarily have ended. However, its presence on the Israel side of the Line has never been permitted. The fact that UNEF was not stationed on the Israel side of the Line was a recognition of the unquestioned sovereign right of Israel to withhold its consent for the stationing of the Force. The acquiescence in the request of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the Force after ten and a half years on United Arab Republic soil was likewise a recognition of the sovereign authority of the United Arab Republic."

(S/7906, para. 7)

"The Secretary-General recognized that any United Nations force could remain on the territory of a Member State as long as this consent continued, a position with which my Government is in complete agreement both on legal and practical grounds.

"I am proud to represent a country which has contributed the largest single national contingent to UNEF for all the ten years from its inception to its withdrawal. I am, therefore, speaking in the name also of those gallant Indian sentinels of peace who served in the Middle East and died at their posts as martyrs. We

supported the position of the Secretary-General that UNEF, by staying on in the region once the consent of the United Arab Republic to its presence had been withdrawn, might have become an army of occupation. On this point, speaking in the Indian Parliament on 19 November 1956, the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said:

"We made it clear that it was only if the Government of Egypt agreed that we would send them" - - the Indian Contingent to the UNEF - - "We are not prepared to agree to our force or any force remaining there indefinitely..."

He added that the position stated by him was in consonance with the agreements arrived at by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the Egyptian Government. It is on this basis that my delegation deplores the Israeli criticism which our Secretary-General, U Thant, was compelled to rebut in his statement yesterday. We fully support the stand taken by U Thant. I am sure the Assembly will endorse what he has stated.

"The extraordinary charge has been made that the withdrawal of UNEF precipitated the recent conflict. This is baseless. It is in this context that we have to look at the problem of Sharm El Sheikh which overlooks the Strait of Tiran. Once UNEF was withdrawn, the task of ensuring the security of Sharm El Sheikh and wherever else UNEF had been located became once again the sovereign responsibility of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

(A/PV.1530 at pages 83-85):

"... The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization will have to be enlarged and strengthened in order to ensure strict compliance with the various provisions of General Armistice Agreements. A special representative of the Secretary-General may also be appointed to help reduce tension in the area and to assure the safety and security of the civilian Arab population under Israeli occupation, and facilitate the return of those who were forced to leave their homes..."

Mr. Shcherbitsky, Ukrainian SSR (A/PV.1532 at pages 13-15):

"... They even tried to portray events in such a way as to suggest that the decision of Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic, in accordance with the request of the Government of that country, has supposedly increased tension in the Middle East. We believe that the Secretary-General has convincingly, and with dignity, rejected their unfounded claims in this matter..."

Mr. Tugan, Jordan (A/PV.1531 at page 6):

"... In view of the seriousness of the problem created by the policy on which Israel has embarked for vacating the west bank of its Arab inhabitants, the Government of Jordan has decided to take the necessary steps to bring the matter to the

attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. A letter (A/6725) was therefore sent to the Secretary-General last night..."

Mr. Wane, Mauritania (A/PV.1531 at pages 7-10):

"... The delegation of Mauritania wishes warmly to thank the Secretary-General for the manner in which he is carrying out his important and difficult mission, thereby commanding the esteem and appreciation of the peoples of the world. We should like to assure him of the active support of the Government and the people of Mauritania in the struggle being waged with courage and perseverance for respect for the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The irrefutable juridical basis of the reply made by the Secretary-General to the request of a sovereign State, formally requesting that the United Nations Emergency Force be withdrawn from its territory, and the fact that this decision by the Secretary-General is in conformity both with a sound concept of peace-keeping operations and with the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter are so clear that no insinuation on the part of the Zionist aggressors or their accomplices -- North Americans and English -- can becloud the point.

"The admirable reply which the Secretary-General felt it necessary to give the General Assembly two days ago to the accusations by those who expect the United Nations to capitulate to an obvious and treacherous aggression will, we are convinced,

suffice to expose the bad faith and to cover with shame those who, having seriously prejudiced the basic principles of the Charter, seek today, with typical cynicism, to challenge the integrity and impartiality characteristic of the activities of U Thant as he works for peace and respect for the rights of peoples.

(A/PV.1531 at pages 16-17):

"... In the past few weeks we have witnessed a sustained campaign by the whole Press of the United States, and of the majority of Western countries, designed to distort the facts. Israel is made to appear as a peaceful State that has been compelled to defend itself against neighbouring countries determined to make war against it. Those who are behind this odious campaign describe as "hasty, inopportune and even irresponsible" the decision of the Secretary-General to withdraw the troops of the United Nations Emergency Force. We should like to say once again that the decision taken by the Secretary-General at the time that request was made is in complete conformity with the fundamental principles of the Charter. The irrefutable arguments given by the Secretary-General in his report of 26 May 1967 (S/7906) demonstrates the spirit of complete impartiality and respect for the principles of the Charter of our Organization which guided the Secretary-General in his decision..."

Mr. Harmel, Belgium (A/PV.1531 at page 22):

"...Throughout nineteen turbulent years, we have taken part

in the armistice commissions, we have contributed financially to the extent of our ability to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. However, the efforts of so many nations had not led to an over-all settlement, and we knew that any act which changed the unstable balance that somehow had managed to prevail in that region could, at any moment, rekindle the hostilities. That is why the recent incidents along the frontiers, the withdrawal of the United Nations Force, the change of the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba, the virulent political declarations, and finally the movements of troops, created a paroxysm of tension. However, we all still hoped that the conflict could be avoided and, to the extent of our means, we all recommended moderation to all the parties concerned.

(A/PV.1531 at page 28):

"... The main objective of this Assembly is to formulate principles which would be capable of bringing peace and stability to the Middle East. The Belgian Government thinks that a concomitant examination of urgent humanitarian action would be in accord with our general objective. We support the appeals of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 14 June, and the actions of the specialized agencies..."

Mr. Pirzada, Pakistan (A/PV.1531 at page 52):

"... An objective account of the situation is given in

paragraph 8 of the Secretary-General's report contained in document S/7896:

"Intemperate and bellicose utterances, by other officials and non-officials, eagerly reported by Press and radio, are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that State statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines."

(A/PV.1531 at pages 56-57):

"... The Secretary-General decided on 18 May to accede to the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic in the exercise of sovereign rights for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. There has been some criticism of the Secretary-General's action. Many speakers before me have noted Israel's refusal to accept the deployment of the Force on its side of the border, following the suggestion of the Minister of External Affairs of Canada, which the Secretary-General put to Israel. A few days ago a memorandum purporting to have been left by the late Dag Hammarskjöld was published in an attempt to prove that U Thant acted contrary to the under-

standing reached between the Secretary-General and President Nasser in 1957 on the conditions to be complied with if the question came to withdrawal of the Emergency Force. The Secretary-General has given a clear and convincing reply. We regret and deplore attacks on the Secretary-General. They can only weaken the United Nations. Pakistan reposes the fullest confidence in his judgement, impartiality and integrity..."

Mr. Shcherbitsky, Ukrainian SSR (A/PV.1532 at pages 13-15):

"... They even tried to portray events in such a way as to suggest that the decision of Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic, in accordance with the request of the Government of that country, has supposedly increased tension in the Middle East. We believe that the Secretary-General has convincingly, and with dignity, rejected their unfounded claims in this matter..."

Mr. El Kony, United Arab Republic (A/PV.1533 at page 2):

"... Parallel to what the Israeli authorities are doing in Jordan, they have followed the same practice in the parts of the United Arab Republic that are illegally occupied by Israeli troops as a result of their naked aggression.

"In this connexion, my Foreign Minister has addressed a letter to the Secretary General. It is contained in document A/6726 of 22 June 1967..."

Mr. Maiwandwal, Afghanistan (A/PV.1533 at page 7):

"... Ever since the aggression of Israel against the Arab countries, this Organization has been on trial before humanity. At the outset of the consideration of the recent aggression of Israel, I should like to take this opportunity to pay a most sincere tribute to the distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant, for his untiring efforts in the cause of peace in general and the effective discharge of his onerous responsibilities in an impartial manner.

(A/PV.1533 at page 11):

"... The Secretary-General, in his statement of 20 June 1967 in this Assembly restored "the balance which the facts warrant" (1527th meeting, page 2-5) regarding the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force on 18 May 1967. He reminded us that:

"... the indispensable basis for the effective buffer function exercised by the United Nations Emergency Force for more than a decade was the voluntary decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to keep its troops away from the line...", while "Israel extended no such co-operation on the United Nations Emergency Force to the United Nations". (Ibid., page 6)

This means that the United Arab Republic was perfectly within its legal right in asking for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from its sovereign territory, and the Secretary-General took the only possible legal action. It has been made clear that Israel rejected once again the idea of the United Nations Emergency Force being stationed on the Israeli side of the line. In this connexion, we pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his noble efforts to discharge his responsible functions, and fully support the action taken by him in this regard.

(A/PV.1533 at page 13):

"... It was disappointing to note that while peace talks were going on in the Security Council, Israel's premeditated designs upon the Arabs were proceeding unabatedly; while attempts in the Security

Council were directed towards containing the issue and the Secretary-General was asking for a breathing spell, Israel, in spite of pious utterances to the contrary, unleashed massive air and ground attacks upon the Arab lands, thus facing the United Nations with another so-called reality -- and another fait accompli..."

Mr. Martin, Canada (A/PV.1533 at page 41):

"... The present Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Lester Pearson, took an intimate part in the negotiations which led to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. Canada supplied the first Commander, General Burns, and a sizable contingent to the Force. The United Nations Emergency Force was the first peace-keeping force to be established by the United Nations. I am convinced that its record of accomplishment and service will be a legacy upon which the United Nations will be able to draw in the future. This record will be far more important in the verdict of history than the current differences of opinion over the circumstances of its withdrawal.

(A/PV.1533 at page 42):

"... May I say to the Secretary-General that he is aware of the regard the people of Canada and its Government have for him. I want him to know that we are grateful for his untiring efforts in this difficult problem.

(A/PV.1533 at page 47):

"... Another United Nations body which is still extant is the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The function of conciliation is

bound to be a vital one during this first stage on the road to a permanent settlement. Whether or not the Commission is the right organ to perform this function without changes being made both in its mandate and in its membership, or whether a different procedure might be envisaged, perhaps in the form of a special representative of the Secretary-General, I do not now wish to say with certainty. Yet some United Nations agency or representative will be required, I believe, to maintain full contact with all the Governments concerned and to prepare the way for subsequent negotiations, looking towards a permanent peace. I may say that this might well be the most important thing that this Assembly could do: to recommend the appointment of such a representative..."

Mr. Beavogui, Guinea (A/PV.1534 at pages 16-18):

"... Thus, since 1956 a relative peace had prevailed in the Middle East, thanks, first of all, to the policy of peaceful co-operation of the United Arab Republic with the United Nations, and also thanks to the meritorious efforts of our Organization, the effective presence of which was ensured by the troops of the United Nations Emergency Force, and by other institutions which functioned more or less according to the caprice of the Hebrew State which, as everybody knows, has never felt anything but contempt for the mission of peace of the United Nations in the Middle East and which has often been guilty of provocative acts against the blue-helmeted troops along the demarcation line.

"The causes of the recent crisis in the Middle East are well known. It was as a result of the bellicose declarations of the Tel-Aviv authorities threatening to invade the Syrian Arab Republic that the United Arab Republic invoked Arab solidarity and the common Arab defence pact, and officially asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, on 18 May 1967, to withdraw all the United Nations forces from Egyptian national soil. It is quite obvious that the United Arab Republic was thus exercising the prerogatives of its national sovereignty in liquidating the consequences of the 1956 tripartite aggression, both in Sinai and in the Strait of Tiran which, as all States are aware, even though some have been lacking in candour in the matter, fall exclusively within its sovereignty. In accordance with the agreement on the establishment of the United Nations presence, and also with the spirit and practice of all peace-keeping operations in any Member country of the United Nations, U Thant acceded to the request of the United Arab Republic. My Government warmly congratulates the Secretary-General for the diligence, intelligence, realism and dignity with which he discharged his obligations, thus reaffirming the impartial and neutral character of the United Nations.

Of course, certain Governments, including Israel, and certain of the international Press and other mass media obedient to the Zionists, attacked the Secretary-General and criticized his actions, in order to discredit the United Nations. For certain persons,

such as the famous attorney whom the African States had chosen in connexion with the case of South West Africa - - a case which was lamentably lost, by the way, proving his lack of juridical knowledge - - they did not hesitate sordidly to compromise themselves in intemperate stands which can only be damaging to the only internationally effective peace-keeping instrument, the United Nations. This aberration by the Israel Government, which is nothing other than the child of the United Nations - - an illegitimate child, but nevertheless a recognized child - - this international conspiracy against the United Nations for inadmissible political ends, must be denounced and condemned. We should emphasize that Israel never agreed that United Nations troops should be stationed on its territory, in accordance with United Nations decision. This Zionist rebellion against the United Nations seems strangely to have escaped the imperialist circles, which are suddenly stricken by amnesia every time political and juridical arguments seem to be unfavourable to Israel. The Government of the Republic of Guinea affirms its unswerving support for U Thant, who has done honour to the noble functions he discharges; he bears a heavy burden with distinction, intelligence and impartiality.

"It is no secret to anyone that the withdrawal of the United Nations troops from Egyptian territory created a new and controversial situation which was interpreted differently by different countries, but the gravity of which escaped no one. The Secretary-General himself did not conceal the fact that this situation was the most menacing since the hostilities of 1956. That is why U Thant

went to Cairo in order to try to defuse the crisis by advocating a breathing spell, in the course of which, through peaceful means and diplomatic methods, a solution of the crisis might be found. At that time he received full assurances of the peaceful intentions of the United Arab Republic..."

Mr. Cyrankiewicz, Poland (A/PV.1534 at page 31-32):

"... In the course of this debate and also before the present session was convened, we heard remarks on the withdrawal of the United Nations Forces which were stationed on Arab territory with the consent of Egypt. This force was likened to a fire brigade being withdrawn at the time of a fire. These were pin-pricks aimed at the Secretary-General, to which he replied in a dignified and well-documented statement. But, after all, nothing prevented the Israeli Government from calling this fire brigade to the Israeli territory which, however, that Government has repeatedly refused to do..."

Mr. Malik, Indonesia (A/PV.1534 at pages 41-42):

"... We supported the request of the President of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. Likewise, we approved the prompt response of Secretary-General U Thant in compliance with this request. Consequently, we were in full accord with the measures taken by the Government of the United Arab Republic with regard to the Strait of Tiran. Our positive stand in these instances was dictated by our conviction of

the sovereign right of the Government of the United Arab Republic to take these and other measures in the defence of their legitimate national interests.

"In this connexion, I would like to stress my Government's view that there are no grounds whatsoever for the doubt voiced by certain quarters as to the legality and appropriateness of the conduct of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in complying with the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from its territory. We wish, therefore, to reiterate the full confidence of the Indonesian Government in the ability, judgement, and impartiality of Secretary-General U Thant..."

Mr. Khatri, Nepal (A/PV.1535 at pages 7-10):

"... My delegation also wishes to record its appreciation of the efforts made by the Secretary-General in trying to avert the emergence of the present crisis. We greatly regret the imputations levelled at the impartiality of the Secretary-General and at his scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of a Member nation. U Thant's dedication to peace and to the principles and purposes of the United Nations can never be challenged..."

King Hussein, Jordan (A/PV.1536 at page 2):

"... Happily for the world, the United Nations continued to survive and since then it has continued, under the wise and patient guidance of its present Secretary-General, to serve well the cause of peace..."

Mr. Sallan, Yemen (A/PV.1536 at page 31):

"... We also record with admiration and appreciation the honourable and correct decision of our Secretary-General U Thant in responding to the call to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force. By this action, U Thant refused to put this world Organization under the pressure of any Power, thus preserving its dignity as the true institution to safeguard world peace and security..."

Mr. Hambro, Norway (A/PV.1536 at page 36):

"... These words (of the President of the General Assembly) echo what our Secretary-General stated on his return from his mission to Cairo at the beginning of the crisis which has brought

us together here, when he stressed that we "must continue to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions".  
(S/7906, para. 19)..."

Mr. Eban, Israel (A/PV.1536 at page 41):

"... The first phase in the aggression was the sudden movement of infantry and tank forces into Sinai on 16 May. The second phase began the next day when General Mahmoud Fawzi requested the commander of the United Nations Emergency Force to evacuate his troops from the line of the Egyptian advance and concentrate them in Gaza. On 18 May the Egyptian Foreign Minister conveyed his Government's decision to remove all United Nations forces from the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza.

"The third stage of the plan began on 20 May with the forcible expulsion of the United Nations forces at Sharm el Sheikh.

(A/PV.1536 at page 42):

"... Indeed, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as he has reported to us, informed President Nasser that the imposition of that blockade would have the gravest consequences.

(A/PV.1536 at page 61):

"Some Members may feel that the defects of an intermediate and ambiguous situation can be removed by what is called an international presence. Well, we had our experience last month, on which I shall not enlarge again. But what we should do is give attention to what our own Secretary-General wrote in his report to the twenty-first

session of the General Assembly. He wrote:

"In such cases as the United Nations Emergency Force, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the United Nations Force in Cyprus, the crux of the matter from the standpoint of the United Nations is the continuing absence of any earnest resolve on the part of the parties directly involved in the dispute to seek a reasonable way out of it. Indeed, at times it seems" - -

said the Secretary-General - - "and it may actually be the case, that they tend to take the attitude that the very United Nations presence frees them from any pressing obligation to exert a really serious effort towards a settlement of their differences."

I repeat: He wrote that "the very United Nations presence frees the parties from any pressing obligation to exert a really serious effort towards a settlement of their differences".

"It may well be true" - - the Secretary-General went on to say - - "that the existence of the United Nations peace-keeping operation and the feeling of security that grows with its effectiveness, reduce the sense of danger and urgency about the continuing dispute, thus relieving the pressure on the parties to seek a settlement." (Official Records of the General Assembly: Twenty-First Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6301/Add.1)...)

Mr. Baroody, Saudi Arabia (A/PV.1536 at page 92):

"... You will see that they are not respectors of persons. They can get away with murder. And they also touch our Secretary-General. Anyone who does something that does not harmonize with Mr. Eban or the wishes of Israel, is an arch enemy, even the Secretary-General. I am not going to quote what they wrote about the Secretary-General officially.

(A/PV.1536 at pages 93-95):

"... Now I am quoting again from the editorial which appeared in The Reporter published on 5 June 1967, the day of the aggression - - I think it is The Reporter:

"As to U Thant, poor man, we feel sorry for him. After so much blabbering about a Soviet-American collision course, he may be the one to bring it about. But let us forget about him. He does not count. He should never have counted. Only the President counts, and we are waiting." -- meaning the President of the United States..."

Mr. BALAFREJ, Morocco (A/PV. 1537 at pages 7-11):

"... Some people have claimed here that the present crisis started with the request made by the Government of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal from its territory of United Nations forces and with that country's decision to ban Israeli ships, or those which helped to strengthen its aggressive potential, from passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. Now, we all know that when the Assembly decided to station United Nations troops on the territory of the United Arab Republic and Israel, the latter disregarded the resolution of the General Assembly and refused, in the name of its sovereignty, to allow the stationing of those troops on its territory.

"The United Nations, not being able, therefore, to station forces in that region on the basis of that resolution whose implementation Israel rejected, had to station the troops only on the territory of the United Arab Republic, within the framework of an arrangement which gave the United Arab Republic complete freedom to put an end to it.

"The request by the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of troops was, therefore, legal and legitimate, and the position taken by the Secretary-General in this regard was fully justified. We firmly reject the attacks to which the Secretary-General has been subjected, particularly by those who refused to agree that the Organization had any right to station forces on its territory.

"In the course of this debate before the General Assembly, statements whose authority cannot be questioned have revealed that before the launching of the Israeli aggression contacts that had taken place with the United Arab Republic made it clear that constructive discussion on the problem was not

excluded. The Secretary-General himself, after his return from Cairo, told the Security Council that he hoped that after a certain time this question could develop towards a constructive solution..."

Mr. ENAHORO, Nigeria (A/PV. 1537 at page 37):

"...We profoundly regretted that "the breathing spell" for which our distinguished Secretary-General called in his report to the Security Council in document S/7906 could not be realized. In this connexion, may I pay warm tribute to the energetic endeavours of our Secretary-General, His Excellency U Thant, on behalf of peace in the Middle East. In the considered view of my Government, no blame attaches to the Secretary-General for the tragic events of the last few weeks, and we believe that he must regret, as we do, that the peace he sought eluded us.

. . . . .

(page 46)

"...My delegation is in favour of the proposal that the Secretary-General should depute a representative or agent to the area. We consider that the functions of the representative or agent should include recommendation of terms for a permanent peace settlement in the area, in particular proposals relating a limitation on arms and the reconciliation of international maritime needs and interests with the undisputed sovereignty of Arab States; administration of areas of United Nations presence; supervision of the work of the International Commission on Holy Places; recommendation of suitable guarantees for stability in the area to be given by the United Nations or the major Powers; and the direction of refugee resettlement operations..."

Mr. JAKOBSON, Finland (A/PV.1537 at page 62):

"... Until a lasting political settlement is achieved, the United Nations, in our view, continues to have a vital role in the Middle East. It is in fact inconceivable to us that peace could be kept in the area without United Nations participation. Although one of the consequences of the present crisis was the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization has remained, and its services, performed in the most difficult conditions and with minimal resources, proved indispensable to the Security Council in the process of establishing a cease-fire.

. . . . .

(page 64)

"... In his report of 26 May Secretary-General U Thant expressed the hope that a breathing spell could be created to allow the Security Council to deal with the underlying causes of the crisis. Instead of a breathing spell we have had war; and in its aftermath a political settlement, which has eluded the United Nations for eighteen years, appears to be more difficult to achieve than ever before. Yet the United Nations cannot abandon its task. We must, in the words of the Secretary-General, "continue to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions" (S/7906, para. 19).

Mr. FARAH, Somalia (A/PV.1538 at pages 4-5):

"... Similarly, the Israeli position with regard to the United Arab Republic's call for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force was that of one who searches for excuses for his actions. The Israeli representative's criticism of the United Arab Republic and of the Secretary-General can only be described as sheer effrontery. If the request of the United Arab Republic to have the forces withdraw was a sign of belligerence, then the refusal of Israel to permit these same forces on its territory at any time since 1957 can only be evidence of a warlike intent of long standing..."

Mr. AIKEN, Ireland (A/PV.1538 at page 21):

"... I am convinced that, in view of the exclusion of the United Nations peace-keeping force from Israeli territory and its expulsion from Gaza and Sinai, to which the Secretary-General had no option but to agree, there is no possibility that peace can be kept in the Middle East by any force which can be mounted under present conditions by the Assembly. As I have already said, the only hope I see of avoiding another outbreak in the area is the speedy negotiation and signing of a permanent treaty of peace by Israel and the neighbouring States, and that this treaty should be guaranteed by the United Nations. I believe that it would be wise to ask our distinguished and respected Secretary-General to assist in the initiation and conduct of the negotiations..."

Mr. MWEMBA, Zambia (A/PV.1538 at page 36):

"... My delegation should also like to assure our Secretary-General of our confidence in his untiring efforts for peace before, during and after the war. In this regard, my delegation finds it difficult to justify the criticism levelled at our Secretary-General in the discharge of his heavy responsibilities with regard to the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the posts which they held before the start of belligerence in the Middle East. We believe, as others do who have spoken before us, that the Secretary-General acted in the best interest of this Organization and in accordance with the terms of the agreement between the United Arab Republic and the then Secretary-General of the United Nations..."

Mr. LUNS, Netherlands (A/PV. 1539 at page 28):

"...The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom as well as other speakers have suggested that the Secretary-General should nominate a special representative to be sent out to the Middle East. One of the tasks of this special representative would be to 'play an active part in relations with all the parties in the area itself'..."

Mr. AZNAR, Spain (A/PV. 1539 at page 31):

"...Exactly a month ago, on 28 May of this year, our Secretary-General addressed a conference in Geneva on the subject of the Encyclical Pacem in Terris and stated that the policies which consisted of evading international responsibilities when it was thought convenient to do so, seemed to him highly dangerous and quite capable of leading us, if it had not already done so, to the very brink of a third world war. The statement that we may be witnessing the prologue to a third world war had been expressed a few days before by U Thant in a speech made to the United Nations Correspondents Association. The words of the Secretary-General, half-thinking aloud and half-prophetic, seemed terrifying to all of us. Those words had been spoken by a man who, when he gives the sound of alarm, does not tend to speak in vain and does not give way to facile emotion. However, that shock lasted a few hours. And after the first impression, once again a gay confidence took over. Perhaps, we told ourselves, U Thant was exaggerating somewhat, thinking thus to render better service to the main principles of peace and international coexistence and thus trying to dispel the black threats that hover over us. But now we know that the Secretary-General had given us a correct diagnosis. A war of implacable aggressiveness was unleashed on the Middle East, and visited on the hearts and souls of the peoples of the region such hatred and such fear as had not been known in those lands for centuries. We are now surrounded by a feeling of universal anxiety..."

Mr. HAKIM, Lebanon (A/PV. 1539 at pages 58-60):

"...Many speakers before me have reviewed the events that led up to the present crisis. During the last several months, Israel launched large-scale armed attacks on Syria and Jordan. Early in May, Israeli leaders publicly threatened to invade Syria, occupy Damascus and overthrow the Syrian regime. In order to ensure their mutual defence, the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan were obliged to adopt certain measures. The United Arab Republic requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, and the Secretary-General decided to comply with that request. He has made the reasons for that decision perfectly clear. We fully understand those reasons and, together with the majority of Member States, we give him our full support. We have confidence in the Secretary-General's impartiality and good judgement..."

Mr. de MAGALHAES PINTO, Brazil (A/PV. 1540 at page 2):

"...For more than ten years we contributed a battalion to the United Nations Emergency Force, which rendered such outstanding service to the cause of peace. As UNEF's presence in the area was based on a consensual agreement, we never disputed the right exercised by Israel to decline to admit the Force on its territory, nor the right of the United Arab Republic to request the Force's withdrawal. We very much regretted, however, that UNEF's services should have been terminated at a time when it could still have fruitfully discharged its peace-keeping functions. Nonetheless, we shall not hesitate, if once again called upon to do so, to collaborate in any peace-keeping operation that may result from a decision taken by this Organization.

(Page 7):

"Negotiations for the settlement of all pending problems, including, on the basis of mutual consent, the eventual establishment of demilitarized zones by the methods of peaceful solution envisaged in the Charter and with the collaboration, if required, of a special representative of the Secretary-General. The special representative could play an important role in the problem of establishing contact between the parties and in expediting the negotiations..."

Mr. CORNER, New Zealand (A/PV. 1540 at page 16):

"...The Soviet Union and those aiding it have placed great weight, in their hypothesis, on the contention that on a certain date in May there was a military concentration in Israel preparatory to a major assault upon Syria. Whatever the nature of statements made by Israeli leaders at this time—and these did not lack a mountain of counterparts in neighbouring countries—only one piece of unquestionably objective evidence on this matter has, at this point in history, been put to Members of this Organization: that is the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 19 May in which he said:

'Reports from UNTSO Observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line.'

"That statement by the Secretary-General has not yet been controverted.

(Page 21):

"A stronger and more effectively based United Nations presence in the region might be thought both necessary and

desirable. It would, of course, need to be established more securely than UNEF turned out to be — a matter on which my delegation may have some observations to make in another and more appropriate context..."

Mr. TILAKARATNA, Ceylon (A/PV. 1540 at page 31):

"...The fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly has met to consider as a matter of grave importance and urgency the situation which has arisen in the Middle East consequent on the military hostilities which broke out in that region in the early hours of 5 June. My Government is among those deeply appreciative of the untiring efforts of the Security Council and those of the Secretary-General to ease the situation; but at the same time we recognized that the gravity of the crisis was such that an urgent and effective solution was the responsibility of every Member nation present here.

(Page 36)

"Before I conclude, I must also place on record my delegation's endorsement of the Secretary-General's view that the UNEF was on United Arab Republic soil with the express consent of the United Arab Republic Government, and that once that consent was withdrawn UNEF could not possibly continue to be there, except as an occupation force. My delegation expressed this view as far back as March 1957, and we reaffirm it now.

"My Government would wish further to place on record its deep appreciation of the dedicated manner in which Secretary-General U Thant endeavoured, not only in the exercise of his high office but also by the use of his personal prestige, to prevent the tragic events of which we are all aware.

(Page 37):

"Lastly, the Government of Ceylon will firmly support any proposal or suggestion for the establishment or reactivation of any United Nations presence or peace-keeping force which, in the collective view of this Assembly, may contribute to a possible easing of the tension existing between Israel and its neighbouring States and thereby give what our Secretary-General referred to as "a breathing spell" before final and long-term solutions are sought to be achieved. It is our view that such a presence or peace-keeping force should be supported and accepted on their respective territories by both Israel and its neighbouring States..."

Mr. RAJA AZNAM, Malaysia (A/PV. 1541 at page 37):

"...With the effective implementation of a cease-fire on the ground, the breathing space called for by the Secretary-General was achieved. But let not the political settlement of the Palestine problem, which has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for the last nineteen years, leave the Arabs short of breath and with diminished area. This could be the net result of our deliberations, should Member States allow the fait accompli caused by Israeli occupation of Arab territories to go unchallenged..."

Mr. ROSSIDES, Cyprus (A/PV. 1541 at page 47):

"...In our view, the Secretary-General had no alternative but to withdraw the United Nations forces after the consent for their stationing had been cancelled. In so doing, the Secretary-General not only complied with a legal obligation, but also acted in the best interests of the United Nations and its peace-keeping functions. These peace-keeping operations have been clearly defined as voluntary or consent operations, and as such were accepted by the United Arab Republic. We are fully in favour of the United Nations presence in all critical situations, but to that end there should be co-operation on the part of the States involved. And it is a fact, stated in the report of the Secretary-General, that Israel never accepted any United Nations forces to be placed on its side of the line, in spite of the relevant resolutions.

"The Secretary-General spared no effort to save the Middle East situation. He visited the area and did all that was within his means in the circumstances for the maintenance of peace. This instance, however, may serve to show up the need for an organized system of peace-keeping and for strengthening the Organization as an effective instrument of peace and security in the world. U Thant more than once stressed this basic need, which weighed greatly in his mind.

"We take this opportunity to reiterate our deep appreciation of the Secretary-General for his abiding concern for peace coupled with his wisdom and objectivity, which have been the greatest assets of the Organization and of the world community during a most trying period of world crisis..."

. . . . .

Mr. LIATIS, Greece (A/PV. 1542 at page 17):

"... In this same sense of historical duty and responsibility, my Government, upon the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June, addressed an urgent appeal to the Secretary-General, asking him to take the initiative to have Jerusalem declared an open city in order to have it spared from the ravages of war..."

Mr. NSANZE, Burundi (A/PV. 1542 at pages 28-31):

"...I turn now to the matter of the full conformity on the part of the Secretary-General with the imperatives of national sovereignty.

"Hardly had he ordered the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force when U Thant became the object of criticism, whose bitterness and intensity were expressed in various forms. A good number of critics vied in reproaching the Secretary-General with not having undertaken preliminary consultations; with having precipitately complied with the demand of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

"No doubt the error of our valiant pillar of peace is attributable to his failure to act to the sound of trumpets, and the frustration of certain people is due to his refusal to obey their instructions, and not to the fact that he refrained from consulting them.

"The eloquence with which His Excellency U Thant refuted those accusations, using obvious and clear arguments based on the full facts and on the events, makes it unnecessary for my delegation to enter a prolonged plea on behalf of the Secretary-General. We

invite this august body to refer to Assembly document A/6669 and to Security Council documents S/7896 and S/7906.

"Nothing can better justify the legitimacy of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force than the full conformity of the Secretary-General's attitude with the inseparable imperatives of the sovereign right which every Government has over its national territory. It was to these requirements of national sovereignty that U Thant had to acquiesce. The primary objective of the Assembly is to put an immediate end to the war which is suspended for the moment, and we must therefore refrain from concentrating on a past episode which is, after all, almost alien to the origin of the hostilities..."

Sir LAURENCE McINTYRE, Australia (A/PV. 1542 at page 37):

"...In past years we have all continued to place our hopes in the dedicated efforts of individual statesmen, of our Secretary-General and of his predecessor, within and outside the United Nations, to create by degrees a new climate of mutual tolerance and understanding by tackling individual points of friction. At times it has seemed that these efforts would succeed. But it is apparent that we shall have to concentrate on the causes rather than the symptoms, and that what is needed now is a new and sustained effort to settle the entire range of new and old differences, and an earnest search for the basis of a stable and viable peace..."

Mr. Bishti, Libya (A/PV.1543 at page 2):

"... The noble objective of this Organization, peace on earth, has been gravely endangered in recent weeks by the Zionist blitz war against three neighbouring Arab countries. This calculated assault was launched even as the Security Council was attempting to deal with the changes which had taken place after the United Nations Emergency Force was withdrawn and the United Arab Republic rightfully reasserted its sovereignty over its own lands and territorial waters.

(A/PV.1543 at pages 3-5):

"... At the outset of the crisis, the United Nations Secretary-General, during his visit to Cairo, was assured personally that the UAR would never initiate hostilities..."

Mr. Bouteflika, Algeria (A/PV.1543 at page 46):

"... For having put into effect the Charter and the very texts of this Organization with courage and a probity which can only result in tremendous faith in the way in which he performs his task, the Secretary-General, U Thant, has been subjected to the most unjust and misplaced criticism. In fact by these personal attacks we are witnessing a new attempt to weaken further international institutions. This clear-thinking and honest man can be assured of our esteem and of our confidence because we know that his only ambition is to serve the principles to which we remain unswervingly attached..."

Mr. Ousman Ba, Mali (A/PV.1543 at pages 68-70):

"... We shall not hesitate to proclaim from this rostrum that if we allow aggression to go unpunished, we shall become the grave-diggers of the United Nations twenty-one years after its birth because, the precedent once established, the gate will be left open to new endeavours of the same kind and a third world war -- to which our Secretary-General has drawn our attention -- will become inevitable. What is happening today in Viet-Nam and the Near East we believe to be the preparation for a world conflagration. The powerful voice of General de Gaulle did not hesitate to echo that of U Thant in warning the world of the grave dangers threatening it..."

Mr. Perez Guerrero, Venezuela (A/PV.1545 at pages 28-30)

"...The contribution of the Secretary-General, U Thant, who has performed so many valuable services for us, will be more and more indispensable particularly at the present time simply because of the serenity, devotion, and impartiality that he has always shown..."

Mr. Panyarachun, Thailand (A/PV.1545 at page 46)

"...In this connexion, my delegation would like to pay special tribute to the Secretary-General for his untiring and dedicated efforts in the cause of peace and stability in the region..."

Mr. Goldberg, United States (A/PV.1546 at page 11)

"...UNTSO has performed, and is still performing, a valiant service, but surely we all recognize -- and the Secretary-General himself has reported -- that the removal of a still more substantial United Nations presence, the United Nations Emergency Force, created, in the Secretary-General's words, 'a new situation'; and that situation was altered still further by the recent hostilities. It is a situation which UNTSO, with its present resources and structure, cannot adequately manage..."

Mr. Schuurmans, Belgium (A/PV.1546 at pages 28-30)

"...However, this is not the case with draft resolution A/L.522, because if we consider the proposal it would be the General Assembly itself that would assume responsibility for certain measures calling for action, while at the same time it would entrust to the Secretary-General the task of supervising their

execution. If we followed these lines, we would be infringing upon the very clearly defined prerogatives of the Security Council..."

Mr. Lopez Villamil, Honduras (A/PV.1546 at page 72)

"...it is surely the primary responsibility of the Security Council, as the Charter says, to maintain international peace and security. This is the aim of operative paragraph 3 (A/L.523) in which we request the Security Council to take action in the Middle East by adopting such measures and pursuing such possibilities as are open to the Security Council, and also calling upon the parties to carry out the decisions of this Assembly in the implementation of the above measures. There is also the duty imposed ... to guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones, with the agreement of the parties so that co-operation will not be unilateral, since it is not an act of morality to hold blameworthy the just efforts made in defence of peace by high officials of the United Nations, and particularly the Secretary-General, unless the resolutions of the United Nations organs are first complied with and co-operation is forthcoming in the establishment of a stable peace..."

Mr. Csatorday, Hungary (A/PV.1546 at page 81)

"...As a result my delegation had no choice but to turn to the Secretary-General; and, on his direct advice and on the personal instructions of the President, the document was distributed as document A/6728. But because of all this wrangling, the distribution was delayed one week. Such a delay is unacceptable when such an important question is dealt with in a document..."

Lord CARADON, United Kingdom (A/PV. 1547 at page 42):

"...We recognize, however, that there has been an effort to make substantial improvements. In particular, the countries which sponsor the draft resolution have declared themselves in favour of the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General to make contact with the parties concerned. We have strongly advocated such a proposal. Without such a presence, it is difficult to see how practical progress can be made..."

Mr. SAYETH, Kuwait (A/PV.1547 at pages 48-50):

"...The Latin American draft resolution now tries to follow a short-cut instead of passing the stage that the Security Council has ruled, and that the Secretary-General has considered, indispensable before progress towards different political conditions and different political arrangements can be made..."

Mr. ENAHORO, Nigeria (A/PV.1548 at page 12):

"...My delegation proposes, therefore, to support the draft resolution of the seventeen non-aligned nations, (A/L.522/Rev.3/Corr.1) although we would have much preferred that it go further than it has gone towards meeting our position, particularly in regard to an effective United Nations presence in the area.

"My delegation wishes to explain that in doing so it is our understanding, first, that the Security Council will address itself to the entire question of peace and stability in the Middle East; second, that the Secretary-General's representative will not be

precluded from undertaking the tasks suggested in our six-point peace plan at the instance of the Secretary-General; and, third, that operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution means exactly what it says, namely, that States are "to render every assistance to the Secretary-General..."; in other words, that the initiative in this matter will rest unequivocally with the Secretary-General. On that understanding my delegation supports the draft resolution of the seventeen non-aligned nations.."

Mr. ASTROM, Sweden (A/PV.1549 at page 26):

"...If a further attempt is made to arrive at a draft resolution, it is our feeling that amongst the main substantive provisions might be an endorsement of the cease-fire with a statement urging the parties to observe it scrupulously and an authorization for the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative who will be in contact with the parties with respect to all problems pertaining to the area. This is, in our view, the least that the United Nations can do to assist in bringing about practical arrangements that can assure peaceful conditions in the area. It would then, of course, be for the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council, on the basis of the observations of his special representative..."

President PAZHAK, Afghanistan (A/PV.1549 at page 121):

"...At the 1546th meeting of the General Assembly, on 3 July, while delegations were in the process of explaining their votes and while I was in my office consulting with certain representatives on the matter before the Assembly, one representative made a statement in which he referred to a high official of the Secretariat and declared that he had been able to get a communication circulated in document form only on the direct advice of the Secretary-General and on the personal instructions of the President..."

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Mr. PACHACHI, Iraq (A.PV.1559 at page 12):

"... What kind of negotiations can be held when territories of Member States are under military occupation? It must be very clear that the United Nations itself has to play the major role in this crisis. And, as the Secretary-General very rightly said in his Press conference on Saturday, it would not be realistic to do otherwise, and the United Nations indeed has an important and necessary role. It is our hope that the role will be played in a way consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the principles of equity and justice..."

Mr. MESTIRI, Tunisia (A.PV.1559 at page 27):

"... From the report of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative it becomes perfectly clear that there has been a series of violations of international law against the Moslim and Christian populations of the Old City; there has been profanation of the holy places; lands belonging to the churches and certain property have been confiscated by the Israeli army for its own use, as the report states, and harassing and provocative measures have been taken, such as the setting up of a Supreme Rabbinical Tribunal in the eastern town, the dynamiting of houses in the Arab area, the complete destruction of the church and presbytery of the Catholic parish, etc..."

Mr. PACHACHI, Iraq (A.PV.1559 at page 46):

"...What I said in the Security Council was that the Arab States had informed the Secretary-General repeatedly and had stated on more than one occasion that they would not initiate offensive action. And I said that although we gave these assurances, no such assurances came from Israel..."