

AMIR

EXPIRATION OF UNAMIR MANDATE

19 JULY 1993 - 14 NOV 1995

[4 CONFIDENTIAL]

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**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 14 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

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|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| Mr. Claude Dusaidi | Office of the Vice-President |
| Mr. Higiro Thaddée | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi | Ministry of Planning |
| Maj. Kamarade Kayitare | RPA Liaison Officer |

UNAMIR

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| Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| Col. Shiva Kumar | Chief of Staff |
| Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer | Principal Officer, DPKO |
| Mr. Wilfrid de Souza | Executive Director |
| Ms. Susan Mathew | Chief Administrative Officer |
| Ms. Isel Rivero | Special Assistant to SRSG |
| Mr. Mtshana Ncube | Senior Legal Officer |
| Mr. Ismael Diallo | Spokesman |
| Mr. Mamady Condé | Senior Political Affairs Officer |

1. The SRSG introduced Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer, Principal Officer, DPKO mission to Rwanda. The SRSG then referred to the previous meeting and indicated at the request of Mr. Dusaidi, he had prepared a non-paper which summarized the points raised by the G-10 and UN Specialized Agencies regarding UNAMIR's Mandate and which had been subject of discussions at the last meeting.
2. Regarding the list of UNAMIR disposable equipment, the SRSG informed Dusaidi that UN Headquarters had responded that it would be ready by 27 November.
3. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he would refer the non-paper to higher authorities that he would provide the SRSG with his Government's views on the Mandate at a forthcoming meeting.

4. Mr. Dusaidi regretted that the United Nations was not able to finalize the equipment list earlier. He informed the SRSG that the Rwandese Foreign Minister had written a letter to the Secretary-General requesting the transfer of UNAMIR equipment and material to the Rwandese Government. Mr. Dusaidi then added that Rwanda would not be expected to give its response on the UNAMIR's Mandate while the United Nations was delaying its response on the equipment list. He said the two issues went hand-in-hand.

Mr. Dusaidi then reiterated his views concerning UNAMIR protection of UN bodies and agencies in Rwanda which could be provided by private services and/or Rwandese Security Forces. He repeated that it was insulting to Rwanda to suggest that it could not handle the security of foreign representatives. He could not accept the 1,800 as a critical mass as if it were a magic number. The truth was that during the genocide the United Nations had reduced its force to 210. Mr. Dusaidi expressed the views that Rwanda needed the rehabilitation of its infrastructure and that it was necessary to have a clear picture of how it was being done. However, in the short-term, he wished to know how the facilities occupied by UNAMIR would be repaired. He suggested that joint visits be undertaken to these sites in order to arrive at a clearer idea on the magnitude of the work to be done prior to UNAMIR's departure.

Regarding the rehabilitation of Rwanda's infrastructure and repair of facilities occupied by UNAMIR, SRSG stated that UNAMIR would repair the damage it had caused, due to its own possession of buildings but could not assume for damage caused by the conflict. UNAMIR had undertaken repairs of damaged bridges, roads and even undertaken some demining activities.

The CAO enumerated the numerous initiatives taken by UNAMIR in the repair of general infrastructure of Rwanda such as at the Kanombe International Airport where maintenance costs added up to \$23,000 a month. Repairs to the Amahoro stadium, Kigongo communal offices, Kigali Hospital, Police and Gendarmerie Training Schools, Military Academy, Butare School for Demobilized Children, Tea factory, Amahoro hotel, in addition to the loans of 12 generators, amounted to approximately over a million dollars. There were many other items which were not quantifiable such as disposal of munition and explosives, demining, repairs of bridges, roads and helicopters landing strips, construction of septic tanks and their servicing, and finally providing food for two orphanages.

The SRSG then turned to the issue of UNAMIR contractors such as Economat and Owen and Root. He clarified that items imported for the use of UNAMIR by the contractors were privileged and tax-exempt. Privileges and immunities were not otherwise extended to these companies. SRSG suggested that meetings be held with the management of those companies at which UNAMIR could attend as observer in order to ascertain their taxation liability. The CAO added that a final legal opinion had been

requested from the United Nations Legal Counsel on the responsibility of contractors under the SOMA. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Ministry of Finance had been instructed to examine Rwandese Tax Law and its application to international contractors.

Mr. Dusaidi then explained how he visualized UNAMIR's role in Rwanda. He said that the term "assistance mission" was particularly important for Rwanda. Tracing the significance of the term he said that the word was accepted after a careful and deliberate consideration. It referred to the need for United Nations to assist in the implementation of the Arusha process which meant financial support for the rehabilitation of refugees, a united army, demining, etc.. The genocide had led to an even greater need for United Nations to assist Rwanda in repairing the shattered infrastructure and helping Rwanda to recover from last year's crisis. In this regard, the Assistance Mission would have to change its Mandate from a peace-keeping role to a civilian role. Rwanda needed material assistance. UNAMIR could not walk out and leave behind a shattered nation. The United Nations had a moral responsibility to provide the country with the equipment it needs to stand on its feet. A level of flexibility in the application of UN rules had to be exercised. Rwanda required special measures. In fact, the world had a responsibility to rebuild Rwanda having stood still during the genocide. Mr. Dusaidi went on to say that Rwanda was examining the feasibility of legal responsibility.

The SRSG thanked Mr. Dusaidi for providing the historical context and his own personalization for the concept of Assistance Mission. He suggested that these views should be raised in the Security Council.

Maj. Kamarade interjected that Rwanda needed technology, experts, heavy machinery to improve production. Rwanda needed to achieve food security in order to be able to receive the refugees. Spoon-feeding did not help as people became used to hand-outs. The need for self-sufficiency needed to be included in the Mandate.

Mr. Dusaidi agreed that the future mandate needed to reflect these objectives.

SRSG indicated that while he understood Rwanda's reasoning, the United Nations had to be understood as a compartmentalized bureaucracy. Peace-keeping did not encompass economic development which was a role played by UNDP and the specialized agencies.

Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer then added that she would transmit the comments made by Mr. Dusaidi to her superiors in New York. She explained that at the United Nations everyone shared the same eagerness to assist Rwanda, but that it needed to recall that UNAMIR had never ceased to be a Chapter VI Operation and that it did not have a peace-keeping Mandate under Chapter VII. Regarding the future, she suggested that the

Rwandese Ambassador should clarify Rwanda's position in the Security Council as there was not much time left till the 8 December. At the moment the United Nations did not have the proper instruments to respond to post conflict needs. The requirements indicated by Mr. Dusaidi belonged to unchartered territory which fell outside traditional peace-keeping and peace-making.


15. In the opinion of Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi, the international community should treat Rwanda as a special case and therefore UNAMIR should convert itself into a civilian mission. The Force Commander remarked that it was clear by the remarks made that the concept for a new mission was emerging which fell outside traditional peace-keeping. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that what was needed was a mission with a radically different concept.

16. Mr. Nsengumuzemyi then enquired about United Nations Financial Regulations Procedures as related to the United Nations Budget. More particularly, he wished to know the mechanisms used by Trust Funds in purchasing equipment.

17. Ms. Lindenmayer provided an extensive reply which included explaining differences between United Nations Regular Budget and voluntary contributions, creation of Trust Funds for particular projects and peace-keeping, assessed contributions.


18. Mr. Dusaidi closed the meeting by stating that Rwanda was responsible for rebuilding itself. The Government wanted to be assisted in the priorities it had identified. Sometimes, donor countries and NGOs acted on their own priorities even without consulting the Government.

19. It was decided that the next meeting would be held on **Monday, 20 November** instead of Tuesday, 21 November.



Mr. Claude Dusaidi

Date: 17/11/95



Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 17/11/95

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 7 NOVEMBER 1995**

In attendance:

Government

| | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|
| Mr. Claude Dusaidi | Office of the Vice-President |
| Mr. Higiro Thaddee | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Maj. Kamarade Kayitare | RPA Liaison Officer |

UNAMIR

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|-----------------------|---|
| Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| Mr. Wilfrid de Souza | Executive Director |
| Ms. Susan Matthew | Chief Administrative Officer |
| Ms. Isel Rivero | Special Assistant to SRSG |
| Col. W. J. Fletcher | Chief of Operations |
| Mr. Mtshana Nkube | Senior Legal Officer |
| Mr. Mamady Conde | Senior Political Affairs Officer |

1. The SRSG recalled that, at the last meeting, the Government of Rwanda's position was that after the conclusion of the current mandate, UNAMIR would phase-out and that any changes in this understanding should be proposed by the United Nations and the International Community with convincing rationalisation. In the meantime, the SRSG said, a meeting had been held on Thursday, 2 November in New York attended by the G-10, "interested" countries (i.e. donor and troop contributing countries) to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate at which a consensus had emerged. The SRSG added that in conveying this consensus view, he wished to underline that he was not expressing the opinion of the United Nations on the subject but of the G-10 group of countries. The SRSG added that United Nations Agency Representatives, also meeting in New York, had expressed similar views as adopted by the G-10.
2. The consensus view was that, in the next mandate, UNAMIR's present status quo should be maintained. There should be no reduction in formed troops, milobs, civpol and the civilian support staff. The G-10 group of countries agreed that 1,800 represented a minimum "critical mass" of formed troops.
3. Citing the reasons for the consensus position, the SRSG stated that the predominant factor related to the safe and secure return of 1.5 million refugees. The next few months were seen as critical in persuading the refugees to return home voluntarily because of the ultimatum given by Zaire

and Tanzania. During this critical period, it was felt that UNAMIR could play a positive role in practical terms as well as in helping to provide stability and confidence building measures that would encourage voluntary return. The SRSG gave examples such as the effective and successful cooperation between UNAMIR and the Government during the forced repatriation of 15,000 Rwandese refugees in August 1995 which had been processed smoothly and efficiently. He also referred to the re-settlement of nearly 1 million IDPS between September 1994 and April 1995 again through effective cooperation between the United Nations and the Government.

4. The SRSG further stated that all neighboring countries and UNHCR were currently engaged in a supreme effort to persuade the refugees to return hom voluntarily. For UNAMIR to walk away at such critical phase would send negative signals to the camps and even to the host countries who could use the withdrawal as an excuse to revert to forced return. The SRSG added that there was no guarantee of success for the return of refugees but it was necessary for all parties concerned to do their utmost to achieve lift-off for voluntary repatriation. In the event of forced repatriation which could lead to a massive influx of refugees, UNAMIR could play a positive role in resettling the returning refugees.

5. Protection of the International Tribunal personnel, the SRSG indicated, was an ancillary responsibility that UNAMIR had undertaken as part of its mandate; however, protection of the Tribunal could not serve as the *raison d'être* for a UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda.

6. As regards the issue of UNAMIR continuing its mandate with a reduced number of formed troops, the SRSG explained that by reducing the number from the current strength of 1,800 would mean that UNAMIR would not be able to perform the essential task of building confidence and stability for returning refugees in the prefectures. UNAMIR would be obliged to withdraw to Kigali and appear essentially to protect itself which was not the role or image that UNAMIR wanted to project. Moreover, a figure below 1,800 would mean that the military contingent would cease to be an operational unit and the practical advantages of having engineering, logistic and communication units would be severely undermined. Accordingly, 1,800 formed troops was seen as the minimum critical mass for the military contingent.

7. The SRSG underlined that should the Government of Rwanda agree to the extension of UNAMIR, the mandate would need to be revised so that UNAMIR military contingent was given relevant and meaningful tasks to perform.

8. The SRSG concluded by saying that the SOMA needed to be finalised because the amendments suggested by the Government of Rwanda indicated a reluctance to allow UNAMIR to continue after 8th December.

9. Mr. Dusaidi responded by stating that he had taken note of the points made by the SRSG and would transmit them to higher authorities. He would then convey their reaction as his Government's considered views on the issue.

10. Making a personal comment based on knowledge of his Government's existing policy, Mr. Dusaidi expressed scepticism about the refugees returning in 6 months. He was not optimistic about their return in 6 months because the issue was complex with many parties and countries pulling in contradictory directions. He did not visualize a return of refugees for one or two years. Rwanda was participating in Tripartite Agreements to ensure the safe and secure conditions for refugee return. President Mobutu's recent statement had also influenced the issue and Rwanda was prepared to cooperate with Zaire, Tanzania, UNHCR and all United Nations agencies to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees. Mr. Dusaidi was of the opinion that UNAMIR's presence should not be related to the refugee situation and should not serve as a basis for its continuation.

11. The SRSRG interjected to clarify that the consensus view was not that UNAMIR should continue indefinitely until the return of the last refugee. On the contrary, their recommendation was related to the immediate future in the context of regional states, UNHCR and the international community making a supreme effort for a voluntary return of refugees to gather momentum. There was no guarantee of success but all those who supported this objective needed to maximise their efforts within the short time-frame of about 6 months. UNAMIR's role was seen in this limited time-frame.

12. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to the issue of security and protection which he felt was the exclusive responsibility of a sovereign state. Rwanda was now capable of providing security and protection to United Nations agencies, diplomats, etc., including the Tribunal. Therefore, the insistence on UNAMIR providing protection to the Tribunal could even be seen as a slight against the Government's capability to provide security and protection. He added that Rwanda, the Tribunal and Human Rights Agencies share the same responsibility of investigating genocide and therefore it was in the Government's interest to provide security for these agencies.

13. The SRSRG stated that UNAMIR was providing security to the Tribunal as part of its mandate. However, this was an ancillary role for UNAMIR as part of its overall mandate and the security of the Tribunal or of any other United Nations Agencies could not be the sole justification for its presence in Rwanda. It was understood that the Government of Rwanda was responsible for providing security to all diplomatic and United Nations missions. However, the Tribunal's insistence on United Nations or Third Party security related to the need for transparency and justice appearing to be done. It was not a reflection on the Government of Rwanda's capability to provide security. Judge Goldstone would elaborate on these principles himself on his next visit the 23 of November.

14. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to the finalisation of the SOMA and indicated that he was waiting to receive his Ambassador's comments from New York.


15. Under other business, Mr. Dusaidi raised the following issues:

- (a) UNAMIR assets and list of disposable equipment;
- (b) Payment for repairs to installations used by UNAMIR;
- (c) Rwanda's request for unclassified material to be left behind by UNAMIR (e.g. maps, data bases, etc.);
- (d) The status of contracting companies and their financial obligations such as Brown and Root and Economat;
- (e) Information on UNAMIR local employees.


16. The SRSG replied that he would ask Ms. Matthew, the CAO, to respond to these enquiries in detail at the next meeting.

17. In conclusion Mr. Dusaidi asked the SRSG if he would give the points stated on the mandate in writing. The SRSG said that he would do so in a non-paper.

18. The SRSG also informed Mr. Dusaidi that the International Commission of Inquiry into Arms Flow would be arriving in Kigali on Wednesday, 8th November. He also reminded Mr. Dusaidi that no news had so far been received regarding the case of Mr. Mugabo Manase.



Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Date: 13-11-95



Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 13-11-95

PERSONAL 15 NOVEMBER 1995

I agree
with you and
S
Isel.

SRSB

As I am preparing the minutes of yesterday's meetings the following strikes me as very relevant.

1. There is no provision in the Arusha Peace Agreements for what Mr. Dusaidi was claiming. The name of UNAMIR was not discussed in Arusha. The mission was baptized by Gen. Barril, Annabi and myself. The word assistance is generally used in peace keeping nomenclature. (UNTAG, UNTAC etc.)
2. Mr. Dusaidi wishes to have a Marshall Plan. Yet, it is not up to the UN to offer such. It is the responsibility of Member States to decide whether there is a moral and pragmatic imperative in devising such a plan. UNAMIR has done all in its power to provide assistance and Von Kappen's analysis that UNAMIR has been acting as a peace making post conflict entity is correct.
3. The Concept of a post conflict operation is not new. But it would have to have military components to offer some guarantee to donors. In the case of Rwanda, this country is preparing for war. It is well deployed in border areas and it needs equipment to better mobilize itself as a full army and not a guerrilla. Their interest is not only in technicians for production, their interest is also of a military nature.
4. The threat that Rwanda will take the Security Council to the International Court for having remained quiet during the Genocide indicates to what extent the RPA is ready to confront the international community for its inactivity during April 94. War reparations from the international community would be a first in international law.
5. In my opinion the United Nations can only play humanitarian role as long as the threat of war persists. No one will venture a Marshall plan without security and without 3/4 of an ethnic group excluded from the process. Looming in the horizon lies that the country may yet again be devastated by war.
6. The RPA is pushing UNAMIR and the United Nations into a corner. They want to be recipients of assistance on their own terms but they are not working for "peace". The regional tensions are not conducive to stability. Everyone is gaining time. Once UNAMIR leaves, RPA having consolidated its grip, will declare martial law in order to face the Zairean/FRGS threat. They will be supported by Uganda and possibly by the Burundese military. Tanzania may remain neutral. No one has analyzed the consequences of FRGF activity from the East.
7. It is in this theatre that the Carter initiative becomes another actor.

2
Hm

10. Making a personal comment based on knowledge of his Government's existing policy, Mr. Dusaidi expressed scepticism about the refugees returning in 6 months. He was not optimistic about their return in 6 months because the issue was complex with many parties and countries pulling in contradictory directions. He did not visualize a return of refugees for one or two years. Rwanda was participating in Tripartite Agreements to ensure the safe and secure conditions for refugee return. President Mobutu's recent statement had also influenced the issue and Rwanda was prepared to cooperate with Zaire, Tanzania, UNHCR and all United Nations agencies to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees. Mr. Dusaidi was of the opinion that UNAMIR's presence should not be related to the refugee situation and should not serve as a basis for its continuation.

11. The SRSB interjected to clarify that the consensus view was not that UNAMIR should continue indefinitely until the return of the last refugee. On the contrary, their recommendation was related to the immediate future in the context of regional states, UNHCR and the international community making a supreme effort for a voluntary return of refugees to gather momentum. There was no guarantee of success but all those who supported this objective needed to maximise their efforts within the short time-frame of about 6 months. UNAMIR's role was seen in this limited time-frame.

12. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to the issue of security and protection which he felt was the exclusive responsibility of a sovereign state. Rwanda was now capable of providing security and protection to United Nations agencies, diplomats, etc., including the Tribunal. Therefore, the insistence on UNAMIR providing protection to the Tribunal could even be seen as a slight against the Government's capability to provide security and protection. ~~He added that United Nations and Rwanda shared the same objectives of providing security and protection to all United Nations agencies but it was time that Rwanda assumed this responsibility completely.~~ *Rwanda, Tribunal & Human rights agencies share the same responsibility of investigating genocide and therefore it is in the Government's interest to provide security for these agencies*

13. The SRSB explained that while the principle of the host government providing security to United Nations agencies, programmes and bodies, was accepted, the Tribunal insisted that its security should not be handled by the Rwandese Government. The Tribunal's objection was of principle which related to the transparency and impartiality of the process and of justice seen to be done. These principles would best be explained by Judge Goldstone himself.

14. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to the finalisation of the SOMA and indicated that he was waiting to receive his Ambassador's comments from New York.

15. Under other business, Mr. Dusaidi raised the following issues:

- (a) UNAMIR assets and disposable equipment; <
- (b) Payment for repairs to installations used by UNAMIR;
- (c) Rwanda's request for unclassified material to be left behind by UNAMIR (e.g. maps, data bases, etc.);

① I also inquired on the list of equipment. *Is there*

* *Note* ② I also insisted that the position on *renewal* be put to me in writing for easy transmission to higher authorities. The SRSB agreed to do so.

- (d) The status of contracting companies and financial obligations such as Brown and Root and Economat;
- (e) Information on UNAMIR local employees.

16. The SRSG replied that he would ask Ms. Matthew, the CAO, to respond to these enquiries in detail at the next meeting.

17. The SRSG also informed Mr. Dusaidi that the International Commission of Inquiry into Arms Flow would be arriving in Kigali on Wednesday, 8th November. He further requested information on United Nations local employees who had been detained and still not released, in addition to the case of UNAMIR radio employee, Mr. Manase Mugabo, who had disappeared.

*then in
my
contact
yes it is
correct
you said
this*

Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Date:

Shaharyar M. Khan
Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 24.11.95



**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 1 NOVEMBER 1995**

1. On 1 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

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|------------------------|--|
| Mr. Claude Dusaidi | Office of the Vice-President |
| Mr. Higiro Thaddée | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Sam Nkusi | Ministry of Transport and Communications |
| Mr. Mushyo Kamanzi | Ministry of Defence |
| Lt. Karenzi Karake | Ministry of Defence |
| Maj. Kamarade Kayitare | RPA Liaison Officer |

UNAMIR

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|-----------------------|---|
| Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| Mr. Wilfrid de Souza | Executive Director |
| Ms. Susan Matthew | Chief Administrative Officer |
| Col. David Kattah | Deputy Chief of Staff - Operations |
| Mr. Mamady Condé | Senior Political Affairs Officer |
| Ms. Isel Rivero ✓ | Special Assistant to the SRSG |
| Ms. Ladan M. Rafii | Political/Legal Officer |

2. The SRSG began the meeting by reviewing issues related to UNAMIR's mandate. He stated that when the current mandate expires on 8 December 1995, UNAMIR was prepared to phase out completely unless indications were received to the contrary, and that UNAMIR was not in Rwanda to perpetrate its presence within the country. He added that in the absence of any agreement, UNAMIR was ready to withdraw and, in fact, the latest indications from New York were that it should be prepared to withdraw after the termination of its current mandate. In the mean time, he stated that it was up to the Security Council and the Government of Rwanda to define the terms of UNAMIR's future mandate. The SRSG emphasized that although UNAMIR was, in conjunction with the Rwandese Government, providing security to United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda, this should be regarded as only an incidental task and not UNAMIR's main role. He stated that he could not envisage the Security Council or the United Nations agreeing to maintain a force in Rwanda solely for the purposes of protecting United Nations staff and installations.

3. With regard to the assistance part of the mission, the SRSG mentioned that what the the Rwandese Government was seeking from UNAMIR was understandable, but he explained that UNAMIR was essentially conceived of as a peace-keeping operation. The assistance portion of UNAMIR's mandate would normally be undertaken by other United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda whose functions were purely civilian in nature.


He stated that he would appreciate an indication from the Government of its envisaged role for UNAMIR beyond 8 December. With respect to the list of all UNAMIR equipment, he expected a response on the matter to be shortly received from United Nations Headquarters in New York (UNNY) indicating the items to be disposed of in Rwanda according to accepted rules and regulations and those to be transferred to other peace-keeping operations.


4. In response, Mr. Dusaidi stated that Rwanda's leadership had not yet decided on its policy regarding UNAMIR's mandate. However, in his Government's view, it was clear under the terms of UNAMIR's present mandate that it would end in December. He added that the onus was on the United Nations to inform the Rwandese Government of the need to change the present assumption. The United Nations would be expected to give reasons for continuing the mandate or for altering it. He agreed with the SRSG that it was unacceptable to many members of the United Nations to allow UNAMIR to remain in Rwanda for the sole purpose of protecting United Nations agencies. He insisted that he still viewed UNAMIR's role as being that of an assistance mission, in addition to the security aspects of its mandate. As regards the requirement, he explained that this request was being made as a matter of principle and not for purposes of hastening UNAMIR's departure from Rwanda. He added that in the absence of a list of UNAMIR equipment, his Government was willing to assist the United Nations by providing a list of its requirements, so that it would not be offered equipment it did not need. In this respect, he stated that his Government would make a request to the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council that some of the United Nations rules be adjusted to meet Rwanda's needs.

5. The SRSG assured the Government representatives that he would convey the message given to New York and that every effort would be made to assist Rwanda's genuine requirements. He added that it appeared there was a common understanding between the United Nations and the Rwandese Government that UNAMIR's mandate would end on the 8 December, but that the Security Council's position had yet to be clarified. The SRSG and Mr. Dusaidi both agreed that it was now up to the Security Council to take the initiative on the issue.

6. The SRSG also expressed his concern over certain instances whereby the Rwandese authorities had been overly zealous vis à vis UNAMIR staff in their efforts to maintain internal security (such as at road barriers near UNAMIR compounds and at the airport). Mr. Dusaidi assured the SRSG that this appeared to be a purely administrative problem and that he would look into the matter.

7. Mr. Dusaidi ended the meeting by inquiring about the modifications to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) proposed by the Rwandese Government. The SRSG responded that there did not appear to be much point in negotiating a new agreement if UNAMIR's mandate would be ending soon, and that some concerns had been raised in UNNY regarding the modifications proposed, but that a final decision had yet to be made. Mr. Dusaidi added that negotiations on the SOMA would be taken up in New York.


Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Date: 7/11/95


Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 3-11-95

7/11/95

Sally

Ladan left for Nairobi this
morning. Should I take notes
at the Joint meeting today
at 10³⁰ am?

Isr.

JG.

Note to the SRSG

Proposed amendments to the mandate for UNAMIR established
in S/RES/997 (1995) of 9 June

1. In accordance with the terms of reference given by you and the Force Commander, the new mandate's guiding idea should be to enhance the role of UNAMIR in connection with the return of the refugees and their safe reintegration in their home communities. It was decided to assert that the international community views UNAMIR as a necessary partner of the Rwandan Government in this endeavour. Therefore, while maintaining a cautious language, it was felt that the proposal should be made that UNAMIR be given a mandate that better defines its tasks and allows the mission to have greater freedom of action.

2. To this end, this proposal:

- a) introduces changes in the preambular paragraphs so as to state the importance of the prompt, voluntary and safe return of the refugees and the role the international community feels UNAMIR has to play in facilitating such return; and
- b) divides current operative sub-paragraph 3 (b) into two sub-paragraphs, the first of which asserts the role of UNAMIR in generally promoting the return of refugees through confidence-building measures, and the second of which specifically deals with facilitating the actual return of the refugees from the border until their safe reintegration in their home communities is completed.

3. Changes to preambular paragraph 6

- Whereas the original preambular paragraph 6 reads:

"Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,";

- The new proposal is:

"Underlining the need to assist the Government of Rwanda in its efforts for a prompt, voluntary and safe return of all the Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries to their home communities and *stressing* that UNAMIR plays an instrumental role in this respect".

4. Changes to operative subparagraph 3(b)

-Whereas the original operative subparagraph 3(b) reads:

(b) "Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers";

- The new proposal is:

(b1) **"Contribute to promote a climate of confidence and trust in Rwanda which encourages the prompt, safe and voluntary return of the refugees through patrolling and the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country";**

(b2) **"Assist the Government of Rwanda by facilitating the return of the refugees and their safe reintegration in their home communities".**

5. Please note that the major differences are the following:


-UNAMIR has now the mandate to directly take actions which contribute to the promotion of a climate of confidence and trust; these tasks are no longer undertaken exclusively *in support of the Government*, as before;

-A reference to *patrolling* has been added, while the reference that excluded formed troops from these tasks has been omitted;

-No longer does UNAMIR assist the Government *in* facilitating the return of refugees; now UNAMIR assists the Government *by* facilitating such return;

-The fact that UNAMIR is mandated to facilitate the *safe* reintegration of returnees all the way to their home communities has been emphasized.

Thank you.



Diego Zorrilla
6 November 1995

Cc. General Tousignant
Mr. de Souza
Ms. Rivero



File

JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 17 OCTOBER 1995

1. On 17 October 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss various aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Mr. Claude Dusaidi | Office of the Vice-President |
| Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro | Office of the Vice-President |
| Mr. Mushyo Kamanzi | Ministry of Defence |
| Mr. Higiyo Thaddée | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Mr. Jean-Marie Byakweli | Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration |
| Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi | Ministry of Planning |
| Mr. Gérard Rutagengwa | Ministry of Planning |
| Maj. Kamarade Kayitare | RPA Liaison Officer |

UNAMIR

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| Maj. Gen. Guy Tousignant | Force Commander |
| Mr. Wilfrid de Souza | Executive Director |
| Ms. Susan Matthew | Chief Administrative Officer |
| Col. Shiva Kumar | Chief of Staff |
| Ms. Isel Rivero | Special Assistant to the SRSG |
| Mr. Mtshana Ncube | Administrative/Legal Officer |
| Ms. Ladan M. Rafii | Political/Legal Officer |

2. The SRSG began the meeting by informing the Rwandese Government representatives that UNAMIR had completed and sent to United Nations Headquarters in New York (UNNY) a survey of all its equipment available in Rwanda classified according to particular categories. He stated that it was up to officials at UNNY to decide which items would be needed for future peace-keeping operations and which would be available for disposal at the end of UNAMIR's mandate. The SRSG further added that UNAMIR eagerly awaited the Rwandese Government's response regarding certain basic issues concerning UNAMIR's mandate, and gave assurances that a decision would not be made without input from the Security Council and the Rwandese Government. He also mentioned that the Permanent Representative of Germany to the Security Council had proposed a Presidential Statement which would serve as an indicator of UNAMIR's future mandate and presence in Rwanda.


3. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that the question of UNAMIR's future mandate was for the Security Council to decide and stated that he could not comment more on this issue. He expressed an interest in seeing the catalogue of goods prepared by UNAMIR in order to determine what would be of use to his Government. He added that he would later go into greater detail regarding UNAMIR's assistance role and what the United Nations could do to assist Rwanda in its rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.


4. On the question of UNAMIR's mandate, the SRSG stated that he would like to make certain clarifications. He explained that there had been rumours at UNNY that due to the financial crisis being experienced by the United Nations, the Secretary-General would be compelled to propose to the Security Council measures to be taken with regard to UNAMIR's mandate. Although the SRSG acknowledged that the Secretary-General had indeed been considering the adoption of certain measures, it had been decided at high levels in UNNY not to take any precipitate measures in this regard. As a result, the future mandate of UNAMIR would be decided between the Security Council and the Government of Rwanda in the usual manner without regard to financial constraints.

5. With regard to the disposal of UNAMIR's equipment, the SRSG proposed that the matter should be raised with high-level officials in UNNY by the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations, as well as by the President of Rwanda during the course of his forthcoming visit to New York to participate in the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the United Nations. The SRSG stated that due to the necessity of observing regulations governing the disposal of equipment used by United Nations peace-keeping missions throughout the world, a decision at a high level would be required to change existing procedures. He explained that those items perceived as being required for future operations would be stored or sent to another mission; those considered too expensive to be transported, redundant or of little remaining use could be left behind, in which case each item would be valued with United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda being given priority over the Government of Rwanda for purposes of distribution. He added that he fully understood the Government's need for United Nations assistance and its interpretation of an "assistance mission". The SRSG stated that he was urging a response from UNNY on the matter as quickly as possible.

6. Regarding the Status of Mission Agreement, Mr. Dusaidi inquired as to when the legal subcommittee would be established to discuss the modifications proposed by the Rwandese Government. The SRSG replied that a UNAMIR subcommittee had already been set up, and if the Government could provide the names of members of its own subcommittee, discussions on the matter could begin the same week.

7. The meeting ended with Mr. Dusaidi inquiring when his Government could have access to the list of UNAMIR equipment discussed, to which the SRSG replied that the list may be made available by the following week.


Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Date: 20/10/95


Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 19.10.95

Free

KSEL

The following comments correspond with views raised in the *attached* executive summary numbered 1 to 9 respectively :

1. After the Arusha Agreement was signed on the 4 August 93, almost all the participants of that eleven months negotiation were very positive that the implementation of the accord will be a success. At this juncture, on the request of the former Government, the Rwanda crisis was listed as the 12th priority of possible country that UNATION DPKO were to study for possible assistance based on the request. The DPKO after carrying out all the necessary investigation and evaluation felt with confidence that this mission will be a success. Considering then the reputation of UN, reference the problems of missions at Somalia and Bosnia, UN needed to partake in a mission short in duration and very successfull. The agreement signed at Arusha requesting the UN to participate was the answer. When the UN Sec Co deliberated on the Sec Gen submission on Rwanda, it lifted the priority from 12th to first. When we came to Rwanda to conduct the reconnaissance our mind was already made up, all we got to do was to present a paper to win the confidence of the Sec Co.

This too positive approach in most of the key players negate us to think or even suspect that a battle will even occur leave alone genocide. Everybody were working flat out to see the formation of the BBTG. When we experienced the difficulty of the formation of the BBTG, everyone beleived, even the locals, that the political indifference will be resolved politically, at that time the two forces kept to their own ground without any problems. (apart from very few minor cease-fire violations). On the night of 17 and 18 Nov 93, after a month of the establishmment of UNAMIR and some weeks away from the date of the formation of the BBTG, and on the same night the UNAMIR HQ was officially opened by the late President, a terrible massacre of which 42 people were mutilated and killed, occured in the general area of Ruhengeri. UNAMIR immediately mounted a preliminary investigation, after seven days we had compiled our findings and with the population at large demanding to know who was responsible, a press meeting was held. UNAMIR was not in a position to point at anybody at that crucial moment as we do not want to jeopadised the most important transition and that is to establish the BBTG which was only a few weeks away.

Even this incident, UNAMIR did not change its modus-operandi but it continued positively to achieve its first major objective, to see that the BBTG is formed. We beleived that once this is formed we would be able to effectively execute the mandate and the investigation tasks given to us by both parties.

I agree with the comment that we did not prepare any contingency plan on massive violence against civilians probably all were gullible with optimism of the Arusha Accord success.

2. This is an unfair comment. Rwandan crisis was probably the best example of the participation of both the Regional and International bodies coming in at the right time at the request of both conflicting parties in Rwanda. OAU was involved with Tanzania at the beginning, although the former Govt(FG) was infavour of an UNATIONS mission, RPF strongly refused. The FG accepted the RPF stance and accepted the Neutral Military Observer Group of OAU to operate in Rwanda.

During the Arusha Meeting, both parties recognised the need to invite a neutral body to supervise the transional period up to the election date, the OAU officially announced that they cannot continue to provide such a support because of financial constraints and invite the meeting to find other alternatives. RPA with dissappointment and remorse have no other alternatives but to accept an International Organisation " not UNATION " it urged that the name to be used in the document of agreement to read NIF, Neutral Int Force.

All the Military Observers of OAU in Rwanda were integrated to the UNAMIR. The political echelon in Kigali under Mr Joe Felli was in tremendous cooperation with UNAMIR, the DPKO send their staffs from NYork to assist the OAU secretariat in preparing a proposal on establishing a DPKO cell in the OAU.

As for other African countries we involve Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Whilst Burundi had their representatives at Arusha, we had difficulty in corresponding on the ground level.

What we know for certain that OAU and other African nationalaties, apart from those who were members of UNAMIR, left this country during the outbreak of war and those countries and OAU kept their distant and were not involve in any sort of assistance at all during and after many months after the war. Many european embassies were re-established in Rwanda many months before the OAU came in, OAU did exactly this in Somallila.

4. During the negotiation in Arusha, the two parties urged the importance of deploying the NIF as fast as possible. The Agreement was signed on the 4 August 1993, the Technical Mission for Rwanda arrived for reconnaissance two and half weeks after the signing of the agreement, the first draft for the Sec Gen was ready on the second week of September 93, the SecCo adopted Resolution 872 on the 5 Oct 93 and the deployment of the advance party of UNAMIR was on the ground by the 20 Oct 93. This was quite fast!!!. Because of the urgency of deploying a UN Force was paramount, all the key players, RGF, RPF and UN agreed on using the Belgique, who was returning from UNOSOM, knowing fully well that it had vested interest in Rwanda hence NOT NEUTRAL, this mistake was a costly one for Belgium. It was quite obvious from the events above, that UNations was trying its best to fulfill the Rwandese request even though it does not own a force of its own.

5. No comments.

6. The strength of the force does not matter, what matters most is the mandate that requires that force to do what is expected of them.

7&8. Concur with critic. The only way to be able to operate effectively with Human Rights in similar situation is to have them placed under command and control of the UN mission and not a special entity as they are doing at present.


9. Concur.

Personal Comment:

I personally beleived that France could have done a lot more then what it actually did. I beleived they could have intervened much earlier to stop the genocide. The FG and the general Hutu community in Rwanda respected the French very highly, this was displayed all over Rwanda when France announced the deployment of Operation Turquoise, this ended up in dissappointment as the people had misconstrued idea that the French will be deployed all over Rwanda to protect the FG and its supporters.

No matter what size of Force we have , no matter what type of mandate there is to implement, we can only contribute a slight percentage of success, Success is in the hands of the people themselves. Somalia on the arrival of the UNITAF, American led, they had manpower, they had logistics at its best, they had a powerfull mandate but the Somalians had other agendas.

I wish not to comment on pages 6 and onwards, I found it too ambitious and unworkable. Their implication of having a Spy Network in United Nations is a bit absurd.



COLONEL
30 Oct 95.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Using the techniques of critical policy analysis, this report examines the effectiveness of early warning and conflict management of the Rwanda conflict. The study begins with the refugee problem prior to 1990 and ends with the genocide of half a million to one million persons, mainly belonging to the minority Tutsi community, in the second quarter of 1994. Security issues related to the subsequent formation of refugee camps are also examined.

1. { Once the civil war broke out in 1990, increasingly there were warnings supported by evidence that large-scale civilian massacres might occur. Nevertheless, virtually no one anticipated genocide on the scale that took place. Preparations to deal with the contingency of massive violence that targeted civilians were inadequate.

2. { By failing to deal with the festering refugee problem prior to 1990, both the Rwandan and the Ugandan governments set the stage for future conflict. The build-up of tension leading to the 1990 invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was inadequately monitored. Once the civil war started, however, it triggered an intense and effective diplomatic process that secured a peace agreement. This Arusha process was initiated and led by the OAU and Tanzania, and received considerable international attention and support. The United Nations assumed formal responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the consequent Arusha Accords, but failed to make adequate use of the OAU and local African states in this regard. As a consequence, there was a disjuncture between the mediation and implementation phase which contributed to undermining the Accords. Throughout, insufficient attention was paid to the warnings from human rights organizations and other sources that extremist forces linked to the regime were progressively organizing and arming themselves to derail the peace process and massacre the minority group.

4. { The UN force mandated to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement (UNAMIR) was structured and financed to satisfy a cost-conscious United States increasingly unwilling to support UN peacekeeping. The force was inadequately supported and slowly deployed, despite warnings that speed was essential to keep the momentum of the peace process. The operation had no flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, such as those caused by the crisis in neighbouring Burundi in October 1993. When unequivocal warnings reached the United Nations regarding a planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans for genocide, the cable was confined to a separate Black File in the UN Secretariat. The information was neither acted on nor forwarded to key Security Council members. There was no preparation of contingency plans. Generally, the UN Secretariat interpreted UNAMIR's mandate and terms of engagement narrowly, and on several occasions denied the Force Commander permission to search and seize arms caches. When developments in early 1994 further eroded the peace accords, the Secretary-General threatened to withdraw the UN force, hence strengthening the hands of the extremists.

When the crisis came to a head on 6 April, there was an absence of leadership at UN headquarters in New York. The Secretary-General misread the nature of the conflict. The killing of 10 Belgians created a political surge in the Security Council to withdraw, although this was not recommended by UNAMIR's Force Commander nor by African countries contributing troops.

Once the direction and magnitude of the genocide became undeniable, the UN reversed itself and accepted the obligation to protect civilians. However, the realization of this peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR II) was hampered by the unwillingness of key members to pay and provide troops, and to match troops with equipment in an expeditious manner. The force was deployed only after the genocide and the civil war had ended. The French Opération Turquoise was deployed with great speed and efficiency, but the political

decision to intervene was only taken two and a half months after the genocide commenced and when civil war was almost over. Furthermore, the operation was in some respects compromised by France's previous military, economic and political support for a government of Rwanda linked to systematic killing of civilians.

When massive numbers of refugees, retreating government forces and the assumed perpetrators of genocide crossed into Zaire and Tanzania in April-July 1994, UNHCR warned the UN in New York of the attendant security problems. The Secretariat took the unprecedented step of examining the issue in a peacekeeping context, but the Security Council provided no support. The problem fell back into the hands of UNHCR, which resorted to a novel and reasonably effective method of policing the refugee camps; the arrangement did not and could not deal with the broader security threats posed by the existing militarized communities in exile, and these were left to fester. The large concentrations of internally displaced persons in south-west Rwanda presented a domestic version of similar problems. These came to a head in the operation when the Kibeho camp was closed in April 1995 with a huge loss of life. Nevertheless, in this instance the efforts and planning that went into the coordination of the UN agencies, the UNHCR and the Rwandan government were clearly steps in the right direction.

The report attempts to explain why the signals that were sent were not attended to or not translated into effective conflict management.

7. { Failures of early warning are attributable to many factors. To briefly summarize:
- * As a universal membership organization, the UN is poorly suited to collect and flag information on human rights violations, and especially genocide, in member states;
8. {
- * Failure in both the UN-system and the NGO community to link human rights reports to dynamics of social conflict;
 - * An internal predisposition on the part of a number of the key actors to deny the possibility of genocide because facing the consequences might have required them to alter their courses of action;
9. {
- * The mesmerization with the success of Arusha and the failure of Somalia, which together cast long shadows and distorted an objective analysis of Rwanda;
 - * The vast quantity of noise from other crises that preoccupied world leaders;
 - * The confusion between genocide as a legal term referring primarily to an intent, and the popular notion of genocide with massive murder in the order of hundreds of thousands;
 - * Finally, the general desensitization that has emerged to mass slaughters, and the incredulity that genocide might actually occur.

The media, with some exceptions, played an irresponsible role in their reporting on Rwanda. The failure of the media to accurately and adequately report on a crime against humanity significantly contributed to international disinterest in the genocide, and hence to the crime itself.

Conflict management, however, is a function of capacity, interest and commitment as well as in the Rwandan case, the relevant actors knew at a critical stage that the situation was undeniably dangerous. Yet, the sustained and careful attention so necessary to successful conflict management was lacking. Admittedly, some individual or collective actors did the most with the least under the circumstances.

diplomacy. UNAMIR I tried to function proactively despite tight reins prior to April 6; the units which remained - along with ICRC - bravely sought to save civilians once the killings started. Human rights NGOs monitored the situation throughout. This could not compensate, however, for the overall failure of the international community to prevent, mitigate or stop the genocide. When the crisis struck, and it became clear that a massive genocide was unfolding, there was still no effective international action.

On one level, this can be seen as a propensity of states to follow narrowly defined perceptions of cost and self-interest rather than moral obligations to act on crimes against humanity. On another level, this propensity - which historically has varied over time and place and in strength - was in this case allowed significant play because of a structural mismatch between institutions and interests in the contemporary world.

Revitalized by the end of the Cold War, the United Nations in the 1990s rapidly expanded its peacekeeping operations throughout the world. Rwanda was added to the list in October 1993. The framework for peacekeeping, however, was set by the distribution of power in the Security Council, which in form still reflected the world as it was half a century ago. Apart from France, the major powers on the Council were basically not interested in a small Central African country that was marginal to their economic or political concerns, and peripheral to international strategic rivalries. Through their power of veto and financial commitments, these states also controlled the peacekeeping and enforcement operations of the United Nations. Preoccupied with crises elsewhere, especially in Bosnia and Haiti, and haunted by the memories of Somalia, they decided not to engage effectively in the Rwanda conflict until it was too late. Other potential actors were either unwilling or, at that late stage, unable to respond on their own. Hence, a principal lesson from the Rwandan conflict is that in a world of multiple crises, in a seemingly peripheral state even major disasters may fall victim to neglect.

The report ends with a number of suggested recommendations which follow from the analysis and which are consistent with the principles of humanitarian realism.



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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 16 October 1995

To: Mr. Wilfrid de Souza, Executive Director

Copied to: Ms. Isel Rivero, Special Assistant to the SRSG
Mr. Ncube, Chief, BOI Unit
Ms. Rafii, Legal/Political Officer

From: Diego Zorrilla, Legal Officer *DZ*

Subject: Proposal of program of work

Following your request, I have drawn a list of topics which I believe have legal implications for UNAMIR and would therefore merit the attention of UNAMIR's legal officers.

By comparison with the "Programme/Areas of Work of the Legal Office" prepared by Mr. Minta last year (attached), you will notice that certain topics have been omitted. In particular, I believe that all legal administrative issues are already being dealt with by Mr. Ncube. As regards the program of rehabilitation of the Rwandese justice system, I believe liaison on this topic with UNDP and HRFOR is already ensured by Miss Rafii. In any case, the proposed list will need to be discussed and revised with Mr. Ncube and Miss Rafii.

I have attempted to be as comprehensive as possible. However, given my recent arrival to the mission, it is very likely that this list is not complete. I am of course ready to assist with any other issue you might consider of relevance to the mission.

I. Relations between UNAMIR and the Government of Rwanda

1. Renewal of UNAMIR's mandate: The current mandate expires on 8 December. The SRSG will be involved in consultations with the Government to discuss the form that the UN presence in Rwanda takes beyond that date.

Action: To provide, as requested, advice on the legal implications of any new mandate that might be established by the Security Council.

2. New SOMA proposed by the Government: The Government expects a response from UNAMIR to its proposed amendments to the current SOMA. The UNAMIR Committee set up to examine the proposal found it generally unacceptable. The SRSG, while respecting the Committee's views, wishes to give different consideration to those proposed amendments which are wholly unacceptable, those which could be subject to negotiation and those which could be accepted with minor changes of language. In this light, he has requested UN HQ's views on the proposed modifications.

Action: To follow-up with UN HQ's and to give advice as requested if eventually negotiations with the Government are held.

3. Privileges and immunities of UNAMIR and members of UNAMIR: The pattern of violations of the P&I granted to UNAMIR and its members increased in the past at the time the current mandate was being negotiated.

Action: To assist as requested in upholding UNAMIR's and UNAMIR members' privileges and immunities granted under the Convention and the current SOMA. To assist other UN bodies in Rwanda in having their P&I respected by the Government.

4. Requests received by the Government for donations of equipment: The Government has already made clear in the past that they expect donations of equipment from UNAMIR. These requests will obviously increase as the end of the mandate approaches.

Action: To liaise, together with the CAO, with the Department of Administration and Management at UN HQ in order to provide the Government with an answer to its requests.

II. Relations between UNAMIR and its contractors

1. Problems linked to the status of contractors: Problems have existed in the past with two separate sets of requests from the Government:

a) Requests for payment of custom duties on goods imported by contractors for UNAMIR's exclusive use. This problem arose in connection with goods imported by ECONOMAT. Importation of such goods is covered both by the SOMA and the CPI. Requests for payment of such customs duties do not seem to be the focus of the Government's attention anymore;

b) Requests for payment by contractors of social security taxes and, more important, direct taxes on the profit made by these contractors in Rwanda (impôt sur le revenu). Two issues need to be considered in this connection: whether contractors have or do not have to pay such taxes, and whether, according to the terms of each particular contract, UNAMIR has to reimburse contractors if such payments are made.

Action: To liaise with the Office of Legal Affairs in order to clarify our contractors' and UNAMIR's position with regard to these requests. To assist

contractors in their relations with the Government.

2. Investigation on food rations in the open market: The appearance of ECONOMAT and ES-KO food rations in the open market is a matter of the highest concern. Responsibilities need to be immediately clarified.

Action: To liaise with the CAO's office and the Military Police in order to recommend an adequate course of action to the SRSG.

III. Prison situation:

1. UN locally-recruited staff detained in Rwandese prisons: As of today, some 20 UN locally-recruited staff are being detained. In most cases, the general charge is to have participated in the genocide. It is however likely that most, if not all, of these arrests have been irregularly made. UNAMIR has the right and the obligation to ensure that the P&I of these staff (to "be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity") have not been violated by their arrest. In practical terms, this implies to closely follow the judicial dossiers (if any) of all these staff and to insist that they appear before the "Commissions de Triage".

Action: To visit, together with the CSO, these prisoners. To liaise with other UN agencies (particularly HRFOR) and ICRC in order to determine their condition. To get access to their judicial files and, with due respect to Rwanda's jurisdiction upon them, to request that their situation be regularized.

2. Rehabilitation of the prison system: While this is part of the overall program for the rehabilitation of the justice system, the SRSG has a special responsibility with regard to the comprehensive action plan on this issue.

Action: To assist, as requested, with the follow-up of the implementation of this program.

IV. International Tribunal

1. Security arrangements for the Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Manlowe will be visiting Kigali on or about 24 October in order to discuss with UNAMIR and UNDP security arrangements for the Office of the Prosecutor.

Action. To liaise, together with the CSO, with the Office of the Prosecutor, UNDP and the UN Security Coordinator, in order for the necessary security arrangements to be established.

2. Facilities at Arusha: UNAMIR will have to assist with the implementation of any plan to get the Tribunal operational in Tanzania. Concerns exist with respect to security, logistics and communications for the Tribunal.

Action: To follow-up, together with the CAO's office, on arrangements made with respect to the Arusha International Conference Centre.

3. International Tribunal's activities:

Action: To follow-up developments.

V. Rwanda legal system:

Action: To follow-up developments. Following the recent appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, the activities of the judiciary are likely to gain some momentum.

Thank you for your time and consideration.



(UNAMIR)

TO: Dr. A. Kabia
Executive Director

FROM: I. Minta *IM*
Legal Adviser, OSRSG

DATE: 28 September 1994

SUBJECT: Programme/Areas of Work of the Legal Office

31st
Issues comprehensive
for
ED

I would like to propose the following as the areas of work of the Legal Adviser and Legal Officers. I stand ready to discuss this with you, at your convenience, together with such other colleagues as you may wish to invite.

1. The Mandate of UNAMIR

To keep track of the evolution of the mandate and its component parts for purposes of providing legal advice as necessary.

2. Mediating the Rwandan Problem

All necessary legal work in this regard.

3. UNAMIR Forces

All legal issues pertaining to their security operations.

4. Law and Order/Policing Issues

To keep track of who is responsible for what, under what laws, in Rwanda.

5. Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

Legal issues raised in Secretary-General's reports on Rwanda, and requests for legal work made in Security Council resolutions, e.g. genocide investigations and trials.

6. Legal Protection, Privileges and Immunities of UNAMIR Personnel

Int'l
Immunities

7. Legal relationships with Rwandan Government and agencies

8. Legal relationships with neighbouring (and other) countries, as necessary, pertaining to implementation of the mandate.

9. UNAMIR's contracts

Advise on contracts being negotiated/entered into by UNAMIR. This is, perhaps, an administrative issue to be left to the Administration, but referenced to the Legal Adviser as necessary.

10. Legal issues relating to UNAMIR Staff

As under item 9 above.

11. Miscellaneous

Any other legal issues referred by SRSG or UNAMIR units.

12. Documentation

Law books and relevant instruments/documents are vital to the work of a Law Office. As there is no law library here that can be used, efforts must be made to gain access to such facilities/resources as quickly as possible. The following options may be pursued:

- (i) Contacts/access to University of Nairobi Law Faculty and Library;
- (ii) Ministry of Justice, Nairobi;
- (iii) Lawyers for Human Rights, Johannesburg;
- (iv) Direct purchases of necessary books/documents from publishers;
- (v) Office of Legal Affairs, New York;
- (vi) Dag Hammarskjöld Library, New York.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
CABINET DU MINISTRE
BP 23 KIGALI

Mandate

6th September, 1995

H.E Shariyar Khan
Special Representative
of Secretary General
United Nations
KIGALI

The following Inter-ministerial team has been appointed to appraise the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The team will be responsible for all discussions and negotiations with UNAMIR on issues related to UN mission and make recommendations to the Government of Rwanda.

The team will be composed of the following :

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Mr. Claude DUSAIDI | - Vice President's Office |
| 2. Lt. Col. KARENZI KARAKE | - MINADEF |
| 3. Maj. Frank KAMANZI | - MINADEF |
| 4. Mr. Antoine SENDAMA | - MINIREISO |
| 5. Mr. Sam NKUSI | - MINITRNSCO |
| 6. Mr. James MUSONI | - MIJEUMA |
| 7. Mr. James RWAGASANA | - MINIPLAN |
| 8. Mr. Felix BAGAMBIKI | - MINAFFET |


I will appreciate any assistance you will provide to facilitate the work of this committee.

Sincerely,



Paul KAGAME
Major General
VICE PRESIDENT & MINISTER OF DEFENCE



- c.c. : - H.E The President of the Republic
of Rwanda - KIGALI
- Hon Prime Minister - KIGALI
- Ministers (All)



POLITICAL COMPONENT OF UNAMIR





UNAMIR - MINUAR

The Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda

21 August 1995

Your Excellency,

Thank you for your letter of 3 August 1995 which we have carefully read. In response to your request we have the pleasure to attach a list of UNAMIR equipment which has been made available on loan to various Rwandese Government Ministries and other public sector entities in Rwanda.

It is precisely for the above reason that UNAMIR and UNDP have prepared an agreement by which Government Ministries will be able to retain the equipment desired at the depreciated United Nations value. It is understood that equipment which the Government does not wish to retain will be returned to UNAMIR.

At the present time, however, UNAMIR is unable to provide a list of equipment which could be made available to the Government until such time as UNAMIR's final operational requirements are defined. We are assuming that by the end of October 1995, when UNAMIR authorized configuration is reached and our inventory is completed, we shall be able to take stock of items which we could make available under the agreement with UNDP. The equipment in question will generally consist of vehicles, office equipment and generators.

In addition, our agreement with UNDP provides for the possibility of UNAMIR procuring for the Government of Rwanda items which the Government might wish to obtain for its use and which could be unrelated to UNAMIR's equipment.

To conclude: The agreement with UNDP is intended to provide the financial mechanism for the following three alternatives:

(a) Regularizing the equipment already made available to the Government, by converting it from loan to transfer. With respect to that equipment, the Government has of course the choice of retaining those items it wishes to retain, at their depreciated value, and return to us the ones not wished, ending the loan.


Her Excellency Madame Immaculée Kayumba
Minister for Transport and Communications
Kigali

(b) Providing a mechanism for future transfer of UNAMIR equipment to the Government -- equipment which UNAMIR will be in a position to transfer and which the Government will wish to have. This equipment will also be at depreciated values.

(c) Providing a mechanism for the procurement of new equipment for the Government by UNAMIR's Procurement Services, unrelated to UNAMIR's own equipment.

I hope the above clarifies present and future arrangements by which UNAMIR is endeavoring to assist the Government of Rwanda.

Please accept, Madame, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General for Rwanda

UNAMIR equipment loaned to the Government of Rwanda
and other public sector organs, as at 31 July 1995

| | | Approximate depreciated value 31 July 1995 |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| | | US\$ |
| <u>Generators</u> | | |
| Kigali Airport | 630 KVA | 54,000 |
| Kigali Airport | 10.6 KVA | 3,000 |
| Rwandatel | 100 KVA | 20,000 |
| Rwanda TV | 36 KVA | 9,000 |
| Ministry of Interior | 3.9 KVA | 800 |
| <u>Communications</u> | | |
| Ministry of Rehabilitation & Social Integration | 26 phones | N.A. |
| " | 1 Switchboard | N.A. |
| " | 1 Fax | N.A. |
| Rwandatel | 1 Repeater | N.A. |
| <u>Computers</u> | | |
| Ministry of Rehabilitation & Social Integration | 6 PC Sets | (each) 3,000 |
| " | 6 Transformers for the above | (each) 50 |
| Ministry of Interior | 1 Printer | 350 |
| ARDEC | 1 PC set | 3,000 |
| Kigali Airport | 1 PC set | 2,500 |
| Rwandatel | 1 Modem | 150 |
| <u>Other office equipment</u> | | |
| Ministry of Rehabilitation & Social Integration | 2 Copiers | N.A. |
| Ministry of Interior | 1 Copier | N.A. |
| Rwandatel | 1 Copier | N.A. |
| <u>Vehicles</u> | | |
| Prime Minister's Office | 2 Mitsubishi minibuses | (each) 3,950 |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 1 Toyota 4x4 Jeep | 6,660 |
| Ministry of Interior | 1 Toyota 4x4 Jeep | 5,230 |
| Ministry of Information | 1 Toyota Pickup | 7,760 |
| Ministry of Public Works | 1 Toyota Hilux Pickup | 6,640 |
| Prefecture of Kibuye | 1 Toyota 4x4 Jeep | 6,660 |
| ARDEC | 2 Toyota 4x4 Jeep | (each) 6,660 |

N.A. = Value not readily available.



DATE: 16 August 1995

Excellency,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 10 August 1995, requesting us to continue make available to the Integrated Operations Centre (ICO) our equipment (telephones, faxes, photocopiers, PCs, printers and transformers) previously made available through UNREO.

I am pleased to confirm the continued availability of the items to you. However, at this time we can extend the items as a loan only. We have proposed to the Ministry of Planning a mechanism for the Government to receive such items on a permanent basis, and once that mechanism is approved by the Government of Rwanda, we will be in a position to transfer the items to you.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Chaim Ouziel".

Chaim Ouziel
Chief Administrative Officer

His Excellency
Dr. Jacques Bihozagara
Minister of Rehabilitation
and Social Integration
Kigali



Ministère de la Réhabilitation
et de l'Intégration Sociale
B.P. 2034 KIGALI

Le 10/08/95
N°

N/Ré: 2295/NLID/326

HE Ambassador Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General UNAMIR

V/Ré:.

Objet:

ICC EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES PROVIDED BY UNAMIR

To date the Integrated Operations Centre ICC has benefited greatly from UNAMIR's substantial support. As well as providing a number of personnel to the ICC staff, material support has included repair and construction work; electrical installation; telephone provision and installation; and diesel supply for this Ministry's main generator. I would like to take this opportunity to renew my thanks for all of UNAMIR's help to date.

The ICC's work is set to continue into the future, providing significantly increased capacity for the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (HACU) in commune rehabilitation, NGO coordination, humanitarian database facilities and possibly a humanitarian crisis management facility.


It is therefore necessary that the status of the ICC's equipment be clarified. I am most grateful that UNAMIR has borne the costs of all the consumable supplies diesel, stationery etc, repairs and installation work provided by UNAMIR to date. However, it would be so important for our further activities if we could keep equipment provided by UNAMIR on a permanent basis. This equipment represents the principal assets that we have to maintain our work; and without it, our efforts would suffer a severe setback. If you are in agreement, I would like to suggest that UNAMIR formally signs over to ICC ownership the equipment. This will ensure the future of a significant element of government humanitarian capacity. Attached is an inventory of equipment provided to the ICC to date by UNAMIR.

I very much look forward to hearing from you. With renewed thanks.

Dr Jacques Bihozagara
Minister of Rehabilitation and
Social Integration

C.C:

- Hon. Prime Minister
- Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Hon. Minister of Planning



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

23 June 1995

Dear Mr. Musare,

Thank you for sending the final corrections of the Minutes of the Joint Presidential Commission on UNAMIR's mandate.

I have now signed the final copy and I would like you to do the same then send them back to me so that I can make a number of photocopies. Kindly tell me how many photocopies you need at your end.

Best regards.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Isel Rivero'.


Isel Rivero
Special Assistant to the SRSG

Mr. Faustin Musare
Ministry of Interior
Kigali
Rwanda

file 11
RW0189-05

UNAMIR OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
195 MAY 31 09 50
INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 31 MAY 1995
NUMBER: MIR 1902



NO. OF PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF UNAMIR

1. I indicated that I would respond to you regarding the Vice Presidents views on the mandate and the proposed strength of the military element of UNAMIR. The Vice President, MAJGEN Kagame, has proposed that the military element of UNAMIR should be limited to 1800 personnel (including Milobs). This would include 1200 personnel (six independent companies) outside of Kigali and 600 personnel inside Kigali.
2. This strength in my view is not sufficient to provide a proper level of security in Kigali. Currently, security tasks inside Kigali are being provided by INDBATT (600 pers) plus two platoon (70 pers) from GHANBATT and TUNBATT. This does not include the security tasks that are being performed by the Force Signals unit or the Force Engineer unit to released infantry elements from INDBATT to dedicated security tasks. The minimum strength that I would require in Kigali to perform the security duties, including security /protection for the Tribunal, and also to support any withdrawal/evacuation is one battle group of four infantry companies and support elements (800 pers). Anything less than this would not allow me to carry out the security tasks that UNAMIR is already performing in Kigali. If we then add engineers, signallers, a medical unit, logistics unit, military police and a headquarters the total strength being employed in Kigali is approximately 1600 personnel.
3. The strength of 1200 military personnel outside Kigali is workable. However, the requirement to replace TUNBATT and ETHIOBATT with independent companies in my view would be a serious mistake. These are the areas where we must keep our strength to an appropriate level because of the still unstable security situation, even if the mandate changes.
4. I believe that the Vice President is attempting to reduce UNAMIR to a strength where it will be unable to achieve it's mission and become a laughingstock. Finally, even if the force structure as outlined above was agreed by the government it must give an undertaking to abide by the charter and SOMA. If this cannot be guaranteed then I would strongly recommend a complete withdrawal from Rwanda.



IK

New York, 30th May 1995

No. MP/96/16.06/E/03

DPKO

000347

1995 MAY 30 P 4:48

MISSION PERMANENTE AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES
336 EAST 45TH STREET, THIRD FLOOR

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

TELEPHONE (212) 808-9330

FAX (212) 808-0975

**DPKO-OUSG
INCOMING MAIL**

* Action by: EL

Info copy to: (1) SIR (2) HA

(3) KA/Cenfa

* Please return originals to Central/other: _____

His Excellency Boutros
Boutros-Ghali
Secretary General of
the United Nations

NEW YORK

Isel Your Excellency,

On the 9th June 1995, the present mandate of UNAMIR comes to an end. It is in my duty to communicate to you the instruction of my Government on the future role of UNAMIR before the matter is discussed in the Security Council.

It is probably useful to recall that since the 5th October 1993, when the United Nations Security Council by resolution 892 created UNAMIR I, the mandate of UNAMIR was revised. A number of times to cope with the realities on the ground. The original mandate of UNAMIR was:

- Contribute to the security of Kigali inter alia within a weapon secure area established by the parties in and around the city;
- To monitor observance of the Cease-fire Agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the democratization of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedure;
- To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;

- d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;
- e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Accord relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary General;
- f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;
- g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities of the gendarmerie and police;
- h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.

At the material time the arrival of and presence of United Nations Forces gave great hope to the Rwandese people who saw the forces as a contributory factor to the then engaged peaceful solution to the Rwandese conflict.

That hope was nonetheless dashed when the United Nations Forces became mere onlookers during the obvious preparations for genocide in Rwanda. It even became worse when on the 6th April 1994 UNAMIR, hiding behind a vage mandate refused to intervene and save the victims of the genocide. The withdraw of UNAMIR at that material time has left a very vivid dark image in the minds of most Banyarwanda vis-a-vis UNAMIR. Cries and pictures of innocent citizens who were being killed having sought protection in UNAMIR compounds, are still very fresh in their memories.

The reaction of the United Nations Security Council at the time, was to adopt resolution 91/1994 on the 21st April 1994 withdrawing the bulk of United Nations troops and leaving only a token figure of 270 men primarily to protect the United Nations personnel. That same resolution adjusted the UNAMIR mandate as follows:

- a) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease fire;

- b) To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible;
- c) To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. With this mandate and a number of troops, genocide continued unabated.

At a time when the Rwandese Patriotic Army was engaging the genocidal regime and its armed gangs, the United Nations adopted resolution 918/1994 on the 17th May 1994 expanding the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops expanding also its mandate to:

- a) Contribute to the security of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance where feasible of secure humanitarian areas;
- b) Provide security and support supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

Surfice for me to add that at the same time, a blanket arms embargo was imposed on Rwanda which embargo is still applied at the moment. The 5,500 United Nations troops did not foot in Rwanda until long after the genocide and the war had ended. Since that large force was deployed, it has played some positive role particularly during the transition in Zone Turquoise and other humanitarian activities. My government is cognisant of this and appreciates it. UNAMIR's mandate was again revised on the 30th November 1994, with the following mandate:

- a) : To contribute to the security and the protection of displaced people, refugees and civilians faced with danger in Rwanda, thanks notably to the creation and the maintenance, where this is possible, of protected areas for humanitarian purposes;
- b) To assure security and support to the distribution of emergencies and humanitarian assistance operations;
- c) To use its good offices to facilitate national reconciliation according to the Arusha Peace Agreement;
- d) To contribute to assuring the security of International Tribunal staff for Rwanda and the specialists of Human Rights in Rwanda, notably to protect the prosecutor's office and to plan escort to assure security of missions carried out outside of Kigali town;

- e) To help to establish and to teach a new integrated police.

As we now come to review the usefulness of UNAMIR, I am under instructions to point out the following:

- I. UNAMIR is in Rwanda because the Rwandese Government approves of its presence and any of its activities must have the full blessing of the Sovereign State of Rwanda;
- II. The efforts of the International Community in assisting Rwanda in its reconciliation and reconstruction efforts are highly appreciated;
- III. The size of UNAMIR must be commensurate with the mandat assigned to UNAMIR.

It is the considered view of my Government, that time has come that UNAMIR must immediately cease to be seen as a parallel force in Rwanda, with a mandate to ensure "security and protection" for anybody on the Rwanda soil. The National Security Services are capable and have full responsibility to carry out this task. It is also important that our friends in the International Community understand that the argument for the continued presence of United Nations forces as a confidence building measure is not founded. On the contrary, the presence of a massive foreign military personnel continues to create a false impression of a state of insecurity. It further compounds the reconciliation process as their presence all over the country is interpreted by some, as a lack of confidence in our Security Services.

My Government therefore is of the view that a very substantially reduced military component of UNAMIR is a must. My Government is also prepared to cooperate with UNAMIR as long as it is clearly understood that their mandate is limited to the following:

- a) UNAMIR can assist in observer capacity in the process of voluntary and safe repatriation and resettlement of refugees;
- b) UNAMIR will assist the Rwanda government in providing logistical support for the distribution of relief supplies;
- c) The Special Representative of the Secretary General will continue his diplomatic work by using his good offices in the process of national reconciliation with the framework worked out by my Government;

d) UNAMIR will provide some protection to the United Nations
✓ Installations and personnel including the International
Tribunal personnel;

Ref 100 e) UNAMIR could assist Rwanda Government in such activities as
demining when so requested by Rwanda Government.

In light of the above, and it being understood that after the
9th of June 1995, the UNAMIR presence will no longer pretend to
deal with matters of security. The size of the military component
will be reduced to only a reasonable number that can handle the
above mandate. The exact figure will be communicated to you in due
course. The position of my Government has been arrived at, after
lengthy and constructive consultations between us and your Special
Representative and we do hope that they will meet with the
understanding of the entire membership of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest
considerations.



Manzi BAKURAMUTSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the United Nations

cc: H.E. Mr. Jean-Bernard
Mérimée
President of the
Security Council

NEW YORK



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PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR RWANDA

Shaharyar M. Khan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rwanda, this morning briefed correspondents on the new mandate for the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which the Security Council was expected to approve today. (The Council, by its resolution 997 (1995), subsequently approved UNAMIR's mandate for a six-month period, until 8 December.)

In considering how the new mandate had evolved, it was necessary to address four points, he said. First, any effort at reconciliation in Rwanda must be based on the return of the nearly 2 million refugees to the country, most of whom were in Zaire, United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi. Efforts must be undertaken to bring about their voluntary return in conditions of dignity and safety.

The Council resolution on UNAMIR would underline the need to continue the process of reconciliation and would cite the Bujumbura Declaration as the basis for the refugees' return, he continued. That Declaration stated precisely what the Government of Rwanda must do, the obligations of countries where the refugees now resided, and what agencies and donor countries must do to facilitate the refugees' return. Their return was an essential to rebuilding stability in Rwanda.

Secondly, there was a need for justice in Rwanda -- immediate justice, he said. Most families had been affected by the genocide, directly or indirectly. The people saw that an International Tribunal had been established "for the so-called big fish", but felt the process was going too slowly. That was partly because financial support, although forthcoming, had been slow.

There was also a need for justice to be administered at the national level with regard to the 42,000 prisoners now being held, he said. Prison conditions were appalling. Foreign support was required to continue the repair of the national system of justice at all levels, including the gendarmerie, prosecutors and judges. Fifty members of the international community would be arriving soon to begin helping in that process.

While the next two to three months would not see the functioning of a perfect system of justice, it was better to have an immediate, imperfect system in place now, he went on. That was important, not only in view of the 42,000 prisoners, but because of the psychological impact of seeing the process of justice begin. Only when justice was seen as being carried out would it be possible to move forward in the process of reconciliation.

A third concern was the major problem of cross-border military infiltrations, he said. Guerrilla attempts at blowing up buildings and institutions led the defending force to look suspiciously on the population, which, in turn led to repression and generated a vicious cycle. It was important to discipline all military activities in the camps.

Broadly speaking, there were two types of camps, he said. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had been actively involved with the camps for civilians, which had seen some improvement. However, UNHCR had no involvement in the purely military camps where military training was taking place. Zaire and Tanzania had asked for international support to help control that process of military training.

Fourthly, there was a need to expedite the disbursement of financial aid, he said. Out of over \$100 million pledged at the round-table in Geneva, only \$69 million had actually been seen, and most of that had been spent on debt-servicing. That left a relatively small amount for a country that had been completely shattered. That, in turn, made it very difficult to encourage refugees to return to a country which could not deliver basic requirements, including, for example, teachers' salaries.

Turning to the subject of the new mandate of UNAMIR, he said there was a need to reflect the changed situation since the establishment of that Mission. At that time, there were two parties contending for power under the Arusha Accords, and the United Nations was to be the arbiter. However, the Accords, though signed, had not taken off. Following the genocide, UNAMIR had sought to protect the innocent -- the non-combatants. On 19 July 1994, a new sovereign Government had been formed, and the United Nations was now dealing with a single Government, which had stated its responsibility for the protection of its people.

The proposed new mandate envisaged a reduced number of troops, he said. It focused on national reconciliation and on the need for UNAMIR to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees, as well as their rehabilitation and reintegration into home communities. Police and monitors would be retained, and the Mission would provide security to international personnel in the country.

A correspondent asked whether agreement had been reached with the Government of Rwanda, which had wanted small contingents. Mr. Khan said the matter had been satisfactorily resolved, arriving at a figure of 2,330 to be reached within three months of today's expected mandate renewal. Those levels would be further reduced to 1,800 within four months. In addition, the current levels of 320 military observers and 65 civilian police would be maintained.

Asked to comment about the relations between UNAMIR and the Government, Mr. Khan confirmed that those relations had been strained and that there had been non-cooperation. However, at higher levels, there was a spirit of cooperation, and it was hoped that the new mandate would encourage a new era of cooperative relations.

Rwanda Briefing

- 3 -

9 June 1995

A correspondent asked about a proposal to station additional peace-keepers in neighbouring countries to monitor arms supplies to the camps. Mr. Khan said the proposal was still alive and was mentioned in the resolution. However, the actual numbers would have to be arrived at in consultations with Tanzania and Zaire.

How many people were involved in the cross-border infiltrations and how often did they occur? a correspondent asked. Mr. Khan said that over the past six months, the infiltrations mainly from Zaire, and not Tanzania - had been increasing. Earlier, there had been raids involving banditry, such as attacking and taking cattle. Now, however, they were more of a military nature and had become more organized. In the western region, at the frontier between Rwanda and Zaire, there were almost daily incursions, which were clearly part of a campaign.

Asked if the numbers involved were in the thousands or the hundreds, Mr. Khan said they were small groups. It was "very much a guerrilla type of activity", with small groups raiding and then returning.

A correspondent said there were reports that France had been funding these groups in Zaire and asked if the issue had been raised with the Government of France. Mr. Khan said he had absolutely no evidence that France or any other country was funding such activities, either in Zaire or in Tanzania. However, money was available to those groups, and it was being spent at arms bazaars worldwide.

Asked to speculate on the source of that money, Mr. Khan said that when members of the former Government had left the country, they had taken all of its liquid assets with them. Beyond that, he could not speculate on who might be assisting them.

In response to another question, he confirmed that the new mandate would put greater emphasis on humanitarian rather than security aspects of the Mission. The mandate was based on consultations within the Security Council, of which Rwanda was a member. Negotiations between the United Nations and the Government had made it possible to present a "dish" to the Council. Emphasis would now likely be placed on protecting Rwandan citizens and encouraging the safe return of the refugees, in conditions of dignity and fairness. For that purpose, UNAMIR needed a certain visible presence.

* * * * *

- That UNAMIR will*
- a) To contribute to the efforts of the government of Rwanda in promoting stability and security throughout the country and in supporting confidence building measures to facilitate voluntary and safe repatriation and resettlement;
- That the UNSG will continue to assist the Gov. of Rwanda in*
- b) Exercise good offices of the SRSG to help to achieve the process of national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
- That UNAMIR will assist the Gov. of Rwanda*
- c) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
- That UNAMIR will*
- d) To provide protection and security to United Nations installations and personnel, including protection for staff of the International Tribunal and the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation Headquarters and field offices throughout Rwanda and their personnel;
- e) To contribute to the protection and security of UN Agencies and NGOs and their personnel;
- f) To continue to assist, as required and requested, in the establishment and training of a new integrated, national police force;
- That whenever called upon, UNAMIR will*
- g) To assist the Rwandese government in de-mining operations.

- SG's DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS -

What emerges from a careful, comprehensive review of relevant developments and the situation on the ground is a continuing need to consolidate and to render irreversible the process towards lasting peace in Rwanda. This a complex, delicate and huge challenge, the accomplishment of which would require the continued and, indeed, intensified support and cooperation of the international community. In the current post-civil war and post-genocide environment when efforts are concentrated on normalization, stabilization and recovery, it could easily be concluded that the threshold has been crossed and we are definitively at the post-conflict phase. As Secretary-General of the United Nations, an organization which has invested much effort in helping to promote peace in Rwanda, I would be pleased to announce a return to total normality in Rwanda. I also believe, at the same time, that I have a responsibility to present the situation in a manner that would enable the world body to take the proper, constructive decisions.

The United Nations and Rwanda share a common objective for peace in a member state of the United Nations that has been ruined by war and genocide and is struggling to repair, rebuild and heal itself. I believe the transition to peace is not yet over. Rather, a new or adjusted phase has been reached in the evolution of the situation. This requires greater emphasis on confidence-building efforts with a view, in particular, to consolidating the progress and momentum achieved, preventing the recurrence of violence, promoting respect for the rule of law and the human rights of all citizens and helping to facilitate rehabilitation, reconstruction, repatriation and national reconciliation.

Accordingly, therefore, given the progress that has been made and the challenges that remain, I recommend that the mandate of UNAMIR be extended for a further six months, that is, until 10 December 1995, on the understanding that it would be reviewed after every sixty days with the continuation of the mission contingent on progress made in the implementation of UNAMIR's tasks. I recommend further that during the extension period, UNAMIR will:

- contribute to and assist as appropriate efforts by the Government of Rwanda to promote confidence and security and to restore civil administration and public services nation-wide;

.../...

(4) to provide security and to
continue its protection, throughout the territory of Rwanda, for
United Nations installations and personnel, including protection
for staff of the International Tribunal and human rights monitors;

Human Rights Field Reliance

- contribute to security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
- cooperate with the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the return and reintegration of refugees in cities and communes throughout the country;
- provide help and expertise in the areas of demining and mine-clearance when required and requested;

- continue to assist, as required and requested, in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force;

- strengthen its good offices role in order to facilitate and promote more expeditious movement towards peace and national reconciliation, within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

I would also like to recommend that during this period, the United Nations should intensify its efforts in cooperation with Member States and the Organization of African Unity with a view to the convening of an international conference to identify long-term solutions that would help ensure lasting peace, security and development in the subregion as a whole.

15/6

1 MAY 1995

COL. DIARRA,

YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ATTACHED HANDWRITTEN NOTES THAT THE SRSG WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME AMPLIFICATIONS TO THE FUTURE MANDATE OF CIVPOL.

1. WHY SHOULD CIVPOL BE DEPLOYED IN ALL SECTORS? WHY SHOULD THEY ASSIST PREFECTS? IS IT TO ASSIST THE GENDARMERIE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN ASSUME ALL NORMAL CIVPOL RESPONSIBILITIES?
2. HOW DOES CIVPOL INTEGRATE WITH MILITARY POLICE?
3. SHOULDN'T CIVPOL PROVIDE FORENSIC EXPERTISE?

KINDLY ELABORATE.

ISEL RIVERO, SA/SRSG

-
- Airport - explosion in
the sector today -
 - meet the projects (until
procedures they can
do)
 - Forensic advice?

o



THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA:

THE EVOLUTION OF ITS MANDATE AND PROPOSALS FOR A FUTURE MANDATE

Introduction

The purpose and the rationality for the creation of UNAMIR, which is essentially to bring a durable peace and stability to Rwanda, remains relevant, indeed vital, at the present time. The need for a solution to the Rwandan problem is more urgent and more critical than ever.

In order to determine what the current mandate of UNAMIR should be, it is necessary first to: (a) analyze the present situation in Rwanda in terms of the reality on the ground; and (b) study the evolution of the mandate up to the present time and determine the relevance and applicability of its various components in view of the current realities on the ground. Within this framework, two of the essential components of UNAMIR's mandate, repatriation and political reconciliation, must be analyzed.

The Current Situation in Rwanda

Repatriation

The Security Council, in paragraph 2 of its Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, decided to establish a peace-keeping operation under the name "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (UNAMIR). In paragraph 3 of the same resolution, UNAMIR was assigned as part of its mandate, inter alia, to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.

Although UNAMIR is fulfilling its mandate of facilitating refugee repatriation in coordination with UNHCR and IOM, at the present time, there are obstacles which are impeding the process of spontaneous repatriation, namely: (a) Rwandans who had repatriated to Rwanda are returning to Zaire with reports of RPA reprisals; (b) Rwandans who repatriate to Rwanda are finding their private property (residences and businesses) occupied; and (c) Interahamwe and other militia and hardline elements continue to intimidate refugees to prevent repatriation.

A recent example of this intimidation occurred in Katale camp near Goma on 28 September when the UNHCR was attempting to move refugees out of school rooms and into camps. Reportedly, interahamwe spread the word that UNHCR was attempting to force people to return to Rwanda. The "boyscouts", a local gang which was assisting the UNHCR with the move, entered into combat with "Sagesse" (interahamwe), resulting in six to twelve casualties. ICRC was reportedly informed of a "hit-list" which included several NGO's. NGO's subsequently evacuated this camp.

Political Reconciliation

Though the Government of Rwanda has made attempts at reconciliation, specifically in offering ministerial posts to members of MRND, it appears that the RGF and the RPF have very different and divergent views of the current situation and of the manner in which the international community should proceed in Rwanda. The Hutu population view themselves as victims of RPF aggression dating back to 1990, and, consequently, downplay the gravity and significance of the violent events that followed the downing of the President's plane on 6 April 1994. In the eyes of the RGF, the RPF have been committing atrocities since 1990 and continue to do so with impunity. The RGF has withdrawn from Mugungu camp, possibly south towards Bukavu, where it is reported they are rearming and training for a possible invasion or incursion into Rwanda. It is possible that the refugee community will be used as a human cover for the preparation and execution of this plan.

The DFC of UNAMIR reports that the prefects in the Goma area have stated the following:

- UNAMIR, especially General Dallaire, is responsible for the overthrow of the former legitimate government;
- UNAMIR is pro-RPF;
- the United Nations should place an embargo on the present Government; and
- the United Nations should pursue the implementation of the Arusha Accord;

The DFC, in addition, reported that General Bizimungu, the former RGF Chief of Staff, is taking a hard line, declaring that the war is not over and that the RGF is not defeated.

The Government, for its part, feels that neither the international community nor the United Nations has taken effective action to apprehend the perpetrators of the April and May massacres. The Government feels that, in the absence of such legal action, reprisals initiated individually are inevitable and even understandable. The Government has been calling for action in this regard since its installation on 19 July, and now feels particularly disappointed since the release of the "Gersony Report" which they feel was an example of an unbalanced and unfair approach to the human rights situation in Rwanda.

.../...

In view of these divergent points of view and incidents of conflict, every effort should be made, parallel to UNAMIR's ongoing efforts, to facilitate a return to negotiations and the signing of a new agreement between the current Government and individuals who are true representatives of the Hutu community. This will require a comprehensive review and revision of the Arusha Accords, followed by a return to Arusha to negotiate issues based on the new realities on the ground in Rwanda.

UNAMIR's mandate initially evolved out of the Arusha Accords, and a new agreement will not only contribute to laying a framework for peace in Rwanda, but also will provide a framework for UNAMIR's future role and mandate.

Future Negotiating Points/Possible Political Solutions

The Zairean-based Rwandan refugees' stated preconditions for return to Rwanda reportedly are:

- (1) general amnesty;
- (2) judgment of leaders and organizers of both RPF and RGF;
- (3) a return of the properties seized by Tutsis since April; and
- (4) recognition of the government in exile as a legitimate political institution.

These points, among others, represent possible subjects for negotiation and a potential initial framework for discussions of issues which must be addressed and resolved.

One possible solution is the establishment of a decentralized government comprised of a Hutu region and a Tutsi region. The central government would be in Kigali, but both the Tutsi and the Hutu regions would have a good deal of autonomy. The above-referenced points would be negotiated with a view to establishing this type of government.

UNAMIR's facilitation of and assistance in the establishment of such a government, as well as with issues regarding the recuperation of private property and land tenure, will be an important part of its new mandate. The definition of UNAMIR's mandate in this regard, however, will depend on the outcome of negotiations concerning repatriation and reconciliation (amnesty, limited amnesty, international tribunal).

There is also debate about which of the following options would be more likely to lead to reconciliation in Rwanda: (a) the granting of a general amnesty to all in Rwanda; or (b) attempting to try several leading individuals for crimes. This question should be studied carefully by UNAMIR, as well as by both concerned parties, before a decision is made. It should be made a subject of the overall negotiations and general agreement; if it is not negotiated and agreed upon, it could become the subject of conflict, and it could create even

.../...

more division and bitterness. The international community, and the UN, in particular, must keep in mind that the objective of the UNAMIR mission is to view the Rwandan situation from a broad historical perspective and to try to promote peace and reconciliation.

**The Evolution of UNAMIR's Mandate
and Proposals for a Future Mandate**

Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993

-outlined UNAMIR's mandate regarding the maintenance of security in Kigali and the observance of the cease-fire agreement. These are, of course, no longer relevant. Resolution 872 also called for UNAMIR to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading up to the elections.

It should be noted that the Broad-Based Government of National Unity, at the time of its installation, granted itself a mandate of 5 years, instead of the 22 months which had been envisioned in Arusha.

-Also, in paragraph 6 of Resolution 872, it states that UNAMIR's mandate, if extended, is expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda, events which are scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995.

UNAMIR should monitor the security situation up until national elections, however, a new time frame will have to be negotiated as part of the overall agreement.

-Resolution 872 calls for UNAMIR to assist in mine clearance.

DHA and DPKO are currently working together on a plan of action, however, the issue of mine clearance may have to be negotiated by the two parties as part of the overall agreement.

-The Resolution calls for UNAMIR to investigate allegations of non-compliance with Arusha relating to the integration of armed forces.

UNAMIR could have a role in this in the future, however, Arusha would have to be reviewed and revised before UNAMIR's mandate in this regard could be determined.

-Monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandan refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.

.../...

UNAMIR should continue in this mandate, however, the two parties should discuss the conditions for repatriation and reconciliation in the context of the overall agreement (revision of Arusha).

-UNAMIR should assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

UNAMIR should continue to coordinate relief operations, especially development projects as part of RENP.

-UNAMIR is called upon to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and the police.

This mandate should be continued, however, UNAMIR's role has already been expanded to that of training and advising the gendarmerie. This should be reflected in a new mandate.

Resolution 912 of 21 April 1994

-UNAMIR's role to act as an intermediary between parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire is no longer relevant.

-UNAMIR is to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible.

UNAMIR should continue to carry out this mandate, though the focus will probably be on development and land tenure issues.

-UNAMIR is to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. This is no longer relevant.

Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994

Expanded UNAMIR's mandate to:

-contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment of and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas.

UNAMIR should continue in this mandate, however, ideally, there should be no need for secure humanitarian areas.

.../...

-provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief.

This component of the mandate should be continued, though again, the focus will be on rehabilitation and development.

-Paragraph 5 urges all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring its freedom of movement and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

There have been several incidents in which the RPA has refused access to UNAMIR in Rwanda. These incidents seem to be becoming more frequent. This request, then, should be reiterated as part of the Government's overall request for assistance from the United Nations.

-Paragraph 13: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts.

This embargo should be maintained as part of any future mandate.

Resolution 925 of 8 June 1994

-Notes that UNAMIR's expanded military component will continue only as long as and to the extent that it is needed to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security, as required, to humanitarian relief operations.

The role and the configuration of the military component will be determined more effectively once discussions regarding national reconciliation and repatriation begin and once a new agreement is in place. The capacity of the military component to play an effective role in the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda will depend on what type of agreements result from negotiations on repatriation and reconciliation.

-UNAMIR's mandate was extended to 9 December 1994 at which time it will be reviewed.

.../...

Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council of 3 August 1994

The report states that UNAMIR's principle tasks are now:

-to ensure the stability and security in the Northwest and Southeast regions of Rwanda;


These regions are still tenuous in terms of security, however, the entire country is reporting instances of banditry, human rights violations and, seizure of private property and extra-judicial reprisals. UNAMIR must cover the entire country.

-to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda in order to encourage the return of refugees and displaced populations.

UNAMIR's visibility can contribute somewhat to stability, however, in order to encourage the return of refugees, the Government should engage in discussions with representatives of the Hutu leadership to negotiate the conditions for their repatriation.

-to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda.

This should be the primary focus, in a parallel manner with the other on-going efforts, of UNAMIR. UNAMIR should attempt to encourage and facilitate the identification of representatives of the Hutu community (both those in exile and within Rwanda), as well as the initiation of a dialogue between these representatives and the current Government.



Kristen Scott
Political Affairs Officer
3 October 1994

UNAMIR's Mandate - beyond 9th June

1. The issue of UNAMIR's mandate after June 9th has been raised by the President and the Vice-President in the context of a "phase-out" by UNAMIR from Rwanda. The following paper examines the issue as seen from Kigali. The paper has been drawn up after thorough discussion with Force Commander Gen. Tousignant and senior officers of the mission. Heads of Agencies have also been consulted.

2. The primary consideration regarding the number and configuration of a UNAMIR force in Rwanda depends on its mandate. Therefore, the first priority must be for the Security Council to approve a mandate that reflects the changed realities on the ground in Rwanda. The mandate must be relevant and defensible, especially in rough weather. Only then can the strength and configuration of the UNAMIR force contingent be accurately assessed.

History of the Mandate

3. UNAMIR's mandate has passed through three phases; each phase representing a qualitative change from the other. Now, beyond June 9th, a fourth phase needs to be considered. In each of the previous three phases, the troop strength and logistic back-up has not matched the demands of the mandate, so that the UN has come under severe strain at times of crisis leading to widespread criticism of failure to achieve objectives. A brief review of the three phases illustrates.

First phase

4. In the first phase [1993 - April 6 1994], UNAMIR's role was to ensure the faithful implementation of the Arusha Accords. There were seven, detailed agreements to monitor, including various dates when important events had to be completed, leading to a general election twenty-two months after the signature. Essentially, UNAMIR's role was that of a referee blowing the whistle between two contending parties. It was soon evident that neither side was

ready to play the game according to the rules and the strength available to UNAMIR was inadequate to keep the peace.

Second phase

5. When, on April 6, war and genocide broke out, UNAMIR's strength, depleted further by withdrawals, was hopelessly inadequate to stem the tide of horror that swept across the country. In fact, between April 6th and July 19th, two parallel developments were taking place, a civil war and genocide, over which UNAMIR had scant influence. The UN force was unable to provide nationwide protection to innocent civilians caught in the war and genocide in which up to a million lives were lost. The UN and the Security Council faced widespread opprobrium for not having anticipated the disaster and when it broke, having neither the mandate nor the capability (400 soldiers) to stop the holocaust.

Third phase

6. The third phase began in mid-July 1994, with the military defeat of the interim government and the assumption of office by the BBGNU which shortly thereafter assumed sovereignty over the entire territory of Rwanda. In this third phase, UNAMIR's role was to provide security, assist a return to stability, give protection to humanitarian agencies and to gradually help Rwanda and its people towards normalisation. UNAMIR's presence helped provide security and confidence that has led to a gradual return to normalcy. The UN, therefore, deserves to consider this phase as one of its most successful Peace Keeping Operations.

7. Over the past two months and as we near the end of the present mandate (June 9), signs of tension and insecurity have emerged. The cause of this negative trend can be found in the frustration at the absence of justice, the lack of up-front cash flow, the low grade insurrection being supported from the camps in Zaire with the consequent hardening of security measures by the RPA and the aggressive, extremist influence of "59ers". Rwanda, therefore, stands at the

cross roads. It can either continue its gradual climb back to normalcy, reconciliation and harmony. Or, extremism could lead to violence, retribution and a continued ethnic confrontation.

Phase IV

8. With regard to UNAMIR's future mandate, the argument from Ministry of Defence and RPA elements runs on the following lines. The Rwandese government is grateful for the support that UNAMIR has given in Phase III (Phase II being a dark chapter). UN's help in the economic and social restructuring - especially in rehabilitation, reconstruction, humanitarian aid would continue to be appreciated. However UNAMIR's military presence needs to be scaled down and to eventually phase out, as a large military force derogates from the sovereign authority of the government which must now assume sole responsibility for security and governance in the country. MILOBs, CIVPOL may remain and a small force to guard essential personnel and facilities but a phase-out needs to be negotiated from 9th June when the mandate ends.

9. Behind this façade of "derogation of sovereignty", the real reason for seeking UNAMIR's phase-out is that, in peacetime, UNAMIR is seen as a supervisory, monitoring agency, bringing no material benefit to the country. Unlike the Agencies, it does not channel funds, it does not help in the economic or social uplift of the country, it does not even provide material help like building barracks for the military or vehicles and telecommunications to the security forces. It does not repair bridges, roads and buildings it has used. It does not even help in demining. Instead, its huge, opulent presence is an eyesore to the public.

10. It is important, therefore, that UNAMIR should, in the changed context of Phase IV, be mandated to perform a "post-conflict peace building role" rather than its current peace-keeping mandate. In doing so, UNAMIR must play a central role in the national effort at rehabilitation and reconstruction. Apart from providing security, UNAMIR forces must help in the economic and social uplift of the country by helping set up communications, health-care, de-mining, tube

wells, undertake civil engineering works. etc. It must also be given appropriate funds to perform this task. In my opinion, UNAMIR's mandate should start with a package of peace-building operations aimed at addressing the central issues facing the country e.g. the repair of infrastructure, rehabilitation of refugees and reconstruction in the social and economic sectors, the restoration of the justice process and support for reconciliation measures at all levels. This uplift is an essential part of reconciliation as refugees will not return to a country which does not function effectively. To achieve these targets, the Security Council must set aside a sum of US \$50-70 m drawn either from the existing US \$611 m pledged at the Geneva Round Table, or as a separate contribution to SRSG's Trust Fund for Rwanda.

11. As against the RPA sponsored indication for a phase-out, the Prime Minister and Hutu moderates in the Cabinet have expressed disagreement with the proposal and have indicated that UNAMIR's presence was necessary until the bulk of refugees return. Moreover, the International Community has set forth objectives contained in Security Council resolutions that UNAMIR is expected to fulfil. The Rwandese government's position will be subjected to divergent pressures and its final position, may be expected to emerge as a compromise, probably in favour of the RPA's stand.

12. After careful consideration, it is suggested that UNAMIR's mandate for Phase IV (i.e. post June 9) may be based on the following outlines:

(a) It should project a peace-building rather than a peace-keeping image as stated in paras 9 and 10 above.

(b) UNAMIR may also include border patrol activity between Rwanda and its neighbours (Zaire and Tanzania), provided of course it is so requested by the countries concerned.

(c) The current mandate may be made more precise in certain areas and updated to include protection of foreign magistrates, prosecutors, etc. likely to be inducted for the national judicial process. Specifically these alterations are suggested as follows:

- (i) Para 2 (a) of the current mandate reads as follows:

"Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;"

The reference to "Contributing to the protection of civilian at risk" is vague and imprecise.

13. It is in fulfilling the vague and imprecise mandate of "protecting civilians at risk" that the task for UNAMIR becomes controversial. First, what precisely does "civilians at risk" mean. Are we to contribute to the protection of every citizen who feels a sense of fear? If so, this would mean that this category encompasses every moderate Hutu from the Prime Minister down to the ordinary villager. Are "civilians at risk" all those refugees and IDP's that have returned home but find their homes or properties taken over by the old case-load? If "civilians at risk" covers this extended category, I am afraid that in a mandate to protect them, UNAMIR has neither sufficient strength nor capability. I, therefore, believe that this vague, ambiguous phrase must be re-defined in our next mandate so that UNAMIR is given a precise and manageable mandate to defend, as follows: (Exact phraseology would be finalised later)

(i) To provide security to all returning refugees and IDP's in accordance with arrangements and agreements arrived at with concerned government(s) for protection along security corridors, transit camps and overnight relief centres.

- (ii) To provide security to :

- (i) International Tribunal
 - (ii) Human Rights Monitors
 - (iii) UN Agencies
 - (iv) NGO's
 - (v) International Community
 - (vi) Magistrates, prosecutors, etc.
-

- (iii) To provide border patrols in order to assist in the process of reconciliation at all levels.

14. The remaining items in the current mandate would be retained.

Conclusions

15. A) UNAMIR is now operating with a sovereign, one dimensional Government which feels that its "protection" and "monitoring" is an intrusion on their sovereignty. Due weight would have to be given to a considered request for a phase-out. Staying on against the express wishes of the government would be fraught with danger. The government's willing cooperation with UNAMIR is essential in order for it to attain objectives presented in its mandate.
- B) Conversely, there are some elements in the government that consider that the presence of our formed troops provide the necessary security for the population. These elements would prefer a phase out only after the bulk of refugees have returned.
- C) The Security Council representing the views of the international community also expects UNAMIR to provide security to the population and to underpin the process of normalisation, reconciliation and humanitarian relief.
- D) UNAMIR's hand in the negotiations is seriously weakened by the fact that it does not dispense financial funds or technical aid to Rwanda. This fact encourages the Rwandese government to believe that UNAMIR brings no benefit to Rwanda. It prefers, therefore, to dispense with its irksome, supervising presence. This attitude is likely to change if UNAMIR were to play in its next phase, a central peace-building role. In order to do so UNAMIR would need financial support and contingents that can help provide economic and social uplift in Rwanda.
-

- E) Border patrolling by UNAMIR to prevent cross border military insurgency may also be considered.
 - F) The mandate given to UNAMIR is, in some areas, imprecise and undefendable especially in adverse circumstances. It needs to be expanded and made more specific in the following areas:
 - (i) The next phase should see UNAMIR engaged in a constructive, peace-building role.
 - (ii) UNAMIR should also engage itself in border patrolling to deter de-stabilising activities taking place from across Rwanda's borders.
 - (iii) The general phrase of "civilians at risk" should be replaced by a more precise task.
 - (iv) Protection of foreign technicians (magistrates, prosecutors) may have to be undertaken by UNAMIR.
 - G) A worst case scenario of serious internal strife could develop as a result of the following developments":
 - (i) An implosion in Burundi.
 - (ii) RPA sponsored aggression from Zaire.
 - (iii) An internal take-over by extremists.
 - (iv) Complete breakdown of order within country.
-

In such a scenario, UNAMIR would need to play a humanitarian, life-saving, evacuating role.

- H) Negotiations with the Rwandese government should aim to find a "**via media**" between the conflicting demands of A) above as against B) and C). This could possibly be achieved by a token withdrawal of troops and making the remaining phase-out conditional on the implementation of key issues e.g.: reconciliation, positive attitude to returning refugees, commitment to judicial process, overall cooperation with UN and International Agencies etc. Essentially, the successful return of the bulk of refugees should mark the effective phase out of UNAMIR formed troops (except those required for specific tasks).
 - I) UNAMIR's main political task in Rwanda would remain unspecified and unwritten in the mandate. It is the security that our formed troops provide to the population as a whole. MILOBs and CIVPOL, though useful in their domains, are not a substitute for formed troops.
 - J) UNAMIR would continue its efforts at reconciliation at all levels, from grassroots, to a waited army to the highest political echelons. It would continue to train police and help the revival of the judicial process.
 - K) In a crisis, UNAMIR formed troops should be large enough to provide security and to evacuate UN and international personnel from Rwanda.
 - L) Finally, it is possible that, financially, the Operation in Rwanda may not be sustainable. Phase-out may therefore present itself as making a virtue out of a necessity.
-

Course of Action

16. The following course of action is recommended:

(a) Headquarters may consider proposals for the new mandate suggested in paras. 12 and 13 for Phase IV.

(b) At the same time we may be authorised to engage in negotiations with the Rwandese government, for the present, with only a listening brief. (Given the contrasting view it may be difficult for the Rwandese government to iron out an agreed brief. However, in the end, the RPA point of view is likely to dominate).

(c) If a demand for a phase-out after June 9 is made, I may be authorised to respond by:

(i) Making the general point that the UN has a responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate by providing security, reconciliation and protection for various categories. The Rwandese request would need to be viewed against the objectives set forth by the Security Council in its mandate.

(ii) informing the Rwandese government that their views would be referred to New York.

(d) Once Rwanda's request has been received, the mandate as also the proposed troop strength to fulfil the mandate, would have to be examined and approved by New York. Maximal and minimal negotiating positions would then need to be conveyed to us in order to engage in negotiations.

(e) The results of these negotiations would then have to be confirmed by a formal session of the Security Council.

Distribution to:

FC
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SA

3



*(consultations with Agencin
on UNAMIR's mandate)*

UNOP - 24/3.95

F.

unicef

regarding border patrolling warned that UNAMIR might be placing itself on the line of fire. also asked how UNAMIR would react after reduction if there was a massive influx of refugees from Zaire. Finally he expressed concern over security situation of international staff if UNAMIR was reduced.

UNREO

pointed out that criticisms from the government had always pointed at UNAMIR offering protection to IDPs and refugees who were the actors of the genocide. on the other hand if UNAMIR offered border protection that could strike a balance.

SMSG

in reply to UNREO remarked that Government might want to go solo on the border.

UNDP

stressed that UNAMIR had a role to play in the post conflict situation, that it was a stabilizing presence and that it offered protection to the international community. he agreed that UNAMIR should extend its protection to magistrates and prosecutors. all in all the justice system had to be put in place. he further remarked that the RPA did not have the capability to protect all of its borders. UNAMIR could certainly become a partner in peace, a partner in rehabilitation efforts, such as fixing the prisons, mine clearance programmes, and similar activities.

HUMAN RIGHTS

explained that RPA constantly kept referring to UNAMIR's capability, "ah, if only we had their budget.." UNAMIR could not reduce its formed troops which were the backbone of security. Human Rights Monitors would have to leave if UNAMIR troops would be cut down drastically.

SMSG

He took note of HR concerns.

UNHCR

UNAMIR was essential in the whole repatriation exercise, it would be a set back if UNAMIR left or was drastically reduced. agreed that refinement of mandate was required. provide some balance on the mandate, as UNREO

explained. would place security up front. RPA is obsessed with sovereignty and in this sense might get their back up with offer to patrol borders. they might even think that UNAMIR is interfering. yes to mine clearance programme. enlargement of mandate not to forget training of gendarmerie, police. would UNAMIR impose law and order within IDP camps?

SMSG

No to the last. it is up to the government to provide security inside the camps.

UNHCR

and home communes?

SMSG

some arrangement would be worked out.

UNREO

we have forgotten regional security, UNAMIR is providing that framework. look at Burundi.

SMSG

we should look at this as a larger package. Yes we should also add UNDP's concerns regarding post conflict activities.

WFP

the package will make it acceptable to the Government.

FAO

expressed his concerns over expatriate community security, especially agency personnel, and evacuation procedures.

UNDP II

understood resentment of government over UNAMIR's resources. but UNAMIR has not been perceived correctly, we make poor PR for all we do.

UNDP

security council should authorize or mention in its new mandate funding sources so that budget committee has no other option but to accept.

SMSG

thanked everyone. promised to look into secco funding orders.

Secured

F.

UNAMIR's Mandate - beyond 9th June

1. The issue of UNAMIR's mandate after June 9th has been raised by the President and the Vice-President in the context of a "phase-out" by UNAMIR from Rwanda. The following paper examines the issue as seen from Kigali. The paper has been drawn up after thorough discussion with Force Commander Gen. Tousignant and senior officers of the mission. *Heads of Agencies* have also been consulted.

2. The primary consideration regarding the number and configuration of UNAMIR force in Rwanda depends on ^{is} the mandate. Therefore, the first priority must be for the Security Council to approve a mandate that reflects the ground realities ^{in Rwanda. The mandate must be relevant} and that can be applied to Rwanda. Only then ^{can} would the strength and configuration of the UNAMIR force contingent ^{become relevant.}

History of the Mandate

3. UNAMIR's mandate has passed through three phases; each phase representing a qualitative change from the other. ^{Now,} Beyond June 9th, a fourth phase needs to be ^{considered} contemplated. In each of the previous three phases, the troop strength and back-up has ^{logical} lagged behind ^{not matched the demands} causing the UN ^{of the mandate, situation} to come under severe strain at ^{crisis} times ^{has} and for widespread criticism ^{or} of failure to achieve objectives. ^{A brief review of the three phases illustrates.}

First phase

4. In the first phase, ^[1993 - No. 16 1994] UNAMIR's role was to ensure the faithful implementation of the Arusha Accords. There were seven ^{arrived at between the principal contending parties} detailed agreements to monitor as also various dates when important events had to be completed, including a general election twenty-two months after the signature. Essentially, UNAMIR's role was that of a referee blowing the whistle between two contending parties. It was ^{non-existent} clear that neither side was ready to play the game according to the rules and the strength available to UNAMIR was inadequate to keep the peace.

Second phase

5. When, on April 6th, ^{war} ~~was~~ and genocide broke out, UNAMIR's strength, depleted further by withdrawals, ^{was} hopelessly inadequate to stem the ^t ~~hide~~ of horror that swept across the country. In fact, between April 6th and July 19th, two parallel developments were taking place, a civil war and genocide, ~~one~~ ^{one} which UNAMIR had scant influence.

~~The second phase began on 6th April when the war and genocide broke out.~~ The UN force was ^{unable} ~~wholly inadequate~~ to provide protection to innocent civilians caught in the war and genocide in which a million lives were lost. The UN faced widespread opprobrium for not having anticipated the disaster and when it broke, having neither the mandate (~~nor~~ ^{nor} ~~?)~~ ^{not} the capability (400 soldiers) to influence the holocaust.

Third phase

7. The third phase began in mid-July ⁽¹⁹⁹⁴⁾ with the military defeat of the interim government and the assumption of office of BBGNY ^{shortly} ~~eventually~~ assumed sovereignty over the entire territory of Rwanda. In this third phase, UNAMIR's role was to provide security, a return to stability, ^{protection to} and humanitarian relief ~~to a devastated people, repair and a sheltered economy~~ and gradually help Rwanda and its people towards normalcy. In this third phase, the UN has been ~~as successful~~ ^{having} ~~as it was hopelessly inadequate in Phase II.~~ UNAMIR's presence ^{a gradual} ~~has~~ helped provide an aura of confidence that has led to Rwanda ^{gradual} ~~returning~~ to normalcy. ^{for a while} The take-over of the HPZ from Operation Turquoise was achieved without a single incident ~~and the Rwandese gov. persuaded to participate in Operation Refeur and help with IDP camps.~~ ~~unlike Goma relatively low exodus to Bukavu.~~ Since then, Rwanda has seen relative peace, no curfews, a burgeoning private sector, the opening of schools, a slow return of IDPs and towns and village returning to normal life. UNAMIR has ^{assisted} ~~helped~~ at every level, from supporting humanitarian relief operations to helping rebuild the shattered infrastructure so that, today, water, electricity, telecommunications, airport etc. are functioning. It must be stated that the primary responsibility for the 9 months of relative peace and security lies with the Broad-based government of Rwanda but I am convinced that UNAMIR supportive role in this ^{effort} ~~effect~~ has been

crucial. The UN therefore deserves to consider this phase as one of its most successful Peace Keeping Operations.

8. Over the past two months signs of tension and insecurity have ~~begun to mount. And to~~ ^{emerge}. The cause of this negative trend can be found in the frustration at the absence of justice, the low grade insurrection being supported from the camps in Zaire with the consequent hardening of security measures by the RPA and the aggressive, extremist influence of SGRS-Rwanda.

Phase IV

8.9 We are now about to enter Phase IV of our mandate. Now that government's sovereignty has been consolidated, the basic framework of government repaired, the re-structuring of destroyed institutions - judiciary, civil cadres, gendarmerie etc -. There is also mounting pressure on the government - primarily from the extremist ^{59er} Tutsi element - to assert its sovereignty, ^{arrogate to themselves} allocate to the old case load the lion's share of the cake and ⁱⁿ on the absence (or long delay) of the judicial system - to seek retribution from the criminals and those who commissioned genocide. Should ^{a function} this happen, the vast majority of the Rwandan population would qualify as "citizens at risk".

8.10 With regard to UNAMIR's future mandate the argument from ^{RPF elements} ~~the government~~ runs as follows. The Rwandese government is grateful for the support that UNAMIR has given in Phase III (Phase II ^{being} having a dark chapter) of UN insensitivity to Rwandese people). UN's help in the economic and social structure - especially in rehabilitation, reconstruction, humanitarian aid would continue to be appreciated. However UNAMIR's military presence needs to be scaled down and to eventually phase out, as a large military force derogates from the sovereign authority of the government which must now assume sole responsibility for security and governance in the country. MILOBs, CIVPOL may remain and a small force to guard essential personnel and facilities but a phase-out needs to be negotiated from 9th June when our mandate ends.

12 Conversely, the Prime Minister and Hutu moderates in the Cabinet have expressed themselves against a ~~phase out~~ ^{phase out} until the bulk of refugees return.

8.13 Against this demand must be considered the ^{UN APF's} ~~Secretary's~~ ^{Security Council} objectives that UNAMIR is expected to achieve through its mandate. The success of Phase III is mainly due to the fact that UNAMIR has helped in sailing through fair weather. The question is whether ^{in the changed circumstances} ~~we have the~~ ^{UNAMIR has the} strength and the capability to deliver in rough weather. In my opinion, except in one area - "providing security to civilians at risk", we are capable of fulfilling our mandate with our existing strength and even with reduced strength during Phase IV. Thus the ^{current} ~~mandate~~ ^{mandate} requirement of providing security to Human Rights Monitors, to the tribunal, to humanitarian

is therefore starts at the core roots. If can allow it to gradual climb back to normalcy, security, economy. Or, extremists could lead to violence, inhibition and a continued ethnic confrontation.

Para 10 is at page 8

relief agencies, etc. can be achieved without difficulty.

12.14 It is in fulfilling the vague and imprecise mandate of "protecting citizens at risk" that the task for UNAMIR becomes controversial. First, what precisely does 'citizens at risk' mean. Are we to protect every citizen who feels a sense of fear? If so, this would mean that this category encompasses every moderate Hutu from the Prime Minister down to the ^{ordinary} villager ~~who heard his neighbours screams for help but did not move out of his house to help out of fear~~. Are 'citizens at risk' all these refugees and IDP's that have returned home but find their homes or properties taken over by the old case-load? Are 'citizens at risk' all these who find themselves in prisons ^{awaiting} ~~amounting~~ trial? Are ~~citizens at risk~~ ^{they} these Hutu's in camps who refuse to move out but are regarded as criminals by the government? If 'citizens at risk' covers this extended category, I am afraid that in ^{a mandate to} ~~protecting~~ them, UNAMIR has neither ^{the} ~~sufficient~~ strength or capability, ^{therefore it} ~~and~~ would be entering a phase of confrontation with the government which would see UNAMIR as a protector of criminals and ^{in fact} ~~would~~ regard this role as an interference in national sovereignty. Relations would become ^{sour} ~~down~~ and even hostile with a siege mentality developing and UNAMIR unable to perform the many positive tasks that the government would welcome. In any case, I do not believe that UNAMIR has the personnel or the capability to carry out the protection of "civilians at risk" in its widest ~~contestation~~ ^{in the event} a critical turn of events. I, therefore, believe that this vague, ambiguous phrase must be re-defined in our next mandate so that UNAMIR is given a precise and manageable mandate to defend.

12.15 In short, I recommend that UNAMIR's mandate for Phase IV i.e. ^{past} ~~past~~ June 9 - should be redefined as follows:

(a) To provide security to returning refugees and IDP's in accordance with arrangements ^{and} ~~or~~ agreements arrived at with concerned government for protection along security corridors, transit camps and overnight relief centres.

(b) To provide protection to displaced persons in camps agreed with by the Rwandese government.

(c) To provide security to :

- (i) International Tribunal
- (ii) Human Rights Monitors
- (iii) UN Agencies
- (iv) NGO's
- (v) International Community

in the performance of their functions and duties.

(d) To assist in the process of reconciliation at all levels and especially those persons who are abroad and who are not accused of criminal activity.

(e) To assist Rwanda in its economic, social and institutional rehabilitation as also in the repair and restructuring of its infrastructural base and especially in:

- (i) ^{restoring} ~~returning~~ its national judicial process which encompasses the judicial courts, the gendarmerie, the communal police and the provision of magistrates;
- (ii) rehabilitation, housing and land-tenure for returning refugees.

(f) To provide security to foreign magistrates, prosecutors, experts engaged in the national judicial process.

13.16 If the above mandate for UNAMIR is accepted by the Council, I believe that in the 6 months period of Phase IV, we ^{should aim to} ~~can~~ achieve the following:

(a) Except for a ^{token} ~~token~~ reduction, the retention of the existing strength of formed troops to provide an ^{aura} ~~aura~~ of confidence and security to the population during a period of ^{high} ~~high~~ frustration. ~~(slow down of aid, national judiciary not performing, kind and propriety rights not addressed) but hopefully of a return the path of stability, monetary and~~

moderation.

(b) To calibrate the phase-out of ^{UN AMIR}troops with the ~~confirmation and~~ implementation by the Rwandese government of policies of reconciliation, justice, human rights and moderation. The greater the implementation of these policies the quicker the phase-out.

(c) A negotiated understanding with the government of Rwanda that, given our revised ^{mandate} modality for Phase IV, ^{and a satisfactory return of refugees} we would begin a gradual phase-down of our formed troops ~~in accordance with the attached plan prepared by the military~~. This ~~mandate would be dependable by our existing strength~~.

(d) ^{for the present} We would envisage only a small reduction of our former ~~troops~~, aiming to phase-out substantially after the next 6 month period. In doing so, we would maintain our capability, to fulfil the mandate while at the same time providing reassurance to respect Rwanda's sovereignty.

(e) Eventually, a basic-core of formed troops would remain to support para. ¹⁵c-e of ~~the~~ mandate. It is to be assumed that IDP's would by then have returned home ^{and that those} ~~refugees that intend to return would be in the process of gradual return as judicial process, housing, fair treatment and the reconciliation process takes root in Rwanda.~~

Conclusions
17 [Leave gap]
Recommendations

¹⁸
18. The following course of action is recommended:

(a) Headquarters may consider the new mandate proposed ^{in para 15 of Jav} for Phase IV, especially the replacement of "civilians at risk" para by the subparas proposed.

(b) At the same time, we may be authorised to engage in negotiations with the Rwandese government, for the present with only a listening brief. ~~When learning of their~~ ^{Given the} contrasting views it may be difficult for the Rwandese govt to iron out an agreed brief. However, in the end, the RPF point of view is likely to dominate.

c) If a demand for -7- a phase out after June 9 is demand, as is likely, for a phase-out of armed troops, I would respond by:
 made, I may be authorized to respond by

(i) informing the Rwandese government that their views would be referred to New York and subsequently to the Security Council for a response.

(ii) I would make the general point that the UN has a responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate by providing security, reconciliation and protection for various categories. The Rwandese request would need to be viewed against the ^{objective} fulfilment of the mandate.
 set forth by the Security Council in its

d
(e) Once Rwanda's request has been received, the mandate as also the proposed troop strength for ~~Phase IV~~ ^{to fulfil the mandate, examined (and/or)} would have to be approved by New York. Maximal and minimal negotiating positions would ^{then} need to be conveyed to us in order to engage in negotiations.

(d) The results of these negotiations would then have to be confirmed in formal session of the Security Council.

15. The issue of national sovereignty needs, at this point, to be assessed. In Phases I and II, UNAMIR was operating, essentially, in a two front dimension. In Phase one we were to hold the line between two confronting political entities. In Phase two they were at war with a consequent in sovereign power. In Phase three one party - the BBGNU supported by the RPF - gradually assumed sovereign control over Rwanda to the point that it now exercises full authority over the country. We have therefore seen a qualitative change from the situation in which UNAMIR was originally indicated into the scene. The policies and wishes of a sovereign government must, therefore, be given due weight. No longer as in Angola, Liberia, Western Sahara, Cyprus or even Somalia are there two or more political entities for sovereign control but only one. It would be the international community's hope that this single sovereign power adopts policies that are fair, just and humane. But even if they in a

negative ~~direction~~ the sovereign government needs to be given due weight.

✓ So far, the mandate for Phase IV has been envisaged on the basis of an optimistic scenario. It is prudent, even necessary, to visualise UNAMIR's role in Rwanda in a worst case scenario. UN must not be caught ~~flat-footed~~ again, as in Phase II, unable and ~~ill-~~ ^{ill-} prepared to react to a crisis situation. Over the past two months there are ~~disturbing~~ signs of a descent towards such a disturbing scenario. I have ^{analysed} ~~outlined~~ the signs and given my analysis for this trend in my report No. , Suffice to state, at this stage, that frustration at ^{the} lack of

punitive justice towards the criminals, the international community's perceived ^{passivity to} these criminal elements (humanitarian support and open military preparation in the ^{Zairean refugee} camps), the ~~[X]~~ slow trickle down of aid and the growing demands of the 59ers for a booty are the primary cause for the tension. Thus a worst case scenario would see a sudden take-over by the extremist Tutsi elements in the RPA joining hands with the Tutsi extremist rank and file to take charge of the government. ~~[The moderate Hutus like the Prime Minister, the Interior Minister, the Justice Minister, the Minister for Public Works would be assassinated with either~~

~~Kagame showing the same forte or forced to lead this cabal.]~~ This scenario could be precipitated by an explosion in Burundi, a RPF sponsored attack from Zaire, increased ethnic cleansing by ruling Party or internal strife leading to the disintegration of the country.

The other, less likely, worst-case scenario would see an RGF "invasion" and attempt to regain territory which would signal a Hutu uprising and a return to blood, civilian strife.

The aim of the international community should be to ~~prevent~~ this scenario from developing through clear signals that Rwanda would lose all international sympathy and support if it began moving in that direction. At the same time, the causes of the frustration which is the underlying basis of this scenario need to be addressed urgently.

Nevertheless, the possibility of the worst case scenario taking place cannot be excluded. Should it happen UNAMIR's role and the protection of "civilian at risk" assumes control significance. Is UNAMIR equipped to prevent another blood-bath. Moreover even if it enters the fray to prevent bloodshed, it would almost certainly find itself in hostile confrontation with the government.

In such eventuality with the risk of UN casualties is UNAMIR in a position to defend itself [at least UNISOM had the sea behind it and a defensible enclave was fortified !]. Would countries again consider withdrawing troops to avoid casualties in what would be another hopeless battle. Possibly regional states would be drawn into the fracas. At such a time, UNAMIR's strength would seem to me to be barely sufficient. It would certainly, in a worst case scenario, require the authority of Chapter 7.

UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN UGANDA/RWANDA (UNOMUR)

Field Personnel Section, Field Operations Division
Department of Administration and Management

19 July 1993

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN UGANDA/RWANDA
(UNOMUR)

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NOTES FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

I. INTRODUCTION

"Of all the tangible and intangible resources available to the Organization, nothing matches the worth of its staff."

Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Statement to the Fifth Committee
November, 1992

The following notes provide basic information for international civilian personnel to be assigned to the United Nations Observer Mission In Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR). They are intended to guide and assist staff members prior to their departure for, and after their arrival at the mission area. They are based on the most current data and will be updated periodically as new information becomes available.

These notes are for information purposes only and should not be construed as having any legal, financial or other commitment on the part of the United Nations. Similarly, they are not meant to replace the Staff Rules and Regulations or other Personnel instructions. It is the staff member's responsibility to consult the appropriate documentation to determine his/her entitlements and the conditions that must be met to apply for the same. The Personnel Officer at the mission will have the relevant documents available and may be consulted on the subject.

II. GENERAL INFORMATION

A. Background, mandate and organization of UNOMUR:

Historical background

Both Uganda and Rwanda have undergone a series of upheavals in their post-independence history.

Uganda, originally a British protectorate, has been a member of the Commonwealth since October 1962. A republican Constitution was adopted in September 1967. Four years later, Major-General Idi Amin took power in a military coup. He was overthrown in April 1979 and the present régime came into power in January 1986. The current Government is headed by President Yoweri Museveni, Vice-President Samson Kisekka and Prime Minister Cosmas Adyebo.

Two decades of violence that started in the late 1960s resulted in an estimated 100,000 deaths, a decline in agricultural and industrial output and an exodus of capital investment. However, the current Government has restored stability throughout the country. In recognition of this improved climate, the World Bank has approved credits and the donor countries increased their aid substantially.

Rwanda was originally part of German East Africa and then following World War I, together with Burundi, was entrusted to Belgium as a League of Nations mandate. Ethnic strife has been prevalent between the Hutu majority (85 per cent) and the Tutsi minority (about 14 per cent). Widescale massacres between the two communities occurred, particularly in 1959 and 1963. In July 1973, Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, the current Head of State, assumed power in a bloodless coup and proclaimed a Second Republic. With an area of 26,000 square kilometres, Rwanda currently has a population of approximately eight million; in addition, there are an estimated one million displaced persons and 350,000 refugees.

In 1989, a combination of population pressure, soil degradation, crop disease and political scandals resulted in a serious crisis of both economic and political nature. In October 1990, approximately 10,000 Tutsi-dominated guerrillas crossed the border from Uganda and progressed to within 70 kms. of Kigali, the capital.

French and Belgian troops were deployed to protect foreign interests in Kigali; the Belgians withdrew their forces by November 1991. A tenuous cease-fire was achieved in July 1992 and a 50-member Neutral Military Observer Group from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was deployed to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire. Maps of Uganda and Rwanda are attached as ANNEX A for your convenience.

Mandate and Organization of UNOMUR

On 12 March 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution #812 which asked the Secretary General "...to examine the request by Rwanda and Uganda for the deployment of observers at the border between the two countries...". Consequently, a technical mission was dispatched and instructed to make recommendations, as appropriate, regarding the tasks which could be performed by such observers and to prepare a concept of operations. The survey team submitted a report and subsequently on 22 June 1993, the Security Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution 846 (1993) to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). It was to be deployed at the Ugandan side of the border for an initial period of six months, to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda.

By adopting resolution 846 (1993), the Council decided that the focus of the verification would be primarily on the transit or transport by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use. The duration of the Mission, estimated at a cost of \$8,529,000 (gross) for the initial period, will be reviewed every six months.

The Council approved the dispatch of an advance party of 21 military observers and some civilians to be deployed within 15 days after the adoption of the Security Council resolution, to be followed by the full deployment of the estimated 81 military observers, 17 international and seven local civilian support staff.

In an interim report to the Council, the Secretary-General had stated that the deployment of the observers could help promote the negotiations and encourage the Government of Rwanda and the opposition Rwandese Patriotic Front to actively pursue efforts towards national reconciliation in Rwanda. Negotiations between the two parties are currently underway in Arusha, under the auspices of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Elsewhere in the resolution, the Council urged the two parties to quickly conclude a comprehensive peace agreement and to refrain from any action that could contribute to tension. It also urged them to respect the rules of international humanitarian law.

The Secretary-General was requested to conclude with the Government of Uganda, before the full deployment of UNOMUR, a status of mission agreement which included the safety, cooperation and support the Government of Uganda would provide to UNOMUR.

The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to support the peace efforts of the OAU by putting two military experts at its disposal to help expedite the deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group to Rwanda. The Secretary-General was further requested to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the OAU in the implementation of the peace agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decides that such a contribution is needed.

B. Status of the Mission:

UNOMUR is a special, non-family mission. All staff will be given a mission subsistence allowance (MSA). The MSA will be discussed further on pages 28 and 29.

The mission has no facilities for dependents and the United Nations strongly discourages staff members from bringing dependants. Accordingly, the United Nations will neither authorize travel for such dependents nor make any other arrangements, such as securing visas, for them. Dependents who travel to the mission area do so at their own risk and expense, and the United Nations will not be held responsible for their welfare, living conditions, or security.

Staff members who have questions on such issues as home leave, family visit and an education grant should refer to the relevant paragraphs of the Staff Rules and Regulations, which take precedence over the information provided in these notes.

Generally, however, staff members regarded as international recruits who are serving outside their home country and are serving at duty stations designated as having very difficult conditions of life and work, which includes Uganda and Rwanda, will be granted home-leave travel once in every 12 months.

One of several qualifying conditions for this home leave is that the staff member's service with the Organization is expected to continue at least six months beyond the date of his or her return from this proposed leave. (SR 105.3, ST/AI/280/Rev.6, and ST/AI/280/Rev.6/Amend.2).

The exercise of the home leave entitlement may be advanced due to the exigencies of service and the personal circumstances of the individual staff member. In that case, the staff member may be eligible for accelerated home leave after six months, if all the other provisions are met. (SR 105.3, ST/AI/280/Rev.6, and ST/AI/280/Rev.6/Amend.2).

A staff member's travel expenses for a family visit may be paid by the United Nations subject to several conditions, one being that the staff member's service at the duty station in the mission area is expected to continue at least six months after his/her return to the duty station. (Please refer to SR 107.1 (v) (b) (ii) and ST/AI/215/Rev.1).

Education grant benefits apply to Field Service personnel and other internationally recruited staff as well as to staff who are considered locally recruited at their official duty station when detailed to a mission from outside the area of the mission, provided that in each case the staff member is not a national of the country of the duty station and the mission service is for a continuous period of six months or more.

On non-family missions, no education grant travel is authorized to or from the mission area duty station.

The education grant will be payable only in respect of the staff member's period of actual service at the mission area duty station. The grant is pro-rated according to the length of the assignment vis-a-vis the school year and if certain other provisions are met. For more details on the applicability of the grant and the actual amounts, please refer to ST/AI/181/Rev.9/Amend.1 issued on 16 February 1993, SR 103.20, ST/AI/181/Rev.9 and ST/AI/280.

C. Organization of the administrative component:

The Chief Administrative Officer is responsible for all administrative functions and provides the requisite administrative support for carrying out the substantive work of the mission efficiently and economically. Subordinate to the CAO are the section chiefs and staff that make up the civilian administration of the mission.

III. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

A. Definition:

United Nations civilian personnel may be either Professional, General Service staff or Field Service officers, who have been assigned to the area to fulfill the mission's needs. They could serve a political, legal, public information, or administrative function.

B. Conduct and attitude:

Respect is to be shown to all members of the mission regardless of their civilian or military status, their race, color, or creed. Normal courtesy should prevail in dealings with all members of the mission. For more details, you may refer to the Report on Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service 1954, Coord/Civil Service/5. It emphasizes that integrity, international loyalty, independence and impartiality, and the subordination of private interests to the interests of the Organization, are daily requirements.

Staff members will discharge their functions and regulate their conduct only with the interests of the United Nations at heart. They shall not seek or accept instructions with respect to the performance of their functions from their own government or from any authority external to the United Nations.

Staff members must always be impartial and objective and must avoid any conduct that would raise doubts about their ability to remain so.

Staff members should not have close ties with individuals, organizations, parties, or factions in any part of Uganda or Rwanda, and should not use information acquired while at the mission to private advantage.

No staff member shall accept any honor, decoration, or remuneration from any source external to the Organization, without first obtaining the approval of the Secretary-General.

Attitude is important. A good attitude will help everyone. Staff members may have to endure difficult and uncomfortable situations, whether it be in the mission job, housing facility or everyday encounters. Work with each other to try to solve the problems and to try to stay cheerful about it.

Staff members are reminded of the different cultural customs around the world. Every effort should be made to become familiar with the local customs and every precaution should be taken not to publicly violate them, particularly in orthodox societies.

Personnel are not authorized to give interviews to representatives of the media. Any such representatives should immediately be referred to the Public Information Unit or to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

C. Privileges and Immunities:

Article 105 of the UN Charter guarantees immunities and privileges in the interest of the Organization. However, these privileges and immunities furnish no excuse to staff members for non-performance of their private obligations, (not paying their bills or failure to observe laws and police regulations).

D. Financial liability:

Staff members may be required to reimburse the United Nations partially or in full for any financial loss suffered by the Organization as a result of their negligence or by their failure to follow a rule, regulation, or administrative instruction. (e.g. parking fines)

E. Tax matters:

The responsibility for filing complete, correct and timely tax returns is that of the individual taxpayer. Field Operations Division will make available the Information Circular on Payment of Income Taxes, ST/IC/1993/5, to staff members who are permanent United States citizens and to those holding a "green card", since these are the staff members who will be affected by the payment of such taxes. In addition, any staff member affected in this way should send a short memo to the Tax Department advising them where you are going, how long you will be gone and where they should send your tax check and any correspondence that they have for you.

IV. QUALIFICATIONS

A. Professional:

To qualify for a mission assignment, applicants are normally required to be at least 23 years old and to hold a long-term appointment. Staff members must be cleared by the Medical Service prior to such assignment.

The United Nations will do its utmost to match personnel with the proper skills for the assigned jobs in the mission. However, a perfect match may not always be possible. The Organization will depend on people in the field to use problem-solving and organizational skills to deal with the issues that arise. At the very least, devising interim solutions until management can provide support is expected.

B. Physical:

Staff members should be in superior physical condition as they may have to live and work under conditions of hardship and, sometimes, physical danger. It is easier to endure difficult surroundings when fit.

C. Other requirements:

A knowledge of Swahili and French languages is desirable.

V. DURATION OF TOUR OF DUTY

A. Length:

Assignments may be for varying lengths of time, depending upon the needs of the mission. They are normally for six months.

An assignment may be extended if the Head of the mission requests the extension, the staff member is willing, and the parent department from which the staff member has come, agrees to the further extension.

B. Administrative Matters:

Correspondence on all administrative arrangements connected with a staff member's assignment and travel, both prior to departure for the mission area and after completion of duty with UNOMUR, will be conducted by Field Operations Division (FOD), United Nations, New York. During the tour of duty in the mission area, personnel shall deal through the UNOMUR Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) on all administrative and financial matters.

VI. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR STAFF SERVING IN UNOMUR

A. General:

The primary responsibility for the protection of staff members in the host country rests with the Host Government. This responsibility flows from every government's normal and inherent function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations and their officials and property, the Government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.

It is recognized, however, that in some cases the security and protection factor afforded by the Government may be uncertain. For that reason, in all locations where the United Nations has a presence, system-wide arrangements are in place for the protection of United Nations Staff. The safety of staff members is of paramount importance to the United Nations and it is doing its utmost to ensure their security.

The responsibility for overall security in the country rests with the Designated Official. He/she is assisted by Area Coordinators in each location where United Nations Staff are based.

Upon arrival in Uganda staff members will be briefed regarding their area of assignment and general security conditions including, how to respond to general threats, standard operating procedures, travel restrictions, communications procedures and any other relevant issues.

B. Reporting all incidents:

It is of the utmost importance that all security incidents are reported to the UN security authorities as soon as possible after the incident. The report should be as detailed as possible to assist UN security authorities in determining what course of action should be followed.

C. Malicious Act Insurance Policy:

Because there are hazardous conditions in Uganda/Rwanda, extra insurance coverage is being provided by the United Nations. Benefits under this policy reach a maximum of \$250,000. All arrangements related to this policy are handled by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, and all correspondence, queries or claims must be addressed to that office through the CAO and Field Operations Division (FOD).

The United Nations has put this insurance policy in place to cover staff serving at designated duty stations against malicious acts. Coverage is related only to malicious acts, i.e. for death or disability caused directly or indirectly by war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared or not), civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, military or usurped power, riots or civil commotion, sabotage, explosion of war weapons, terrorist activities (whether the terrorists are the country's own nationals or not), murder or assault by foreign enemies or any attempted threat.

This policy does not cover death or disability directly or indirectly resulting from or consequent upon:

- (a) the insured person engaging in or taking part in naval, military or air force service or operations;
- (b) the insured person engaging in air travel, except as a passenger on official travel;
- (c) suicide or attempted suicide or intentional self-injury or the insured person being in a state of insanity.
- (d) deliberate exposure to exceptional danger (except in an attempt to save human life) or the insured person's own criminal act; and
- (e) the insured person being under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

VII. DUTY SCHEDULE, LEAVE AND COMPENSATORY TIME OFF

A. Hours of Duty:

Hours of duty are determined by the tasks to be performed and the situation in the area. Civilian personnel should be prepared to work irregular and long hours when necessary, and to be on call to work all hours at little or no notice. This is especially the case during the formative stages of the mission or during periods of peak activity.

Hours of work may often be longer and less "convenient" than might be expected at established non-field duty stations, and invariably without any compensation in terms of overtime or compensatory time off (CTO).

Although adherence to an established hierarchy of duties is not possible in the field, all staff members are still required to follow established United Nations rules, regulations, and procedures. In this respect, personnel should seek guidance from their superiors, especially if the assigned tasks are unfamiliar. Staff members may also address queries to the Personnel Officer.

B. Leave:

All staff members, whether internationally or locally recruited/appointed under the 100 series of Staff Rules are entitled to annual leave. Annual leave accumulates at the rate of 2 1/2 days per month.

Short-term staff members appointed for a period of less than six months under the 300 series of Staff Rules are not entitled to annual leave.

C. Compensatory time off:

International staff are not entitled to compensatory time off. However, they continue to receive MSA during periods of annual leave not exceeding one and one-half days for each completed month of their assignment. Such entitlement may be accumulated during the period of assignment but the accrued leave has to be taken within the mission area before the conclusion of the assignment during which the entitlement is earned. Otherwise it is considered that the entitlement is forfeited.

VIII. TRAVEL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BEFORE DEPARTURE TO UNOMUR

A. Responsibility:

Staff members share responsibility with the Field Operations Division for securing their travel documents. FOD will provide application forms for an entry Visa and a United Nations Laissez-Passer.

B. Passport and Laissez-Passer:

Before departing on a mission, all personnel must be in possession of a valid national passport and a valid United Nations Laissez-Passer. Laissez-Passers are recognized and accepted as valid travel documents in the territories of such Member States as have accepted the relevant provisions of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

C. Visas:

All personnel, except nationals of the country, must obtain entry visas before departure for Uganda. To avoid unnecessary delay, personnel should ensure that they are in possession of visas for any countries en route. Advance request forms may be obtained through Field Operations Division (FOD) and thereafter submitted to the UN Visa Office (20th floor). Personnel outside UN Headquarters should obtain Ugandan entry visas locally or request FOD's assistance.

Before departure for the mission, Headquarters personnel who hold United States alien registration cards ("green cards") should request a re-entry permit from the Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), regardless of the length of their assignment. The United States Mission to the UN may also provide assistance.

D. International Certificate of Vaccination:

Civilian personnel must have in their possession at all times an international certificate of vaccination.

E. Photographs:

To facilitate the issuance of identity cards and for other purposes, staff members should be in possession of at least 10 recent passport-size photographs (approximately 2" x 2 1/2" or 5 x 6 cm.).

IX. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

A. Initial medical examination before departure:

All staff members to be assigned to UNOMUR must be medically cleared by the UN Medical Service. As soon as an applicant is accepted for the mission, he/she should obtain medical clearance and begin immunizations.

B. Medical Requirements for Mission to UNOMUR:

1. In addition to the medical clearance required by the Medical Service for fitness to undertake a mission assignment, the following immunizations and malaria chemoprophylaxis are required and/or recommended for Uganda:

A. Required Immunizations:

Yellow Fever

- * An appointment with the UN Medical Service is necessary in order to receive this immunization because of vaccine protocol.

Recommended Immunizations:

Typhoid

Tetanus Toxoid

Poliomyelitis

Immune Globulin

or

Hepatitis A (for assignments of 6 months or longer)

Meningococcal

Hepatitis B

B. Required Malaria Prophylaxis:

- * Mefloquine Hydrochloride (Brand Name: Lariam)

2. The following is the recommended dosage for Mefloquine hydrochloride/Lariam chemoprophylaxis:

(a) For prolonged stays in the endemic area (more than 3 weeks) -

Initial dose of one tablet (250 mg.) is to be taken 1 week before arriving in the malarious area, followed by one tablet once weekly always on the same day. This regimen is to be continued until 4 weeks after leaving the malarious zone.

(b) For brief stays in the endemic area (1 to 3 weeks) -

First dose of one tablet (250 mg.) is to be taken 1 week before arriving in malarious area, followed by 1 tablet once weekly always on the same day for the next 5 weeks.

3. Travellers to malarious areas run a high risk of acquiring the disease. Therefore, it is important that every traveller take personal protective measures in order to reduce the risk of contracting malaria.

Attached in ANNEX C is an information sheet listing some of the personal protective measures that are effective in reducing the risk of mosquito bites.

4. The United Nations Medical Service will discuss all of the above medical requirements during your visit as well as provide you with a Medical Kit which contains useful medications you might need and a copy of a pamphlet on Your Health in the Tropics.

Additional information on vaccination is attached as ANNEX D.

C. AIDS:

Take the usual precautions that are used universally. It is important to note that the risk of this infection exists throughout the country, as it does in many areas of the world. Uganda is the first African country with an Aids Counselling Office (Kampala). Additional information may be found in ANNEX E.

D. Medical and Dental Insurance:

Staff members should ensure that they have the appropriate insurance coverage prior to leaving for mission assignment. Consultations with the Insurance Section is highly recommended.

Headquarters Staff:

Information Circular ST/IC/1993/27, prepared for members of the staff at headquarters, states that in view of the large number of staff members who will go on mission assignment, it has been decided to extend a special medical/dental plan enrolment opportunity to such staff members. The provisions in this respect, which will apply to all staff members going on mission for six months or more, are as follows:

(a) Staff members who at present are not enrolled in any United Nations health insurance plan will be allowed to enrol themselves and eligible family members. The insurance will become effective on the first day of the month in which the mission assignment commences. Enrolment in a health insurance plan in these circumstances must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(b) Staff members assigned to a mission who are enrolled in either HIP or Kaiser, two plans which do not offer full services at locations away from Headquarters, may switch to either Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus. These two plans provide benefits on a worldwide basis, though in the case of Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus, there are no participating providers outside the Headquarters area. Enrolment in the Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus plans under this provision must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(c) Staff members who, at the time of commencement of the mission assignment, do not have GHI Dental coverage but who are already enrolled, together with eligible family members, in Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus may enrol themselves and family members covered under their medical insurance plan in the dental plan. Such enrolment must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(d) Staff members who elect to enrol in a health insurance plan in the circumstances provided under (a) to (c) above forego the right to make any further change during the annual enrolment campaign taking place in the same calendar year as the commencement of the mission assignment. The next opportunity for these staff members to make any changes in their insurance coverage will be at the time of the annual enrolment campaign of the following year;

(e) Staff members who are already enrolled in Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus at the time of the mission assignment must retain their existing coverage until the next annual enrollment campaign;

(f) Headquarters staff members who will be on mission assignment for a year or more and who will not have eligible covered family members residing in the United States for the duration of the mission assignment may opt for coverage under the Van Breda Medical, Hospital and Dental Insurance plan for staff overseas. Details of this plan are available in the offices of the Insurance Section, room S-2765;

(g) Staff members returning to Headquarters from mission assignment, other than those who qualified and opted for the Van Breda plan, may not change their insurance coverage until the next annual enrollment campaign. Staff members who switched to the Van Breda plan, as provided under subparagraph (f) above, must revert, upon return to Headquarters, to the insurance plan which they had prior to the mission assignment, at least until the next annual enrollment campaign. It is essential that such staff members advise the Insurance Section within 31 days of their return to Headquarters.

Staff at Duty Stations Away From New York:

The Information Circular, ST/IC/1992/75, on Van Breda Medical, Hospital and Dental Insurance, prepared for members of the staff at duty stations away from Headquarters, sets out the eligibility criteria for enrolment in that plan:

Except for staff members whose duty station is New York, Geneva or Vienna and locally recruited staff members at duty stations where the Medical Insurance Plan (MIP) is established, all staff members holding appointments of three months or longer under the 100 or 200 Series of the Staff Rules may enrol themselves and eligible family members in the United Nations Van Breda plan. For enrolment purposes, applicants will be required to present proof of eligibility from their respective personnel or administrative officers attesting to their current contractual status. The enrolment of eligible family members requires the provision of evidence of the status of such family members. In most instances, the necessary proof of eligibility will be contained in the P.5 personnel action form.

In view of the large number of staff members going on mission assignment, it has been decided to extend a special health insurance enrolment opportunity to such staff members. The provisions in this respect, which will apply to all eligible staff members going on mission for six months or more, are as follows:

(a) Staff members who at present are not enrolled in the Van Breda plan will be allowed to enrol themselves and eligible family members. The insurance will become effective on the first day of the month in which the mission assignment commences. Enrolment in the plan in these circumstances must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(b) Staff members who elect to enrol in the Van Breda plan in the circumstances set out in (a) above forego the right to make any further change during the annual enrolment period taking place in the same calendar year as the commencement of the mission assignment. The next opportunity for these staff members to make any change in their insurance coverage will be at the time of the annual enrolment period of the following year;

(c) Staff members going on mission assignment who wish to enrol in the Van Breda plan or change their present coverage, as provided above, must present evidence to the Insurance Section or to their administrative office, as the case may be, of the mission assignment and its duration.

Locally-recruited staff members who are enrolled in the Medical Insurance Plan (MIP) will retain that plan when on mission assignment.

IN ALL CASES, STAFF MEMBERS GOING ON MISSION ASSIGNMENT WHO WISH TO ENROL IN A HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OR CHANGE THEIR PRESENT COVERAGE, AS PROVIDED ABOVE, MUST PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE INSURANCE SECTION OR THE RELEVANT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE MISSION ASSIGNMENT AND ITS DURATION.

E. Medical Facilities:

Personnel are advised to have any dental treatment completed before travelling to Uganda. In cases of specific purpose medicines, obtainable only through prescriptions, it is recommended that the user takes along a supply sufficient to last a reasonable period.

Uganda has all the medical problems of a tropical African country, including malaria, cholera, tsetse fly, and a high incidence of HIV infection. The local medical support is rather limited. However, the United Nations will provide medical services. Serious cases can be referred to Kampala and Nairobi in Kenya.

Private doctors (three UN examining physicians) practice in Kampala and most foreigners consult them to avoid the delays involved in Government hospitals. Fees are comparable with those in Europe.

A modest United Nations Dispensary for all United Nations personnel and dependants became fully operational in 1988. It is located on the ground floor of the United Nations house at 15 Clement Hill Road in Kampala. It is manned by a UNV doctor and a nurse.

In Kampala, there are several pharmacies, but commonly required medicines are not always available and prices are high. Supplies may be purchased in Kenya where prescriptions must be endorsed by a Kenyan registered physician.

Staff members on assignment to or recruited for UNOMUR are required to have appropriate medical insurance coverage. They may be reimbursed for reasonable hospital and medical expenses over and above those covered by their insurance, insofar as these are not covered by other arrangements. For information on conditions governing this provision, consult the Personnel Officer in the mission.

F. Common ailments and health precautions:

Common diseases are malaria and dysentery, tropical ulcers, fungus infections, cholera, typhoid and hepatitis (jaundice) occasionally occurs in some parts of the country.

Bilharziasis, caused by a small parasite carried by snails found in stagnant water, is also a danger in many areas, and it is not advisable to bathe or wade in stagnant water.

Hookworm can be avoided by wearing shoes. This precaution also applies to jigger fleas, which cause painful abscesses in toes.

X. TRAVEL TO AND FROM UNOMUR

A. Class and route:

Travel authorization (Form PT.8) will be issued by FOD. Travel to Uganda will be via commercial carrier. Arrangements for the travel of Headquarters personnel will be made by FOD through the Carlson Travel Network. Offices away from Headquarters may be authorized by FOD to make travel arrangements for their own personnel. Normally, if FOD does not make the staff member's travel arrangements, the expenses will not be reimbursed.

The normal provisions governing the official travel (standard of accommodation, travel time, reimbursement of miscellaneous travel expenses, etc.) will apply unless otherwise advised. FOD must be informed of flight details in order to assist with arrival formalities.

Overseas offices are requested to fax flight details of their staff members directly to FOD, United Nations, New York, with a copy to UNOMUR. In this way, it will ensure that all staff members are met and initial accommodation arranged upon arrival. Any subsequent changes in these arrangements should be reported to FOD.

Upon arrival at UNOMUR, a claim for reimbursement of travel expenses (form F.10) should be submitted with supporting receipts to the Administrative Officer. These would include ticket stubs, the original FTR, taxi and hotel receipts, if a stopover was authorized.

XI. SHIPMENT AND INSURANCE OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE

A. Baggage Allowance:

The shipping entitlement for UNOMUR will be 100 kilos, regardless of the duration of the mission, for as long as it continues under special mission status. During the initial stage of the mission, because of possible shipping difficulties, the shipment of personal effects may be **accompanied**. The 100 kilo allowance remains fixed, regardless of whether you decide to send your baggage by air, surface or any other means of transport.

Once the mission becomes established, the baggage entitlement will be **unaccompanied** by air freight.

B. Insurance:

The United Nations does not accept responsibility for insuring accompanied baggage taken on the airplane. However, since airline tickets for United Nations personnel are purchased under an American Express account, accompanied baggage is covered under American Express insurance. Personnel requiring additional insurance for accompanied baggage should arrange it at their own expense.

The Traffic Unit should be contacted to arrange pick-up of the unaccompanied shipment. You **must** also provide them with an itemized valued inventory of personal effects, as well as a request for insurance coverage, as it is not automatic.

XII. CLOTHING AND SUPPLIES

A. General Information:

Because of the relatively high altitude, Uganda has a very pleasant climate generally in spite of its location on the equator. Temperatures vary between a mean minimum of 18°C (63°F) and a mean maximum of 30°C (80°F) over most of the country. In the Kampala area, temperatures range from 20°C to 28°C. There is a daily thick fog from evening to the following mid-morning.

Rainfall varies from 750 mm in the north-east to 1,500 mm in southern parts of the country annually and is distributed more or less evenly throughout the year, although the 'rain peaks' occur in April/May and September/October. More heavy rainfalls occur in the western tropical rainforest mountain areas.

B. Selection of Clothing and Supplies:

Clothing of all sorts is available but very expensive. Staff members are advised to bring what they need with them. Light clothing is required, including a light raincoat and umbrella. Cotton clothing, as well as mixed fabrics, are very good. A jacket or sweater is also helpful.

Cosmetic and toiletry items for both men and women can be obtained locally. However, it is advisable to take a sufficient supply of mosquito repellants and cosmetics/toiletry items to the mission area.

Personnel are advised not to take expensive or sentimental items with them into the mission area. Suitcases and trunks should have strong locks in order to secure personal effects when leaving rooms unoccupied. Try to take all precautions against loss or theft of personal property.

C. Cameras:

Discretion in the use of cameras and binoculars is highly recommended at all times.

XIII. LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE MISSION AREA

A. Living accommodations:

Personnel will be briefed regarding accommodation arrangements on arrival at UNOMUR headquarters. Initial hotel accommodations will be arranged at the Kampala Sheraton Hotel for travellers arriving to assume duties in the UNOMUR mission area.

As a result of the war of 1979 and neglect of subsequent years, most essential facilities were either destroyed or looted. This also applies to many of the houses and apartments. However, the Government and the private business community are making efforts to rectify the situation and many houses, apartments, and hotels are already up to an acceptable standard.

The following hotels have a reasonable to good standard: In Kampala, Sheraton, the Diplomat, Nile, Fairway, Speke, and Athena. In Entebbe, the Lake Victoria Hotel.

The smaller towns of Uganda do operate hotels and guest houses, though here also the repair of war damage is still going on in most upcountry places.

The UN System has a small housing estate, but the bulk of the housing needs of UN personnel is satisfied by the private market. Rentals for three-bedroom houses may be as high as from US\$1200 to US\$2500 per month. Rents for apartments are lower but there are only very few in Kampala. Owing to the prevailing housing shortage, newly arrived UN personnel may be compelled to stay in a hotel for an extended period - sometimes three months or more.

B. Electricity and Electric Current:

The electricity supply is 230 to 250 volts, 50 cycles AC, single phase throughout the country. Cooking is done by electricity or bottled gas. The average monthly electricity bill for a three-bedroom house is between US\$50 and US\$100. Voltage regulators (UPS) are recommended for sensitive equipment. TV operates on the PAL-B/G system.

C. Food and Water:

There is a wide range of local fruits and vegetables. However, essential food commodities such as dairy products, sugar, flour, salt, eggs, cooking oil and meat have become more expensive with prices going up continuously, particularly in Kampala. There is a Government duty-free shop catering to diplomats and UN personnel where some commodities may be purchased. Trips to Kenya for the purchase of certain items of food and small household requirements can be made by car with the proper customs papers. Eldoret and Kisumu are the two most visited towns - about 5 hours drive from Kampala.

Water is not safe to drink without boiling and filtering. It is advisable to bring water filters and extra filter candles, although they are now becoming available locally.

D. Driving:

Driving is on the left side of the roadway. Traffic regulations forbid left-hand driving vehicles.

A valid national or international driving license is required.

E. Salary Deposit:

Staff members who do not already have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts may wish to make arrangements before departure for automatic deposit into an account at their duty station. Prior to arrival at the duty station recruits should complete a United Nations salary/allowances distribution form. Recruits are advised that computerized payroll processing will take some time to commence.

F. Mail and Emergency Contact:

Airmail service connecting Uganda with other parts of the world is generally reliable. There is no house to house delivery in Uganda, and it is difficult, particularly in Kampala, to obtain a permanent post office box. UN personnel may, therefore, use the UNDP post office box no. 7184 Kampala.

Mail containing anything of value should be registered and insured. Air mail service is relatively quick. Surface mail takes about two to three months to Europe, Asia and possibly longer to the American continent and Australia. Weekly diplomatic pouch service is maintained between the UNDP office in Uganda and the United Nations Headquarters in New York, UN Geneva, and UNDP Nairobi.

Postal Address:

Name of Staff Member
UNOMUR
P.O. Box 4661
Grand Central Station
New York, New York 10163-4661

Shipping/Mailing

UNOMUR
UN House
15 Clement Hill Road
Kampala
Republic of Uganda

P.O. Box

UNOMUR
c/o UNDP
P.O. Box 1784
Kampala
Republic of Uganda

Telephone and FAX numbers are as follows:

Although it is possible to make international phone calls from most cities, including Kabele, it is prohibitively expensive (\$18 per minute).

Telephone: There will be certifying officers who will approve official long distance telephone calls made in the United Nations system.

Within the country, telephone communication is not so reliable. However, much effort is being put into restoring normal conditions. In Kampala, there is an automatic exchange but certain areas still have difficulties with adequate facilities. Acquiring a private telephone is quite difficult. Normal telegraph services are available but could be unreliable with regard to delivery of messages received in Uganda.

A Telefax System No. 245907 has been installed at Kampala General Post Office to cater to the general public. Charges are U.Shs. 1500 per DINA4 with receiving charge of U.Shs. 200/- per DINA4 message. This service is being extended to private subscribers. For official purposes, it is possible to use the UNDP telefax, No. 244801; World Bank, No. 230092 and UNICEF, No. 259146.

G. Travel within the country:

The main roads out of Kampala have been renovated. Leaving Kampala by car, an Upcountry Travel Permit is required for certain areas which can be obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the UNDP office.

The railway line that runs from Mombasa is connected up to Kasese in the west and in the north-east. The railways are in bad need of repair and unreliable in maintaining their schedule.

Uganda Airlines flies to Nairobi and Arua. Its flights should be confirmed at all times. There are several air charter services operating in the country.

XIV: MISSION SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE (MSA)

A. Entitlement:

Staff members who are on temporary assignment to UNOMUR will continue to receive the emoluments and allowances of their current duty station. In addition, they will receive a Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA).

No post adjustment, mobility and hardship allowance will be given since the mission subsistence allowance takes into consideration any difficult conditions that are present in the mission area.

B. Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) - Definition:

The MSA is designed to cover, among others, the cost of food and lodging, local transportation, water/drinks and incidentals. This constitutes the entire United Nations contribution towards such costs. It should be noted, however, that reductions in the MSA will apply if food and/or accommodation is provided by the United Nations or the host country.

C. Rate of the Mission Subsistence Allowance:

Under Staff Rule 103.21, the following uniform MSA rates have been approved for UNOMUR personnel throughout the mission area:

The first 30 days is SUS110. Thereafter, the rate has been set at \$US85 per day.

The above MSA rates are subject to supplements of 10 and 25 per cent for staff in the D-1/D-2 and ASG/USG levels, respectively. They are payable in U.S. dollars.

D. Exchange Controls:

Currency regulations vary from country to country. Regulations for currency exchange will therefore be established for this operation to ensure that national currency regulations are respected in the mission area as well as in neighboring countries that the members may visit on leave or on duty. Regulations pertaining to the mission will be obtained on arrival in the country and United Nations personnel are expected to strictly adhere thereto.

XV. COMPENSATION FOR DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS

A. Entitlement:

The United Nations provides staff members with compensation coverage for death, injury or illness, determined by the Secretary-General to be attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations. The details of this compensation are contained in Appendix D to the Staff Rules.

B. Compensation Claims:

Compensation will be awarded in the event of death, injury or illness of a staff member that is attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations, except that no compensation shall be awarded when such death, injury or illness has been occasioned by:

(a) The wilful misconduct of any staff member; or

(b) The staff member's wilful intent to bring about the death, injury or illness of himself/herself or another.

The death, injury or illness of a staff member will be deemed to be attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations in the absence of any wilful misconduct or wilful intent when:

(a) The death, injury or illness is the result of a natural incident of performing official duties on behalf of a United Nations assignment; or

(b) The death, injury or illness is directly owing to the presence of the staff member in accordance with a United Nations assignment in an area involving special hazards to the staff member's health or security, and occurred as a result of such hazards; or

(c) The death, injury or illness occurs as a direct result of travelling by means of transportation furnished by, or at the expense of, the United Nations in connection with the performance of official duties only. This provision will not extend to motor vehicle transportation provided by the staff member or sanctioned or authorized by the United Nations solely at the requests and for the convenience of the staff member.

The compensation payable under the rules governing entitlement will be the sole compensation payable by the United Nations in respect of death, injury or illness.

C. Beneficiary:

A staff member is at liberty to name his/her own beneficiary, whether the latter be a recognized dependant or not. For this purpose, each staff member, either before he/she leaves for UNOMUR or upon arrival at UNOMUR, is required to complete, in triplicate, a designation of beneficiary form. Although the staff member might have done this when first joining the United Nations, he/she should check to make sure that the form is complete and current.

XVI. COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS

Administrative Instruction ST/AI/149/Rev.4 sets out the provisions concerning compensation for loss or theft of personal effects incurred in the course of duty in the mission area. This instruction will be available at UNOMUR headquarters.

A. Limitations:

As pointed out earlier, civilian personnel are advised not to take expensive cameras, watches, radios or similar items, or large amounts of cash or traveller's checks with them into the area, and to take all possible precautions against loss or theft of their personal property. In cases of loss or theft that qualify for compensation under the terms of ST/AI/149/Rev.4, the maximum payment will not exceed the amount indicated for each of the following items:

US\$

| | |
|---|------|
| (a) Television or video tape machine | 1000 |
| (b) Stereo systems (radio, tape recorder, stereo-amplifier, compact disc player, speakers | 1500 |
| (c) Watch | 350 |
| (d) Camera (still or movie) | 350 |
| (e) Video camera | 1500 |
| (f) Cash | 400 |

These figures are revised periodically in the light of prevailing circumstances. No compensation will be paid for loss of or damage to more than one of each of the articles mentioned.

B. Voluntary Personal Property and Personal Accident Insurance Plan:

In addition to the coverage already provided by the United Nations, Herbert L. Jamison & Co. has for some time provided a voluntary insurance plan to UNDP staff members, and this plan will now be available for staff members going on missions.


The insurance is optional. It might be useful insurance to staff members who must carry somewhat precious items with them because they cannot leave such items at home. Since the United Nations already provides compensation in the event of death, injury or illness, as well as compensation for loss of personal effects, this would be additional insurance coverage for those who wanted it.

The personal property insurance would be a minimum of \$5,000 and a maximum of \$100,000 at a rate of \$1.80 per \$100 of value. The accidental death and dismemberment insurance would be as follows:

| Amount of Insurance | Premium |
|---------------------|---------|
| \$ 25,000 | \$ 45 |
| \$ 50,000 | \$ 90 |
| \$100,000 | \$180 |
| \$ 10,000 (Child) | \$ 15 |

For further information, please contact Herbert L. Jamison & Co. at (212) 686 - 2233, 345 Park Avenue South, New York, New York 10010, USA.

Location map of Uganda



SAI UGA 2

10 Prefectures : Kigali
 Byumba
 Gisenyi
 Gitega
 Gikongoro
 Kibungo
 Kibuye
 Cyangugu
 Butare
 Ruhengeri

1245 : Communes
 1429 : Secteurs
 8959 : Cellules


International
 Boundary

Prefecture Boundary

Prefecture

Carte du Rwanda

Ikarita y'u Rwanda



This is general information. The only required vaccination for Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR) is Yellow Fever. The other vaccinations are recommended.

VACCINATION INFORMATION

| <u>Kind of Immunization</u> | <u>Duration of Protection</u> | <u>Number of Doses</u> | <u>Timing between Doses</u> |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Yellow Fever | 10 years | 1 dose | 10 years |
| Tetanus Toxoid | 10 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-3 | 1 month between 1st & 2nd dose 1 year between 2nd & 3rd dose |
| Typhoid (Injectable vaccine) | 3 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-2 | 1 month between 1st & 2nd dose |
| Poliomyelitis (Oral) | 10 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-3 | 6-8 weeks between 1st & 2nd dose 1 year between 2nd & 3rd dose |
| Hepatitis A (Inactive Virus Vaccine) assignments of 6 months or longer) | | Initial Series-3 | 1 month (2 weeks if necessary) bet. 1st & 2nd dose 5 months bet. 2nd & 3rd dose |
| OR | | | |
| Immune Globulin | 3-6 months | 1 injection | 6 months |
| Hepatitis B | 3-8 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-3 | 1 month bet. 1st & 2nd dose 5 months bet. 2nd & 3rd dose |
| Meningococcal | | 1 injection | 3 years |

PERSONAL PROTECTION MEASURES AGAINST MALARIA


Travellers can protect themselves quite effectively against mosquito bites, and in this way, prevent infections. This should constitute the traveller's first line of defense against malaria. Protecting oneself from insect or mosquito bites involves:

- Wearing sufficiently thick, long-sleeved clothing and long trousers when outdoors after sunset, and avoiding dark colours which attract mosquitoes;
- Smearing an insect repellent, such as dimethyl phthalate or N, N-diethyl-m-toluamide (DEET), on the parts of the skin remaining exposed (observing the manufacturer's precautions);
- Sleeping in properly screened rooms (this is generally the case with air-conditioning);
- Using "anti-fly" spray to kill any mosquitoes that may have entered in spite of the screening;
- Using mosquito nets around the bed at night, taking care to tuck in the net carefully under the mattress, and ensuring that the net is not torn, and that there are no mosquitoes inside; increased protection may be obtained by impregnating the net with permethrin or deltamethrin;
- Burning mosquito coils (but usually they do not last through the night).

January 1993

AIDS

Information for Travellers



If you plan to travel, or are already on your way,
here are some basic facts about AIDS.

Concern about AIDS should not prevent
travel to any part of the world.

Whether at home or travelling,
avoiding AIDS is mainly up to you.

AIDS.

Knowledge is the key to prevention

You can protect yourself against AIDS everywhere in the world, at home or travelling. Don't take risks during your travel that could send AIDS home with you. If this advice sounds strict, remember this: *with no cure or vaccine so far for AIDS, prevention is vital.*

For more information, please contact your health care provider or your local, regional or national health authority.

This leaflet has been prepared by the
World Health Organization which
directs and coordinates international health
and is leading the global fight against AIDS.

WHAT IS AIDS?

AIDS is a disease caused by a virus which can break down the body's immune system and lead to fatal infections and some form of cancer.

Should the traveller be concern about AIDS?

No matter where you live or travel, you need to know about AIDS. AIDS is a fact in today's world-throughout the world. However, you can easily protect yourself against AIDS during your travels by knowing and following some simple rules.

How is AIDS spread?

The AIDS virus spreads most frequently through sexual activity. The virus can be transmitted from any infected person to his or her sexual partner (man to woman, woman to man, and from man to man). But it is also spread by contaminated blood - in transfusions, on needles, or on any skin-piercing instruments. Also, an AIDS virus-infected mother can transmit the virus to her child before, during or shortly after birth.

Is AIDS spread by casual contact?

No. AIDS is not spread by daily and routine activities ("casual contact") such as sitting next to someone, or shaking hands, or working with people. Nor is it spread by insects or insect bites. And AIDS is not spread by swimming pools, public transportation, food, cups, glasses, plates, toilets, water, air, touching or hugging, coughing or sneezing.

How can sexual spread of AIDS be prevented?

Do not have sex with prostitutes (male or female) or casual acquaintances, even in countries that claim there is no AIDS problem. You cannot tell by appearances if someone is infected with the AIDS virus; he/she can look healthy.

If you are going to have sexual relations with someone who might be infected:

- * Men should always use a condom, each time, from start to finish, and women should make sure their partner uses one.
 - * Remember that vaginal, anal or oral sex can spread AIDS.
 - * Reducing the number of your sexual partners will lower the risk of exposure to the AIDS virus.
-

What about AIDS and blood transfusions?

Although AIDS can be transmitted by transfusions of infected blood, in many places blood is screened for AIDS virus contamination before being given. If you need a blood transfusion, try to ensure that screened blood is used. Since more and more countries around the world are now testing blood for the AIDS virus, blood transfusions will increasingly be protected from AIDS virus contamination.

You can reduce the risk of serious injury, leading to possible need for blood transfusions, by taking ordinary, everyday precautions. Wear a seat belt and drive carefully. Don't mix alcohol with driving, boating or other activities that could lead to injury.

What about injections?

Avoid injections unless absolutely necessary. If you must have an injection, make sure the needle and syringe come straight from a sterile package or have been sterilized properly (by steam, boiling water or chemicals). For example, a needle and syringe which have been cleaned and then boiled for 20 minutes are ready for re-use.

Unless you have a prescription or a doctor's authorization, don't take your own needles with you.

Finally, if you inject drugs - no matter what kind - never use anyone else's equipment.

What about skin-piercing instruments?

Like needles and syringes, other instruments that pierce the skin (tattoo and acupuncture needles, ear-piercing equipment and dentists' tools) must always be sterile (used only once or sterilized between each use). As with needles and syringes, proper sterilizing of these instruments eliminates risk. In general, you should avoid any procedures which pierce the skin unless absolutely necessary.

What if you are already infected with the AIDS virus?

If you are already infected with the AIDS virus, consult your personal health care provider for guidance well in advance of your proposed travel.

INTRODUCTION TO UGANDA

Geographic Situation

Uganda, a land-locked country, (see map attached as ANNEX A) is typified by a diversity of geographical conditions consisting of lakes, rolling plains and high mountains. It lies across the equator in the upper basin of the River Nile and between 1 South and 4 North latitudes. It is located on the Central African plateau at a base elevation of 200 - 800 meters above sea level. The surrounding countries are Sudan to the north, Kenya to the east, Zaire to the west and Rwanda and Tanzania to the south. It is also the cradle of the River Nile and accommodates the western Rift Valley. Outstanding topographical features include the snow-capped Rwenzori range in the extreme west (Mt. Margherita is the highest mountain of Uganda and rises to over 5,000 m), the Mufumbira range in the south-west and Mt. Elgon in the extreme east, the latter with an altitude of more than 4800 m above sea level.

Uganda has no coastline of its own, but 20 per cent of the 241,000 sq.km. is occupied by lakes, swamps and rivers. Most of Uganda's southern border is formed by Lake Victoria, one of the largest freshwater lakes in the world.

Population

The population of Uganda is estimated at 18 million based on 1980 Population Census projections with 88% and 12% living in rural and urban areas respectively. The main towns are situated in the Lake Victoria zone: Kampala, the capital, with over 1 million inhabitants, industrial Jinja (300,000) and Entebbe (25,000). Other important towns are Mbale, Tororo, Lira, Gulu, Soroti, Moroto, Masindi, Arua, Fort Portal, Kasese, Hoima and Masindi. The Ministry of Health, the Public Service and Cabinet Affairs and a major part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, including the international airport, are located in Entebbe.

Language

There is no national language, but English is spoken widely and used in all government communications. More than three-fifths of the population speak Bantu languages and most of the other languages and dialects are of Nilotic and Hamitic origin. Of the twenty or so languages, Luganda is the major language being spoken in Central Southern Uganda, Runyoro in the west, Rutoro, Runyankole and Rukiga in the southwest and Luo in the northern areas. Swahili does not play the same official role as in Kenya or Tanzania but is spoken as linguafranca in almost the whole country.

Religion

Uganda is mainly a Christian country. The Catholic and Anglican (Church of Uganda) churches are predominant. Missions have played, and still do play, an important role in the education field and health services of the country. Followers of the Moslem faith have places of worship, in addition to Moslem schools within the country; they constitute about 5% of the population.

Currency

The monetary unit, the Ugandan shilling is issued in 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 200 shilling notes. In July 1993 the official rate of the shilling was established at Shs. 1170 = US\$1. Since exchange rates may be subject to fluctuations, the current UNDP/PROG/XR series document should be consulted for the most recent rate.

Weights and Measures

The metric system is in use.

INTRODUCTION TO RWANDA

Geography

The Rwandese Republic is a land-locked state in central Africa, just south of the Equator, bounded by Zaire to the west, by Uganda to the north, by Tanzania to the east and by Burundi to the south. The capital is Kigali. The principal towns are Butare, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi.

Climate

The climate is tropical, although tempered by altitude. It is hot and humid in the lowlands, but cooler in the highlands. The average annual rainfall is 785 mm (31 in). The main rainy season is from February to May.

Population

The population is composed of three ethnic groups: Hutus (85%), Tutsis (14%) and Twas (1%).

Language

French and Kinyarwanda, the native language, are both in official use, and Kiswahili is widely spoken.

Religion

About one-half of the population adhere to animist beliefs. Most the remainder are Christians, mainly Roman Catholics. There are Protestant and Moslem minorities.

Weights and Measures

The metric system is in use.

Principal Crops

The principal crops include: maize, sorghum, potatoes, sweet potatoes, Cassava, yams, taro, dry beans, dry peas, groundnuts, plantains, coffee and tea.

Transportation

There are no railways in Rwanda, although plans exist for the eventual construction of a line passing through Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, to connect with the Kigoma-Dar es Salaam line in Tanzania. Rwanda is linked by road to the Tanzanian railways system.

In 1990, there were 13,173 km of roads, of which 5,200 km were main roads. Some 9% of roads were paved in 1990. A road link to Zaire was completed in 1987.

There are services on Lake Kivu between Cyanuagu, Gesenyi and Kibuye.

The Gregoire Kayibanda international airport at Kigali can process up to 500,000 passengers annually. There is a second international airport at Kamembe. There are airfields at Butare, Gabiro, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, servicing internal flights.

Air Rwanda operates domestic passenger and cargo services.

UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

Field Personnel Section, Field Operations Division
Department of Peace-Keeping Operations

1 November 1993

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR)**

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NOTES FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

I. INTRODUCTION

"Of all the tangible and intangible resources available to the Organization, nothing matches the worth of its staff."

Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Statement to the Fifth Committee
November, 1992

The following notes provide basic information for international civilian personnel to be assigned to the United Nations Assistance Mission Rwanda (UNAMIR). They are intended to guide and assist staff members prior to their departure for, and after their arrival at the mission area. They are based on the most current data and will be updated periodically as new information becomes available.

These notes are for information purposes only and should not be construed as having any legal, financial or other commitment on the part of the United Nations. Similarly, they are not meant to replace the Staff Rules and Regulations or other Personnel instructions. It is the staff member's responsibility to consult the appropriate documentation to determine his/her entitlements and the conditions that must be met to apply for the same. The Personnel Officer at the mission will have the relevant documents available and may be consulted on the subject.

II. GENERAL INFORMATION

A. Background, mandate and organization of UNAMIR:

It will be recalled that, on 22 June 1993, the Security Council, by its resolution 846 (1993), authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the border. UNOMUR is now fully operational.

In the same resolution, the Security Council also urged the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement.

On 4 August 1993, the parties signed a peace agreement in Arusha (Tanzania) and asked the United Nations to help them implement that accord.

Following the signature of the Peace Agreement, the Secretary-General sent a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in August 1993 to examine the ways in which the United Nations could help the OAU - whose Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) had been supervising the cease-fire since August 1992 - and the parties implement that accord.

On 27 September 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council recommending the establishment of a "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (UNAMIR). The mandate of UNAMIR will be to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government. The mandate also includes monitoring the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner and the humanitarian component of assisting in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.

The UNAMIR mission, which will be placed under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, will be deployed for the duration of the transitional period.

On 5 October 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 872 (1993) authorizing the deployment in stages of UNAMIR for an initial period of 6 months. The mandate of UNAMIR, if extended, is expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new Government in Rwanda scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995.

A map of Rwanda is attached in ANNEX A and a copy of resolution 872 is attached in ANNEX B.

B. Status of the Mission:

UNAMIR is a special, non-family mission. All staff will be given a mission subsistence allowance (MSA). The MSA will be discussed further on pages 28 and 29.

The mission has no facilities for dependants and the United Nations strongly discourages staff members from bringing dependants. Accordingly, the United Nations will neither authorize travel for such dependants nor make any other arrangements, such as securing visas, for them. Dependants who travel to the mission area do so at their own risk and expense, and the United Nations will not be held responsible for their welfare, living conditions, or security.

Staff members who have questions on such issues as family visit, home leave and an education grant should refer to the relevant paragraphs of the Staff Rules and Regulations, which take precedence over the information provided in these notes.

Generally, however, staff members regarded as international recruits who are serving outside their home country and are serving at duty stations designated as having very difficult conditions of life and work, which includes Rwanda, will be granted home-leave travel once in every 12 months. One of several qualifying conditions for this home leave is that the staff member's service with the Organization is expected to continue at least six months beyond the date of his or her return from this proposed leave. (SR 105.3, ST/AI/280/Rev.6, and ST/AI/280/Rev.6/Amend.2).

The exercise of the home leave entitlement may be advanced due to the exigencies of service and the personal circumstances of the individual staff member. In that case, the staff member may be eligible for accelerated home leave after six months, if all the other provisions are met. (SR 105.3, ST/AI/280/Rev. 6, and ST/AI/280/Rev.6/Amend.2).

A staff member's travel expenses for a family visit may be paid by the United Nations subject to several conditions, one being that the staff member's service with the mission is expected to continue at least six months after his/her return to the duty station. (Please refer to SR 107.1 (v) (b) (ii) and ST/AI/215/Rev.1).

Education grant benefits apply to Field Service personnel and other internationally recruited staff as well as to staff who are considered locally recruited at their official duty station when detailed to a mission from outside the area of the mission, provided that in each case the staff member is not a national of the country of the duty station and the mission service is for a continuous period of six months or more.

On non-family missions, no education grant travel is authorized to or from the mission area duty station.

The education grant will be payable only in respect of the staff member's period of actual service at the mission area duty station. The grant is pro-rated according to the length of the assignment vis-a-vis the school year and if certain other provisions are met. In addition, school attendance for children between ages 18 and 21 must be submitted for certification to the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer (CCPO) before transmission to the Pay and Allowance Unit. For more details on the applicability of the grant and the actual amounts, please refer to ST/AI/181/Rev.9/Amend.1 issued on 16 February 1993, SR 103.20, ST/AI/181/Rev.9, and ST/AI/280.

C. Organization of the administrative component:

The Chief Administrative Officer is responsible for all administrative functions and provides the requisite administrative support for carrying out the substantive work of the mission efficiently and economically. Subordinate to the CAO are the section chiefs and staff that make up the civilian administration of the mission.

III. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

A. Definition:

United Nations civilian personnel may be either Professional, General Service staff or Field Service officers, who have been assigned to the area to fulfill the mission's needs. They could serve a political, legal, public information, or administrative function.

B. Conduct and attitude:

Respect is to be shown to all members of the mission regardless of their civilian or military status, their race, color, or creed. Normal courtesy should prevail in dealings with all members of the mission. For more details, you may refer to the Report on Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service 1954, Coord/Civil Service/5. It emphasizes that integrity, international loyalty, independence and impartiality, and the subordination of private interests to the interests of the Organization, are daily requirements.

Staff members will discharge their functions and regulate their conduct only with the interests of the United Nations at heart. They shall not seek or accept instructions with respect to the performance of their functions from their own government or from any authority external to the United Nations.

Staff members must always be impartial and objective and must avoid any conduct that would raise doubts about their ability to remain so.

Staff members should not have close ties with individuals, organizations, parties, or factions in any part of Mozambique, and should not use information acquired while at the mission to private advantage.

No staff member shall accept any honor, decoration, or remuneration from any source external to the Organization, without first obtaining the approval of the Secretary-General.

Attitude is important. A good attitude will help everyone. Staff members may have to endure difficult and uncomfortable situations, whether it be in the mission job, housing facility or everyday encounters. Work with each other to try to solve the problems and to try to stay cheerful about it.

Staff members are reminded of the different cultural customs around the world. Every effort should be made to become familiar with the local customs and every precaution should be taken not to publicly violate them, particularly in orthodox societies.

C. Privileges and Immunities:

Article 105 of the UN Charter guarantees immunities and privileges in the interest of the Organization. However, these privileges and immunities furnish no excuse to staff members for non-performance of their private obligations, (not paying their bills or failure to observe laws and police regulations).

D. Financial liability:

Staff members may be required to reimburse the United Nations partially or in full for any financial loss suffered by the Organization as a result of their negligence or by their failure to follow a rule, regulation, or administrative instruction.))

E. Tax matters:

The responsibility for filing complete, correct and timely tax returns is that of the individual taxpayer. Field Operations Division will make available the Information Circular on Payment of Income Taxes, ST/IC/1993 /5, to staff members who are permanent United States citizens and to those holding a "green card", since these are the staff members who will be affected by the payment of such taxes. In addition, any staff member affected in this way should send a short memo to the Tax Department advising them where you are going, how long you will be gone and where they should send your tax check and any correspondence that they have for you.

F. Dependency Benefits:

Any new staff member claiming dependency benefits in respect of spouse or children must submit originals of birth/marriage/divorce decrees, to the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer (CCPO), for certification before transmitting them to the Pay and Allowance Unit.))

IV. QUALIFICATIONS

A. Professional:

To qualify for a mission assignment, applicants are normally required to be at least 23 years old and to hold a long-term appointment. Staff members must be cleared by the Medical Service prior to such assignment.

The United Nations will do its utmost to match personnel with the proper skills for the assigned jobs in the mission. However, a perfect match may not always be possible. The Organization will depend on people in the field to use problem-solving and organizational skills to deal with the issues that arise. At the very least, devising interim solutions until management can provide support is expected.

B. Physical:

Staff members should be in superior physical condition as they may have to live and work under conditions of hardship and, sometimes, physical danger. It is easier to endure difficult surroundings when fit.

C. Other requirements:

Proficiency in English is considered essential, proficiency in French is considered desirable.

V. DURATION OF TOUR OF DUTY

A. Length:

Assignments may be for varying lengths of time, depending upon the needs of the mission. They are normally for six months.

An assignment may be extended if the Head of the mission requests the extension, the staff member is willing, and the parent department from which the staff member has come, agrees to the further extension.

B. Administrative Matters:

Correspondence on all administrative arrangements connected with a staff member's assignment and travel, both prior to departure for the mission area and after completion of duty with UNAMIR, will be conducted by Field Operations Division (FOD), United Nations, New York. During the tour of duty in the mission area, personnel shall deal through the UNAMIR Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) on all administrative and financial matters.

VI. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR STAFF SERVING IN UNAMIR

A. General:

The primary responsibility for the protection of staff members in the host country rests with the Host Government. This responsibility flows from every government's normal and inherent function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations and their officials and property, the Government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.

It is recognized, however, that in some cases the security and protection factor afforded by the Government may be uncertain. For that reason, in all locations where the United Nations has a presence, system-wide arrangements are in place for the protection of United Nations Staff. The safety of staff members is of paramount importance to the United Nations and it is doing its utmost to ensure their security.

The responsibility for overall security in the country rests with the Designated Official. He/she is assisted by Area Coordinators in each location where United Nations Staff are based. Area Coordinators are responsible for preparing an area-specific security plan and, in consultation with the Designated Official, for its implementation in their area of operation, as discussed below.

B. Country Specific:

Background:

Rwanda has known little peace since it gained independence in 1962. Constant ethnic conflict between the majority Hutu tribe (85%) and the minority Tutsi tribe (14%) (who had formerly ruled over the Hutu) has been the norm for the past thirty years. In 1990 the Tutsi dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. After initial success the RPF reverted to a protracted guerilla warfare and during the next three years a bitter conflict was pursued between the government of Rwanda and the RPF.

Peace negotiations in Tanzania led to a peace treaty signed at Arusha on 4 August 1993. A demilitarized zone between the RPF and government forces was created, supervised by the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

C. Rwanda Today:

Although security incidents have declined since May 1993 and both the Government and the RPF appear to genuinely want a peaceful settlement, the situation is very tense and the potential for further violence remains a very real threat.

Despite political tensions, crime is the main threat to foreigners in Rwanda. It is inspired by relative poverty and a breakdown in social and governmental controls. The war caused many persons to flee their homes, and large numbers of internally displaced persons live around the Kigali area. The most common problem is simple theft and robbery. Less common, but with growing cause for caution is the problem of violent crime, often involving deserters from the military or gendarmerie.

Hand grenades and Kalashnikov rifles are easily obtainable in Kigali. Years of conflict and the Uganda war over the border have resulted in a surplus of weapons in Rwanda. Mines have been laid in the northern parts of Rwanda, and their presence prevents many of the displaced from returning to their former homes.

The police and gendarmerie are not adequately equipped nor trained to effectively combat crime in Rwanda and preserve law and order.

D. Security Guidelines:

Crime in Kigali is no greater than in many other cities of similar size. Exercise normal caution. However, do not walk around outside your hotel after dark. If you have a UN Laissez-Passer, please carry it with you at all times.

Avoid displaying large sums of money or jewelry. Store excess cash, traveller's cheques, airline tickets, etc. in the hotel safe.

Lock the doors when in a vehicle, and do not open the windows more than two inches when in town. Do not leave valuables visible in the vehicle.

If you are confronted by a thief, stay calm and cooperate with him. Take action that will preserve health, wealth and dignity in that order. Remember that your life is worth more than your material possessions.

If you are staying in a hotel be aware of security measures recommended by the hotel for its guests. Study the fire regulations and know how to exit the hotel in an emergency. When in your hotel room always lock the door. Check the identity of repairmen with the hotel management before admitting them to your hotel room.

Try to vary your routes to and from the hotel, and vary the times that you leave and return to the hotel each day. Be alert in the hotel car park, and try to limit any time spent waiting there for a vehicle.

Do not discuss your itinerary in public places, and be discreet about revealing information about yourself, your hotel or room number to anyone.

E. United Nations Security Planning:

Whilst in Rwanda you will be expected to comply with the same security procedures as all other UN organization staff in the country. The Designated Official for Security in Rwanda is the UNDP Resident Representative, Mr. Ahmadou Ly. (Office Telephone for UNDP is 77822). He is responsible for the management and implementation of the Security Plan for Rwanda, to ensure the protection and security of UN organization staff in the country.

Phase I is in effect in Rwanda, and all staff must notify the Designated Official of their movements within the country. There is a Security Plan for Rwanda which, with the deployment of the mission, will be integrated into an expanded plan to coordinate security planning for the entire UN presence in the country. There will be a security advisor appointed to the chief of the mission, who will be available in Rwanda to assist and advise staff on security issues.

In the event of a crisis, please return to your hotel (if it is safe to do so) and contact the Field Security Officer, Mr. Francois Tissot: telephone 75381 ext. 111 (work) 76772 (home). In the event of an evacuation, instructions will be given to you by the Field Security Officer. If you are out of town, or cannot return to your hotel, seek the nearest safe refuge and contact the Field Security Officer soonest.

Check with the Field Security Officer for the current update on the security situation in Rwanda.

F. Report all incidents:

It is of the utmost importance that all security incidents are reported to the UN security authorities as soon as possible after the incident. The report should be as detailed as possible to assist UN security authorities in determining what course of action should be followed.

G. Malicious Act Insurance Policy:

Because there are hazardous conditions in South Africa, extra insurance coverage is being provided by the United Nations. Benefits under this policy reach a maximum of \$250,000. All arrangements related to this policy are handled by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, and all correspondence, queries or claims must be addressed to that office through the CAO and Field Operations Division (FOD).

The United Nations has put this insurance policy in place to cover staff serving at designated duty stations against malicious acts. Coverage is related only to malicious acts, i.e. for death or disability caused directly or indirectly by war, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared or not), civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, military or usurped power, riots or civil commotion, sabotage, explosion of war weapons, terrorist activities (whether the terrorists are the country's own nationals or not), murder or assault by foreign enemies or any attempted threat.

This policy does not cover death or disability directly or indirectly resulting from or consequent upon:

- (a) the insured person engaging in or taking part in naval, military or air force service or operations;
- (b) the insured person engaging in air travel, except as a passenger on official travel;
- (c) suicide or attempted suicide or intentional self-injury or the insured person being in a state of insanity.
- (d) deliberate exposure to exceptional danger (except in an attempt to save human life) or the insured person's own criminal act; and
- (e) the insured person being under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

VII. DUTY SCHEDULE, LEAVE AND COMPENSATORY TIME OFF

A. Hours of Duty:

Hours of duty are determined by the tasks to be performed and the situation in the area. Civilian personnel should be prepared to work irregular and long hours when necessary, and to be on call to work all hours at little or no notice. This is especially the case during the formative stages of the mission or during periods of peak activity.

Hours of work may often be longer and less "convenient" than might be expected at established non-field duty stations, and invariably without any compensation in terms of overtime or compensatory time off (CTO).

Although adherence to an established hierarchy of duties is not possible in the field, all staff members are still required to follow established United Nations rules, regulations, and procedures. In this respect, personnel should seek guidance from their superiors, especially if the assigned tasks are unfamiliar. Staff members may also address queries to the Personnel Officer.

B. Leave:

All staff members, whether internationally or locally recruited/appointed under the 100 series of Staff Rules are entitled to annual leave. Annual leave accumulates at the rate of 2 1/2 days per month.

Short-term staff members appointed for a period of less than six months under the 300 series of Staff Rules are not entitled to annual leave.

C. Compensatory time off:

International staff are not entitled to compensatory time-off. However, they continue to receive MSA during periods of annual leave not exceeding one and one-half days for each completed month of their assignment. Such entitlement may be accumulated during the period of assignment but the accrued leave has to be taken within the mission area before the conclusion of the assignment during which the entitlement is earned. Otherwise it is considered that the entitlement is forfeited.

II. TRAVEL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BEFORE DEPARTURE TO UNAMIR

A. Responsibility:

Staff members share responsibility with the Field Operations Division for securing their travel documents. FOD will provide application forms for an entry Visa and a United Nations Laissez-Passer.

B. Passport and Laissez-Passer:

Before departing on a mission, all personnel must be in possession of a valid national passport and a valid United Nations Laissez-Passer. Laissez-Passers are recognized and accepted as valid travel documents in the territories of such Member States as have accepted the relevant provisions of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

C. Visas:

All personnel, except nationals of the country, must obtain entry visas before departure for Rwanda. It will be necessary to fill in two required forms, present two passport-size photographs and show proof of the required inoculations. To avoid unnecessary delay, personnel should also ensure that they are in possession of visas for any countries en route. Advance request forms may be obtained through Field Operations Division (FOD) and thereafter submitted to the UN Visa Office (20th floor). Personnel outside UN Headquarters should obtain Rwandese entry visas locally or request FOD's assistance.

Before departure for the mission, Headquarters personnel who hold United States alien registration cards ("green cards") should request a re-entry permit from the Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), regardless of the length of their assignment. The United States Mission to the UN may also provide assistance.

D. International Certificate of Vaccination:

Civilian personnel must have in their possession at all times an international certificate of vaccination.

E. Photographs:

To facilitate the issuance of identity cards and for other purposes, staff members should be in possession of at least 10 recent passport-size photographs (approximately 2" x 2 1/2" or 5 x 6 cm.).

IX. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

A. Initial medical examination before departure:

All staff members to be assigned to UNAMIR must be medically cleared by the UN Medical Service. As soon as an applicant is accepted for the mission, he/she should obtain medical clearance and begin immunizations.

B. Medical Requirements for Mission to UNAMIR:

1. In addition to the medical clearance required by the Medical Service for fitness to undertake a mission assignment, the following immunizations and malaria chemoprophylaxis are required and/or recommended for Rwanda:

A. Required Immunization:

All personnel arriving in Rwanda must be immunized against Yellow Fever.

* An appointment with the UN Medical Service is necessary in order to receive this immunization because of vaccine protocol.

Recommended Immunizations:

Typhoid
Tetanus Toxoid
Poliomyelitis
Hepatitis A Vaccination or Immune Globulin
Hepatitis B

B. Required Malaria Prophylaxis:

Lariam/Mefloquine HCL, 250 mg

The following is the recommended dosage for Mefloquine Hcl/Lariam.

- (a) For prolonged stays in the endemic area (more than three weeks): -

First dose of one tablet (250 mg.) is to be taken 1 week before arriving in malarious area followed by one tablet once weekly always on the same day of the week during the entire stay in the malarious area and four weeks after leaving the malarious zone.

- (b) For brief stays in the endemic area (1 to 3 weeks): -

First dose of one tablet (250 mg.) is to be taken 1 week before arriving in the malarious area, followed by 1 tablet once weekly always on the same day for the next 5 weeks.

2. Travellers to malarious areas run a high risk of acquiring the disease. Therefore, it is important that every traveller take personal protective measures in order to reduce the risk of contracting malaria. Attached, as ANNEX C, is an information sheet listing some of the personal protective measures that are effective in reducing the risk of mosquito bites.

3. The United Nations Medical Service will discuss all of the above medical requirements during your visit as well as provide you with a Medical Kit which contains useful medications you might need and a copy of a pamphlet on Your Health in the Tropics.

Additional information on vaccination may be found in ANNEX D.

C. AIDS:

Take the usual precautions that are used universally. It is important to note that the risk of this infection exists throughout the country, as it does in many areas of the world. There is additional information in ANNEX E.

D. Medical and Dental Insurance:

Staff members should ensure that they have the appropriate insurance coverage prior to leaving for mission assignment. Consultation with the Insurance Section is highly recommended.

Headquarters Staff:

Information Circular ST/IC/1993/27, prepared for members of the staff at headquarters, states that in view of the large number of staff members who will go on mission assignment, it has been decided to extend a special medical/dental plan enrolment opportunity to such staff members. The provisions in this respect, which will apply to all staff members going on mission for six months or more, are as follows:

(a) Staff members who at present are not enrolled in any United Nations health insurance plan will be allowed to enrol themselves and eligible family members. The insurance will become effective on the first day of the month in which the mission assignment commences. Enrolment in a health insurance plan in these circumstances must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(b) Staff members assigned to a mission who are enrolled in either HIP or Kaiser, two plans which do not offer full services at locations away from Headquarters, may switch to either Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus. These two plans provide benefits on a worldwide basis, though in the case of Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus, there are no participating providers outside the Headquarters area. Enrolment in the Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus plans under this provision must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(c) Staff members who, at the time of commencement of the mission assignment, do not have GHI Dental coverage but who are already enrolled, together with eligible family members, in Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus may enrol themselves and family members covered under their medical insurance plan in the dental plan. Such enrolment must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(d) Staff members who elect to enrol in a health insurance plan in the circumstances provided under (a) to (c) above forego the right to make any further change during the annual enrolment campaign taking place in the same calendar year as the commencement of the mission assignment. The next opportunity for these staff members to make any changes in their insurance coverage will be at the time of the annual enrolment campaign of the following year;

(e) Staff members who are already enrolled in Blue Cross/Aetna or Blue Cross/WrapAround Plus at the time of the mission assignment must retain their existing coverage until the next annual enrollment campaign;

(f) Headquarters staff members who will be on mission assignment for a year or more and who will not have eligible covered family members residing in the United States for the duration of the mission assignment may opt for coverage under the Van Breda Medical, Hospital and Dental Insurance plan for staff overseas. Details of this plan are available in the offices of the Insurance Section, room S-2765;

(g) Staff members returning to Headquarters from mission assignment, other than those who qualified and opted for the Van Breda plan, may not change their insurance coverage until the next annual enrollment campaign. Staff members who switched to the Van Breda plan, as provided under subparagraph (f) above, must revert, upon return to Headquarters, to the insurance plan which they had prior to the mission assignment, at least until the next annual enrollment campaign. It is essential that such staff members advise the Insurance Section within 31 days of their return to Headquarters.

Staff at Duty Stations Away From New York:

The Information Circular, ST/IC/1992/75, on Van Breda Medical, Hospital and Dental Insurance, prepared for members of the staff at duty stations away from Headquarters, sets out the eligibility criteria for enrolment in that plan:

Except for staff members whose duty station is New York, Geneva or Vienna and locally recruited staff members at duty stations where the Medical Insurance Plan (MIP) is established, all staff members holding appointments of three months or longer under the 100 or 200 Series of the Staff Rules may enrol themselves and eligible family members in the United Nations Van Breda plan. For enrolment purposes, applicants will be required to present proof of eligibility from their respective personnel or administrative officers attesting to their current contractual status. The enrolment of eligible family members requires the provision of evidence of the status of such family members. In most instances, the necessary proof of eligibility will be contained in the P.5 personnel action form.

In view of the large number of staff members going on mission assignment, it has been decided to extend a special health insurance enrolment opportunity to such staff members. The provisions in this respect, which will apply to all eligible staff members going on mission of for six months or more, are as follows:

(a) Staff members who at present are not enrolled in the Van Breda plan will be allowed to enrol themselves and eligible family members. The insurance will become effective on the first day of the month in which the mission assignment commences. Enrolment in the plan in these circumstances must be completed prior to the departure of the staff member on mission assignment;

(b) Staff members who elect to enrol in the Van Breda plan in the circumstances set out in (a) above forego the right to make any further change during the annual enrolment period taking place in the same calendar year as the commencement of the mission assignment. The next opportunity for these staff members to make any change in their insurance coverage will be at the time of the annual enrolment period of the following year;

(c) Staff members going on mission assignment who wish to enrol in the Van Breda plan or change their present coverage, as provided above, must present evidence to the Insurance Section or to their administrative office, as the case may be, of the mission assignment and its duration.

Locally-recruited staff members who are enrolled in the Medical Insurance Plan (MIP) will retain that plan when on mission assignment.

IN ALL CASES, STAFF MEMBERS GOING ON MISSION ASSIGNMENT WHO WISH TO ENROL IN A HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN OR CHANGE THEIR PRESENT COVERAGE, AS PROVIDED ABOVE, MUST PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE INSURANCE SECTION OR THE RELEVANT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE MISSION ASSIGNMENT AND ITS DURATION.

E. Medical Facilities:

Personnel are advised to have any dental treatment completed before travelling to Rwanda. In cases of specific purpose medicines, obtainable only through prescriptions, it is recommended that the user takes along a supply sufficient to last a reasonable period.

Staff members on assignment to or recruited for Rwanda are required to have appropriate medical insurance coverage. They may be reimbursed for reasonable hospital and medical expenses over and above those covered by their insurance, insofar as these are not covered by other arrangements. For information on conditions governing this provision, consult the Personnel Officer in the mission.

X. TRAVEL TO AND FROM UNAMIR

A. Class and route:

Travel authorization (Form PT.8) will be issued by FOD. Travel to Rwanda will be via commercial carrier. Arrangements for the travel of Headquarters personnel, including provision of travel advances, will be made by FOD through the designated UN travel agent. Offices away from Headquarters may be authorized by FOD to make travel arrangements for their own personnel. Normally, if FOD does not make the staff member's travel arrangements, the expenses will not be reimbursed.

The normal provisions governing the official travel (standard of accommodation, travel time, reimbursement of miscellaneous travel expenses, etc.) will apply unless otherwise advised. FOD must be informed of flight details in order to assist with arrival formalities.

Overseas offices are requested to fax flight details of their staff members directly to FOD, with a copy to UNAMIR, Kigali. In this way, it will ensure that all staff members are met and initial accommodation arranged upon arrival. Any subsequent changes in these arrangements should be reported to FOD.

Upon arrival at UNAMIR, a claim for reimbursement of travel expenses (form F.10) should be submitted with supporting receipts to the Administrative Officer. These would include ticket stubs, the original PT.8, taxi and hotel receipts, if a stopover was authorized.

XI. SHIPMENT AND INSURANCE OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE

A. Baggage Allowance:

The shipping entitlement for UNAMIR will be 100 kilos, regardless of the duration of the mission, for as long as it continues under special mission status.

During the initial stage of the mission, because of possible shipping difficulties, the shipment of personal effects may be accompanied. Once the mission becomes established, the baggage entitlement will be unaccompanied by air freight. The 100 kilo allowance remains fixed, regardless of whether you decide to send your baggage by air, surface or any other means of transport.

B. Insurance:

The Traffic Unit should be contacted to arrange pick-up of the unaccompanied shipment. You must provide them with an itemized valued inventory of personal effects, as well as a request for insurance coverage, as it is not automatic.

The United Nations does not accept responsibility for insuring accompanied baggage taken on the airplane. However, since airline tickets for United Nations personnel are purchased under an American Express account, accompanied baggage is covered under American Express insurance. Personnel requiring additional insurance for accompanied baggage should arrange it at their own expense.

XII. CLOTHING AND SUPPLIES

A. General Information:

The climate is tropical, although tempered by altitude. It is hot and humid in the lowlands, but cooler in the highlands. The average annual rainfall is 785 mm (31 in.) the main rainy season is from February to May.

Light clothing is required, including a light raincoat and umbrella. Cotton clothing, as well as mixed fabrics, are very good. A light jacket or sweater is also helpful.

B. Selection of Clothing and Supplies:

There are few clothing shops. Some relatively good quality clothing could be found in souvenir shops, but of course it is very expensive. It is recommended that you bring what you need with you.

Cosmetic and toiletry items for both men and women can be obtained locally. However, it is advisable to take a sufficient supply of mosquito repellents and cosmetics/toiletry items to the mission area with you.

Personnel are advised not to take expensive or sentimental items with them into the mission area. Suitcases and trunks should have strong locks in order to secure personal effects when leaving rooms unoccupied. Try to take all precautions against loss or theft of personal property.

C. Cameras:

Discretion in the use of cameras and binoculars is highly recommended at all times.

XIII. LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE MISSION AREA

A. Living accommodations:

Personnel will be briefed regarding accommodation arrangements on arrival at UNAMIR headquarters. Initial hotel accommodations will be arranged, unless specifically requested to the contrary, for travellers arriving to assume duties in the UNAMIR mission area.

There are about nine hotels and four guest-houses in Kigali. "Le Meridien" and "Mille Collines" are first class hotels. The rate per day at these two hotels is more or less the same: US\$100 for a single room, US\$120 for a double, US\$150 and US\$200 for small and large suites. There is a 25% discount, rooms only, for United Nations personnel.

"Les Diplomates," which is located downtown, is much cheaper. The rate is from 6,700 FRW for a single room to 15,400 FRW for a large suite. There is also a 10% discount for United Nations personnel.

There is also the "Isimbi," which is cheap, but the location is not safe and it would not be advisable to have United Nations staff there.

There is one hotel that has some apartments with cooking facilities - the "Village Urugwiro". Most of the time it is fully booked but when there are apartments or rooms available, these are rented on a monthly basis. The monthly rent is 70,000 FRW for apartments and 50,000 FRW for rooms. No discount for United Nations personnel.

The "Chez Lando" is a kind of village with rooms. The rate is 4,950 FRW for a single and 6,050 FRW for a double room.

The "Amahoro" hotel is located next to the Stadium, and customers have access to sports facilities. The rate is between 2,750 FRW and 3,850 FRW for rooms and 5,000 FRW for a suite.

B. Electricity and Electric Current:

The standard electrical power in Rwanda is 220 volts, 50 cycles. There is a lot of power outages depending upon the area. The newer an area is, the more shortages in electricity there are.

C. Food and Water:

There is an abundant water supply but all water should be bought, filtered or treated with purification tablets since many tropical diseases are endemic.

In general, food exists in large quantities. There are two areas where one can buy food - supermarkets and central markets.

Supermarkets: Almost all that one normally would see in a large city such as New York is sold in Kigali, but in smaller quantities and at a very high price. Everything is imported, with the exception of vegetables and fruit. A variety of alcohol is also sold in supermarkets. At the Alirwanda Supermarket, there is a butcher as well as a bakery that has all kinds of bread. The following are some of the prices: Nescafe (200g) - 4,845 FRW; cheese "la vache qui rit" - 1,085 FRW; vegetable oil - 1,100 FRW; can of mixed vegetables (small can) 400 FRW and (large can) 850 FRW; small can of corn - 560 FRW; bottled water - 550 FRW; bread - from 65 to 150 FRW; shampoo (small) - 900 FRW; and deodorant - 2,000 FRW. Beef is of high quality and costs 800 FRW per kilo, and the chicken is 600 FRW a kilo.

Central Markets: The Central Market is a huge area where you can find a relatively good selection of vegetables, and fruit which is grown locally. Oil, sugar, souvenir items, toiletries (soap, shampoo, cream, toilet paper, etc.) are also available at almost the same prices as supermarkets. Some vegetables and fruit prices are: tomatoes - 80 to 100 FRW a kilo; cucumbers - 15 FRW each; string beans - 80 FRW for 1/2 kilo; zucchini - 250 FRW a kilo; papaya - a small one is 50 FRW and a big one is 100 FRW.

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D. Driving:

Driving is on the right side of the roadway.

A valid national or international driving license is required.

The main road network is excellent, being tarmac surfaced, single carriageway with good drainage and alignment. Off the main network the majority of the roads are dust or gravel. The minor roads in the north are in poor repair and require renovation and maintenance if they are to be used as main supply routes for food convoys or for transit by vehicles over 8 tons. There are many sedans on the roads, but the majority of vehicles are 4x4 Landcruisers or small Suzukis (4 seats), mainly because of the quality of the roads and the rainy seasons (Sept.-Feb. and Apr-Jun).

E. Salary Deposit:

Staff members who do not already have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts may wish to make arrangements before departure for automatic deposit into an account at their duty station. Upon arrival at the duty station recruits should complete a United Nations salary/allowances distribution form. Recruits are advised that computerized payroll processing will take some time to commence and, until then, salary advances may be requested.

F. Mail and Emergency Contact:

Postal Address: (for letters only)

Name of Staff Member
UNAMIR
P.O. Box 4661
Grand Central Station
New York, N.Y. 10163-4661

Telephone and FAX numbers are as follows:

Tel: 9-011-250-84268
Fax: 9-011-250-84265

- 3094 Convent
- 73092 (duty station)

Sit room
[963-7820
Mala Enrique
Reque -

G. Communications Systems:

The communications facilities in Rwanda are currently being expanded. They consist of the following:

(a) Television. A television service started in 1992. A limited number of stations are available;

(b) Radio. There are 2 AM and 5 FM stations in Rwanda. They serve 630,000 radio sets, or about one radio per 11 people;

(c) Newspapers. Rwanda has one national daily newspaper with a limited circulation;

(d) Telecommunications. Telephone services for national and international use are generally adequate but very expensive. The area code is 250.

H. Telephone Charges:

Telephone: There will be certifying officers who will approve official long distance telephone calls made in the United Nations system.

XIV: MISSION SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE (MSA)

A. Entitlement:

Staff members who are on temporary assignment to Rwanda will continue to receive the emoluments and allowances of their current duty station. In addition, they will receive a Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA).

No post adjustment, mobility and hardship allowance will be given since the mission subsistence allowance takes into consideration any difficult conditions that are present in the mission area.

B. Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) - Definition:

The MSA is designed to cover, among others, the cost of food and lodging, local transportation, water/drinks and incidentals. This constitutes the entire United Nations contribution towards such costs. It should be noted, however, that reductions in the MSA will apply if food and/or accommodation is provided by the United Nations or the host country.

C. Rate of the Mission Subsistence Allowance:

Under Staff Rule 103.21, the following uniform MSA rates have been approved for UNAMIR personnel throughout the mission area and are effective 5 October, 1993:

First 30 days in the mission area - \$110
After 30 days in the mission area - \$ 85

The mission subsistence allowance is payable on a continuous basis in the mission area and is payable in US dollars.

The above MSA rates are subject to supplements of 10 and 25 per cent for staff at the D-1/D-2 and ASG/USG levels, respectively.

The currency in Rwanda is the Rwandese Franc (FRW). The official rate is 141 FRW = US\$1 as of 22 October, 1993.

D. Exchange Controls:

Currency regulations vary from country to country. Regulations for currency exchange will therefore be established for this operation to ensure that national currency regulations are respected in the mission area as well as in neighboring countries that the members may visit on leave or on duty. Regulations pertaining to the mission will be obtained on arrival in the country and United Nations personnel are expected to strictly adhere thereto.

XV. COMPENSATION FOR DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS

A. Entitlement:

The United Nations provides staff members with compensation coverage for death, injury or illness, determined by the Secretary-General to be attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations. The details of this compensation are contained in Appendix D to the Staff Rules.

B. Compensation Claims:

Compensation will be awarded in the event of death, injury or illness of a staff member that is attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations, except that no compensation shall be awarded when such death, injury or illness has been occasioned by:

(a) The wilful misconduct of any staff member; or

(b) The staff member's wilful intent to bring about the death, injury or illness of himself/herself or another.

The death, injury or illness of a staff member will be deemed to be attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations in the absence of any wilful misconduct or wilful intent when:

(a) The death, injury or illness is the result of a natural incident of performing official duties on behalf of a United Nations assignment; or

(b) The death, injury or illness is directly owing to the presence of the staff member in accordance with a United Nations assignment in an area involving special hazards to the staff member's health or security, and occurred as a result of such hazards; or

(c) The death, injury or illness occurs as a direct result of travelling by means of transportation furnished by, or at the expense of, the United Nations in connection with the performance of official duties only. This provision will not extend to motor vehicle transportation provided by the staff member or sanctioned or authorized by the United Nations solely at the requests and for the convenience of the staff member.

The compensation payable under the rules governing entitlement will be the sole compensation payable by the United Nations in respect of death, injury or illness.

C. **Beneficiary:**

A staff member is at liberty to name his/her own beneficiary, whether the latter be a recognized dependant or not. For this purpose, each staff member, either before he/she leaves for UNAMIR or upon arrival at UNAMIR, is required to complete, in triplicate, a designation of beneficiary form. Although the staff member might have done this when first joining the United Nations, he/she should check to make sure that the form is complete and current.

XVI. COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS

Administrative Instruction ST/AI/149/Rev.4 sets out the provisions concerning compensation for loss or theft of personal effects incurred in the course of duty in the mission area. This instruction will be available at UNAMIR headquarters.

A. Limitations:

As pointed out earlier, civilian personnel are advised not to take expensive cameras, watches, radios or similar items, or large amounts of cash or traveller's checks with them into the area, and to take all possible precautions against loss or theft of their personal property.

In cases of loss or theft that qualify for compensation under the terms of ST/AI/149/Rev.4, the maximum payment will not exceed the amount indicated for each of the following items:

US\$

| | |
|---|------|
| (a) Television or video tape machine | 1000 |
| (b) Stereo systems (radio, tape recorder stereo-amplifier, compact disc player, speakers) | 1500 |
| (c) Watch | 350 |
| (d) Camera (still or movie) | 350 |
| (e) Video camera | 1500 |
| (f) Cash | 400 |

These figures are revised periodically in the light of prevailing circumstances. No compensation will be paid for loss of or damage to more than one of each of the articles mentioned.

B. Voluntary Personal Property and Personal Accident Insurance Plan:


In addition to the coverage already provided by the United Nations, Herbert L. Jamison & Co. has for some time provided a voluntary insurance plan to UNDP staff members, and this plan will now be available for staff members going on missions.

The insurance is optional, and the premium is low. It might be useful insurance to staff members who must carry somewhat precious items with them because they cannot leave such items at home. Since the United Nations already provides compensation in the event of death, injury or illness, as well as compensation for loss of personal effects, this would be additional insurance coverage for those who wanted it.

The personal property insurance would be a minimum of \$5,000 and a maximum of \$100,000 at a rate of \$1.80 per \$100 of value. The accidental death and dismemberment insurance would be as follows:

| Amount of Insurance | Premium |
|---------------------|---------|
| \$ 25,000 | \$ 45 |
| \$ 50,000 | \$ 90 |
| \$100,000 | \$180 |
| \$ 10,000 (Child) | \$ 15 |

For further information, please contact Herbert L. Jamison & Co. at (212) 686 - 2233, 345 Park Avenue South, New York, New York 10010, USA.



Current demilitarized zone

PERSONAL PROTECTION MEASURES AGAINST MALARIA

Travellers can protect themselves quite effectively against mosquito bites, and in this way, prevent infections. This should constitute the traveller's first line of defense against malaria. Protecting oneself from insect or mosquito bites involves:

- Wearing sufficiently thick, long-sleeved clothing and long trousers when outdoors after sunset, and avoiding dark colours which attract mosquitoes;

- Smearing an insect repellent, such as dimethyl phtalate or N, N-diethyl-m-toluamide (DEET), on the parts of the skin remaining exposed (observing the manufacturer's precautions);

- Sleeping in properly screened rooms (this is generally the case with air-conditioning);

- Using "anti-fly" spray to kill any mosquitoes that may have entered in spite of the screening;

- Using mosquito nets around the bed at night, taking care to tuck in the net carefully under the mattress, and ensuring that the net is not torn, and that there are no mosquitoes inside; increased protection may be obtained by impregnating the net with permethrin or deltamethrin;

- Burning mosquito coils (but usually they do not last through the night).

January 1993


This is general information. The only required vaccination for Rwanda is Yellow Fever, if you are coming from an infected area. The other vaccinations are recommended.

VACCINATION INFORMATION

| <u>Kind of Immunization</u> | <u>Duration of Protection</u> | <u>Number of Doses</u> | <u>Timing between Doses</u> |
|--|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Tetanus Toxoid | 10 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-3 | 1 month between 1st & 2nd dose 1 year between 2nd & 3rd dose |
| Typhoid (Injectable vaccine) | 3 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-2 | 1 month between 1st & 2nd dose |
| Poliomyelitis (Oral) | 10 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-3 | 6-8 weeks. between 1st & 2nd dose 1 year between 2nd & 3rd dose |
| Hepatitis A (Inactive Virus Vaccine) (For assignments of 6 months or longer) | | Series-3 | 2-4 weeks between 1st & 2nd dose; 3rd dose is 6-12 months after initial dose |
| OR | | | |
| Immune Globulin | 3-6 months | 1 injection | 6 months |
| Hepatitis B | 3-8 years | Booster-1 Initial Series-3 | 1 month bet. 1st & 2nd dose 5 months bet. 2nd & 3rd dose |
| Yellow Fever (if coming from an infected area) | 10 years | 1 dose | 10 years |

AIDS

Information for Travellers



If you plan to travel, or are already on your way,
here are some basic facts about AIDS.

Concern about AIDS should not prevent
travel to any part of the world.

Whether at home or travelling,
avoiding AIDS is mainly up to you.

AIDS.

Knowledge is the key to prevention

You can protect yourself against AIDS everywhere in the world, at home or travelling. Don't take risks during your travel that could send AIDS home with you. If this advice sounds strict, remember this: *with no cure or vaccine so far for AIDS, prevention is vital.*

For more information, please contact your health care provider or your local, regional or national health authority.

This leaflet has been prepared by the
World Health Organization which
directs and coordinates international health
and is leading the global fight against AIDS.

WHAT IS AIDS?

AIDS is a disease caused by a virus which can break down the body's immune system and lead to fatal infections and some form of cancer.

Should the traveller be concerned about AIDS?

No matter where you live or travel, you need to know about AIDS. AIDS is a fact in today's world-throughout the world. However, you can easily protect yourself against AIDS during your travels by knowing and following some simple rules.

How is AIDS spread?

The AIDS virus spreads most frequently through sexual activity. The virus can be transmitted from any infected person to his or her sexual partner (man to woman, woman to man, and from man to man). But it is also spread by contaminated blood - in transfusions, on needles, or on any skin-piercing instruments. Also, an AIDS virus-infected mother can transmit the virus to her child before, during or shortly after birth.

Is AIDS spread by casual contact?

No. AIDS is not spread by daily and routine activities ("casual contact") such as sitting next to someone, or shaking hands, or working with people. Nor is it spread by insects or insect bites. And AIDS is not spread by swimming pools, public transportation, food, cups, glasses, plates, toilets, water, air, touching or hugging, coughing or sneezing.

How can sexual spread of AIDS be prevented?

Do not have sex with prostitutes (male or female) or casual acquaintances, even in countries that claim there is no AIDS problem. You cannot tell by appearances if someone is infected with the AIDS virus; he/she can look healthy.

If you are going to have sexual relations with someone who might be infected:

- * Men should always use a condom, each time, from start to finish, and women should make sure their partner uses one.
- * Remember that vaginal, anal or oral sex can spread AIDS.
- * Reducing the number of your sexual partners will lower the risk of exposure to the AIDS virus.

What about AIDS and blood transfusions?

Although AIDS can be transmitted by transfusions of infected blood, in many places blood is screened for AIDS virus contamination before being given. If you need a blood transfusion, try to ensure that screened blood is used. Since more and more countries around the world are now testing blood for the AIDS virus, blood transfusions will increasingly be protected from AIDS virus contamination.

You can reduce the risk of serious injury, leading to possible need for blood transfusions, by taking ordinary, everyday precautions. Wear a seat belt and drive carefully. Don't mix alcohol with driving, boating or other activities that could lead to injury.

What about injections?

Avoid injections unless absolutely necessary. If you must have an injection, make sure the needle and syringe come straight from a sterile package or have been sterilized properly (by steam, boiling water or chemicals). For example, a needle and syringe which have been cleaned and then boiled for 20 minutes are ready for re-use.

Unless you have a prescription or a doctor's authorization, don't take your own needles with you.

Finally, if you inject drugs - no matter what kind - never use anyone else's equipment.

What about skin-piercing instruments?

Like needles and syringes, other instruments that pierce the skin (tattoo and acupuncture needles, ear-piercing equipment and dentists' tools) must always be sterile (used only once or sterilized between each use). As with needles and syringes, proper sterilizing of these instruments eliminates risk. In general, you should avoid any procedures which pierce the skin unless absolutely necessary.

What if you are already infected with the AIDS virus?

If you are already infected with the AIDS virus, consult your personal health care provider for guidance well in advance of your proposed travel.

INTRODUCTION TO RWANDATERRAIN

Geography. Rwanda is in east-central Africa. The country slopes gradually from a mountain range in the west to a lowland plain in the east. The mountain range includes a chain of volcanoes in the northwest. West of the mountains the land falls sharply to Lac Kivu. A plateau in the centre of the country is covered in steep hills. The average elevation in Rwanda is 2000m. The mountain range in the west forms the Nile-Congo Divide. Rivers to the east flow to the Nile and those on the west feed the Niger. There are nine large lakes in Rwanda, six of which are totally within the borders. Vegetation varies from tropical forests in the west to savannah grasslands in the east. There are also considerable marshlands in the low lying areas. The soils vary also from rich volcanic soils in the west to poor, gravelly soils in the east. The climate is mild despite the latitude and high elevation of the country. The year is divided into two rainy seasons and one dry season.

Infrastructure. Rwanda has a relatively dense road network by African standards with 1200 km of paved roads. There are eight airports in the country, three of which have commercial flights. International traffic enters via Kigali, the capital. A ferry service operates on Lac Kivu on a north-south route. Electrical and communications facilities are adequate, however potable water, adequate sewage disposal, and medical facilities are scarce outside the capital.

MANDATE FEATURES

Population Centres. Although the population density of Rwanda is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (320 per km²) only 5.4% of the population live in urban centres. The few urban concentrations are grouped around the administrative centres of the ten prefectures. Only four of these centres have populations which exceed 20,000. These cities are: Kigali 232,000, Ruhengeri 30,000, Butare 29,000, and Gisenyi 22,000.

Rural Areas. The populace of this country is 94% rural. Dwellings in Rwanda are not clustered together in compact villages but instead are disposed in familial groups, for which a hill serves as the basic unit. Each place of habitation is surrounded by an enclosure formed by a hedge, or palisade. The enclosure extends rearward in circular sections. Each section shelters a family in order of importance. In the past, huts were made of an interlaced frame covered with straw. This style has been replaced by clay or brick rectangular houses with a roof of tiles or sheet iron.

TEMPERATURE

The average annual temperature for Rwanda is 19.7° C. This, however, does not reflect the variations in the different regions. The three thermatic regions are based on mean monthly temperature variations. These variations are recorded during the daylight hours only. The three thermatic regions are:

- a. Below 1500 m. This area is primarily in the east but extends up the Nyabirungu River Valley. Temperatures in this region rise over 13° C during the day. The absolute maximum is 33° C and absolute minimum is 5° C. The average annual temperature for the region is 21° C;
- b. 1600-1900 m. This zone is one of transition between the low elevations and high elevations. The daily temperature variation in this zone is between 10° C and 12° C. The mean annual temperature varies from 19° C at 1700 m to 17.5° C at 1900 m. The absolute maximum in this region is 31° C and the absolute minimum is 5° C; and
- c. Over 2000 m. The mean annual temperature in this zone is 15° C. Daily temperature variation is less than 10°C. The mean maximum temperature in this zone is 22°C with the mean low being 9°C. The

PEOPLE

Population. Population of Rwanda is 7,347,000 with a density of 279 per km².

Ethnic Division. The indigenous population consists of three ethnic groups. They are the Tutsi 9%, Hutu 90% and Twa 1%. The Tutsi are a pastoral people who raise cattle. They are of Nilotic origin and are also known as Tussi, Batusi and Watusi. The Hutu are farmers of Bantu origin. They are also known as the Bahutu and Wakhutu. The Twa are pygmies and hunters. They are thought to be the remnants of the regions earliest settlers.

Language. The official languages are French and Kinyarwanda. The Kiswahili tongue is widely used in commerce. Kinyarwanda is a complex Bantu language and is spoken in the same manner by all Rwandese. The Rwanda Patriotic Front members are generally English-speaking.

Religion. About 45% of the population follow traditional beliefs. These beliefs include a supreme being called Imana. Roman Catholics make up 45% of the population and 9% are Protestant. Less than 1% of the population are Muslim.

Education. The percentage of the total government expenditure spent on education is 25.4%. Rwanda has compulsory education beginning at seven years of age and lasting for eight years. Secondary education which is not compulsory, begins at the age of 15 and lasts for a further six years, comprising two equal cycles of three years. Enrolment in 1989 was estimated at 65% for primary school and only 7% for secondary schools. Rwanda has a University with campuses at Butare, Kigali and Ruhengeri. The average rate of adult literacy is estimated at 49.8%.

Economic Background. Agriculture accounts for 46% of Rwanda's GDP, and employs an estimated 91% of the labour force. About 95% of the total value of agricultural production is provided by subsistence crops. The two major cash crops are coffee and tea which accounted for 59% and 24.5% respectively of the total export earning in 1991. The industrial sector follows the usual pattern for the less developed African states, and food based industries predominate. There are small textile, chemical and engineering, cement and match factories. There are also other enterprises based on transistors, plastic footwear, and agricultural tools. Rwanda also has a small mining (tin, tungsten, gold), and forestry industry. Imports to Rwanda include machinery, transport equipment, fuels and lubricants, and construction materials.

HISTORICAL NOTES

Unlike most African States, Rwanda and its southern neighbour Burundi were not an artificial creation of colonial rule. When it had been absorbed by German East Africa in 1899 it had been an established Kingdom for several centuries. The Tutsi, cattle breeders from the Horn of Africa, began arriving about 500 years ago. The Tutsi gradually subjugated the Hutu inhabitants. They established a monarchy headed by a mwami (king) and a feudal caste of nobles. The Tutsi reduced the Hutus to serfdom through a contract known as abuhake whereby the Hutu farmers obligated their services to the Tutsi lords in return for cattle and the use of pastures and arable land.

In 1899, the court of the mwami submitted to a German protectorate without resistance. Belgian troops from Zaire occupied Rwanda in 1916. From 1920, Rwanda formed part of Ruanda-Urundi, administered by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate and later as a UN Trust Territory. Reforms instituted by the Belgians in the 1950s encouraged the growth of democratic political institutions. Dissension between the majority Hutu and their former overlords the Tutsi led to a rebellion in 1959, resulting in an overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy. During the 1959 revolt and its aftermath more than 160,000 Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries and an estimated 20,000 were killed. A UN-supervised referendum brought victory to the Party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) in 1961. As a result internal autonomy was granted by Belgium on January 1, 1962 and in June, Belgian Trusteeship was terminated by the UN. Rwanda became independent effective 1 July 1962.

From 1962 to 1973 the PARMEHUTU ruled with Gregoire Kayibanda as leader. As a result of inefficiency and corruption, the public became disaffected with the party. A bloodless coup was led by Gen Juvenal Habyarima, after which all political activity was abolished. A national referendum in December 1978 approved a new constitution, aimed at returning the country to normal government. In December 1983 Habyarima was elected president, and re-elected in 1988. From 1982, cross border refugee problems have affected Rwandese relations with Uganda. In early July of 1990, after sharp declines in political and economic conditions, Habyarima conceded that political reform was necessary. In September of 1990, the Commission Nationale de Synthese was established, having a mandate to make recommendations for political renewal.

On October 1, 1990, an estimated force of 10,000 guerillas representing the exiled Tutsi-dominated Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR or Inkotanyi) crossed the border from Uganda into northeastern Rwanda. Numerically, the troops were dominated by Tutsi refugees, but there were also a number of disaffected elements of the Ugandan army. Belgian and French troops were dispatched in response to a request for assistance. They did not engage in combat as the small Rwandese army, with help from Zaire, turned back the assault. The Rwandese government declared victory in November, however, the FPR now adopted guerilla tactics. Attacks occurred in border areas in the north and northwest, initiated from camps in Uganda. This raised accusations, which were denied, that Uganda was supporting the FPR. The conflict continued through 1991 and 1992 with a cease-fire reported in late March 1993. Under the truce, the rebel force gave up half the territory it controlled so that displaced civilians could go home. A 19 km wide demilitarized zone has been set up. On 4 August 1993, the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed and called for a UN led International Neutral Force to come and assist in the 22-month peace process.