

UNAMIR

CODE CABLES - OUTGOING

7-30 APR 1994

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

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UNAMIR

CRN-147

194 APR 30 06 55

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U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 30 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-864

SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF RADIO RWANDA AND RADIO MUHABURA NEWS

1. FIND ATTACHED TWO NEWS TRANSCRIPTS THAT WERE BROADCASTED ON 29 APRIL 1994.
2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR  
194 APR 30 07 04



29 April 1994, 19:00 hrs -New from Radio Rwanda

1. The Rwandese Government calls the RPF to a cease-fire but puts forward a number of conditions to be respected. In his message to the population the Prime Minister asks the RPF to turn back to its former positions before the resumption of the war. He affirms that the draft of a cease-fire agreement must say that the agreement is made between the Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front instead of saying the agreement is made between the RGF and the RPF. He also states that the Government does not hold the same view like the UNAMIR's as far as the death of the President. For the Government, the plane was shot by some unknown wrongdoers while UNAMIR states that the President died in an accident of unclear circumstances. The Rwandese Government still accepts negotiations, has gone on the Prime Minister, but the RPF must respect the following conditions:
  - a. The RPF must turn back to the positions its held formerly.
  - b. The RPF must stop massacres of innocent civilians in the zone it controls.
  - c. The RPF Battalion in Kigali must go back to Mulindi since the VIPs it came to protect are no longer in Kigali.
  - d. The RPF must allow the displaced to go back in their properties.
  - e. The next cease-fire agreement must literally stipulate that UNAMIR will be increased, for the number today is so reduced that they cannot monitor a cease-fire.
  - f. The Government is not against the creation of a Board of Inquiry to investigate on the massacres but it asks that the Human Right Organization which have already shown their positions do not have a role in this inquiry.
2. The Rwandese conflict has become an inter-country one. The RGF Staff declares that Uganda is overtly involved in war. The information goes on explaining that Ugandan helicopters and hercules are supplying the RPF with ammunition and food and that it has mobilized its soldiers to help the RPF which is an army of avant garde.
3. The Tanzanian President wants to try again to invite the fighters to a table of negotiation. The spokesman of the Presidency informed today that Minister NTAGERURA who is in Tanzania asked the President of Tanzania to call again both parties to meet and discuss about a cease-fire. The same spokesman adds that a date is not yet set for the meeting.



29 April 1994 19:hrs local time -News from Radio  
 Muhabura: The Voice of RPF.

1. Massacres in Kibungo. No words can say the ignominies and atrocities committed on the civilians in Kibungo, affirms a catholic priest who witnessed the death of his colleague in Kibungo. For the priest, it was awfully unhuman to see how those killers asked us to pray for them so that they kill in a better way. He adds that they have killed a lot of religious and that even one of the priests was killed in their bishop's hand. Priest NKURUNZIZA J. Léonard affirms that around 80 thousands people have savagely massacred by the militia helped by the Gendarms and the bourgmasters of Birenga, Mugesera and Rusumo. He testifies that a VIP he does not want to say the name came and enhanced the militia to go on killing by saying: "Courage, power!"  
 A second witness is a 12 year-old girl who sustains that the INTERAHAMWE came and forced the door of the church in which they have taken refuge with her family and many other from her area. As the doors did not open they went up the roof and tore out the iron and threw grenades and stones inside. She only escaped because she hid herself between dead bodies. As for her little sister with whom she is, they let her saying she is going to starve.
2. The International Community continues to accuse the Government of having a part in the massacres of the civilians. The US Foreign Affairs Department asks the RGF to stop the killings of the civilians.
3. The Humanitarian Organization, Médecins Sans Frontières accuses France of helping a bloody regime of Kigali. Many other Human rights Organizations like the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also accuse France, Egypt and the RSA of having provided weapons that the Habyarimana regime distributed its militia. France refutes these allegations saying that it has not received a bloody Government but representatives of the country.
4. International Organizations state that around 200,000 people have lost their lives in this genocide. For OXFAM, the number may be even bigger.
5. The former Minister of Finances, Mr RUGENERA Marc explains that the genocide in this country has a regional background. For him, It is not only led against tutsi, for 60% or 70% of the dead VIPs are hutu and come from the south. He urges the population to stand up and fight against "AKAZU" (a band of people of a same family). He warns people like KARAMIRA and MUGENZI that the time they will finish tutsi and opponents hutu their turn will come. He shows that speeches to suppress tutsi are nazis and that the people who are delivering them must be brought before international courts.



6. The RPF denies the allegations put forward by the RGF staff that Uganda is helping it in the fight. It asks the RGF to shoot those planes or to show to the International Community a dead body of a white mercenary, for it is the only way to give proof to everyone. It presupposes that the RGF wants to internationalize the conflict perhaps to explain some eventual help from some countries.



CRN-148

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UNAMIR

194 APR 30 11 03

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BANIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 30 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-865  
SUBJECT: RESCUE MISSIONS  
REFERENCE:

194 APR 30 11 22

UNAMIR

GENERAL SITUATION:

1. THE RISK CONNECTED WITH THE EVACUATION OF RWANDESE PEOPLE FROM THE RGF ZONE REMAINS SIGNIFICANT. UNAMIR HAS LIMITED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. UN MOVEMENT PERMITTED IS BASED ON AGREEMENT THAT UN VEHICLES WILL NOT SMUGGLE RWANDESE REFUGEES. ON RGF/MILITIA ROAD BLOCKS UN VEHICLES ARE CHECKED THOROUGHLY. RWANDESE PEOPLE, IF FOUND, MAY BE SHOT ON THE SPOT AND UN PERSONNEL MAY BE ATTACKED. SUCH AN INCIDENT COULD JEOPARDIZE OTHER RESCUE ACTIVITIES.
2. UNAMIR IS MAINTAINING A DATABASE OF RWANDESE PEOPLE WITH VISAS AND THEY WILL BE EVACUATED AS SOON AS SITUATION ALLOWS. SIMILAR PROBLEMS CONCERN EVACUATION OF BELGIAN CITIZENS. REQUESTS TO CHECK ON RWANDESE NATIONALS IN THEIR HIDING PLACES CANNOT BE ALL FULFILLED AT THIS TIME AS THIS MAY ATTRACT ATTENTION OF MILITIA OR BANDITS AND EXPOSE PEOPLE IN HIDING TO DANGER.
3. TO AVOID UNNECESSARY FAX EXCHANGE AMONG UNAMIR, UNNY AND DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE SECTOR, UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL PROPOSES THAT UNNY WILL:
  - A. COLLECT REQUESTS FOR EVACUATION/INFORMATION FROM ALL SECTORS (DIRECT REQUESTS TO UNAMIR WILL BE REGISTERED AND PASSED TO UNNY);
  - B. MAKE SURE THAT A REQUEST CONTAINS MAXIMUM AVAILABLE DATA ABOUT PARTICULARS AND LOCATION OF MISSING PERSONS AND HAS NOT BEEN SENT PREVIOUSLY;
  - C. INFORM AGENCIES SEEKING UNAMIR ASSISTANCE ABOUT THE GENERAL SITUATION IN RWANDA WITH REGARDS TO EVACUATION. ADVISE THEM TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TRANSIT PAPERS (A VISA CONFIRMED BY ANY GOVERNMENT) WITHOUT WAITING FOR AN UNAMIR REQUEST;
  - D. APPLY TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES FOR VISAS ACCORDING TO LISTS SENT BY UNAMIR;
  - E. KEEP RECORDS OF CASES AND UPDATE UNAMIR DATABASE ONLY WITH INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT SENT PREVIOUSLY. CURRENTLY UNAMIR GETS THE SAME REQUEST TWO OR THREE TIMES WITH DIFFERENT COVERING LETTERS.
4. ATTACHED IS AN UPDATE OF ACTIVITIES. YOUR SUPPORT IS MOST APPRECIATED.
5. REGARDS.



CONDUCTED RESCUE OPERATIONS

21 APRIL 1994

1. LISTS OF REFUGEES IN HOTEL MERIDIEN AND MILLES COLLINES WERE MADE BY UNMOS. MR CANESUS KAMALI AND 3 CHILDREN WERE LOCATED IN MILLES COLLINES.

22 APRIL 1994

1. MS UMWALI AGNES WHO SUFFERED A KNIFE INJURY WAS EVACUATED FROM THE CND COMPLEX BY AN UNAMIR AMBULANCE. SHE HAD ALL NECESSARY PAPERS AND WAS TAKEN TO NAIROBI.
2. A WOMAN NAMED CECILLE MUKARUBUGA AND 3 KIDS WERE BROUGHT FROM HOTEL MILLES COLLINES TO FC HQ. ALL OF THEM HAD BELGIAN VISAS BUT MS MUKARUBUGA DECIDED THAT SHE WOULD GO WITH RPF SOLDIERS WHO WERE TO TAKE HER IN A CONVOY TO THE NORTH.

23 APRIL 1994

1. TWO TANZANIANS MR HAMZA ZARI RAMADHAN (PASS. A0041871) AND MR ABDALLAH MOHAMEDIMATTARY (PASS. A0042587) WERE BROUGHT TO FC HQ FOR INTERVIEW. THERE ARE 420 REFUGEES IN THE TANZANIAN EMBASSY COMPOUND (TANZANIA, SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, GUINEE, PAKISTAN, BURUNDI, ZAIRE, RWANDA). NEXT DAY UNMOS DELIVERED THE LIST OF REFUGEES. THEY WANT TO GO TO TANZANIA BY A ROAD CONVOY. MASS EVAC TO BE CONDUCTED.

25 APRIL 1994

1. MS ROSA AIDA YOLANDA MANNA, POPULARLY CALLED SISTER BEATRICE, FROM NYINAWIMANA IN BYUMBA PREFECTURE TOGETHER WITH BROTHER QUOIDBACK AND FATHER QEERAERTS REACHED KABALE ON 25 APR AT 1415 HRS. SISTER FABIEN TREMBLAY REFUSED TO LEAVE RWANDA.
2. 3 CHINESE EXPATRIATES WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE KIGALI APT.

26 APRIL 1994

1. 3 CHINESE EXPATRIATES DEPARTED TO NAIROBI.
2. 3 RWANDESE NUNS (GASIBIREGE ANTOINETTE, LUKAMALA GORETTI, NIYONAMBAZA LAILILDE - "LES SOEURS AUXILIATRICES DU PURGATOIRE") GOT THE AUTHORIZATION FOR EVACUATION FROM THE CANADIAN CONSULAR AFFAIRS BUREAU. THEY WERE TAKEN TO THE KIGALI AIRPORT BUT THE FLIGHT WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE OF MORTAR SHELLING AT THE RUNWAY. THEY SPENT THE NIGHT IN UNAMIR FORCE HQ.

27 APRIL 1994

1. MS AMELIA BARBERI, DIRECTOR OF THE MUHURA ORPHANAGE WAS TAKEN TO MULINDI TOGETHER WITH 42 ORPHANS IN COOPERATION WITH WFP. THE NEXT DAY THEY SHOULD BE IN UGANDA.
2. 3 RWANDESE NUNS DEPARTED FOR NAIROBI ON UN FLIGHT.



28 APRIL 1994

1. MEMBERS OF THE GASANA FAMILY (RWANDESE - FORMER MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS). FOUR OF THEM WERE FOUND IN KING FAYCAL ON 23 APR. NAMES: GAKWANDI CALLIXTE, GASASINA TELESPHORE, UWIZEYE DAMACENE, NKUNDABAGENZI CAMILLE. THEY LEFT KING FAYCAL WITH OTHER REFUGEES TO THE NORTH. NO INFO WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE REST OF THAT FAMILY (GASANA MUKARUTABANA, MUKAGASANA MICHELLE, UWAMAHORO MARIE-JOSÉE, GASANA SERGE, UWIMANA MARIE-CHRISTELE AND GASANA JEAN-CHRISTOPHE).
2. 4 TANZANIAN CITIZENS WERE PICKED UP FROM A WFP WAREHOUSE ON AVENUE DE L'INDUSTRIE IN KIGALI, GIVEN FOOD AND WATER IN FC HQ AND TRANSFERRED TO THE AIRPORT. NAMES:
  - A. REBMAN MARKO KIMARO - PASSPORT NO. A005317;
  - B. FABIAN GADIE EMERGENCY TRAVEL DOCUMENT NO. 00449549;
  - C. SALIM IL SAID EMERGENCY TRAVEL DOCUMENT NO. 00419639;
  - D. NKIRWA NKO EMERGENCY TRAVEL DOCUMENT NO. 00419638.A FAX WAS SENT TO TANZANIAN EMBASSY IN NAIROBI TO ARRANGE RECEPTION. THEY DEPARTED ON UN FLIGHT AT ABOUT 1530 HRS.

29 APRIL 1994

1. SIX INDIAN NUNS FROM THE SISTERS OF CHARITY CONVENT NEAR MILLES COLLINES WERE EVACUATED. THEY HAVE AN ORDER FROM THEIR MOTHER SUPERIOR TO LEAVE RWANDA.

OUTSTANDING RESCUE MISSIONS

1. IMMACULEE KWIGIRA AT NYAMIRAMBO AND SOLINE DUSABEMARIYA NEED TO BE EVACUATED TO A UN REFUGEE CAMP ONCE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED IN THIS AREA. PRESENTLY IT IS STILL TOO DANGEROUS TO ATTEMPT EVACUATION.
2. A SPANISH FATHER VELMAGO, SISTER FABIENNE TREMBLAY (SHE REFUSES TO GO) AND UGANDAN SISTER CECILIA GASIGWA +10 YOUNG SISTERS ARE IN KAGEYO 4KM NORTH OF BYUMBA. PRESENTLY IT IS TOO DANGEROUS TO EVACUATE OR VISIT THEM.
3. BELGIAN CITIZENS TO BE EVACUATED FROM RWANDA:
  - A. PRIESTS FROM RULINDO 60 KM FROM KIGALI IN THE RUHENGERI DIRECTION. NAMES: COLIN ALBERT, DEPIENNE ROGER, GEERAERTS FRANZ; IMPOSSIBLE TO PASS FIGHTING ON ROUTE.
  - B. A PRIEST DONNET MICHEL FROM SAINT PAUL PARISH IN GISHAKA NEAR KIGALI;
  - C. BADOUX CLAIRE, A WIFE OF KARUMUHINZI + 6 CHILDREN LIVING IN NYAMIRAMBO (A YELLOW HOUSE OF ELECTROGAZ NEAR THE REGIONAL STADIUM TEL. 73663);
  - D. BEHIN THERESE, CREVECOEUR JEANINE - SISTERS FROM BYUMBA;
  - E. BRASSEUR JEAN LIVING WITH GATAMBAYIRE (TUTSI) AND A DAUGHTER SANDRINE IN KIMIHURURA (300 METERS DOWN THE ROAD OF PECHE MIGNON RESTAURANT, A GATE ON THE LEFT);
  - F. DEJEMEPPE ARTHUR A FATHER FROM PARISH RWAZA NEAR RUHENGERI;



G. TEACHERS FROM A SCHOOL IN ZAZA (20 KM FROM KIBUNGO):

- VANDEBENNE GUILLAUME;
- VANDIKKELEN ALBERT;
- JEURISSEN GASTON;
- BAES LUCAS;
- KLEREN ALFONS;

H. KESENNE PAUL - A FATHER FROM PARISH DE SANTIZY IN GISENYI;

I. LEVEQUE HELENE + 2 SONS RICHARD AND ALAIN MATON LIVING IN KICUKIRO, KIGALI.

4. SISTER FAUSTINA (LYDIA) ESTARIS, A PHILIPINO NURSE, ADDRESS CYEZA, GITARAMA B.P. 66. UNMOS COULD NOT FIND HER - POPULATION UNCOOPERATIVE, MORE DETAILED LOCATION NECESSARY.
5. TWO DUTCH CITIZENS. NAMES AND LOCATIONS:
  - A. SISTER JOHANNA C. DEKKERS - BUTARE/GISAGARA, TEL. 30238;
  - B. MS ANK SLAGMOLEN - RUBENGARA, TEL. 68415;
6. THE FOLLOWING RWANDESE CITIZENS WERE GRANTED BELGIAN VISAS:
  - A. NSANZUWERE FRANCOIS;
  - B. MR RUSESABAGINA + FAMILY:
    - MURKANGAJE TATIANA;
    - LYS ROGER;
    - LYS DIANE;
    - LYS TRESOR
  - C. MR UWIMANA + FAMILY:
    - MUKARUGWIZA IMMACULE;
    - SOLANGE (DAUGHTER).
  - D. + MS LYDIA ITELERA WAS GRANTED AN IRISH VISA.

THOSE TEN PERSONS SHALL BE EVACUATED FROM HOTEL MILLES COLLINES AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO KIGALI AIRPORT. TWO ATTEMPTS TO SMUGGLE THEM IN UN APCs FAILED BECAUSE RGF ROAD BLOCK COMMANDER INFORMED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO CHECK EVERY APC LEAVING MILLES COLLINES.

7. ONE RUSSIAN WOMAN WITH HER THREE KIDS STAYED IN THE PREMISES OF THE EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND IN KIGALI. SHE DOES NOT WANT TO LEAVE WITHOUT HER HUSBAND - HIS PRESENT LOCATION IS UNKNOWN.
8. MRS PRUDENTIENNE NAMBAJIMANA-SEWARD A RWANDESE WHO IS MARRIED TO A BRITISH CITIZEN MR CHRISTOPHER JOHN SEWARD. AN UNMO PATROL ATTEMPTED TO VISIT THE HOUSE BUT COULD NOT EVADE MILITIA AND WERE ESCORTED OUT OF AREA. FURTHER ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE WHEN SECURITY PERMITS.



CRN-146 P1/2

UNAMIR

OUT/GOING CABLE

CODE

194 APR 30

UNAMIR

05 03

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 29 APRIL 1994

MIR-863

SUBJECT: UNOMUR MANDATE/KABALE HUMANITARIAN CELL

1. REFERENCE YOUR CODE CABLE NO 1322 DATED 27 APR 94 ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT, I WISH TO AFFIRM THE ACTION OF UNAMIR TO ESTABLISH A HUMANITARIAN CELL AT KABALE TO FACILITATE THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE NORTHERN PART OF RWANDA.

2. IN THIS REGARD A NUCLEUS OF THE CELL HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH TWO MILITARY OFFICERS FROM UNOMUR. THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT IS ALSO EXPECTED TO BE POSTED FROM KIGALI TO KABALE SOONEST.

3. AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES HAS BEEN MADE AND IS DULY ATTACHED. IT IS INTIMATED THAT THESE ARE ONLY THE INITIAL NEEDS AS IDENTIFIED. ANY OTHERS THAT MAY BE IDENTIFIED IN FUTURE WILL BE ADVISED LATER.

REGARDS.

UNAMIR  
194 APR 30  
05 12



DETAILS OF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED  
FROM UGANDAN AUTHORITIES

1. Standing Security clearance for UN Humanitarian Agencies staff and vehicles to enter Rwanda through Uganda.
2. Authorisation for the installation and use of:
  - a. Satellite telephone.
  - b. HF radios.
  - c. Short Waves radios.
3. Access to international telephone line.
4. Multiple entry and exit visas for relevant UN staff.
5. Customs facilitation for import of office materials for Kabale and for export to Rwanda of materials and supplies for relief operations.
6. Access to office accommodation/space.
7. Ugandan Liaison Officer with knowledge and authority regarding customs and border procedures.



UNAMIR

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U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN145

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 28 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR 853

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL

1. ATTACHED TO THIS CODE CABLE IS OPERATION ORDER NO 9 WHICH IS THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL PLAN OF UNAMIR FROM RWANDA ON ORDER. IT IS SENT FOR YOUR REVIEW AND COMMENT.

2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR  
184 APR 28 01 04

FC E/DIR SRSG



U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 28 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_  
SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL

1. ATTACHED TO THIS CODE CABLE IS OPERATION ORDER NO 9 ~~REPEATING~~ *which*  
WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR FROM RWANDA *see order. It is sent*  
2. *with proposed plan for your review and*  
REGARDS *Comment*



UN SECRET

Copy No. 1 of 15

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ

27 Apr 94

3000.15 (Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO. 91. SITUATIONa. RPF/RGF/MILITIA

(1) Fighting has been going on in the country (Rwanda) for the past three weeks between the RGF and Presidential Guards on one side and the RPF on the other hand. In Kigali in particular, armed Militias have also become a force to contend with over the past three weeks. They are uncontrollable and are usually doped and drugged most of the time.

(2) The situation in Kigali keeps deteriorating day in and day out with the RPF infiltrating into the city and consolidating positions they are already holding. The RGF and the Presidential Guards are also putting up stiff resistance in the areas under their control.

(3) Attempts to broker a cease fire by UNAMIR and the facilitator of the peace Process (The President of Tanzania) have so far yielded no results. From all indications both sides are determined to carry on the fight for sometime to come.

b. UNAMIR FORCES

(1) After the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops/MILOBs from the DMZ to Kigali and further scaling down of the force to 459, all troops are presently concentrated in Kigali. Present disposition is as follows:

- (a) Byubat Coy and Bn HQ - KIA
- (b) Byubat Coy (+) - Anahoro Stadium.
- (c) Force HQ - Anahoro Hotel
- (d) Tunisian Pl (+) - Anahoro Hotel.
- (e) MILOB GP HQ - Anahoro Hotel.
- (f) Force Sp Gp - KIA.



## UN SECRET

(2) Should this situation deteriorate further, it will be necessary to pull out all UNAMIR troops out of RWANDA.

2. MISSION. To withdraw all UNAMIR troops and some essential equipment from RWANDA.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. The withdrawal will be conducted in Two Phases:

(1) Phase I. Concentration of all UNAMIR troops at KIA with some essentials for withdrawal.

(2) Phase 2. Evacuation by air or by road as soon as possible.

b. Byubat

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks

(a) Phase 1

i. Ensure security of KIA as first priority on receipt of Codeword BULL DOG.

ii. Provide security at KIA for Force HQ and all personnel/aircraft.

iii. Assemble all personnel, essential equipment and vehicles at present locations.

iv. Move personnel, equipment and vehicles to KIA.

v. Secure route from Amahoro to KIA with armed escorts.

vi. Prepare own transport with drivers for possible road evacuation.

vii. Ensure all important document, stores and equipment not being evacuated are destroyed before abandoning present locations. Only very essential materials to be taken.



## UN SECRET

viii. Prepare load table and forward it to C Log O for approval. with 48 hrs (from issue of this order).

(b) Phase II

i. Ensure security at KIA during air evacuation.

ii. Withdraw from KIA by air.

iii. Line up for road move (if situation demands) under direction from Force HQ G-3. Format of road move at Annex A.

b. Tun Platoon (+)(1) Grouping. Integral.(2) Tasks(a) Phase I

i. Provide armed escorts for Force HQ move to KIA.

ii. Concentrate all your personnel and stores at KIA.

iii. Assist Force HQ to evacuate all essential stores to KIA.

iv. Prepare vehicles and drivers for possible road move.

v. Ensure that all important documents stores and equipment not being evacuated are destroyed. Only very essential material is to be taken.

vi. Prepare load table and forward it to C Log O for approval within 48 hrs (from issue of this order).

(b) Phase II

i. Provide local protection to Force HQ at KIA.

ii. Withdraw from KIA by air.

iii. Be part of UNAMIR road convoy if evacuation is not possible by air.



UN SECRET

c. MILOB GP(1) Grouping. Integral.(a) Phase I

i. Concentrate all personnel and stores and move by road to KIA.

ii. Earmark vehicles and drivers for possible road move.

iii. Ensure that all important documents and stores not being evacuated are destroyed.

(b) Phase II.

i. Provide UNMO Team to act as Mov Con.

ii. Withdraw from KIA by air as per plan.

d. Force HQ(1) Tasks

(a) Phase I. All branch heads to ensure the following:

i. Destroy all stores, and equipment not being evacuated. Only very essential materials to be taken.

ii. Concentrate all personnel and move to KIA by road.

iii. COO to establish Step Up HQ at KIA.

iv. Form part of UNAMIR road convoy if road move is under taken. Provide LOs for road convoy.

v. All branches prepare their load table and forward it to C Log O witing 48 hrs (from issue of this order).

(b) Phase II.

i. All branches to set up their offices in tower building at KIA and be operational quickly.

ii. CMPO evacuation plan is attached as Annex B.



## UN SECRET

iii. Ops branch to establish Step Up HQ at Nairobi if required.

iv. Withdraw from KIA as per plan.

v. Form part of UNAMIR road convoy if required. Ops branch will be functional from command vehicle.

vi. C Log O to scrutinize load tables received from branches/units and allot vehicles.

(c) C Comm Offr to ensure comm to outside world during all phases.

e. Force Support Gp

(1) Tasks

(a) Phase 1.

i. Prepare vehicles and drivers for possible road move. Coord with C Log O for details.

ii. Assist Force HQ in loading personnel and equipment onto aircraft.

iii. Assist Mov Con (MILOB Team) in smooth loading of all personnel and equipment.

iv. Ensure all important documents and equipment not being evacuated are destroyed.

(b) Phase II

i. Withdraw by air from KIA as per plan.

ii. Be part of UNAMIR road convoy if evacuation by air is not possible.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timing

(a) Emergency. All to be at one hr NTM.

(b) Normal. All to be at four hrs NTM.

(2) Liaison. COO and CMO to liaise with warring factions for safe passage of UNAMIR troops/convoys.



## UN SECRET

(3) All to earmark vehicles, essential stores equipment and drivers for possible withdrawal with immediate effect.

(4) Rules of Engagement. Annex C.

(5) Route for Road Withdrawal. (If undertaken)  
KIGALI - RUKOMO - NGONOORE - GATUNA - KABALE -  
KAMPALA. Sketch of route to be used out of Kigali  
attached as Annex D.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

- a. Feeding. All to carry three days C - ration.
- b. Water. Enough water to be carried centrally by all groups.
- c. Dress. As per UNAMIR instructions. Flak jackets and steel helmets to be worn.
- d. Weapons. All to carry personal weapons.
- e. Ammo. First line ammo will be carried with hand grenades by all. Convoy protection escorts to carry LAWS.
- f. Medical. Force Sp Platoon medical elements to provide medical support in both phases.
- g. Tpt. C Log O to work out detailed requirement of tpt with immediate effect.
- h. Fuel. C Log O to work out requirements for a possible road move.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALa. Locations

(1) Force HQ remains at present location until withdrawal commences. Step Up HQ will be established at KIA before Force HQ withdraws.

b. Radio Net

- (1) All low priority radio assets will be closed.
- (2) Withdraw all radio sets from all, other than key appointment holders who require it.
- (3) Detailed signal instructions at Annex E.



c. Codewords and Nicknames


(1) Codewords

Srl	Codeword	Meaning	Issued By
1	BULLDOG	Evacuation Starts	Force HQ
2	EAGLE	Evacuation by air	Force HQ
3	GORILLA	Evacuation by road	Force HQ

(2) Nicknames

Srl	Nickname	Meaning
1	HURRY UP	KIA
2	RED ANT	FORCE HQ
3	COW BOY	RUKOMO
4	DIRTY HEROES	NGONDORE
5	GOOD BOY	GATUNA
6	SLEEPY BABY	KABALE

6. Ack Instructions: All ack.

  
R.A. DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Authentication

MOEEN UDDIN AHMED  
Colonel  
Chief Operation Officer



UN SECRET

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Copy No

MILOB GP HQ  
BYUBAT  
Tun Pl (+)  
Force Support Gp

Internal:

DFC  
CAO  
HAC  
COO  
CMPO  
C Log O  
C Plans  
FSO  
Camp Comdt  
File  
Spare



10/18

ANNEX A TO  
OPO-9

FORMAT OF ROAD MOVE

<input type="text"/>	ARMED ESCORT
<input type="text"/>	UNMOS ESCORT
<input type="text"/>	* TCV (No of TCV will depend upon availability of trucks)
<input type="text"/>	TCV
<input type="text"/>	TCV
<input type="text"/>	LUGGAGE TRUCKS (No of luggage trucks will depend upon availability of vehs)
<input type="text"/>	"
<input type="text"/>	"
<input type="text"/>	ARMED ESCORT

\*TCV : Troop Carrying Vehicle.



4/18

UN SECRET

ANNEX B  
TO OP ORDER NO 9

UNAMIR EVACUATION PLAN

1. As part of its emergency evacuation plan, UNAMIR must be ready to evacuate, either by air or by road, its 459 military personnel as well as its 20 civilian personnel. The following paragraphs will indicate the priorities to be respected.

ROAD EVACUATION

2. This move will be coordinated by the COO using the plan drawn by the C Log O. Personnel will be travelling in vehicles as assigned by the COO.

AIR EVACUATION

3. Evacuation will be from Kigali International Airport, likely using C130 HERCULES aircraft. The authorized load for each aircraft is 70 personnel. It is expected that a minimum of nine (9) lifts will be required: seven (7) for personnel and two (2) for essential equipment and stores to be withdrawn. In case of emergency evacuation, all personnel will travel with minimum personal equipment and clothing.

EVACUATION PRIORITIES

4. The priority for evacuation will be as follows, keeping in mind that some UNMOs will be required to stay behind to carry on negotiations:

- a. injured and non-essential/combattant personnel;
- b. BUYBAT Coy at Amahoro stadium;
- c. FHQ and Tunisian Coy; and
- d. BUYBAT Coy at Airport.

5. Non-essential/combattant personnel.

- a. Flight 1. All civilians and those military personnel that are unarmed (UNMOs) will depart on the first available aircraft. There are 20 civilians. The CMO will determine who the first 50 UNMOs to be evacuated will be.
- b. Flight 2. The BUYBAT support platoon, less the medical team (45 personnel), 17 personnel from FHQ and

UN SECRET

B - 1



UN SECRET

8 personnel from BUYBAT HQ will leave on flight 2. Priority has to be given to those personnel who are not armed.

- c. Flight 3. Equipment and stores, as determined by the C Log O.
- d. Flight 4, 5. CO BUYBAT to allocate 140 seats to his personnel from the Amahoro stadium on these two flights; this should include the remainder of Bn HQ, less 6 personnel.
- e. Flight 6. Equipment and stores, as determined by the C Log O.
- f. Flight 7. 55 personnel from BUYBAT Airport Coy with 6 personnel from the medical platoon;
- g. Flight 8. 22 UNMOs, 6 personnel from FHQ and 40 personnel from Tun Coy.
- f. Flight 9. 6 personnel from Bn HQ, 2 from the Med pl and the remaining 62 personnel from the Airport Coy.

6. It is hoped that sufficient aircrafts will be available to ship out essential stores early in the evacuation phase; if this is not the case, all stores and equipments will have to be destroyed at the airport.

ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES

7. Any follow-on administration procedures dealing with such things as pay and allowances, documentation, travel, etc. will be handled in Nairobi.

UN SECRET

B-2



UN SECRET

ANNEX C TO  
OPO-9SPECIFIC FOR HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION ESCORT  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TO: ALL SECTORS

RULE NO 1: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.  
STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

RULE NO 2: STATE OF WEAPONS.  
STATE B: WEAPON CARRIED WITH MAGAZINE CHARGED.

RULE NO 3: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT  
WITHOUT USE OF FIRE.

STATE D: OBSERVE AND REPORT, STAY IN PLACE, WARN  
AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND  
DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS.  
DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF FIRE IS AUTHORIZED.

RULE NO 4: DISARM PARAMILITARY.  
STATE B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED.  
USE OF MINIMUM FORCE.  
EVALUATE INTENT TO USE.


RULE NO 5: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS.  
STATE B: INTERVENTION BY FIRE FOR EFFECT AGAINST  
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND DESIGNATED TARGETS  
ONLY AFTER WARNING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AS  
PART OF THE WARNING PROCESS.


RULE NO 6: DESIGNATED AUTHORITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE  
FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED BUT WILL BE  
SPECIFIED BY:


MAN - MOVE - PREPARE - FIRE.

C-1  
UN SECRET



Main Route : 

Alternative Route: 





UN SECRET

ANNEX E TO  
OPO - 9COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS1. SITUATION

- a. Concept of Ops. Srl 3a of OPO 9 Ref above.
- b. Att and Dets. The CCO's outfit will be in direct sp.

2. MISSION

To provide comm sp for the wdr of UNAMIR.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Gen Outline. The existing VHF comm would be used.
- b. Radios
  - (1) The following nets will be estb for road convoy.
    - (b) Convoy Comd Net.
    - (b) Escort Net.
    - (c) UNMOs Net.
  - (2) The Force Comd Net would be used in case of air evac. All other nets would be closed down.
  - (3) Callsign Extracts. Appendix 1.
  - (4) Channel Allocation. Appendix 2.
- c. Line. CCO will ensure the existing line comm are maintained for long as possible.

E - 1 of 2

UN SECRET



16/18

UN SECRET

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings. Various nets to be estb on the issue of codeword BULLDOG.

(2) Radio Discipline. Use of radio comms should be kept as short as possible and used only for urgent operational matters.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. All users of motorolla handie talkies will ensure they carry along spare charged batteries.

b. The Signal Offr will carry a few spare radios for emergencies.

c. Apart from the key appointment holders that appear on the Road Convoy Command net, all walkies talkies will be wdr.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

a. Location

(1) See serial 5 para 9 of OPO 9 ref A.

b. Comms Cord.

(1) Signal offr.

E - 2

UN SECRET



UN SECRET

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX E TO  
OPC 9

CALL SIGNS EXTRACTS  
ROAD CONVOY COMD NET

SRL	CALL SIGN	APPT	
1.	F 9	FC	
2.	Z-F-9-A	ADC TO FC	
3.	F-8	DFC	
4.	Z-F-8-A	ADC TO DFC	5.
5	C-C-9	CONVOY COMD	
6.	F-3	COO	
7.	A-9	ARMED ESCORT COMD	
8.	U-9	UNMOS ESCORT COMD	
9.	C-9	CMO	
10.	F-S-8	MO	



18/18

UN SECRET

APPENDIX 1 TO  
ANNEX E TO  
OPO 9

ARMED ESCORT NET

SRL	CALLSIGN	APPT
1.	A 9	COMD
2.	A 1	Leading Veh
3.	A 2	Last Veh

UNMOS NET

SRL	CALLSIGN	APPT
1.	U 9	CMO
2.	UI	First Veh
3.	U 2	Second Veh

E1 - 2

UN SECRET



KYF 799  
MIR 950

1/3

UNAMIR  
194 MAY 12 10 58

UNAMIR  
OUTGONG CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO: UN HQ - DPKO SITUATION CENTRE

FROM: UNAMIR, KIGALI

*Handwritten signature*  
for FC

DATE: 12 MAY 94

FAX NO: (212)-963-9852 **9053**

SUBJECT: RGF/RPF CONFRONTATION LINES.

REFERENCE: FAX NO 3 DTG 111157 NYT MAY 94.

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED POSITIONS OF BOTH PARTIES AS REQUESTED  
VIDE ABOVE REFERENCE.

2. REGARDS.

*Handwritten signature*

*(FC) EDIR ops o/c*







MAP NO. 1991.1 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS  
DECEMBER 1993

\*\*\*\*\* - RPF FRONT LINES



UNAMIR

194 APR 27 14 46

PAGE 1 OF 5

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 27 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 851

SUBJECT: CONVERSION OF STAFF TO UNMO STATUS IN UNAMIR

1. UNAMIR HAS NOW THINNED DOWN TO A RESIDUAL STRENGTH OF 459 PERSONNEL. ONCE THE SIX NEW CANADIANS ARRIVE, APPROXIMATELY 10 MAY, AND TWO WHO WERE ON LOAN FROM SOMALIA LEAVE, APPROXIMATELY 13 MAY, THE UNAMIR STRENGTH WILL BE UP TO 463. IT IS EXPECTED TO STAY AT THIS LEVEL FOR THE PERIOD OF CEASE FIRE NEGOTIATIONS DUE TO THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE AIRPORT SECURITY AND DUE TO THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE REFUGEES UNDER OUR CARE.

2. FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN REORGANIZED WITH OUR BEST PERSONNEL, REGARDLESS OF STATUS, FILLING THE POSITIONS. WE ANTICIPATE RESTRUCTURING TO CONTINUE AS THE SITUATION CHANGES AND SO THE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT IS REQUIRED FROM ALL PERSONNEL AS THE MOBILITY/AVAILABILITY FACTORS FOR PERSONNEL EMPLOYMENT ARE THE DOMINANT FEATURES OF MY NEW HQ.

3. AS DISCUSSED ON 26 APR, THE PERSONNEL IDENTIFIED ON THE ATTACHED LIST (ANNEX A) ARE TO BE CONSIDERED UNMOS AS OF 23 APR 94, DATE OF TOTAL REORGANIZATION OF HQ AND PUBLICATION OF MY NEW MANDATE. THE NAMES IN BRACKETS INDICATE THE REPLACEMENT FOR TWO DEPARTING CANADIANS AS WELL AS THOSE GOING TO POSITIONS NOT YET FILLED. THE NEW CANADIANS ARE BEING POSTED IN BECAUSE OF THE ACUTE NEED FOR BILINGUAL (FRE/ENG) OFFICERS.

4. THE SIX NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHO SERVE IN HQ SHOULD BE TERMED QUOTE MONITOR UNQUOTE AS IS THE CASE FOR NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN CAMBODIA.

5. I AM ALSO ENCLOSING ORG CHARTS SHOWING CURRENT NEW FORCE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF PERSONNEL ACCORDING TO FHQ/HUMANITARIAN/MILOB STRUCTURE (ANNEXES B, C AND D).

FC

E/DIR

CRN 144

194 APR 27 16 48


UNAMIR



UNAMIR STAFF OFFICERS TO BE CONVERTED TO UNMOs

	<u>RANK INITIALS NAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>	<u>APPOINTMENT</u>
1.	BGEN HK ANYIDHO	GHA	DFC
2.	CAPT AY NSIAH	GHA	ADC TO DFC
3.	COL UA MOEEN	BAN	COO
4.	MAJ EC QUIST	GHA	DCOO
5.	MAJ H NASMUL	BAN	SDO
6.	SQN LDR AB MOTTALEB	BAN	DO
7.	CAPT BK ACHEAMPONG	GHA	DO
8.	(CAPT JR LEBLANC)	CAN	MIO (DES)
9.	(LCOL AM AUSTDAL)	CAN	C PLAN O (DES)
10.	MAJ EMO KONEY	GHA	SO PLANS
11.	(MAJ PFA DEMERS)	CAN	SO PLANS (DES)
12.	MAJ M BUSSIERE (MAJ JS MCCOMBER)	CAN CAN	CMPO CMPO (DES)
13.	MAJ PK SENCHIM	GHA	DCMPO
14.	COL DJ YAACHE	GHA	CHAO
15.	MAJ DJ MCNEIL	CAN	HAO
16.	MAJ JG PLANTE	CAN	D C LOG .O
17.	LCDR RJ READ (CAPT JF ST DENIS)	CAN CAN	SO LOG SO LOG (DES)
18.	MAJ LA RACINE	CAN	OIC LOG BASE
19.	MAJ A ANNAN	GHA	HQ COMDT





(1) TOTAL FORCE PRESENTLY - 459 ALL RANKS



1200/27 APR 94

## UNAMIR FORCE HQ

### FC OFFICE

FC - MGEN. DALLAIRE (CAN)  
MA - CMDT DIAGNE (SEN)  
A/MA - MAJ. BEARDSLEY (CAN)  
ADC - CAPT. FAYE (SEN)  
- CAPT. SECK (SEN)  
Driver - SGT ADJEI (GHA)  
Bodyguard - SGT AZINADAGA (GHA)

### DFC OFFICE

DFC/COS - BGEN. ANYIDHO (GHA)  
MA - LCDR ZOWONOO (GHA)  
ADC - CAPT. NSIAH (GHA)  
Driver - CPL NORVIHOHO (GHA)

### PERSONNEL

CMPO - MAJ. BUSSIERE (CAN)  
/ [MAJ. McCOMBER (CAN)]  
DCMPO - MAJ. SENCHÉM (GHA)  
CLK - SSGT ARHIN (GHA)

### OPERATIONS

COO - COL. MOEEN (BAN)  
DCOO - MAJ. QUIST (GHA)  
SDO - MAJ. NAZMUL (BAN)  
DO - MAJ. LAGAGWOMA (NIG)  
DO - SQNDR MOTTALÉB (BAN)  
DO - CAPT. ACHEANPONG (GHA)  
DO - CAPT. NDLOVU (ZIM)  
MIO - CAPT. DEME (SEN)  
MIO - CAPT. [LEBLANC] (CAN)  
CLK - SGT NAZIR (BAN)

### LOGISTICS

CLO - LCOL. NYAAKU (GHA)  
DCLO - MAJ. PLANTE (CAN)  
LOG BASE - LCDR READ (CAN)  
LOG BASE - MAJ. RACINE (CAN)  
/ [CAPT. ST DENIS (CAN)]  
LOG BASE - CAPT. ALHASSAN (GHA)  
CLK - SSGT DEBRAH (GHA)

### HQ COMMANDANT

HQ CMDT - MAJ ANNAN (GHA)

### PLANS

CPLANS - LCOL. [AUSTDAL] (CAN)  
SO PLANS/ENG - MAJ. MACZKA (POL)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. KONNEY (GHA)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. [DEMERS] (CAN)



UNAMIR

194 APR 27 14 46

PAGE 1 OF 5

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CRN 144

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 27 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 851

UNAMIR  
194 APR 27 16 40

SUBJECT: CONVERSION OF STAFF TO UNMO STATUS IN UNAMIR

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
FC E/DIR



UNAMIR STAFF OFFICERS TO BE CONVERTED TO UNMOs

	<u>RANK INITIALS NAME</u>	<u>NATIONALITY</u>	<u>APPOINTMENT</u>
1.	BGEN HK ANYIDHO	GHA	DFC
2.	CAPT AY NSIAH	GHA	ADC TO DFC
3.	COL UA MOEEN	BAN	COO
4.	MAJ EC QUIST	GHA	DCOO
5.	MAJ H NASMUL	BAN	SDO
6.	SQN LDR AB MOTTALB	BAN	DO
7.	CAPT BK ACHEAMPONG	GHA	DO
8.	(CAPT JR LEBLANC)	CAN	MIO (DES)
9.	(LCOL AM AUSTDAL)	CAN	C PLAN O (DES)
10.	MAJ EMO KONEY	GHA	SO PLANS
11.	(MAJ PFA DEMERS)	CAN	SO PLANS (DES)
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15.	MAJ DJ MCNEIL	CAN	HAO
16.	MAJ JG PLANTE	CAN	D C LOG O
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




(1) TOTAL FORCE PRESENTLY - 459 ALL RANKS



1200/27 APR 94





1200/27 APR 94

## UNAMIR FORCE HQ

### FC OFFICE

FC - MGEN. DALLAIRE (CAN)  
MA - CMDT DIAGNE (SEN)  
A/MA - MAJ. BEARDSLEY (CAN)  
ADC - CAPT. FAYE (SEN)  
- CAPT. SECK (SEN)  
Driver - SGT ADJEI (GHA)  
Bodyguard - SGT AZINADAGA (GHA)

### DFC OFFICE

DFC/COS - BGEN. ANYIDHOHO (GHA)  
MA - LCDR ZOWONOO (GHA)  
ADC - CAPT. NSIAH (GHA)  
Driver - CPL NORVIHOHO (GHA)

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CLK - SSGT ARHIN (GHA)

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DO - MAJ. LAGAGWOMA (NIG)  
DO - SQNDR MOTTALB (BAN)  
DO - CAPT. ACHEANPONG (GHA)  
DO - CAPT. NDLOVU (ZIM)  
MIO - CAPT. DEME (SEN)  
MIO - CAPT. [LEBLANC] (CAN)  
CLK - SGT NAZIR (BAN)

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SO PLANS - MAJ. KONNEY (GHA)  
SO PLANS - MAJ. [DEMERS] (CAN)



UNAMIR

U N A M I R

14 APR 27 07 31

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANMAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 27 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MR 848  
SUBJECT: SUPPORT OR EVACUATION RESOURCES AFTER 30 APRIL 1994

REFERENCE:

1. THE TWO CANADIAN FORCES HERCULES WHICH ARE FLYING IN SUPPORT OF UNAMIR (AND DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN AID) WILL BE REDEPLOYED TO CANADA ON 30 APRIL 1994.
2. THE UN AIRCRAFT IN NAIROBI ARE NOT AT PRESENT PERMITTED TO FLY INTO KIGALI DUE TO THE CANCELLATION OF THEIR INSURANCE POLICIES FOR RWANDA DUE TO THE WAR.
3. UNLESS REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT ARE FOUND FOR 30 APRIL 1994, UNAMIR WILL NOT BE ABLE TO BE SUPPORTED FROM ITS ONLY SUPPORT BASE; NAIROBI. IN ADDITION, HUMANITARIAN AID WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO COME INTO THE COUNTRY BY ROAD FROM THE NORTH AS OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY ARE CONSIDERED TOO DANGEROUS AT THIS TIME. FOR SAFE TRANSIT OF AID.
4. UNAMIR HAS WATER, FOOD AND FUEL STOCKS FOR APPROXIMATELY 11 DAYS (3 OF WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A ROAD EVACUATION DEPENDING ON THE ROUTE; PREFERRED OPTION REMAINS NORTH TO UGANDA).
5. REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT FOR SUSTAINING UNAMIR AND DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN AID ARE A CRITICAL PRIORITY. SHOULD THEY NOT BE AVAILABLE, A DECISION CONFIRMING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR BY ROAD MUST BE MADE BY APPROXIMATELY 7 MAY 94 FOR UNAMIR TO EXTRACT ITSELF FROM RWANDA. ATTACHED TO THIS CABLE IS THE CURRENT WITHDRAWAL PLAN SHOULD THE SITUATION SO DEMAND.
6. THE PREFERRED OPTION, AT THIS POINT IN THE MISSION, IS TO REMAIN IN RWANDA AND CONTINUE WITH OUR PEACE-BROKERING AND HUMANITARIAN MISSION. HOWEVER, REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT ARE AN ESSENTIAL PRE-CONDITION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THIS MISSION.
7. REGARDS.

FC E/DIR

UNAMIR  
14 APR 27 07 39



UNAMIR

194 APR 26 10 42

CRN 142

P 1/2

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIK, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 26 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 841  
SUBJECT: RESCUE MISSIONS  
REFERENCE:

UNAMIR  
194 APR 26 10 52

21 APRIL 1994

1. LISTS OF REFUGEES IN HOTEL MERIDIEN AND MILLES COLLINES WERE MADE BY UNMOS. MR CANESUS KAMALI AND 3 CHILDREN WERE LOCATED IN MILLES COLLINES.

22 APRIL 1994

1. UMWALI AGNES WHO SUFFERED A KNIFE INJURY WAS EVACUATED FROM THE CND COMPLEX BY AN UNAMIR AMBULANCE. SHE HAD ALL NECESSARY PAPERS AND WAS TAKEN TO NAIROBI
2. A WOMAN NAMED CECILLE MUKARUBUGA AND 3 KIDS WERE BROUGHT FROM HOTEL MILLES COLLINES TO FC HQ. ALL OF THEM HAD BELGIAN VISAS BUT MS MUKARUBUGA DECIDED THAT SHE WENT WITH RPF SOLDIERS WHO WERE TO TAKE HER WITH A CONVOY TO THE NORTH.

23 APRIL 1994

1. TWO TANZANIANS MR HAMZA ZARI RAMADHAN (PASS. A0041871) AND MR ABDALLAH MOHAMEDI MATTARY (PASS. A0042587) WERE BROUGHT TO FC HQ FOR INTERVIEW. THERE ARE 420 REFUGEES IN THE TANZANIAN EMBASSY COMPOUND (TANZANIA, SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, GUINEE, PAKISTAN, BURUNDI, ZAIRE, RWANDA). NEXT DAY UNMOS DELIVERED THE LIST OF REFUGEES. THEY WANT TO GO TO TANZANIA BY A ROAD CONVOY. MASS EVAC TO BE CONDUCTED.
2. MISSING PERSONS GASANA FAMILY (RWANDESE) - FOUR OF THEM WERE FOUND IN KING FAYCAL, NAMES: GAKWANDI CALLIXTE, GASASINA TELESOPHORE, UWIZEYE DAMACENE, NKUNDABAGENZI CAMILLE. AWAITING VISAS.

25 APRIL 1994

1. MS ROSA AIDA YOLANDA MANNA, POPULARLY CALLED SISTER

FC

4/DIR



BEATRICE, FROM NYINAWIMANA IN BYUMBA PREFECTURE TOGETHER WITH BROTHER QUOIDBACK AND FATHER QEERAERTS REACHED KABALE ON 25 APR AT 1415 HRS. SISTER FABIEN TREMBLAY REFUSED TO LEAVE RWANDA.

2. 3 CHINESE DIPLOMATS WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE KIGALI APT.

26 APRIL 1994

1. 3 NUNS AT 17 KIYOUVA AVE (RWANDESE - GASIBIREGE ANTOINETTE, LUKAMALA GORETTI, NIYONAMBAZA LAILILDE) HAS GOT THE AUTHORIZATION FOR EVACUATION FROM THE CANADIAN CONSULAR AFFAIRS BUREAU. THEY WERE TAKEN TO THE KIGALI AIRPORT AND FLOWN TO NAIROBI.



UNAMIR

184 APR 25 10 57

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 25 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: mr 836  
SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF UNMOS IN NAIROBI AND IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES  
REFERENCE: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 912 (1994) DATED 21 APRIL 1994

1. PLEASE CONFIRM THE DISPOSITION OF UNMOS FROM UNAMIR WHO HAVE BEEN EVACUATED TO NAIROBI AND OF THOSE UNMOS WHO WERE EXTRACTED TO BURUNDI, ZAIRE, UGANDA AND TANZANIA.

2. MILITARY DIVISION IS UNDER DIRECTION THAT THEY BE RETAINED IN NAIROBI PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA AND FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS.

3. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT IS UNDER DIRECTION THAT ALL UNMOS FROM UNAMIR IN NAIROBI AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES BE REPATRIATED TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES.

4. FC WISHES TO KEEP ALL BUT 21 AS THEY WILL BE REPLACED BY PERSONNEL IN STAFF POSITIONS IN KIGALI. ALL OTHERS EXCEPT 5 UNMOS WHO ARE IN NAIROBI TO KEEP OPEN A COORDINATION HQ SHOULD GO ON 10-14 DAYS CTO.

4. ONCE YOUR DECISION IS MADE PLEASE INFORM UNAMIR KIGALI, UNAMIR NAIROBI AND UNDPs IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION THIS REPATRIATION MUST BE CONTROLLED FROM NAIROBI. UNAMIR IN RWANDA IS INCAPABLE AND OVERLOADED TO HANDLE THIS TASK AT THIS TIME.

5. REGARDS.

FC

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UNAMIR

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U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 25 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 835  
SUBJECT: NEWS REPORTS FROM THE TWO PARTIES IN KINYARWANDA

## REFERENCE:

1. UNAMIR NOW HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR NEWS BROADCASTS IN KINYARWANDA. ATTACHED ARE TWO EXAMPLES, ONE FROM THE GOVERNMENT RADIO (RADIO RWANDA) AND THE OTHER FROM THE RPF RADIO.
2. THE RGF RADIO BROADCAST DEMONSTRATES DESPERATION AS IT EXHORTS THE YOUTH OF THE NATION TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AND KILL DESERTERS FROM THE ARMY. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WAS AT THAT MEETING AT THE PREFECTURE.
3. THE RPF BROADCAST DEMONSTRATES THE CONFIDENCE THE RPF HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY DISPLAYING.
4. REGARDS.

(FC) E/DIR



24 April 1994, 1900 hrs - Radio Rwanda News (Kinyarwanda)

1. The Rwandese Army keeps firm in fighting against the enemy. This was announced by the Ministry of Defence. The same ministry goes on stating that RPF soldiers kill innocent people as it was done today in a displaced camp in BICUMBI Commune, some 30 kms from Kigali going east. It affirms that RPF continue to shell into Kigali town to set fear into the civilians. For this reason, it calls on all the population to be aware and to point out any suspected RPF sympathiser or any RPF soldier to the RGF.
2. ARUSHA attempt to bring both fighters to a same table of negotiation has failed. This failure was initiated by RPF which put forward impossible conditions like a joint patrol in Kigali Town and at the aeroport, and which refused to negocaité with a government it does not recognize its raison d'être. RUDASINGWA Théogene, the RPF representative, has decided to leave Tanzania this afternoon despite the Tanzanian Foreign Minister's entreaty to avoid the deadlock.
3. The prefect of Kigali-Town held a meeting with the youth of the parties which form the present government. In this meeting, he urged the youth to take weapons and defend the sovereignty of their country. He called them to help the RGF to identify the enemy. In the same way, he asked them to stop all the stolen vehicles in order to use them on the battlefield. He proposed that everyone who wants to use his car for one's private affairs must apply for a circulation licence. He encouraged the youth to arrest all the deserting soldiers, to disarm them and kill them. With the help of the youth, a crisis committee was created whose job is to defend the integrity of the country.



24 April 1994, 19:30 hrs (local time) - News from Radio  
Muhabura: the Voice of RPF (Kinyarwanda).

1. UNAMIR is reduced from the strenght of 2,500 men down to 270 men. This decision was proposed by the UN Secretary General who has lost all hope to bring both fighters to a same round table. Nevertheless, he informed that a decision was taken to keep 1,000 soldiers who could come back to Rwanda if ever the situation came to normal.
2. Representatives of Recognized parties made a joint communiqué in which they asked their adherents to close their ears to the Rwandese Radio and find out the real motives of this war. In the same communiqué, they explained their followers that RPF did not come to fight for power but to redeem all the innocent people. They enclosed a list of VIPs killed in the massacres and proved that they were slaughtered not because they were "tutsi" but because they did not share same political beliefs with the ruling band.

Kigali Town	:	1 dead
Kigali Rural	:	9 VIPs were killed
Gitarama	:	12 killed among them many businessmen
Butare	:	9 dead including the Pimer Minister and her husband.
Gikongoro	:	9 dead including the Minister of Agriculture.
Kibuye	:	1 killed
Gisenyi	:	1 dead
Ruhengeri	:	2 dead including the chairman of the Constitutional Court.
Byumba	:	8 dead including the Minister of Information.
Kibungo	:	9 dead.

To end up the communiqué, the parties affirmed that the list was not exhaustive. They gave an example as what they detained information from credible sources that most of the officers coming from south were killed. Commenting upon these massacres, RPF compares the country to a tree whose head is cut (meaning the VIPs) and whose branch are being also taken out (meaning the innocent civilians). RPF reiterates its firm determination never to negotiate with a government which shed Rwandese Blood and is still carrying it out. It reminded that the Rwandese Government has unwillingly signed the ARUSHA Peace Agreement and that this was the reason that they were the first to break it down. It blames the international community which has passively witnessed the massacres. Contrarily to the



incapacity displayed by the International Community, RPF could not observe the slaughter of innocent people without taking any action. That is why it has stood up as one to save civilians' lives. Unfortunately, the International Community is urging RPF to a negotiated solution instead of finding a means to stop those wrongdoers and to judge them. The International Community must propose a long-lasting solution to peace instead of calling RPF to a round table, knowing that the disease must be cured in eradicating the real causes of the evil, that is in judging the bloody ruling band.



UNAMIR

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24 April 1994

CODE CABLE (1)

TO: ANNAN\GOULDING\UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI

FROM: BOOH-BOOH-UNAMIR, KIGALI

SUBJECT: ARUSHA PEACE TALKS

MIR 830

1. IN RESPONSE TO AN INVITATION FROM THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT, I TRAVELLED TO ARUSHA ON 22 APRIL TO ATTEND A MEETING BETWEEN THE RGF AND RPF CONVENED BY THE PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA, THE FACILITATOR OF THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS. I ALSO AUTHORIZED THE PROVISION OF A UN PLANE FOR THE RGF DELEGATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETING. UNFORTUNATELY, WHEN THE UN PLANE ARRIVED IN GOMA TO PICK UP THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION, NONE OF THEM WAS AT THE AIRPORT AND THE PLANE RETURNED EMPTY TO NAIROBI.

2. WHILE AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF THE RGF DELEGATION IN ARUSHA, I HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THE AMBASSADORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF OBSERVER COUNTRIES TO THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS. I ALSO MET AND EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL, THE PRIME MINISTER OF TANZANIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF TANZANIA.

3. THE RPF WAS REPRESENTED IN ARUSHA BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL WHO SAID HIS VISIT TO ARUSHA WAS NOT TO ATTEND THE PEACE TALKS BUT TO PRESENT TO THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE FACILITATOR HIS ORGANIZATION'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF A CEASE FIRE WHICH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT MONDAY 25 APRIL 1994. HOWEVER, ATTACHED TO THE CEASE FIRE DECLARATION WERE SEVERAL CONDITIONS TO BE MET OR AGREED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY.

4. INCIDENTALLY, THE DECLARATION WAS NOT PRESENTED TO UNAMIR ALTHOUGH IT COMMITS THE UN, OAU AND COUNTRIES IN THE REGION IN THE VERIFICATION AND MONITORING OF THE CEASE FIRE. IN MY VIEW, THE DECLARATION POSES A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. IT SEEMS NOT TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER WITH THE RGF WHICH HAS ALL ALONG EXPRESSED READINESS FOR A CEASE FIRE. OF COURSE IF THE RPF ACCEPTS THE CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN THE CEASE FIRE DECLARATION, THE PEACE PROCESS MAY RESUME AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY OUR MANDATED ROLE.

5. IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES SO AS TO ACHIEVE A CEASE FIRE, THE FACILITATOR, OAU AND UNAMIR PREPARED THE ATTACHED DRAFT CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT WHICH WE PLAN TO PRESENT TO THE WARRING PARTIES. WE DECIDED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE OF PUTTING THE DOCUMENT TOGETHER BECAUSE OF OUR CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PEACE PROCESS INCLUDING THE ROLE ENVISAGED FOR US DURING THE CEASE FIRE. MEANWHILE, RPF HAS CONFIRMED THAT A CEASE FIRE WILL BE SIGNED IN KIGALI.

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6. I AM NOT CERTAIN AT THIS STAGE IF RPF IS STILL WILLING TO ABIDE STRICTLY BY THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT SINCE IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT IT IS CALLING FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SAID AGREEMENT. UNAMIR SHARES THE VIEW OF THE FACILITATOR THAT THIS DOCUMENT REMAINS THE BASIC FRAME WORK FOR PEACE, NATIONAL UNITY, AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA. AMENDMENTS OF A PURELY TECHNICAL NATURE (E.G. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE DECEASED PRESIDENT) SHOULD OF COURSE BE ACCEPTABLE IF AGREED UPON BY BOTH PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT.

7. I AM HAPPY TO NOTE THAT YOU HAVE AUTHORIZED US TO HOLD APPROXIMATELY ONE THOUSAND MEN IN NAIROBI FOR TWO TO THREE DAYS AND THAT THE QUESTION OF HOLDING THEM FOR A LONGER DURATION WILL BE EXAMINED BY FOD WHICH WILL SEND US SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EFFECT. THIS DECISION WILL DEFINITELY ENHANCE OUR CAPABILITIES TO REACT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ROLE ENVISAGED FOR US DURING THE CEASE FIRE, WHICH IS MONITORING AND VERIFYING THE CEASE FIRE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH FLEXIBILITY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT THE ENVISAGED TASK WITH OUR CURRENT LIMITED MILITARY STRENGTH.

8. HAVING WAITED IN VAIN FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION AND WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE RPF DELEGATION, I PLAN TO LEAVE ARUSHA TOMORROW FOR NAIROBI. AS YOU WILL NOTE FROM THE ABOVE, THE PROPOSED MEETING DID NOT TAKE PLACE BECAUSE OF THE DECLARED UNWILINESS OF RPF TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETING AND THE NON-ARRIVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION. I HOWEVER TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE OAU SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE TANZANIAN DELEGATION TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON OUR EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEACE PROCESS AND ALSO TO PREPARE A CEASE FIRE PROPOSAL WHICH I BELIEVE COULD FORM THE BASIS OF ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES.

9. WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT SO THAT WE CAN REVERT TO ASSISTING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.

BEST REGARDS.



**CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND THOSE  
OF THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT**

The Representatives of the Rwandese Government forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Gravely concerned over the massacres and senseless violence that have been perpetrated since the death of President Juvenal HABYARIMANA in a suspicious air crash on 6th April, 1994,

Seriously concerned over the subsequent resumption of hostilities between the Rwandese Government forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Reaffirming their commitment to the Peace Agreement signed in Arusha on 4th August, 1993,

Mindful of the fact that an immediate ceasefire will facilitate:

- (a) an end to the massacres, and
- (b) discussion of the immediate implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

HAVE TODAY .....APRIL, 1994 AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING:

1. The Representatives of the Rwandese Government Forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front are committed to an immediate ceasefire;
2. There shall be an immediate ceasefire which shall take effect from ..... 1994;
3. The ceasefire shall be preceded by a truce, i.e. the cessation of hostilities, which shall enter into force at midnight on ..... 1994;



2

4. The practical modalities of the ceasefire shall be worked out by the
4. The practical modalities of the ceasefire shall be worked out by the Joint Military Commission comprising the Commanders of the Rwandese Government forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front under the auspices of the UNAMIR.
5. Upon entry into force of the ceasefire, it shall be supervised and verified by UNAMIR.
6. Upon entry into force of the ceasefire, both sides shall undertake to halt, within 96 hours, the violence and continue to control the violence in their respective areas of control.
7. Both sides reaffirm their commitment to the Arusha Peace Process and have agreed to move to immediate discussion of the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement within one week.
8. The two parties have agreed to the establishment of an 'Interim' Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the killings and massacres before and after the late President HABYARIMANA's death and also the circumstances of his death.



~~Mayor Bensky~~  
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Rwandan rebels declare unilateral ceasefire

By Aidan Hartley

ARUSHA, Tanzania, April 23 (Reuter) - Rwandan rebels, under intense international pressure, declared on Saturday a unilateral ceasefire hours before peace talks were due to start with their government enemies.

"The international community sees this as a way of stopping the massacres, so we have obliged," guerrilla Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) Secretary-General Theogene Rudasingwa told Reuters.

But the chief rebel delegate to internationally-brokered talks in the northern Tanzanian town Arusha said the RPF doubted the government side, which independent observers blame for most of the massacres, was capable of fulfilling its ceasefire conditions.

Human rights workers estimate that 100,000 people have been killed and two million people displaced since violence erupted after president Juvenal Habyarimana was killed in a rocket attack on his plane on April 6.

The RPF says it is in a position of military strength following the capture of a swathe of Rwanda's north and a substantial portion of the capital.

Aid workers say the killings were still going on in southern Rwandan towns and it appears most of the victims are from the Tutsi clan, associated with the RPF, or are supporters of opposition parties.

The ceasefire declaration, signed by RPF Chairman Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe from the rebel headquarters in northern Rwanda, comes into effect at midnight (2100 gmt) on Monday.

Government comment was not yet available and United Nations officials attending the talks had not even heard of the RPF move.

Terms to the ceasefire included:

- control of killings by government forces in their areas of control within 96 hours of the ceasefire deadline
- monitoring of the ceasefire by 270 U.N. observers still in Rwanda following the drawdown of peacekeeping forces by the Security Council
- negotiations on implementation of the nine-month-old peace accord which was supposed to end the civil war and establish an all-party transitional government
- exclusion of those connected with the killings from peace talks

11



11 talks

-- an international tribunal to investigate and punish those responsible for the killing of president Juvenal Habyarimana in a plane crash on April 6 and for the massacres since then

-- joint control of Kigali airport by the rebels and government forces and the creation of safe corridors supervised by international observers for the delivery of aid and safe passage of civilians.

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim welcomed the news of the RPF ceasefire declaration and said the talks should now aim to consolidate the move.

"Much will depend on what happens on the ground but a ceasefire would be an important step towards ending the carnage and mayhem," he told Reuters on arrival in Arusha.

On Friday Salim blasted the U.N.'s announcement that it was evacuating most of its 2,500 observers and troops from the Rwandan capital Kigali due to the resumption of fighting.

"When things get worse, when things become more miserable, it is incomprehensible to us that the U.N. presence should be reduced," Salim told Reuters.

But U.N. special envoy Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh told Reuters on Saturday he had been given authority to hold back 1,000 mainly Ghanaian troops who had been evacuated to Nairobi to send back to Kigali if a ceasefire was reached.

"This is the last chance for the Rwandan people," Booh-Booh, of Cameroon told Reuters.

U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) spokesman Moutar Gueye told reporters the U.N. was deeply concerned about the safety of 12,000 Rwandan civilians under its protection who would be defenceless if they left.

He said the U.N. wanted agreement from the warring parties on the handover of Kigali airport to the U.N., the burial of corpses left in the open -- which the U.N. numbers at 20,000 in Kigali alone -- joint RPF-government security patrols to restore order, and guarantees for food distribution to the needy.

Also attending the talks called by Tanzania in Arusha are Western diplomats and officials from regional African nations.

REUTER AHH



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1994 APR 21 06 23

CRN 134

PAGE 1 OF 1

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

RIVERO

TO: ~~SEVAN~~ UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 21 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-804

SUBJECT: UN EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TEAM FOR RWANDA - SECURITY SITUATION

REFERENCE: 1170 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND FORWARD THE FOLLOWING INFO FOR YOUR ACTION:

- A. UNAMIR IS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE MISSION AT THIS TIME AS WELL AS THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION. HUMANITARIAN SECTION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH OFFICE, EDP, VEHICLES ETC TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION.
- B. UNAMIR WILL PROVIDE ALL SECURITY TO THE MISSION TO THE BEST OF ITS ABILITY AND ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR SAFETY AND SECURITY IN KIGALI.
- C. UNAMIR HAS ASSISTED ICRC IN CONDUCTING ONE HUMANITARIAN CONVOY WITH NO PROBLEMS. UNAMIR WILL PROVIDE SECURITY TO THE BEST OF ITS ABILITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY DELIVERY OF RELIEF SUPPLIES.

2. PLEASE EXPEDITE MISSIONS RELEASE FROM NAIROBI TO TRAVEL TO KIGALI. THEIR ASSISTANCE IS URGENTLY REQUIRED.

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1994 APR 21 06 30



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PAGE 1 OF 3

U N UNAMIR  
OUTGOING CABLE 159

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: VISSERS, UNRP, DAR-ES-SALEM  
FROM: DALDAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 20 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MISC-345  
SUBJECT: SITREP ON RESCUE MISSIONS  
REFERENCE: 1529\1533 DATED 19 APRIL 1994

UNAMIR  
94 APR 20 16 45

1. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND THIS UPDATE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
2. THE GASSANA FAMILY WAS AT HOME ON 7 APRIL 94 WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS ATTACKED THE HOUSE TO TAKE THE FAMILY. THE GHANIAN SENTRIES HELD OFF THE GUARDS UNTIL THE GENDARMERIE SENTRIES EVACUATED THE FAMILY OUT OF THE BACK OF THE HOUSE. MRS GASSANA TOLD THE GHANIAN GUARDS THAT SHE WAS GOING TO HER SISTERS HOUSE TO HIDE. SEARCHES FOR HER SISTERS HOUSE HAVE PRODUCED NO RESULTS.
3. PLEASE APPROACH MR GASSANA TO PROVIDE US WITH A DIAGRAM WITH MAJOR LANDMARKS OF WHERE MRS GASSANA'S SISTER LIVES. WHILE MR GASSANA HAS STATED HE BELIEVES THEY ARE IN THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES OUR NOMINAL ROLL DOES NOT REFLECT THEIR NAMES. A SECOND SEARCH OF THE HOTEL WILL BE MADE. IF THEY ARE RECOVERED, DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION IN THIS RGF\INTERHAMWE CONTROLLED AREA, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO EVACUATE THEM TO THE AIRPORT. THEY WILL HAVE TO GO TO NAIROBI AS THAT IS WHERE OUR PLANES GO. PLEASE APPROACH THE GOVERNMENT OF ANY NATION TO ISSUE THEM PAPERS AS REFUGEES OR THEY MAY BE DEPORTED BACK TO RWANDA BY THE KENYAN AUTHORITIES. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP ON THIS MATTER.
4. NO INFORMATION YET ON PROF RUNYINYA BARABWILIZA. WE ARE CHECKING OUR LISTS OF REFUGEE CAMPS. WE NEED MORE DETAILS. WHERE DID HE LIVE WITH A DIAGRAM?

FC



United Nations  
Development Programme

World Development

## FACSIMILIE TRANSMISSION FORM

FACSIMILIE REFERENCE NO. 1529/1933 DATE: 19 April 1994

AGENCY/ACCOUNT TO CHARGE : UN REF : ORG 130/UN

TO : NAME: 1) UNAMIR, RWANDA  
2) Mr. Amadou Ly, Rwanda Emergency Team,  
Intercontinental Hotel, Nairobi  
FAX NO : 1) (212) 963-3090  
2) (254-2) 21 06 75

FROM: Toon Vissers  
Resident Representative a.i.

This transmission consists of the following pages including this page : 2

Subject: STATUS/EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS OF  
SENIOR RWANDA CITIZENS

1. Please find attached copy of self-explanatory letter from the Hon. Dr. Gasana, Minister for Foreign Affairs, indicating that he has received information that his wife and children might be in Hotel Mille Collines. It would be appreciated if you could check if this is correct and, if so, to arrange their evacuation, to Tanzania.
2. Please advise if you have information on the whereabouts of the dependents of
  - Prof. Runyinya Barabwiliza
  - Ambassador ISONERE, Simon
 our fax 1507 of 18 April refers.
3. We acknowledge receipt of your fax of 19 April authorising one way economy tickets for 9 UNAMIR MILOBS.  
There are rumours that 10 or 14 more peace keepers crossed into Tanzania, but this is not yet confirmed. We will advise names etc. if and when confirmed.
4. You can reach me on  
(255) (51) 32475 )  
46716 ) Office or 66659 (Home)

Thanks and best wishes.

Approved by: Toon Vissers  
Resident Representative a.i.

TV/asm



E/DIR.

Hvy. Puzit



Dar-es-Salaam 19th April 1994

3/

Dr Gasana Anastase  
 Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 and Cooperation of Rwanda  
 c/o Kilimanjaro Hotel  
 Room 503 Phone 21282/9  
Dar-es-Salaam

To His Excellency the Resident  
 Representative of UNDP  
Dar-es-Salaam

- Your Excellency,  
 Following the letter I wrote you  
 on 12th April 1994, I would like to come to you  
 again to ask your help with the contribution  
 of UNAMIR in Kigali, UNHCR/Kigali and  
 Red Cross (international, Belgian or Red  
 sans frontières) to identify where is my  
 family and to evacuate it to Tanzania  
 where I found refuge.

- The last news I have today are that  
 my wife and children would have found  
 refuge in Hill Collines Hotel in Kiga  
 1° Godebert the GASANA, MUKARUTABANA, M.A. in Literat  
 42 years old, my wife  
 2° Michèle KUKAGASANA, 18 years old, my daughter  
 3° Marie-Josée UWAMAHORO, 17 years old  
 4° Serge GASANA, 12 years old my son  
 5° Marie-Christèle UWIMANA, 9 years old my daughter  
 6° Jean Christophe GASANA, 6 years old my last child

Thank you very much to UNDP, UNAMIR,  
 UNHCR, Red Cross, for all that you are  
 doing and will do to try to save  
 my family. Dr Gasana Anastase -



UNAMIR

PAGE 1 OF 5

UNAMIR 194 APR 20 13 161

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 20 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 798  
SUBJECT: SITREP ON RESCUE MISSIONS  
REFERENCE: 1196 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND THE FOLLOWING UPDATE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
2. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITH ICRC TO HANDOVER ANY CASES THAT ARE NOT COMPLETED IF WE THIN OUT.
3. STATUS REPORT OF CASES IS AS FOLLOWS:
  - A. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE EVACUATED FROM THE HOTEL MERIDIEN TO THE AIRPORT ON 18 APRIL 1994.
  - B. FOUR ITALIAN NUNS LOCATED IN KABUYI NEAR GITARAMA CANNOT BE EVACUATED WITHOUT A GENDARMERIE ESCORT FOR A UN TEAM. GENDARMERIE WILL NOT PROVIDE ESCORT AT THIS TIME. NEGOTIATIONS ON-GOING. NOTE: THREE CANADIAN PRIESTS ARE AT THE VILLAGE OF KABUYI 2 KM SOUTH OF GITARAMA. IF AN ESCORT IS PROVIDED THESE GROUPS WILL BE EVACUATED CONCURRENTLY ON THE SAME MISSION.
  - C. LYDIA ITELEBA CANNOT BE EVACUATED UNLESS WE RECEIVE IRISH PAPERS FOR HER. SHE IS IN THE MILLES COLLINES IN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY. PLEASE HAVE IRISH MISSION FORWARD WRITTEN GUARANTEE BY FAX TO UNAMIR SO WE CAN ARRANGE HER TRANSIT TO NAIROBI. PLEASE ACTION.
  - D. ABRAN UNDER THE CARE OF MOTHER, ELIZABETH AT 83141 CANNOT BE ACTIONED. TELEPHONES DO NOT WORK IN KIGALI. WHO IS MOTHER ELIZABETH AND WHERE DOES SHE LIVE? CHECK OF LISTS WE HAVE PREPARED HAVE NOT REVEALED HER LOCATION. WHICH NATION IS GOING TO PROVIDE PAPERS BY FAX TO UNAMIR FOR THIS CHILD? PLEASE ACTION.
  - E. CECILE MUKARUBUGA AND HER THREE CHILDREN ARE ALIVE AND WELL IN THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES. THEY CANNOT BE EVACUATED WITHOUT PAPERS. WHICH NATION IS GOING TO PROVIDE PAPERS BY FAX TO UNAMIR FOR THIS FAMILY. PLEASE ACTION.



- 2 -

- F. 11 SPANISH NUNS AND 16 UNMOs SHOULD BE EVACUATED BY BELGIAN HERCULES FROM BUTARE TODAY WITH RGF APPROVAL.
- G. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE GASSANA FAMILY ARE STILL UNKNOWN AND ARE BEING URGENTLY INVESTIGATED. THEY ARE NOT IN THE MERIDIEN OR THE MILLES COLLINES. ON 7 APRIL (THE MORNING AFTER THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS COMMENCED THEIR ROUNDUPS OF OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THEIR FAMILIES) THE GHANIAN GUARDS HELD OFF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS WHILE THE GENDARMERIE BODYGUARDS TOOK THE FAMILY OUT THE BACK OF THE HOUSE. THE WIFE OF MR GASSANA TOLD THE GHANIAN GUARDS SHE WAS GOING TO HIDE IN THE HOUSE OF HER SISTER WHO LIVED NEARBY. UNAMIR DOES NOT KNOW WHERE THE SISTER LIVES AND SEARCHES BY GHANIAN SOLDIERS HAVE PROVED FRUITLESS. PLEASE CONTACT MR GASSANA AT UNDP IN DAR-ES-SALEM FOR A MAP OF THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE HOUSE AND FAX IT TO US ASAP SO THAT A RESCUE MISSION CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN ADDITION PLEASE APPROACH A COUNTRY TO GRANT PAPERS FOR AIR EVACUATION AS THEIR SAFETY IN A REFUGEE CAMP CANNOT BE GUARANTEED AND THEY ARE MOST LIKELY STILL TARGETS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.
- H. MR FRANCOIS SOMAYIRE IS BEING RECHECKED TO SEE IF HE IS AT THE MILLES COLLINES.
- I. LIBYAN NATIONALS UNKNOWN. WE HAVE NO RECORD OF A REQUEST FROM THE LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTRY.
- J. THE TANZANIAN REQUEST WAS FORWARDED TO UNAMIR BY THE BELGIAN JOINT OPERATIONS STAFF. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO MESSAGE FROM TANZANIA. IT IS OUR INTENTION TODAY TO EVACUATE TWO EMBASSY OFFICIALS FROM THE RESIDENCE OF THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO ASSIST US IN LOCATING THESE 250 INDIVIDUALS FOR EVACUATION. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THEY ARE AT THE TANZANIAN EMBASSY (GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AREA) AND AT THE CUSTOMS CLEARING HOUSE IN GIKONDO (SCENE OF INTENSIVE FIGHTING). THIS RESCUE IS ON-GOING.
- K. CHRISTINE MUHIGANA PARENTS AT 75084. TELEPHONES ARE OUT IN KIGALI. WE NEED NAMES AND AN EXACT LOCATION TO CONDUCT THIS RESCUE.
4. ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC ACTIONS WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO TAKE ARE:
- A. UNDP LOCAL STAFF AT THE UNDP COMPOUND INCLUDING MR LYS SECRETARY DONNATELLA. THEY ARE RWANDESE AND WILL REQUIRE TRAVEL PAPERS. PLEASE ADVISE WHICH NATION WILL PROVIDE?
- B. ONE CANADIAN CITIZEN WHO LOST HIS PAPERS HAS BEEN VERIFIED AS A CANADIAN, MR FRANCOIS SOMARYIRE AND SHOULD BE EXTRACTED TODAY.



C. MR NTAWIHA AND HIS FAMILY LOCATION WILL BE CHECKED BY UNMO TEAM AT ST MICHELS CATHEDRAL (ALONG WITH 10000 OTHER REFUGEES) TODAY.

D. THE EMBASSY OF ZAIRE HAS APPROACHED UNAMIR BY LETTER (ATTACHED) TO ASSIST IN THE EVACUATION OF 10,000 ZAIREAN CITIZENS. TO DATE WE HAVE EVACUATED OVER 300 ZAIREANS. HOWEVER, THIS TASK IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR UNAMIR AT THIS TIME. ZAIRE ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE RGF. ZAIREANS ARE UNDER NO DANGER FROM THE RPF. THEREFORE WE RECOMMEND UNNY APPROACH THE ZAIREAN MISSION IN NEW YORK AND REQUEST THEIR GOVERNMENT ENTER INTO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE RGF TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT A ZAIREAN EXPATRIATE EVACUATION TO ZAIRE. THIS IS A DESPERATE MATTER WHICH REQUIRES YOUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

4. TO DATE UNAMIR HAS ASSISTED IN THE EVACUATION OF OVER 4000 PERSONS. IN ADDITION WE NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 14,000 REFUGEES SHELTERED ~~NEAR~~ OUR CAMPS. INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT ICRC HAVE ABANDONED RWANDA. RELIEF SUPPLIES ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTANT EXCEPT FOR LIMITED ICRC AMOUNTS. CAMPS ARE DESPERATELY SHORT OF WATER, FOOD, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, SANITATION FACILITIES ETC. UNAMIR STILL AWAITS THE ARRIVAL OF A DHA HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT TEAM TO ASSIST US IN THIS TASK. THE TEAM HAS BEEN IN NAIROBI FOR TWO DAYS AND IS STILL AWAITING CLEARANCE FROM SECURITY AT UNNY. PLEASE INTERVENE AND OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR THIS TEAM TO ARRIVE SO THAT THE ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AND RELIEF SUPPLIES THAT ARE URGENTLY NEEDED CAN BE DELIVERED TO KIGALI AND DISTRIBUTED.

5. IN ADDITION PLEASE DO NOT PROVIDE OUR TELEPHONE NUMBER TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR AGENCY. UNAMIR IS SWAMPED WITH TELEPHONE CALLS FROM AROUND THE WORLD OF PERSONS LOOKING FOR FAMILY MEMBERS AND FRIENDS. THIS ONLY DELAYS THE EVACUATION PROCESS AND TIES UP OUR LINES WHICH ARE URGENTLY NEEDED FOR OPERATIONAL MATTERS. IN ADDITION PLEASE INFORM ALL PERMANENT MISSIONS TO PASS REQUESTS THROUGH YOU. WE ARE SWAMPED WITH REQUESTS FROM NATIONS AND AGENCIES. IN ADDITION WE REQUIRE FEEDBACK IF PEOPLE ARE FOUND BY OTHER MEANS THAN OURSELVES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WE HAVE SEARCHED FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE ALREADY LEFT RWANDA BY OTHER MEANS. THIS UNNECESSARILY IS ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF UNAMIR MILITARY PERSONNEL.

6. IN SEVERAL CASES YOU HAVE NOTED WHERE WE STATE "NEED PAPERS" OR "NOT AT THIS TIME". THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT KENYAN OFFICIALS HAVE VOICED INCREASED ANGER WITH UN PERSONNEL IN NAIROBI FOR EVACUATING RWANDESE REFUGEES TO KENYA WHICH WILL BECOME A KENYAN PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, VERBALLY ONLY, THEY HAVE STATED THEY MAY HAVE TO DEPORT REFUGEES BACK TO RWANDA. NATIONS MUST BE APPROACHED TO PROVIDE PAPERS FOR THESE PERSONS IF WE ARE TO EVACUATE THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY OR WE RISK LOSING THE WHOLE SYSTEM. "NOT AT THIS TIME" REFERS TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA OF THE REFUGEE. IF MILITIAS ARE RAMPANT IN THE AREA, TO REMOVE A RWANDESE FROM HIDING WOULD ONLY ENDANGER THEIR LIFE AND THE LIVES OF THE UNAMIR MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO ARE ATTEMPTING



- 4 -

TO EVACUATE THEM. IT IS BETTER TO STAY HIDDEN AND SAFE THAN TO RISK THEIR LIVES IN A FUTILE ESCAPE ATTEMPT WHICH ALSO ENDANGERS THE LIVES OF THE UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND COULD THREATEN OTHER OPERATIONS IF THE MILITIAS OR THE RGF STOP CONVOY RESCUE MISSIONS. EACH CASE IS CALCULATED AS TO THE RISK TO THE REFUGEES, TO THE UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND TO THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. IF THE RISK IS TOO GREAT THE MISSION IS DELAYED UNTIL THE SITUATION CHANGES AND REDUCES THE RISKS.

7. UNAMIR PERSONNEL, SINCE THE START OF THE WAR, HAVE ON A DAILY BASIS RISKED THEIR LIVES TO SAVE PEOPLE, WHETHER EXPATRIATES OR NATIONALS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN OUR ABILITIES AND WITHIN THE LEVEL OF RISK TO CONTINUE PERFORMING THESE TASKS. PLEASE ACTION THE REQUESTS ABOVE TO ASSIST US IN THIS HUMANITARIAN TASK.

8. REGARDS.



COMMUNAUTE ZAIROISE DE KIGALI  
C/O AMBASSADE DU ZAIRE  
B.P. 169 KIGALI  
Tel. 7 5026

5/5  
Kigali, le 17 / 04 / 1994

DR KABIA

S.O.S Communauté Zaïroise  
de Kigali

Au Représentant Spécial de la  
Mission des Nations Unies pour  
l'assistance au Rwanda.-

COPIE POUR INFORMATION :

- A la Croix Rouge Internationale
- A Monsieur le Commandant en Chef  
des forces de la MINUAR
- Au Ministre de la défense de la  
République Rwandaise
- Au Représentant du R.C.R. au  
Rwanda.
- Au Ministre des affaires étrangères  
de la République Rwandaise
- Au Préfet de la ville de Kigali.

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial  
de la MINUAR,

Nous, la Communauté Zaïroise à Kigali, réfugiée dans l'enceinte de l'Ambassade du Zaïre depuis le 11 avril, avons l'honneur de vous lancer cet ultime S.O.S de toute une population en détresse et abandonnée à elle-même :

1°) Nous sommes une population de dix mille (10.000) têtes humaines, exposées à la faim, à l'insalubrité due à l'absence des toilettes, d'eau potable, d'abri contre la pluie et le soleil, étouffée dans un espace vraiment étroit sans assistance médicale (le cas des femmes qui accouchent, avortent, les bébés qui suffoquent, ...)

2°) L'insécurité devient grandissante car nous craignons l'infiltration, les exécutions sommaires des réfugiés tel que cela s'est passé ailleurs, les obus qui sifflent au-dessus de nos têtes, tout cela après plus de deux semaines de traumatisme.

Pour éviter l'écoulement de toute une population étrangère dans notre pays hôte, nous vous prions de bien vouloir faire diligence pour nous évacuer de cette ville et nous rapatrier en République du Zaïre. L'évacuation déjà faite pour une partie de nos compatriotes (500 personnes environ) ne pourrait pas justifier le sacrifice de 10.000 vies humaines.

Dans l'attente d'une suite urgente favorable, nous vous prions, Monsieur le Représentant de la MINUAR, d'agréer nos remerciements anticipés.

Pour le Comité de Crise  
Nour l'Ambassade



U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 20 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_  
SUBJECT: SITREP ON RESCUE MISSIONS  
REFERENCE: 1196 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND THE FOLLOWING UPDATE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITH ICRC TO HANDOVER ANY CASES THAT ARE NOT COMPLETED IF WE THIN OUT.

3. STATUS REPORT OF CASES IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE EVACUATED FROM THE HOTEL MERIDIEN TO THE AIRPORT ON 18 APRIL 1994.
- B. FOUR ITALIAN NUNS LOCATED IN KABGAYI NEAR GITARAMA CANNOT BE EVACUATED WITHOUT A GENDARMERIE ESCORT FOR A UN TEAM. GENDARMERIE WILL NOT PROVIDE ESCORT AT THIS TIME. NEGOTIATIONS ON-GOING. NOTE: THREE CANADIAN PRIESTS ARE AT THE VILLAGE OF KABUYI 2 KM SOUTH OF GITARAMA. IF AN ESCORT IS PROVIDED THESE GROUPS WILL BE EVACUATED CONCURRENTLY ON THE SAME MISSION.
- C. LYDIA ITELEBA CANNOT BE EVACUATED UNLESS WE RECEIVE IRISH PAPERS FOR HER. SHE IS IN THE MILLES COLLINES IN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY. PLEASE HAVE IRISH MISSION FORWARD WRITTEN GUARANTEE BY FAX TO UNAMIR SO WE CAN ARRANGE HER TRANSIT TO NAIROBI. PLEASE ACTION.
- D. ABRAN UNDER THE CARE OF MOTHER, ELIZABETH AT 83141 CANNOT BE ACTIONED. TELEPHONES DO NOT WORK IN KIGALI. WHO IS MOTHER ELIZABETH AND WHERE DOES SHE LIVE? CHECK OF LISTS WE HAVE PREPARED HAVE NOT REVEALED HER LOCATION. WHICH NATION IS GOING TO PROVIDE PAPERS BY FAX TO UNAMIR FOR THIS CHILD? PLEASE ACTION.
- E. CECILE MUKARUBUGA AND HER THREE CHILDREN ARE ALIVE AND WELL IN THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES. THEY CANNOT BE EVACUATED WITHOUT PAPERS. WHICH NATION IS GOING TO PROVIDE PAPERS BY FAX TO UNAMIR FOR THIS FAMILY. PLEASE ACTION.



- F. 11 SPANISH NUNS AND 16 UNMOs SHOULD BE EVACUATED BY BELGIAN HERCULES FROM BUTARE TODAY WITH RGF APPROVAL.
- G. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE GASSANA FAMILY ARE STILL UNKNOWN AND ARE BEING URGENTLY INVESTIGATED. THEY ARE NOT IN THE MERIDIEN OR THE MILLES COLLINES. ON 7 APRIL (THE MORNING AFTER THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS COMMENCED THEIR ROUNDUPS OF OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THEIR FAMILIES) THE GHANIAN GUARDS HELD OFF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS WHILE THE GENDARMERIE BODYGUARDS TOOK THE FAMILY OUT THE BACK OF THE HOUSE. THE WIFE OF MR GASSANA TOLD THE GHANIAN GUARDS SHE WAS GOING TO HIDE IN THE HOUSE OF HER SISTER WHO LIVED NEARBY. UNAMIR DOES NOT KNOW WHERE THE SISTER LIVES AND SEARCHES BY GHANIAN SOLDIERS HAVE PROVED FRUITLESS. PLEASE CONTACT MR GASSANA AT UNDP IN DAR-ES-SALEM FOR A MAP OF THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE HOUSE AND FAX IT TO US ASAP SO THAT A RESCUE MISSION CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN ADDITION PLEASE APPROACH A COUNTRY TO GRANT PAPERS FOR AIR EVACUATION AS THEIR SAFETY IN A REFUGEE CAMP CANNOT BE GUARANTEED AND THEY ARE MOST LIKELY STILL TARGETS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.
- H. MR FRANCOIS SOMAYIRE IS BEING RECHECKED TO SEE IF HE IS AT THE MILLES COLLINES.
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TO EVACUATE THEM. IT IS BETTER TO STAY HIDDEN AND SAFE THAN TO RISK THEIR LIVES IN A FUTILE ESCAPE ATTEMPT WHICH ALSO ENDANGERS THE LIVES OF THE UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND COULD THREATEN OTHER OPERATIONS IF THE MILITIAS OR THE RGF STOP CONVOY RESCUE MISSIONS. EACH CASE IS CALCULATED AS TO THE RISK TO THE REFUGEES, TO THE UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND TO THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. IF THE RISK IS TOO GREAT THE MISSION IS DELAYED UNTIL THE SITUATION CHANGES AND REDUCES THE RISKS.

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8. REGARDS.



UNAMIR

194 APR 19 13 53

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 19 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-791

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

REFERENCE: UNAMIR 1173 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. THIS MORNING FC UNAMIR RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL LETTER OF RESPONSE FROM THE RGF IN REFERENCE TO MAKING THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL GROUND (ATTACHED). THE RGF REFUSED THE INTENT OF UNAMIR TO MAKE THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL GROUND OPERATED AND SECURED BY UNAMIR ONLY.

2. INSTEAD THE RGF PROPOSED CO-CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT IN RELATION TO FUNCTIONING AND SECURITY. A PHOTOCOPY OF THEIR LETTER IS ATTACHED. THE RGF STATED THAT SECURITY OF UNAMIR, HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION WERE THE PRIORITIES. NEUTRALITY OF THE AIRPORT WAS NOT AS GREAT A CONCERN TO THE RGF AS "CONGESTION". IN ADDITION THE RGF REQUESTED A CEASEFIRE PERMITTING RETURN TO THE KWSA AGREEMENT. PENDING A CEASEFIRE THE RGF "APPROVED" THE RELIEF IN PLACE OF KIBAT (BELGIUM) WITH BYUBAT (GHANA) WHICH WOULD THEN CO-HABITATE WITH RGF UNITS. THE RGF PROPOSED A JOINT COMMISSION TO OPERATE AND DEFEND THE AIRPORT. THIS COMMISSION WOULD ENSURE THE INTEREST OF BOTH THE RGF AND UNAMIR. THEY ALSO STATED THERE WAS NO REASON TO INVOLVE THE RPF IN THIS AGREEMENT.

3. OUR ANALYSIS OF THIS LETTER IS THAT THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN HARDLINER AND MODERATE RGF OFFICERS SEEMS TO HAVE SWUNG IN FAVOR OF THE HARDLINERS. ONLY YESTERDAY THE RGF AGREED TO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLE HANDOVER OF THE AIRPORT AS NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AREA CONTROLLED ESSENTIALLY BY UNAMIR. THIS CHANGE IN POSITION IS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO ANY ACCEPTABLE OPTION. THE RPF WILL NEVER ACCEPT BEING EXCLUDED FROM AN AIRPORT AGREEMENT OR TO JOINT RGF\UNAMIR CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT. IT COULD APPEAR THE RGF MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO "BLACKMAIL" UNAMIR AND USE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL AS A BARGAINING CHIP FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING UNAMIR PRESSURE ON THE RPF FOR A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ON LESS THAN THE RPF FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS. THE FC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NEW RGF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF THIS MORNING DID NOT REVEAL ANY

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ANIMOSITY NOR DESIRE TO QUESTION UNAMIR'S STATUS. HIS CONCERNS OVER THE AIRPORT WERE TACTICAL IN NATURE ONLY AND AS SUCH SHOWED NO HINT OF ANY ULTERIOR MOTIVE.

4. THE AIRPORT COULD BECOME THE SCENE OF A BATTLE AS EACH PARTY MAY VIE FOR SOLE CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT AND ITS ENVIRONS. THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER A POSSIBLE UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESUPPLY, SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL.

5. INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH RGF BATTALION COMMANDERS ON 18 AND 19 APRIL REVEALED A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE FROM SEEKING PEACE TO A RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO A CEASEFIRE WITH THE RPF AND A DESIRE TO "SORT THINGS OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL"; SIMILAR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY RPF FIELD COMMANDERS. THIS SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE POSITION OF THE RGF IN THE LAST 18 HOURS, COUPLED WITH THE REFUSAL OF THE RPF TO ENTER INTO CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE IS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS CONCLUDES THAT THEIR IS NOT MUCH HOPE OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BOTH PARTIES NOW SEEM TO BE READY TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD IF THIS CEASEFIRE SITUATION DOES NOT CLEAR UP RAPIDLY.

6. IN ADDITION IN THE EARLY AM OF 19 APRIL THE RGF FIRED MORTAR ROUNDS INTO THE AMAHORO STADIUM (A KNOWN JOINT UNAMIR AND REFUGEE LOCATION) KILLING 6 REFUGEES AND WOUNDING 46 OTHER REFUGEES. UNAMIR PERSONNEL WERE UNHURT BUT SUBJECTED TO SEVERE DANGER. ADDITIONAL MORTAR SHELLS LANDED IN THE AREA ADJACENT TO THE STADIUM KILLING AND WOUNDING AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CIVILIANS. THE FORCE HEADQUARTERS WAS ALSO HIT BY A MORTAR BOMB THAT DID NOT EXPLODE. THIS MORTAR ATTACK FURTHER ENDANGERED THE LIVES OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED TO EVACUATE CASUALTIES WITH RED CROSS AMBULANCES AND SIRENS.

7. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT VIABLE TO LEAVE A RESIDUAL FORCE AS FC OPTION C (IE ABOUT 1300 PERSONNEL) IN RWANDA. THERE IS NOW NO REASONABLY GUARANTEED SAFETY VALVE FOR THE RESUPPLY AND POSSIBLE EXTRACTION OF A VERY LARGE CONTINGENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IN RWANDA SHOULD THINGS GET WORSE.

8. UNAMIR SHOULD HOWEVER GO TO A FORCE OF OPTION B (IE 250 PERSONNEL) IN ORDER TO KEEP A UN SECURE PRESENCE FOR HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE BROKERING PURPOSES. JUST AS IMPORTANT IF NOT MORE, THIS OPTION IS CONSIDERED AN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL MINIMUM STEP OF UNAMIR PRESENCE IN RWANDA BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES HAVE CONTINUOUSLY STATED THEY FIRMLY WISH TO SEE UNAMIR STAY. A WHOLESALÉ WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSION WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE INTERPRETED AS LEAVING THE SCENE IF NOT EVEN DESERTING THE SINKING SHIP. IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS ONE SHOULD ANTICIPATE ENORMOUS DANGEROUS REACTIONS AGAINST OUR TROOPS AND AS SUCH PREJUDICE AND ENDANGER THE WHOLE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. FOR SECURITY REASONS IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO GO TO OPTION B AND THEN LET THE SITUATION SETTLE FOR A SHORT WHILE (AFTER POSSIBLY THE TANZANIAN MEETING) BEFORE REVIEWING



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THE MISSION. FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL TO LEAVE THIS TERRIBLE SCENE WITHOUT AT LEAST GIVING A LAST HARD AND DETERMINED CHANCE FOR A CEASE FIRE AND AN EMBRYO OF A RELIEF ORGANIZATION IN COUNTRY. THE MISSION WOULD BE BASED IN OUR CURRENT HQ AND STADIUM COMPLEX AS IT IS STILL A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE AND IT IS VERY EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO CITY AND AIRPORT.

9. SHOULD OPTION B BE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND/OR IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED DUE TO FIGHTING IN ITS ENVIRONS, THEN A ROAD MOVE WILL HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED. THE PREFERRED ROUTE OF KIGALI-BYUMBA-MULINDI-GATUNA-KABALE-KAMPALA MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE WITH FIGHTING STILL ON-GOING IN THE NORTH. IN ADDITION THE ROUTE KIGALI-DAR-ES-SALEM MAY BE INSECURE IN SOME OF THE RGF\MILITIA CONTROLLED TERRITORY. UNAMIR DOES NOT POSSESS HEAVY WEAPON SYSTEMS OR THE AMMUNITION TO FORCE ITS WAY OUT. OPTIONS LIKE AN INTERNATIONALLY IMPOSED CEASEFIRE OR GUARANTEES OF AN INTERNATIONALLY MILITARY SUPPORTED EXTRACTION MAY HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IF UNAMIR IS TO SUCCESSFULLY WITHDRAW ITS PERSONNEL WITH SAFETY FROM RWANDA.

10. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WITHDRAWAL BY UNAMIR WILL DEFINITELY HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE CIVIL POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE REFUGEES, WHO WILL FEEL WE ARE DESERTING THEM. HOWEVER IN ACTUAL FACT THERE IS LITTLE THAT WE ARE DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME EXCEPT PROVIDING SECURITY, SOME FOOD AND MEDICINE AND A PRESENCE. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE HAS NOT REALLY COMMENCED. THE REFUGEES IN THE AMAHORO STADIUM, THE KING FAISEL HOSPITAL AND THE MERIDIEN HOTEL ARE IN SECURE RPF TERRITORY AND THEY WILL BE WELL TREATED (WITHIN THEIR MEANS) BY THE RPF SHOULD THEY CONTINUE TO HOLD THAT GROUND. THE ONLY THREAT WILL BE INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS BY THE RGF WHO ARE CAPABLE OF SUCH ACTION AS WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 19 APRIL. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD SEEM TO BE INCLINED TO CONDUCT SUCH ATTACKS IF UNAMIR WAS HERE OR NOT AS WITNESSED TODAY AND AS INDICATED BY THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF ARMY WHO STATED HE MAY HAVE TO USE ALL THE TOOLS HE HAS TO WIN IF THE RPF INSIST ON CONTINUING THE FIGHT.

11. THE REFUGEES AT LOCATIONS LIKE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES, THE RED CROSS, ST MICHELS CATHEDRAL ETC IN RGF TERRITORY ARE IN DANGER OF MASSACRE, BUT HAVE BEEN IN THIS DANGER WITHOUT RESULT SO FAR FOR THE LAST WEEK EVEN WITH UNAMIR ON THE GROUND. BOTH PARTIES ARE BEING INFORMED THAT WE HAVE NOMINAL ROLLS OF THE PERSONS IN THE MERIDIEN AND MILLES COLLINES AND AN ACCURATE HEAD COUNT OF THE REFUGEES IN THE OTHER LOCATIONS. THIS WAS MADE AS A WARNING THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF REFUGEES UNDER THEIR CONTROL. LETTERS AND MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITH EACH PARTY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE PERSONS MUST BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BASIC HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE FORWARDED TO RWANDA UNTIL THERE IS A STABLE AND DURABLE CEASEFIRE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES.

12. THE FIRST INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE ICRC HEAD WAS HELD AT FORCE HQ IN ORDER TO POSSIBLY CONVINCE BOTH




4/6

- 4 -

PARTIES TO MEET ONLY TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE TEAM WENT TO THE RPF IN ORDER TO FEEL THEM OUT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING (UNAMIR, ICRC, RPF, RGF) TO DISCUSS IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS LIKE BURYING THE DEAD, FOOD DELIVERY ETC. THE RESULTS WERE RATHER DISAPPOINTING AS THEY EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THEIR VERY STRONG CASE REGARDING THE CONTINUING MASSACRES AROUND THE COUNTRY THAT ARE NOT SEEMINGLY BEING ABATED.

13. IN CONCLUSION THE PREFERRED OPTION IS TO REDUCE THE MISSION TO THE OPTION B LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 250 MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN A UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA, TO ASSIST IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF A CEASEFIRE AND TO ENSURE THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REST OF THE FORCE. THE SAFETY OF OUR WITHDRAWAL IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR KEEPING A FOOT ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT SHORT WHILE. FC CANNOT STRESS THIS POINT EMPHATICALLY ENOUGH. WE AWAIT YOUR DECISION ON THIS MATTER.





MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE  
ARMÉE RWANDAISE  
ÉTAT-MAJOR

G3

KIGALI, le 18 AVR. 1994

N° 0646/G3.3.0

Au Commandant de la MINUAR

O B J E T : Sécurité de l'Aéroport  
International de KIGALI

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à votre lettre adressée au Chef d'EM AR et au Chef d'EM Gd N pour vous exposer les commentaires que suscitent les propositions contenues dans la dite lettre :

1. Le cessez le feu immédiat reste la condition sine qua non pour l'entreprise des activités de nature à pacifier le pays, afin de s'atteler à la mise en place rapide du Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie.
2. Dans ce cadre, comme signalé dans ma lettre N° 0624/G3.3.3 du 15/04/1994 les Forces Armées Rwandaises n'ont aucune objection à ce que la MINUAR soit associée au fonctionnement de l'Aéroport, notamment pour les aides humanitaires, les évacuations éventuelles, la sécurité de la MINUAR etc... Néanmoins, les conditions ci-après doivent être remplies :

a. Neutralité de l'Aéroport

Plutôt que de parler de la neutralité de l'Aéroport, mais plutôt de la cogestion entre la MINUAR et la partie Gouvernementale. La cession d'une partie du territoire National est une question juridique de souveraineté nationale du ressort du peuple par voie de référendum.

- b. Instaurer un cessez le feu permettant de revenir à l'application des principes de consignation des armes, tels qu'ils étaient appliqués avant la reprise des hostilités (KWSA).
- c. En attendant que le cessez le feu intervienne, le Bn Ghanéen procéderait à la relève du contingent Belge dans le cadre de la défense de l'Aéroport, tout en cohabitant avec les Unités des Forces Armées Rwandaises tel que stipulé dans le document de la KWSA.

.../...

SECRET




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6/6

Une commission technique affinerait les modalités de cohabitation dans l'intérêt de la sécurité de nos deux forces.

- d. L'Aéroport étant dans la zone contrôlée par les Forces Armées Rwandaises il n'est pas opportun d'associer le FPR à une quelconque activité avant qu'il ne soit associé à la prise des décisions dans le cadre du Gouvernement de Transition à Base Élargie.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant,  
de la MINUAR, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.



GATSINZI Marcel  
Général de Brigade  
Chef EM AR(a.i)

SECRET



UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN 126

P1/1

194 APR 19 11:05  
TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 14 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-389

*[Handwritten signature]*

WE REFER TO YOUR OUTGOING CODE CABLE NUMBER 1116 DATED 13 APRIL 1994 ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ESCORT OF ICRC MEDICAL SUPPLIES BEING HELD AT THE KIGALI AIRPORT.

PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED SAFELY TO KING FAISAL HOSPITAL UNDER UNAMIR ESCORT.

SUPPORT OF NATIONAL STAFF OF OTHER UN AGENCIES IS AT THE MOMENT NOT POSSIBLE AS THE FINANCIAL STAFF OF UNAMIR WERE EVACUATED TO NAIROBI DURING THE CRISIS.

BEST REGARDS.

SRS6

FC.

UNAMIR  
194 APR 19 11:00



UNAMIR  
194 APR 18 16 01

CRN-125 1/2  
194 APR 18 16 42  
UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODED CABLE

TO : ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE : 18 APRIL, 1994

NUMBER : MIR-784

SUBJECT : POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA

1. There is currently a vacuum in the political leadership in the country. The appointment of an interim government following the death of President Habyarimana on April 6th in a plane crash, has not produced credible political leaders who could take decisions representative of the government. Most of the ministers of the so called interim government have either left Kigali or are in hiding in the city and are not available to the public.

2. In a radio interview on 15th of April, the Minister of Defence assured the public that the military was representing the interim government in negotiations with the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and that the government ministers were in control of the country but had retreated to the countryside for strategic reasons. The accuracy of this assertion is doubtful because of reports that some of the ministers have sought asylum or are living in neighbouring countries. What is equally baffling is the complete disappearance of the leaders of the political parties. Presumably, they too have left city or are in hiding in the city.

The question then arises as to who speaks and acts on behalf of the government. Obviously in the present environment, there are only two forces that are visible and represent the realities of the current situation. These are the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the RPF.

3. On the government side, senior officers of the RGF constituted themselves into a committee that acts like a cabinet and takes decisions for and on behalf of the government. This committee has twice changed the leadership of the RGF and established itself as the de facto interim administration. It is still not clear as to the extent of their influence within the armed forces or their effective control of the levers of power in the government. It is also not clear if they are being manipulated by politicians who are still in hiding and have decided to stay in the background.

4. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the evident fact is that they are the only identifiable force in the city that seems to carry the mantle of government and thus the only party that can take decisions and ensure their implementation for the government side.



The RPF on the other hand has remained essentially monolithic and pursued its political objectives with military aggressiveness following what they perceived as the failure of peace efforts to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement. Its political and military leadership has remained unaltered and its determination to achieve equilibrium in power sharing as envisaged in the Arusha Peace Agreement is relentless.

5. Now the two parties are at war and the militias of militant political parties have gone on a rampage massacring mostly members of the minority ethnic group. RGF has called for an unconditional cease fire but RPF has counter proposed preconditions before cease fire talks. As the only neutral and credible force on the scene, UNAMIR has initiated, with the concurrence of both parties, measures aimed at first securing a ceasefire to be followed by the resumption of the peace process. On the 15th of April, UNAMIR convened a meeting between representatives of the two parties to explore the possibility of a ceasefire. Since then it has been in constant discussion with both parties separately trying to narrow their differences and re-instate ceasefire talks.

6. In my view, the RGF side has demonstrated a clear readiness to immediately put into effect a ceasefire. They have indicated their willingness to fulfill some conditions imposed by the RPF but stressed that other conditions can only be implemented by the Broad Based Transitional Government. I have communicated to the RPF their letter conveying their readiness to the RPF preconditions to the RPF (copies attached). Thus far RPF remains intransigent in its insistence that RGF must first stop the massacres of innocent civilians before the parties enter into talks for a ceasefire. It has even gone further in its letter of today's date (copy attached) by adding a new element of discouraging our efforts in promoting indirect negotiations. It has also told us orally that their preconditions are non-negotiable.

7. RPF's reluctance to immediately enter into a ceasefire seems to indicate that it intends to achieve still undeclared military objectives. I have however stressed to the parties that the Security Council does not have long to wait before it decides on the future of UNAMIR, which is likely to be full withdrawal if there is no ceasefire within the next 48 - 72 hours. I have drawn their attention to the grave humanitarian situation which could only be ameliorated if a ceasefire is in place.

8. I am encouraged by the fact that the intensity of the fighting is substantially scaled down to occasional fire exchanges that last for a very short duration. I am not in a position to indicate what this signifies. We are however continuing our efforts to secure as a first step, a ceasefire even if it is for a limited period, while the negotiation continue. This should be followed by a resumption of the peace process leading to the prompt installation of the transitional institutions.

9. I am convinced that our role as an interlocutor has had a



3/12


positive effect on the violence, hence the armed confrontation has not degenerated into a full scale war throughout the country. I am however concerned that if UNAMIR withdraws without a ceasefire in place, the violence and massacres that will be unleashed will be in horrendous proportions for which the international community may not be able to absolve itself from part of the blame.

10. Please find attached a draft agreement which I have submitted to both parties today for consideration. Initial reaction to the draft agreement from the RPF is negative but the RGF has acknowledged that it contains many positive elements. Should RPF formally reject the concept on of an immediate ceasefire, even for a limited period while negotiations continue, I will conclude that the RPF has for now decided on the logic of armed confrontation. This will of course render our presence in Rwanda untenable and our mandate unattainable.

11. I will submit to you, within the next 48 hours, my final evaluation of the situation and my recommendations relating to UNAMIR and it's mandate.


Regards.





19/12

# FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



Kigali, le 17 avril 1994

Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire  
Général des Nations Unies au Rwanda  
(Kigali).

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial.

J'accuse réception de votre lettre du 14 courant, pour laquelle je vous remercie.

Comme vous le savez fort bien, la réunion prévue ce jour-là n'a pas pu se tenir du fait du non respect des conditions de confidentialité dont vous aviez convenu avec nos représentants au CND.

Vous vous en souviendrez, le décès inopiné du Président de la République dans un accident d'avion dont les causes et les circonstances ne sont pas encore élucidées, a été immédiatement suivie des massacres de populations civiles perpétrés par la Garde Présidentielle, à laquelle se sont joints les éléments des autres Forces Armées Gouvernementales ainsi que des hordes de malfaiteurs issus des milices des partis politiques MRND et CDR. Devant l'inaction des Forces de sécurité et l'incapacité de la MINUAR, débordé par la soldatesque surarmée, à contenir ces actes, le FPR a volé au secours de la population de Kigali dont un grand nombre allait être massacré au Stade AMAHORO où elle avait pris refuge. A cette heure-là, des informations concordantes, et qui se sont malheureusement avérées fondées, faisaient état d'assassinats des leaders des partis politiques et d'autres personnalités importantes dans le pays. C'est dans ces circonstances que le bataillon du FPR cantonné au CND a décidé, sur ordre du commandement du FPR, d'occuper la Garde Présidentielle à combattre d'autres soldats plutôt qu'à massacrer des innocents.

Par ailleurs, vous êtes sans ignorer que dans la nuit du 6 au 7 courant, après que la nouvelle de la mort du Président de la République fût connue et que les massacres eurent commencé à Kigali, nos officiels vous ont contacté par téléphone dans le but d'échanger des informations et étudier ensemble les mesures qui pouvaient être envisagées. Malheureusement, vous ne vous êtes pas montré disposé à leur prêter attention. De même, pendant la journée du 7 avril 1994, nos officiels ont cherché à contacter le Général Roméo DALLAIRE ainsi que le commandement des Forces Armées Gouvernementales dans le même but. Comme nous l'avons souligné plus haut, c'est face à l'inaction et/ou à l'incapacité des Forces Armées Gouvernementales et de la MINUAR que nous avons déclenché cette action et avons dû l'amplifier pour chasser les groupes fascistes qui opèrent ou commanditent ces



1/12


massacres. Ce n'est d'ailleurs que cinq jours après le début des événements que vous avez bien voulu envoyer votre Conseiller politique contacter nos officiels résidant au CND. A cette occasion, il vous avait été demandé de vous prononcer sur la reconnaissance ou non par la MINUAR du Président et du Gouvernement auto-proclamés le 8 avril 1994. Malgré la promesse de votre Conseiller politique, cette clarification se fait encore attendre.

Depuis ce premier contact, nous n'avons cessé de souligner l'arrêt des massacres comme préalable à un arrêt éventuel des hostilités. Depuis le 10 avril 1994, nous avons donné au Général DALLAIRE les conditions à communiquer à l'autre partie et à propos desquelles les réponses ont été empreintes de mauvaise foi et de faux fuyants. Moyennant ces préalables, nous restons disposés à entamer d'éventuelles négociations en vue d'un cessez-le-feu. Cependant, le cessez-le-feu le plus urgent est celui qui porterait sur l'arrêt des actes de massacres perpétrés par les Forces Gouvernementales et les milices des partis MRND et CDR contre les populations civiles. C'est à ce premier cessez-le-feu que nous vous demandons de vous employer avec tout le tact et le courage nécessaires et pour lequel nous vous promettons toute la coopération désirée.

Les préconditions à une éventuelle rencontre de discussion d'un cessez-le-feu que nous avons remis au commandement des Forces Gouvernementales le 15 avril 1994 en votre présence constituant, à cet égard, les seules bases, sérieuses d'un éventuel cessez-le-feu entre les deux armées.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.

Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE  
Président du FPR





12/12

Kigali, le 18 avril 1994

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général  
Adjoint des Nations Unies et  
Représentant Spécial du  
Secrétaire Général au Rwanda  
B.P 749 KIGALI  
KIGALI.

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

Nous avons bien reçu votre lettre de transmission du document des Forces Armées Rwandaises faisant suite à notre mémorandum sur les prérequis nécessaires avant de faire ébauche à toute négociation de cessez-le-feu.

Nous tenons à rappeler que nos exigences premières ne visent que l'arrêt inconditionnel des massacres perpétrés quotidiennement contre la population civile. Ainsi nos interventions ne cesseront-elle pas d'être des opérations à la fois de sauvetage de la population civile et de neutralisation des expansions criminelles et meurtrières de la Garde Présidentielle qui agit de concert avec les milices INTERAHAMWE-CDR. Le temps n'est plus à ces tractions stériles mais bien aux actes concrets de cessation d'hostilités civiles et militaires conformément à nos préconditions.

Sur ces faits, nous nous voyons obligé de vous adresser, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, une fin de ~~non-recevoir à de~~ telles tentatives de négociations indirectes. Nous vous demandons donc de bien vouloir éviter des navettes inutiles tant que les massacres et autres tribulations s'exécuteront impunément sous vos yeux par les INTERAHAMWE-CDR et autres militaires hors contrôle et en mal de commandement.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'assurance de notre haute considération.

Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE  
Président du FPR - INKOTANYI.





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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIDE UNAMIR KIGALI

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- E. 3 X SPARTAN (ARMOURED PERSON)
- F. 850 X GRENADE FRAGMENTATION.
- G. 2 X TRAILOR CLASS III (JET A 4)
- H. 2 X WATER TRAILORS.

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U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 17 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: EQUIPMENT HANDED OVER TO UNAMIR BY BELGIUM

1. THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT WAS HANDED OVER TO UNAMIR BY BELGIUM DURING THEIR EVACUATION FROM RWANDA:

- A. 428 X 60MM HE.
- B. 1 X .50 CAL HMG.
- C. 10,000 X .50 CAL LINK BALL.
- D. 95 X LAW ROCKETS.
- E. 3 X SPARTAN (ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS).
- F. 850 X GRENADE FRAGMENTATION.
- G. 2 X TRAILOR CLASS III (JET A 4)
- H. 2 X WATER TRAILORS.
- I. 4 X SD H20.
- J. 3 OR 13 4 TON TRUCKS.
- K. 3 X FORKLIFTS.
- L. 11500 X RATION PACKS (1 DAY\1 MAN).
- M. 31000 X LITRES OF WATER (3 LITRES\1 DAY\1 MAN).

2. REGARDS.

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## EQUIPMENT FROM KIBAT TO BE MOVED BY AIR (\*MARKED ITEMS STAY)

TYPE APPRO/MAT	EXISTANTS KIGALI	BESOINS ROUTE	RESTE	COMMENTAIRES
1. MOR 4"2	0	0	0	
2. MILAN	12	12	0	
3. MSL MILAN	32	24	0	
4. MOR 60 mm HE	644	216 *	428	+ 400 in NAIROBI
5. MOR 60 mm	6	6 *	0	+ 11 from NAIROBI
6. Mi .50	10	9 *	1	+ 10 from NAIROBI
7. .50 LINK BALL	12000	2000 *	10000	but need more ammo
8. LAW ROCK HEAT	215	120 *	95	+ 300 from NAIROBI
9. CVRT	9 (6xSCI, 3xSPA)	6xSCI	3xSPA	+ 6xM113, + 1xSAMSDA, 1xSAMA
10. FRAG GREN	1300	450 *	850	+ 1000 from NAIROBI
11. BOWZER(JET A4)	1	1	0	EN CAS D'UTILISATION HELI
12. TRL CL III (JET A4)	2	0	2	+ UNIMOG, + ILTIS
13. CA H20	0	0	0	
14. WATER TRL	2	3 *	2	MANQUE 1xTRL H20
15. BERLIET	0	0		2x BERLIET DETRUTTS
16. SD H20	4	0	4	+ 2xPOMPE VARISCO
17. SD CL III	0	0		
18. MAN 4T	20	17 ou 7	3 ou 13	TPT MAT ROUTE OU AIR (VEIR DERNIERE REMARQUE)
19. CLIMAX	3	0	3	DONT 1 CLIMAX NONOPS (FORKLIFTS)
20. CL I CRAT	13500 (SIT 15 AUR)	2000	500	5 JOURS/HOMME
21. CL I WATER	37000 (SIT 15 AUR)	6000	31000	3 LR/HOMME/JOUR
22. CL III MOGAS	4500LR (SIT 15 AUR)	6000 LR		20 LR/100KM/VEH(300KM)
23. CL III DIESO	3300LR (SIT 15 AUR)	1200 LR		
24. BAGGAGES PERS	200M3			2xAC130 (VOLUME)
25. BAGGAGES COLLECTIVES	150M3			2xAC130 (VOLUME)







EQUIPMENT FROM KIBAT TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO BYUBAT  
IF KIBAT IS TO BE MOVED BY AIR THE ITEMS MARKED\* WILL REMAIN FOR BYUBAT

18 APRIL 1994

TYPE APPRO/MAT	EXISTANTS KIGALI	BESOINS ROUTE	RESTE	COMMENTAIRES
1. MOR 4"2	0	0	0	
2. MILAN	12	12	0	
3. MSL MILAN	32	24	0	
4. MOR 60 mm HE	644	216 *	428	+ 400 in NAIROBI
5. MOR 60 mm	6	6 *	0	+ 11 from NAIROBI
6. Mi .50	10	9 *	1	+ 10 from NAIROBI
7. .50 LINK BALL	12000	2000 *	10000	but need more ammo
8. LAW ROCK HEAT	215	120 *	95	+ 300 from NAIROBI
9. CVRT	9 (6xSCI, 3xSPA)	6xSCI	3xSPA	+ 6xM113, + 1xSAMSDA, 1xSAMA
10. FRAG GREN	1300	450 *	850	+ 1000 from NAIROBI
11. BOWZER(JET A4)	1	1	0	EN CAS D'UTILISATION HELI
12. TRL CL III (JET A4)	2	0	2	+ UNIMOG, + ILTIS
13. CA H20	0	0	0	
14. WATER TRL	2	3 *	2	MANQUE 1xTRL H20
15. BERLIET	0	0		2x BERLIET DETRUIITS
16. SD H20	4	0	4	+ 2xPOMPE VARISCO
17. SD CL III	0	0		
18. MAN 4T	20	17 ou 7	3 ou 13	TPT MAT ROUTE OU AIR (VEIR DERNIERE REMARQUE)
19. CLIMAX	3	0	3	DONT 1 CLIMAX NONOPS (FORKLIFTS)
20. CL I CRAT	13500 (SIT 15 AUR)	2000	500	5 JOURS/HOMME
21. CL I WATER	37000 (SIT 15 AUR)	6000	31000	3 LR/HOMME/JOUR
22. CL III MOGAS	4500LR (SIT 15 AUR)	6000 LR		20 LR/100KM/VEH(300KM)
23. CL III DIESO	3300LR (SIT 15 AUR)	1200 LR		
24. BAGGAGES PERS	200M3			2xAC130 (VOLUME)
25. BAGGAGES COLLECTIVES	150M3			2xAC130 (VOLUME)

NOTE: SEVERAL M6 (WITH 7.62 AND 5.56 AMMO) WOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE IF KIBAT GOES BY AIR.



CRN-123

1/6

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

194 APR 16 21 54

194 APR 16 22 20

TO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: ANNAN/GOULDING

FROM: *[Signature]* BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALISUBJECT: Ceasefire- Rwanda conflict

DATE: 16 APRIL 1994

MIR-777

1. My telecommunication facilities have been disrupted by recent developments in Kigali. Hence, my inability to reach the Secretary-General by phone as he has requested. Please transmit the following note to him.

2. On 15 April 1994, I convened a meeting between the RPF and the RGF to explore the possibility of a ceasefire. The atmosphere in the meeting was cordial but RPF presented a set of conditions to be fulfilled before participating in discussions for a ceasefire. (Document in French containing Preconditions attached). RGF agreed to study the document and react to it at the next meeting the following day.

3. On 16 April 1994, I urged both parties to be flexible and to prioritise their demands since some conditions could best be implemented by the Broad-Based Transitional Institutions. RPF called to state that a follow-up meeting will be futile if RGF did not stop the massacres. RGF informed me that a meeting was being convened on the situation in Rwanda today in Kampala by President Museveni and that the RPF and the RGF will be represented by the First Vice President of RPF and the Rwanda Ambassador in Uganda, respectively. Consequently, RGF suggested we await the outcome of that meeting before both sides meet again. Meanwhile, the RGF issued the attached statement which appears to be its response to the preconditions of the RPF.

4. At 20.00 hours local time, the national Radio of Rwanda announced a new group of military leaders, including a new Chief of Staff appointed by the self-proclaimed interim government. The new group of military leaders did not include the leaders earlier appointed by the "Crisis Committee". We have not determined the tendencies of this new group. Their initial statement is however conciliatory. General Dallaire is scheduled to meet with General Kagame of the RPF tomorrow and will raise the question of the ceasefire and the worsening humanitarian situation. We also plan to meet the new military leaders of the RGF. Thereafter, we will undertake a thorough appraisal of the overall situation and inform you accordingly.

5. Regards.



PRECONDITIONS A UNE EVENTUELLE RENCONTRE  
DE DISCUSSION D'UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU

UNAMIR

1. Arrêter et faire arrêter les massacres sur tout le territoire rwandais.

MOYENS DE VERIFICATION

- a/ Rétablir les communications téléphoniques dans le bâtiment du CND: 3 lignes dont deux capables de couvrir l'ensemble du Pays et une de portée internationale.
- b/ Constituer les patrouilles conjointes (FPR- MINUAR- FAR) sur tout le territoire national afin de vérifier l'arrêt effectif des massacres et de faire état des lieux.
- c/ Accorder le libre accès aux journalistes qui veulent arriver au bâtiment du CND.
- d/ Publier la liste des personnalités politiques assassinées sur tout le territoire rwandais et évaluer le nombre de victimes des massacres.
- e/ Accepter d'associer à cette tâche tout individu ou groupe susceptible d'aider.

2. Condamner la Garde Présidentielle pour avoir initié les massacres et la mettre hors d'état de nuire.

MOYENS DE VERIFICATION

- a/ Mettre la Garde Présidentielle sous commandement, la désarmer et la cantonner dans les camps sous la supervision conjointe dans l'attente de traduire en justice les éléments coupables.
- b/ Dissolution de la Garde Présidentielle.
- c/ Rechercher les éléments coupables sur tout le territoire rwandais.
- d/ Emettre un communiqué radiodiffusé (quatre fois par jour) condamnant les actes de la Garde Présidentielle. Ce communiqué sera en Kinyarwanda et en Français. Ce texte doit être préalablement approuvé par le F.P.R.

3. Condamnation et arrestation sans complaisance de tous ces groupes (INTERAHAMWE, CDR, les éléments militaires et autres membres des organes de sécurité).

MOYENS DE VERIFICATION

- a/ Condamner et sanctionner le commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale pour son inertie face aux massacres. Ceci ferait l'objet d'un communiqué radiodiffusé (quatre fois par jour) rédigé en Kinyarwanda et en Français avec l'approbation du texte par le F.P.R.
- b/ Arrêter et traduire en justice tous les éléments des milices qui se seraient rendus coupables des massacres et autres délits.
- c/ Lancer un appel à la restitution de toutes les armes à feu distribuées à la population civile. Ce communiqué sera radiodiffusé quatre fois par jour en Kinyarwanda et en Français.
- d/ Destituer immédiatement toutes les autorités locales soupçonnées d'avoir commandité, exécuté et fait exécuter les massacres.
- e/ Arrêter tous les politiciens et journalistes qui ont tenu des propos d'incitation aux massacres ou des propos incendiaires.
- f/ Fermer immédiatement et sans autres préalables toutes les émissions de la Radio R.T.L.M. Utiliser la Radio Rwanda à des fins de réconciliation nationale étant entendu que la censure conjointe des émissions de la radio nationale reste acquise. Pour cela, il ne faudra garder en fonction que les journalistes réputés non sectaires sur les antennes de la Radio Rwanda.




**4. Dénonciation du Gouvernement et du Président auto-proclamés.****MOYENS DE VERIFICATION**

- a/ Emettre un communiqué radiodiffusé quatre fois par jour en Kinyarwanda et en Français. Ce communiqué doit être préalablement approuvé par le F.P.R.
- b/ Restitution par les membres du Gouvernement et par le Président auto-proclamés de tous les moyens de l'Etat à leur disposition.
- c/ Contrôle de tous les actes posés par ce gouvernement et par le Président auto-proclamés.
- d/ Poursuite à titre individuel des membres qui se seraient rendus coupables d'actes de malversations et de participation à l'incitation du peuple à la haine et à la violence.

TOUTES CES DISPOSITIONS NE SONT QUE DES PRECONDITIONS NON NEGOCIABLES ET A METTRE EN APPLICATION IMMEDIATEMENT.

FAIT A KIGALI CE 15 AVRIL 1994



*Dr. Jacques BIHOZAGARA*  
**VICE-PREMIER MINISTRE DESIGNE**  
**SECRETAIRE D'ETAT A LA REHABILITATION ET A LA REINTEGRATION SOCIALE**



Kigali le 16.04-1994

Mécanismes à mettre en place  
pour faciliter le retour  
à la Paix.

---

1. Arrêt immédiat des Tirs et des opérations militaires (combats, infiltrations, sabotage des infrastructures) pour :
  - a. Permettre aux autorités administratives de faire des tournées de pacification et de tenir des réunions et meetings de sensibilisation.
  - b. Permettre aux Forces de l'ordre de faire des patrouilles préventives et d'entamer la poursuite des malfructeurs récalcitrants.  
En effet les Gendarmes, les Policiers et le Parquet ne peuvent rien faire aussi longtemps que le FPR tire sur eux.




- c. Permettre le ravitaillement des personnes déplacées et de mener d'autres opérations humanitaires
- d. Permettre l'évacuation des blessés l'administration des soins.
- e. Permettre le ramassage des corps et leur inhumation...
- f. Permettre aux Services techniques de réparer les Infrastructures abîmées par les combats.
- g. Permettre la reprise des activités administratives et économiques.

- 2. Créer les couloirs de ravitaillement des Forces des 2 parties
- 3. Arrêter les expéditions punitives et les opérations de vengeance menées par le FPR.
- 4. Mettre fin à la campagne médiatique mensongère et provocatrice diffusée par le Radio du HRP et ses correspondants



5. Rechercher et neutraliser les militaires égarés qui participent aux pillages et exactions diverses contre la populations
6. Organiser des rencontres fréquentes entre les responsables des FAR et du FPR dans le cadre de la Confiance Building

GATSINZI Marcel

 autte

Col. BETI

Chef ETI AR (Ri)



UNAMIR

194 APR 14 15 25

CRN-117

1/5

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 14 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-762

SUBJECT: CONCEPT AND PLANS FOR OPTIONS

REFERENCE: CNR 91 DATED 13 APRIL 1994

1. ACK RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND ATTACHED TO THIS CODE CABLE IS THE REQUIRED CONCEPTS AND PLANS FOR THE OPTIONS YOU DIRECTED US TO EXAMINE.

2. OUR RECOMMENDATION AS IS SUPPORTED IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT IS THAT UNAMIR REMAIN AT ITS PRESENT STRENGTH LESS KIBAT AS PER OPTION 1 OF YOUR PAPER WHICH IS OPTION 3 OF OUR PAPER.

3. IN ADDITION PLEASE FIND A LIST OF BELGIAN EQUIPMENT THAT IS IN KIGALI THAT UNAMIR WISHES TO OBTAIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR DIRECTION.

4. REGARDS.

194 APR 14 15 37  
UNAMIR



2/5

14 APRIL 1994

LIST OF EQUIPMENT FROM BELGIUM FOR UNAMIR

<u>SER</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>AMMUNITION</u>
1	4.2 INCH MORTAR	4	80 RDS HE (TRAINERS REQUIRED)
2	MILAN	16	32 MISSILES (TRAINERS REQUIRED)
3.	MORTAR 60 MM	8	140 RDS HE
4.	.50 CAL HMG	9	45,000 RDS
5.	LIGHT ANTI-TANK	140	-
6.	CVRT	12	120 RDS PER VEHICLE (NEED TRAINERS)
7.	HAND GRENADE	1000	-
8.	FUEL TRUCKS	?	NEED ALL
9.	WATER TRUCKS AND WATER TRAILORS	?	NEED ALL
10.	HEAVY RECOVERY VEHICLE	1	
11.	BLADDERS WITH PUMPS	?	NEED ALL
12.	HEAVY TRUCKS	?	NEED ALL
13.	FORKLIFT	?	NEED ALL

  
R. A. Dallaire  
MGen  
Force Commander



A REAPPRAISAL OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVELGENERAL SITUATION

1. As the military situation between the RPF and the RGF deteriorates and both sides remain belligerent, the general situation in Kigali remains very unclear. This is not to mention that both sides have hesitated to agree to at least initial talks to be hosted by UNAMIR.
2. At the moment, it has become very clear that the DMZ no longer exists due to violations largely by the RPF. UNAMIR troops in KIGALI have been confined to their present locations due to the insecurity in the city. The force is however carrying out escort duties to expatriates in same humanitarian assistance and providing its own security.
3. The evacuation of foreign nationals is almost completed with the French and Belgian troops about to leave.
4. With the insecurity in the city of Kigali at the moment and the fact that the Belgian component of UNAMIR has become a target of the Rwandese people, the Belgian government has decided to withdraw the Belgian battalion and staff officers with UNAMIR (428 all ranks). This pull out will commence anytime from now.
5. While UNAMIR should not appear to be intimidated by the by the negative propaganda being waged, it must also be brought out that UNAMIR has maintained a neutral stand in the conflict despite all these accusations.
6. This mission was started at the invitation of the warring factions after the Arusha Peace Accord, and so far none of these parties has asked for the withdrawal of the force. On the contrary both parties continue to ask for and depend upon UNAMIR to help in re-structuring their country's future.
7. With the current exchanges of fire using all kinds of weapons resulting in a large number of displaced persons and unexploded EODs, the engineer and humanitarian roles of UNAMIR will certainly be required to a large extent when a cease-fire is finally brokered. For example escort duties to humanitarian organisations will increase, so will be security of UN installations and property.
8. In the light of the above, it has become necessary to take a second look at the UNAMIR Force level and also examine a few options open in order to re-group and consolidate while at the same time maintaining an efficient force to carry out its mandate in the face of the Belgian pull out.



# OPTIONS

9. An appreciation of the situation brings out the following options.

a. Option I. To reduce the force to a strength of about 200 personnel (a Coy plus with some observers and civpol.

(1) Advantages. The only advantage of this option is that the UN will maintain a small force in Rwanda which will show some UN presence in the country.

(2) Disadvantages: These are:

(a) The force will be too small to carry out any tasks when hostilities cease between the factions.

(b) The force will not be able to defend itself should hostilities be directed at it.

b. Option II. To reduce the force level to between 1200 and 1300. (ie half current strength of Byubut, Rutbat, Tunisian Coy (-) and some elements of Engr, Log and Med Pls).

(1) Advantages:

(a) There will be some UN presence in Rwanda.

(b) Logistics requirements to maintain the force will be reduced below the present level.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) There will be a reduced force level to carry out the mandate of the force.

(b) The force may not be able to protect itself should the need arise.

c. Option III. To keep the force strength at approximately 2100, (current strength less the strength of the Belgians) and take over equipment to be left behind by the Belgians.

(1) Advantages. These are as follows:

(a) There would still be a reasonable large force to show UN presence and also carry out UNAMIR's mandate even though some duties will have to be combined.



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(b) All units will have been consolidated in Kigali for ease of administration and logistic re-supply.

(c) Troops still serving with the mission could continue using the equipment left behind by the Belgians.

(d) There will be a reduction in the maintenance cost of the force.

(e) It is good for the morale of all the troops that have worked through this perilous period to continue with the mission.

(2) Disadvantages. The only disadvantage here

is that it will take some time to train other nationals to use the equipment to be left behind by the Belgians.

#### CONCLUSION

10. It should be noted here that UNAMIR troops have remained resolute over the period with the hope that some sanity will prevail on the factions for an amicable compromise to be found to the current crisis. We do however face significant logistical problems that need to be solved in the very short order. Concerted efforts to be made to alleviate this critical weakness in the force.

11. There is also the hope that both factions may return to the Arusha Peace Agreement and this will make it prudent to adopt the third option in order to maintain a UN presence even though at a slightly reduced strength and operating with the additional equipment to be left behind by the Belgians.

12. The advantages of this are enormous and will help UNAMIR maintain its neutrality and credibility in the face of all odds. The future of UNAMIR will have to be revised in due course.

#### RECOMMENDATION

13. It is strongly recommended that Option III be adopted.

  
RA DALLAIRE  
Major-General  
Force Commander



DUTY OFFER'S - LOG BOOK

Date:

SER	TIME	Msg FROM	Msg TO	Message	Action taken																												
	1325	F28	F0	<p><u>State of Heavy Wpn and Ammo of Belgics</u></p> <table><thead><tr><th><u>Ser</u></th><th><u>Type</u></th><th><u>No</u></th><th><u>Ammo</u></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1.</td><td>MOR 4'2 INCH</td><td>4 per</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>2.</td><td>MILAN Anti Tank</td><td>16 per</td><td>32 missiles</td></tr><tr><td>3.</td><td>MOR 60 mm</td><td>08 per</td><td>140 rds.</td></tr><tr><td>4.</td><td>.50 Auto gun</td><td>09 per</td><td>45,000 rds.</td></tr><tr><td>5.</td><td>Lt Atk</td><td>140 per</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>6.</td><td>Lt Arms to veh CVRT</td><td>— 12 per</td><td>120 rds per CVRT</td></tr></tbody></table>	<u>Ser</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Ammo</u>	1.	MOR 4'2 INCH	4 per	—	2.	MILAN Anti Tank	16 per	32 missiles	3.	MOR 60 mm	08 per	140 rds.	4.	.50 Auto gun	09 per	45,000 rds.	5.	Lt Atk	140 per		6.	Lt Arms to veh CVRT	— 12 per	120 rds per CVRT	
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				<p>7. Hand Grenade — 1000 —</p> <p><u>Note:</u> More details are avail with F28, may be contacted if nec.</p>																													



UNAMIR  
194 APR 14 15 25

CRN-117 1/5

U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE  
MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 14 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-762  
C SUBJECT: CONCEPT AND PLANS FOR OPTIONS  
REFERENCE: CNR 91 DATED 13 APRIL 1994

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2/5

14 APRIL 1994

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6.	CVRT	12	120 RDS PER VEHICLE (NEED TRAINERS)
7.	HAND GRENADE	1000	-
8.	FUEL TRUCKS	?	NEED ALL
9.	WATER TRUCKS AND WATER TRAILORS	?	NEED ALL
10.	HEAVY RECOVERY VEHICLE 1		
11.	BLADDERS WITH PUMPS ?		NEED ALL
12.	HEAVY TRUCKS	?	NEED ALL
13.	FORKLIFT	?	NEED ALL

  
R. A. Dallaire  
MGen  
Force Commander



3/5

## A REAPPRAISAL OF THE UNAMIR FORCE LEVEL

### GENERAL SITUATION

1. As the military situation between the RPF and the RGF deteriorates and both sides remain belligerent, the general situation in Kigali remains very unclear. This is not to mention that both sides have hesitated to agreement for at least initial talk to be hosted by UNAMIR.
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- C 6. This mission was started at the invitation of the warring factions after the Arusha Peace Accord, and so far none of these parties has asked for the withdrawal of the force. On the contrary both parties continue to ask for and depend upon UNAMIR to help in re-structuring their country's future.
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#### OPTIONS

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RA DALLAIRE  
Major-General  
Force Commander



U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 14 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: CONCEPT AND PLAN FOR OPTIONS FOR RETENTION OF UNAMIR

REFERENCE: CNR 91 DATED 13 APRIL 1994

1. ACK RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND THE OPTIONS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED IN DETAIL AND THE FOLLOWING CONCEPT AND PLAN FOR EACH OPTION IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. IN ADDITION A THIRD OPTION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED WHICH BALANCES BETWEEN THE FIRST TWO OPTIONS. THIS COMPLEMENTS OUR LAST CODE CABLE ON THE OPTION ANALYSIS.

2. OPTION 1. THIS OPTION DICTATES THAT UNAMIR LESS KIBAT WOULD REMAIN FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO THREE WEEKS.

3. CONCEPT. THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF THIS OPTION WOULD BE THAT THIS REASONABLE FORCE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE AND ASSISTING IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REQUIRED FOR THE INSTALLATION AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATION OF THE BBTG AND THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

4. TASKS. THE TASKS OF THIS FORCE WOULD BE:

- A. PROVIDING ARMED ESCORTS AND SECURITY FOR JOINT MEETINGS AT NEUTRAL ZONES SECURED BY THE FORCE.
- B. MONITORING THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW, ORDER AND SECURITY OF CIVILIANS WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE AREAS AND BY THE PARTIES.
- C. PROTECT UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS.
- D. DEFEND THE AIRPORT AND ITS APPROACHES WITHIN A NEUTRAL ZONE CONTROLLED EXCLUSIVELY BY UNAMIR (THIS NEUTRAL ZONE MUST BE
- E. ASSIST IN THE SECURITY AND POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTION AND PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND CONTINUED EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. CREATED AND PROVIDED
- F. MONITOR AND ASSIST IN THE REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED



PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES.

- G. CONDUCT SECURITY PATROLLING WITHIN THE GREATER KIGALI AREA.

5. FORCE STRUCTURE. THE FORCE FOR THIS OPTION WOULD BE:

- A. ENGINEER COMPANY (203) WOULD BE BASED IN THE STADIUM. ITS PRIMARY TASK WOULD BE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (IE DIGGING MASS GRAVES, REPAIR OF WATER, SEWAGE AND HYDRO FACILITIES, EOD, MINE CLEARANCE, REPAIR TO CRITICAL BUILDINGS ETC).
- B. MOVEMENT CONTROL PLATOON (20) WOULD BE BASED AT THE AIRPORT. ITS PRIMARY TASK WILL BE TO CONTROL THE MOVEMENT OF AERIAL RESUPPLY OF UNAMIR AND THE ARRIVAL AND UNLOADING OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
- C. MILITARY POLICE (11) WOULD BE BASED AT THE FORCE HQ. IT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL HQ SECURITY.
- D. LOGISTICS COMPANY (200) WOULD BE BASED AT ITS LOGISTICS BASE AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVISION SECOND LINE SUPPORT OF THE FORCE FROM THE AIRPORT TO UNIT LOCATIONS.
- E. BYUBAT (800) WOULD BE BASED AT THE AIRPORT AND IN THE LOCAL AREA. IT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE DEFENCE OF THE AIRPORT. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE ONE APC MOUNTED QUICK REACTION FORCE FOR RESERVE TASKS AND ONE MOUNTED COMPANY FOR ARMED ESCORT TASKS INCLUDING EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS.
- F. RUTBAT (400) WOULD BE BASED AT THE AMAHORO STADIUM AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY OF THE AMAHORO COMPLEX (INCLUDING THE FORCE HQ) AND VEHICLE AND FOOT PATROLS WITHIN THE GREATER KIGALI AREA TO MONITOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER AND SECURITY OF THE CIVIL POPULATION.
- G. TUNISIAN COMPANY (-) (60) WOULD BE BASED AT THE KING FAISEL HOSPITAL AND THE MERIDIEN HOTEL. BOTH OF THESE LOCATIONS WOULD BE NEUTRAL AREAS. THE HOSPITAL WOULD PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POPULATION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF NGOs AND THE MERIDIEN WOULD BE A NEUTRAL MEETING PLACE. THE COMPANY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY AT BOTH LOCATIONS.
- H. MILOB GROUP, KIGALI AND DMZ HEADQUARTERS WOULD BE COLLAPSED AND INTEGRATED INTO A SINGLE FORCE HQ (75) WHICH WOULD BE BASED AT THE AMAHORO HOTEL AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE FORCE.
- I. MEDICAL PLATOON (50) WOULD BE BASED AT THE KING FAISEL HOSPITAL AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MEDICAL SUPPORT



TO THE FORCE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POPULATION.

- J. UNMOs WOULD BE REDUCED AND WOULD RESPOND TO A MILOB SECTION IN FORCE HQ FOR MONITORING TASKS THROUGHOUT RWANDA LIKE MONITORING THE REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER, THE SECURITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, THE MOVEMENT AND PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ETC. UNOMUR UNMOs WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE.

6. OPTION 2. THIS OPTION DICTATES THAT UNAMIR WILL BE REDUCED CONCURRENT WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF KIBAT USING AN AMENDED WITHDRAWAL PLAN OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN PROVIDED A COPY.

7. CONCEPT. THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF THIS OPTION WOULD BE THAT THIS TOKEN FORCE WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL MISSION WITH A SMALL SECURITY AND MONITORING ELEMENT. THE ROLE OF THIS ELEMENT WOULD BE TO PROVIDE LIMITED SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT AND AT THE JOINT MEETING PLACE\ACCOMMODATION FACILITY.

8. TASKS. THE TASKS OF THIS FORCE WOULD BE:

- A. PROVIDE AN ARMED PRESENCE AND SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT.
- B. PROVIDE SECURITY AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL NEUTRAL ZONE FOR ACCOMMODATION OF THE FORCE AND AS A JOINT MEETING PLACE.
- C. PROVIDE ARMED ESCORTS FOR THE PARTIES FOR JOINT MEETINGS.
- D. PROVIDE SERVICE SUPPORT TO THE FORCE.
- E. PROVIDE A MONITORING AND LIAISON CAPABILITY.

9. FORCE STRUCTURE. THE TASKS OF THIS ELEMENT WOULD BE:

- A. FORCE HQ (-) (20) WOULD BE BASED IN THE MERIDIEN HOTEL AND WOULD PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE MILITARY ELEMENT. THE FC WOULD PROVIDE MILITARY ADVICE TO THE SRSG DURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTIES.
- B. FORCE SUPPORT GROUP (20) WOULD CONSIST OF MOV CON, MEDICAL, AND LOGISTICS ELEMENTS BASED AT THE AIRPORT. THEY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FIRST LINE SERVICE SUPPORT TO THE FORCE.
- C. TUNISIA COMPANY (60) WOULD BE BASED AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE MERIDIEN HOTEL AS AN ACCOMMODATION CANTER FOR UNAMIR AND A NEUTRAL ZONE FOR JOINT MEETINGS.
- D. GHANA COMPANY (100) WOULD BE BASED AT THE AIRPORT AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENCE OF THE AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING WHICH WOULD BE DECLARED A NEUTRAL



ZONE SECURED BY UNAMIR, MOUNTED ARMED ESCORTS, AND RESERVE TASKS.

- E. UNMO TEAMS (25) TO BE BASED AT THE AIRPORT AND THE MERIDIEN HOTEL WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING TASKS, LIAISON AND UNARMED ESCORT TASKS.

10. OPTION 3. THIS OPTION IS PROPOSED AS A THIRD CONSIDERATION BASED ON MAINTAINING MINIMUM VIABLE CAPABILITY WHICH CAN BE REDUCED OR ENLARGED DEPENDANT UPON THE SUCCESS OF STAGNATION\DEGRADATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

11. CONCEPT. THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF THIS OPTION WOULD BE THAT THIS MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE CEASEFIRE AND SECURITY OF KIGALI AND PROVIDING AN ARMED FORCE TO PROTECT THE AIRPORT, THE MERIDIEN HOTEL NEUTRAL ZONE, THE HOSPITAL AND TO PROVIDE AN ARMED PRESENCE AND RESERVE IN KIGALI.

12. TASKS. THE TASKS OF THIS FORCE WOULD BE THE SAME AS PER OPTION 1 EXCEPT THE NUMBER OF LOCATIONS FOR THE FORCE WOULD BE REDUCED DUE TO THE LESSER NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN THE FORCE.

13. FORCE STRUCTURE. THE FORCE WOULD BE STRUCTURED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. FORCE HQ (50) WOULD BE BASED IN THE MERIDIEN HOTEL AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE FORCE.
- B. MOVEMENT CONTROL SECTION (10) WOULD BE BASED AT THE AIRPORT AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVEMENT CONTROL TASKS IN SUPPORT OF THE FORCE.
- C. MILITARY POLICE SECTION (10) WOULD BE BASED AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL HEADQUARTERS SECURITY AT THE MERIDIEN.
- D. MEDICAL HOSPITAL (50) WOULD BE BASED AT THE KING FAISEL HOSPITAL AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE FORCE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
- E. TWO SMALL BATTALIONS (GHANA AND BANGLADESH) WOULD BE BASED AT THE AIRPORT AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENCE OF THE AIRPORT, STATIC GUARD TASKS AT UN INSTALLATIONS, ARMED ESCORT, PATROLLING AND RESERVE TASKS. THE ENGINEER\PIONEER PLATOON COULD UNDERTAKE DEMINING TASKS.
- F. UNMO GROUP (100) WOULD BE BASED AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL BUT WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN EACH PREFECTURE. ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE MONITORING LAW, ORDER AND SECURITY, LIAISON AND INFORMATION GATHERING.
- G. ANOTHER OPTION WITH THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS WOULD BE TO LEAVE THE GHANA BATTALION (800) IN KIGALI AND REPATRIATE THE BANGLADESH BATTALION. TWO SMALL



BATTALIONS DOUBLES THE OVERHEAD IN HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT AND REDUCES LINE CAPABILITY. IT ALSO FACILITATES COMMAND AND CONTROL WHEN ALL COMPANY'S COME FROM THE SAME ARMY AND THEREFORE SHARE COMMON DOCTRINE, TRAINING AND PROCEDURES.

PREFERRED OPTION

14. GIVEN THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO ACCEPT OPTION 1. A FORCE OF THAT SIZE CAN BE EASILY SUPPORTED BY AIR FOR THREE WEEKS AFTER WHICH ITS NORMAL SUPPLY SYSTEM CAN BE IN PLACE IF THE PEACE PROCESS IS IN PLACE. IN ADDITION, TURNOVER AND TRAINING OF BELGIAN EQUIPMENT CAN READILY BE DONE AT THE AIRPORT.

15. OPTION 2 IS FEASIBLE BASED ON THE STATED AIM OF THAT MISSION. THIS MISSION WOULD MERELY MAINTAIN A UN PRESENCE AND PROVIDE SOME PROTECTION FOR KEY UN PERSONNEL IN KIGALI AND IT COULD PROVIDE LIMITED SECURITY AT JOINT MEETINGS.

16. OPTION 3 IS AN ACCEPTABLE MEDIUM BETWEEN OPTIONS 1 AND 2 AS A MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE THAT CAN MAINTAIN AN ARMED PRESENCE IN KIGALI FOR SECURITY AND PROTECTION TASKS AND CAN SUPPORT THE PROGRESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS. IT IS HOWEVER A SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER FORCE THAN OPTION 1 AND THEREFORE HAS LESS ENDURANCE AND CAPABILITY.

CONCLUSION

17. OPTION 1 IS THE REASONABLE AND RESPONSIBLE RESPONSE TO THIS PROBLEM AT THIS TIME AND OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN RESTORING THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA. THE SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE BULK OF THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT EQUIPMENT AND STORES BE TRANSFERRED TO BYUBAT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT UNITS EFFECTIVENESS.



1/8

UNAMIR  
194 APR 14 04 24

UNAMIR  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE  
MOST IMMEDIATE

CRN-116

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 14 15 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-758

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER FOR WITHDRAWAL

REFERENCE: TELCON ANNAN/DALLAIRE 14 APRIL 1994.

1. ATTACHED TO THIS CODE CABLE IS THE OPERATION ORDER FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR FROM RWANDA.

2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR  
194 APR 14 05 21



Copy No of

UNAMIR  
Force HQ

April 1994

OPERATION ORDER NO - 41. SITUATION.a. RPF/RGF Forces

(1) After the death of President HABİYARIMANA, the situation deteriorated very fast. Mass killing of civilian population in and around Kigali created panic and fear among the habitants of Kigali. RGF along with Gendarmerie initially started the massacre and subsequently the civilian Hutus joined them in expediting the mass killing.

(2) Initially RPF high command did not react to the activities of the RGF but soon they ran out of patience and came out of CND. By 07 Apr 94, RPF has consolidated in and around CND and fanned out upto Hotel Village in the north, Remera in the south, Amahoro Stadium in the east and Meridien round-about in the west. As on 13 Apr 94 morning, RGF and Gendarmerie position both from north and south, RPF are carrying out mopping up operations.

(3) New CAS of RGF has offered unconditional cease-fire to RPF. UNAMIR is the mediator of the probable cease-fire. This cease-fire deal is being sent to RPF authorities. However, it has become very difficult for UNAMIR to function under the present circumstances more especially since both sides (RPF and RGF) seems never to honour their word.

b. UNAMIR Forces

(1) DMZ Sec HQ and BYUBAT have re-adjusted their position at NKUMBA and KINIHIRA. Force Engr Coy has withdrawn from BYUMBA and presently located at Amahoro Stadium. All their heavy vehicles/equipments are at BYUMBA.

(2) One Coy of KIBAT, which was located at city area, is now located at Kigali International Airport (KIA).



2. MISSION. To withdraw UNAMIR forces from RWANDA on order.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. Withdrawal of UNAMIR Forces will be conducted in TWO phases:

(1) Phase 1

(a) Concentration of all assets of DMZ sector at KABALE.

(b) Concentration of rest of the forces at KIGALI.

(c) Attempt to recover as much assets as possible from BYUMBA.

(d) Thinning out of all non-essential personnel and equipments.

(2) Phase 2. Withdrawal through:

(a) DMZ Sector to KABALE to KAMPALA.

(b) Kigali Sector through KIA.

(c) UNMOs located on the northern side through KABALE and rest through KIA and nearest crossing points to their present locations.

(d) All other troops to withdraw through Kigali Airport.

b. Kigali Sector

(1) Grouping

(a) KIBAT.

(b) RUTBAT.

(c) BYUBAT GOLF.

(d) TUN Coy.



(4) Tasks(a) Phase 1

- i. Concentrate all assets at respective Battalion/Coy areas.
- ii. Secure Kigali International Airport (KIA) and routes AIRPORT-KIGALI where UNAMIR troops are located.
- iii. Defend KIA.

(b) Phase 2

- i. Continue to defend KIA.
- ii. Thin-out all non-essentials.
- iii. Withdrawal of main forces.
- iv. Withdraw from KIA to NAIROBI - KENYA.

c. DMZ Sector(1) Grouping

- (a) BYUBAT less BYUBAT GOLF.
- (b) Troops of Sector HQ.
- (c) Any other troops at DMZ Sector Area.

(2) Tasks(a) Phase 1

- i. Concentrate all personnel and equipments at KABALE.
- ii. Recover all possible equipments from BYUMBA.

(b) Phase 2

- i. Withdraw by road from KABALE to KAMPALA.
- ii. Leave KAMPALA on orders.



d. MILOB Gp(1) Tasks(a) Phase 1

i. All UNMOs located around DMZ and Northern Sector to concentrate at KABALE.

ii. Rest of UNMOs to concentrate at KIGALI.

iii. Provide escorts and LO as and when required.

(b) Phase 2

i. UNMOs at KABALE to withdraw through KAMPALA.

ii. Rest of UNMOs to withdraw through KIGALI.

e. Force Engr Coy

(1) Grouping. Under command RUTBAT.

(2) Tasks

(a) Be prepared to perform road clearance tasks on order.

(b) Retrieve essential equipments from BYUMBA.

(c) Withdraw on orders as per plan of RUTBAT.

f. Force Log Coy

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks. On order, withdraw through KIA to NAIROBI.

g. Medical Platoon(1) Grouping

(a) One First Aid Det (FAD).

(b) Med platoon (-).



(2) Tasks

(a) Med platoon (-), on order, withdraw through KIA.

(b) FAD to deploy at AMAHORO stadium and provide medical support during all the phases. On order withdraw through KIA to NAIROBI.

h. Mov Control(1) Grouping

(a) KIA Control Detachment.

(b) Mov Control Platoon (-).

(2) Tasks

(1) Mov Control Platoon (-) to withdraw on orders through KIA.

(2) KIA Control Det to assist Force HQ through all the phases and withdraw with Force HQ to NAIROBI.

j. MP Sec

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks

(a) In phase 1 remain under command Kigali Sector.

(b) In phase 2 control traffic and persons at KIA.

k. Coordinating Instructions(1) Timing

(a) Phase 1 starts with codeword "HARBOUR LIGHTS" on "WHISKY-Day".

(b) W: "HARBOR LIGHTS".

i. Prepare secure move to KIGALI.

ii. Defend KIA.



UN SECRET

4/8

iii. Withdrawal of force.

(c) W + 1. Withdrawal of forces.

(2) Rules of Engagement, as published for EX-PATRIAT  
GEN V & Y DUTIES ON 11 APR 94.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

- a. Detail log orders are being issued by C Log O.
- b. Food and Water. Individuals will be on dry ration.
- c. Medical. FAD located at AMAHORO to provide medical support till the completion of withdrawal.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Location

(1) Force HQ continues to function from present location.

(2) Alternative HQ. KIA.

b. Radio Net

(1) Close all low priority radio assets.

(2) Withdraw all radio sets from all other than key personnel.

(3) Force Signal Officer to issue detail orders and instruction on signal matters.

  
R A DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander



7/8

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Kigali Sector HQ  
DMZ Sector HQ  
MILOB Gp HQ  
Force Engr Coy  
Force Log Coy  
Force Med Pl  
Mov Con Pl  
MP Section

Information:

RUTBAT  
BYUBAT G  
TUN Coy  
CAO

Internal:

DFC  
COO  
C Log O  
CMPO  
Office Copy



UNAMIR

94 APR 14 04 24

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-115 1/4

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 14 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-757  
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONTINGENCY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF  
A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELGIAN  
CONTINGENT FROM UNAMIR

UNAMIR  
14 APR 14 05 16

1. ON 12 APRIL 1994, THE FC OF UNAMIR WAS INFORMED THAT THE BELGIAN BATTALION IN UNAMIR MIGHT UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW.
2. MY STAFF CONDUCTED A DAY LONG ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPING OPTIONS ON HOW THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT UNAMIR. THIS ANALYSIS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH CONTINGENT SENIORS, COMMANDERS AND STAFFS TO SOLICIT THEIR VIEW OF THE SITUATION.
3. THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS:
  - A. SCENARIO 1. THE PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUES AND PROGRESSIVELY DETERIORATES.
  - B. SCENARIO 2. THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVES.
4. SCENARIO 1. GIVEN THAT THIS MISSION HAS BARELY BEEN ABLE TO FUNCTION DURING THE LAST WEEK OF WAR IN RWANDA DUE TO LOGISTICS SHORTAGES IN STOCKS, VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELGIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS THE BEST OPERATIONALLY EQUIPPED AND LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED UNIT IN UNAMIR, WOULD BE A TERRIBLE BLOW TO THE MISSION. THE MISSION COULD ONLY CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS WERE MET:
  - A. THE UNIT WAS IMMEDIATELY REPLACED WITH AN EQUALLY TRAINED, EQUIPPED, MOTIVATED AND SUPPORTED CONTINGENT AND IN ADDITION THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT SHORTFALLS OF THE FORCE WERE SATISFIED IN AN URGENT MANNER.
  - B. IF THE ABOVE CONDITION CANNOT BE MET THE FORCE IS WITHDRAWN.
5. SCENARIO 2. IF THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVES THE BELGIAN BATTALION NEED NOT BE



REPLACED AND THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF THE FORCE SHOULD BE REEVALUATED TO REDUCE ITS SIZE. THE MINIMUM VIABLE OPTION OF THE TECHNICAL REPORT ON RWANDA DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1993 SHOULD BE REVIEWED. IF THE LOGISTICS CAPABILITY AND SUSTAINMENT OF ONE OF THE OTHER BATTALIONS IN THE MISSION ARE ENHANCED TO THE SCALE AND CAPABILITY OUTLINED IN THE MILITARY GUIDELINES TO TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES THEN THE MISSION CAN CONTINUE WITHIN THIS SCENARIO. THE ECONOMIES IN MANPOWER SAVINGS ARE USED TO OFFSET EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS PROVISION.

6. THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN RWANDA MAY HAVE PEAKED BUT WILL NOT STABILIZE AND IMPROVE FOR AT LEAST 4-6 DAYS AS THE RPF ADVANCE SEEMS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A MOST DELIBERATE FASHION IN KIGALI. SOME RGF UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN COMMITTED AT THIS TIME. IT WAS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THE MISSION SHOULD BE CONTINUED. THE SOLDIERS ON THE GROUND FEEL THEY ARE MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN RWANDA AND STILL HAVE A VALUABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA.

7. BOTH PARTIES HAVE STATED THEY ABSOLUTELY WANT A UNAMIR PRESENCE TO ASSIST IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND ASSIST IN SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN DUTIES. SHOULD THE FORCE BE TOTALLY WITHDRAWN THERE IS A VERY REAL THREAT THAT REFUGEES OR AT WORST ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES WILL REVENGE THEMSELVES UPON UNAMIR. IF WITHDRAWAL IS CONTEMPLATED IT WILL HAVE TO BE ASSISTED BY AN INTIMIDATING AND THREATENING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BOTH PARTIES MUST REALIZE THAT AN ATTACK UPON THE FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND WILL HAVE DIRE ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND POSSIBLE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES. UNAMIR HAS LOST ENOUGH MEN AND SHOULD NOT LOSE ANYMORE ESPECIALLY DURING A WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS. THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF UNAMIR DURING A WITHDRAWAL MUST BE GUARANTEED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PRESENCE OF THE BELGIUM BATTALION (+) MUST STAY FOR AIRFIELD DEFENCE IN PARTICULAR.

8. AT PRESENT UNAMIR IS SUFFERING FROM PERSONNEL FATIGUE AND SOME STRESS. ITS EQUIPMENT IS BEING WORN OUT WITHOUT THE LOGISTICS BASE TO MAINTAIN IT. ITS OPERATIONAL STOCKS ARE MINIMAL AND ARE ONLY BEING MAINTAINED BY AN EMERGENCY AIRLIFT. HEALTH AND HYGIENE PROBLEMS WILL CULMINATE IN SICKNESS WITHIN DAYS (NO WATER IN CITY WITH THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES). LASTLY, THE POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON MORALE AS THIS WILL BE SEEN AS DESERTION IN THE FACE OF A THREAT.

9. GIVEN A WITHDRAWAL IS ORDERED IT MUST BE NOTED THAT A UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA, ALBEIT REDUCED, IS REQUIRED TO ASSIST AND SECURE THE MAJOR HUMANITARIAN EFFORT WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE POST WAR PERIOD. JUST AS IMPORTANT THERE WILL ALSO BE AN REQUIREMENT FOR A NEUTRAL CONDUIT IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE PRE AND POST-CEASEFIRE PERIOD.

10. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINIMUM VIABLE OPTION PRESENTED IN THE TECHNICAL REPORT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1993 BE ASSESSED GIVEN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:



- A. THE 800 MAN INFANTRY BATTALION (GHANA) MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THE MEANS TO MAKE IT SELF-SUFFICIENT TO SECOND LINE. WE MUST ABSOLUTELY AVOID THE CURRENT 2X BATTALION (-) TO EQUAL 1 BN CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL. WE HAVE WASTED TOO MANY ASSETS IN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS. REDISTRIBUTION OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT WILL HELP BUT SOME MAJOR SECOND LINE EQUIPMENTS WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED. THIS UNIT WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS BUT WOULD ALSO BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE MISSION EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL THAT COULD NOT BE READILY EVACUATED DURING THE WITHDRAWAL, PROVIDE A FORCE RESERVE TO REINFORCE UNMO TEAMS THROUGHOUT RWANDA, PROVIDE ARMED ESCORTS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT, PROVIDE SECURITY OF UN AND OTHER VITAL POINTS AND ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.
- B. A MILOB GROUP WOULD TAKE OVER MONITORING TASKS THROUGHOUT RWANDA. IT COULD BE REINFORCED BY THE QUICK REACTION FORCE FROM KIGALI. IT SHOULD CONSIST OF NO MORE THAN 100 UNMOs.
- C. A 5 MAN MOVE CONTROL SECTION AND A 5 MAN MILITARY POLICE SECTION ( BOTH FROM BANGLADESH) WOULD PROVIDE SPECIALIST SUPPORT TO THE FORCE.
- D. A 50 MAN FIELD HOSPITAL (BANGLADESH).
- E. A FORCE HEADQUARTERS OF 46 PERSONNEL WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL DIRECTLY FROM KIGALI.
- F. THE FORCE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A REDUCED DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT AND A CONTRACTED HELICOPTER UNIT CONSISTING OF 2 BELL 212 IN KIGALI.
- G. IN ADDITION UNOMUR SHOULD REMAIN IN PLACE AS IS.
- H. A SRSG OFFICE AND POLITICAL OFFICE, ALONG WITH A CIVPOL ORGANIZATION ARE REQUIRED.

11. BOTH PARTIES MUST SEE THAT THE FORCE HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED TO A MINIMUM VIABLE LEVEL AS A WARNING THAT FURTHER NON-COMPLIANCE WITH DEADLINES OR VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS WILL RESULT IN A TOTAL UN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA. BOTH PARTIES FEAR SUCH A WITHDRAWAL AND MUST BE INTIMIDATED TO COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENTS THEY MAKE. THEY MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC AID THEY RECEIVE AND SO DESPERATELY NEED.

12. RWANDA AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE COUNTRY HAVE SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK WITH THIS WAR. HOWEVER, THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA DESPERATELY WANT PEACE. WITH A POSSIBLE RPF VICTORY,



CRN-115 4/4

ESPECIALLY IN KIGALI, OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE MORE WILLING TO COMPLY WITH THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. THIS IS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY THAT THE UN SHOULD NOT MISS.

13. THE SOLDIERS OF THIS COMMAND, ESPECIALLY THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT, HAVE SUFFERED GREATLY OVER THE PAST WEEK TO BRING PEACE AND FREEDOM TO RWANDA. THEY ARE STILL PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO RWANDA. RESOLVE IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PEACE PROCESS CAN CONTINUE IN RWANDA.



UNAMIR

194 APR 13 00 15

"MOST

IMMEDIATE"

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-111 P1/

194 APR 13 00 28

UNAMIR

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: *for* DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 13 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-750  
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL  
INFO: KITTANI

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION FROM ANOTHER LANGUAGE OF A MOST IMPORTANT LETTER RECEIVED FROM THE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES.

" APRES LA MORT DU PRESIDENT QUI A OCCASIONNE LA MORT DE PLUSIEURS PERSONNES ET A MIS LE PAYS DANS UNE SITUATION TRAGIQUE, PARCE QUE BEAUCOUP, ENTRE AUTRES DES SOLDATS BELGE DE LA MINUAR ET MEME DES ETRANGERS, POUR NOUS LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FAR IL EST TEMPS D'ARRETER TOUT CELA.

POUR CELA LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FAR, C'EST A DIRE LE CHEF D'ETAT MAJOR ET SES COLLABORATEURS ET LE CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DU FPR DOIVENT SE RENCONTRER POUR VOIR COMMENT FAIRE SORTIR LE PAYS DE CETTE SITUATION ET VOIR RAPIDEMENT COMMENT APPLIQUER LES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA. LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FAR APPRECIERIE LE TRAVAIL DE LA MINUAR ET TOUS LES EFFORTS QU'ILS DEPLOIENT POUR L'APPLICATION DES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA. ILS SONT COSCINETS DES DIFFICULTES QU'ELLE RENCONTRE. ILS COMPTRENT SUR LA MINUAR ET LUI DE MANDENT DE POURSUIVRE SON ROLE.

IL EST TEMPS D'ARRETER LA GUERRE, POUR CELA LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT ACCEPTE UN CESSER LE FEU INCONDITIONNEL A PARTR DE 131200 AVRIL 94.

FAIT A KIGALI LE 12 AVRIL 94

SIGNE PAR LE CHEF D'ETATMAJOR, 6 COLONELS ET 3 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

1 MINUAR  
2 FPR"

2. IN CANDID CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ELDER CHIEF OF STAFF, HE, MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT AT THE MOMENT OF THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT, THE IDEA OF A MILITARY COUP WAS IN EVIDENCE. HOWEVER HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION AND THAT OF THE SRSG AT HIS RESIDENCE DURING THAT



NIGHT CHANGED WHAT WAS TO BE A PALACE COUP D'ETAT TO A DEMOCARTIC PROCESS WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY. I HAVE HAD A LOT OF RESPECT FOR THIS MAN AS HE ACCOMPLISHED SO MUCH THROUGH DISCIPLINE AND HIS GENUINE CONCERN FOR HIS TROOPS.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND MUST BE MAXIMISED TO THE FULLEST. IT MAY BRING A QUICK END TO A BLOODY AND TERRIBLE WAR IF IT IS CAPITALIZED ON AND IF WE MOVE WITH SPEED. IT MAY ALSO ACCELERATE THE STALLED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. APPROACHES TO THIS PROBLEM ARE BEING EXAMINED. YOUR DIRECTION IN THIS MATTER IS SOLICITED.

4. REGARDS.



UNAMIR

194 APR 13 00 15

"MOST IMMEDIATE"

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-111 P1/

194 APR 13 00 28

UNAMIR

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: *for* DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA!  
DATE: 13 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-750  
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL  
INFO: KITTANI,

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION FROM ANOTHER LANGUAGE OF A MOST IMPORTANT LETTER RECEIVED FROM THE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES.

" APRES LA MORT DU PRESIDENT QUI A OCCASIONNE LA MORT DE PLUSIEURS PERSONNES ET A MIS LE PAYS DANS UNE SITUATION TRAGIQUE, PARCE QUE BEAUCOUP, ENTRE AUTRES DES SOLDATS BELGE DE LA MINUAR ET MEME DES ETRANGERS, POUR NOUS LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FAR IL EST TEMPS D'ARRETER TOUT CELA.

POUR CELA LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT FAR, C'EST A DIRE LE CHEF D'ETAT MAJOR ET SES COLLABORATEURS ET LE CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DU FPR DOIVENT SE RENCONTRER POUR VOIR COMMENT FAIRE SORTIR LE PAYS DE CETTE SITUATION ET VOIR RAPIDEMENT COMMENT APPLIQUER LES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA. LE HAUT COMMANDMENT FAR APPRECIERIE LE TRAVAIL DE LA MINUAR ET TOUS LES EFFORTS QU'ILS DEPLOIENT POUR L'APPLICATION DES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA. ILS SONT COSCINETS DES DIFFICULTES QU'ELLE RENCONTRE. ILS COMPTRENT SUR LA MINUAR ET LUI DE MANDENT DE POURSUIVRE SON ROLE.

IL EST TEMPS D'ARRETER LA GUERRE, POUR CELA LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT ACCEPTE UN CESSER LE FEU INCONDITIONNEL A PARTIR DE 131200 AVRIL 94.

FAIT A KIGALI LE 12 AVRIL 94

SIGNE PAR LE CHEF D'ETATMAJOR, 6 COLONELS ET 3 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

1 MINUAR  
2 FPR"

2. IN CANDID CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ELDER CHIEF OF STAFF, HE, MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT AT THE MOMENT OF THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT, THE IDEA OF A MILITARY COUP WAS IN EVIDENCE. HOWEVER HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION AND THAT OF THE SRSG AT HIS RESIDENCE DURING THAT



NIGHT CHANGED WHAT WAS TO BE A PALACE COUP D'ETAT TO A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY. I HAVE HAD A LOT OF RESPECT FOR THIS MAN AS HE ACCOMPLISHED SO MUCH THROUGH DISCIPLINE AND HIS GENUINE CONCERN FOR HIS TROOPS.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND MUST BE MAXIMISED TO THE FULLEST. IT MAY BRING A QUICK END TO A BLOODY AND TERRIBLE WAR IF IT IS CAPITALIZED ON AND IF WE MOVE WITH SPEED. IT MAY ALSO ACCELERATE THE STALLED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. APPROACHES TO THIS PROBLEM ARE BEING EXAMINED. YOUR DIRECTION IN THIS MATTER IS SOLICITED.

4. REGARDS.



CRN 103 1/6

UNAMIR

194 APR -8 12 42

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 7 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER: 001-~~212~~ 212-963-6460  
SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT - REPORTED DEATH OF  
PRESIDENT OF RWANDA  
REFERENCE: MIR - 722

1. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED AND CONFIRMED BY RGF AND GENDARMERIE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA AND THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WERE KILLED IN AN AIRPLANE CRASH AT KIGALI AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS 6 APRIL 1994. THE DEATHS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL BUT DUE TO THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF LEADING RGF AND GENDARMERIE LEADERS THIS REPORT IS CONSIDERED TRUE. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. WE BELIEVE 9 PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE CRASH.

2. AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS UNMOs AT KANOMBE (KIGALI INTERNATIONAL) AIRPORT REPORTED A LARGE EXPLOSION FROM THE AREA OF CAMP KANOMBE WHICH IS A MILITARY CAMP NEAR THE AIRPORT. INITIAL REPORTS STATED IT WAS AN EXPLOSION OF MUNITIONS. HOWEVER, WITHIN MINUTES GENDARMERIE AND RGF PERSONNEL AT THE AIRPORT BEGAN TO PANIC IN THE AREA OF THE AIRPORT. THE UNMOs REQUESTED AN ARMED ESCORT INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION.

3. AT 2118 HOURS A PLATOON OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ESTABLISHED A ROADBLOCK AT THE MERIDIEN TRAFFIC CIRCLE AND BLOCKED TRAFFIC. SEVERAL SHOTS WERE FIRED. NO REPORTED CASUALTIES. THE GUARDS APPEARED BY UNAMIR OBSERVATION TO BE NERVOUS AND DANGEROUS.

4. AT 2130 HOURS A REPORT FROM UNMOs AT THE AIRPORT STATED THE TOWER HAD DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL AIRPLANE HAD CRASHED. IT WAS NOT AT THIS TIME CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ON THE AIRCRAFT. A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE RPF LOS LIVING WITH UNAMIR STAFF AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL DISCOVERED ALL THE LOS HAD DEPARTED THE MERIDIEN HOTEL APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES EARLIER. THE FC DISPATCHED THE DCOO TO THE RPF/CND COMPOUND TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THEM AND ORDERED THE DFC/COS TO THE HEADQUARTERS.

5. AT 2135 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR HQ REPORTED THAT THE ARMED

UNAMIR  
194 APR -8 13 13



PATROL SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH HAD BEEN STOPPED, DISARMED AND WERE BEING HELD AT THE AIRPORT. IN ADDITION THE UNMOs AT THE AIRPORT WERE CONFINED TO A ROOM AT THE AIRPORT. THE FC PLACED UNAMIR ON RED ALERT AND PLACED THE FORCE RESERVE ON 30 MINUTES NOTICE TO MOVE.

6. CONSTANT TELEPHONE CALLS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS PERIOD BY THE FC AND FORCE HQ FROM MINISTERS REQUESTING ARMED UN PROTECTION. IN ADDITION AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE RGF LO WAS IN CONSTANT TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION FROM ARMY HQ WITH THE FC AND REPORTED THE CRASH HAD OCCURRED AND SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED FC PRESENCE AT THE RGF ARMY HQ.

7. A CALL FROM MR RIZA IN NEW YORK WAS RECEIVED AND THE UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION AS KNOWN AT THAT TIME WAS PASSED TO HIM AT 2210 HOURS. THE FC MOVED TO RGF ARMY HQ AT 2230 HOURS.

8. TRANSITING THE CITY IT WAS VOID OF INHABITANTS OR TRAFFIC. ROADBLOCKS MANNED BY RGF SOLDIERS WERE LOCATED NEAR THE RGF HQ. FC ARRIVED AT 2250 HOURS AND WAS MET BY THE CHEF DE CABINET OF THE MND OF RWANDA (THE MND IS IN CAMEROON AT A CONFERENCE), THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE KEY STAFF APPOINTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE. THE CHEF DE CABINET SPOKE FOR THE GROUP.

9. HE STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WERE ON THE PLANE AND THAT THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS FROM THE AIRPLANE CRASH. HE COULD NOT AT THIS POINT CONFIRM THE OTHER PASSENGERS. THE FC OFFERED NO INFORMATION (IE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI). HE STATED APPARENTLY THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED IN THE AIR AND CRASHED ON THE GROUND IN THE PRESIDENTS GARDEN NEAR THE AIRPORT. IT WAS SUSPECTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN.

10. DURING HIS DISCOURSE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE BY PHONE WHICH UPDATED THE SITUATION. THE CHEF STATED THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE WERE PREPARED TO KEEP THEIR POSITION FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR PEACE. WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT HE STATED THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE POPULATION HAD TO BE REASSURED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE NATION. HE REQUESTED UNAMIR SUPPORT IN THEIR ACTIONS. THE FC STATED EVEN WITH THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT THERE WAS STILL A GOVERNMENT UNDER PM AGATHE. THE OFFICERS SCOFFED AND STATED SHE AND HER GROUP WERE NOT A GOVERNMENT. THE FC DID NOT PURSUE THAT CONVERSATION BUT ASKED WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT THEY WERE REQUESTING. THE CHEF STATED JOINT UNAMIR GENDARMERIE AND RGF PATROLS AND A STATEMENT TO THE POPULATION. THE FC STATED THAT THE RGF MUST REMAIN IN ITS BARRACKS AND THAT THE GENDARMERIE MUST DO ITS JOB OF MAINTAINING ORDER. THE FC STATED THE RPF WERE CALM AND UNAMIR WOULD MONITOR THEM CLOSELY AND THAT IT WAS CRITICAL THAT UNAMIR BE ALLOWED TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH SITE AND THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD RETURN TO THEIR GARRISON. NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE AT THIS POINT.

11. AT 1107 HOURS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE REPORTED THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI HAD BEEN ON THE AIRCRAFT.



HE STATED THIS GROUP DID NOT WANT POWER BUT ONLY WANTED TO REASSURE THE POPULATION AS THE POPULATION WAS TIRED OF THIS DANCING AROUND. THE FC ASKED WHO WOULD SPEAK TO THE POPULATION AND SUGGESTED THE PM AGATHE. HE ALSO ASKED IF ANYONE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PM AND THE CABINET. THE CHEF AVOIDED THE QUESTION BY STATING THE NATION NEEDED A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY TO HANDOVER TO THE POLITICIANS AT ANYTIME THEY WERE PREPARED TO GOVERN. HOWEVER, HE REITERATED ORDER HAD TO BE MAINTAINED TONIGHT AND THAT UNAMIR ASSISTANCE WAS CRITICAL.

12. THE FC STATED THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND HE MUST CONSULT WITH THE SRSG. HOWEVER HE STATED ANY ACTION HE WOULD TAKE WOULD ONLY BE WITH HIS PERMISSION. A JOINT COORDINATED PLAN WAS ESSENTIAL. IT MUST BE TRANSPARENT AND CONTROLLED. THE FC ASKED WHAT WAS THE THREAT AT THIS MOMENT.

13. THE CHEF STATED WHAT DID UNAMIR WANT THEM TO DO.

14. THE FC STATED RGF TROOPS MUST BE CONFINED TO THEIR BARRACKS AND ONLY THE GENDARMERIE MUST MAINTAIN ORDER.

15. THE CHEF ASKED TO PLACE TROOPS ON ALERT FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT BUT THEY WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR BARRACKS.

16 AT 2330 HOURS THE FC CONSULTED WITH THE SRSG BY TELEPHONE. HE RETURNED TO THE MEETING AND LISTENED TO THE COS GENDARMERIE ENHANCED SECURITY PLAN TO CONSIST OF ONE ARMORED CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE RADIO STATION, ONE ARMORED CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE TELCON AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE ELECTROGAZ AND THE CITY FUEL TANKS IN CASE OF SABOTAGE. IN ADDITION HE REQUESTED SATURATED PATROLLING WITH JOINT GENDARME AND UNAMIR PATROLS. THE FC AGREED TO THE ABOVE REQUESTS AND STATED THE GROUP MUST REASSURE THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE COUNTRY, KEEP THE RGF IN ITS BARRACKS AND ORDER THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BACK TO ITS BARRACKS. THE CHEF ADDED THAT THEY WOULD SPEAK TO THE RPF THE NEXT DAY WHEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS CLEARER. THE FC OFFERED TO STAY AT THE HEADQUARTERS TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES UNTIL KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER COULD ARRIVE TO COORDINATE DETAILS.

17. AT 2400 HOURS THE FC WAS CONSULTING WITH THE SRSG BY TELEPHONE WHEN THE CHEF STATED HE WANTED TO SEE THE SRSG WITH THE FC. THE FC, AFTER ACCEPTANCE BY THE SRSG, ESCORTED THE CHEF TO THE SRSG HOME WHILE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER COORDINATED THE ENHANCED JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE STAFF OF THE RGF AND GENDARMERIE. BEFORE LEAVING, THE FC ASKED THEM TO RECONSIDER AGAIN SPEAKING TO PM AGATHE.



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19. AT 0200 THE FC RETURNED TO RGF HQ WITH THE CHEF FROM HIS MEETING WITH THE SRSG AND CONFIRMED THE SECURITY DETAILS WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER. THE FC REITERATED THE NECESSITY OF GETTING A UNAMIR PRESENCE TO THE CRASH SITE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION. THE COS GENDARMERIE AND RGF LO TO UNAMIR COORDINATED THIS MATTER WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER AS ROAD BLOCKS STILL BLOCKED ACCESS OF UNAMIR FORCES TO THE CRASH SITE. THE CHEF STATED THE GROUP WOULD PREPARE A COMMUNIQUE FOR THE RADIO AND PRESS. THE FC INSISTED ON SEEING THE COMMUNIQUE BEFORE IT WAS RELEASED. AT 0230 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER STATED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE SUPPOSEDLY ON THE AIRCRAFT:

- A. PRESIDENT OF RWANDA.
- B. PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI.
- C. TWO BURUNDIAN MINISTERS.
- D. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF (MGEN NSABIMANA).
- E. COL SAGATWA (STAFF OFFICER).
- F. DR AKINGENEYE (PERSONAL PHYSICIAN OF THE PRESIDENT).

20. AT 0245 HOURS THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION AND ANOTHER FRENCH OFFICER ARRIVED AT THE RGF HQ AND STATED THEY HAD DIRECTION PARIS TO ENSURE A QUALIFIED CRASH INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED OF THE CRASH. FC ASSURED THEM IT WOULD BE. THEY OFFERED THEIR MILITARY TECHNICAL TEAM CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING 6 HOURS AWAY AT BANGUI.

21. AT 0300 THE FC MOVED TO FORCE HQ AND CONSULTED WITH HIS PRIMARY STAFF OFFICERS. AT 0530 THE SOUND OF SPORADIC MACHINE GUNS, ROCKET AND GRENADE FIRE WAS HEARD IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE CITY. ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION THE RPF RETURNED FIRE AIMED AT THEM.

22. AT 0600 INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE PM HAD CANCELLED HER RADIO ADDRESS AT 0530 AND WAS REMAINING AT HER HOME. THE GUARD ON HER HOME WAS INCREASED. IN ADDITION THE PM REPORTED THAT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND AGRICULTURE HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED WITH THEIR FAMILIES BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

23. ATTEMPTS BY FC TO GET THE RADIO STATIONS TO CARRY AN ADDRESS BY THE PM OR BY UNAMIR OVER THE PHONES WERE REFUSED. RADIO RWANDA TECHNICIANS WERE WARNED NOT TO BROADCAST ANY ADDRESS AND ARE PLAYING CLASSICAL MUSIC. RTLM SUPPOSEDLY BROADCASTED A MESSAGE FROM THE MND (WHO IS OUT OF COUNTRY) BUT DETAILS COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AS IT WAS IN KINYARWANDA. IN ADDITION RTLM WOULD NOT ALLOW FC TO BROADCAST. THEY ACCUSED UNAMIR OF KILLING RWANDESE WHICH IS TOTALLY UNTRUE AS UP TO THAT POINT UNAMIR HAD NOT FIRED A SHOT.

24. SRSG, FC AND VARIOUS AMBASSADORS HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE COMMUNICATION AND ATTEMPTED TO ORGANIZE A MEETING AT THE US



AMBASSADORS HOME AT 0900. AT 0730 HOURS IT WAS REPORTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE HOME OF MINISTER LANDO (LIBERAL PARTY) HAD BEEN ATTACKED AND UN (GHANA) SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED. A RESERVE PATROL WAS SENT TO HIS HOME.

25. RPF REMAINED CALM AND PASSED INFORMATION TO UNAMIR THROUGH THE UNAMIR LO. UNAMIR HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO THE CRASH SITE. IN ADDITION COMMENCING AT 0730 RGF (POSSIBLY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS).

26. AT 0830 MORE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE OF MINISTERS HOMES BEING ATTACKED BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS. AT 0845 THE PM FLED HER HOME AND HER UN GUARD WHICH BOUGHT HER TIME WAS DISARMED AND HELD BUT LATER RELEASED. THE PM TOOK REFUGE IN THE UNDP. AT 0920 IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MINISTER LANDO AND HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THEIR HOME. THE UN GUARD WAS OVERPOWERED AND ONE GHANIAN SOLDIER WAS REPORTED MISSING.

27. AT 0920 HOURS FC CALLED MR RIZA AT UNNY TO INFORM HIM OF THE ESCALATION OF THE SITUATION AND TO INFORM HIM UNAMIR MIGHT HAVE TO USE FORCE TO SAVE THE PRIME MINISTER. THE ARMED ESCORT ATTEMPTING TO GET TO UNDP TO RESCUE THE PM WAS BLOCKED AND THREATENED WITH FIRE IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO GO TO UNDP. THE FC DISCUSSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH MR RIZA AND THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE CONFIRMED THAT UNAMIR WAS NOT TO FIRE UNTIL FIRED UPON. OUR PERSONNEL WHO WERE OVERPOWERED WITHOUT FIRE.

28. THE AMBASSADORS MEETING AT THE US AMBASSADORS HOUSE WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE THE AMBASSADORS COULD NOT BE SAFELY ESCORTED TO THE MEETING. THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE GROUP DID APPEAR. FC DISCUSSED MR RIZA'S DIRECTION WITH SRSG.

29. FC CONVENED A STAFF MEETING AT 1000 HOURS. FC TO GO TO ARMY HQ TO MEET ARMY AND GENDARMERIE GROUP TO EMPHASIZE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS MUST GO TO THEIR BARRACKS, MINISTERS MUST BE RELEASED AND PM RECOGNIZED AS HEAD OF STATE. DFC\COS TO CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT ACCESS TO CRASH SITE. DCOO TO REMAIN WITH RPF AND KEEP THEM CALM. CMO TO REMAIN AT FORCE HQ AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH OTHER SECTORS. SOUTHERN SECTOR ALL QUIET EXCEPT FIRING IN CYANGUGU. RPF SECTOR ALL QUIET. UNMOS DEPLOYED TO RPF FRONT LINES. SECTOR COMMANDER WITH MGEN KAGAME. RGF SECTOR QUIET.

30. DCOO CONVEYED AT 1005 RPF CALM BUT INSISTING ON INSTALLATION OF BBTG, PM AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION, END TO VIOLENCE.

31. 1015 REPORT FROM RGF LO THAT 3 UNAMIR PERSONNEL KILLED AT CAMP KAMI. CMO TOOK DECISION TO CALL IN ALL MILOBS FROM MILOB GP HQ TO FORCE HQ. CMO CHECKED AND MILOBS WERE NOT KILLED AND ALL WERE ACCOUNTED FOR.

32. 1030 HOURS UNDP REPORTED PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO COMPOUND AND ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT. PATROL BLOCKED BY ROADBLOCK AND UNABLE TO GET THROUGH.

33. 1215 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER DISPATCHED APCs TO GET PM DESIGNATE WHO HAD BEEN LOCATED AT THE HOME OF A US NATIONAL



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BY THE US AMBASSADOR. A TOGOLESE CAPTAIN UNMO REPORTED TO THE FORCE HQ AND STATED HE AND 13 BELGIAN SOLDIERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND TAKEN TO CAMP KIGALI WHERE HE REPORTS THAT 13 BELGIAN SOLDIERS WERE EXECUTED. BELGIAN CONTINGENT COMMANDER INFORMED AND INVESTIGATION COMMENCED.

34. FC CALLED AT 1300 TO STATE HE FELT HE HAD NEGOTIATED THE RELEASE OF THE UNDP PERSONNEL. WHETHER OR NOT THE PM AGATHE WAS IN THIS GROUP COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED. COL MARCHAL CALLED TO STATE HE HAD SECURED THE PM DESIGNATE FAUSTIN. CONTINUOUS CALLS FOR HELP FROM THE LOCAL, UN AND EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY BUT DUE TO ROADBLOCKS VERY FEW ACTIONED. TERRIFIED REFUGEES SWAMP THE HQ AND ARE MOVED UNDER ESCORT TO AMAHORO STADIUM UNDER PROTECTION OF RUTBAT. FC CALLED FOR TWO MORE APC'S TO HELP HIS APC EXTRACT UNDP HOSTAGES. DISPATCHED. DFC\COS ORDERED ALL STAFF OFFICERS TO THE FORCE HQ IN CONVOY. ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN STAFF MOVED INTO THE HQ.

35. AT 1315 HOURS MGEN KAGAME MADE A STATEMENT BY RADIO THAT THE RPF UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY OF THE ATTACKS IN KIGALI WERE AIMED AT THEIR SUPPORTERS AND THAT IF THIS CONTINUED HIS SOLDIERS WOULD REACT TO DEFEND THEIR PEOPLE. REPORTED TO FC WHO DIRECTED DCOO WITH RPF AND CND AND RPF SECTOR COMMANDER TO ATTEMPT TO CALM DOWN RPF.



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 7 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER:  
SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT - REPORTED DEATH OF  
PRESIDENT OF RWANDA  
REFERENCE:

1. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED AND CONFIRMED BY RGF AND GENDARMERIE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA AND THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WERE KILLED IN AN AIRPLANE CRASH AT KIGALI AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS 6 APRIL 1994. THE DEATHS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL BUT DUE TO THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF LEADING RGF AND GENDARMERIE LEADERS THIS REPORT IS CONSIDERED TRUE. *The Chief of Staff of the Army was also in the aircraft. We believe about 9 persons were killed in the crash.*
- Rwandan* 2. AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS UNMOS AT KANOMBE (KIGALI INTERNATIONAL) AIRPORT REPORTED A LARGE EXPLOSION FROM THE AREA OF CAMP KANOMBE WHICH IS A MILITARY CAMP NEAR THE AIRPORT. INITIAL REPORTS STATED IT WAS AN EXPLOSION OF MUNITIONS. HOWEVER, WITHIN MINUTES GENDARMERIE AND RGF PERSONNEL AT THE AIRPORT BEGAN TO PANIC IN THE AREA OF THE AIRPORT. THE UNMOS REQUESTED AN ARMED ESCORT INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION.
3. AT 2118 HOURS A PLATOON OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ESTABLISHED A ROADBLOCK AT THE MERIDIEN TRAFFIC CIRCLE AND BLOCKED TRAFFIC. SEVERAL SHOTS WERE FIRED. NO REPORTED CASUALTIES. THE GUARDS APPEARED BY UNAMIR OBSERVATION TO BE NERVOUS AND DANGEROUS.
4. AT 2130 HOURS A REPORT FROM UNMOS AT THE AIRPORT STATED THE TOWER HAD DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL AIRPLANE HAD CRASHED. IT WAS NOT AT THIS TIME CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ON THE AIRCRAFT. A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE RPF LOS LIVING WITH UNAMIR STAFF AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL DISCOVERED ALL THE LOS HAD DEPARTED THE MERIDIEN HOTEL APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES EARLIER. THE FC DISPATCHED THE DCOO TO THE RPF/CND COMPOUND TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THEM AND ORDERED THE DFC/COS TO THE HEADQUARTERS.
5. AT 2135 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR HQ REPORTED THAT THE ARMED PATROL SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH HAD BEEN STOPPED, DISARMED AND WERE BEING HELD AT THE AIRPORT. IN ADDITION THE UNMOS AT THE AIRPORT



WERE CONFINED TO A ROOM AT THE AIRPORT. THE FC PLACED UNAMIR ON RED ALERT AND PLACED THE FORCE RESERVE ON 30 MINUTES NOTICE TO MOVE.

6. CONSTANT TELEPHONE CALLS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS PERIOD BY THE FC AND FORCE HQ FROM MINISTERS REQUESTING ARMED UN PROTECTION. IN ADDITION AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE RGF LO WAS IN CONSTANT TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION FROM ARMY HQ WITH THE FC AND REPORTED THE CRASH HAD OCCURRED AND SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED FC PRESENCE AT THE RGF HQ.

\* *Army*  
7. ~~CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WAS MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE SRSG, FC AND POLITICAL ADVISOR.~~ *at a conference* A CALL FROM MR RIZA IN NEW YORK WAS RECEIVED AND THE UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION AS KNOWN WAS PASSED TO HIM AT 2210 HOURS. THE FC MOVED TO RGF HQ AT 2230 HOURS.

8. TRANSITING THE CITY IT WAS VOID OF INHABITANTS OR TRAFFIC. ROADBLOCKS MANNED BY RGF SOLDIERS WERE LOCATED NEAR THE RGF HQ. FC ARRIVED AT 2250 HOURS AND WAS MET BY THE CHEF DE CABINET OF THE MND OF RWANDA (THE MND IS IN CAMEROON), THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE KEY STAFF APPOINTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE. THE CHEF DE CABINET SPOKE FOR THE GROUP.

9. HE STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WERE ON THE PLANE AND THAT THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS FROM THE AIRPLANE CRASH. HE COULD NOT AT THIS POINT CONFIRM THE OTHER PASSENGERS. THE FC OFFERED NO INFORMATION (IE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI). HE STATED APPARENTLY THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED IN THE AIR AND CRASHED ON THE GROUND IN THE PRESIDENTS GARDEN. IT WAS SUSPECTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN.

10. DURING HIS DISCOURSE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE BY PHONE WHICH UPDATED THE SITUATION. *sheep been partition* THE CHEF STATED THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE WERE PREPARED TO ~~TAKE ACTION~~ *near the airport* FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR PEACE. WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT HE STATED THEIR WAS NO GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE POPULATION HAD TO BE REASSURED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE NATION. HE REQUESTED UNAMIR SUPPORT IN THEIR ACTIONS. THE FC STATED EVEN WITH THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT THERE WAS STILL A GOVERNMENT UNDER PM AGATHE. THE OFFICERS SCOFFED AND STATED SHE AND HER GROUP WERE NOT A GOVERNMENT. THE FC DID NOT PURSUE THAT CONVERSATION BUT ASKED WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT THEY WERE REQUESTING. THE CHEF STATED JOINT UNAMIR GENDARMERIE AND RGF PATROLS AND A STATEMENT TO THE POPULATION. THE FC STATED THAT THE RGF MUST REMAIN IN ITS BARRACKS AND THAT THE GENDARMERIE MUST DO ITS JOB OF MAINTAINING ORDER. THE FC STATED THE RPF WERE CALM AND UNAMIR WOULD MONITOR THEM CLOSELY AND THAT IT WAS CRITICAL THAT UNAMIR BE ALLOWED TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH SITE. NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE AT THIS POINT.

11. AT 1107 HOURS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE REPORTED *and that the Presidential Guard return to their garrison* THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI HAD BEEN ON THE AIRCRAFT. HE STATED THIS GROUP DID NOT WANT POWER BUT ONLY WANTED TO REASSURE THE POPULATION AS THE POPULATION WAS TIRED OF THIS DANCING AROUND. THE FC ASKED



WHO WOULD SPEAK TO THE POPULATION AND SUGGESTED THE PM AGATHE. HE ALSO ASKED IF ANYONE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PM AND THE CABINET. THE CHEF AVOIDED THE QUESTION BY STATING THE NATION NEEDED A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY TO HANDOVER TO THE POLITICIANS AT ANYTIME THEY WERE PREPARED TO GOVERN. HOWEVER, HE REITERATED ORDER HAD TO BE MAINTAINED TONIGHT AND THAT UNAMIR ASSISTANCE WAS CRITICAL.

12. THE FC STATED THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND HE MUST CONSULT WITH THE SRSG. HOWEVER HE STATED ANY ACTION ~~TAKEN~~ *he would take* WOULD ONLY BE WITH HIS PERMISSION. A JOINT COORDINATED PLAN WAS ESSENTIAL. IT MUST BE TRANSPARENT AND CONTROLLED. THE FC ASKED WHAT WAS THE THREAT AT THIS MOMENT.

13. THE CHEF STATED WHAT DID UNAMIR WANT THEM TO DO.

14. THE FC STATED RGF TROOPS MUST BE CONFINED TO THEIR BARRACKS AND ONLY THE GENDARMERIE MUST MAINTAIN ORDER.

15. THE CHEF ASKED TO PLACE TROOPS ON ALERT FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT BUT THEY WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR BARRACKS.

16. AT 2330 HOURS THE FC CONSULTED WITH THE SRSG BY TELEPHONE. HE RETURNED TO THE MEETING AND LISTENED TO THE COS GENDARMERIE ENHANCED SECURITY PLAN TO CONSIST OF ONE ARMoured CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE RADIO STATION, ONE ARMoured CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE TELCON AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE ELECTROGAZ AND THE CITY FUEL TANKS. IN ADDITION HE REQUESTED SATURATED PATROLLING WITH JOINT GENDARME AND UNAMIR PATROLS. THE FC AGREED TO THE ABOVE REQUESTS AND STATED THE GROUP MUST REASSURE THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE COUNTRY, KEEP THE RGF IN ITS BARRACKS AND ORDER THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BACK TO ITS BARRACKS. THE CHEF ADDED THAT THEY WOULD SPEAK TO THE RPF. THE FC OFFERED TO STAY AT THE HEADQUARTERS TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES UNTIL KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER COULD ARRIVE TO COORDINATE DETAILS.

*in case of sabotage.*

17. AT 2400 HOURS THE FC WAS CONSULTING WITH THE SRSG BY TELEPHONE WHEN THE CHEF STATED HE WANTED TO SEE THE SRSG WITH THE FC. THE FC ESCORTED THE CHEF TO THE SRSG HOME WHILE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER COORDINATED THE ENHANCED JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE STAFF OF THE RGF AND GENDARMERIE. *the next day when the political situation is clearer, after acceptance by SRSG*

18. AT 0200 THE FC RETURNED TO RGF HQ WITH THE CHEF FROM HIS MEETING WITH THE SRSG AND CONFIRMED THE SECURITY DETAILS WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER. THE FC REITERATED THE NECESSITY OF GETTING A UNAMIR PRESENCE TO THE CRASH SITE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION. THE COS GENDARMERIE AND RGF LO TO UNAMIR COORDINATED THIS MATTER WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER AS ROAD BLOCKS STILL BLOCKED ACCESS OF UNAMIR FORCES TO THE CRASH SITE. THE CHEF STATED THE GROUP WOULD PREPARE A COMMUNIQUE FOR THE RADIO AND PRESS. THE FC INSISTED ON SEEING THE COMMUNIQUE BEFORE IT WAS RELEASED. AT 0230 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER STATED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE SUPPOSEDLY ON THE AIRCRAFT:

A. PRESIDENT OF RWANDA.

*Meeting at SRSG house.*



MRZ



- B. PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI.
- C. TWO BURUNDIAN MINISTERS.
- D. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF (MGEN NSABIMANA).
- E. COL SAGATWA (STAFF OFFICER).
- F. DR AKINGENEYE (PERSONAL PHYSICIAN OF THE PRESIDENT).

19. AT 0245 HOURS THE HEAD OF THE <sup>French</sup> ~~BELGIAN~~ MILITARY MISSION AND <sup>another</sup> FRENCH OFFICER ARRIVED AT THE RGF HQ AND STATED THEY HAD DIRECTION FROM ~~BRUSSELS AND PARIS~~ <sup>Paris</sup> RESPECTIVELY TO ENSURE A QUALIFIED CRASH INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED OF THE CRASH. FC ASSURED THEM IT WOULD BE.

20. AT 0300 THE FC MOVED TO FORCE HQ AND CONSULTED WITH HIS PRIMARY STAFF OFFICERS.

They offered their <sup>military</sup> technical team currently 6 hours away at Bangui. <sup>investigator</sup>

→ Prohibited Area  
→  
→