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**MILITARY PLANNING  
IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS**

by

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This paper uses some British terminology and outlines a number of British practices; they are explained where their meaning is not self evident. While the detail of the processes may vary from one country to another, the underlying principles remain valid for any particular situation.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be taken to represent the policy of either the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda or the British government.

## MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

### INTRODUCTION

1. There is a growing body of literature dealing with the demobilization process, based mainly on the study of exercises to reduce armed forces in countries which have recently passed through internal struggles. This literature appears to assume that the objectives of demobilization are purely social and economic, with the emphasis on the latter. Yet it is an implicit assumption in all this work that not every soldier will be demobilized and, ergo, the countries concerned will continue to have armed forces. None of the works reviewed addresses the issues relating to this aspect of the topic - other than a few passing references to *professionalization* of the remaining armed forces. It may be that, in countries which are emerging from internal security problems, of whatever kind, there is a reluctance on the part of the military authorities to discuss matters which they consider might compromise national security and this could explain why the literature pays scant regard to these topics.

2. Matters such as the appropriate role, size, organization, equipment and level of training of the armed forces for the circumstances of the country concerned are equally as important for future national security - in the widest sense as well as the narrow meaning of the word - of that country as the successful reintegration into society of those who are demobilized. Indeed, such matters must be addressed to some degree before detailed work on the demobilization process can begin because it is only from an examination of them that it becomes possible to begin to calculate how many soldiers are to be demobilized. This work is not only relevant to the demobilization process, it also forms the basis of coherent defence planning; the introduction of mechanisms necessary for planning demobilization will provide a firm framework for much subsequent work.

3. It is possible to identify and discuss the issues involved without reference to any particular situation and, hence, without addressing, still less compromising, the security of any particular state.

### AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider in outline the military aspects of demobilization of armed forces.

5. The context in which the paper is written is the newly emerging state in a troubled region of the world, a state which will be relying heavily on external advice and funding. But the processes described are essentially the same as those adopted by any state when it carries out a defence review.

6. It is hoped that this work will assist the economic and development communities by demonstrating that:

a. There are valid military concerns which have significance equal to that of the economic and social issues and, like those economic and social issues, their proper resolution is vital for the future well-being and stability of the country concerned.

b. It is essential that appropriate military planning staff are fully involved in the demobilization process.

c. While the processes involved are not difficult to understand, their application does require the use of specialized skills and techniques. It is as appropriate for institutions, aid agencies and donors to provide teams of advisors to assist in this work as it is in the areas in which advice is more traditionally given. Indeed, if such agencies are encouraging demobilisation, they may be considered to have a responsibility to fund that advice.

### THE THREAT

7. All military planning takes as its starting point 'the Threat' and the approach to demobilization can not be an exception. It is only by having a thorough understanding of the potential for aggression against the state, whether external or internal, that it becomes possible to start designing the forces necessary to counter that threat and, hence, calculate the numbers for demobilization.

8. Accurate identification of the Threat is fundamental to the success of the exercise yet inevitably involves a considerable degree of speculation, hypothesis and, less sophisticatedly, sheer guesswork, based upon information which may be of dubious accuracy. There is a tendency among some threat analysts to overestimate the Threat; they build in a safety margin so that future events cannot be worse than they have predicted. At the least, prudence demands that they err on the side of caution.

9. The Threat is also dynamic and must be subjected to continual review to ensure that the military planning which depends upon it remains appropriate to the developing circumstances. Once a demobilization programme has been established, however, the consequences of such reviews should result in minor adjustments to numbers rather than radical reappraisals unless, of course, there is a major change in international relationships within the region; such changes would be likely to affect programmes other than those which are essentially military-related and, hence, will probably precipitate policy reviews in other areas as well.

10. There are 2 elements to the Threat: capability and intention<sup>1</sup>. For example, if a neighbouring state has strong, well equipped and trained Armed Forces but enjoys excellent relationships with the country under consideration, considerable commonality of interest exists between the 2 states and there are no border disputes, the military might of that neighbouring country presents little threat. On the other hand, if the

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1 I am grateful to my British Army colleague, Captain Sean Moorhouse, for his assistance with capabilities and intentions.

neighbouring country has small, poorly equipped Armed Forces but there are fundamental policy disagreements, cross-border ethnic tensions and/or long-standing territorial disputes, the threat of a major attack, limited incursions or a counter-insurgency campaign is clearly greater than in the first example. Consideration of capability is naturally a matter in which the military staffs should lead while substantial political advice is necessary when intentions are being assessed; it needs always to be remembered that intentions are effectively limited by capability.

11. It is necessary to carry out a Threat Analysis for each neighbouring country and any other state within the region which might pose a strategic threat. The countries must be considered alone and in the form of potential alliances. It will also be necessary to consider internal elements who may wish to see changes in the constitution, borders or policy of the state. The work must clearly be soundly based in the present but, to have any value, it must make forward projections. It is suggested that for the purposes under consideration the optimal period for review is likely to be in the order of 5 years.

12. Current Capability. The assessment of current capabilities is the easiest element of the analysis, despite the fact that many details may be shrouded under a blanket of security. There are published data relating to the armed forces of all states and these may form a useful starting point. Further information will come from observation of a country's military training and ceremonial events and by monitoring the international arms trade to determine what military hardware a country has acquired.

13. Future Capability. Projections into the future are clearly more speculative but there will be information available from which inferences may reasonably be drawn. There is a link between perceived intentions and future capability, clearly demonstrating that the political and military aspects of this work are interdependent. The types of indicator which may be used to assess future capability include: the development of a manufacturing base with the potential to produce weapons, the signing of arms deals with other nations and the recruitment of weapons design specialists from more advanced countries.

14. Current Intentions. Current intentions may be explicit, such as a publicly announced aim, as in the case of territorial disputes, or they may be more subtle. Intentions are determined by the political leaders of a state but are carried out by the military staff. Purely military indicators which help to determine intentions include the build up of military forces in a particular area or the stockpiling of military materiel. Indicators of a political nature include the deterioration of diplomatic relations between states or the signing of an alliance with a hostile power.

15. Future Intentions. As with the assessment of future capabilities, the assessment of future intentions is speculative. Thorough research and an in depth knowledge of the surrounding countries, internally and in regard to the regional situation, is essential in order to produce an assessment of those countries' likely intentions. Given the political nature of intentions, any change of leadership, particularly if it occurs by force, will precipitate a review in this area.

16. **The Threat Document.** From consideration of these aspects of capability and intention, the Threat Document is synthesized. It will contain an assessment of the likelihood of armed aggression (and whether this is likely to be a major or minor incursion), insurrection or civil disorder against the state. It is unlikely that there will be an unequivocal statement of the Threat but, rather, the identification of a spectrum - a low threat best case up to the high threat worst case and, in between, implicitly or explicitly, a most likely worst case.

17. **Need for Regular Review.** The production of such a document involves a considerable amount of skilled and detailed work by many agencies and this needs to continue. It was previously noted that the Threat will change; even in a relatively stable environment, there will be changes of detail and emphasis. The current capabilities and intentions are no more than foundations on which the more important, and much more difficult, future capabilities and intentions are based and, no matter how skillfully the Threat is analyzed, it is unlikely that the Threat Document will be accurate in every detail. These considerations do not invalidate the work but they emphasize the need for regular reviews of the situation. Any fundamental, unforeseen change in the political environment affecting the state will force an immediate Threat Review to consider the new circumstances. While Intelligence staffs should constantly monitor the situation and note relevant information, there should not normally be full reviews more than once each year; even full reviews are unlikely to produce major, unexpected changes from year to year but there will inevitably be changes in detail which will need to be addressed. Ideally, these full reviews will be timed to precede the preparation of the defence element of the national budget by a sufficient amount to allow any changes in the Threat which may be considered sufficiently significant to affect the defence programme to be addressed as part of the budgetary process. It is important that non-defence agencies understand that this process may affect the numbers of soldiers to be demobilized over the planned programme and that this is not because the military planning was faulty; rather that the military decision makers are adapting their plan to meet developing circumstances.

## **DESIGN OF APPROPRIATE ARMED FORCES TO MEET THE THREAT**

### **SIZE AND SHAPE**

18. Once the Threat has been defined, it becomes possible to begin the design of armed forces capable of meeting it. The first step in this design, and all that is necessary for broad budget planning, is the so-called 'size and shape' or structure of the armed forces - size is self-explanatory but shape refers to the division between the branches of the service - navy, army and air force - and within those branches eg, for the army, the proportion which will be infantry, armoured, artillery, military engineers, logistic troops etc (called the capbadge split in many armies<sup>2</sup>).

19. States may be able to rely, to a greater or lesser extent, upon the support of allies or United Nations protection and this support may reduce the need for armed

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2 This is a convenient shorthand, used later in this paper, which derives from those armies in which different arms and services wear distinctive capbadges

forces of their own. In considering this, it needs to be remembered that alliances may be transient and United Nations protection temporary. The defence of the homeland is both the right and duty of a sovereign state, some would argue that it is the primary responsibility; the Government must be allowed to devote adequate resources to this task.

20. It is not axiomatic that all the forces considered necessary need be fully-mobilized. The Threat Document will identify Warning Periods and it may be possible to mobilize reserve forces (ie civilians with a liability to be called up to full time military service) so that they can be ready where required within the Warning Period. This may also open the way to the employment of formed bodies of troops on non-Defence tasks. It should be noted that systems will be required to activate and deploy the reserve forces, they will be less militarily skilled than full time soldiers (although they may well bring additional skills into the armed forces and may particularly be a source of certain types of specialist), they will require planned training periods and there will be little saving in equipment costs. There are social and other wider matters to be considered (which fall outside the scope of this paper). Clearly, there are many issues to be addressed before this option can be adopted but it can be a valid approach to the provision of adequate defence at minimum cost.

21. It has been noted previously that there may be internal and external threats to security. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the extent to which the military will be involved in internal security matters. There may be political and presentational advantages in placing as much of this task as possible under the police and, hence, outside the defence budget.

22. The armed forces of developing countries tend to assume that defence capability should rely wholly on military personnel. In the developed world, the trend is in the other direction - military personnel are increasingly being used solely for tasks in which military training and experience are necessary, while civilians, employed directly or through a commercial contractor, are used to provide as much support as possible. Military personnel are generally more flexible than civilians but time spent on military activities reduces their productivity if they are engaged in technical activities; They also tend to be more expensive. Of course, in developing countries, there may not be the necessary pool of qualified civilians who could fill all of the posts appropriate for them. Here, too, there may be political and social considerations to take into account when the balance is struck between military and civilian staff.

23. Taking these and other factors into account, and from consideration of the Threat Analysis, it is possible to design armed forces capable of meeting and containing the Threat, together with all their necessary support functions. This is not a precise science and considerable judgement is required but there are a number of yardsticks and military axioms which are available to assist. Two simple examples: if a well equipped, hostile neighbour has strong armoured forces, there will need to be an anti-tank capability; an attack is usually planned on a 3:1 ratio - a defended position occupied by 100 soldiers will need not less than 300 soldiers to seize it and it follows that if a divisional attack (> 10,000 troops) on the country is considered probable, a minimum of a brigade (ca 5,000 troops) will be needed to resist, although qualitative comparisons will also be necessary.



24. It is not necessary in this paper to explain the detail of how the process is carried out, but it will be appreciated that it is inevitably long and detailed, requiring a high level of military expertise and judgement, together with a sound understanding of the forces to which the process is being applied and the personnel and logistic support functions which will be necessary to support those deployed in the field.

25. The development of a size and shape is inevitably an iterative process. It is almost a foregone conclusion that the first attempt will produce a design - probably providing ample capability to deal with at least the realistic worst case - which will far exceed anything which can remotely be afforded and so it will be necessary to apply judgement, compromise and take considered risks. It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply profligacy to be inherent in the military planning process; rather that military staffs are entrusted with substantial responsibilities for the defence of the homeland and, like most other professionals, do not wish to fail; indeed, they recognize that failure on their part would be more drastic than is the case in many other professions. This first, as it were ideal, design is a necessary part of the work as it is only by constant reference back to it that a sensible view can be taken of the compromises and risks necessary and acceptable to bring the design within budgetary reality.

26. Once developed, the size and shape of the armed forces provides a detailed basis on which a wide range of more specific planning can take place, much of which will have wider, social implications as well as affecting the defence budget. In many cases, some preparatory work can be carried out in parallel with the Threat Analysis and structural work but it cannot be finalized until that has been completed. For example:

- a. An operational concept and tactical doctrine - produced in conjunction with the Threat Document to describe how the armed forces will operate in the field.
- b. Detailed organization tables for each unit in the armed forces, listing the number of personnel, by rank, capbadge and qualification, together with the major and minor equipment requirements. These may be different for peace and war, to reflect the use of reserves or the redeployment of troops which may take place on mobilization.
- c. An equipment programme - what equipment is required and in what quantity, including war reserves; phasing of purchase of that which needs to be procured to match budgetary planning; replacement parts, tools, test equipment etc for existing and planned equipments; disposal of surplus equipment etc.
- d. A training programme - individual basic military skills; collective training; functional training to reflect new roles for the armed forces, particularly if those forces have moved from fighting a liberation struggle to keeping the peace; technical and special to arm or equipment training;

- e. An accommodation plan - how many troops and their equipment are to be housed, where they would best be located having due regard to likely threats and other considerations, policy on family housing etc.
- f. A terms and conditions of service policy - pay and allowances, leave, welfare etc.
- g. A manning plan - career patterns, postings, promotion, personal records, indeed, everything relating to an individuals career - the most important document in the demobilization context and thus now examined in more detail.

27. It should, however, first be noted that many of the areas of work are interrelated. The training plan, for example, will need to reflect the manning plan and to feed into the accommodation plan, which will also be affected by the conditions of service policy.

### **THE MANNING PLAN**

28. From a consolidation of the individual unit organization tables, the total military manpower<sup>3</sup> requirement is produced, showing the numbers of troops required under each capbadge, by rank and qualification. This becomes one of the foundations of the manning plan. Before declaring this as the size of the armed forces, it will be necessary to consider the need for additional manpower:

- a. **Working Margin.** The Working Margin provides a small reserve of manpower which is available to meet new or temporary commitments.
- b. **Supernumerary Allowance.** The Supernumerary Allowance provides manpower cover for personnel who, for whatever reason, are not filling established posts. During a handover/takeover period, for example, both the incumbent and his relief are effectively filling one post and there is only the cover for one. Unless some recognition of this is made in the overall manpower plan, effective handovers will only be possible by creating manning gaps elsewhere in the organization. Other situations covered by this allowance include attendance on long courses, long term sickness and travelling time on posting.

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3. It may be helpful to explain that, in this paper, manpower and manning have distinctly different meanings:

Manpower Planning relates to personnel in the abstract - how many are required and where they are to be employed, ie size and shape or structural issues.

Manning, on the other hand, relates to the filling of the posts listed in the structure by suitable individuals and their career management as they move through those posts.

29. The total manpower requirement, by capbadge, rank and qualification, is collected together in a Manpower Conspectus, the basic document on which all manning matters are based.

30. In parallel with all of the Threat Analysis and size and shape work, a manning policy should be developed, although it is one of the many policies which cannot be finalized until the processes above have been completed. It is unlikely that the manning policy will be contained in one, simple document; for example: there are likely to be separate policy considerations affecting officers and other ranks; certain specialists may require different treatment from the majority, and so on.

31. A number of considerations arise when the manning policy is being considered. The overall aim of this policy is to ensure that all authorized posts are filled by suitably qualified and experienced personnel, while ensuring that those individuals have a satisfying career in the armed forces, during which their abilities are developed and rewarded, leading to their eventual discharge back into civilian life as useful citizens with skills which will be of value to the community.

#### **THE RECRUITING AND REDUNDANCY APPROACH**

32. In the context of this paper, the most important decision to be made is whether, and to what extent, there will be a flow of personnel into the armed forces, through the ranks and back into civilian life; in other words, will positive efforts be made to recruit and train new soldiers, with a compensating redundancy programme (affecting say 5% of the post-demobilization armed forces each year) becoming a feature of the manning policy for a number of years<sup>4</sup>? This will obviously affect the resettlement activities in a necessarily extended programme. While the recruiting and redundancy approach may be more expensive but has a number of social, political and military advantages:

- a. Post-revolutionary armed forces, and particularly armies, tend to consist of predominantly young men, indeed often children, whose education has probably not been completed and who are thus not ideal material for military service. Among those who are not demobilized, there will be little natural retirement on grounds of age; natural opportunities for promotion will not arise, meaning that merit will not be rewarded and individuals will become frustrated. A resentful army is not an ingredient for stability within the country. Alternatively, if promotions are manufactured, the armed forces will become over-ranked and more expensive to no useful purpose, without the individuals gaining the enhanced job satisfaction which should come from filling appointments of greater responsibility on each successive promotion.

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4 Although not in the situation covered by the context of this paper, Nigeria has adopted this approach in its current Revitalization Programme. In 1989, the Nigerian Army was some 100,000 strong and, under the programme will reduce to about 60,000 by 1995.

b. The age profile will lead to the armed forces becoming less effective over time. Although the level of military expertise might increase, staleness is a potential problem. More seriously, while there is a place for older men within the armed forces, it is not appropriate for infantry riflemen to be in their late 30s as would happen 15-20 years after the establishment of the armed forces in this context.

c. There will come a time, perhaps some 20 years downstream, when a large proportion of the armed forces will reach retirement age within a short period. Assuming that they will need to be replaced - and if they do not they should previously have been demobilized - this will result in a huge recruiting and training programme. The armed forces will have little or no experience in the management of such activities and there will obviously be considerable turbulence, leading to the formation of essentially new, inexperienced armed forces.

d. Simultaneously with this development, the retiring veterans will all be precipitated onto the job market within a short period. Despite the comments on the aim of the Manning Policy including the return of useful citizens to civilian life, the low level of education of the majority of the veterans will mean that expensive education and resettlement programmes will be necessary, ideally throughout the period of their service but certainly as it nears its end. Even with such programmes, the market may not be able to absorb so many at one time, leading to a potentially destabilizing situation; indeed, a repetition of just the problem which demobilization itself would cause if not carefully managed in the manner described in the literature.

e. The adoption of a recruiting and redundancy policy could, itself, become a destabilizing influence. This disadvantage would be negated if it became clear that those discharged as redundant received the best possible preparation for discharge. This should include remedial education, vocational training and social skills.

f. Having the processes in place will allow the structure of the armed forces to be conveniently and easily adjusted as the work described above is refined and in the event of any significant change in threat.

g. Armed forces should reflect the society which they serve and from which they are drawn, yet in almost all countries they tend to be alienated, or at least set apart, from that society. There are many reasons for this (outside the scope of the paper) but a constant flow of new blood into the armed forces and a steady rate of discharge of personnel into the civilian community would foster greater mutual understanding and prevent the development of the dangerous situation of a military clique or sub-society within society as a whole.

33. Once this basic decision is taken, it becomes possible to complete the development of the manning policy itself. This should lead to the construction of simple mathematical models which will indicate ideal or target age, rank and length of service profiles for the numbers contained in the manpower conspectus.

34. It is typical of liberation armies that administration is at best informal. An essential tool in the administration of the personnel of the armed forces is basic personal documentation and the capture of the necessary data must be achieved as quickly as possible. This will take the form of personal profiles of every soldier including educational background, previous careers etc, which when collated, will provide much useful management information on which many planning activities can be based.

35. Not only will this provide a basis on which selections for demobilization can be made, the requirement is more fundamental than that. It is only by collecting and collating the data that it will become possible to determine the current size of the armed forces and hence, in due course, how many are to be demobilized. But more immediately, and with significant security implications, it allows for the proper administration of pay (including a reduction in the potential for fraud by paymasters and commanders).

#### DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING

36. It is only when all of the work described above has been completed that it becomes possible to start addressing the quantitative aspects of the demobilization policy. The following basic information should have become available:

- a. The number of personnel within the armed forces, together with at least basic personal details about each individual.
- b. The number required for the long term, by capbadge, rank and qualification, with an indication of the target age, rank and length of service profiles.
- c. Hence the number to be demobilized immediately.
- d. An estimate of the numbers to be declared redundant in any follow up programmes, such as long term recruiting and redundancy, and the time scale over which this will take place.

37. It would be facile to pretend that a liberation army, converting into a conventional force, will have the infrastructure and experience necessary to carry out this planning process, and certainly not to do it quickly enough to satisfy the donor countries and organizations which will be wanting to see speedy progress towards demobilization. This gives rise to the following considerations:

- a. The work which needs to be carried out to prepare for demobilization will be necessary to produce the design for appropriate, balanced and properly structured forces to meet the legitimate security concerns of the country. Demobilization considerations may force the pace but many other issues will be resolved through the process.
- b. In reality, even developed nations with much experience of similar processes do not complete them quickly - and they have a corpus of power.

covering all the key areas, rather than having to start ab initio.

c. The provision of suitable advisors will thus be essential. They will necessarily become privy to much information which will rightly be regarded as vital to the security of the state. If they are to be effective, they must be acceptable to and trusted by the government; and the command group and strategic and corporate planning elements of the armed forces. Clearly they will need to be selected with care.

d. The development of the necessary policies will be iterative. It will be necessary to first carry out crude analyses of the various issues - thus allowing some broad estimates to be made - and then refine the policies, leading to more accurate figures of those to be demobilized. This strengthens the case for the adoption of the long term recruiting and redundancy approach discussed above, as its adoption would provide the means of adjusting numbers over the long term if the estimates were found to be wildly inaccurate.

e. The start of demobilization does not, however, need to wait for almost any of this work to be completed. There will be priority cases - individuals who should be discharged regardless of the outcome of the full planning process.

#### PRIORITY CASES

38. There are 2 obvious categories who demand priority treatment: the disabled and underage soldiers. While all veterans may be regarded as belonging to 'a specially disadvantaged group'<sup>5</sup> these 2 groups present particular problems and challenges. In addition, veterans' dependents have also been identified as a special/vulnerable group,<sup>6</sup> but consideration of them falls outside the scope of this paper. In any event, dependents need to be considered at the same time as the heads of their families and they are not, in themselves, priority cases.

39. Disabled Veterans. The literature contains much comment on the manner in which disabled veterans might be treated on demobilization and whether they should attract a priority above that of war-disabled civilians. For the purposes of this paper, suffice it to note that these personnel have no long term future within the armed forces, regardless of the overall numbers to be discharged, and it might be beneficial to them to be released ahead of the able-bodied, as soon as they can be supported by appropriate rehabilitation programmes.

40. Underage Soldiers. A feature of modern liberation struggles is the youth of many of the combat hardened soldiers - fighters as young as 10 or 12 are not

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5. Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel - Case Studies, Chapter VIII, The Case of Uganda, paragraphs 9 and 10. Nat Colletta and Nicole Ball, World Bank; date not shown.

6. World Bank Discussion Paper: Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies. World Bank October 1993.

uncommon; many of them are actually or effectively orphans and the army has become their family. It is not clear whether any demobilization exercises have addressed the particular needs of underage soldiers but they obviously represent a group which needs to be demobilized quickly so that their education can be resumed, psychological damage can be repaired and they can be taught social skills and attitudes different from the inappropriate ones they may have acquired during their service. If it is not possible to demobilize all of them, special attention must be directed at the needs of those who remain; perhaps some form of partial demobilization in which military activity is combined with a programme of education and vocational training. Given the recent UNICEF initiative on the employment of underage soldiers<sup>7</sup>, donors might be particularly well disposed to fund the necessary programmes for this group as a matter of urgency.

#### SELECTION FOR DEMOBILIZATION

41. For the balance, it will be necessary to consider which individuals are to be demobilized. On 5 Jun 92 the Ugandan Army Council published the criteria which they had adopted for their demobilization programme:

- a. 'Voluntary resignation is accepted from all officers and men. The Army reserves the right to retain anybody for his or her skills, profession or special talent.
- b. Age as contained in the terms and conditions of service.
- c. Non-citizens.
- d. Services no longer required; this will cover all those who are undisciplined, malingerers, incompetent ones, drug abusers etc.
- e. Local defence units: Those interested in the army must be on active service now and have contributed to counter-insurgency operations for at least one year. They will be screened, like the rest of the army, and taken on provided there is room in the establishment. Those found unfit for health reasons shall be discharged.
- f. There are officers and men seconded to institutions outside the army. Whereas the secondment of officers will continue, they shall however cease to depend on all army resources. Only officers and specialists will be seconded. Those affected [who] are interested will report back to the army for screening.'<sup>8</sup>

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7. Details not yet to hand.

8 'Army Council Issues Criteria for Reducing Army', Kampala Radio, 5 Jun 92, reproduced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-AFR-91-110, 6 Jun 92, p11.

42. A number of useful points arise from these criteria:

a. In general, any soldier who wishes to be demobilized should be allowed to do so. The armed forces will, however, invariably reserve the right to retain individuals with particular qualifications for which they foresee a need, in order to prevent the depletion of necessary skills, in order to allow the new armed forces to remain effective. Many of the skills likely to be under consideration will be those for which there is a ready market, and high pay, in the commercial sector; it will be necessary to ensure that the terms and conditions of service policy allows for those with such qualifications to be adequately rewarded within the armed forces. In considering the retention of skilled personnel, it may be appropriate to take account of whether the individuals gained their qualifications before or after joining the armed forces.

b. Underage soldiers have previously been considered as priority cases for demobilization. While the age criterion was absolute in the Ugandan demobilization exercise, ie governed by the terms and conditions of service policy, the ideal manning profiles will also tend to indicate groups of personnel who become prime candidates for redundancy on grounds of age.

c. In moving to smaller and, it is hoped, more professional armed forces, there is a natural and proper wish to remove non-effective personnel and the Ugandan criteria indicate the type of individual who has little to offer the armed forces. These and similar groups are easily identified and should be discharged.

d. There may be auxiliary forces associated with the armed forces who will need to be considered; this will clearly depend on circumstances and any roles they perform will need to be considered as part of the size and shape processes. If, however, such forces are to be demobilized, it is unlikely to be acceptable for all their members to be discharged and, anyway, doing so would eliminate a potential source of the good quality personnel required for the new armed forces.

43. It has been previously recommended that disabled veterans should be demobilized as priority cases but a health criterion might also be adopted for non-disabled personnel. The armed forces should have medical minimum standards; these might usefully be reviewed in preparation for the demobilization programme and enforced as a means of improving the overall standard of health of the forces. This will, in due course, lead to significant savings to the defence budget.

44. It is important to consider the extent to which is necessary or desirable to have ethnically mixed or balanced armed forces. This is essentially a political matter and beyond the scope of this paper but guidance must be obtained before any selection for demobilization can take place beyond those who fail to meet specified criteria.

45. Agreed criteria for selection for demobilization form the final requirement for the implementation of the demobilization plan. Certain groups will have been identified for automatic selection but it is unlikely that there will be sufficient volunteers to meet the balance of the total number required to be demobilized; compulsory demobilization



will be required. Although there is some evidence that, even shortly after leaving the armed forces, 'no matter how difficult economic circumstances may [have been], for both men and women, army life [no longer] seems attractive'<sup>9</sup> it is unrealistic to expect personnel to accept this ante facto. There will need to be an information campaign within the armed forces, stating the facts fairly and honestly, but in such a manner that it does not give rise to alarm or discontent; emphasis must clearly be given to the resettlement package. A published timetable will also be of assistance.

46. It will be necessary for selection boards to be convened to decide which volunteers are to be retained in the armed forces and to select personnel for compulsory demobilization. In the absence of comprehensive records of service, prepared to common standards, it will be difficult to achieve the levels of scrupulous fairness to which the armed forces of developed states would aspire during periods of military retrenchment. Nonetheless, great care should be taken so that the process is as fair as possible and this may be another activity in which the use of external advisors could be beneficial, not least in the presentational aspects of the programme.

#### **MANAGEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION**

47. The scope of this paper is effectively bounded by the discharge of personnel from the armed forces, but the management of programmes for the re-integration of veterans into the civilian community is a subject in which the military authorities have a legitimate interest. The literature reviews the available options and concludes that such programmes are best conducted by private organizations and NGOs; further, the military authorities have much else to do and may consider that they would not wish to assume full responsibility for another major task. But the demobilization process is a continuum and it is clear that considerable coordination and cooperation between the military authorities and the organizations (for there will inevitably be more than one) which will carry out the subsequent work is a vital ingredient for success.

48. The coordination and cooperation cannot begin too early. As soon as the need for a demobilization programme is identified, contact should be established between the defence authorities and potential partners so that possibilities can be identified and appropriate research and planning commenced. There will need to be openness and mutual trust on both sides; they share a common aim.

49. Liaison between the authorities and the implementing organizations will need to continue throughout the demobilization process. This will include discussion of major policy issues, such as the timing of demobilization, management of the transition from military to civilian life, the types of vocational training to be offered, finance etc, but there will also be many minor administrative matters which will need close coordination. If the programme is to be a success, it is essential that discussions take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation rather than one of suspicion.

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9 Preliminary Report on the Evaluation of the Uganda Veterans' Assistance Programme by the Evaluation Mission of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Kampala, 26 Jul 94, p13.

50. Once the selections for demobilization have been announced, the implementing organizations may need to have access to those concerned, in order to discuss their individual plans and aspirations.

51. If demobilization is to be carried out in phases (and, indeed, the implementing bodies may need to be involved in such decisions), there must be a system of feedback to the military authorities so that problems, which will inevitably arise, can be discussed frankly to identify how they can be avoided in subsequent phases. Information on the successes of the programme should be passed to those still serving to reassure them that life outside the defence forces is not as frightening as they may fear.

#### INTEGRATION OF PREVIOUSLY WARRING FACTIONS

52. It is perhaps unfortunate that, in the literature relating to demobilization, integration has 2 distinct meanings:

- a. Generally, it refers to the reintegration (which is also used) of ex-military personnel into civilian life.
- b. But it is a feature of post-independence struggles that at least a measure of integration of the previously warring armies takes place. This section of the paper considers this integration.

53. Integration is a powerful symbol of reconciliation and unity of the new state. It may be defined as the creation of military units which contain a balanced mixture of the previously warring factions, subsequent to a process in which all personnel have received training to the same standards and been inculcated with a common ethos of service and loyalty to the new government and the whole community.

54. The principle and scope of integration are essentially political matters (and hence outside the scope of this paper; indeed, topics worthy of a paper of their own) but from the military perspective, integration provides a greater pool of training, experience and expertise from which to draw for the new armed forces.

55. If integration is to take place, it is a joint political/military matter to consider its timing in relation to demobilization. From a narrow military position, it might be argued that it will be a waste of resources to bring people together for military training, only to discharge them shortly afterwards. But there are other aspects which should be considered:

- a. It is clear from this paper that it will take some time before the armed forces will be in a position to declare who is to be demobilized and, probably before it will be possible to deliver resettlement packages. Integration should involve confidence building measures between the various factions and, if the programme is successful, it would be beneficial for some of those who passed through it to take that experience into the civilian community.

b. In the meantime, the integration programme provides a constructive activity in which the larger than now required armed forces can engage and gain a sense of purpose different from those previously held by the different factions. Even if one faction can be seen as having won, it is likely that there will need to be a change of ethos; from liberation army to servants of the new state, its community and, indeed, the country.

c. If one faction can be seen as having won, there will also be a losing side. Many fighters on that side will feel a greater loyalty to their country than to any particular cause and will wish to continue to serve that country in some way. Willing participation in the integration process provides them with an opportunity to demonstrate this, so that they may make a new beginning, whether their eventual post-war career is to be in the armed forces or not.

d. Government will not want the factions to remain apart any longer than necessary, particularly if they remain armed; the political imperative may therefore be to press on with integration so that one, unified defence force is created as quickly as possible.

e. The process of integration may allow better informed selection of individuals for demobilization as training to common standards allows more valid comparisons to be made. Appropriate assessment procedures must be included in the integration training package but this must not be taken to the extent that those passing through the programme come to believe that their performance during that period is the sole, or even main, determinant of their future. It will also be necessary to ensure that the assessments are fair and undertaken by a team in which all factions are represented.

56. It is considered that if the programme for the integration of previously warring factions is well designed and properly conducted, the balance of advantage lies in taking it forward independently of demobilization. This is not to imply that there is not a need for close coordination between the 2 programmes.

#### CONCLUSIONS

57. While economic and social benefits may result from a demobilization programme, the need for such a programme is primarily driven by military considerations. In the context of this paper, the Threat will normally have reduced and hence armed forces can be reduced commensurately.

58. Before it is possible to produce a definitive figure of personnel to be demobilized, the size and shape of the armed forces of the future need to be defined. This is a complex process and external, independent advisors may need to be provided. But the decision-making responsibility rests with the government as the final structure will be a compromise between perceived defence needs and budgetary reality.

59. In parallel with the design of the structure of the armed forces, a wide range of other policy matters will need to be addressed, although it is unlikely that this work can be concluded before an outline structure is developed. One of these is a manning plan, leading to the identification of target age, rank and length of service profiles for each capbadge within the defence forces.

60. A key decision to be made is whether planned redundancy will become a long term feature of military life.

61. It is important that formal personal documentation of all military personnel is introduced at the earliest opportunity. Inter alia, this will accurately identify the size of the defence forces.

62. Based upon the defined size and shape, it becomes possible to identify the future manpower requirement and, hence, the size of the demobilization programme.

63. Clear, well publicized criteria must be developed for the selection of those to be demobilized. The selection process must be as fair as possible, particularly if ethnic considerations are involved.

64. Fair and honest publicity will alleviate many of the worries felt by those vulnerable for selection for demobilization.

65. If the social aspects of demobilization are to be achieved, it is essential that a close, cooperative relationship is established between the military authorities and any outside organizations who will take on the work of reintegrating veterans into the community. Fundamentally, both sides share a commonality of interest.

66. Two particular groups, disabled veterans and underage soldiers, should be demobilized as soon as the necessary programmes can be put in place.

67. If there is to be an integration of formerly warring factions, this may better take place before demobilization. However integration is conducted, it must be carefully coordinated with the demobilization programme.

68. Demobilization programmes serve many interests and their success may be vital for the future well being of the country. It is essential that they are properly planned and conducted. Much military planning must take place before a programme can begin.

CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RWANDESE ARMED FORCES  
AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY

Current as of 15 June, 1994

We, the representatives of the Rwandese Armed Forces and of the Rwandese Patriotic Army;(agreed)

Gravely concerned over the massacres and senseless violence that have been perpetrated prior to and after the signing of the Arusha Agreement;(agreed)

Reaffirming, as agreed on 2 June 1994, our commitment to take all measures necessary to ensure the evacuation of all displaced people who wish to leave, have decided to:(agreed)

- 1) Facilitate the continued evacuation of all displaced persons on both sides without restriction, conditions or regard to their total numbers; and(agreed)
- 2) Guarantee the security of the displaced persons by ceasing all exchanges of fire during the transfers of displaced persons during the conduct of the UNAMIR convoys.(agreed)

Reaffirming our commitment to the future discussions on the applicability of the Peace Agreement signed in Arusha on 4 August 1993, as a basis for the peace negotiations;(agreed)

Mindful of the fact that a ceasefire, simultaneously with the disbandment of armed bands and militias and the stoppage of inflammatory radio broadcasts, would facilitate:(agreed)

- (a) the creation of an environment conducive to these future discussions;(agreed)
- (b) the cessation of hostilities, massacres and killings of civilians;(agreed)
- (c) the security of humanitarian relief operations to displaced persons, refugees and other civilians at risk;(agreed)

Have on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of June 1994, agreed on and accepted the following provisions with respect to the ceasefire;(date TBC)

1. There shall be a ceasefire throughout the territory of the Republic of Rwanda between the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army which shall take effect from .....1994.(date TBC)
2. The ceasefire shall be preceded by a truce, i.e. the cessation of hostilities which shall enter into force at midnight on the ..... 1994(date TBC)

3. The two forces shall maintain the positions they hold at the time the ceasefire comes into effect. They shall not attempt to change these positions.(agreed)
4. The practical modalities of the ceasefire shall be worked out by a Ceasefire Monitoring Commission comprising the Commanders of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army under the auspices of the Force Commander of UNAMIR.(To be discussed later)
5. Upon entry into force of the ceasefire, it shall be monitored by UNAMIR, whose movements for this purpose shall not be impeded or obstructed by either side over all the territories they control. Checkpoints on roads and highways shall be manned only by personnel of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army. There are no other persons, specifically armed bands or militias allowed to man checkpoints anywhere in the country.(agreed)

-----14 June, 1994-----

6. Immediately upon the signature of this Agreement, all violence against civilians will be halted, measures towards this having been taken during the negotiation of this Agreement. In this connection, both sides shall control the activities of armed civilians and groups, including militias and self defence groups. There shall be no inflammatory radio broadcasts. Recovery of illegal arms shall commence immediately. The Ceasefire Monitoring Commission shall supervise the fulfilment of these undertakings.(see attached proposals)
7. Both sides agree to respect, for purposes of the safety of the Kigali International Airport, the operational control of this national infrastructure and its perimeter by UNAMIR. The use of the airport by the UN and other aid organizations in the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and support services shall not be impeded by the parties to this Agreement.
8. Both sides will address, as early as possible, the modalities for the resumption of the Peace Process with the goal of a political settlement of the present situation in Rwanda.
9. The two parties have agreed to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the killings and massacres and to request the United Nations to propose

steps for the establishment of such a Commission,  
which should include representatives of both sides.

10. The present Agreement, of which the English and French  
texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the  
archives of UNAMIR.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Rwandese  
Armed Forces (FAR) and the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) have  
signed the present Agreement.

DONE at Kigali on \_\_\_\_\_ one  
thousand nineteen ninety four.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_  
for the  
Rwandese Patriotic Army

Signed \_\_\_\_\_  
for the  
Rwandese Armed Forces

Signed as witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
for UNAMIR

Annex A

RPA PROPOSAL ON PARAGRAPH SIX OF THE CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT

At the time of the signature of this agreement all violence against civilians will have been halted.

In this connection, the Presidential Guard, all Militias, in particular the Interhamwe and the self-defence groups are disbanded.

Steps towards this disbandment and halting of violence should have been taken prior to the signature of this agreement.

There shall be no inflammatory radio broadcasts. The recovery of illegal arms shall be started immediately.

The following steps should precede the signature of this agreement:

- a. The arrests and investigations, specifically of the Presidential Guard, Militias etc., involved in massacres.
- b. A change in radio broadcasts from inflammatory programs to educational programs promoting National Unity.
- c. Removal of militia, self-defence groups from roadblocks leaving RGF and RPA to man the roadblocks.

The Ceasefire Monitoring Commission shall undertake the supervision of these activities.

RGF COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON PARAGRAPH SIX OF THE CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT

Immediately upon the signature of this agreement, all violence against civilians will be halted, certain measures already being taken during the negotiations of this agreement.

A Commission of Inquiry should be set up to investigate the killings and massacres in such a way that those responsible be immediately brought to justice.

In this connection, the two parties shall control the activities of armed civilians and groups, including the militia and self-defence groups. There shall be no inflammatory radio broadcasts. Recovery of illegal arms shall commence immediately.

UNAMIR shall supervise the fulfillment of these undertakings



ACCORD DE CESSEZ-LE-FEU ENTRE LES FORCES ARMÉES RWANDAISES (FAR)  
ET L'ARMÉE DU FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS (RPA)

14 Juin, 1994

Nous, les représentants des Forces Armées Rwandaises et ceux de l'Armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais;

Profondément préoccupés par les massacres et les actes insensés de violence perpétrés avant et après la signature de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;

Réaffirmant, comme convenu le 2 juin 1994, notre ferme engagement à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'évacuation des personnes déplacées qui souhaitent partir, avons décidé de:

- A. Faciliter la poursuite de l'évacuation des personnes déplacées dans les deux sens sans restriction, condition ou considération sur leur nombre total; et
- b. Garantir leur sécurité dans leurs déplacements en cessant tout échange de tirs lors des transferts des convois de la MINUAR.

Réaffirmant notre engagement à des discussions futures sur l'applicabilité de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha signé le 4 août 1993, comme base des négociations de paix;

Conscients qu'un cessez-le-feu, accompagné simultanément du démantèlement des bandes et milices armées et de l'arrêt des programmes de radio incendiaires, contribuerait:

- a. A créer un environnement propice à ces discussions futures;
- b. A la cessation des hostilités, massacres et tueries de civils, et
- c. A assurer la sécurité des opérations de secours humanitaires destinées aux personnes déplacées, aux réfugiés et à tous les civils en danger.

Nous, en ce ..... ième jour du mois ..... 1994, acceptons et décidons de prendre les dispositions suivantes au regard du cessez-le-feu:

1. Instaurer un cessez-le-feu entre les Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) et l'Armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais (RPA) sur le territoire de la République Rwandaise qui doit prendre effet à partir de ..... 1994.
2. Faire précéder ce cessez-le-feu d'une trêve, à savoir l'arrêt des hostilités, qui doit entrer en vigueur le..... 1994 à minuit.
3. Les deux Forces devront maintenir les positions tenues au moment où le cessez-le-feu prendra effet. Elles ne doivent pas tenter de changer ces positions.
4. Les modalités pratiques du cessez-le-feu doivent être discutées par une Commission de Vérification du cessez-le-feu comprenant le commandant des Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) et celui de l'Armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais (RPA) sous les auspices du commandant de la MINUAR;
5. Dès son entrée en vigueur, le cessez-le-feu sera supervisé et vérifié par la MINUAR, dont les actions ne doivent pas être entravées ou empêchées par les deux parties dans le territoire qu'elles contrôlent. Les points de contrôle sur les routes et les grandes voies seront assurés uniquement par les Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) et l'Armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais (RPA). Nulle autre personne, spécialement les bandes et milices armées, n'est autorisée à surveiller des points de contrôle nulle part dans le pays.
- ✓6. Immédiatement après la signature de l'accord, tous les actes de violence contre les civils seront arrêtés, des mesures ayant été prises au cours des négociations de cet accord.  
( Proposition des FAR: Tous les actes de violence doivent cesser. Des mesures ont déjà été arrêtées au cours des négociations de cet accord ). A cet égard, les deux parties doivent contrôler les activités des civils et des groupes armés, y compris les milices et les groupes d'auto-défense.  
( Proposition M. Dessande: Les deux parties doivent coopérer dans le contrôle des activités civils... )  
Il n'y aura pas de diffusions radiophoniques incendiaires. Des programmes de récupération d'armes illégales seront initiés immédiatement. La Commission de Vérification du cessez-le-feu devra superviser ces démarches;
7. Dans le but d'assurer la sécurité de l'aéroport international de Kigali, les deux parties s'accordent à respecter la zone d'accord de facilités permanentes qui sera sous le contrôle opérationnel de la MINUAR. L'utilisation de l'aéroport par les Nations Unies et par d'autres agences d'aide pour la livraison de secours humanitaires et de services de soutien ne devra pas être empêchée par les parties signataires de cette accord;

8. Les deux parties déclareront aussitôt que possible, les modalités pour la reprise du processus de paix en vue d'un règlement politique de la situation actuelle au Rwanda; et
9. Les deux parties sont d'accord pour l'établissement d'une commission d'enquête pour enquêter sur les tueries et les massacres, et de demander aux Nations Unies de proposer les procédures pour l'établissement d'une telle commission qui comprendrait les représentants des deux parties.
10. Le présent Accord, dont les textes français et anglais feront également foi, sera déposé dans les archives de la MINUAR.

ENFOI DE QUOI les représentants des Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) et de l'Armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais (RPA) ont signé le présent Accord.

FAIT à Kigali le \_\_\_\_\_, mille neuf cent quatre vingt quatorze.

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour la RPA

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les FAR

Témoin

\_\_\_\_\_  
pour MINUAR

5100.1(C PLANS)

31 MAY 1994

Major-Général Augustin Bizimungu  
Chef d'état-Major des Forces Armées

DÉCLARATION D'ENGAGEMENT

RÉF: Discussions au QG MINUAR 30 mai 1994

Vous trouverez ci-joint, une déclaration d'engagement qui fait état des trois principaux points discutés en référence.

Ce document en annexe, illustre les pré-conditions nécessaires aux premiers pas d'un engagement de cessez-le-feu définitif.

La signature de ce document, si accepté des deux parties, sera à l'ordre du jour du 2 juin 1994.

Roméo A. Dallaire  
Major-Général  
Commandant de la Force

#### DECLARATION D'ENGAGEMENT

1. Nous les représentants des FAR et des RPA très préoccupés par la situation qui prévaut actuellement au Rwanda et devant la nécessité de conclure un cessez-le-feu, décidons qu'un accord d'engagement préliminaire soit conclu entre les deux parties afin de démontrer notre coopération et notre bonne volonté pour sortir le pays de ce conflit.
  - a. Nous réaffirmons notre ferme engagement pour prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour continuer les transferts déjà commencés et décidons de:
    - 1) Faciliter la poursuite, inconditionnelle et indépendamment du nombre, de l'évacuation des personnes déplacées dans les deux sens; et
    - 2) Garantir leur sécurité dans leurs déplacements en cessant tout échange de tirs lors du transfert, à l'aller comme au retour des convois de la MINUAR.
  - b. Dans cette même perspective, nous nous engageons fermement:
    - 1) À mettre fin aux massacres et tueries de populations civiles à travers tout le pays et plus particulièrement dans leur secteur de contrôle respectif; et
    - 2) Dans les cas d'accusations de massacres nous nous engageons de permettre à la MINUAR de procéder à une investigation immédiate afin de mettre à jour l'authenticité des faits.
  - c. Sérieusement préoccupés par les diffusions radiophoniques:
    - 1) Nous affirmons notre engagement total à faire cesser toutes diffusions diffamatoires, ou incitatives à la violence et aux massacres; et
    - 2) Devant la nécessité d'apaiser les esprits et de favoriser un climat de paix, nous prendrons toutes les mesures nécessaires pour que les diffusions soient de caractère pacifique.

2. En conclusion, la concrétisation de ces différentes actions, sous-entendue par une réelle volonté de paix des deux parties, facilitera les premiers pas vers l' accord définitif de cessez-le-feu.

Fait à Kigali le \_\_\_\_\_ mai, 1994.

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les APR

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les FAR

Témoin

\_\_\_\_\_  
pour la MINUAR

Procès-Verbal de la réunion relative au Projet de document sur le cessez-le-feu entre les représentants des FAR et du RPA le 17 Juin 1994.

Etaient présents:

- MINUAR : - Brigadier Général ANYIDHO Henri:  
Commandant/adjoint de la MINUAR.
  - Mr. BEADENGAR Dessande: conseiller politique
  - Lt Col AUSTDAL: Chef des Plans
  - Commandant DIAGNE: Assistant Militaire FC
  - Mr David Violet: Interprète de la MINUAR.
- FAR : - Brigadier Général GATSINZI Marcel: Chef de la délégation
  - Lt Col SETAKO
  - Lt Col RWABALINDA
  - Major KAGARA.
- RPA : - Lt Col RWIGAMBA
  - Major KAMANZI

Objet de la réunion:

Reprise des discussions sur le projet de document du cessez-le-feu.

Le 17 Juin 1994 au Quartier Général de la MINUAR s'est tenue la réunion entre les deux délégations FAR et RPA sous la présidence du Brigadier Général ANYIDHO, adjoint au commandant de la MINUAR de 11h15 à 16h40.

- DFC - En ouvrant la séance a présenté aux deux délégations Mr David Violet, nouveau interprète de la MINUAR.
- Il informe la délégation des FAR de l'indisponibilité du Chef de la délégation RPA, le Colonel Mugambage Franck et du Capitaine Kazura. La délégation du RPF se compose donc de deux membres présents. Il souligne que le retard à cette réunion est dû non pas à un manque de coordination mais plutôt de sécurité occasionné par les tirs de ce matin.
  - Il déclare l'ouverture de la séance et demande aux deux délégations leurs commentaires sur les textes déjà abordés.

Lt Col. Rwigamba: - rappelle l'accord des deux parties quant à leur engagement pour faciliter les mouvements des déplacés et qu'un texte avait

~~UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION~~ ~~FOR RWANDA~~ ~~MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA~~

- Il a été élaboré et signé par les deux parties.
- Il souligne selon les informations reçues, des personnes auraient été enlevées à Sainte Famille et qu'une demande d'intervention des FAR n'a donné aucun résultat. Selon toujours ces informations près de 60 personnes auraient été enlevées.
- Alors que nous parlons de cessez-le-feu, a-t-il dit, les massacres continuent et la délégation ici présente affirme ne pas être au courant. Les FAR continuent à massacrer les civils innocents dans les églises, lesquels sont sous la protection de la MINUAR.
- Avons reçu, poursuit le Lt Col. Rwigamba, des instructions pour que la délégation des FAR s'explique sur ces massacres, une explication publique et officielle sur les 60 enfants enlevés et les mesures prises.

Major Kamanzi: - Indique que beaucoup de massacres ont été perpétré par les FAR avec la collaboration de milices. Il souligne que ce sont des FAR qui ont donné accès aux milices pour pénétrer dans Sainte Famille, il n'est pas donc possible que cette délégation ne soit pas au courant. Elle porte la responsabilité de ces massacres et des explications sont demandées à cette délégation.

**Séance interrompue momentanément à cause des incidents survenus aux UNMOS en mission et des menaces d'attaque de Mille collines par la milice.**

DFC - A la reprise de la réunion, il demande aux délégations des informations compte-tenu des événements qui viennent de se passer.

Lt Col. Rwigamba: - souligne que les déplacés de Mille Collines sont en danger et que ceux enlevés seront massacrés. Il demande une explication à la délégation des FAR.

B/Gén. Gatsinzi:- Intervient pour dire que la délégation des FAR n'étaient pas au courant des menaces qui pesaient sur les déplacés de Saint Paul et Sainte Famille. Nous avons fait des promesses pour assurer la sécurité de ces deux sites. C'est ici même à la MINUAR que nous avons entendu du major Kamanzi les difficultés à Sainte Famille et Saint Paul, et nous avons déploré cette situation, a dit le chef de la délégation des FAR.

- Il souligne que la délégation n'a aucune responsabilité dans cette situation. Pour les tueries de Saint Paul il déclare n'être au courant que maintenant. Une enquête ou



concertation entre les FAR - la Préfecture de Kigali et la MINUAR sera menée pour retrouver les auteurs de ces faits. Malgré le cessez-le-feu signé le 15 Juin 1994 au niveau politique, poursuit le Chef de la délégation, le FPR a occasionné beaucoup de morts, de blessés et enlevé plusieurs personnes à Nyamirambo, Sainte Famille et Saint Paul. Pour les incidents de Mille Collines on vient d'en prendre connaissance, a dit le Chef de la délégation. Le CEM/FAR et le chef des opérations sont actuellement sur place au Mille Collines pour voir la situation et les mesures seront prises pour empêcher les gens d'attaquer Mille Collines. La délégation des FAR ne sait pas ce qui se passe à l'extérieur et la situation n'est pas encore claire. Il propose une concertation avec les deux parties avant de continuer la séance.

DFC: - Intervient pour souligner sa tristesse car depuis deux jours il a tenté de débloquent la situation pour la continuation des évacuations. En compagnie du Préfet de Kigali, le DFC dit avoir visité Saint Paul - Sainte Famille et que le CEM/FAR contacté, assure de la continuité des évacuations.  
- Il informe du décès d'un officier Uruguayen et d'un Bengalais blessé ce jour. Il n'y a pas de sens pour ces discussions alors que les gens meurent, a dit le DFC et déclare être d'accord pour lever la séance.

Major Kamanzi:- Souligne que lever la séance alors que des personnes sont en danger n'est pas souhaitable et demande que les camions de la MINUAR soient mis en oeuvre pour enlever les déplacés de Mille Collines. Il faut essayer de faire quelque chose.

DFC: - Est d'accord mais avec la garantie des deux parties.  
- Il informe également que la situation est présentement maîtrisée par les FAR et les officiers observateurs de la MINUAR à L'hôtel des Mille Collines.

Lt Col Rwigamba:- Considère que la proposition du Major Kamanzi est très importante et insiste pour que ces déplacés de Mille Collines soient transférés sans tenir compte de délais ou d'échange.  
- Il insiste également pour que cette opération se fasse aujourd'hui.

B/Gén. Gatsinzi:- Est d'accord pour une évacuation dans les deux sens avec priorité Mille Collines compte tenu de la situation.

DFC: - Les véhicules sont prêts mais les deux parties doivent assurer la garantie de cette opération.

Les deux délégations sont d'accord pour donner cette garantie nécessaire.

DFC: - Propose compte tenu du temps (il est 15 heures) que la délégation des FAR soit accompagnée par les véhicules de la MINUAR chargés du transport des déplacés. Il précise que le FC a donné son accord.

Mr Dessande: - Intervient pour dire que la MINUAR est prête, il faut donc aller à l'action sinon il sera trop tard.

Il est 15h10. Les deux délégations sortent de la salle pour contacter leurs responsables par radio en vue de l'évacuation des déplacés de Mille Collines.

DFC: - Compte tenu du temps, le DFC souligne que l'évacuation aura lieu le 17/06/1994 à 08 heures. Cette opération risque de se poursuivre la nuit et il faut tenir compte des problèmes de sécurité d'où le report pour demain matin. Il informe les deux délégations qu'il sera lui-même au Mille Collines et à l'Hôpital Fayçal.

Il est 16h40, le DFC clos la séance.

Le Commandant I. Diagne  
Rapporteur.

NOTES SUR LES DISCUSSIONS RELATIVES AU PROJET DE DOCUMENT DU  
CESSEZ-LE FEU

KIGALI - 14 JUIN 1994

Lieu et heure: Salle de Conférence du Siège de la MINUAR -  
10h20.

Etaient présents:

FAR: GEN. B. de GATSINZI Marcel, Chef de délégation.

LT.COL. SETAKO, membre.

LT.COL. RWANBALINDA, Ephrem, Officier de Liaison.

COL.LT. KAGARA, membre.

RPA: COL. MUGAMBAGE, Frank, Chef de délégation.

LT.COL. RWIGAMBA.

COL.LT.KAMANZI, Frank, Officier de Liaison.

CAPT. KAZURA.

MINUAR: GEN.BDE. ANYIDHOHO, Henri, Commandant-Adjoint de la Force, Président; M. BEADENGAR DESSANDE, Conseiller Politique; LT.COL. AUSTDAL, Mike, Assistant Militaire.

Monsieur Amadou Moctar GUEYE, Conseiller de Presse, assure l'interprétation.

1. Les deux délégations citées plus haut ont poursuivi aujourd'hui les discussions sur le projet de document de la MINUAR sur le cessez-le-feu. Ces discussions ont porté sur le point 6. de ce document, à savoir les mesures à prendre à la signature du cessez-le-feu.

2. Dans leurs commentaires:

- Les FAR acceptent le point 6.5 mais propose l'amendement suivant pour la dernière phrase: "...Une Commission d'enquête devra être mise sur pied a fin d'enquêter sur les tueries et massacres pour que les responsables soient traduits immédiatement devant la justice. Les deux parties doivent contrôler... La MINUAR devra superviser ces démarches.

- Les RPA proposent l'amendement ci-après:

"Au moment de la signature de cet accord, tous les actes de violence contre les civils auront été arrêtés. A cet effet, la Garde présidentielle,

toutes les milices, particulier les **Interhamwe** et les groupes d'auto-défense seront démantelés. Des mesures pour leur démantèlement et l'arrêt de la violence devraient avoir lieu avant la signature de cet accord. Il n'y aura pas de diffusions radiophoniques incendiaires.

Des programmes de récupération d'armes seront initiés immédiatement. Les mesures suivantes devraient précéder la signature de cet accord:


(a) Arrestation et enquête sur toutes les personnes, particulièrement la Garde présidentielle, les milices etc... impliquées dans les massacres,

(b) Un changement dans les programmes radiophoniques incendiaires à des programmes radiophoniques éducationnels pour la promotion de l'unité nationale,

(c) Interdire aux milices et aux groupes d'autodéfense de surveiller les points de contrôle, cette responsabilité incombant aux **RPA** et **FAR**. La Commission de vérification du Cessez-le-feu devra superviser ces mesures."

3. Le consensus ne pouvant se faire sur ce paragraphe, le Général **ANYIDHO** a offert aux deux délégations l'occasion de s'entretenir directement en **Kinyrwanda**. A l'issue de ces discussions bilatérales de plus d'une heure de temps, les deux délégations, par la voie du Chef de délégation des **FAR**, ont déclaré à la **MINUAR** qu'elles ont eu une fort utile discussion dont elles doivent rendre compte à leur haut commandement avant de se trouver le Jeudi 16 Juin 1994 à 1100 h pour poursuivre l'examen du projet de document du cessez-le-feu.

La séance a pris fin à 16 heures quinze minutes.

  
Beadengar DESSANDE  
Conseiller Politique

NOTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN B. GENERAL ANYIDOH  
AND GEN. MAJOR BIZIMUNGU,  
RESPECTIVELY DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER, UNAMIR AND  
CHIEF OF STAFF, RWANDESE ARMED FORCES (FAR)

KIGALI, 10 JUNE 1994

Present:  
UNAMIR:

Beadengar P. Dessande, Political Adviser  
Amadou Mactar Guèye, Press Adviser  
Lt Col. Paul Victor Moigny, Liaison Officer,  
Maj. Don McNeil, Humanitarian Assistance Cell  
Capt. A. Nsiasa, Aide de Camp, Deputy Force Commander

Interpretation by Mr. Guèye.

*1. In the exchange of usual courtesy calls, B. Gen. Anyidoho expresses to Gen. Major Bizimungu:*

- *his pleasure to meeting with him the first time;*
- *his pride to belong to the same continent. As such, he convinced his government to maintain its presence in Rwanda, together with Tunisians and other Africans in order to help the rwandese reach for peace once again and,*
- *his desire to hold a tête-à-tête meeting with him after their formal discussions.*

*2. General Bizimungu expresses his "pride and happiness" to meet with General Anyidoho of whom he has heard so much about, and agrees to a tête-à-tête meeting despite his "poor" english. He stresses the determining role played by UNAMIR in the setting up of the transitional institutions and praises the mission's sustained efforts under difficult conditions. He expresses sorrow at the recent death of a senegalese UNAMIR military observer. (NOTE: This refers to Captain MBaye Diagne, killed on 31 May 1994 by mortar shells in Kigali).*

*He appreciates UNAMIR's presence which allows for continued contact with the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and he hails the call by the President of Ghana for an end to the fighting.*

*3. Discussions dealt on two mains issues brought by General Anyidoho. First, the 5 June incident at Kigali International Airport where a UN plane was almost hit by a mortar shell. The Force Commander wrote to the Rwandese Armed Froces a protest letter which is not answered to date; as a consequence, UNAMIR is unable to resume its flights.*

*The Deputy Force Commander also mentionned the stoppage of the evacuation operations of displaced persons and orphans. This issue is affecting the ceasefire discussions, he said. He thanks the Chief of Staff for paying a particular importance to these ongoing negotiations by allowing the Rwandese Armed Forces delegation to attend each and every meeting held at UNAMIR Headquarters.*

4. General Bizimungu confirms receipt of General Dallaire's letter and says he had discussed the issue with his officers and with the Prime Minister. He says that investigations are underway to determine the origin of the shells that hit the airport that day. But he stresses his army's concern about the RPF forces' presence at the airport. He says that UNAMIR must communicate its air movements well in advance so that its planes are not mistaken as enemy targets.

He notes his concern of a probable use of UNAMIR planes by RPF to attempt to infiltrate its personnel coming from Bujumbura.

5. General Anyidoho notes the positive responses of his host and underlines the fact that UNAMIR had always informed the two parties of the arrival and departure of its planes. He reaffirms UNAMIR's neutrality and says that the Kigali International Airport is solely used and will continue to be used for humanitarian emergency operations to the benefit of those populations in the zones under the control of either of the two parties.

General Anyidoho asks him whether UNAMIR can now resume its flights. General Bizimungu says he has no problem with that. The two men agree to the need to resume discussions on the neutrality and control of this airport by the UN.

General Bizimungu says the RPF- which controls the airport- must also be requested to begin immediate discussions on the matter.

6. As regards the evacuation of displaced persons, General Bizimungu says that the Rwandese Armed Forces have no objection to their continuation. However, he complains that the RPF has always shot at convoys going to areas under the Rwandese Armed Forces' control. He says that after the death of the senegalese officer, instructions were given to his officers in charge of the operations to be ready for their resumption.

General Bizimungu says that the RPF is deliberately slowing down the process while it gives itself a clean face to the outside world. He stresses that UNAMIR will be told tonight of a new Rwandese Armed Forces' location for the evacuation of displaced persons.

7. On an item not on the agenda of the meeting, General Bizimungu asks General Anyidoho whether UNAMIR could bring back the bodies of clergymen- including three bishops-, who were killed by the RPF in Kapgayi. The request was presented to the Minister of Defence by the country's catholic leadership. The Deputy Force Commander promises an early response to such request.

8. The meeting which began at 15h40 ends at 16h35.

The two Generals leave after their tête-à-tête which lasted fifteen minutes.

Done in Kigali on the 10th of June 1994  
B.P. Dessande.

MINUTES OF THE CEASEFIRE MEETING  
BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE RGF AND THE RPA.  
02 JUNE, 1994

**Present**

**UNAMIR:** Brig Gen Anyidoho, Mr. Dessande, LCol Austdal, Maj Diagne, Capt Turgeon, Mr. Moctar Gueye.

**RAF:** Brig Gen Gatsinzi, Lt Col Setako, Lt Col Rwabalinda, Maj Gakara.

**RPA:** Col Mugambage, Lt Col Rwigambe, Maj Kamanzi, Capt Kazura.

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

To continue the ceasefire discussions started 30 May, 1994.

On the 02 June, 1994 at the UNAMIR Force HQ, there was a meeting held between the representatives of the RGF and the RPA under the chairmanship of the Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier-General Anyidoho from 1000 hrs until 1625 hrs.

**DFC** After welcoming both delegations and thanking them for their continued presence, he indicated that the minutes from the first meeting had some errors in them. They would be completed and distributed at the next meeting. He then invited Col Yaache, the Chief Humanitarian Officer, to speak regarding the current situation on the evacuation of displaced persons.

**Col Yaache** He informed everyone that since the meeting of 30 May, 1994, nothing new had happened. The basis of the agreement for the evacuation of displaced persons hinged on the cooperation of the two parties. The evacuation was planned in three phases:

1. Transporting the displaced persons from the known camps within Kigali;
2. Transport of those displaced persons who are still in hiding in their homes; and
3. Transfer of all displaced persons in the

country.

He indicated that the transfer of displaced persons (Phase I) from the Hotel Milles Collines and the Amahoro Stadium began the 27th of May and continued on the 28th and 30th of May, 1994. Up until now 799 people have been transferred from the Milles Collines and 932 from the stadium. There are actually 171 displaced at the Milles Collines from the government side and 45 who would prefer to leave Rwanda. The next operation will be St. Famille and the continuation of the stadium. The St. Famille operation will begin on the 3rd of June at 0800 hrs.

DFC                   The DFC requested more details concerning the St. Famille operation.

Col Yaache           He indicated that the evacuation would be done in two stages. The convoy would be put in place at St. Famille with the intention of going in both directions including picking up people at the stadium. The convoys would be filled at the same time and would depart at the same time.

Maj Kamanzi          He was surprised that there were no more people at the Milles Collines for the RPF side.

Col Yaache           He stated that to his knowledge that there were no more individuals at the Milles Collines for the RPF side.

UNAMIR LO            He stated that in fact there are more people for the RPF side, however the new arrivals are now being counted as part of the group at St. Famille.

Col Yaache           To add to what the LO has said, there are also a number of people who would like to leave Rwanda. They must be authorized and have the proper travel documents. He indicated that the Force Commander has since written a letter on this subject.

Col Mugambage        He raised certain points regarding the evacuation. Why cannot the refugees go to anyplace where they feel safe. Why change the system of operation.

UNAMIR LO            He indicated that five displaced persons arrived at the Milles Collines this morning, and these people were placed on the St. Famille list according to Col Yaache's orders.

Col Yaache           The reason that the new arrivals are place on the



St. Famille list is because evacuating the original individuals at the Milles Collines was a very specific aim of the agreement, however as individuals leave new people are arriving at Milles Collines. The individuals arriving at the Milles Collines are not turned away. It is strictly a problem of the lists as mentioned before.

Col Mugambage He appreciates the problem but the individual should be considered first. The refugee could be in danger if they have to move from location to location. It makes little difference if they are located at the Milles Collines or elsewhere.

Col Yaache No one is rejected.

Maj Kamanzi Conditions should not be placed on the registration of individuals, it will only lead to confusion and also make it difficult to know exactly where the individual is located.

DFC He confirmed that all those who present themselves at the Milles Collines or elsewhere will be received.

Col Yaache He believes that we are all speaking about the same thing.

Lcol Rwigambe He stated that by registering individuals from Milles Collines at St. Famille there is a danger that they will be difficult to find.

DFC He was in agreement with this statement and asked if the RGF had any comment.

Gen Gatsinzi No comment.

Col Yaache There appears to be no problem at the Milles Collines and he understands that the displaced persons want to leave less comfortable place to go to a more comfortable one. The hotel manager does not want to see his hotel turned into a refugee camp.

Maj Kamanzi If manager insists that those who stay must pay. UNAMIR should negotiate with the manager, the RPF, the RGF and even with the international community.

DFC Emphasized that he could not confirm whether people at Milles Collines were required to pay or not or whether any had been evicted for non-payment.

Lt/C Rwigambe Asked what the specific problems of the Stadium were.

Col Yaache A problem management committee is in place at the Stadium. They have three difficulties: 1) irregular transfer times, 2) safety; and, 3) people who sign on too many different lists.

Lt/C Rwigambe Asked that the people be reassured.

Col Yaache Asked how to reassure people who are under fire. UNAMIR's mission is to succeed in this operation and he asked again for cooperation from both sides.

Gen GATSINZI The displaced persons who leave for the government side are shot at by the RPF who must reassure us of their commitment to a truce during the passage of UNAMIR convoys.

Maj KAMANZI Declared that the firing is a response to provocative firing by the RGF.

Gen GATSINZI Refuted the statement of the RPF and asked if the RGF were part of the convoy and if they fired to provoke a response.

Col Mugambage There are lines between the two forces. The RPF do not fire on UNAMIR but they are sometimes caught in the cross fire.

DFC Closed the debate on this subject and asked for cooperation from both sides in the evacuations. He reminded the meeting that the minutes of the meeting of 30 May 1994 was incomplete and that it contained a number of errors in both languages. The minutes will be finalized soon. For the time being they serve as a reference.

Lt/C Rwigambe Agreed that there were errors in the English version and wanted to correct them before continuing.

DFC No. That is not what I asked.

Lt/C Rwigambe Asked that the documents be removed from the table.

Lt/C Austdal Proposed that, in view of the length of the debates, a shortened report be produced.

No response

DFC Reminded that discussion had reached item number 3

of the agenda: the document of declaration of agreement; he asked for discussion and comment from the delegations.

- Lt/C Rwigambe Some remarks: - He emphasized that UNAMIR know that the massacres continue and asked what they know about Kabguyi and Nyamirambo. He affirmed that he knew what had happened at Kabguyi and that there could be no generalizations on this point.
- Gen Gatsinzi It would be absurd to think that only one party was to blame. The same accusations could be made against the RPF. He gave the example of the families of military men being massacred in the area and everywhere else. As a consequence, the agreement must concern the two parties. The problem of Kabguyi is a fabrication of the press and is not supported by facts. The General underlined that the RPF shoot at innocents, at the Red Cross and at hospitals.
- Maj Kamanzi We have proposed an international investigation into these massacres. The Force Commander said yesterday that he was sending a UN team to confirm. But it is for sure that people often disappear from Kabguyi. As far as fire on civilians is concerned, we regret that we are at war and that your forces are just beside the ICRC. You are therefore to blame if the ICRC has problems.
- Lt/C Rwigamba The RGF wish to include the RPF among the authors of massacres. The radio propaganda RTLM and Radio Rwandaise exhort murder and also call people to take opium in order to kill, they ask the delegation here to smoke opium before coming here.
- Gen Gatsinzi We did not come here to be insulted; we do not permit it.
- Lt/C Rwigamba I confirm what RTLM has said and he asks that the RGF produce proof that the radio station, Mouhabura, calls for people to commit murder.
- Col Mugambage Thus in order to say that the radio says to smoke opium is to insult no one contrary to what the head of the RGF delegation indicates.
- Gen Gatsinzi Wished that UNAMIR will take in hand the investigation into massacres on both sides. Whole families of soldiers have been massacred (eg Byumba-Rwamagana and Remera) and we are ready to give information to UNAMIR to support their

investigations. One cannot be both judge and participant. The conclusions of UNAMIR and the International Community will determine responsibility and no one's innocence is certain.

DFC

In the case of massacres, an accord was reached to stop them and the international community is in agreement on the need for investigations. But, the the investigations will not bring peace. Concerning Kabguyi, a UNAMIR team conducted an inconclusive investigation and more thorough investigations will follow. The international commission will return to Rwanda if security returns.

RECESS UNTIL 1230HRS

RESUMPTION OF TALKS 1315HRS

DFC

I would like Mr Dessande to speak.

M. Dessande

A reminder that the declaration of agreement document represents an UNAMIR attempt to bring the two parties closer. He noticed that a third of the time had been dedicated to discussion of the document. He pointed out that item A provoked no disagreement from either side but that the RPF disagreed with items B and C. He proposed that if there were no concrete suggestions from either side then the Chairman of the meeting might speak to both heads of delegation.

Lt/C Austdal

Intervened to emphasize that point C is of specific concern to UNAMIR, particularly since last night RTLM was even more radical while Radio Rwandaise had been more moderate for a period but had resumed its virulence.

DFC

I have no objection to the idea of speaking to the two delegations. I will leave you to speak between yourselves in your own language.

Gen Gatsinzi

Concerning the three points in the document, no problem with A. The international community must address the issue of the massacres at point B. The investigation will engage both sides. I propose that points A and B be considered in their existing form. He reminded us that actions follow from speeches made by the Minister of the Interior to the people calling for moderation and tolerance and to the authorities to pursue and punish those who attack others. Those responsible for the radio

have been contacted to be more moderate. He hoped that the radios of both parties would follow a more moderate policy.

Col Mugambage Affirmed that he had much the same view but that it was based on a more solid foundation. How can the massacres be stopped if the militias are still active - is the militia invincible? These armed bands must be stopped. The Minister of the Interior's speech came from a government that is not recognized by us. If the RGF want my advice, they should stop the militias and we know that the population reacts very quickly when the radio speaks. Can you tell me that RTLM can not be stopped? If you are ready we can stop these massacres together.

DFC Asked Col Mugambage if the RPF are ready to work with the RGF to stop the massacres.

Col Mugambage Affirmed that the RPF are ready.

Gen Gatsinzi I will pass these points on to my superiors. The Chief of Staff of the RPF agrees that an agreement can be announced on the radio. But because of his many pre-occupations, this declaration will have to be made at a later date.

DFC Took up the RPF proposition for an agreement to end the massacres. He proposed to let the two delegations speak in their own language in order to better exchange ideas.

Gen Gatsinzi Asked to consult with the members.

DFC I leave you to discuss this points among you.

Gen Gatsinzi Proposed that the chairman discuss with the two heads of delegation. Being neutral, UNAMIR could act as witness.

DFC Proposed to carry on the discussion with the two heads of delegation in his office.

**1420HRS - DFC AND THE TWO HEADS OF DELEGATION WITHDRAW**

**1615HRS - DFC AND THE TWO HEADS OF DELEGATION RETURN**

DFC - Declared that the discussions that took place in his office had be very useful. According to the RGF, the control of the situation is very difficult as far as massacres are concerned but believe that

it would be easier if a cease fire were in place.

- As for the RPF, he stressed that certain elements within the RPF were sincere and must be permitted to regulate the situation because the responsibility of armies is to protect their populations and the RPF is waiting for a practical demonstration.
- Both parties agree on the cease-fire however, there remained several problems to sort out.
- Both parties assure their firm commitment to halt the massacres.
- The RGF will report the points concerning massacres and the use of the radio to their superiors.

After having invited further comments from other members, the DFC advised that the date of the next meeting would be advised after consultation with both parties.

**1625hrs MEETING CLOSED BY DFC.**

COMPTE-RENDU DE LA REUNION SUR LE  
CESSEZ-LE-FEU, ENTRE LES REPRESENTANTS  
DU FGR ET LE FPR.  
LE 30 MAI 1994

Etaient présent

MINUAR Brig Gén Anyidoho, Col Moeen, Mr Dessande, Lt Col Austdal, Maj Daigne, Capt Turgeon, Mr Moctar Gueye.

FGR Brig Gén Gatsinzi, Col Hakizimana, Lt Col Setako, Lt Col Rwabalinda, Maj Gakara.

FPR Col Frank Mugambage, Lt Col Andrew Rwigambe, Maj Frank Kamanzi, Capt Kazura.

OBJET DE LA RENCONTRE

Discussions sur le projet de cessez-le-feu présenté par la MINUAR.

Le 30 mai 1994, au QG de la Force, s'est tenue une réunion entre les délégations FGR et FPR, sous la présidence du Général adjoint au Commandant de la Force, de 10h00 à 16h45.

DFC Après les paroles d'usage de bienvenue aux deux délégations, le DFC informe sur l'objet de la réunion, à savoir le cessez-le-feu, dernière recommandation de M. Riza, envoyé spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies. Il informe sur la manière de conduire la séance et demande à chaque partie si elle avait reçu le document projet. DFC se dit prêt à recueillir les commentaires de chaque délégation sur ce document.

Col Mugambage Après avoir remercié la MINUAR des efforts déployés au profit des deux parties, fait un recul pour camper la discussion sur l'origine des événements. Dans son exposé, le Col Mugambage, Chef de la délégation du FPR insiste sur l'engagement des deux parties pour résoudre le conflit, engagement sur lequel un accord doit être défini aujourd'hui. Comme manque d'engagement il a donné l'exemple des transferts de déplacés arrêtés et demande une clarification sur cet arrêt avant de continuer la discussion.

DFC Je ferai tout à l'heure des commentaires sur ce

sujet, a dit le DFC, et demande à l'autre partie de livrer ses commentaires.

- Gén Gatsinzi    Après avoir remercié la MINUAR, le Gén Gatsinzi, Chef de la Délégation des Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises assure de la disponibilité de sa délégation pour arriver à une solution. Il souligne que sa délégation est prête pour discuter du document projet de la MINUAR. En ce qui concerne l'arrêt des évacuations, il déclare que cela est dû aux tirs de la partie FPR sur les convois de la MINUAR, mais le gouvernement n'a pris la décision de cet arrêt. Il souligne qu'une réunion avec la MINUAR a eu lieu pour régler ce problème, et qu'en principe les évacuations reprendront ce jour, 30 mai 94.
- DFC    Remarques du FPR, a demandé le DFC.
- Maj Kamanzi    Souligne que la MINUAR a peut-être mal interprété ou a été mal informé. Elle doit nous dire ce qui préoccupe les FGR car la réunion d'hier sur cet arrêt des évacuations n'a rien résolu. Il faut que les FGR, dit-il, nous dise ce qui les préoccupent. Ma seconde remarque concernant la sécurité des convois, nous avons accepté de ne faire aucune action sur l'itinéraire emprunté par les convois.
- Gén Gatsinzi    Précise à nouveau que la réunion d'hier avait étudié l'aspect sécurité des convois vers le côté gouvernemental et que les tirs provenaient du côté FPR vers le carrefour de Khadafi. La MINUAR a dû convoquer une réunion compte tenu de l'intensité des tirs. Concernant absolument nécessaire. Ces évacuations sont très importantes pour la MINUAR, a-t-il affirmé, mais les tirs sur le carrefour de Khadafi et sur les convois ont entraîné l'arrêt des évacuations. Les soldats Ghanéens ont protesté et menacent de ne plus repartir. A propos des chiffres, le DFC déclare que la MINUAR ne peut aligner le même effectif sur les différents sites des déplacés. Les difficultés doivent être aplanies pour la poursuite des opérations, a-t-il souligné.
- Col Moeen  
COO    Confirme que les opérations d'évacuation vont se poursuivre ce matin comme prévu.
- Col Mugambage    Revient sur le problème des évacuations. Celles-ci doivent permettre d'abrégier la souffrance des gens



traqués, donc le respect des engagements est primordial. Il invite l'autre partie à la clarté et insiste encore sur un engagement formel de ne pas tirer sur les convois. D'où un engagement de chaque côté. Il ne peut y avoir un problème de nombre mais d'engagement.

DFC Intervient pour dire de laisser de côté les problèmes de tirs et de chiffres car, dit-il, les déplacés sont un peu partout. Il souligne par ailleurs que le problème des déplacés est mentionné dans le document projet parce que très important.

Lcol Rwigambe Je souhaite obtenir une clarification concernant le terme "FGR" car le FPR ne reconnaît le gouvernement actuel mis en place par les militaires. Qu'est-ce que vous entendez par délégation gouvernementale a-t-il demandé?

Gén Gatsinzi Nous sommes ici pour discuter du cessez-le-feu et non du terme FGR.

DFC Intervient pour dire que la remarque du FPR est clair et il veut entendre "FAR" au lieu de "FGR".

Gén Gatsinzi Nous sommes d'accord.

Interruption de séance à 11h55 pour une pose.

DFC Il confirme à nouveau, sur information du Col Moeen (COO), la reprise des évacuations au Stade Amahoro, Milles Collines et Sainte-Famille. A la suite de cela, le DFC propose que les deux délégations reviennent sur l'ordre du jour.

Col Mugambage Revient à nouveau sur le terme engagement à cause des expériences passées. Chaque accord finalisé avec l'autre partie n'empêche pas des projets de massacres contre la minorité, d'où notre insistance à cet engagement qui doit venir du cœur. Tout un programme de massacres, de génocide, a été orchestré. Le monde sait maintenant que les Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises ont entraîné et armé les Interhamwés et une partie de cette délégation des FGR en fait partie. Cette délégation à les moyens d'arrêter ces massacres de même que la RTLM et le gouvernement qui incitent les populations à s'entre-tuer. Il faut que les évacuations continuent, que la RTLM s'arrête et que le gouvernement cesse ces propagandes de massacres. Ce sont là les bases, nos préoccupations pour la poursuite de nos discussions.

LCol Rwigambe Ajoute les remarques qui suivent: les FGR sont responsables des tueries et tout le monde sait que ce gouvernement peut arrêter les massacres. Une bonne volonté est demandée pour libérer les personnes en otage. Le gouvernement demande un cessez-le-feu alors que la RTLM et la radio officielle continuent de mener une propagande et des distributions d'armes aux civils. Il précise que le quartier de Nyamirambo est menacé de massacres. Il est illogique, selon lui, de demander un cessez-le-feu alors que les massacres continuent. Il faut des critères de base pour démontrer l'engagement des Forces Armées Rwandaises. Que ceux qui exécutent ces propagandes s'arrêtent et que les Forces Armées prennent ses responsabilités pour permettre la poursuite des discussions.

Gén Gatsinzi La plupart des observations relevées par le FPR sont incluses dans le document projet de cessez-le-feu. Il faut nous engager dans cette voie pour faire cesser les massacres. L'indisponibilité des FGR pour faire face aux massacres est due à la situation de guerre actuelle. Le problème de la propagande radio figure dans le document projet, mais la radio Mouhabura (FPR) tient également les mêmes propos. Il faut arriver à l'application des mesures du document projet. Si le cessez-le-feu est instauré, les maux des populations iront en diminuant, alors les FAR, libres de la situation de guerre pourraient ramener la paix et la sécurité.

Mr Dessande Intervient pour situer l'esprit de cette rencontre dont l'objectif est de discuter de l'aspect technique du cessez-le-feu. Il rappelle les recommandations de Mr. Riza envoyé spécial du secrétaire Général de l'ONU à savoir le cessez-le-feu pour commencer avant toute chose. Il n'y a pas donc de contradictions de déclarations entre les délégations. L'engagement des deux parties peut figurer sur le document projet concernant l'évacuation de tous les civils.

DFC Souligne que la MINUAR est patiente mais le monde est à l'écoute. Il faut arrêter la souffrance des populations. Tout dit-il est dans ce document projet et le monde saura qui ne veut pas du cessez-le-feu. Il précise que la remarque de Mr. Dessande reste valable et demande aux deux délégations de revenir sur ce document avec une bonne foi.

Col Muganbage Confirme sa disponibilité pour négocier, mais pas

en fermant les yeux. Tous les points sont dans le document, oui, mais nous voulons des conditions de base, comme le transfert des déplacés, l'arrêt de la radio RTLM et la cessation de la propagande radio qui incite aux massacres. Ces points constituent la base nécessaire pour la poursuite de nos discussions sur le cessez-le-feu.

- DFC                    Demande s'il y a des remarques du côté des FGR?
- Gén Gatsinzi        Non.
- DFC                    Souligne que la souffrance des populations doit s'arrêter, d'où une volonté de part et d'autre. Un projet final vous sera proposé et les délégations devront le signer.
- Gén Gatsinzi        Souligne que sa déclaration est d'accord sur les points présentés par le document.
- Lcol Rwigambe       Déclare que rien n'a été fait pour arrêter l'armée et la milice contre les massacres qui ont commencé après la mort du président. Cette guerre dit-il fait suite aux massacres. Ce document n'est pas nouveau et la délégation en face doit arrêter ce qu'elle a commencé. La discussion sur le cessez-le-feu est impossible sans l'arrêt des massacres.
- Gén Gatsinzi        Le président de la république selon lui a fait une tournée de sensibilisation auprès des populations. De plus les deux parties sont d'accord pour une enquête internationale dans les deux zones. Le FPR peut-il nier ne pas exécuter des massacres? De notre côté, on ne peut nier que quelques militaires et civils ont participé aux massacres, mais dire que toute l'Armée et la population y ont participé, non.
- Col Mugambage       Le cessez-le-feu n'est pas une fin en soi. Au lieu de signer un document de cessez-le-feu, il faut plutôt chercher à savoir pourquoi on massacre.
- Gén Gatsinzi        Notre engagement est ferme mais il faut la disponibilité des FGR.
- Maj Kamanzi        Le chef de la délégation des FGR parle de la tournée du Président mais les milices n'ont pas répondu à son appel. Il souligne également selon Maj Kamanzi (FPR) que la radio RTLM incite la population à la collecte et à la consommation de l'opium uniquement dans le but de tuer.

Reprise de la réunion à 15h30.

DFC Revient sur le document et demande aux deux parties de passer à l'analyse. Le concept et les modalités seront discutés plus tard.

Gén Gatsinzi Les FGR sont d'accord, dit-il, et assurent de leur engagement. Il déclare également être d'accord sur la modification de Mr. Dessande.

Coent dans le document. Il affirme à propos des évacuations de leur engagement. Pour les massacres des instructions sont données pour arrêter mais le problème est le contrôle de cet arrêt. Aucune autorité militaire a donné des instructions pour la propagande ni à la RTLM de diffuser des informations qui incitent à la violence. Tous ces points sont en exécution avant même le processus de paix.

Lcol RwabalindaSouligne que les évacuations sont en cours. Il faut cependant plus de moyens pour accélérer le processus. En ce qui concerne les massacres et les propagandes, ces deux volets doivent concerner les deux parties. Il faut créer, dit-il, des mécanismes pour faire descendre la tension. Le FPR et la MINUAR doivent nous aider pour trouver ces mécanismes pour avancer.

Lcol Rwigambe Je demande pourquoi leur délégation est ici alors que l'armée est à la base des massacres, qu'elle contrôle la milice et qu'elle a mis le nouveau gouvernement en place.

Maj Kamanzi Des milliers de gens sont morts. Nous sommes ici pour discuter de l'arrêt des massacres et non du cessez-le feu.

Gén Gatsinzi Assure une fois de plus que sa délégation est partie prenante pour l'arrêt des massacres. Il est urgent de trouver ces mécanismes et même une déclaration à la radio. Les deux radios seront contactés pour baisser le ton. Les deux parties doivent collaborer et mes supérieurs seront saisis. Notre engagement aura un suivi. Je promets que l'armée, la population et les radios seront encore sensibilisées pour la pacification.

DFC Rappelle l'heure qu'il fait (16h30) et souligne que la dernière déclaration du Chef de la délégation des FGR concernant leur engagement à arrêter les massacres est réconfortante. Il souligne être heureux de la présence des deux délégations et souhaite les voir s'embrasser comme elles l'ont

fait pendant leur entrée devant les caméras. Il propose la date du 2 juin 1994 pour la prochaine rencontre. Il informe sur son projet de déclaration de presse auquel ont souscrit les deux Chefs de délégation et souligne qu'un projet de texte de déclaration de bonne intention sera élaboré et soumis à leur appréciation. Ce texte approuvé devra être signé par les deux parties.

Après avoir remercié les deux délégations, la rencontre pris fin à 16h40.

**UNITED  
NATIONS**MSF 3480-05 P2 **S****Security Council**Distr.  
GENERALS/RES/918 (1994)  
17 May 1994**RESOLUTION 918 (1994)**

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3377th meeting,  
on 17 May 1994

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, and its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling the statements made by the President of the Council on 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) and 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and continue operating therein,

Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full implementation,

Commending the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its organs, as well as the efforts of the Tanzanian Facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, and humanitarian support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council,

Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of many thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the

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Page 2

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internal displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,

Expressing once again its alarm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other violations of the rights to life and property,

Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law,

Strongly urging all parties to cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred,

Recalling also its request to the Secretary-General to collect information on the responsibility for the tragic incident that resulted in the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi,

Recalling further that it had requested the Secretary-General to make proposals for the investigation of reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict,

Underlining the urgent need for coordinated international action to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and to help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU as well as with countries of the region, especially the facilitator of the Arusha peace process,

Desiring in this context to expand the mandate of UNAMIR for humanitarian purposes, and stressing the importance it attaches to the support and cooperation of the parties for the successful implementation of all aspects of that mandate,

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

A

1. Demands that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda;

2. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565);

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Page 3

3. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities within the limits of the resources available to it:

(a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;

(b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

4. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;

5. Authorizes in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops;

6. Requests the Secretary-General, as recommended in his report, and as a first phase, immediately to redeploy to Rwanda the UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi and to bring up to full strength the elements of the mechanized infantry battalion currently in Rwanda;

7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment including, inter alia, on the cooperation of the parties, progress towards a cease-fire, availability of resources and the proposed duration of the mandate for further review and action, as required, by the Council;

8. Encourages the Secretary-General to accelerate his efforts, in conjunction with the Secretary-General of the OAU, to obtain from Member States the necessary personnel to enable deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to proceed urgently;

9. Invites Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for the resources required, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the UNAMIR expanded force level and its support in the field;

10. Strongly urges all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring its freedom of movement and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance, and further calls upon them to treat Kigali airport as a neutral zone under the control of UNAMIR;

11. Demands that all parties in Rwanda strictly respect the persons and premises of the United Nations and other organizations serving in Rwanda, and refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping work;

12. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other



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Page 4

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assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to provide such assistance;

B

Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

13. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts;

14. Decides also to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 above;

(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

15. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of the United Nations, and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the adoption of this resolution;

16. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 13 and 15 above do not apply to activities related to UNAMIR and UNOMUR;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

/...

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Page 5

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c

18. Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict;

19. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

20. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant review and requests the Secretary-General to report further, including on the humanitarian situation, within five weeks of the adoption of this resolution and again in good time before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAMIR;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Demobilization.

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28/11

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Colonel K P O'Kelly  
Deputy Chief of Staff (Support)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters  
Kigali  
Rwanda

4000.1/Log 28

See Distribution

28 Nov 94

MILITARY PLANNING IN THE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

1. In situations such as those in which we find ourselves in Rwanda, there is often an understandable desire on the part of many to see an immediate move towards demobilization of the armed forces, in order to release resources from defence to what are perceived as more constructive activities. The armed forces themselves often share this aspiration, so that they can concentrate on their role of providing the best possible forces for the defence of the country against internal or external aggression.

2. In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of study into the demobilization process, leading to the publication of a number of papers. This literature concentrates on the economic and social aspects of the demobilization process, with much useful information on how veterans have been successfully re-integrated into the civilian community in a number of countries and, inevitably, examination of some less successful programmes.


3. As a soldier, I naturally share the concern that the veterans, recognized as a *specially disadvantaged group*, receive as much appropriate assistance as possible in their transition back to civilian life. But it also concerns me that there is little or no published material available on the military aspects of demobilization; for the defence forces, it should come at the end of a long planning process and it is only as a result of that process that the numbers to be demobilized can be determined.

4. I suspect that the non-military community has little understanding of the issues which need to be considered in this process and why governments will see them as important; indeed, important enough to delay demobilization. I have, therefore, produced the attached paper with the aim of explaining what I see as the military considerations involved in demobilization. I must stress that the paper is a personal view and the views expressed should not be attributed in any way to UNAMIR nor to my own national authorities.

5. The paper does not include an executive summary as such but, as it is written in the form of a military service paper, a reading of the introduction, aim and conclusions sections will serve the same purpose.

6. I would be grateful if, as UNAMIR's link with the UN agencies and NGOs, you would circulate the paper to those organizations which you feel may have an interest in any aspect of the demobilization process, including the reintegration of veterans into the civilian community. I would also be happy to discuss any aspect of the paper with you or any other organization and can provide a limited number of further copies, if required.

7. The paper is not specific to any particular situation and certainly does not pretend to address the problems faced by the Government of Rwanda; none the less, I hope that it will be a useful contribution to the current debate on demobilization. In particular, I would draw attention to the need for close cooperation between the armed forces and other bodies which may be involved in the integration of veterans into the civilian community; this cooperation can, and should, begin well before it is possible to start calculating the numbers to be demobilized.



K P O'KELLY  
Colonel

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Office of SRSG  
Force Commander  
DFC/COS/CMO

*This is a useful paper. we may  
circulate.*

*(E)*

*Shelley P. C.  
29.11*

Notre Réf.: CL.52/94.

18 février 1994

✓ DR KABIA  
M. KANE

RECEIVED OFFICE OF SRSG	
Date	18/2/94
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By	RF

S.E.M. Augustin Ndirabatware  
Ministre du Plan  
MINIPLAN  
KIGALI

Monsieur le Ministre,

Suite à la réunion tenue hier au Ministère du Plan sur la possibilité d'utilisation du Fonds de Contrepartie pour le financement des activités urgentes préparatoires à la démobilisation, il a été convenu que le groupe de travail créé par les bailleurs de fonds pour faire la synthèse des différentes propositions à ce sujet, soit élargi au FPR et au Gouvernement afin d'avoir les points de vue de toutes les institutions concernées par le programme de démobilisation aussi bien que pour assurer son exécution efficace et rapide.

Ainsi, je vous demanderais de bien vouloir désigner votre représentant à ce comité de travail. Pour les détails sur le calendrier de travail, il peut se mettre en contact avec M. François MUNYANTWALI de la Mission Résidente de la Banque Mondiale.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

*Julio R. Gamba*  
Julio R. Gamba  
Représentant Résident  
de la Banque Mondiale  
au Rwanda

info - Mr. B...  
N...  
R... 2/2

CC:

- S.E.M. le Ministre des Finances
- M. Patrick Mazimpaka, Direction FPR
- M. Téléphore Bizimungu, Directeur Général, Miniplan
- Bailleurs de Fonds (Tous)
- Membres du Groupe de travail (Tous)

Notre Réf.: CL.51/94.

18 février 1994


Mr Bizimungu Pasteur  
RPF  
KIGALI

Mister Bizimungu,

Further to the meeting which took place yesterday at the Ministry of Planning, on the possibilities of using Counterpart Funds for financing the most urgent activities of the demobilization program, it has been agreed that the working group created by the Donors to make the synthesis of the propositions prepared by UNDP and a World Bank mission, would be enlarged by incorporating representatives (one each) from RPF and the Gouvernement so that it can take into account the views of all the institutions concerned with the demobilisation program as well as with its efficient and prompt execution.

I would be very grateful if you could designate your representative in that working group. For details on the working calendar, your representative can contact M. François Munyantwali of our Resident Mission Resident Mission in Kigali.

With best regards.

  
**Julio R. Gamba**  
Resident Representative  
World Bank  
Rwanda

CC:

- H.E. Minister of Finance
- H.E. Minister of Plan
- M. Patrick Mazimpaka, RPF
- M. Télesphore Bizimungu, General Director, Ministry of Plan
- Donors (All)
- Working Group members (All)

**RWANDA**  
**Demobilization and Reintegration Program**

**Introduction**

1. At the invitation of the Ministry of Finance, a World Bank mission<sup>1</sup> visited Rwanda from January 23-February 4, 1994 to review the overall plans for Demobilization and Reintegration. Specifically, the mission considered the following: (a) impact of military expenditures on the draft budget as discussed in December 1993 in Washington between the Government/RPF delegation and IMF/World Bank representatives, (b) the proposed program of economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers developed jointly by the Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) with assistance of UNDP, and (c) an overall demobilization approach consisting of three phases: (i) assembly in cantonments, (ii) demobilization safety net package including counselling and placement, and (iii) reintegration, in order to

- (a) assess the benefits of the demobilization process for the economy and its overall cost and net budgetary impact;
- (b) design and cost a short-term transitional safety net to meet the basic needs of the veterans and their dependents over a 6-12 month period; and
- (c) review the proposed program of economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers.

2. In addition to the above, the mission developed terms of reference for a study to assess the medium-term training capacities (utilization) and labor market opportunities and explored administrative arrangements for the implementation of the short-term transitional safety net cum insertion, counselling and placement program. The overall program costs for cantonment, demobilization, and insertion were also estimated. The mission would like to thank the Government, the Patriotic Front, the UNAMIR and the Donor/NGO Community for the generous time and assistance provided during our brief but intensive visit. The findings and recommendations of the mission are as follows.

**Background and Rationale**

3. After a prolonged military struggle, the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front signed a Peace Accord on August 4, 1993, setting forth the principles, terms and conditions of peace. These included, inter alia, the formation of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, the development of a new unified National Army and National Gendarmerie, the demobilization and reintegration into civil society of the remaining military and police forces, and the democratic elections of a new government. The Peace Accord, specifically Chapter III, Sections 1-3 covering the principles, demobilization modalities, and follow-up of the demobilized personnel, provided the framework for the mission's design of a short-term transitional safety net (see Article 153), review of longer-term reintegration programs (see Articles 156-160), and assessment of program

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<sup>1</sup> The mission was led by N. J. Colletta (Principal Education and Social Policy Specialist) and comprised A. Ngweni (Human Resource Economist), E. Murray (Financial Analyst/Implementation Specialist), M. Kostner (Economist/Statistician), and F. Munyantwali (Operations Officer). Mr. J. Gamba (Resident Representative) assisted the mission and participated in all key meetings. The recommendations of the mission are subject to senior management review upon return to headquarters. Any changes or revisions will be communicated to Government and the Donor/NGO community.



implementation under the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration (see Article 162).

4. The Peace Accord provides for the new forces (army and gendarmerie) to have a total strength of 19,000 men, a reduction of two thirds from the present combined level of about 55,000 men (see Article 2, 85 and 147). The subsequent reduction in defense expenditure will be a major element of the nation's macro-economic adjustment. However, the consequences for the lives of soldiers to be demobilized will also be great. Of these 36,700 (see table A.1 for details), preliminary analyses indicates that, on average, they have little education, few non-military skills and possess limited financial resources. Their reintegration into civilian life is, therefore, not only a matter of importance for the country's reconciliation but also poses a social challenge for the demobilized as well as the receiving communities. Most soldiers will need financial, institutional and occupational support in order to cushion their transition to civilian life and become contributing members of the peacetime society and economy. This mission therefore examined the financial, administrative, and logistical requirements necessary to provide the veterans with such a transitional safety net.

5. The demobilization program as defined and assessed in this Aide-Mémoire is only one element in a broader transition program towards a peace economy; yet it is the first indispensable step without which the other two elements, i.e. reintegration of refugees and rehabilitation of infrastructure, will not be feasible. At the same time, one should keep in mind that this three-pronged program will have to be accommodated within an overall macroeconomic program towards stability and resumption of growth. The design and implementation of a well-prepared transition program will positively influence stability and growth and thus form the very basis for a lasting peace.

#### The Economic Context for Demobilization

6. Budgetary Impact. The program of demobilization takes place against the backdrop of an overall economic reform effort which will be one of the first items on the agenda of the Broad-Based Transitional Government. Budget proposals discussed in Washington in December 1993 by the joint Government-RPF mission indicate that the authorities plan a reduction of at least 50% in recurrent defense expenditure in 1994-96 (see table 1), with the resources shifting to priority programs of health, education, and social services. In addition, there will be a shift towards capital expenditures, which will permit rehabilitation and the creation of new employment opportunities for veterans and refugees to be reintegrated within society.

Table 1  
Distribution of Military Budget 1993-96  
(FRW million)

	1993	1994	1995	1996
Military Current Expenditure*	12,880	11,073	6,011	5,425
Total Expenditure	65,155	67,679	78,423	85,025
% Military	20%	16%	8%	6%

\* excluding non-recurrent expenses.

7. However, the proposed budget does not make sufficient provision for (a) the costs of cantonment (food, salaries and supplies for veterans); (b) the full cost calendar of the demobilization allowances (to be paid in two tranches over a period of 6-18 months spilling into 1995); and (c) the costs of training programs. Although the budgeted expenditure for 1994 as proposed seems broadly

sufficient to cover the demobilization activities planned during the current year, revenue shortfalls are likely and the budget would be put under stress by other extraordinary expenditures such as the reintegration of the displaced and refugee populations (about 500,000 people), as well as the rehabilitation of social and physical infrastructure destroyed during the war. Revenue shortfalls might be even greater in 1995 when the greater portion of demobilization expenditure will be incurred.

8. Keeping within the budget envelopes discussed during the joint mission to Washington, several possible calendars and modalities of training were examined. Table 2 provides budgetary figures for the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) proposed in this Aide-Mémoire, which would allow military expenditures to fall even faster in the 1994 budget, mainly due to the quick reduction in military salaries which would be permitted by discharging soldiers as quickly as possible. (Table A.2 provides a detailed analysis of the budgetary implications of the RDRP.)

Table 2  
Military Expenditures Under  
the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program  
(FRW million)

	1993	1994	1995	1996
Military Current Expenditure*	12,880	6,902	6,631	6,631
Total Expenditure	65,155	67,679	78,423	85,025
% Military	20%	10%	8%	8%

\* excluding non-recurrent expenses.

9. In sum, the demobilization program needs to be viewed as a critical transitional expenditure, forming part and parcel of the overall adjustment program to be reflected and agreed upon in the forthcoming Policy Framework Paper (PFP).

10. **Monetary Effects.** Inflationary effects of the demobilization allowances are likely to be partially offset for a number of reasons. Firstly, payments will be dispersed over time and space. Payments to each soldier will be spread over two tranches and soldiers will be released over a period of about 12 months, meaning that the money will enter the economy in a more predictable manner. Secondly, a broad geographical spread will be obtained by paying the allowances to the veterans at the commune of settlement through the Banques Populaires (which have branches in many commune headquarters) or other local financial intermediaries. If training scholarships are adopted, some percentage of the demobilization allowances will go directly to training institutions.

#### The Joint Government-RPF Reintegration Proposal

11. The mission was able to examine at length and discuss with policy makers the reintegration plan drawn up between the Government and the RPF. While cognizant that training does not in and of itself produce jobs, the mission supports the orientation of the proposal towards the training and social reintegration of ex-soldiers and has consequently restricted itself to two issues which were not fully covered in the proposal: (a) the modalities of payment of the demobilization allowances; and (b) logistical aspects of putting in place in the cantonments and in the receiving communities services of counselling, placement, supervision and follow-up of soldiers, to help them find, and remain in, employment and training.

#### Program Scope and Objectives

12. Within the broader aim of transition to peace and resumption of growth within a framework of financial stability, the specific objectives of the program are to:

- (1) provide the veterans with some means to cover basic needs for a limited time, including education and training for themselves and their children;
- (2) offer them extensive counselling and placement services to support and enable them to make well-founded decisions on their future lives; and
- (3) reinsert them into society through placement in intermediary institutions for training and/or employment.

13. The objectives of the program and the needs for intervention are based on a preliminary profile of soldiers undertaken by the two armies. It is recommended that both armies enlarge their profile data bases as envisaged in their demobilization preparations. As soon as this information becomes available, the program objectives and components would be refined as appropriate.

#### Program Description

14. Article 153 of the Peace Accord entitles every retrenched soldier to a demobilization allowance between FRW 100,000 and FRW 500,000, depending on rank. The modalities of the distribution of these allowances are to be specified by the Broad-Based Transitional Government. With the Broad-Based Transitional Government not yet in place but the budgetary constraints tightening, the mission designed - on the basis of the number and structure of the military personnel and the agreed allowances - a transitional safety net comprising:

- (1) a core package,
- (2) a transition allowance,
- (3) a counselling and placement service,
- (4) a children's education fund, and
- (5) a veterans education and training scholarship fund.

15. The Core Package. The core package would provide the means to cover a veteran's basic needs, irrespective of rank. Given the framework of the Peace Accord, the package is developed to cover such needs for a period of nine months from the moment of discharge or the completion of schooling/training and apprenticeships. The basic needs include housing, clothing, food, medical expenses, transport from the cantonment to the education and training facilities or the community of settlement, and production implements for agricultural and crafts activities. They have been priced reflecting the estimated costs of such items for a low-income group. Because of the expected scarcity of food (drought, returning refugees), the daily allowance for food was adjusted upwards. The core package amounts to FRW 94,600 per soldier or US\$ 23.1 million (at the current exchange rate) for about 36,700 veterans (see table A.3 for a detailed breakdown).

16. Transition Allowance. The transition allowance would provide cash-in-hand for any additional needs, differing - following Article 153 of the Peace Agreement - by rank. This difference is accepted by all ranks and reflects the social status associated with each rank. The core package and transitional allowance together would constitute the demobilization allowance.

17. Counselling and Placement Service. While those who joined either army recently would be in a position to return to civilian life on their own, those who have been part of an army for an extended period of time cannot be expected to know and understand the many facets of life in this different environment, both socially and economically, especially if they joined the military at a young age. Assistance to enable them to assess their skill requirements and clarify their aspirations and needs is therefore of paramount importance. To this end, a counselling and placement service (CPS) would form an integral part of the RDRP and would as such be covered within the program's administrative budget.

18. The proposed CPS would consist of three interlinked activities:

- (1) based on the individual veteran's profile, counselling him/her on which opportunities exist for participation in the civilian life;
- (2) based on his/her occupational aspirations and the availability of intermediary human resource service providers in the desired region, the placement of the veteran in an education, training or apprenticeship program; and/or
- (3) the placement of the veteran in a job either directly from the assembly points or upon completion of his/her education and training.

19. Proper execution of the CPS requires solid knowledge about the opportunities open for veterans in the country. While a preliminary assessment has been carried out during preparations for the joint proposal, the whole spectrum of institutions and labor market opportunities still requires detailed investigation. In particular, more informal institutions, such as church-related workshops and informal sector apprenticeships, would be promising opportunities for on-the-job training and employment networking. Their potential to absorb veterans after discharge therefore needs to be fully evaluated. The mission, therefore, proposes that a training and labor market survey be undertaken as soon as possible by a qualified NGO or private sector contractor, focussing on three key aspects: (a) the utilization rate of existing training institutions; (b) apprentice and employment opportunities in the informal and formal sectors; and (c) the design of an appropriate counseling system that would be able to match employment opportunities with veterans and subsequent placement. The mission recommends that the study be financed under the on-going PNAS (National Poverty and Social Action) project.

20. CPS activities would be offered at two different locations: the assembly points prior to discharge and the communities after reinsertion. The CPS requires specific skills and experience as well as local networks and neutrality. Therefore, the mission recommends the contracting out of these services to one or more NGOs and grassroots organizations with proven local capacity. It is envisaged that veterans from the beneficiary population would also be recruited and trained as counsellors in the cantonment and communities.

21. Children's Education Fund (CEF) and the Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Fund (VETSE). In order to complete the safety net, the mission recommends establishing two education funds, one under Articles 156 ff. of the Peace Accord and one for the education of the veterans' children. While the mission suggests including these funds in the RDRP, they would be optional and could also be covered under the restructuring of ongoing projects.

22. Children's Education Fund. With the loss of an important household income source, children of veterans of primary school age are an especially vulnerable group. In such a difficult transition period, a veteran may have difficulty covering all their education needs. Rather than attending school, some children might be forced to quit school in order to compensate for this income loss. Through

the provision of school fees for a period of one year, paid directly to the institution upon enrollment, this immediate pressure could be reduced. As the age of both armies is rather young, an average of one child of primary school age is assumed per veteran. The total cost of the CEF is then estimated at US\$ 0.5 million.

23. *Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Fund.* A range of training and education programs has already been identified in the joint reintegration proposal. This proposal is oriented towards the rehabilitation of social infrastructure and therefore requires a longer time period for implementation. Because it does not seem advisable to keep veterans in the assembly points for too long, measures for implementing the training and employment components (Article 156 ff.) are called for. The creation of an VETSF as the operational window of the joint proposal is recommended to this end. During the fund's period of operation, the rehabilitation of schools and training centers is expected to be ongoing, i.e. that over time progressively more training facilities would be established. The VETSF would essentially pay for tuition and boarding of those veterans choosing to undergo training. As detailed in table A.4, the total cost for formal and informal schooling and training would amount to some US\$ 3.1 million over a period of one year, benefitting over 25,000 veterans.

24. The soldiers of both armies are knowledgeable about the demobilization program and expect to receive essentially the full amount in cash. However, in order to ensure that the veterans value their education, training and apprenticeship programs they might be requested to contribute with a small deduction from their transition allowance, with the contribution rate increasing with rank. This contribution could be requested only from those actually participating in either fund or from all veterans irrespective of their actual participation. Financial implications of such arrangements are presented in table A.5.

25. With regard to the joint Government-RPF proposal, the mission recommends that the Secretary of State for Rehabilitation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government convene individual meetings with donors as soon as possible to look at existing projects in the PIP to see possibilities for retargeting and advancing the calendar on priority items. This restructuring would ensure that the projects are oriented toward agreed sectoral policies and strategies, while at the same time perhaps allowing preference of admission to veterans.

26. Given the time needed to expand the supply capacity of training institutions, the mission recommends that due consideration be given to providing veterans with scholarships (see VETSF discussed above) which would allow them to immediately pay for their training (fees and boarding costs) in existing public and private training institutions and informal sector apprenticeships, which they may choose with the help of their training and employment counsellors. Such scholarships would empower the veterans by placing career choice in their hands and equipping them with the necessary occupational and training information and counselling (at cantonment) to shape and control their own insertion into society. This should also reduce the transaction costs and time required for longer-term rehabilitation and expansion of existing training and employment infrastructure as presumably training providers would compete to seek the scholarship fees and boarding remuneration as a source of revenue.

#### **Program Implementation**

27. Because of the short-term nature of the RDRP, the mission recommends the use of already existing and proven implementation mechanisms rather than creating parallel or new ones. This approach is expected to both reduce the costs and increase the pace of implementing the RDRP. A preliminary administrative budget is presented in table A.6. The mission recommends to use the

institutional structure proposed below for the implementation of the overall three-phased demobilization approach.

28. At the national level, a Veterans Coordination Committee (VCC) would be put in place to oversee and provide guidance for the quick and efficient implementation of the RDRP. The VCC would approve quarterly work programs, budgets, training programs and make adjustments as appropriate. In addition, the VCC would be responsible for approving terms of reference for and recruitment of the personnel for the executive secretariat. The VCC would be chaired by the Secretary of State for Rehabilitation and Social Integration and comprise representatives from the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Defense, Agriculture, Primary, Secondary Education and Higher Education as well as the Banques Populaires. The Government Forces and the RPF would also appoint a representative to the VCC. The RDRP organigram is attached in Annex 1.

29. The Veterans Program Coordination Unit (VPCU) would be established as an independent sub-unit within the PNAS-PIU and serve as the executive secretariat of the VCC. The VPCU would be responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the RDRP. This unit would: (a) ensure that the veterans receive their discharge entitlements; (b) put in place modalities to ensure that the proposed training program is properly implemented; (c) provide overall guidance to the prefectoral units on veterans counseling; (d) implement a monitoring system, and (e) liaise between the various donors for technical as well as financial matters. The VPCU would submit a quarterly progress report for the previous quarter and a quarterly work program and corresponding budget to the VCC for approval.

30. The VPCU would be staffed by a unit coordinator, an accountant, a training coordinator, a veterans counselor, the necessary support personnel, and logistical support. The mission recommends two options for the recruitment of these persons: either using competent civil servants or recruiting local consultants for the duration of the RDRP. Due to the RDRP's financial as well as managerial complexity, the mission recommends that terms of reference be prepared for the computerization of the VPCU's financial management system. When putting in place this system, the following would have to be taken into account: (a) the modalities for the transfer of funds from the RDRP central unit to the financial and training institutions, (b) book-keeping and proper accounting of the discharge payments, (c) the monitoring of program implementation, and (d) other donor concerns.

31. At the cantonment level, the UNAMIR would be responsible for the assembly, disarmament, and discharge of soldiers. In addition, in each cantonment a counseling, placement and monitoring unit would be put in place. This unit would also be responsible for paying the first of the two discharge installments. In addition, it would organize orientation, in-depth counseling and placement sessions for reinsertion into intermediary training and employment institutions. Veterans would only be demobilized from the cantonments when there is a receiving institution identified and the enrolment and transport to the institution arranged for. This unit would be staffed with a veterans counselor, an accountant, and the necessary support staff and logistics.

32. VPCU prefectoral staff would be hired on a fixed term contract basis for each prefecture and would be responsible for: (a) providing follow-up counseling to veterans; (b) liaising between the veterans and the various training institutions; (c) assisting in providing placement services; (e) monitoring the program; and (f) directing veterans to potential sources of information and support at the communal level including potential avenues to obtain credit for non-agricultural activities. Each prefectoral VPCU would submit to the central VPCU a monthly report on its activities, problems and proposed solutions which would be consolidated and presented to the VCC.

33. At the communal level, the modalities for implementation of this program would be the absorptive capacity, financial viability, and communal government staff available in the commune. Training institutions, farmers and other communal groups, NGOs and in the veterans groups would also play an important role in the RDRP. The mission recommends that once the VPCU central unit is in place, an assessment be made on the type of veteran support (e.g., NGO, training center, etc.) each commune would be able to put in place for the program. In addition, specialized NGOs would be contracted to provide social and medical services to the disabled and those with medical problems, including AIDS and mental health.

34. The second and last discharge installment would be provided to veterans upon completion of the training program in order for the funds to be used as seed money for self-employment. The second discharge payment would be provided to the veterans through the Banques Populaires on information provided by the veterans on their final point of settlement; the central bank would transfer the funds to the Banques Populaires' communal branches. In cases where veterans encounter difficulties in opening a bank account with the Banques Populaires, the mission would have to look into other modalities in order for these payments to be made, e.g., request the Banques Populaires to open a "transitory account" for this payment only; or provide veterans with a payment check that would be issued through the prefectural VPCU and cashed at a local bank. The mission recommends that as soon as the central VPCU is in place, it be explored in-depth in order to ensure that an efficient payments system is fully operational for transferring the funds for the second discharge installment.

#### **Program Cost Estimates**

35. Under all scenarios, the estimated number and distribution of soldiers to receive other support is based on the joint reintegration proposal. These estimates would be updated as precise information on the needs and aspirations of soldiers becomes available.

36. It is expected that UNAMIR would provide all food and all basic needs for the first 12 months during the cantonment process and the first, separate, training. The budget in table 1 assumes that all persons in cantonments (before and after demobilization) would be provided with an average rate of FRW 9,200 per month, and that all persons leaving the cantonment would receive the first of two tranches of their demobilization allowance. The first average monthly installment is provisionally calculated at about FRW 120,000. Table 3 would be updated as part of the UNAMIR evaluation of its costs, expected toward mid-February.

37. The Broad-Based Transitional Government would continue to pay for food for soldiers held in assembly points after the UNAMIR mandate ends. This was decided on the basis of the hostile response from ex-soldiers who would lose their daily meals. Although the amount of this expenditure by the government in 1993 seems unusually large (nearly as large as the payroll, as well as being twice the preliminary UNAMIR estimates of about \$1 million per soldier), it was decided to maintain equivalent per capita food expenditures. This is in view of the food shortage prevailing in eastern Africa due to the adverse weather conditions and conflict in the Horn of Africa, which mean that food prices are likely to rise during 1994.

Table 3  
Costs Per Person Per Month in Cantonment

	FRW	US\$
Salary	9,200	65
Food	8,700	61
Supplies, fuels etc	5,500	38
Total per person per month	23,400	164

38. It should be noted that other significant costs appear off budget and would be funded entirely through the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda, whose responsibility is expected to end at the moment the last soldier is demobilized. These mainly include (a) construction of cantonments, feeding and other basic needs of soldiers while still in the military (estimated cost about US\$ 7.7 million or FRW 1,101 million); and (b) clearing of mines (estimated cost between US\$ 500,000 and US\$ 5 million, depending on availability of local expertise, or FRW 70-700 million).

39. The cost of keeping people in cantonment must be offset against the cost of preparing elaborate training programs, as the practicality of the timing must also be kept in mind. Given the time necessary to assemble the soldiers, prepare training programs and find institutional placements for them, the program proposed in this Aide-Mémoire seems the most feasible consistent with respecting the budgetary guidelines discussed in December by the joint government mission to Washington, while reducing the risks to society by inserting veterans into existing intermediary institutions. Figure 1 indicates that the costs of cantonment comprise more than half the costs of the overall demobilization exercise (probably beginning about July 1994), even after subtracting costs to be borne by UNAMIR, and projecting a rapid scenario of discharge from the camps. Of a total cost for demobilization of FRW 11 billion (US\$ 71 million), nearly FRW 5.6 billion (US\$ 37 million) would go to cantonment expenses.

40. **Total Demobilization Program Cost Estimate.** The overall RDRP thus comprises the following cost categories: cantonment, safety net package, and administration. Table 4 provides a general breakdown of RDRP costs (see table A.7 for a detailed breakdown).

Table 4  
Total Cost of the Demobilization Program 1994-95

	FRW million	US\$ million
Cantonment Costs	5,592	37.3
Safety Net Package	4,927	32.9
Administration	194	1.3
Total	10,713	71.4

#### Proposed Program Financing

41. Financing for the RDRP is expected from IDA and other donors. IDA's contribution would come from the on-going Programme National d'Actions Sociales (PNAS) and would essentially be used to set up the RDRP's organizational/implementation structure (VPCU central and prefectural units). The VPCU would be completely independent from the PNAS management and implementation



structure. A "special account" would be created and an initial deposit made in a commercial bank to cover IDA's contribution to the program.

42. Donors would be approached to contribute to the RDRP in addition to the restructuring of their existing portfolios. IDA would be willing to manage overall donor contributions in cash through the establishment of a joint pooled Trust Fund. Their contributions would be disbursed on a case-by-case basis in collaboration with the central VPCU in order to accommodate their individual requirements. The VPCU's accounts would be subject to a semi-annual audit by an external auditor and transmitted to the Government and all financiers.

#### Program Monitoring and Evaluation

43. A monitoring and evaluation system would need to be established within the VPCU to monitor the progress of the ongoing operations and analyze the impact of the program on the retrenched soldiers, their families, and the communities within which they will settle. The monitoring component would collect information of immediate relevance for management at three levels: (i) the cantonments, (ii) the training institutions, and (iii) the communities where the veterans and their families settle in. The instruments would include administrative records and short questionnaires. The RDRP's evaluation would be undertaken through a beneficiary assessment at the community level, using direct observation and conversational interviews to reveal the true concerns of the veterans, their families and the communities.

44. The monitoring and evaluation system still has to be developed in detail. Among the issues to be considered are: the roles of and the flow of information between the VPCU and the cantonments and communities, training and orientation for the officers involved, a time schedule, the forms used for collecting the information, the budget, and data management. The monitoring and evaluation system is expected to blend with the program implementation as well as the implementation schedule and should be in place at the time the offices in cantonments and communities are set up.

#### Implementation Schedule

45. Under current assumptions (see table A.8), the last veteran would leave the cantonment 15 months after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government. The following sequence of activities and time frame are thereby envisaged:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Months</u>
<b>General</b>	
Formation of Broad-Based Transitional Government	0
Agreement on PFP and related matters	1
<b>RDRP-specific</b>	
Agreement of program scope and financing	1
Assembly and cantonment of existing armies	1-3
Selection and entry into new national army	4-10
General orientation for entry in civilian life	5
Individualized counselling and placement into intermediary institutions	6-15
Discharge and reinsertion	6-15
Long-term socio-economic reintegration	6-

#### Major Issues, Benefits and Risks

46. The Peace Accord. The prior establishment of fixed demobilization allowances by rank has constrained the flexibility of program design, especially the potential mixture of in-cash and in-kind payments. To control for these limiting factors, the mission recommends that the demobilization allowances be pegged to the monetary equivalent of a core basic needs package and the costs of in-kind education and training provided in the form of scholarship vouchers. This will also fulfill the requirements of the Peace Accord that veterans receive the real value of the specified amounts.

47. Limitations of Available Arable Land. With Rwanda possessing the highest population to land density in Sub-Saharan Africa, limitations are posed on an agriculture-based model of social and economic reintegration of demobilized soldiers. The mission recommends that an exhaustive study of available arable and industrial land be undertaken, including the potential use of military preserves formally utilized for firing ranges and training, as well as urban-based barrack-type compounds. The latter may be converted for use as urban micro-enterprise zones in which skilled veterans could be allotted secure work sites, thus putting to use their skills and demobilization allowance as start up resources. Other lands such as private and church owned estates may be included in the survey for possible procurement by government for use in resettling veterans and repatriates. Care would have to be given to avoid creating ethnic enclaves by promoting ethnic integration in any land reallocation scheme. Currently, an IDA Agricultural and Resettlement mission is in Rwanda exploring land use and resettlement options and will make further recommendation regarding this issue.

48. Constrained Training and Labor Market Supply Response. Both the costs and time implications of the rapid rehabilitation and expansion of the training and employment opportunity structure are severe constraints to the immediate demobilization and insertion of veterans into the economy. The mission recommends that a detailed training and labor market survey be conducted prior to disengagement and assembly of the armies in cantonments. Such a survey would establish a directory of possible training places in public and private institutions, apprenticeship and employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors, and opportunities for rural or urban based self-employment. This directory would subsequently be utilized to match individual skill and aspirational profiles of soldiers to insertion opportunities while they are in cantonments awaiting placement. This proposal is not meant to compete nor undercut the need for longer-term rehabilitation and expansion of the training and labor market, but to operate in parallel with such development activities.

49. Costs and Risks of Prolonged Cantonment. It is important not to underestimate the costs and security risks of housing, feeding, paying, and entertaining large numbers of soldiers in concentrated areas. The opportunity costs of maintaining these camps for prolonged periods is relatively high vis-à-vis the use of that same money for rehabilitation of training facilities and job creation programs. The mission recommends an efficient and effective approach of discharge and insertion into institutional settings as soon as, and only after, direct placement can be identified and arranged. Regarding the related time factor in the placement of veterans, the sequencing of insertion should be attuned to agricultural planting and school calendars.

50. Weak Local Governmental Implementation Capacity. Recognizing that local government has become demoralized, disrupted and defunct throughout the country due to civil strife and poor, lack of funding at the local level, it will be difficult to utilize such institutions in the implementation of an emergency, time-bound operation such as the RDRP. While existing prefecture and commune officials could be identified and utilized to assist in program implementation, it would appear to be more efficient to use the existing stronger implementation capacity of selected NGOs and established, proven project implementation bodies such as the PNAS on a short-term, ad-hoc basis.

51. Management Capacity of Local Financial Intermediaries. Given the large amount of cash transfer to veterans at the commune level generated by the proposed program, the mission has some concern about the capacity of the Banques Populaires to handle the transfers in an efficient and timely manner. Careful advanced planning and some local capacity building may be required to avert delays in payment of the demobilization allowances.

52. Inequalities and Creation of Elite Class of Veterans. Rumors and perceptions are afoot that the demobilization program runs the risk of creating the impression if not the reality of a privileged class. While these concerns are understandable and the demobilization allowances are in excess of the annual expenditure of many households, one has to consider the risks of providing insufficient incentives for disarmament and peaceful reentry into civilian life. By spreading the fruits of demobilization over time and in-kind as well as cash, these effects may be allayed. However, one should not be mistaken that the cost of peace is indeed high.

53. Benefits and Risks. In summary, substantial, but not as easily quantifiable as budgetary savings, are the benefits that will arise from the return to the productive economy of the some 37,000 young and disciplined workers, who would be able to invest their demobilization allowance in productive activities. These investments, in addition to the training which the veterans would receive immediately as well as over the longer-term, should yield positive results for the economy for years to come. The risks that the demobilized soldiers will revert to a life of petty crime should not be discarded but could be minimized by an efficient and effective implementation of the support program. In order to reduce the threat of insecurity, the mission recommends that no demobilization into society begin until the first units of the newly trained army and police are established. Veterans could then be inserted into institutions in areas where the new army and police are deployed. The use of multiple payments spread in time also provides an incentive system for veterans to remain in institutional training and apprenticeship programs for some time, enabling further adjustment. By optimizing the time use of the veterans in the cantonment camps for socio-psychological orientation, including the possibility of intensive, low-cost language training one might facilitate smoother transition.

#### **Key Policy Decisions Required Concerning Demobilization**

54. Upon formation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, the following decisions would be required:

- agreement on a macro-economic framework including the 1994 budget and a budget estimate for 1995 through the PFP process;
- agreement on a comprehensive, multi-phase demobilization program and finances with Donors;
- reviewing possibilities of restructuring existing projects in the PIP for retargeting and advancing the calendar on priority items;
- implementing the demobilization, re-insertion and reintegration programs under civilian administration; and
- achieving a net reduction-in-force and a reduction in defense expenditure (peace dividend).

The mission cautions against short-circuiting this sequence of decision points and/or rushing to seek commitments to a comprehensive program without sufficient prior consultation and agreement on a

consistent set of sectoral policies and strategies in support of rehabilitation toward the impending transition from war to peace and longer-term sustainable growth.

#### Summary of Operational Program Recommendations

##### Preparations:

- enlarging profile data bases of the two armies;
- conducting a detailed training and labor market survey and development of a counselling system prior to disengagement and assembly of the armies in cantonments;
- undertaking an assessment on the type of veteran support each commune would be able to put in place for the purpose of this program;
- undertaking an exhaustive study of available arable and industrial land;

##### Program components:

- pegging the demobilization allowances to the monetary equivalent of a core basic needs package and the costs of in-kind education and training provided in the form of scholarship vouchers;
- establishing a children's education fund and a veterans education and training scholarship fund;
- providing veterans with scholarships which would allow them to immediately pay for their training in existing public and private training institutions and informal sector apprenticeships;

##### Implementation arrangements:

- identifying existing and proven implementation mechanisms for implementing the RDRP and using it for the implementation of all phases of the three-phased approach;
- recruiting staff for the VPCU by either using competent civil servants or employing local consultants for the duration of the RDRP;
- contracting out the cantonment and communal counselling and placement services to one or more NGOs and grassroots organizations with proven capacity;
- ensuring that an efficient payments system is fully operational for transferring the funds for the second discharge installment;
- undertaking independent external auditing and transparent reporting of demobilization and reintegration implementation and expenditures on a semi-annual basis.

##### Implementation schedule:

- delaying the demobilization into society until the first units of the newly trained army and police are established;

- discharging veterans into institutional settings as soon as, and only after, direct placement can be identified and arranged; and

#### Attachments

Table A.1:	Estimated Size of Armed Forces (Government and RPF).
Table A.2:	Budget with Adjustment Measures as Proposed December 1993, Option "RDRP.
Table A.3.1:	Core Package per Veteran.
Table A.3.2:	Core Package, Transition and Demobilization Allowances (Article 153).
Table A.4:	Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Program.
Table A.5:	Veterans Contributions to the Optional Education Funds.
Table A.6:	Estimated Costs for Operations and Administration.
Table A.7:	Estimated Program Costs.
Figure 1:	Budget for Defense and Demobilization; Demobilization Costs.
Table A.8:	Tentative Reinsertion Schedule.
Annex 1:	RDRP-Organigram.

Kigali, February 8, 1994

**Table A.1**  
**Estimated Size of Armed Forces (Government Forces and RPF)**

Rank	Priv.	NCO 2nd	NCO 1st	CO jr.	CO sr.	Total
Government Forces	30,940	1,700	1,590	700	70	35,000
National Army	8,070	1,612	1,000	600	68	11,350
Demobilized	22,870	358	320	90	12	23,650
RPF	14,961	3,264	987	1,287	103	20,602
National Army	5,424	1,306	391	419	60	7,600
Demobilized	9,537	1,958	596	868	43	13,002
Total to be demobilized	32,407	2,316	916	958	55	36,652

Remarks: Priv. (Privates), NCO 2nd (Non-commissioned Officers, 2<sup>nd</sup> rank), NCO 1st (Non-commissioned Officers, 1<sup>st</sup> rank), CO jr. (junior Commissioned Officers), CO sr. (senior Commissioned Officers).

Source: Government Forces and Rwandese Patriotic Front, January 1994.

Table A.2

Budget with adjustment measures as proposed December 1993, option "RDRP"

Demobilisation as soon as possible towards transitional institutions (training, apprenticeship and employment)

	Years		FRW millions				
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<b>Recurrent Military</b>							
Personnel costs*	2,130	2,923	3,748	4,529	3,534	2,098	2,098
Goods and services**	5,823	10,255	13,485	8,351	3,367	4,533	4,533
food				3,665	1,344	1,990	1,990
tech. mat.				3,280	1,416	1,781	1,781
fuel & others				1,406	607	763	763
<b>Demobilisation Program</b>							
Recurrent					7,832	2,180	15
Salaries in cantonnement*					1,364	180	0
Goods and services in cantonnement**					3,769	280	0
Demobilisation allowances***					2,684	1,706	0
Programs for the disabled*					15	15	15
<b>Capital</b>					519	213	0
Fees & board: transitional institutions					406	132	0
Counselling services					112	82	0
<b>Total Public Expenditure</b>	<b>42,801</b>	<b>52,677</b>	<b>65,770</b>	<b>65,155</b>	<b>67,679</b>	<b>78,423</b>	<b>85,025</b>
Demobilisation expenditure					8,351	2,393	15
% demob/total					12%	3%	0%
<b>Military Rec. Expenditure</b>	<b>7,953</b>	<b>13,178</b>	<b>17,233</b>	<b>12,880</b>	<b>6,902</b>	<b>6,631</b>	<b>6,631</b>
% rec. military/total	19%	25%	26%	20%	10%	8%	8%

**Assumptions:**

\* integration of the two armies from March 1994, demobilisation from July 1994, with an average salary of 9200FRW, and the elimination of combat allowances.

\*\* continued payment for food for everyone in the assembly points.

\*\*\*demobilisation allowances in two tranches three months apart.

\*indicative figure for special programs for the disabled, estimated on the base of 1400 people in need.

NB:

Costs covered by UNAMIR are not shown in the budget (construction of the assembly points, food and maintenance before demobilisation, and demining operations).

**Table A.3.1**  
**Core Package per Veteran**  
**(FRW)**

Housing	9,000
Clothing	4,000
Prod. implements	7,500
Food	67,500
Medical	6,000
Transport	600
Total per veteran	94,600

**Remarks:** The core package is calculated for a period of nine months. The unit costs are derived as follows: housing (rent equivalent for one room), clothing (two shirts and two trousers at FRW 600 each, one pair of shoes for FRW 1.600), production implements for agricultural and crafts activities (lumpsum of FRW 7,500), food (FRW 250 per day), medical expenses (cost of malaria treatment of 2,000 per quarter), transport (one-way bus fare Butare or Ruhengeri to Kigali). An exchange rate of FRW 150 per US\$ was used.

**Source:** Staff estimates, January 1994.

cont.



Table A.3: Core Package, Transition and Demobilization Allowances

2/2

**Table A.3.2**  
**Core Package, Transition and Demobilization Allowances (Article 153)**  
**(FRW and US\$)**

Rank	Priv.	NCO 2nd	NCO 1st	CO jr.	CO sr.	Total
Total demob.	32,407	2,316	916	958	55	36,652

**Per Veteran**

Core Package	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	
Trans. Allowance	5,400	105,400	205,400	305,400	405,400	
Demob. Allowance	100,000	200,000	300,000	400,000	500,000	

**Total FRW**

Core Package	3,065,702,200	219,093,600	86,653,600	90,626,800	5,203,000	3,467,279,200
Trans. Allowance	174,997,800	244,106,400	188,146,400	292,573,200	22,297,000	922,120,800
Demob. Allowance	3,240,700,000	463,200,000	274,800,000	383,200,000	27,500,000	4,389,400,000

**Total US\$**

Core Package	20,438,015	1,460,624	577,691	604,179	34,687	23,115,195
Trans. Allowance	1,166,652	1,627,376	1,254,309	1,950,488	148,647	6,147,472
Demob. Allowance	21,604,667	3,088,000	1,832,000	2,554,667	183,333	29,262,667

Remarks: An exchange rate of FRW 150 per US\$ was applied for the calculations.

Source: Peace Accord, Government Forces and Rwandese Patriotic Front, and staff estimates; January 1994.

**Table A.4**  
**Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Program**

Type of training	Course duration (mos.)	Tuition & board	No. of veterans	Total cost per type (FRW)	Total cost per type (US\$)
<b>Formal schooling</b>					
secondary	12	17,500	3,000	52,500,000	350,000
university & other	12	120,000	1,000	120,000,000	800,000
<b>Vocational training</b>					
CERAI/CFJ	3	15,000	17,000	255,000,000	1,700,000
<b>Apprenticeships</b>					
informal sector	6	8,800	4,200	36,960,000	246,400
<b>Total (FRW/US\$)</b>				<b>464,460,000</b>	<b>3,096,400</b>

**Remarks:** This table covers expenditures under Article 157 of the Peace Agreement for the period of one academic year (formal schooling) or one course (vocational training and apprenticeships). The costs of apprenticeships are calculated at FRW 300 per day salary for 26 working days plus a rent subsidy of FRW 1,000 per month. An exchange rate of FRW 150 per US\$ is used.

**Source:** Joint Government/RPF reintegration proposal and staff estimates; February 1994.

**Table A.5**  
**Veterans Contributions to the Optional Education Funds**

Rank	Men	NCO 2nd	NCO 1st	CO jr.	CO sr.	Total
No. of soldiers	32,407	2,316	916	958	55	36,652

**Option 1: Contribution to the Children's Education Fund**

Core package	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	
CEF contribution	162	6,324	12,324	27,486	36,486	
Net transition allow.	5,238	99,076	193,076	277,914	368,914	
Demob. allowance	100,000	200,000	300,000	400,000	500,000	
CEF contr. total FRW	5,249,934	14,646,384	11,288,784	26,331,588	2,006,730	59,523,420
CEF contr. total US\$	35,000	97,643	75,259	175,544	13,378	396,823

**Option 2: Contribution to the Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Fund**

Core package	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	
ESF contribution	270	10,540	20,540	45,810	60,810	
Net transition allow.	5,130	94,860	184,860	259,590	344,590	
Demob. allowance	100,000	200,000	300,000	400,000	500,000	
VETSF contr. tot. FRW	8,749,890	24,410,640	18,814,640	43,885,980	3,344,550	99,205,700
VETSF contr. total US\$	58,333	162,738	125,431	292,573	22,297	661,371

**Option 3: Contribution to the Children's Education Fund and the Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Fund**

Core package	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	94,600	
CEF + VETSF contr.	432	16,864	32,864	73,296	97,296	
Net transition allow.	4,968	88,536	172,536	232,104	308,104	
Demob. allowance	100,000	200,000	300,000	400,000	500,000	
Total contr. FRW	13,999,824	39,057,024	30,103,424	70,217,568	5,351,280	158,729,120
Total contr. US\$	93,332	260,380	200,689	468,117	35,675	1,058,194

cont.

Table A.5: Veterans Contributions to the Optional Education Funds

2/2

**Remarks:** The contributions to the two funds from the transition allowances are calculated at the following rates:  
Children's Education Fund: Men (3%), NCOs (6%), COs (9%); Veterans Education and Training Scholarship Fund:  
Men (5%), NCOs (10%), COs (15%). An exchange rate of FRW 150 per US\$ has been applied.

Under the assumption that there is an average number of one child of primary school age per veteran and the annual school fee is FRW 2,000, the total funding requirement of the CEF would be FRW 73,304,000. Applying the above-mentioned rates, the veterans would fund US\$ 397,000 of the total of US\$ 489,000, thus leaving a funding gap of US\$ 92,000 to be covered within the RDRP.

Likewise, the veterans would contribute with US\$ 661,000 to the VETSF, leaving a funding gap of US\$ 2,4 million.

**Source:** Joint Government-PRF reintegration proposal and staff estimates; February 1994.

**Table A.6**  
**Estimated Costs for Operations and Administration**  
**(FRW and US\$)**

**VPCU/Headquarters**

<b>Non-Personnel</b>	
vehicles (4WD)	5,250,000
computer equipm.	1,500,000
rec. costs	7,200,000
vehicle maint.	2,100,000
travel	1,920,000
<b>Personnel</b>	
salaries	18,000,000

**VPCU/Assembly Points**

<b>Non-Personnel</b>	
rec. costs	168,000
<b>Personnel</b>	
salaries	65,520,000

**VPCU/Communes**

<b>Non-Personnel</b>	
motorcycles	3,300,000
rec. costs	264,000
motorc. maint.	1,320,000
travel	10,560,000
<b>Personnel</b>	
salaries	49,341,600

Auditing	19,500,000
<b>Evaluation</b>	
fees	1,350,000
field work, etc.	6,750,000

**Total**

Total administration FRw	194,043,600
Total administration US\$	1,293,624

cont.

Remarks:	The following assumptions were made for calculating the program costs:
1.	The average period of VPCU operations in assembly points is six months;
2.	The period of VPCU operations at headquarters and in the communes 24 months;
3.	there will be 28 assembly points and 11 offices in communes;
4.	the unit cost of a 4WD vehicle (motorcycle) is estimated at US\$ 35,000 (1,000); the maintenance cost being 20% of cost p.a.;
5.	the per diem for field trips is FRW 5,000 and there would be 8 field trips per officer per month;
6.	monthly recurrent costs in headquarters (assembly points and communes) would amount to US\$ 2,000 (1,000);
7.	consultancy fees are US\$ 1,500 p.m.; and
8.	monthly salaries range from US\$ 1,000 (chairperson) to US\$ 200 (clerks).
Source:	Joint Government/RPF reintegration proposal and staff estimates; February 1994.



**Table A.7**  
**Estimated Program Costs**

Program component	FRW million	US\$ million
Core package	3.467,3	23,1
Transition Allowance	922,1	6,1
Demobilization allowance	4.389,4	29,3
Children Education Fund	73,3	0,5
Education and Sch. Fund	464,5	3,1
Safety Net Package	4.927,2	33,7
RDRP Administration	194,0	1,3
Cantonment Costs	5.592,0	37,3
Grand Total	10.713,2	71,4

**Remarks:** The possible contribution of veterans to the two optional education funds have not been considered in the above calculations. Based on the rates used in table A.5, these contributions would reduce the financing needs by FRW 158 million or US\$ 1.1 million.

**Source:** Joint Government/RPF reintegration proposals and staff estimates; February 1994.

Figure 1





**Table A.8**  
**Tentative Reinsertation Schedule**  
**(months)**

**A. Number of demobilized soldiers being discharged from cantonments**

Insertion place	D+6	D+7	D+8	D+9	D+10	D+11	D+12	D+13	D+14	D+15
Auto-insertion	0	8.000	0							
Secondary school	0	3.000	0							
University & other	0	1.000	0							
Apprenticeships	700	700	700	700	700	700	0			
Public works	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	0		
Training	3.840	0	0	4.800	0	0	4.800	0	0	3.560
Total out of cant.	5.040	13.200	1.200	6.000	1.200	1.200	5.300	0	0	3.560

**B. Number of demobilized soldiers staying in cantonments and waiting for discharge**

Insertion place	D+6	D+7	D+8	D+9	D+10	D+11	D+12	D+13	D+14	D+15
Auto-insertion	8.000	0								
Secondary school	3.000	0								
University & other	1.000	0								
Apprenticeships	3.500	2.800	2.100	1.400	700	0				
Public works	3.000	2.500	2.000	1.500	1.000	500	0			
Training	13.160	13.160	13.160	8.360	8.360	8.360	3.560	3.560	3.560	0
Total in cantonments	31.660	18.460	17.260	11.260	10.060	8.860	3.560	3.560	3.560	0

cont.

Remarks: The joint proposal assumed a total number of some 31,000 soldiers to be demobilized. The latest estimates indicate close to 37,000. The calculations of how many soldiers will use which of the options set forth in Articles 155 ff. of the Peace Agreement therefore had to be refined in the following way (the proposal's figures are presented in parenthesis if different):

auto-insertion:	8,000 (4,930);
secondary schools:	3,000;
university & other:	1,000;
training:	17,000;
apprenticeships:	4,200 (0);
public works:	3,500.

The demobilization process will start once the is in place (D-day). In the fourth month thereafter (D+4), the separate training of the soldiers would be undertaken. The fifth month would be used for orientation regarding the transition into civilian life. Currently, the schedule is based on the assumption that the Broad-Based Transitional Government is operational by March 1994. This would allow for the reinsertion of those veterans who opted for formal education to leave on time for the start of the next academic year in September.

Regarding the training of veterans in CERAI and CFJ, it is assumed that courses would last for three months each. For the first course, 64 institutions would be available. It is planned that this figure be raised to 80 starting with the second course. In each of the courses, an estimated number of 60 veterans would participate. These assumptions need to be updated upon completion of the employment opportunities and labor market survey.

Source: Joint Government/RPF reintegration proposal and staff estimates; February 1994.

## RDRP-ORGANIGRAM

