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Print Name of Person Submit Image

Signature of Person Submit

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Congo Advisory Committee Meeting at 11:00 a.m.
Friday, 17 November 1961

Thanks Amb. Baines —

This is my first opportunity to meet with this Committee, but I have heard much about the very helpful role you have played in guiding the UN through the hazards of the Congo maze. I have been told of the important assistance you regularly gave to my predecessor. I am happy to join you, and I look forward to this unique form of collaboration. I have wanted to lose no time in getting acquainted. I am sorry that my first meeting with you comes under the shadow of the tragedy at Kindu. This was a crime for which the guilty must be punished. UN personnel have suffered too many such tragedies in the Congo, including the shocking massacre at Port Francqui.

This morning I wish first to welcome two of the top men in ONUC who have come here at my request on short notice for important consultations. I believe you know them both: General Maceoin and Dr. O'Brien. They will gladly respond to any questions you may wish to put to them a bit later on. I intend also to touch briefly on one aspect of some thinking I've been doing about the UN in the Congo.

Ever since the unhappy chain of events in Katanga in September, everyone is asking what next for the UN in the Congo, is there a next step that can be taken, or has a deadend been reached for the UN?

In seeking an answer and a way, I have been mindful that the feasible way must be one that is possible within the existing mandate of the operation, as defined by the various resolutions, or likely to be defined by any new resolution, and which will not require more in the way of fighting action by the Force than governments providing the contingents are willing to have them undertake in the light of the conditions on which they were originally provided.

A paper "solution", which though appearing very attractive, would lead only to the dissolution of the Force, would be even worse than meaningless.

There may be such a course, but it must be most carefully weighed in terms of alternatives, overall impact and priorities. I say priorities advisedly for it may not be possible for the Force to do all that the resolutions call for at one and the same time.

With regard to what I am about to say I wish to make two things entirely clear. Firstly, the statements I make here are not in any sense to be interpreted as in response to or otherwise related to the debate now underway in the Security Council. Secondly, I am exposing only an idea not fully refined and not a plan.

My Secretariat associates on the Congo front at Headquarters, both civilian and military, endorse the idea and consider it practical. For this and other purposes, I have asked General MacEoin and Dr. O'Brien to come here for consultations, and they are helping me to assess the feasibility of the idea.

It seems to me that among the objectives of United Nations resolutions, the one which has been most incompletely fulfilled by ONUC is the elimination of mercenaries in Katanga. This is now the key issue in the Congo complex for a number of reasons, among which are the following.

The continued activity of the mercenaries in Katanga is the major factor in perpetuating the Congo crisis, for without the leadership of the mercenaries ~~the Katangese gendarmerie would be a weak fighting force which could not long sustain secession against the opposition of the Central Government and its own weak army.~~ the Katangese gendarmerie would be a weak fighting force which could not long sustain secession against the opposition of the Central Government and its own weak army.

It is intolerable that the peace of the Congo and even the broader peace should continue to be threatened by the irresponsible activities of a few hundred unscrupulous non-African adventurers who fight only for pay.

The present concentration of most UN members is on the mercenaries out of a sense of outrage that the Security Council resolution of 21 February is being so flagrantly flouted.

The elimination of the mercenaries would make possible an early and substantial reduction in the size of the Congo Force, thereby greatly reducing the financial burden of the Congo operation.

In saying this, however, I do not in the least minimize the vital importance of other objectives, such as the first and fundamental one of assisting in the maintenance of law, order and security, or the necessity of reorganizing and re-training the ANC, since the country can never be secure from the savage brutalities of a large number of heavily armed but undisciplined and largely uncontrolled army men who every now and then, in one place or another, run amok.

There must be some new move, for ONUC cannot stand idly by while the Congo's internal situation, including the Adoula Government itself, deteriorates and dissolves all around it, leading to dead-sure civil war and ultimate chaos.

The UN, it seems, has at least some measure of authority to act against mercenaries under existing resolutions and one gathers that this authority would most surely be reinforced in any new resolution. The controlling question, however, is whether ONUC has the physical means to take at an early date decisive action in the elimination of all mercenaries from Katanga. I hope to obtain that answer from General Maceoin in the course of our consultations. With the UN Force at its present strength, and there seems to be little hope of increasing its manpower, a decision on priorities would have to be made as between continuing assistance on the present scale in the maintenance ~~throughout~~ of law and order throughout all provinces, and undertaking an effective operation for the elimination of the Katanga mercenaries. Perhaps such a decision on priorities should be decided by the Central Government itself. There should be no illusions about what the Force at its present strength can accomplish.

The Katanga authorities should be informed in advance of the UN intention to remove the mercenaries once and for all, and should be told convincingly that while the UN will observe the provisions of the cease-fire and will hope to be able to achieve its objective of eliminating all mercenaries peacefully, it will swiftly counter any armed resistance with hard-hitting force, ground and aerial.

The UN round-up operation would require that the UN have and employ free access to all places. The Katangese authorities should be advised that the UN intends to go wherever its task requires, to search as necessary the persons and premises of non-Africans, and if in this effort it should in any place meet resistance by force, it will undertake, by all means at its disposal, to overcome that resistance.

It may be taken for granted that many, perhaps most, of the Katanga mercenaries would try to go underground on learning of the round-up, would don civilian clothes and pose as employed. A thorough search of all non-African population groups and areas would therefore be required, and every precaution should be taken to ensure proper although determined demeanour by the ONUC troops. This would be a task of great scope and difficulty.

Our experience thus far has shown that a greater deterrent is needed to discourage the mercenaries from holding out and returning after evacuation. This might be found in a request to the UN by the Central Government to hand over to the Central Government for internment all mercenaries which the UN takes into custody. These mercenaries, which would then be under the authority of the Central Government and subject to its laws, could be guarded jointly by detachments of ONUC and ANC troops to avoid any mistreatment of them.

~~THE~~

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ONUC should devise improved procedures for screening suspected mercenaries and determining those who are subject to paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February.

An operation of this magnitude and complexity would require a major redeployment of ONUC's detachments, in order to be prepared to meet resistance by force.

Mobile radio transmitters and other transmitters, if available, in North Katanga and wherever else they may be effective, should, in advance of the operation, broadcast to the people of Katanga, in French and the principal African dialects, clear explanations and justifications of the operation.

In carrying out such an operation, it would be necessary to make it completely clear to the Central Government that disturbances in areas temporarily vacated by ONUC in order to reinforce the Katanga effort would have most serious implications for the continuance of any UN effort in the Congo. It may also be necessary, in order to avoid a breakdown of law and order, to prevent the ANC from moving in behind the UN action. Albertville has been a valuable lesson.

I repeat that this is still in the idea stage and that the question of ONUC's ability to mount such an operation is under study and as yet unanswered.

Before calling for discussion on what I have said, ^{Psychological warfare.} ^{Intelligence.} on any other matters you may wish to raise with me or with Gen. Maceoin and Dr. O'Brien, I may inform you that Mr. Tshombe has sent a message to me, which I think you should see, although I am not circulating it as a document. We have some informal copies here and they may now be passed around.

I also learned yesterday of messages which Mr. Tshombe cabled to certain Delegations here, namely China, Ethiopia, France, India, Nigeria, United Kingdom and United States. There may have been others. Copies of this message will likewise be passed around.

Now, the floor is open for discussion.

Secretary-General's opening remarks to some members of the Congo
Advisory Committee at 3.00 p.m.
18 December 1961

Adm

Developments in the Congo during the last few hours require urgent action on my part. As time is of the essence I am not in a position to consult with the whole of the Advisory Committee. I have therefore asked you and particularly those who have troops in Elisabethville to meet with me this afternoon so that I may have the benefit of your advice.

Since we last met, the military situation has continued to improve. Ethiopian troops captured the Lido and Swedes captures Camp Messart. Our troops have conducted themselves magnificiently and I would ask you to send my appreciation to your governments of the bravery and devotion to the United Nations of the troops involved in current operations.

Yesterday Ethiopians at Lido came under intense fire from the administrative buildings of Union Miniere. Our troops conducted themselves with considerable restraint in spite of losing six Ethiopians killed and five wounded, and did not retaliate. ONUC representatives in Elisabethville issued several warnings to the staff of Union Miniere that firing should stop, but with no avail. This morning ONUC troops launched an attack to clear this opposition. We are hopeful of results.

In Camp Messart and tunnel areas, we are secure though have suffered some casualties due to sniping. By the end of today we should be in possession of all our objectives with perhaps some pockets of resistance left.

On a request received from Spaak I issued ordersto ONUC that they must facilitate evacuation of women and children from Union Miniere buildings. This probably was not possible due to heavy fighting around the area and continued stiff opposition.

We also received requests for assistance to many civilians who had taken refuge in Square Uvira. In spite of heavy firing from Katangese, ONUC representatives made their way to this area to provide help.

Tshombe was first reported to have left for Kupushi but is now believed to be in Elisabethville. He has agreed to come to Kitona to meet Adoula, but insists on a cease fire.

Bunche, Linner, Khiary and Gardiner have been in constant touch with Adoula and Ambassador Gullion. Adoula will not agree to a cease fire and has told Gullion so. Otherwise, he has agreed to go to Kitona and meet Tshombe.

I have already stated my position clearly. I have stated that once ONUC objectives have been secured, I am willing to consider suspending the operations.

There is an understanding with Stevenson that in case firm arrangements are actually made for Tshombe to fly to Kitona, we would hold our fire for duration of parley, with of course right to act in self-defence in case we should be attacked during this period.

Bunche informed me this morning that as soon as they learn of success of Ethiopian attack, MacEoin will put out a brief press statement saying that all ONUC objectives have been captured.

Stevenson came to see me this morning. He said Gullion is in Ndola with a plane to bring Tshombe to Kitona. United States Consul Hoffacker in Elisabethville, however, reports that although fighting has abated, Tshombe insists on a cease fire.

I told Stevenson that we expected to hear from MacEoin soon. But in any event, I could only accept a temporary halt in operations on basis of my previous arrangement with him. While he accepted this, he ~~impressed~~ need of urgency to bring Tshombe. Tshombe is known to change his mind. I said that is the exact

reason why I can only agree to such arrangements on my terms.

I would be glad to have your views.

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United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Press Release SG/1234
CO/215

29 June 1962

STATEMENT MADE BY ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT
BEFORE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO, 29 JUNE

I called this meeting in order to bring the members up to date on developments in the Congo, particularly with regard to the Adoula-Tshombe talks in Leopoldville. Since issuing the call for this meeting, those talks, as you know, ended early in the morning of the 26th of June without agreement, thus creating a new critical phase for the UN operation in the Congo.

You will have seen by now the text of Mr. Gardiner's* report on the Adoula-Tshombe talks, which I have distributed as Security Council document S/5053/Add.10. The Annexes, however, which are voluminous, are still being processed and have not yet been circulated.

Mr. Rolz-Bennett,** the ONUC Representative in Elisabethville, who sat with Mr. Gardiner in the second phase of the talks, has returned and I intend to call upon him to give you first-hand information supplementary to the written report about the talks.

It is, I think, a bit early to attempt to draw any conclusions as to the significance of the failure of the Leopoldville talks to end in agreement. There is no provision for their resumption but we will press for them to do so.

The decisive question, of course, will be whether Mr. Tshombe and his lieutenants in Katanga will now undertake to resume their secessionist efforts. They may or they may not.

As you know, Mr. Tshombe, at Kitona and on other occasions since then, has renounced secession, but what he will actually do now remains to be seen, particularly since some of his colleagues, most notably Mr. Kimba, have increasingly evidenced a lack of sympathy with Mr. Tshombe's participation in the talks and with the so-called "conciliatory" line he was pursuing at Leopoldville.

(more)

* Robert K.A. Gardiner, Officer-in-Charge of the UN operation in the Congo.

**Jose Rolz-Bennett formerly held that position and is now back at UN Headquarters.

*Adv. Comm
Congo*

29 June 1962

I might add that while we were hoping that the Leopoldville talks might end in agreement, we were always prepared for their likely failure, despite the fact that Mr. Gardiner was exhibiting great skill and doing everything humanly possible to keep them going and to achieve fruitful results from them.

I have suggested to Mr. Gardiner that he come here for consultations in the next few days, since I would wish to have the benefit of his analysis in giving thought to the immediate future. You may be sure that our people in the Congo have been told to be very much on the alert for any contingency as a consequence of the breakdown of the talks.

It is quite possible that in the light of developments in the few weeks ahead I would find it necessary to consult you about courses of action and even to invite the Security Council to review the entire Congo situation and to consider the advisability of clarifying and strengthening existing mandates and providing certain new ones.

You may be sure, of course, that in the meantime we will continue the policy of giving all possible assistance under the Security Council resolutions to the government in its efforts to achieve unity and protect the territorial integrity of the country. In this respect, I may read to you the text of the message which I am sending today to Leopoldville in connection with the second anniversary of independence of the Congo which will be celebrated on Saturday, 30 June [message being released at 5 p.m. on 29 June].

I may also inform you that the Katangese authorities some time ago informed our people in Elisabethville of their intention to celebrate "Katangese independence" on 11 July and to bring a thousand or more Katangese gendarmes from places outside Elisabethville to participate in the parade on that date.

Our people have taken a firmly negative position against bringing in any additional gendarmerie to Elisabethville for this or any other purpose and, indeed, we have informed the Katangese authorities of our strongly negative view of any so-called independence celebration at all by them.

I think it might now be advisable to call upon Mr. Rolz-Bennett and after his statement to invite discussion about the situation in general.

* *** *

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Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Note No. 2525
25 July 1962

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

The following statement was made by a UN spokesman in New York today:

Yesterday's meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Congo was called by Acting Secretary-General U Thant to report to the members on the talks he had on the Congo during his recent visit to several European capitals. He also reported to them on the failure of the talks between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. Reference was also made to the obvious bad faith on the part of Mr. Tshombe who seemed to be playing for time. Robert Gardiner (Officer-in-charge of the UN Operation in the Congo) elaborated on the situation in the Congo and on the recent incidents in Katanga and the attempts by the Katangese authorities to use civilians, including women and children, to harass ONUC forces.

The Secretary-General asked members of the Committee for their advice as to how the present impasse could be broken, including the possibility of seeking a fresh mandate from the Security Council.

It is absolutely incorrect to say that the Secretary-General had proposed a fresh military initiative in the Congo.

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(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Press Release SG/1344
CO/1249
12 October 1962

ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT REPORTS
TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGO

The Congo Advisory Committee held its 70th meeting on the afternoon of 12 October. It was called by Acting Secretary-General U Thant for the purpose of bringing the Committee up to date on developments in the Congo and therefore the meeting was devoted primarily to oral reporting by him.

The Acting Secretary-General informed the Committee of the developments relating to the implementation of the Plan which he had submitted to Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, including the two recent visits of Mr. Gardiner to Elisabethville in connection with it and the work of the three commissions concerned with its implementation.

He reported on the difficulties that had been encountered but held to his hope for the successful implementation of the Plan and urged that nothing be done by the United Nations which could in any way hamper this effort. The Committee was informed that a report on developments affecting the Plan is in preparation for submission to the Security Council.

The Acting Secretary-General stressed the continuing efforts of the United Nations to ensure a peaceful reconciliation of differences and territorial unity in the Congo.

He also discussed other matters relating to peaceful reconciliation. In this regard, the Acting Secretary-General repeated the statement he had made on numerous other occasions that there is no mandate under which the UN Force could undertake any offensive military action in Katanga or elsewhere in the Congo and there is no intention for that Force to do so. In this regard, the Acting Secretary-General strongly refuted the various reports being given circulation concerning ONUC military plans and offensive intentions in Katanga.

It is the intention to hold another meeting of the Committee in a week or two.

* *** *

Notice of postponement of meeting sent to members of Advisory
Committee on the Congo.

New York
29 October 1962

To:

The Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations
regrets the necessity of postponing the meeting of the Congo
Advisory Committee scheduled for Tuesday, 30 October, at 3 p.m.
The members of the Committee will understand this is unavoidable
and is due only to U Thant's deep involvement in the effort
to solve the problems that have given rise to the crisis over
Cuba. It is the intention to reschedule the postponed meeting
at an early date and you will be notified as soon as possible.

A handwritten signature, likely of the Acting Secretary-General, is located at the bottom right of the page. The signature is stylized and appears to be 'R. Thant'.

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Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

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Note No. 2691
6 November 1962

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

71st Meeting of the Advisory Committee
On the Congo, Held on 6 November 1962 at 3 p.m.

The Acting Secretary-General, after expressing regret for the postponement of the meeting on two previous occasions for unavoidable reasons, made a short statement on developments in the Congo since the last meeting.

He made special reference to an assessment of the progress thus far in fulfilling the requirements of the Plan of National Reconciliation, pointing out that the Plan was not negotiable, that the period for its implementation could not be prolonged indefinitely, and that no substantial progress in implementation has been made in the sense of a solid advance toward the end of secession and the reintegration of Katanga.

U Thant emphasized that the time for implementation is now rapidly running out. He informed the Committee that Robert K.A. Gardiner, Officer-in-Charge of the UN Operation in the Congo, will probably be going to Elisabethville again later this week. The Acting Secretary-General also informed the Committee of the latest developments in Leopoldville with regard to the draft constitution. He called on Ralph J. Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to make a brief report to the Committee on his consultations in Leopoldville during his recent visit.

The Acting Secretary-General also made a special point of calling upon the Foreign Minister of the Congo Republic, Justin Bomboko, for a statement.

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The Acting Secretary-General also made a special point of calling upon the Foreign Minister of the Congo Republic, Justin Bomboko, for a statement.

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13 December 1962

Statement by the Secretary-General at the 72nd Meeting of the
United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo, on Thursday,
13 December 1962, at 4 p.m., Conf. Rm. 8

Since our last meeting on 6 November I have talked with all members of the Committee, individually or in small groups, about developments in the Congo; ~~and~~ there has been circulated an extensive report to the Security Council on the Plan (S/5053/Add. 13 and Add. 1); and we have circulated to you in recent days certain letters; others are being handed to you here today. By these various means you have been kept informed and given just about all the information we have.

There was a good deal of press coverage, including speculations, before the local papers closed down because of the strike, about various new "plans", such as the so-called "Spaak Plan" and the "McGhee Plan". There is, in fact, only one plan, and that is the Plan of National Reconciliation which I have sponsored and which you received a long time ago. It was also reproduced in full in the report to the Security Council. Mr. Spaak and Mr. McGhee, as you know, had no new plans, but they did advance some ideas about procedures and implementation, but these did not prove feasible. We are therefore going ahead with the Plan in toto and we are now in the stage of calling upon states to give effect to the pressures envisaged in Phases I through IV of that Plan. This you will see from the letters which have been distributed to you.

Now as regards the letters, you will note that they take

different forms, according to the party addressed. One letter, which has been distributed to you, is the letter of warning which Mr. Gardiner has already sent to Mr. Tshombe. As yet there has been no response from and no public comment on this letter by Mr. Tshombe. Another is the letter from me to the Government of Belgium, which was delivered on Tuesday afternoon, the 11th. At the same time the letters from me to Portugal and the Union of South Africa, were delivered. My letter to the United Kingdom was delivered on Wednesday afternoon, the 12th. Late yesterday, I received from Prime Minister Adoula a communication informing me of the identical letters which he has sent to countries which are importing Katangese copper and cobalt in varying quantities. These have gone to the governments indicated in his letter, which is before you. Also before you, is the letter which I am addressing to those same governments in response to Mr. Adoula's appeal.

The letters calling upon certain States to take actions of one kind or another spring directly from the Plan. There are, of course, other actions involving pressure which the Congolese Government itself can take and that Government will, I am sure, take them in due course. On our part, as you know, there are non-military steps outside of the Plan as well as under it, such as I outlined to you in our October meeting, which ONUC can take and will proceed to take one by one.

In other words, we are now in a phase in which all of the pressures available to us will be exerted on the basis of careful selection and planning and with every effort made to avoid armed conflict. If, however, Mr. Tshombe should elect to order his gendar-

merie to attack us we will defend ourselves fully and hit back to the full extent of our capacity. The United Nations troops are alerted and are being prepared for any such eventuality.

Members of the Committee will be interested to learn that Mr. Tshombe now has access to what goes on in this room. In a letter of 7 December, which Mr. Tshombe addressed to Mr. Mathu concerning the fighting at Kongolo, he quotes a passage from the confidential summary of the 70th meeting of this Committee on 12 October circulated to members of the Security Council for their confidential information. Typically, however, Mr. Tshombe missed the point of the passage.

The Katangese Gendarmerie at Kongolo, who had been surrounded by the ANC for a long time, have left the town. With the concurrence of Mr. Adoula, a detachment of ONUC is being placed in the town and a Nigerian unit is now en route to Kongolo for this purpose.

The aerial activities by Katangese planes in North Katanga seem to have ceased. Because of the loss of the Ethiopian jet fighters and the Indian Canberras, the ONUC fighter plane force is now very weak, consisting only at present of three Swedish jet fighters. However, four additional Swedish jet fighters, thanks to the very great sense of cooperation and understanding of the Swedish Government, are being added to the Force; the Ethiopian fighter crews will be soon returning to take over F-86 aircraft which the United Nations is obtaining. We have just been informed that the Philippines Government will provide six jet fighters with crews and there is good

reason to hope for favorable action on an urgent request for additional jet fighters and crews made to Iran.

About mid-day I received a message from Mr. Gardiner transmitting the text of a letter dated 12 December from Mr. Tshombe to me. The text of this letter ^{will} ~~may~~ now be distributed to you. On first look, as you will see, it would appear to be an encouraging development. You will readily understand, however, that in view of our past experiences with Mr. Tshombe we are not jumping to any hasty conclusions. We are studying it very carefully and have asked Mr. Gardiner to get Prime Minister Adoula's reaction to it. It could be that this development is not unrelated to the new steps.

This I believe will serve to bring you fully up to date. I now welcome any comments the members may wish to make.

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Statement by the Secretary-General at the 74th meeting
of the Advisory Committee on the Congo on 8 April 1963

As you will recall from my announcement at our last meeting, the main purpose of today's meeting is to take advantage of the presence at Headquarters, at my invitation, of Lt. Gen. Kebbede Guebre, the Force Commander in the Congo, and his senior military colleagues. I know you would wish to meet them all. General Kebbede Guebre you already know, since he has met with this Committee before.

I now introduce to you General Kebbede's colleagues: Major-General Prem Chand, General Officer Commanding Katanga Area; Major-General C.R. Kaldager, Air Commander; Brigadier Reginald Noronha, the Commander of the Indian Independent Brigade; Brigadier R.A.O. Ogundipe, Nigerian Contingent Commander; Colonel N.L. Hederen, Swedish Contingent Commander; and Lt. Col. A.G. Palmquist, Commander of Swedish Jet Fighter Unit.

It had also been my intention, on the basis of the consultations I have had since our last meeting, to convene a Committee meeting before this one for the exclusive purpose of continuing consideration of the question of the training of the Congolese armed forces. When, however, it became apparent that many members would not be ready to discuss the matter definitively, I dropped the idea of an earlier meeting and decided to take up the matter at today's meeting. That accounts for the informal documents we sent to you last week. However, on last Friday, 5 April, I received a message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Congo, reading as follows:

"The Central Government of the Republic of the Congo attaches particular importance to the question of the training of the Congolese National Army.

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Given the difficulties which seem to have arisen during the meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Congo, the Prime Minister has decided to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Justin Bomboko, to participate in the next meeting of this Committee. It is, therefore, requested urgently that this meeting be postponed until Tuesday, 16 April. (Signed) Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo. "

I felt, of course, that since this question of training is one which concerns the Government of the Congo so intimately, I could only agree to the Government's request for a postponement of the discussion. We will not, therefore, discuss the training of the Congolese armed forces this afternoon. The date of the next meeting of the Committee, which will be for the purpose of taking up this subject, will depend upon the date of Mr. Bomboko's arrival, but it will probably be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, 16 April.

This means that the meeting today will now be as I had originally planned it, namely, for discussing matters of mutual interest, exclusive of ANC training, with General Kebbede and his colleagues. As you know, I invited General Kebbede and his senior military colleagues in the Congo to come here at this time for consultation because I believe that we have reached a point where a thorough reappraisal of the military situation would be most useful.

I am very glad to have the opportunity to welcome General Kebbede and his senior military colleagues here in New York and to express to them personally, and through them to all members of the Congo Force, our very great appreciation for the services they have rendered so loyally to the

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United Nations in the performance of their most difficult and unique task in the Congo. I would wish them to convey these words in turn to all the officers and men now serving or who have served the United Nations in the Congo. Seldom, if ever, in history has a military force from so many countries been concerned with so complex and delicate a responsibility. In spite of all the difficulties and dangers, they have performed their task with a skill, delicacy and restraint which must be almost unprecedented in the annals of military operations. My colleagues and I in the Secretariat have followed their activities with the greatest admiration and gratitude, and I know that our feelings have been shared by almost all of the delegations here in New York. I believe that they have shown in the most striking manner how professional soldiers from many nations can work together in applying the military art to the securing of peace. In doing this they have made an historic contribution to the development of peaceful institutions.

I would now like to call upon the Force Commander, General Kebbede, to give to the Committee his impressions of the present situation in the Congo. I would also like him, if he is willing to do so, to present some of his personal observations upon the problems which the Commander of such an international force faces in the field, and to tell us very frankly how his job looks from the operational end in the Congo. I now have great pleasure in calling upon the Force Commander, General Kebbede Guebre.

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Press Release SG/1472
CO/325

23 April 1963

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT AT MEETING
OF CONGO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TUESDAY, 23 APRIL

"Before proceeding with our main item of business for this meeting, I wish to present to you Ambassador Max Dorsinville, who is to take over from Mr. Gardiner as Officer-in-Charge in the Congo when, at the end of the month, Mr. Gardiner finally leaves to assume his duties as Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa. As you know, Mr. Gardiner's departure from the Congo has been pending for some time but has had to be delayed because of developments and circumstances there.

"Mr. Dorsinville, I am sure, is known to all of you. The announcement of his appointment was made last week. He can be with us for only a few moments this afternoon since he is leaving for the Congo on a 6 o'clock flight.

"I know you all will join me in wishing him well and in an expression of confidence that he will discharge the heavy responsibilities of the Congo ^{assignment} position with distinction.

"Mr. F. T. Liu, who only a few days ago came back from the Congo, will be returning to Leopoldville with Mr. Dorsinville on his fourth tour of duty with ONUC.

"We meet now to resume discussion of the question of the retraining and modernization of the Congolese armed forces, and in particular the role of the United Nations in this programme. As you know, I postponed this meeting for one week in order to allow time for more informal discussions on this important subject, and especially so that the members of the Committee would have the opportunity for informal exchanges of views with Mr. Bomboko.

"I believe that these informal discussions at least have served to clear up some misunderstandings. It was my hope, of course, that they would find a solution to this problem, which is an urgent one both for the Congolese Government and people and for the United Nations, which still has continuing responsibilities in the Congo.

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"You have received the letter of 16 April addressed to me by Prime Minister Adoula, which seeks concurrence on an interpretation of the relevant provision of the resolution of the General Assembly -- paragraph 6 of resolution 1474 of the Fourth Emergency Session, adopted in September 1960 -- as not imposing, in the present and very much changed circumstances, a limitation of his Government's freedom to seek the assistance it may need where it may deem advisable.

"The real practical sense of this interpretation, of course, would be in its application to States providing the assistance requested. Even under the resolution, the Government of the Congo is free to approach any Government for assistance.

"The restrictive burden of the resolution really falls on the States thus approached, for the resolution requires such requests to be made to them only through the United Nations, 'during the temporary period of military assistance'-- that is to say, so long as the United Nations Force is in the Congo. Granting Mr. Adoula's request presumably would make it easier for States to respond.

"Based on my talks with Mr. Bomboko in the past few days, I can say that it is correct to interpret the Prime Minister's letter as not insisting upon a United Nations 'umbrella' or co-ordinating machinery, for the modernization and training programme. Nor would the Secretary-General be called upon to make the requests for assistance.

"In other words, if the Congo Government decided to go ahead, as its sovereign right entitles it to do, with the training programme as previously outlined, the United Nations would not be held responsible for that training programme or for any implications of it.

"It emerges from the informal discussions that no one questions the right of the Government of the Congo to perform all the functions and have all the prerogatives of a sovereign State, and no one wishes to limit those prerogatives. On the other hand, if the United Nations is called upon to play a co-ordinating function in a programme of this importance, or to make the requests, it clearly is within the discretion of the United Nations to decide whether such a role is suitable or not, more especially in the light both of the spirit and of the letter of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions governing its presence in the Congo.

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"It is also true, of course, that the problem of the resolution does, in fact, have the effect of limiting the freedom of choice of the Congolese Government by imposing a restraint on States willing and able to provide the aid.

"It must be borne in mind that it is essential that the Congolese armed forces be modernized and trained without delay, more especially in view of the likelihood of the departure from the Congo of the United Nations Force by the end of 1963. Indeed, these two events have a practical interrelation.

"We have also to consider the inevitable political implications flowing from the selection of particular countries to carry out this programme. As I understand it, the Government of the Congo is anxious that, while ONUC is still in the Congo, all significant aid to the Government of the Congo should be requested through United Nations channels.

"The problem, therefore, is to devise, if possible, a formula by which the needs of the Congolese Government, as stated by Prime Minister Adoula, can be reconciled both with the terms, or the intent, of the resolution governing the United Nations presence in the Congo and with the views of the members of this Committee.

"I would now like to hear the views of the members on the question before us. In so doing, I seek the advice of the Committee on how I am to answer Prime Minister Adoula's letter, taking into account the urgency of the problem and the necessity of making some practical progress.

"At the outset, it will be useful, I think, to ask Mr. Bomboko to summarize his interpretation of the Prime Minister's letter and of the situation as it now stands, as he sees it."

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Before proceeding with our main item of business for this meeting, I wish to present to you Ambassador Max Dorsinville who is to take over from Mr. Gardiner as Officer-in-Charge in the Congo when, at the end of the month, Mr. Gardiner finally leaves to assume his duties as Executive Secretary of ECA. As you know, Mr. Gardiner's departure from the Congo has been pending for some time but has had to be delayed because of developments and circumstances there. Mr. Dorsinville, I am sure, is known to all of you. The announcement of his appointment was made last week. He can be with us for only a few moments this afternoon since he is leaving for the Congo on a 6 o'clock flight. I know you all will join me in wishing him well and in ^{can} expression of confidence that he will discharge the heavy responsibilities of the Congo ^{assignment} ~~position~~ with distinction. Mr. F.T. Liu, who only a few days ago came back from the Congo, will be returning to Leopoldville with Mr. Dorsinville on his fourth tour of duty with ONUC.

Statement by the Secretary-General at the meeting of the
Congo Advisory Committee on Tuesday, 23 April 1963

We meet now to resume discussion of the question of the retraining and modernization of the Congolese armed forces, and in particular the role of the UN in this programme. As you know, I postponed this meeting for one week in order to allow time for more informal discussions on this important subject, and especially so that the members of the Committee would have the opportunity for informal exchanges of views with Mr. Bomboko. I believe that these informal discussions at least have served to clear up some misunderstandings. It was my hope, of course, that they would find a solution to this problem, which is an urgent one both for the Congolese Government and people and for the UN, which still has continuing responsibilities in the Congo.

You have received the letter of 16 April addressed to me by Prime Minister Adoula, which seeks concurrence on an interpretation of the relevant provision of the resolution of the General Assembly - paragraph 6 of resolution 1474 of the Fourth Emergency Session, adopted in September 1960 - as not imposing, in the present and very much changed circumstances, a limitation of his Government's freedom to seek the assistance it may need where it may deem advisable.

The real practical sense of this interpretation, of course, would be in its application to states providing the assistance requested. Even under the resolution, the Government of the Congo is free to approach any government for assistance. The restrictive burden of the resolution really falls on the states thus approached, for the resolution requires such requests to be made to them only through the United Nations, "during the

temporary period of military assistance". That is to say, so long as the UN Force is in the Congo. Granting Mr. Adoula's request presumably would make it easier for states to respond.

The view is strongly held by some that only the General Assembly could make an authoritative interpretation of its resolution. It follows that I cannot in my reply to his letter give the Prime Minister the satisfaction he seeks.

Based on my talks with Mr. Bomboko in the past few days, I can say that it is correct to interpret the Prime Minister's letter as not insisting upon a UN "umbrella" or co-ordinating machinery, for the modernization and training programme. Nor would the Secretary-General be called upon to make the requests for assistance. In other words, if the Congo Government decided to go ahead, as is its sovereign right to do, with the training programme as previously outlined, the UN would not be held responsible for that training programme or for any implications of it.

It emerges from the informal discussions that no one questions the right of the Government of the Congo to perform all the functions and have all the prerogatives of a sovereign state, and no one wishes to limit those prerogatives. On the other hand, if the UN is called upon to play a co-ordinating function in a programme of this importance, or to make the requests, it clearly is within the discretion of the UN to decide whether such a role is suitable or not, more especially in the light both of the spirit and of the letter of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions governing its presence in the Congo.

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It is also true, of course, that the problem of the resolution does, in fact, have the effect of limiting the freedom of choice of the Congolese Government by imposing a restraint on states willing and able to provide the aid.

It must be borne in mind that it is essential that the Congolese armed forces be modernized and trained without delay, more especially in view of the likelihood of the departure from the Congo of the UN Force by the end of 1963. Indeed, these two events have a practical interrelation. We have also to consider the inevitable political implications flowing from the selection of particular countries to carry out this programme. As I understand it, the Government of the Congo is anxious that while ONUC is still in the Congo, all significant aid to the Government of the Congo should be requested through the UN channels, although in this case they are prepared to renounce the idea of the aid being administered under a UN co-ordinating mechanism. The problem, therefore, is to devise, if possible, a formula by which the needs of the Congolese Government, as stated by Prime Minister Adoula, can be reconciled both with the terms, or the intent, of the resolution governing the UN presence in the Congo and with the views of the members of this Committee.

In the course of the informal consultations, the suggestion was often made that as a short term measure, while the UN Force remains in the Congo, the military training assistance required might be sought exclusively from those countries already providing military aid through having contingents in the UN Force.

I would now like to hear the views of the members on the question before

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us. In so doing, I seek the advice of the Committee on how I am to answer Prime Minister Adoula's letter, taking into account the urgency of the problem and the necessity of making some practical progress.

At the outset, it will be useful, I think, to ask Mr. Bomboko to summarize his interpretation of the Prime Minister's letter and of the situation as it now stands, as he sees it.

I call upon Mr. Bomboko.