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C/ORB 130/ 1/3 KAMINA

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST REPORT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS
BASE ADMINISTRATOR AT KAMINA
SUBMITTED TO
THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
IN CONGO

KAMINA

DECEMBER 5, 1960.

C/ORG 130/1/3
KAMINA

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Explanatory Note

Kamina Base covers an area of about 300 square miles. It is divided into two main parts: the eastern area (Lumwe), containing the airfield and aircraft maintenance workshops, and the western area (Kalunga) where the Headquarters building, workshops and supply depots are situated. The two areas are about six miles apart. The power station is at Kilubi, about sixty miles away.

INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations formally established its presence at Kamina on 2 September 1960. A great deal of work has been done since then in putting the United Nations operations on a firm basis and in examining the possible future economic uses of the Base. No connected report has, however, so far been prepared on the operational activities and the lines on which future action is to proceed. The present report is designed to serve that purpose as well as to form the basis for future policy decisions on the major issues arising out of the United Nations presence at the Base.

Plaza Report

2. The report of the study group appointed to inquire into the future use of Kamina Base (Plaza Report) recommended that the whole Base should eventually be converted into a centre for the training of Congolese technicians, craftsmen, clerical officers and so on from all over the Republic of the Congo. The present Administrator has always regarded it as highly doubtful even when conditions become stabilized and it is again possible to travel freely throughout the whole country, whether the Base will be suitable for a training centre, particularly in view of the very large overhead expenditure involved in operating it. This view was confirmed by the Secretary-General in his instruction of 19 November, to the effect that the operation of the Base was to be regarded as a short-term activity and reduced to the barest minimum.

Withdrawal of Belgian personnel

3. The Base was taken over with military personnel, which though symbolizing the presence of the United Nations and thus serving a most useful purpose, was not designed to

take over the technical operations from the Belgians. Moreover the United Nations could not immediately take any action with respect to some 2,500 Congolese workers whose livelihood along with that of their dependents was bound up with their employment at the Base. These difficult problems coupled with the paucity of administrative personnel handicapped the United Nations authorities who arrived in Kamina early in September in drawing up a practical plan of withdrawal of Belgian personnel. Unfortunately the preparation of such a plan dragged on for an unduly long period and gave the Belgian authorities at the Base, who did not intend in any case to make a withdrawal in too great haste, a pretext for alleging that delay in their withdrawal was due to lack of decisiveness on the part of United Nations senior personnel at the Base. It was not until 22 October when the present Administrator arrived at Kamina that the preparation of a definite plan of withdrawal was undertaken; this plan was formally presented to the Belgian authorities at the Base on 27 October. Had a plan which was presented informally by the Belgians on 6 October to the United Nations authorities at the Base been accepted, the withdrawal of all but 36 Belgians would perhaps have been completed by 15 November. As matters now stand the full withdrawal will not be completed until 31 December. A period of some six weeks was thus lost. With clear instructions for speedy withdrawal in their hands, the present Administrator cannot accept that the Belgians could not themselves cut down the delay by a more accelerated schedule of withdrawal of all but the most essential technicians required for the maintenance of the technical services of the Base.

Staffing difficulties

4. In view of the conditions under which the United Nations civilian and military staff have had to operate, it has been virtually impossible to do more than improvise policies and procedures from day to day. The difficulties encountered in taking over technical and administrative functions from a Belgian administration whose officers were trained for their posts and experienced in them, by staff who in most instances have little expert knowledge of the duties they are supposed to perform, have been and still are enormous. Looking back, it is clear that it would have been far better if, when the original take-over team arrived on the Base, it had been accompanied by a group of administrators who would immediately have worked out a plan for a complete administration and indicated the kind of staff, civilian or military, required to put the plan into effect. If this had been done early in September, many of the specialist staff might now have been in their posts, and the present situation in which military units were drafted in to take over from the Belgians, regardless of how well qualified they were to do so, would have been avoided. One of the greatest difficulties of the present administration is that of language; many of the staff taking over from the Belgians find themselves unable to communicate with the Congolese workers, except through interpreters who are difficult to obtain; those taking over workshops are unable to understand and use the records and manuals left by the Belgians, and so on.

5. There is a general absence of trained staff for the most essential tasks, and it should be pointed out that even under the barest minimum operation of the Base a not inconsiderable number of specialist French-speaking staff will be required merely to prevent further deterioration of plant

and buildings. The Belgian policy was to make the Base self-contained, and the considerable extent to which this object was achieved creates additional difficulties for the United Nations staff who do not possess the supply lines or transport which the Belgians had, and whose requirements have to be supplied partly by air, despite a critical shortage of aircraft, spares and skilled maintenance and ground personnel.

Wheeler report

6. The Wheeler Mission performed a useful service in surveying Belgian equipment and material at the Base but its task was unfortunately governed by considerations which have since proved to be impracticable. Much valuable time of scarce personnel has been expended on the inventory of some 68,000 items which was overtaken midway by a fresh detailed reappraisal of actual requirements. Considering the limited senior staff which could be spared from Headquarters for the administration of the entire complex of the Base, the undoing of the work of the Wheeler Mission has proved to be a most difficult and arduous job and could only be undertaken at the sacrifice of other important administrative duties. The work of revising the recommendations of the Wheeler Mission will, however, continue to command a high priority until it is satisfactorily completed.

Administrative and financial controls

7. The taking over of Kamina Base has been an unprecedented operation for the United Nations. It was only after the United Nations entry into the Base that it became apparent that whereas the normal United Nations military activities need only a minimum administrative staff for financial and general administrative control,

the Kamina Base is predominantly an administrative problem complete with elements of a city administration and with the added complexity of a dependent population of about 15,000 persons. Unfortunately, administrative and financial chaos had already taken a grip of the situation and an ill-suited pattern of administration had become established before emergency administrative aid with new terms of reference was rushed in. Although much has already been done during recent weeks to remove the chaos, the situation with regard to financial control still remains alarming. Measures recently applied or in course of preparation should afford some improvement.

Congolese workers

8. There are at present some 2,700 or so Congolese workers on the Base; with families, the total number of Congolese is about 15,000. They have to be fed, housed (here there have been murmurs that the United Nations is slow in removing the segregation in housing practised by the Belgians), paid, educated and provided with a minimum of recreation. In present conditions, with the staff and resources available, the administration is finding it impossible to maintain the standard of material conditions for the Congolese workers set by the Belgians. Moreover, the fact that so many of the United Nations ^{staff} employ the Congolese workers are unable to communicate with them has a deplorable effect on morale. The Congolese feel that their capabilities are not being appreciated, and that no one cares whether they work well or badly (since in some units no one is able to give a word of praise for good work). The cost of the workers' pay is about \$100,000 a month and of the rations issued to them nearly \$16,000 a month. They purchase food, clothing and supplies in

Economats; the conditions under which these operate are most unsatisfactory (as, incidentally, are the conditions under which the free rations are distributed). There is an apparent surplus of Congolese labour to United Nations needs but the task of sorting out the essential from the non-essential with a view to reducing the labour force is one of considerable magnitude and will tax to the utmost the capacity of the small administrative staff now available at Kamina. Unfortunately this task was enormously complicated by United Nations personnel who came to the Base in the first few weeks of the United Nations entry and gave assurances to the Congolese workers that their services would not be dispensed with by the United Nations. In fact several hundred workers who might have left the Base voluntarily were persuaded to stay on with assurances of their maintenance by the United Nations. It will not now be easy to reverse this policy without running some risk of disrupting the United Nations presence at the Base and endangering the security of United Nations personnel there.

Education

9. Reference has been made above to the necessity for continuing the support of the educational facilities for the Congolese workers' families on the Base. The two kindergartens and the one primary school on the Base are staffed by Congolese teachers. The Belgian authorities had been finding increasing difficulty in attracting teachers to Kamina, and it is scarcely likely that the difficulties will decrease under United Nations administration. The standard of education is visibly deteriorating every day and it is important that so long as the United Nations remains at the Base, it should not neglect the obligations which have devolved upon it.

Relations with Belgian and local authorities

10. After a period characterised by some hesitation, the Belgian authorities on the Base have shown a reasonable degree of co-operation and are now going ahead with plans for withdrawal.

11. There are two local authorities in the vicinity of the Base: the civilian administration of Katanga, and the chefferie. It continues to be clearly understood that none of the representatives of the civilian administration may enter the Base or exercise any functions thereon except with the express permission of the Base Administrator. This has naturally led to some difficulties with the local civilian authorities in Kaminaville. For example, a few days ago, a local European civilian who had been appointed as assistant to the United Nations chief of security on the Base was arrested in Kaminaville by the Katanga Gendarmerie.

12. Relations with the chefferie have been much smoother, and it has continued to carry out its administrative functions among the Congolese population on the Base.

13. It may be pointed out in passing that the commercial life of Kaminaville is bound to be affected as the United Nations activity on the Base is curtailed, and this might conceivably cause a further deterioration in relations with the civil authorities.

Administrative questions remaining to be settled

14. The Base Administrator has been unable to find time to attend to certain administrative and organizational matters which will have to be decided if the United Nations presence in the Base is to be maintained for any period longer than a few months. One of these is the question of the administration of the public utilities on the Base,

particularly electricity and water supply and sanitation. At present there is waste of water and electricity; some system should be devised of bringing the consumption under control and of administering the supply and distribution of these utilities.

15. Warning has recently been given that standards of hygiene and particularly, of maintenance of gardens on the Base, is deteriorating to such an extent that outbreaks of insect-borne diseases may occur if corrective measures are not taken forthwith. This again is a matter which should be brought under proper administrative control.

16. It need hardly be pointed out that, whatever systems of administrative control over the above-mentioned matters may be devised, they will depend for their application on the recruitment of technically qualified French-speaking civilian staff.

Conclusion

17. The above statement gives an outline of the kind of problems facing the United Nations administration of this Base; these problems are examined in greater detail in the sections which follow. Speaking generally, it must be admitted that there is still a regrettably high degree of chaos and confusion, and prospects of reducing it are slight while the necessity to improvise solutions for constant crises and day-to-day problems makes it impossible for the Administrator to disengage himself from details and turn his attention to the urgent matter of designing procedures and practices which would at least reduce to some extent the degree of improvisation required, and beyond that of planning in detail the organization of the military and civilian staff which would best meet the United Nations needs.

18. The unsatisfactory nature of the administration and the staffing position have been pointed out on many occasions, and requests for suitable staff have been made. The Base is still moving under the impetus of the Belgian administration, but when the last Belgians are withdrawn, and the United Nations administration is left to carry on with its woefully inadequate resources of qualified staff, the possibility of a complete breakdown of the administration is a real one. The situation is potentially dangerous, and it is urgently recommended that strenuous efforts be made to find the skilled staff who are absolutely vital to the proper functioning of the minimum municipal services of the Base.

19. It is always a far easier task to expand an organization than to contract it. The present military organization of the Base was conceived and established for an elaborate system of Base operations for perhaps several years. If the operations are to be brought down to the bare minimum, the entire structure and strength of the military and air organization must be reviewed and drastically reduced. Apart from the minimum security forces which the United Nations has to maintain at the Base, there seems no reason why the rest of the operation including aircraft maintenance work should not be run on strict business lines which does not seem to be the case at present. In the Administrator's view this should be the keynote of the United Nations operational and maintenance policy at the Base to ^{prevent} the present uncontrolled drain upon the scarce resources of the United Nations.

20. In conclusion, it is necessary to add a word of explanation of the exact scope and purpose of the report contained in the following chapters. The various activities

of the Base administration are described in some detail, the problems are discussed, solutions proposed and recommendations made with a four to six month period in mind.

However, the Base Administrator would like to make it perfectly clear that in his view, Kamina Base is entirely unsuitable for any United Nations purposes whatever. The Secretary-General has said that the Base is unsuitable for use as a civilian training centre; in the Base Administrator's view it is equally unsuitable as a base for United Nations military operations in the Congo. It was for this reason that the Base Administrator had already suggested that United Nations requirements at the Base should be critically re-examined.

21. If it were ultimately decided that the United Nations should no longer occupy the Base, the Base Administrator suggests that the withdrawal be carried out according to the following plan:

(a) the evacuation of all United Nations military forces except those required for security purposes;

(b) a sharp reduction in the establishment of the Air Transport Unit, coupled with consideration of alternative arrangements for the repair of aircraft;

(c) a further cut in security forces as the Congolese labour force is reduced;

(d) the consideration of the possibility of making contractual arrangements for the custodial maintenance of the Base.

22. It is suggested that the above steps should be taken in rapid succession over a three to four month period.

23. In the absence of any firm and clearly stated policy for the future of the Base, the Base Administrator has been

obliged, in making the recommendations in the following chapters, to go on the assumption that the plan for the civilianization of what is at present the military and workshop part of the Base, and the continuance of aircraft maintenance operations, would continue to be carried out. However, the Base Administrator has serious doubts whether the continued presence of United Nations personnel on the Base for these purposes alone would be economically justified, and therefore invites attention to the above plan for closing the Base down altogether.

OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF KAMINA BASE

1. The United Nations personnel who were moved in to Kamina Base in great haste early in September 1960 are mainly military, with a nucleus of civilian administrators, secretarial staff and so on. Operation of the Base as a joint civilian and military responsibility has raised a number of problems which will be examined below.

2. It will be realized that the problems of the Base are predominantly administrative rather than military, insofar as the United Nations responsibility for the Base (as distinct from any operational use made of it) is concerned. There is no doubt that carefully selected military personnel, trained over a period of years, could undertake the administration of the Base and the support of any operational forces stationed there. This was, after all, the manner in which the Belgians administered the Base, but it must be emphasized that practically every Belgian serviceman employed on the Base was an officer or NCO, with appropriate technical qualifications, carefully selected and trained for his job and capable of making the most rational use of the large Congolese labour force available.

3. The United Nations, on the other hand, does not possess in ONUC the kind of military manpower necessary. Indeed, it does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated that the operation of Kamina Base is not the kind of task which was in mind when the ONUC forces were assembled, and is not one which they are capable of performing. The ONUC forces in, say, Stanleyville are in no way responsible for the administration of the town, and it is not reasonable to expect that they should be responsible for the administration of the town of Kamina Base.

4. Until the United Nations can hand over the Base, it presumably bears the responsibility for operating the services there and protecting the installations against deterioration. If the Base continues to be operated by unqualified military personnel there will inevitably be a great wastage of resources through inefficiency. Such waste might be tolerated, as in fact it has been, over a short period of emergency, but there are strict limits to the length of time during which the United Nations should tolerate such wastage, and the consequent drain on its limited funds.

5. To bring this state of affairs to an end it is necessary to import properly qualified staff, who could be either civilian or military. However, in view of the language requirements it is doubtful whether enough technical military personnel could be found in those French-speaking countries from which reinforcements for ONUC could be drawn, and therefore the only solution is to seek civilian staff. This is the plan which commended itself to the ONUC authorities in Leopoldville when the question of the replacement of some of the Belgian technical staff was being discussed (see General Rikhye's memorandum dated 25 September to Dr. Ralph Bunche) and is the plan which the Base Administrator proposes to follow.

6. Under the proposed plan of operation,^{1/} it is envisaged that the operational activities at Kalunga will be civilianized and the scale of operation brought down to the absolute minimum level. Subject to further examination

^{1/} Details of the plan are contained in a note submitted by the Administrator under his memo dated 17 November 1960 to the Special Representative.

of details, it is intended that Kalunga operations be gradually brought almost to a closing down stage except for such training activities for Congolese workers as may prove feasible. ONUC activities will thus be concentrated mainly in the Lumwe sector which will continue to operate as long as necessary on the maintenance and repair of United Nations aircraft.

7. Similarly it is proposed that the manning of all services of a municipal nature should be civilianized and brought under strict administrative and financial control. Job descriptions for all the posts involved have already been forwarded for recruitment.

8. As regards Congolese labour, it is proposed that as soon as the number of surplus workers has been determined, a task which is now in hand, steps will be taken to start the retirement of such workers on a voluntary basis in the first instance. As a measure of inducement, workers willing to leave voluntarily will be offered two months' salary and train passage for themselves and their dependents to their home towns. It is proposed that during the next two or three months, the total Congolese labour force be reduced to at least half the present number. The unskilled labour will be retrenched in the first instance. Efforts will be made to give surplus skilled and semi-skilled workers an accelerated course of training to ensure that the skills already acquired by them are not lost upon their leaving the Base. Simultaneously with the gradual concentration of the ONUC forces in the Lumwe area, the minimum force of Congolese workers required will also be concentrated in the same area.

9. As regards the civilian administrative staff it is considered that finance and budget is the only area in

which the personnel should be strengthened. At least two officers of P-3 or P-4 level should be provided to the finance office as soon as it appears that United Nations will be required to maintain some ONUC forces at the Base for more than a period of three or four months.

10. It is also recommended that the post of Base Administrator should be maintained, and that the responsibilities and powers of this post should be no less than those of the present Administrator. The Base Administrator should be a person of very senior rank at least equivalent to the level of D-2 with considerable versatility and experience in administration. It should be the Base Administrator's responsibility to ensure the most efficient and economical administration of the Base and the proper maintenance of its buildings and installations. The military commander of the Base should act as his adviser and in addition be responsible for maintaining the general security of the Base insofar as the deployment of military personnel is concerned. The military commander should not be involved in administrative and operational responsibility.

11. The Administrator should continue to be responsible to the ONUC authorities in Leopoldville and should report to The Special representative of the Secretary-General on all important matters and to his designated deputy on matters of general administration. He should carry out his functions within the framework of the administrative and operational policies established by the Special Representative.

MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL CONTROL AND BUDGET

Expenditures

1. The estimated average monthly expenditure for the disbursements made by the Finance Officer at Kamina totals \$184,000, made up as follows: per diem \$16,000; service allowance \$50,000; Congolese payroll \$90,000; travel per diem expenses \$4,000; food \$20,000; miscellaneous \$4,000.
2. It may be noted that the Belgian budget for 1960 for the operation of the Base and maintaining all the activities carried on there was \$8,902,000, not including the cost of troops stationed on the Base, and the Wing Command and maintenance team of the Air Force. The Belgians estimated the annual cost of maintaining the Base, as distinct from operating it, at \$180,000, not including labour.
3. The following non-recurrent expenditures have been made between September and the end of November: \$171,000 for contracts in course of completion (see para 30 below); \$90,574 for petrol, cars, refrigerators, office machinery and so on; \$20,000 for inventory of European economy. Moreover, invoices totalling \$3,189 are still outstanding for such items as food, household goods, spare parts and stationery, while a total of \$27,330 (payable in Congolese Francs) is owing to the Belgian authorities for food supplied to United Nations troops at the messes between 19 August and 14 October 1960.
4. The above figures do not take into account any sums payable to the Belgians for supplies and equipment left on the Base and taken over by the United Nations on terms yet to be agreed (see paragraph 23 below).

Financial Control and Budget

5. The management and financial responsibilities of the United Nations arising out of its activities at Kamina can be classified broadly under the following headings:

(a) payment of ~~service~~ allowance to military personnel and per diem to civilian personnel;

(b) payment of wages of some 2,700 Congolese workers;

(c) payment for supplies and equipment purchased from the Belgians;

(d) payment to the Belgians for the support of United Nations personnel at the Base up to 15 October and for Belgian personnel employed in the service of the United Nations;

(e) payment for the purchase of equipment and supplies procured in the Kamina area;

(f) payment for construction contracts.

These responsibilities are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

6. Service Allowance. Except for the Base Commander who has recently been placed on subsistence allowance of \$6 per day as a special case, all military personnel at the Base receive a service allowance of 65 Frs. per day. Lodging is provided to all military personnel free of charge. Enlisted men in the military units are fed in messes, which draw food from the Supply Depot according to the established scale of rations. For Officers and NCO's similar rations are supplied to the messes which are managed and operated by the United Nations. Laundry, barber and shoe repairing services are rendered free of charge to all military personnel.

7. Lodging. There are 350 houses and 75 bachelors' quarters at the Base. A minimum scale of furniture and

equipment has been established for each house. The Belgian scale has been followed in this respect except for the provision of a refrigerator and a radio which the Belgian officials were required to provide at their own expense. Each house is provided with a houseboy and with a minimum amount of linen (sheets and towels) which is laundered weekly. The cost of all these services is included in the free lodging supplied to military personnel, or in the \$8 daily rate for lodging which is paid by civilian personnel.

8. Under the Belgian administration it was the responsibility of the tenants to employ and pay the houseboys directly and to maintain the house gardens. The conditions of employment of the Belgians were, however, different from those of United Nations personnel. The number of houseboys in the employment of the United Nations might perhaps rise to about 100 in due course but this will not put any undue pressure on Congolese housing at the Base, as about the same number were already in private employment at the Base and had housing allotted to them. The maintenance of house gardens still remains a problem. Kamina is known to be infested with snakes and uncontrolled growth of grass and bush cannot be permitted. However, in order not increase further the number of Congolese workers on the United Nations payroll, the question of paying a small amount of overtime to the house boys to keep the gardens in a minimum state of maintenance is being considered. This problem is discussed in another context in paragraph 40 below.

9. Food. The feeding of other ranks presents no particular accounting or financial problem. The management of messes and cooking of food are undertaken by the personnel of the units concerned. Complaints are occasionally made by

unit commanders that established quantities and items are not supplied in the rations. This is partly due to lack of stocks and partly to inability on the part of military personnel employed in the Supply Depot to judge suitable substitutes for items out of stock. Attention is being given to this problem.

10. Messes. For officers and NCO's, two messes are operated under direct United Nations management, one at Lumwe and the other at Kalunga. Rations for the messes are furnished by the Supply Depot in accordance with the requisitions made by the mess manager, based on the average number of officers, NCO's and civilians (including both United Nations and Belgian personnel) eating at the messes. All supervisory and working staff at the messes are employed by the United Nations. Opportunity is being given here to Congolese workers to perform some of the technical and clerical services but the United Nations still has to provide a number of internationally recruited staff.

11. From the date of United Nations entry up to 15 October the messes were managed by the Belgians on behalf of the United Nations. In the early days of the take-over, when the number of international civilian staff at the Base was **small** and general administrative and supervisory staff practically non-existent, a simple system was introduced. The Belgian personnel who under the Belgian administration were charged 108 C.Frs. (\$2.15) for breakfast, lunch and supper were permitted to continue at the same rate by purchasing mess tickets in advance. Civilian personnel were put on an "honour" system to make payment, upon their own declaration, to the finance office for meals taken by them. The charge for the three meals was fixed at \$6. ONUC military personnel were given meals free in lieu of subsistence allowance.

12. From 29 November the above system was changed in order to tighten up administrative and financial control. Under the revised system the military personnel are required to produce two identity cards (one attesting status as an ONUC official and one certifying assignment to Kamina) on entering the mess, and to obtain a meal ticket. Civilian personnel are required to purchase meal tickets. Meals continue to be provided for 108 C.Frs. per day to Belgian military personnel and their families, by purchase of tickets.

13. The administrative and financial control of the messes has left much to be desired. The situation so far has been one of chaos. There has been widespread pilferage of plates, glasses, knives and forks in which Belgian, United Nations and Congolese personnel are stated to have taken part. There is no knowing how many Belgians have passed themselves off as United Nations military personnel and have therefore eaten free of charge prior to the introduction of the new control system. Mess personnel have indulged in direct procurement of food and supplies, bypassing the established channels to meet what they considered situations of emergency. One mess official was recently dismissed for certifying a falsified supply bill.

14. This mismanagement is attributable to failure to introduce an adequate administrative control at the very outset of the take-over and the hasty manner in which international personnel for the messes were recruited. The administrative and financial controls established at the end of November are now as sound as they can be but policy questions concerning the operation of the messes still remain to be dealt with. These questions are discussed further in the following paragraphs.

Policy for messes

15. It can be said that the messes are now operating generally satisfactorily, and that when the two account clerks whose services have been requested arrive, accounting for rations and sales of food and liquor should become more efficient than it now is. There is no reason, however, to leave matters at that and not explore more economical methods of operating the messes. Among these, the following alternatives might be considered:

(a) to let out the operation of the messes on a commercial contract;

(b) to hand over the operation of the mess at Lumwe to the ATU and that at Kalunga to the Irish Battalion and to set up a restaurant on a commercial contract for transient personnel.

16. Should either of the above courses prove feasible, the large expenditure which is now incurred in the payment of salaries of international mess staff would be saved by the United Nations. There should be less pilferage of mess equipment under either of the above alternatives. The Administrator recommends that these possibilities be explored and that a full statement of the financial implications under the present method of operation as well as under the proposed alternative methods should be prepared for further examination.

Wages of Congolese Workers

17. The system of payment of Congolese workers is described in detail in the relevant chapter of this report. The system is somewhat complicated and depends for its operation upon a series of administrative actions originated by administrative staff in the units in which the Congolese workers are employed. Wages and the entitlement to counterpart rations in kind are calculated on the basis of daily statements of

attendance, composition of the family etc. prepared by each unit. This work was performed under the Belgian regime by a body of trained adjutants working with a small Congolese clerical staff. Since the United Nations did not have the necessary French-speaking administrative staff to take over this work, it was agreed with the Belgian authorities that they would compile the wage sheets for October for payment on 10 November. Most of the Belgian adjutants have now been withdrawn and others are ready to leave. The United Nations administrative staff has not yet arrived. The payment for the month of November can therefore only be made on the basis of records prepared by Congolese clerks with little or no supervision, and the accuracy of these records cannot be guaranteed.

18. In past years the Belgian authorities announced promotions of deserving workers on 1 January. General wage increases to all workers have also been made from time to time. The last such increase of 9.50 C.Frs. (19 cents) per day was given on 1 August, following the declaration of independence. In the Administrator's view it will be difficult to avoid the announcement of some promotions for deserving workers at the beginning of next year, as they will have been working with the United Nations for nearly five months and will expect that the United Nations will be more ready to recognize their merit and assist in their advancement than the Belgians were. Unfortunately, again because of the language difficulty, the United Nations military units are not in a position to select the workers who should be promoted. An effort is being made at least to prepare a list of workers in each unit who appear to be promising but as there is not enough time to examine each case before the beginning of

January, and the final recommendations are not expected to be available for at least two months, the Administrator would propose that any promotions which are finally decided upon should be given retroactively from 1 January 1961. The Director of the MOC will be responsible for formulating the recommendations for promotions, which will be formally approved by the Administrator.

Payment for supplies and equipment purchased from the Belgians

19. From the date of United Nations entry up to 15 October, the administration of supplies and equipment at the Base remained in the hands of the Belgians. For this period the Belgians are to be compensated for the maintenance of the United Nations personnel at the Base. It has already been agreed that whereas food and POL supplies made by the Belgians to the United Nations would be paid for according to the actual quantity supplied, the use of other services and supplies would be charged to the United Nations at a mandatory rate calculated on the average cost of maintenance of the Base as a whole and applied to the number of United Nations personnel supported at the Base.

20. Since 15 October supplies and equipment belonging to the Belgian Government at the Base have been drawn by the United Nations while the ground inventories recommended by the Wheeler Mission were in progress. Supplies which have already been used will therefore have to be considered as purchases and are to be paid for. Supplies and stores not yet used are presently under review with a view to ascertaining the estimated future requirements for a short-term period. Stores and equipment which are considered surplus will be surrendered to the Belgians for removal from the Base.

21. Supplies of food are made in accordance with the established ration scales. Ordnance and engineering stores and supplies are not at present governed by any specific United Nations procedure. In some cases the ONUC logistical procedures apply, in others the Belgians' system remains in vogue and in still others, the administrative procedures established by individual units based upon their own national practice are enforced. It is important that a uniform system of control be established as soon as possible for all issues of ordnance and engineering stores, to prevent their use for purposes not strictly necessary for the activities of the United Nations at the Base. Here again the recruitment of administrative officers has been requested in order that a proper system of certification may be established for the issue of stores and supplies from the ordnance and engineering stores depots.

Payment to Belgians for support of United Nations personnel up to 15 October and for their personnel from 15 October onwards

22. The account for the services referred to under paragraph 5 (d) above has recently been rendered by the Belgian Base authorities. It covers the period 30 August - 26 December; the total is just over \$960,000 in respect of the services of Belgian technicians and the United Nations' share of supplies and overheads. The number of Belgian technicians to be paid for has been arrived at by a calculation taking into account the number of United Nations technicians who replaced Belgian personnel and the gradual decline in Belgian strength as their evacuation proceeded. The account is being studied by the Base Administrator and will form the subject of a separate detailed analysis.

Payment for the purchase of equipment and supplies

23. The shortage of supplies in the Quartermaster depot and delays in the meeting of day-to-day needs for other supplies has often made it necessary to make emergency procurements in the town of Kaminaville. The amount of purchases involved has however been small and the practice prevailing in the early days of the take-over of individual units making their own purchases has been controlled and all procurements except those of the Economat for United Nations personnel are now made through the procurement office. The Belgian authorities carried a number of local contracts for supplies of meat, fresh vegetables, fruits and some items of food. These contracts were taken over by the United Nations from 15 October; since all of these expire at the end of December, new ones are at present being negotiated. All local procurement and contractual negotiations are now conducted through the procurement office under the supervision of the Administrator.

Contracts for constructional work

24. The Belgian authorities had awarded fourteen contracts for constructional work on the Base. Work on ten of these was suspended prior to the United Nations take-over, whilst work had not been started on the other four.

25. During his visit to the Base, General Wheeler arranged with the contractors for the resumption of work on the ten projects in progress, and for the start of work on four others, with the object of continuing the employment of some 550 Congolese workers in the contractor's service. Work was resumed on 12 September 1960 and a credit of \$680,000 was requested for the completion of all the contracts.

26. The Base Administrator is having this whole question examined with a view to obtaining the following information on each project: estimated cost of construction up to 30 November; estimated cost of material on site as of 30 November; estimated cost of completion of the project as regards (a) construction and (b) additional materials required; savings to United Nations if construction work is stopped by 1 December or soon thereafter; cost of subsequent penalties payable to the contractors; net savings to the United Nations.

27. Work is at present proceeding on thirteen of the contracts in question (one of them was not resumed). The estimated amount remaining to be paid as at 31 October 1960 totalled \$337,084. The position at the end of November will be reported as soon as possible, but the figures will not be available until the first week of December.

28. It is pointed out that if the contracts were cancelled, a claim would be made against the United Nations for: the value of the work already done since the date the construction works were resumed; materials on site; materials in transit to site; compensation claimed by the contractor and his suppliers; repatriation of Congolese labour; claim for loss of profits, etc.

29. As soon as the figures for November have been received the Base Administrator will examine them with the following considerations in mind: works essential for immediate United Nations purposes will be completed. Contracts for other construction will be studied to see what the net saving to the United Nations would be if the contracts were cancelled and the appropriate penalties paid. In all cases when there would be a significant saving, the contracts will be cancelled.

30. In calculating the cost of this contractual work it will be borne in mind that the United Nations is responsible

only for work done on and after 12 September 1960. Up to 26 November, \$171,000 had been paid out for work under these contracts.

31. A separate detailed report on this matter will be made as soon as the calculations are complete.

Budget for United Nations operations at Kamina Base

32. Now that the initial confusion in the financial operations and the management of the Base is coming to an end it is recommended that steps should be taken as early as possible to formulate a budget for the operation of the Base. It is proposed that the first budget be prepared for a quarterly period beginning January 1961, in two parts. The first part should consist of estimated expenditures required specifically for the operational activities of the United Nations at the Base. The second part should cover estimated expenditures required essentially for the maintenance of the Base in discharge of the responsibility undertaken by the United Nations to this end. The first part of the budget would of course be flexible, to be adjusted in the light of decisions taken regarding the future strength of United Nations military and civilian personnel and the amounts of stores and supplies required for day-to-day operations. It should not include the cost of maintaining any surplus Congolese labour; that cost would fall more properly in the second part of the budget, though it is hoped that in the course of the next two or three months the surplus Congolese labour would be reduced considerably. Except for the cost of maintaining the security forces at the Base both budgets should be based on proper costing. Information should be provided for this purpose on the cost of supplies originating in the general supply depot of ONUC. The budget should be

scrutinized by the administration in Leopoldville and approved by United Nations Headquarters with such controls as may be considered necessary. The preparation of a budget on the lines described above, and the imposition of financial controls, should go a long way towards ensuring that all the financial and administrative operations of the Base run smoothly and economically.

Administration of housing and utilities

33. The administration of housing and utilities is at present carried out in an ad hoc and haphazard manner, or else is non-existent. The following paragraphs contain a brief statement of the problems and suggestions as to how they might be brought under control.

34. Housing. Reference to the chapter on MOC will show that Congolese housing was administered, under the Belgian system, by the MOC service and was decentralized to the units. It continues to be so administered and the considerations set forth below apply primarily to the housing provided by the Belgians for their own personnel in Kalunga and Lumbo.

35. The Base Administrator could not spare time from other duties to attend to the management of housing. This function is at present being performed by the Base Commander personally, though the only staff who could be allotted to him were civilian. (The accommodation of transient personnel - except VIP's - is a matter for Movement Control, a military unit, which has quarters permanently allocated for this purpose).

36. The priority given to housing administration has been very low; in fact some of the staff now engaged on it are among those who for medical or other reasons proved unsuited to the assignments for which they were recruited, and were therefore put into housing allocation and supervision

as a stopgap measure. This may be contrasted with the situation prevailing under the Belgian administration, when housing management was the responsibility of a senior officer with a suitable staff to inspect houses and gardens regularly and thoroughly in order to ensure that the regulations were being observed and the premises kept sanitary and in good repair. With the take-over by the United Nations there is a total vacuum here.

37. The manning tables already prepared for the future operation of the Base by the United Nations contain no provision for a housing management officer, since it cannot be contended that the operation of the Base will break down completely if this post is not filled. However, it is certain that in the absence of any qualified and experienced housing manager, of appropriate seniority, the standard of housing maintenance will fall very far below the mark set by the Belgians.

38. Water Supply. The consumption of water at the Base has gone up considerably. The Congolese are not as careful as they were before in the use of water and allow water taps in their quarters to run wastefully. As a result the United Nations is now spending more money in chemicals for water purification than did the Belgians. The Base Administrator has made an appeal to the workers to check the waste of water, and measures are also being taken to repair leaky pipes and faucets. If these measures do not bring down the rate of consumption to the normal level of about 40 litres per head per day, other steps may have to be taken. For instance it is reckoned that the cost of installing pressure knobs in the Congolese quarters would be recovered in two years through the reduction in the consumption of water and consequent saving in the use of chemicals.

39. Power Supply. The current supply to the villas in Kalunga and Lumwe is metered and it is believed that the Belgians made a charge to tenants. In any case, the presence of these meters indicates the necessity of exercising some control over the consumption of electricity. This would obviously be easy to arrange (Congolese meter readers, accounts office, progressively increasing charges for consumption over a certain level), but it would be necessary first of all to assemble data which would enable the saving of current obtained by tighter control to be balanced against any expenditure incurred in establishing such control. The matter is mentioned here as an example of the kind of case in which the Base administration will have to decide what measure of control it wishes to exercise, and then establish the necessary arrangements.

40. Hygiene and Sanitation. Warning has recently been received from the Commandant of the Hygiene Service that gardens are becoming overgrown, so that garbage (and particularly, empty cans) thrown there cannot be seen. These collect stagnant water and harbour vectors of yellow fever, an outbreak of which in the vicinity of an airfield would have serious consequences.

41. It must be admitted that the standards of hygiene and maintenance of gardens have declined sharply with the departure of the Belgians, the reason being that staff are not available to carry out the stringent control and inspection which the Belgians used to enforce. When the last of the Belgian officials who supervise this service have left, it is likely to cease operating entirely, and the possibility of outbreaks of epidemic disease will greatly increase. It is clearly a problem for the Base administration to devise measures for enforcing proper standards of hygiene and sanitation.

Problems of the administration of utilities

42. The great difference between the Belgian and United Nations officials responsible for administrative and technical services is that the former were members of a unified and homogeneous body with established lines of responsibility while the latter are a collection of officers from a number of different arms of the service, in different countries, assembled in a rather loose grouping. The systems which the majority of the operational units understand and apply are, broadly speaking, those prevailing in the British Commonwealth, and it is difficult to marry them effectively to the Belgian system which the United Nations has to operate unless and until it can develop its own unified system. For example, concepts such as Ordnance and its functions are not co-terminous in the Belgian and Commonwealth systems, with the result that matters which were the responsibility of a single service under the Belgian administration may be divided between two services of the United Nations administration, with all the undesirable consequences which that entails (e.g. workers being paid partly by one unit and partly by another).

43. Furthermore, the Belgians used to arrange matters so that there was an overlap of at least three months between the arrival of one specialist and the departure of the man he was relieving. Most United Nations technicians have not had anything like that margin of time to familiarize themselves with their duties, but have to play themselves in as best they can, and that creates quite unnecessary problems of administration.

44. It is therefore desirable that the entire organization of the United Nations operations at Kamina should be

revised; organizational tables should be prepared, duties and functions defined, labour re-allocated and so on.

45. This is a task which will require a great deal of careful thought and skilled assistance, but until it has been carried out, the United Nations administration of the Base will inevitably be less efficient than that of the Belgians.

United Nations responsibility for maintenance of the Base

46. Reference has been made above to a number of ways in which the United Nations has incurred or may in future incur, financial or administrative responsibilities by taking over Kamina Base from the Belgian Government and operating it for its own purposes. One matter remains to be discussed, and that is the responsibility for maintaining the site of the Base and the buildings and installations thereon. It is clear that, whatever might be the extent to which the United Nations could reduce its operations on the Base, the necessity for preserving the site and installations against abnormal deterioration, other than that occurring through efflux of time, would remain undiminished.

47. The kind of work which the Base Administrator has in mind is that necessary to preserve buildings, roads, runways, the power station, the water purification plant, and so on. The expenditure would be mainly for such items as paint, road and building materials, chemicals for water purification and wood conservation, electrical materials for power generation and distribution, and so on.

48. The letter of 2 September 1960 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Belgium contains certain indications that, in the mind of the Belgian Government at least, a United Nations responsibility for the Bases of Kitona and Kamina is deemed to exist. Thus, the

letter states that "the United Nations has not the right to transfer the lands or to make significant alterations to the installations"^{1/}; it also states that "the Belgian Government notes that the United Nations, in its administration of the bases, will be guided by the general principles of civil law relating to the provisional administration of affairs on behalf of another party"^{1/}; the letter finally states that "[the Belgian Government] understands that expenditure (prestations) for the maintenance of the bases are chargeable to Belgium and expenditure (prestations) for supplies to the United Nations will be paid by the latter."^{1/}

49. It is the Base Administrator's view that the broad general responsibility implied by the above statements should be elaborated, and an understanding reached as to the scale and schedule of the maintenance work to be done.

50. The Belgian Base authorities have proposed that a group of United Nations and Belgian technicians should be formed to prepare a detailed schedule of maintenance work on all Base installations. In the Base Administrator's view this is hardly necessary, since the Base possesses no installations the maintenance of which (using the word in the strictest sense) would require any special technical competence beyond that of the usual engineering services.

51. Although it would probably not be necessary to make any formal agreement, it is the Base Administrator's view that discussions should be held, preferably in New York, in order to reach an understanding on the scale of maintenance work. Once established, such a schedule could be put into practice and would not require the presence on the Base of any Belgian technicians to ensure its observance.

^{1/}unofficial translation

52. It should perhaps be made clear, in conclusion, that what the Base Administrator has in mind is essential maintenance, in the strictest sense of the term. It would not include anything which could be classified as improvements, nor any constructional work except what might be required to prevent further abrupt and dangerous deterioration.

EVACUATION OF BELGIAN PERSONNEL

1. The Belgian Paratroop Battalion stationed at Kamina departed by train for Albertville on 1 September. The Belgian Guards, about 120 in number, followed soon thereafter.

2. By 12 September there remained 866 Belgian military officers at Kamina; 127 were evacuated on 26 September leaving a total of 739.

3. On 25 September the Secretary-General addressed a memorandum to the Special Representative in Leopoldville in which he stated that the evacuation of Belgian personnel "must not suffer any delay" and said that subject to the availability of United Nations personnel needed to replace the essential Belgian personnel at the Base, he aimed at the "completion of Belgian withdrawal by 15 November."

4. Colonel Willems of the Belgian Ministry of National Defence, who had come to Kamina as a member of the Belgian negotiating team and had stayed on to assist in the winding up of Belgian affairs, announced on 29 September his intention of proceeding with a rapid scaling down of Belgian personnel at the Base for two reasons: (a) the Secretary-General's note verbale of 19 September to the Belgian Government stressing the importance of rapid Belgian withdrawal and (b) lack of information as to the number of Belgian technicians needed by the United Nations for its operations.

5. On 6 October the Belgian authorities at the Base submitted to the United Nations Base Commander the following plan of evacuation:

Before 15 October	269
Between 15 Oct. and 15 Nov.	<u>434</u>
	703
To depart by 1 Dec.	<u>36</u>
	<u>739</u>

The United Nations Base Commander sent a cable on 9 October to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Leopoldville stating that as qualified United Nations technicians were not arriving "in sufficient numbers" he considered it necessary to retain about 195 Belgian technicians until they had been replaced "man by man". He suggested a rearrangement of the Belgian plan of evacuation for this purpose.

6. On 12 October the Base Commander submitted to the Special Representative five lists containing the names of 252 Belgian military technicians of whom 13 were proposed to be retained indefinitely as advisers and the balance until they were replaced by United Nations personnel.

7. The above lists were further reviewed by the new Base Commander, Col. V. P. Roy, who advised General Rikhye in his memo dated 15 October 1960 that the number of Belgian technicians to be retained "for a limited time or until replacement" could be reduced from 252 to 211.

8. The first task to which the Base Administrator devoted himself, upon his arrival at Kamina on 22 October, was to start, in consultation with the Base Commander and his military staff, a rigorous scrutiny of the list of 211 Belgian personnel who were then proposed to be retained until replacements were provided. This review was completed on 27 October and on the same date a series of lists were handed over to the Belgian authorities at the Base representing the United Nations plan for the evacuation of Belgian personnel. The plan envisaged the retention of 97 Belgian officials (which number was subsequently reduced to 96 through the departure in the meantime of one official) who were proposed to be retained by the United Nations. They fell under the following categories:

- 25 - staff of Kamina Military Hospital
- 3 - staff of Public Health Service
- 6 - staff of Congolese Labour Office (MOC)
- 3 - social welfare personnel
- 11 - engineering staff supervising current civil construction work at the Base as authorized by the United Nations.
- 22 - aircraft maintenance technicians required by ONUC Air Commodore
- 4 - teaching staff at Technical Training School
- 5 - transport supply technicians
- 1 - telecommunications engineer
- 16 - engineers and mechanics, mainly for maintaining Base utilities

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9. The Belgian authorities at the Base saw no difficulty in complying with the above plan. They found that the list of 315 officials whose services were not required by the United Nations fitted perfectly with the travel plans they had already made on their behalf. They also stated that they would make a further review of the list of officials temporarily required for winding up their affairs at the Base and considered that the number of such officials could possibly be reduced from 14 to 6.

10. On the question of retaining the 96 officials at the Base, the Belgian authorities indicated that in accordance with their instructions from Brussels, they could only retain these officials on a voluntary basis and had no authority to order them to continue to work under the United Nations administration. However, Col. van Lierde, the Belgian ex-Base Commander, recognized that some fifty per cent of the personnel included in the United Nations list were engaged in essential services such as medical duties and water and power supply; he agreed to consult with Brussels to ascertain whether the retention of such personnel could be dealt with

under the official regulations of the Belgian army. Pending clarification of this matter, it was learnt that sixteen Belgian officials included in the United Nations list of retainees had already completed their travel plans which could not be changed because of the late notice given to them.

11. The Special Representative in Leopoldville was kept informed of the withdrawal negotiations with the Belgian authorities. On 29 October, the Administrator submitted to him a list containing the names and functions of the 96 Belgian officials to enable suitable replacement to be sought. Apart from the political necessity of obtaining a rapid withdrawal of Belgian personnel from Kamina, the Administrator had the following additional considerations in mind in requesting urgent action on the recruitment of United Nations personnel for replacements:

(a) there was no guarantee that the Belgian personnel proposed to be retained by the United Nations would in fact be willing to extend their stay, or, if ordered by the Belgian Government to do so, would maintain their full usefulness to the United Nations;

(b) there was also no guarantee that the activities of the Belgian personnel, conditioned as they were to the attitudes and systems of the Belgian military administration, would not in fact distort the image of the United Nations in the eyes of the Congolese workers and thus create difficulties for the United Nations in operating the Base.

12. On 31 October the Belgian authorities advised that out of 432 Belgian personnel at the Base on that date, 315 would be evacuated by the end of November. It was also indicated that a further group of 41 Belgian officials would leave by 24 December leaving a total of 76 officials at the Base after that date. No comment was made by the Administrator on this plan since no details as to names of personnel had

been provided and it was not known how many of the 76 remaining at the Base after 24 December were included in the list of 97 Belgian officials whose retention had been requested in support of United Nations activities.

13. Colonel van Lierde returned from Brussels on 9 November and in a meeting with the Administrator on the following day stated that the Government of Belgium was willing to permit the 97 officials whose services were requested by the United Nations to continue to stay at Kamina under their existing terms with the Belgian army until 31 December 1960. He also stated that if the United Nations wished to retain any of this personnel beyond that date it would have to negotiate contracts with the individuals concerned through the Belgian Government.

14. On 16 November Colonel van Lierde gave the Administrator a list showing the dates of departure of a number of Belgian officials. This list included 29 officials whose retention had been requested by the United Nations. Five of them had in fact already left or were on the point of departure. Colonel van Lierde explained to the Administrator that the passages of the 29 officials had been booked before the United Nations had indicated its definite requirements and that the arrangements could be cancelled only if the United Nations undertook to bear the financial responsibility for any penalties or compensation claims which might result. It was also indicated that in some cases the persons concerned were not willing to stay in Kamina in the service of the United Nations in view of the comments made in the Second Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General concerning the return of Belgian experts and technicians to the Congo.

15. In the meantime experience with the services of the Belgians at the Base had shown that with the exception of some devoted professional officers the others had shown only a marginal interest in serving the purposes of the United Nations. These latter were nevertheless essential for, attending to some of the vital activities at the Base and when their complete absence was weighed against their presence the balance of the advantage was still considered to lie in favour of their retention. However, it was considered inadvisable to attempt to invoke the authority of the Belgian military command to hold up the withdrawal of those Belgian officers whose travel plans had already been completed and it was hoped that by expediting the process of recruitment, replacements for such personnel could be obtained in time to prevent a breakdown of the essential services.

16. Complete details of the 76 Belgian officers whose travel plans had not yet been made were provided by the Belgian authorities on 19 November. These showed the following position:

- 66 - retained at the request of the United Nations until replacements were obtained;
 - 9 - retained until 31 December to wind up Belgian affairs at the Base; and
 - 1 - temporarily retained for United Nations work.
- 76 Total

17. On the same date the Administrator submitted to the Special Representative a list showing the dates of departure of those Belgian officers whose names were included in the original list of 97. The Administrator requested that the recruitment of the replacements should be arranged in such a way that United Nations personnel could take over the functions on or about the date of departure of Belgian personnel.

18. Note should be taken of the fact that the Belgian Government is not willing to allow its personnel to serve with the United Nations after 31 December under their existing terms with the Belgian Army, so that the United Nations would have to negotiate direct contracts with all Belgian personnel retained at the Base after that date. In his correspondence with the Special Representative the Administrator has urged that every effort be made by the Office of Personnel of the United Nations to recruit replacements so as to avoid the necessity of retaining any Belgian personnel beyond 31 December. On 1 December the Base Administrator gave formal notice to the Belgian authorities that none of their personnel would be retained in the service of the United Nations after 31 December 1960, with the exception of six officers engaged in the supervision of constructional work being done under contract. The Base Administrator is studying the possibility of cancelling these contracts. Even if this should prove feasible in all cases, the one month's notice of evacuation which has been agreed upon would carry these officers beyond 31 December, though of course they might be persuaded to accept financial compensation in lieu of notice.

REPORTS OF THE WHEELER AND PLAZA MISSIONS

1. The Wheeler Mission arrived at Kamina in the first days of the United Nations entry on to the Base. Its task was to estimate what United Nations requirements of stores, supplies and equipment would be for operating the Base in connexion with the purposes which the Organization had in mind in establishing its presence there. The Mission's terms of reference were set out by General Wheeler in his report as follows:

(a) the Mission would negotiate for the purchase of materials, equipment and supplies available at Kamina Base on behalf of the United Nations;

(b) the Mission would have no authority to negotiate on any other aspect of the take-over;

(c) real property (lands, buildings and fixtures) would not be included in the negotiations;

(d) the Mission would have no plenipotentiary powers and would submit its recommendations with regard to purchases to the Secretary-General, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, ONUC, for decision;

(e) the terms and currency of payment would be determined directly by negotiations between the Belgian Government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. The magnitude of the task involved, and the short time in which it had to be completed, prevented the Mission from going thoroughly into details of the stores available, or from examining the United Nations' requirements critically; consequently the Mission was led into making decisions on quantities in the light of general considerations only. Unfortunately, the Belgians received the impression

. . .

that, although the Mission was not actually buying the stores in question, there were solid grounds for believing that no significant change would be made in the schedules of equipment for purchase. The fact that the negotiations included discussion of prices as well as quantities strengthened this impression; in many instances the prices themselves were the subject of negotiation, and to that extent the Mission could be said to have exceeded its terms of reference. There were cases in which the Belgians offered discount prices as an inducement for the United Nations to purchase equipment surplus to Belgian requirements, and in other cases, contingent offers seem to have been made.

3. The number of items in the Wheeler report is 68,000, so that inventorying and checking all of them within the 45-day period agreed for the completion of this task required specialist staff which were not at the disposal of the United Nations. The task had therefore to be undertaken by military personnel already busy with other problems connected with the take-over, and the inventory was not started until the Base Administrator arrived at Kamina on 22 October. Personal checks have shown that the inventory was taken as carefully as was possible in the circumstances, though the language difficulty precluded many of the military staff from understanding Belgian stock records or using the services of Congolese workers to assist them in their task.

4. Even while the inventory was proceeding, the Base Administrator gained the impression more and more that his initial judgement that Kamina was unsuitable as a training centre was correct, and that consequently the quantities recommended for purchase by the Wheeler Mission were excessive. He accordingly took every opportunity of

emphasizing to the Belgians that the recommendations of the Wheeler Mission in no way constituted an offer to purchase.

5. The Secretary-General's instruction of 19 November to the effect that owing to acute paucity of funds, operations on the Base must be reduced to the barest possible minimum and regarded as a short-term project, called for a review of the Wheeler recommendations. In connexion with this review, the following questions of procedure arose:

(a) since requirements over any period, whether short or long, can only be judged in relation to the strength of the United Nations establishment to be maintained on the Base, the Administrator inquired how long the present strength of 1,100 would be maintained, having already indicated his view that if some military personnel were relieved by civilian specialists, the military strength could be reduced by about 150. The Base Administrator proceeded on the assumption that operations in Kalunga would be civilianized and military personnel thereby relieved;

(b) a decision had to be reached regarding the retention of equipment such as that in the carpentry and machine shops which, though of only marginal value to United Nations operations on the Base, would be of great value in giving in-service training to Congolese workers. The view of the Belgian authorities in regard to these and similar workshops is that if the United Nations does not purchase the equipment, they would prefer to close the shops entirely and brick them up rather than dismantle and remove the machinery at the present time. The Base Administrator's view is that the equipment should be kept in operation, and that the United Nations might offer to pay a rental to cover depreciation, so that the equipment could be used for training at least some Congolese, thereby making a United Nations contribution to the future economy of the Republic of the Congo.

6. The following procedure has been adopted in reviewing the recommendations of the Wheeler Mission for purchases of stores and equipment. Equipment and stores not required at all for United Nations activities will be eliminated from the Wheeler schedule; requirements of other stores and equipment will be estimated with a six-month to one-year period in mind; in the case of spare parts, particularly for vehicles, every effort will be made to ensure that vehicles retained are of as few makes as possible, so that larger quantities of spare parts can be rejected. Separate lists will be prepared of equipment not strictly required for the United Nations' military operations but essential for maintaining the buildings and installations on the Base.

7. The work of re-assessing United Nations requirements along the above lines is proceeding. The Base Administrator has agreed with the Belgians that he will hand over to them, as they are prepared, lists of items now declared surplus to United Nations requirements, so that arrangements for packing and shipment can be made without delay. It has been considered advisable to proceed in this way rather than to await the completion of the entire survey, which will take several weeks. That would make it necessary for the Belgians (as they have already indicated) to retain an unspecified number of their military personnel at the Base for an indefinite period. The Base administrator has notified the Belgian ex-Base Commander that this reassessment should not affect the withdrawal plans and that every possible facility would be afforded to the Belgians for removing surplus equipment.

8. The negotiations with the Belgians with a view to concluding an agreement on quantities and prices may be protracted. It is virtually certain that discussion will be reopened on the prices stated in the Wheeler report in all cases in which the Belgians had offered discounts as an inducement for the purchase of larger quantities, or where an overall price had been proposed for lots consisting of new and used items together. Even prior to the receipt of the Secretary-General's instruction, preliminary discussions had been held between the Base Administrator and the Belgian authorities to ascertain what their reaction would be if the United Nations declared its intention of making substantial reductions in the items and quantities listed in the Wheeler report. They indicated that they would go over the entire list again, with the following considerations in mind:

(a) that since the prices had originally been proposed, the United Nations had had use out of some items, e.g. vehicles;

(b) that some prices had been assessed on a bulk basis taking the average condition of the articles into account;

(c) that they had procured in Europe, at additional expense, some articles available at Kamina and needed for Ruanda-Urundi.

9. The validity of some of the above contentions is open to doubt; for example, there seems no reason why the United Nations should compensate the Belgian Government in respect of item (c) above, since the Belgian authorities here appear to have proceeded on an assumption rather than a contract. However, discussions with the Belgian representatives on the Base have brought out the fact that in the case of vehicles, they are not prepared to take back any which has

suffered damage in United Nations service or is out of action owing to lack of spare parts or repair facilities.

10. Negotiations with the Belgians regarding these purchases will thus touch upon the above points, and the whole question of prices will have to be gone into again in great detail. These negotiations will therefore have to be conducted by a very senior United Nations civilian officer. It is recommended in addition that the Chief Administrative Officer, Mr. Bloch, who is due to leave at the end of December, should be retained at Kamina until the negotiations are completed.

11. The report of the Plaza Mission calls for no comment. The report recommended development of the Base as a national civilian training centre, but it is the Base Administrator's view, since confirmed by the Secretary-General's instruction, that the recommendation is unsound, and need not therefore be pursued further.