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FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

14 July 1967

PRESS BRIEFING BY AGHA SHAHI (PAKISTAN)

Agha Shahi, Permanent Representative of Pakistan, stated at a press briefing this afternoon that the sponsors of the draft resolution on the question of the status of the City of Jerusalem had decided to drop paragraph four from the original draft because some of the major Powers did not have sufficient time to agree on the changes to the paragraph which had been proposed.

There had been a general consensus, he stated, that there should be a vote on the draft resolution this afternoon. In fact, yesterday, his delegation had made no secret of the desire of the sponsors to come to a vote today.

Mr. Shahi stated that the adoption of the resolution this afternoon did not preclude the passage of another resolution, at any time, calling for Security Council action. He denied that the timing of the voting had in any way been affected by the negotiations taking place between Israel and the Vatican on the question of the holy places and institutions in Jerusalem.

Mr. Shahi stated, in reply to a question, that the United Nations was trying its best to promote fruitful results and had not yet abandoned hope.

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Sq Following was given out by UAR Press officer after Mr El-Zayyat met
the Press.
Beawan
Written statement UAR

J
25/8

"We are content to begin these discussions with ambassador Jarring as the special representative of Secretary General U Thant.

Having these discussions in the United Nations will be a constant reminder to us of the UN Charter and its provisions.

The 25th anniversary of the United Nations is approaching and the world will evaluate its success or failure, that is the success or failure of man's latest endeavor to live by peace and not by violence.

This anniversary has as its motto three words: peace, justice and progress. I hope that these words will prove to be attainable goals.

If peace is a good thing, then it has its price. And in our earnest search for peace, we are willing to pay that price. As far as the situation which we are confronting today is concerned, I believe that peace in the Middle East and its price were clearly defined by the Security Council on Nov. 22, 1967.

25/8

Mr. Tekoah's Briefing After Second Meeting with Mr. Jarring

25 August 1970

Mr. Tekoah (Israel) met with the Press and television crews outside the Secretariat building. These notes are complete.

In an opening statement, he said he wished to emphasize that the objective of the discussions was the attainment of an agreement on a lasting and just peace in the Middle East between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan. Israel was prepared to make every possible effort to achieve such peace agreements which would finally bring peace to the Middle East. He hoped the Arabs had the same determination for peace. One of the best ways for the Arabs to show their sincerity and desire for peace was to terminate their violations of the cease-fire.

Asked about the talks today, he said he hoped they could be speedily continued and he would be in immediate contact with Mr. Jarring on his return from Jerusalem. Asked when he would be back, he said the moment his consultations were over. He was asked who would sit in the talks while he was away and he said the talks will continue with Mr. Eban as Israel's representative and with himself as the alternate. Asked if that meant Mr. Eban was coming here while he was away, Mr. Tekoah said he did not know of any such plans.

A correspondent asked if it was not unusual for him to go to Israel for consultations just as the talks began. He said if the talks were serious ~~they~~ ^{there} should be welcome for the opportunity for the Israeli delegate to consult his Government. The Arab delegates had had such an opportunity to consult their Governments. This was his first chance. He hoped to be back soon.

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Reps Jarring 25/8/70
Preparing
Mr. El-Zayaat's Meeting with the Press after Meeting Mr. Jarring

25 August 1970

Mr. El-Zayaat (UAR) met with the Press and television crews outside the Secretariat building. He held an interview in English and then in French. These notes are complete for the English part.

Mr. El-Zayaat expressed pleasure that talks had begun with Mr. Jarring. He hoped the talks would be a constant reminder about the Charter of the United Nations and all its provisions.

Asked when he would be back to see Mr. Jarring, he said whenever he called him. He had given Mr. Jarring his home telephone number and told him he was available 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Asked if he was optimistic, he said he was always optimistic.

Mr. El-Zayaat was asked if new ground had been covered today, and he said he had been speaking to Mr. Jarring about the subject of the Jarring Mission, which was the implementation of resolution 242. Asked what his country's position was, he said it had been stated in the past but as far as the talks are concerned with Mr. Jarring all conversations and discussions had to be kept confidential by all the parties.

He was asked if an agreement was possible before the end of the cease-fire or whether ~~the~~ he thought the cease-fire would have to be extended. He said people who could make war in six days should be able to reach a settlement in 90 days.

He was asked if his country would vary its position at all from resolution 242, and he replied that when one was a Member of the United Nations, one was obliged to carry *a* out its decisions. It was not possible to vary resolution 242 and "we will not".

Asked if Mr. Tekoah would see Mr. Jarring tomorrow, he said the question was sent to the wrong address. Asked how the ~~talks~~ talks would continue *if*

here

- 2 -
Mr. Tekoah was in Israel, he said he was hardly a confidante of Mr. Tekoah and it could not be expected that Mr. Tekoah would tell him his plans.

Asked if Mr. Jarring had told him Israel's position, he said the conversations must stay confidential.

He was asked if he expected his Foreign Minister to come to the General Assembly. He said it had been announced in Cairo that his Foreign Minister would head the delegation to the General Assembly. Asked when Mr. ~~Rad~~^{Riad} would come, he said he would be informed by cable but he certainly expected him here for the beginning of the Assembly. He said the coming of his Foreign Minister should not mean that he, Mr. El-Zayaat, was designated as a stop-gap. He was not a stop-gap. He said that under the so-called United States initiative and the Secretary-General's note to the Security Council a request had been made for countries to designate people who could get down to work right now. He said his name had been submitted in this light. He was sorry if he was a disappointment. There was a lot of talk about upgrading and downgrading the talks and he resented this. (These remarks were made with a broad smile and he ended up laughing.)

Asked when he would see Mr. Jarring again, he said Mr. Jarring would call him.

To a question on whether the position of the commandoes would jeopardize a settlement, Mr. El-Zayaat said that a settlement would come, if ever, on the basis of resolution 242. That resolution contained some reference to the plight of the Palestinians who were now a nation of refugees.

A correspondent said that Mr. Tekoah ~~4~~ had said he would be more hopeful if there were not repeated violations of the cease-fire by the UAR. Mr. El-Zayaat said the first violation reported was one accusing Israel about three hours after the cease-fire went into effect. He said this had not been put into the press by the UAR. He said if one wanted to sail in one direction one should not row in the opposite direction. If one was trying to be constructive one should not make destructive statements.

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(59)

Interview 25/8
Interview by Dr. Jarring
Interviewed: Sharaf

MR. SHARAF'S MEETING WITH THE PRESS AFTER MEETING

MR. JARRING

Ralph
25 August 1970

Mr. Sharaf (Jordan) met correspondents and television crews outside the Secretariat building and also outside the delegates' lounge after meeting with Mr. Jarring. These notes are based on a tape recording of the interview outside the building and the notes of correspondents by the delegates' lounge. They are complete.

Mr. Sharaf said he had met Mr. Jarring at Mr. Jarring's request and had had a fruitful initial meeting. The other meetings and arrangements for them were left to Mr. Jarring.

As to the subject ^f of the talks, he said the subject was obviously in connexion with the implementation of resolution 242.

He was asked if he would describe the discussion today as procedural or whether they had got down to hammering out the issues. He said he would describe the meeting as "preliminary".

He was asked if he had made any recommendation and he said Jordan's position was clear to Mr. Jarring. Jordan would be presenting it again to Mr. Jarring concretely. Asked what was Jordan's position, he said the specific issues should remain in confidence with Mr. Jarring. However Jordan's general position was for full Israeli withdraw from all occupied Arab territory and the just solution to the problem of the Palestine Arabs in accordance with resolution 242.

Asked if the ^{talk} talks were off to a good start, he said seeing Mr. Jarring was always a good start.

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NOTES ON MR. TEKOAH'S BRIEFING FOR ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS
AFTER MEETING WITH MR. JARRING

25 August 1970

Following his general press briefing Mr. Tekoah (Israel) went to the delegates lounge and met with Israeli correspondents for 15 minutes. The briefing was attributable to Israeli sources. It took place in Hebrew. The following based on the notes of one of the participants. It may not be complete.

Mr. Tekoah said his meeting with Mr. Jarring had taken place for 50 minutes. Mr. Berenson had taken notes for Mr. Jarring and Mr. Apeh had taken notes for Mr. Tekoah.

The main purpose of the meeting had been to find out if the Arabs were ready for a true peace. If they were ready then all the many problems accumulated over 22 years could be solved. However they had to prove they were serious and the Israelis will also have to prove they were serious to the Arabs.

Mr. Tekoah said Mr. Jarring's attitude was quite unusual from previous meetings and his language was a little different. There was an air of expectancy in his attitude. For example photographers were allowed in and Mr. Jarring had called out that he ~~me~~ and Mr. Tekoah were apparently going into history now.

It seemed to Mr. Tekoah that U Thant had convinced Mr. Jarring to have his press conference yesterday because the UN needed a boost.

Mr. Tekoah said he had talked about various things including the seriousness of the cease fire violations and he had given complete details of the true Israeli position regarding the talks with Mr. Jarring.

Mr. Tekoah said he did not expect the Arabs to react immediately. He expected a long drawn out process in which Israel would have to be as strong as the soldiers on the battlefield and as flexible as their mothers who prayed for them.

Mr. Tekoah said there were a lot of differences in terminology and these had to be watched. The Russians spoke about a political ~~xxx~~ settlement. The Arabs spoke about a peace settlement. Israel talked about a peace agreement. Israel's interpretation of a peace agreement was that implementation of resolution 242 did not necessarily mean a peace agreement and implementation of 242 alone was not what Israel wanted.

Mr. Tekoah said there had been no discussion today about representation at Foreign Minister level.

He said he was going back to Jerusalem for consultations regarding the Jarring talks and the forthcoming General Assembly. He would be away a minimum of two days and a maximum of a week.

(The gist of this background briefing appears to ~~the~~ be ~~the~~ being made available to friendly non-Israeli correspondents.)

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Handwritten: 25/8
Ralph

Account of...
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MR. TEKOAH'S MEETING WITH THE PRESS
AFTER HIS FIRST MEETING WITH MR. JARRING,
25 AUGUST 1970

Mr. Tekoah (Israel) met with correspondents in the Secretariat lobby then at the door and finally before television cameras in front of the Secretariat building. He said substantially the same to all three groups. These notes are largely based on the tape recording of one of the correspondents and the notes of a couple of other correspondents. They may not be complete, but certainly cover most of the ground.

Mr. Tekoah said he had informed Mr. Jarring of the basic principles of Israel's position on the question of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The object of the present discussions was the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and ~~Israel~~ Jordan. What was required was a final definitive end of the conflict which had ~~plagued~~ ^{plagued} the Middle East for 22 years by way of peace agreements with the Arab Governments. Israel was ready to co-operate with Mr. Jarring for the speedy attainment of those peace agreements. All realized that peace agreements terminating 22 years of conflict required the solution of many difficult problems. However, if the Arab Governments proved desirous to establish genuine peace agreements Israel was confident that these would be possible.

Asked if he ~~planned~~ ^{planned} to return to Jerusalem for consultations, he said he would be returning, probably this evening. Asked if he would meet Mr. Jarring again before leaving, he said later on this afternoon. Asked how long he would be away, he said only long enough for the consultations and talks needed to continue the talks with Mr. Jarring effectively.

He was asked if there was any agenda or framework for the talks or if Mr. Jarring had put forward any ideas of his own and he replied that he would not go beyond what he had said. Asked if he regarded the talks as procedural or substantive, he said the opening meeting had been held of the discussions with Mr. Jarring and he would not categorize content ~~of~~ ^{of} subjects.

To a question on whether he regarded the talk today as a good opening, he said he hoped so but he would feel better if it were not for the news of continued very grave violations of the cease fire by Egypt.

Jarr
26/8/70

COMMENTS BY ARAB DELEGATIONS AFTER SEEING MR. JARRING

Amb. Jarring

26 August 1970

Mr. Sharif (Jordan) merely said that he had seen Mr. Jarring briefly before he returned to Washington. Mr. Sharif said the meeting had been at his own request.

Mr. El-Zaayat (UAR) met correspondents outside the Secretariat building. The only T.V. team was NBC which is expected to carry the interview at least in part on its 7 p.m. news today.

Mr. El-Zaayat was angry, all correspondents agree.

The background appears to be that this morning Israeli sources, who wished to be referred to only as "informed sources", contacted Reuters to say that Israel had asked Mr. Jarring to start his talks by having the Arabs show their good intentions by dealing with the questions of exchanges of prisoners and the ending of violations of the cease-fire. According to these sources, Mr. Jarring had said that these matters were not within his mandate and Mr. Tekoah was said to have replied how else could ~~it~~^{they} be dealt with if ~~it~~ not within Mr. Jarring's mandate. Reuters, apparently, contacted the UAR Mission for comment before putting this story on the wire. Subsequently Egyptian sources have been saying that the matters reported to have been raised by Mr. Tekoah were not discussed by Mr. Jarring with them.

On leaving the building, Mr. El-Zaayat was asked if he was surprised by Mr. Tekoah's departure. He replied that he had ceased to be surprised about anything that happened. He was asked if was happy about the prospects for the talks now that Mr. Tekoah had left. He said it was not important whether he was happy or unhappy. He did not ask correspondents about their happiness. He would be happy to see something to show that the other party was serious. If that party did not take the talks seriously then he would be very unhappy. He was asked if the departure of Mr. Tekoah indicated that Israel was not taking the talks seriously. He told correspondents to draw their own conclusions.

Asked if Mr. Tekoah's departure obstructed the chances of the talks, Mr. El-Zaayat said the chances of success would be ^{diminished} ~~diminished~~ if Pseudo-News was leaked to the Press. He said Mr. Jarring had informed him that he worked within the framework of resolution 242 and was also bound by the language of the US Government's proposal in the letter to the Security Council. That was the only framework in which Mr. Jarring was working and the only framework in which Mr. ~~Jarring~~ El-Zaayat could work with Mr. Jarring.

He was asked what was the Pseudo-News he referred to. A correspondent mentioned the name Reuters. He said that was an example. He said Mr. Jarring had a very heavy schedule and a complicated mission which was outlined in resolution 242 and the letter to the Security Council. He said Mr. Jarring had confirmed that he did not want to take any more business on himself, that he would not take instructions from anyone but would rely only on instructions from the Security Council relayed to the Secretary-General.

He was asked if Israeli ~~is~~ complaints about violations of the cease-fire could be regarded as Pseudo-News and he said the cease-fire continued and its applicability was in the language of the United States letter which had gone to the Security Council.

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FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

2 February 1971

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC PRESS BRIEFING

Mahmoud Amr, United Arab Republic Press Officer, read out the following statement on behalf of Mr. El-Zayaat:

"We shall refer the text of the Secretary-General's report and the appeal to Cairo. I am sure it will be one of the elements under consideration. Our aide memoire, which will be circulated as a Security Council document, shows that we see that Israel is, by its attitude, blocking the implementation of the Security Council resolution and therefore blocking progress. It is hard to see as of now reasons for optimism. Our aide memoire shows at the same time that we stress the responsibility of the United Nations, of its Security Council, of its permanent members, and indeed of all members of the United Nations General Assembly, vis-a-vis this problem of achieving peace. Peace cannot be reconciled with military occupation -- this must be totally removed. Its continuation, without even the explicit promise of its removal is a negation of peace. We refer to our aide memoire and its annex to show our will, indeed our desire, for peace. We beg you to refer to it. It will answer all your questions."

There was one question -- was this a reply to the Secretary-General. Mr. Amr said "I leave that to your judgement".

* *** *

1 September 1971

PRESS CONFERENCE BY ISRAELI MISSION

Mr. Tekoah (Israel) said he had just delivered to the Secretary-General the most dramatic document he had ever submitted to U Thant regarding Soviet Jews. (Copies were distributed to the press). In part, the document, signed by 531 Jews from Georgia, asked the Secretary-General to put an item on the agenda of the General Assembly relating to the situation of Soviet Jews who wish to go to Israel. Mr. Tekoah said he had submitted the document to the Secretary-General in the hope that the Soviet Union would heed the plea of so many Soviet Jews to leave the Soviet Union.

In reply to questions, Mr. Tekoah said he did not expect Israel to submit a particular item on the matter, given the parliamentary position in which Israel found itself in the Assembly, but would, as in the past, raise the question wherever possible in the Assembly and its subsidiary bodies.

Asked what the Secretary-General had said he would do regarding the communication, Mr. Tekoah said he could not speak for the Secretary-General. Correspondents had the daily opportunity to inquire into the views of the Secretary-General. He knew that the Secretary-General was concerned with the problem, as he was concerned with any human rights issue in the world.

Asked if he had replied to the Secretary-General's aide-mémoire on the Gaza Strip, Mr. Tekoah said the Gaza question had been discussed here in New York and by the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem with UNRWA officials. He said there had been continuous contact on this matter.

Regarding a possible Security Council meeting on Jerusalem, Mr. Tekoah said that, if a complaint was submitted by Jordan, it was generally known that this would be an attempt to divert attention from Jordan's internal problems. Any complaint would be a complaint against the tranquility and development of Jerusalem and the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs in the city, which was a ray of hope for peace and co-operation in the whole area.

Regarding any wider debate on the Middle East, he said the only option for peace in the Middle East was diplomatic efforts. One-sided resolutions could only be harmful and might block efforts for a peaceful solution.

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Press Briefing by Dr. Ralph Bunche
held on Saturday 20 May 1967

Mr. BUNCHE: That I consented to give this briefing can be said, I suppose, to be a measure of the seriousness of the situation in the Near East, because I do not have to tell you that I do not enjoy this.

I have very little to say, and I want to try to help you by attempting to answer any questions you have. This is a very complicated matter and there is obviously a great deal of misunderstanding, honest and innocent misunderstanding, about it. We therefore ought to do our best to clarify the position, in the interest of the United Nations and of the situation out there.

First of all, it is well to keep in mind that the General Assembly authorized the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. It was in fact the only peace-keeping operation dealt with by the General Assembly. But the General Assembly in its resolution did not put the Force on to Egyptian territory, nor did it attempt to order it into Egyptian territory. The basis for the entry of the Force on to Egyptian territory was the negotiation carried on by Dag Hammarskjold directly with President Nasser in Cairo. The agreement was reached there for the entry of the Force. The Force had already been established. In fact, the advance elements of the Force were bivouaced at Capodichino airport in Naples, waiting for Egyptian consent for the entry of the Force on to Egyptian territory -- I use the word "Egyptian" because it was Egypt at that time and not the United Arab Republic. That was late in the fall of 1956. As U Thant pointed out in his report this morning there could be no doubt that if there had been the slightest suggestion that this Force could remain on Egyptian territory after Egyptian consent had been withdrawn, it would never have entered into Egypt; the consent would never have been given. And I could add that this is the case with every United Nations peace-keeping operation that has been mounted thus far.

I think it is well to bear in mind also that there is a distinction to be made as among three things: withdrawal of the Force from the Line, withdrawal of the Force from UAR territory, and termination or disestablishment of the Force -- and I shall explain what I mean.

Now, the Force went into Egypt in 1956, but its initial function, you will recall, was to replace the British, French and Israeli troops that were at that time on Egyptian soil: the Israeli troops in Sinai, and the British and French troops at one end of the Suez Canal -- Port Said. The Force moved by stages from Suez to Gaza as the Israeli troops withdrew. It would be hard to pinpoint just how and when, in any formal sense, the Force came to have the function that it has exercised since 8 March 1957. This function has been the buffer function, which is not mentioned anywhere, in any resolution. That task just fell to the Force by the fact that it was there. As the Israeli troops crossed the Gaza Armistice Demarcation Line, the International Frontier, the United Nations Force moved up. It found itself interposed between the troops of Egypt and the troops of Israel along the Line. That was its buffer function, which included doing what it could to deter and to stop infiltration.

You will recall that prior to December 1956 that Line between Egypt and Israel was just about the most troubled Line to be found anywhere in the world. That was the time of the Fedayeen -- and that term has become more or less obsolete since the Force has been there.

The basis for the Force's effectiveness in that buffer function was not any basic instrument, but a local agreement, so to speak, entered into between the Force Commander and United Arab Republic officers in Gaza, whereby the Force would operate within an area of 500 metres in the Gaza Strip area and 2,000 metres along the International Frontier. UAR troops did not enter into these areas.

That was UAR territory; in the Gaza Strip, we call it UAR-controlled territory. The Force had no right at any time to prevent UAR troops from moving up to the Line. The troops of Israel, throughout these ten and a half years, have regularly gone along their patrol tracks, which are not just contiguous to the Line but in some places right on it. And when we talk about the "Line" we talk about two things: we talk about the Armistice Demarcation Line, the ADL, which is a furrow that the United Nations itself has ploughed, about three feet wide and a couple of feet deep; and the International Frontier, running all the way down to Sharm el-Sheikh. As I said, the Israelis, as has been the case since the establishment of the State, moved along the Line. UNEF was on the Egyptian side of the Line.

I have used the term "withdrawal from the Line". As you have seen from the Secretary-General's report, what happened was this: Within a matter of hours after General Rikhye had received this rather cryptic message from General Fawzy, in certain sectors UAR troops moved up to the Line. They did not displace UNEF troops, but these UNEF troops found themselves in joint occupancy of the area. Once that had happened, the buffer function was ended automatically -- and there was not a thing they could do about it. That is what I mean by "withdrawal from the Line".

Withdrawal from UAR territory was not requested until, as you know from the report, the letter to U Thant from Foreign Minister Riad was received on Thursday noon. The message from General Fawzy to General Rikhye was received Tuesday evening. So there was no official request for withdrawal received by U Thant until Thursday noon. By that time certain things had happened. Of these the foremost was the movement of the UAR troops into areas which they had voluntarily kept away from over a period of ten years. This automatically ended any utility that UNEF might have as a buffer and as a deterrent to infiltration. That was the practical fact of the situation.

The third point is "disestablishment". Let me say, first, that the Secretary-General has agreed to order the withdrawal -- and he has ordered the withdrawal -- of UNEF from UAR territory. The juridical situation is that the final disestablishment of the Force is a matter for General Assembly action, which is obviously a nominal thing once the Force is outside UAR territory. The UAR requested that the Force be withdrawn, and that request is being complied with. Obviously the procedure will be that after the Force has completed its withdrawal from UAR territory, the Secretary-General will make a further, a final, report to the General Assembly informing it of this fact. What will happen after that, I cannot say.

That is the way we envisage it. I thought it necessary to make that sort of clarification of the terms.

QUESTION: Could you bring us up to date on what is actually happening in the field?

Mr. BUNCHE: The Force now is out of business so far as officially functioning as a buffer and a deterrent to infiltration is concerned. It is nowhere exercising any such function. It is preparing for withdrawal from the Line. In some places elements have already been withdrawn from the Line. Preparations are under way and will go forward for the withdrawal of the Force from UAR territory. A plan of evacuation is being worked out by the Field Service in cable consultation with the Commander of the Force. That has not been finalized as yet.

QUESTION: When and where are they going?

Mr. BUNCHE: Our responsibility is to take the troops back to their homelands. We fetched them from their countries; we must take them back. But, of course, this is routine, because, as you know, this is not an integrated Force -- integrated in an international sense. It is a Force composed of national contingents and the personnel have not been permanent. They have rotated: some six months, some a year. So taking them back and forth has become routine.

QUESTION: Will the Force not in fact be disestablished before the General Assembly is informed of it?

Mr. BUNCHE: I referred to the juridical situation. Juridically, the Force will not be disestablished, because nobody could disestablish it except the General Assembly. It will not exist as a unit, but the point is that these are national contingents anyhow, wearing national uniforms, provided as contingents and put under UN command. At any time, of course, new contingents could be provided, just as we do in rotation.

QUESTION: Will they be taken back to the staging area from which they came in 1956?

Mr. BUNCHE: You mean to Capodichino? No. The reason we took them to Capodichino in 1956 was that we could not take them into Egypt. But the purpose of Capodichino was to have them as close as possible so that they could move in quickly once permission had been granted. That was the only reason for using Capodichino. Otherwise they would have been flown in directly from their places of origin.

QUESTION: Could you give us any idea of the time of departure?

Mr. BUNCHE: No; as I said, this evacuation plan has not been finalized. So it would be premature for me to state that. But it is being worked on.

QUESTION: I do not quite understand the juridical position about disestablishment. The Indian Government placed a contingent at the disposal of the United Nations for the UNEF operation in UAR territory, and not generally at the disposal of the United Nations as such.

Mr. BUNCHE: The Secretary-General, faced with a resolution by the General Assembly authorizing the establishment of an international force, cannot himself say, "This Force is now disestablished". He can remove the Force from the UAR -- which he is doing -- because it is there on the basis of an agreement between the previous Secretary-General and President Nasser. But he cannot --

QUESTION: The Assembly resolution does say: Considers that after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line.

Mr. BUNCHE: That is what was done.

QUESTION: That was the General Assembly's decision, but without debate can it now be cancelled out?

Mr. BUNCHE: It is not being cancelled out. It was placed on the Line. The resolution, as I said, did not provide for the buffer function because the buffer function could only be carried out if the Egyptian troops stayed away from the Line. The resolution said nothing about the Egyptian troops staying away from the Line, as you know. This was on the basis of purely local agreements worked out between UNEF and Egyptian officers. UNEF being on the Line along with Egyptian troops would be meaningless and absolutely impractical.

QUESTION: Does it not seem that with an Assembly sitting here, it should have been given a chance to look at it?

Mr. BUNCHE: Can you tell me whether anybody has attempted to inscribe this item on the agenda of the Assembly? I would point out to you that this would require the signatures of sixty-two Member States of the United Nations. I know of no such movement. The Secretary-General consulted with the members of the Advisory Committee -- the correct procedure. He informed them of his intentions before his reply to the letter of the Foreign Minister of the UAR was sent. And that was it.

QUESTION: Could the Force now be based on Israeli territory? Has any approach been received from Israel for such an eventuality?

Mr. BUNCHE: No approach has been made. The United Nations contention from the beginning was that the only practical interpretation of the Assembly resolution was that the Force should be stationed on both sides of the line. That was never possible because the Government of Israel said that this would be unacceptable to it. So the Force, for these ten and a half years, has been stationed only on the UAR side of the line. There has been not the least indication, to my knowledge, of any change in the position of the Government of Israel on this matter and to my knowledge there has been no serious suggestion in any quarter that this position should now be reconsidered.

QUESTION: One of the main points that the late Dag Hammarskjold stressed at that time was the "good faith clause" in the agreement. Is it the considered view of the Secretary-General that this "good faith clause" has been lived up to by the UAR Government when it has pushed its Forces against the United Nations Force without any previous announcement, after ten and a half years?

Mr. BUNCHE: The "good faith clause", of course, did not have anything to do with the question whether UAR troops could or could not approach the Line. From the practical point of view, and in the quite correct view of the Secretary-General, once the UAR troops were exercising their unquestioned right to move to the Line on their own territory, the presence of UNEF was no longer useful; it had no useful function to perform. Indeed, it would have found itself in a rather

absurd position, and to a considerable extent in a humiliating position.

Since you mentioned Dag Hammarskjold, I can assure you that Dag Hammarskjold's most basic principle with regard to this Force was that at no time could it ever be in joint occupation of any area with the troops of either side; that it had to be in control of the area itself, whatever area that would be, and could not be in joint occupation.

QUESTION: Is there not such a thing as precedent in international law, which would have been established by the practice of ten and a half years in which the UAR Government has not interfered with UNEF on the Line?

Mr. BUNCHE: I would doubt that very much. I do not think any possible interpretation of international law would permit the conclusion that, since the Government of the UAR, in pursuance of a resolution of the General Assembly, had extended co-operation to an international Force on its territory for ten and a half years -- and as an expression of that co-operation kept its troops away from the Line -- this could become a cloud upon its sovereignty of a permanent nature. If so, it would be very bad international law because it would certainly discourage States from extending co-operation to the United Nations.

QUESTION: Since the Secretary-General in his report expressed his regrets to the UAR about the situation --

Mr. BUNCHE: He said that he had misgivings.

QUESTION: Not only that he had misgivings, but that there was no sign of Israeli troop movements to justify moving up to the border. He stepped outside the strict legal framework by pointing that out.

Mr. BUNCHE: He expressed a view.

QUESTION: He also expressed the view that this withdrawal was a very dangerous and upsetting thing.

Mr. BUNCHE: That was also his view.

QUESTION: Could he not, in view of the fact that the General Assembly created this Force, simply have said: I will refer this to the Assembly and let it decide -- in order to gain time and perhaps let the dust settle?

Mr. BUNCHE: No, he was very firm in his mind -- and I am convinced that he was absolutely right -- that there was no basis for his submitting this to the Assembly, in view of what was involved, which was the termination of the consent which a Government had given for the presence of an international Force on its territory, a consent which had been negotiated by the Secretary-General with the Government.

Let me point out that there is a difference here with the United Nations Force in Cyprus, which was placed there on the basis of a Security Council resolution, with the representative of the Government of Cyprus and the representative of the Government of Turkey -- neither being a member of the Security Council -- participating in the debate and agreeing with the Security Council to the stationing of that Force in Cyprus. So, if the question of the removal of the Force in Cyprus came up, Security Council action would be required because the whole action was taken with the Security Council and the agreement for stationing the Force was with the Security Council and the representatives of the States concerned. That was not the case with regard to the UAR. If Dag Hammarskjold had not gone to Cairo and obtained the consent, in direct negotiation with the President of Egypt, for the entry of the Force into Egyptian territory, it would never have left Naples.

QUESTION: Would you be obligated to pull out if any of those parties withdrew their agreement?

Mr. BUNCHE: I cannot speak about that; that is a hypothetical question. My assumption is that that would be for the Council to decide. These are not enforcement actions. UNEF and UNFICYP in Cyprus are operations not under Chapter VII of the Charter, not in the exercise of the enforcement authority of the Security Council, but somewhere -- to tell the truth -- in the "limbo" between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. I do not have to go into detail; you all know that there is no specific Charter provision which adequately covers these operations. They came about because there was desperate need and action had to be taken. It is very hard to pinpoint them. But what you can say absolutely is that they have nothing whatsoever to do with Chapter VII, and any attempt or suggestion that these do have an enforcement connotation would be absolutely fatal to all UN peace-keeping operations.

QUESTION: I wonder if this is a correct interpretation. After the General Assembly had adopted its resolution, there seem to have been three steps: one, Mr. Hammarskjold made an agreement with President Nasser --

Mr. BUNCHE: No, take them in order. First he immediately proceeded to set up the Force, to recruit it.

QUESTION: During that period he set up the Force --

Mr. BUNCHE: Moved it as quickly as he could to Capodichino Airport.

QUESTION: Then he got the agreement of President Nasser --

Mr. BUNCHE: He went to Cairo and got agreement for it to enter.

QUESTION: He got agreement for the stationing of that Force.

Mr. BUNCHE: That is right.

QUESTION: When the Force got there, local commanders of the Force and local commanders of the Egyptian Forces agreed, according to the way you spelled it out, to stay away from certain spots in order that UNEF could function.

Mr. BUNCHE: That was in March.

QUESTION: That was done by local commanders' agreements?

Mr. BUNCHE: That is right.

QUESTION: Now along comes last Tuesday and the General Commander of the Egyptian Forces decides that that agreement among the local commanders --

Mr. BUNCHE: -- no longer exists; that is right.

QUESTION: So did he not unilaterally abrogate the local agreements?

Mr. BUNCHE: There could be no question about his right to do that, none whatsoever. There was no time-limit on these agreements. When you say "agreements", perhaps a more accurate word would be "understanding". But there is no question but that they had a full right to abrogate the understanding whenever they wished.

QUESTION: So the Commander of the UAR Armies negated the agreement made?

Mr. BUNCHE: I would not say "negated"; they just ended it and exercised their right to move up to the Line on their own territory. It was as simple as that.

QUESTION: There are some other important points in the statement to the Security Council. Could you say something about EIMAC as it now stands, or give us a little bit of the history?

Mr. BUNCHE: EIMAC is a part of the UNTSO machinery. It is one of the Mixed Armistice Commissions; four were set up under the four Armistice Agreements. EIMAC was the first, because the first of the Armistice Agreements was concluded between Egypt and Israel in February 1949 at Rhodes. These are manned by UN Observers, individual officers recruited as individuals for service with the UN Truce Supervision Organization. There are a total of 133 such Observers now available to UNTSO under the direction of General Odd Bull, a Norwegian, the Chief of Staff -- and, I may say, one of the best military men we have ever had in this work. He is not only a fine military man, but has a very good political sense. He is a soldier-diplomat and has done an excellent job.

EIMAC has been in existence all through the period of UNEF deployment, with headquarters at Gaza. There is an EIMAC building at Gaza. But they have been only nominally able to function, because since the Suez crisis Israel has not participated. Israel, you may recall, denounced the Armistice Agreement with Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis and, therefore, while dealing with UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commissions on the other three fronts -- Lebanese, Jordanian and Syrian -- has not had anything to do with EIMAC since 1956.

The purport of what U Thant has said in his report this morning to the Security Council is that the withdrawal of UNEF from that area would leave a most serious vacuum if EIMAC is not able to function. This was the basis for what could be taken as a mild appeal to the Government of Israel to reconsider its position with regard to non-participation in EIMAC and to make it possible for EIMAC to fill that vacuum at least partially.

QUESTION: Israel has also boycotted other Mixed Armistice Commissions but in spite of that fact the Truce Observers have continued to function. Why cannot the Truce Observers function on the Armistice Line between Israel and Egypt?

Mr. BUNCHE: They can function, but not effectively, because functioning requires dealing with them. You are thinking of Israel's attitude towards the Israel-Syrian MAC. But it is very important to bear in mind that Israel has not denounced the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement; not at all. There has never been any suggestion of that. The Israelis have refused to attend meetings of the Israel-Syrian MAC because of this impasse about whether all this backlog of complaints on the Syrian side would be considered, and also about the question of its authority with regard to the Demilitarized Zone. But you must bear in mind that just in the past three months Israel has attended three emergency meetings of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, in response to the Secretary-General's appeal to the two parties to do so, which was made on 15 January of this year.

With regard to EIMAC, Israel has denounced the Armistice Agreement and, therefore, it is not a question of not attending meetings: the Israelis have

nothing to do with EIMAC, with its Chairman or with any of its functions. In other words, they have nothing to do with the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement. Is that clear?

QUESTION: Could EIMAC Observers be deployed on the Armistice Line?

Mr. BUNCHE: Observers are not deployed. The Force was deployed. Observers from EIMAC, all through the period in which UNEF has been deployed on the Line, have patrolled that line regularly on the UAR side. They still do so.

QUESTION: Assuming that the Secretary-General, as it seems, fears that there is a kind of vacuum left there, that a very important UN peace-keeping element has been removed and that it should be restored, what alternatives could you list that the United Nations can resort to in order to restore what Paul Martin called this morning the equilibrium?

Mr. BUNCHE: What could be done, obviously, would be to have a fully functioning EIMAC. Take, for example, what happened on 7 April on the Israel-Syrian frontier. A serious fight broke out. When you quickly reach the stage where heavy mortars and tanks and military jet aircraft are at work, there is a serious fighting situation. The Observers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization went to work immediately this fighting began, and within five or six hours -- not much more -- they were able to achieve a cease-fire. This has been done by Observers in that area and by Observers of UNMOGIP in the Kashmir area literally hundreds of times in the years since 1949. So this is a very important function. But Observers cannot act as a buffer to prevent direct confrontation such as UNEF has been able to do by interposing itself along the Line, and they cannot be as effective as UNEF has been in stopping infiltration across the Line, whether innocent or not. However, they can perform, and have performed, and demonstrated the ability to perform, a very useful function in connexion with peace.

QUESTION: Since you have mentioned no other alternative, I take it that this is what you are leaning upon heavily now.

Mr. BUNCHE: Your question was, what could the UN do? This is obviously what it could do most readily. You can always devise something new.

QUESTION: Then why does the Secretary-General not go to Jerusalem instead of to Cairo?

Mr. BUNCHE: I think that he is going to Cairo first of all because he had a trip planned -- as his statement explained -- and it got a little fouled up by these developments. His plan was to visit UNEF and to stop at Cairo on the way back. But it did not make much sense to talk about visiting UNEF in July.

QUESTION: If the UAR has clearly asked for withdrawal of the troops, then, under the interpretation you gave earlier, UNEF and its Command no longer exist.

Mr. BUNCHE: No, I have not said that. Let us get this straight right away. The Secretary-General has complied with the request of the UAR that the Force be withdrawn, and that is in process. We have been there; our presence has been governed by what we call a status-of-force agreement, which was entered into with Egypt and has to do with freedom of movement, privileges and immunities, legal questions, and so on. The Force is in existence and the status-of-force agreement remains in existence until the Force is evacuated and is withdrawn from that territory. General Rikhye is still Commander of the UN Emergency Force and is functioning and will function as such so long as the Force is there. What I said was that the Force is no longer performing its function as a buffer and a deterrent to infiltration.

QUESTION: Is that the fulfilment of the request of the UAR?

Mr. BUNCHE: No, the request of the UAR is that the Force be withdrawn, and it is in process of being withdrawn. But the UAR, by requesting withdrawal, did not mean -- and we have assurance of this -- that overnight 5,400 men with their equipment and massive supplies must be gone. And until it is gone, the Force is there. But we are complying with the UAR request by undertaking the withdrawal. The Secretary-General has said that it will be withdrawn and the arrangements are in train for its withdrawal.

QUESTION: Under the agreement I believe that an effective date for the end of UNEF has to be worked out by the Secretary-General and the Egyptian Government. Can we assume that that still has to be worked out?

Mr. BUNCHE: No, that is not a matter of negotiation. We have agreed to withdraw, and then we work it out. To say "effective date" would mean that on that date the Force would be withdrawn. You cannot take it out that way. Some go to Brazil, some go to India, some go by plane, some go by ship. They will go out by increments. So there is no effective date. What the Secretary-General has said -- and you know that from the report -- is that the Force will be withdrawn in an orderly, dignified and deliberate way, as expeditiously as possible. That is the standing order.

QUESTION: Could you tell me, then, what the Secretary-General has to talk about with UAR officials?

Mr. BUNCHE: No, I would not want to go into that, but I would imagine that the question of peace in the Near East will come up.

QUESTION: What is the physical situation regarding Sharm El-Sheikh now? You have told us that the buffer part is already out.

Mr. BUNCHE: UN troops and UAR troops are both there.

QUESTION: With regard to EIMAC -- just suppose shooting broke out right now on the Israeli-Egyptian border, regardless of who started it. Could EIMAC step into the situation? It has headquarters at Gaza, but the Observers work for UNTSO, whose headquarters are elsewhere. Could they step into it -- provided the Israeli Government did not stop them?

Mr. BUNCHE: That is the point. I honestly cannot answer that question -- and for this reason. I mentioned the fighting on 7 April. When that broke out, the UN Observers swung into action. The UN Observers -- UNTSO people -- were on both sides of the Line. There were UN Observers stationed on the Israeli side of the Line and also on the Syrian side of the Line. Those on the Israeli side

of the Line went to the local Israeli Commander, and those on the Syrian side went to the local Syrian Commander, and they worked and finally came together and agreed upon a cease-fire. They were in communication with each other, working on opposite sides of the Line.

Now, with regard to EIMAC, if fighting should now break out because of the position taken by Israel, the UN Observers are only on the Egyptian side of the Line. Whether there would be a change so that Israel would deal with EIMAC Observers on the Israel side to stop the fighting is something I cannot answer. Only the Government of Israel could answer that. But as of now, that is not the case.

* * * * *

22 May 1967

Note for Secretary-General on take-over
and disposal of UNEF Installations and
Equipment

1. HQ UNEF has given instructions that all removable capital items of equipment such as generators, cooking equipment, furniture, refrigerators, coolers, etc., should be returned to ordnance stores when UNEF evacuates its camps.
2. There are now indications that UAR authorities wish to take over UNEF camps in complete running order and in some cases they have forcibly prevented removal of such items as generators. This has happened specifically at Fort Robinson and Fort Saunders where UAR have forcibly prevented the Brazilians from removing the generators. In places where it is not possible to remove the generators and large items of equipment, such as water distillation plant at Sharm El Sheikh, Rikhye has clearly indicated to the UAR authorities that these are exceptions and that the rule is that all UNEF removable property will be returned to ordnance for disposal.
3. There are indications that UAR plan to take over major UNEF camps as they are abandoned and expect that capital items of equipment, such as generators, will not be removed.
4. Rikhye has been told that you will raise the question of forcible sequestration of UNEF equipment in Cairo. If UAR wish to acquire UNEF equipment, this should be a matter of negotiation. Forcible seizure of UNEF stores or equipment would have to be reported to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

22 May 1967

There may be developments in the course of your talks in Cairo which would make desirable a visit by you at an early date to Jerusalem and possibly Damascus. If, for example, Nasser's position is that his moves as regards UNEF and his troops in Sinai have been designed solely to meet a possible Israeli attack on Syria, then the answer would obviously be to get an assurance from Israel that there would be no attack on Syria. But such an assurance would not likely be forthcoming unless there could be some reassurance in Damascus about El Fatah activities.

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ETATPRIORITY

H.E. UTHANT

SECRETARY GENERAL

UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK CITY

NEWYORKU.S.A.

DEAR UTHANT

ON THE OCCASION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES FROM THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND GASA STRIP.

I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU, ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, OUR THANKS AND APPRECIATION OF THE EFFORTS

PAGE 2

AND SINCERE CO-OPERATION THE U.N. AND ITS FORCES HAVE SHOWN IN THE UAR

I HOPE, THAT YOU WOULD CONVEY TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE UNFE OUR APPRECIATION OF THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES DURING THEIR STAY.

THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION IS ALSO ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH

PAGE 3

THESE FORCES BELONG.

IN CONCLUSION, MAY I EXPRESS TO YOU MY APPRECIATION OF YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS AND UNDERSTANDING OF OUR CLEAR POSITION AND YOUR BELIEF IN THE UN AND ITS MISSION.....

WITH MY PERSONAL REGARDS.....

MAHMOUD RIAD

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED ARAB

REPUBLIC.....

Press Release

PRESS BUREAU OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

26 May 1967

The following are excerpts from the interview of the French radio and television with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:

- Q - The United Arab Republic has decided to block Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran, what will happen if an Israeli ship tries to pass?
- A - The blocking of navigation to Israeli ships and strategic materials is the method that Egypt followed until 1956. Israel had declared that its aggression was mainly intended to open this route, it was, therefore, necessary after 11 years to put an end to the remains of the aggression, and to exercise once again the practice prevailing before 1956, thus, if any Israeli ship attempts to pass through Sharm El Sheikh, it will be confiscated.
- Q - What would be Egypt's stand if the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposes to reinforce the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission?
- A - The Mixed Armistice Commission remained in function from February 1949 until 1956. But in November 1956, Israel announced that the Armistice agreement with Egypt no longer exist, terminated its validity, occupied Al Ouga and dismissed the United Nations personnel. In fact, Israel should announce its readiness to reinforce the Armistice Commission and then implement the Armistice Agreement. In such a case, we can re-cooperate with the Armistice Commission.
- Q - Does the United Arab Republic object to the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Forces on Israeli territory?
- A - This concerns Israel. We have no opinion or comment.
- Q - In the case of a simple Israeli air raid on any Arab country, would the Egyptian forces march towards Israel?
- A - Israel undertook simple attacks on the borders which were considered skirmishes and the United Arab Republic did not react to such incidents. But if Israel launches a real aggression on any Arab country, we will fight her.

Press Release

PRESS BUREAU OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

26 May 1967

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic said today that "the campaign undertaken by some Western Powers casting doubts over the uncontested right of the United Arab Republic to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force has been extended now by the same powers to question the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Strait of Tiran. He added, "we are confident that the present campaign will meet with the same fate suffered by the previous one."

Commenting on the declaration of Prime Minister of Britain, as well as the similar declaration made by some American officials to the effect that the Strait of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which ships of all nations including that of Israel have the right of passage, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic stated that Egypt was exercising her established rights in the Gulf of Aqaba including the right of search over ships bound to Israel and the right of seizure of strategic materials as it exercised over them before the aggression against her in 1956. He added that these measures have been applied to British ships and to ships flying under other flags." Today, he said, "it has become incumbent upon us to liquidate the last vestige of the Tripartite aggression." He reiterated that the United Arab Republic exercises its full rights over the Strait of Tiran.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic also stated that the United Arab Republic has previously reiterated before the General Assembly of the United Nations during its consideration of the question of the withdrawal of the aggressive forces that the aggression could not in any way result in rewarding the aggressor and that this position has been re-affirmed by the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Minister added that the United Arab Republic shall continue to permit innocent passage in the Strait of Tiran, however, that innocent passage does not apply to Israel. He pointed out, "we can not permit the passage of her ships in a distance less than one mile from our coast or the passage of arms or strategic materials which would aid the forces of aggression. And this position is fully in accordance with the principles of International Law."

The Minister denounced the self-proclaimed role of protection which the colonial powers assume over what they call international waterways in a manner inconsistent with the sovereignty of states over their territories and waters.

The Minister concluded by expressing his deep conviction that peace-loving states will support the United Arab Republic in its defense of the principles of the sovereignty of states over their territory and territorial waters.

Press Release

PRESS BUREAU OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

26 May 1967

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic made today the following declaration:

"Any attempt by any Israeli ship to enter our territorial waters shall be considered as an act of aggression which necessitates on our part to take all necessary measures for the security of our territory and our territorial waters by our armed forces. Furthermore, any attempt by any states to use our territorial waters to send strategic materials to Israel would be considered an unfriendly act and would constitute assistance to the Israeli military effort against the United Arab Republic and all Arab states."

Press Release



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THE ARAB INFORMATION CENTER

757 THIRD AVENUE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

Telephone 421-5353

For immediate release

New York, May 26 (AIC) --

The Arab League headquarters in Cairo has announced that President Nasser told U Thant at their meeting on May 24 that the UAR is ready, under any circumstances, to shoulder the responsibilities emanating from the attitude it has adopted."

"If the danger of war is imminent in the area today," he continued, "the responsibility falls primarily on those who have encouraged the Israeli aggression, paved the way for it, and supported it with arms and funds. The people of the Arab nation are ready to go to all lengths in the defense of their homeland against any force. The UAR has received forces from Iraq, Algeria and KUWAIT which will participate with the Egyptian forces in facing eventualities. General mobilisation was announced in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and Saudi forces have joined Jordanian troops in Aqaba. Jordan has also allowed Iraqi forces passage to Syria. The Sudan declared that the government and its people stand as a unified bloc inseparable from the UAR. The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies has discussed the situation and voiced support for the UAR. Ambassador Abdel Khalek Hassouna, the Secretary-General, received the text of the Pakistani government statement giving unqualified support to Arab countries against Israeli aggression. An Afghani spokesman has also disclosed that his government condemns the racist aggression against the Arab people.

These reactions were the result of the recent Israeli government threats to attack Syria.

(Note to Editors: This material filed, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, with the Department of Justice, where the required statement of the Arab Information Center, as an agency of the governments of the League of Arab States is available for inspection. Registration does not imply approval of this material by the U.S. Government.)



9/2

מדינת ישראל

ISRAEL

נציגות הקבע ליד
האומות המאוחדות
PERMANENT MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 EAST 70th STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021
TRafalgar 9-7600

27 MAY 1967

PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE
ISRAEL DELEGATION

The U.A.R. complaint to the Security Council is a barefaced attempt to divert international attention from the tension in the Middle East which she has herself created. After ejecting UNEF from the Gaza Strip, from the Sinai Desert and from the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba; after proclaiming an illegal blockade on shipping of all nations in the international waterway of the Straits of Tiran; after introducing a gang of terrorists into the Gaza Strip; after inflaming the Middle East with calls for a holy war against Israel; after massing tens of thousands of troops on Israel borders; Egypt now comes plaintively to the Security Council of the United Nations and accuses Israel of the very aggressive policy which she has herself conducted against Israel as well as against many other countries in the Middle East.

The complaints are frivolous. Their quality and veracity may be gauged by No. 3 on the list, in which the Secretary General's report of 19 May is cited in support of the charge that Israel had mobilised forces on the Syrian border. The Secretary General said precisely the opposite: "Reports from UNTSO Observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line."

But there is also an ominous aspect to this manoeuvre. The U.A.R. does not expect the Security Council to take the details of her complaint seriously. What she wants to do is to create a diversion and set up a smokescreen to conceal her preparations for aggression against Israel.

The Israel Delegation is confident that the Security Council will not be taken in by this transparent tactic.

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UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 27, 1967

PRESS RELEASE USUN-72
MAY 27, 1967

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States
Representative to the United Nations

We are giving the Secretary General's report the most earnest and serious consideration. We concur in the Secretary General's reaffirmation that the situation in the Middle East is more menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956.

We are immediately consulting with all Security Council Members and other interested governments to determine how the Council might as a matter of greatest urgency proceed to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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29/5/67

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PRIORITY

MR. U. THANT, SECRETARY GENERAL UNITED NATIONS
NEWYORK

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND CABLE TO ME STOP I WISH TO EXPRESS
MY GENUINE APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CONTINUED SINCERE EFFORTS
FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE STOP WITH MY
GREETINGS I SEND YOU MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES

GAMAL ABDUL NASSER

125P

29/5/67

(MIDEAST)

CAIRO--PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER SAID TODAY HE HAD RECEIVED SOVIET ASSURANCES IT WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY COUNTRY TO INTERFERE IN HIS BLOCKADE OF THE GULF OF AQABA, AND THAT EGYPT IS "READY TO CONFRONT ISRAEL."

"THE SOVIET UNION STANDS WITH US IN THIS BATTLE," NASSER TOLD MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH HAD JUST GIVEN HIM FULL EMERGENCY POWERS TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN WAR. "WE ARE NOT SCARED BY AMERICA AND ITS THREATS...WE ARE NOT SCARED BY THE ENTIRE WESTERN WORLD AND ITS ALIGNMENT WITH ISRAEL."

HE SAID U.A.R. WAR MINISTER SHAMS BADRAN HAD RETURNED FROM MOSCOW WITH "A MESSAGE TO ME FROM (SOVIET PREMIER ALEXEI N.) KOSYGIN SAYING THE SOVIET UNION STANDS WITH US IN THIS BATTLE AND WILL NOT ALLOW ANY COUNTRY TO INTERFERE SO THAT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS PREVAILING BEFORE 1956 MAY BE RESTORED."

NASSER OBVIOUSLY WAS REFERRING TO THE AQABA BLOCKADE. DURING THE 1956 SINAI CAMPAIGN ISRAEL RECEIVED UNITED NATIONS PLEDGES THE GULF, WHICH LEADS TO ISRAEL'S SOUTHERN PORT OF ELATH, WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING.

THE SOVIET PLEDGE REPORTED BY NASSER APPEARED TO BE THE STRONGEST SINCE THE CRISIS ERUPTED AND NASSER BEGAN HIS HARDER LINE AGAINST ISRAEL.

NASSER SAID THE SOVIET UNION "IS A FRIENDLY COUNTRY TAKING A FRIENDLY STAND ON OUR SIDE" AND HAD SENT WHEAT AND ARMS.

"AMERICA AND BRITAIN ARE SIDING WITH ISRAEL AND THEREFORE WE SAY THAT OUR ENEMY IS NOT ONLY ISRAEL BUT ALSO AMERICA AND BRITAIN AS WELL, AND WE SHALL TREAT THEM AS ENEMIES," HE SAID.

"WE MUST TEACH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HOW TO RESPECT US AND RECKON WITH US. OTHERWISE, EVERYTHING WE SAY ABOUT PALESTINE AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINE PEOPLE IS JUST EMPTY TALK.

"WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR PREPARATIONS AND WE ARE READY TO CONFRONT ISRAEL," HE SAID. "WE ARE READY TO REOPEN THE CASE OF PALESTINE.

"THE QUESTION OF TODAY IS NOT OF AQABA, NOR IS IT THE TIRAN STRAIT AND THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCES. IT IS THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE."

NASSER'S SPEECH WAS AS HARD AS THE ONE SUNDAY IN WHICH HE WARNED HE WILL BAR THE SUEZ CANAL TO NATIONS TRYING TO HELP ISRAEL BREAK THE AQABA BLOCKADE.

THE EMERGENCY POWERS GRANTED TO NASSER TODAY AUTHORIZE HIM TO "ISSUE EMERGENCY DECISIONS WHICH HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES."

5/29--TD1258PED

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FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

Saturday, 20 May 1967

OPI PRESS BRIEFING

At a briefing at 12 noon today, William Powell said that at 12:45 p.m. today Mr. Bunche had agreed to hold a background briefing on all aspects of UNEF. Asked if he would also discuss the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, Mr. Powell said Mr. Bunche was of course familiar with all aspects of the situation and he thought he would answer such questions.*

Ramses Nassif then made the following announcement: "As already announced the Secretary-General was planning a trip to the Middle East including a visit to UNEF and Gaza and thereafter to Cairo towards the end of June and the beginning of July. In the present circumstances he has decided to advance his journey by a few weeks and he will accordingly be leaving New York for Cairo the evening of Monday, 22 May."

On a background basis (a United Nations source) Mr. Nassif added: "He will be having talks in Cairo with the leaders of the Government on the situation in the Middle East and also matters pertaining to the withdrawal of UNEF."

Asked if the Secretary-General would go to Gaza, Mr. Nassif said: "Just Cairo and back."

To a question on whether the Secretary-General's trip to Geneva for Pacem in Terris was still on, Mr. Powell said "we do not know".

* *** *

* Subsequently it was announced that the briefing would be delayed until 1:30 p.m. It was also announced that at 12:30 p.m. Ambassador Goldberg would see the Secretary-General, at the Ambassador's request. Earlier today the Foreign Minister of Canada, Paul Martin, called on the Secretary-General. A Canadian Mission spokesman was saying "Canada feels there should be a meeting of the Security Council".

2/18/67
18 May 1967

NOTES ON PRESS CONFERENCE BY AMB. GOLDBERG (U.S.)

At a press conference at 12:10 p.m., following his appointment with the Secretary-General, Ambassador Goldberg (United States) made the following statement:

"The Secretary-General and I reviewed the present situation in the Middle East. I expressed the deep concern of the United States over reports of increased tension and military movements in the area.

"I assured the Secretary-General this morning that the United States will fully support any United Nations action required to help keep the peace. We have been and remain strongly opposed to the use of force and violence by anyone in the area, and any intimations to the contrary are totally without foundation. In this context, we recently endorsed, and now reaffirm, our support of the Secretary-General's statements of 11 and 13 May.

"It is the considered view of the United States, which I expressed to the Secretary-General, that the United Nations has a continuing and critical role to play in keeping the peace in the area and that all Member States should cooperate to that end".

Asked if he had discussed with the Secretary-General the reports that the United Arab Republic had asked for the withdrawal of UNEF, and what the United States position was on this point, ~~Mr~~ Ambassador Goldberg said that he had no direct information on this subject. ~~He~~ He did not want to speak for the Secretary-General, but he could say that the Secretary-General's information was "not reflective at the moment of such a request". His statement gave the United States views.

Asked what the United Nations should do if forced to withdraw UNEF, ~~inasmuch~~ ~~inasmuch~~ particularly in view of the deadlock over peace-keeping operations, he said that was "an iffy question" and added, "We should be very reserved about what might happen". It was obviously a very serious matter, and the United States supported the Secretary-General's efforts. Asked if the United States considered that UNEF was "absolutely necessary to keep the peace", he said that that, too, was "rather iffy". The United States supported UNEF and all the efforts of the United Nations to keep the peace".

Asked if it would be correct to interpret his statement as meaning that the United States strongly opposed the use of force by Israel in case of new violence in the border area, he said that the statement was not directed at any one side. It was a statement of principle, reiterating the ~~present~~ continuing United States position, ~~with~~ which had one objective: to help maintain peace in the Middle East.

Asked if he considered the situation a threat to international peace, he said he ~~did~~ hoped it would not become one. The United States hoped very much that the situation would be stabilized.

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In reply to other questions, he said that the United States was discussing the situation with many other delegations, and that the United States had made diplomatic representations in all the capitals concerned ~~with regard to stabilizing the situation~~ with regard to stabilizing the situation.

On other matters, he said that most of his discussion with the Secretary-General had dealt with the Middle East. They had not discussed the extension of the 23 May cease-fire in Viet-Nam.

Asked if the United States had any serious ~~thought~~ thought of bringing Viet-Nam ~~m~~ again to the Security Council, he said that, as stated many times before, the United States was ready to go to the Security Council tomorrow on that question. Everyone was familiar with the problems involved, and he hoped these problems would be abated. The view of the United States was that the United Nations has a constructive role to play in bringing peace to Viet-Nam.

Asked if the Middle East question could come before the present session of the General Assembly, he said he thought now that the Secretary-General's present efforts should be supported.

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Edited version
later -

PRESS BRIEFING BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL

Gideon Rafael, Perm Rep of Israel in an opening statement said: "I had this morning a substantive and lengthy conversation with the S-G before his departure for Cairo. I brought to his attention the views of Israel in this crisis caused by continuous Syrian provocations, the expulsion of UNEF and the massing of Egyptian forces on the Israeli border. I reiterated Israel's desire for a restoration of peaceful conditions on its border and in the area, its desire for non-belligerence and that no hostile acts were undertaken against Israel. At the same time I stressed Israel's right to exercise self-defence against any aggressive action carried out against it."

In reply to questions he said the only Security Council action he was contemplating in the next 24 hours was to submit a letter replying to an earlier letter by Syria. The question of an invitation to the SG to go to Israel had not come up because the SG had already said he was going to Cairo.

Asked if fortification of the area around the Gulf of Aquaba would be regarded as a hostile move, he said he did not wish to go into details.

Asked how serious the situation was, he said "it is serious".

To a question on whether Israel would allow a UN peace force on its territory, Mr. Rafael said he did not see the purpose since Israel was not threatening anybody and no terrorist gangs were going from Israeli territory into Arab countries. There had already been a peace force which had done good work, but it had been expelled not by Israel. This expulsion indicated that President Nasser had certain designs. The eviction after 10 years of good work had created an ominous situation. The question of where UNEF had been stationed in the past -- on Israel or UAR soil -- had nothing to do with the fact that its expulsion now created an ominous situation.

Regarding a reactivation of EIMAC and its stationing on Israeli territory, he said this matter had not been discussed with the SG today. When pressed he said he had not gone into this question and would not go into it. Asked if he preferred the diplomacy of the SG or action by the Security Council, he said Israel favoured all efforts which were constructive, objective and impartial to remove the present crisis.

The following exchange took place at the end of the briefing:

A correspondent "Do you think the SG was hasty in removing UNEF?"

Mr. Rafael: "Did I say that?"

The correspondent: "But do you think he was hasty?"

Mr. Rafael: "Did I say so?"

The correspondent: "No."

Mr. Rafael: "All right then."

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UNITED NATIONS

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Background Release

Press Release EMF/449
3 June 1967

NOTES ON WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF)

In his special report of 18 May 1967 to the General Assembly (document A/6669) the Secretary-General gave the main reasons for his decision to comply promptly with the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). He repeated and amplified these reasons in his reports to the Security Council of 19 May 1967 (document S/7896) and 26 May 1967 (document S/7906). Since there still seems to be a widespread and, in some quarters, both governmental and public, a determined misunderstanding on this matter, the following comments summarize the basis of and the reasons for the Secretary-General's decision.

I

The question of alternative courses of action.

1. The decision on the withdrawal of UNEF was based on both legal and practical considerations of an overriding nature.
2. Briefly, the legal considerations are that since UNEF was introduced on the territory of Egypt on the basis of the consent of the Government of Egypt and by an agreement between Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and President Nasser, that consent was at any time basic to its presence on the territory of Egypt. When that consent was withdrawn -- and the United Arab Republic's right to do this could not be questioned -- the basis for UNEF's presence ceased to exist.
3. As a purely practical matter and apart from legal considerations, all the United Nations peace-keeping forces depend not only on the consent, but on the active co-operation, of the host Government. The functions of a peace-keeping force cannot be exercised without that consent and co-operation. The Security Council, of course, has authority under Chapter VII of the Charter to

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take enforcement measures. In the case of UNEF, its buffer function, which had been made possible for over 10 years only by the co-operation of the United Arab Republic, had already lapsed before the request for withdrawal was received by virtue of the decision of the United Arab Republic to move its troops up to the Line. Furthermore, the position and security of the personnel of the Force would certainly have been gravely endangered if the Secretary-General had sought to maintain the Force against the express wish of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

4. Both the legal and the practical reasons for the withdrawal of UNEF will be examined in more detail later, but with these considerations in mind the Secretary-General had only three possible courses of action, namely to comply with the request for withdrawal, to reject the request, or deliberately to delay the response. In the considered opinion of the Secretary-General the latter two courses, in the existing circumstances, would have served no purpose other than to worsen an already explosive situation and might also have had disastrous results as regards the safety of the United Nations Force.

5. The Secretary-General has had, and has expressed, from the very outset of the present crisis his deep misgivings about the consequences which would probably ensue from the withdrawal of UNEF. These misgivings have also been expressed more than once in recent years in the Secretary-General's annual reports to the General Assembly, when the continued existence of UNEF was being threatened through the dwindling and increasing uncertainty of funds. These misgivings, however, could not affect the overriding nature both of the legal and practical reasons for compliance with the request of the United Arab Republic for withdrawal.

II

Regarding assertions that the decision to withdraw UNEF was "hasty", "hurried", etc.

6. The question of the withdrawal of UNEF is by no means a new one. In fact, it was the negotiations on this very question with the Government of Egypt which, after its establishment by the General Assembly, delayed the arrival of UNEF, then concentrated in a staging area at Capodichino airbase, Naples, for

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several days in November 1956. The Government of Egypt, understandably, did not wish to give permission for the arrival on its soil of an international force, unless it was assured that a request for withdrawal would be honoured. Over the years in discussions with representatives of the United Arab Republic the subject of the continued presence of UNEF had occasionally come up, and it was invariably taken for granted by United Arab Republic representatives that if the United Arab Republic officially requested the withdrawal of UNEF, the request would be honoured by the Secretary-General. Thus, although the request for the withdrawal of UNEF came suddenly and as a surprise, there was nothing new about the question of principle nor about the procedure to be followed by the Secretary-General -- hence the decision taken by him on 18 May 1967 to comply with the request for the withdrawal of the Force. The actual withdrawal itself, of course, was to be, and is being, carried out in an orderly, dignified, deliberate and not precipitate manner. That withdrawal is now under way in accordance with a carefully worked out plan.

7. It has been alleged in some quarters that the United Arab Republic first requested only the withdrawal of UNEF from the Line and not from United Arab Republic territory. In a practical sense, this is an academic point, since UNEF, if it was not stationed actually on the Line, would have had no useful function anyway. In fact, however, the cryptic letter received by General Indarjit Rikhye from General Mohammed Fawzy on the night of 16 May 1967 was ignored by General Rikhye and rejected by the Secretary-General as being both incorrectly directed and unclear in meaning. The only official request received by the Secretary-General, therefore, was the one which came from the Foreign Minister of the Government of the United Arab Republic on 18 May 1967, and this very clearly called for the complete withdrawal of UNEF. This request from the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic was not an "ultimatum", as it has been called, but a request to the Secretary-General that steps be taken to remove the Force as soon as possible.

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8. It has been said also that the Secretary-General should have appealed to the Government of the United Arab Republic to reconsider this request. The Secretary-General at the time had been made well aware of the high state of emotion and tension in Cairo and in the UNEF area and had the best possible reasons to be convinced that the decision to request the withdrawal was final and that any appeal by him for a reversal of this decision would most certainly be rebuffed. In fact, ominous expressions such as "army of occupation" were already beginning to emanate from Cairo, and they would only have been magnified and justified if UNEF had sought to stay beyond its welcome, with a predictable hostile public reaction to the presence of the Force.

III

The question of adequate consultation by the Secretary-General.

9. It has been said that there was not adequate consultation with the organs of the United Nations concerned or with the members before the decision was taken to withdraw the Force. As stated above, the Secretary-General was, and is, firmly of the opinion that the decision for the withdrawal of the Force, on request of the host Government, rested with the Secretary-General after consultation with the Advisory Committee on UNEF. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld took the following position in reply to a question about the withdrawal of the Force from Sharm-El-Sheikh on 26 February 1957:

"An indicated procedure would be for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly" (document A/3563/Annexes I.B.2).

The Secretary-General consulted the Advisory Committee before replying to the letter of 18 May 1967 from the United Arab Republic requesting withdrawal. This consultation took place within a few hours after receipt of the United Arab Republic request, and the Advisory Committee was informed of the decision which the Secretary-General had in mind to convey in his reply to the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic. As indicated in the report to the Security Council of 26 May (document S/7906, para. 4):

"The Committee did not move, as it was its right to do under the terms of paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) to request the convening of the General Assembly on the situation which had arisen."

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Before consulting the Advisory Committee on UNEF, the Secretary-General had also consulted the permanent representatives of the seven countries providing the contingents of UNEF and informed them of his intentions. This was what was required of the Secretary-General.

10. Obviously, many Governments were concerned about the presence and functioning of UNEF and about the general situation in the area, but it would have been physically impossible to consult all of the interested representatives within any reasonable time. This was an emergency situation requiring urgent action. Moreover, it was perfectly clear that such consultations were sure to produce sharply divided counsel even if they were limited to the permanent members of the Security Council. This sharply divided advice would have complicated and exacerbated the situation, and, far from relieving the Secretary-General of the responsibility for the decision to be taken, would have made the decision much more difficult to take.

11. It has been said that the final decision on the withdrawal of UNEF should have been taken only after consideration by the General Assembly. This position is not only incorrect but also inapplicable and unrealistic. In resolution 1000 (ES-I) the General Assembly established a United Nations command for an emergency international force. On the basis of that resolution the Force was quickly recruited and its forward elements flown to the staging area at Naples. Thus, though established, it had to await the permission of the Government of Egypt to enter Egyptian territory. That permission was subsequently given by the Government of Egypt as a result of direct discussions between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser of Egypt. There is no official United Nations document on the basis of which any case could be made that there was any limitation on the authority of the Government of Egypt to rescind that consent or which would indicate that the United Arab Republic had in any way surrendered its right to ask for and obtain at any time the removal of UNEF from its territory.

12. As a practical matter, there would be little point in any case in taking such an issue to the General Assembly unless that body could be expected expeditiously to reach a substantive decision. It is hard to see what decision other than the withdrawal of UNEF could have been reached by the Assembly once United Arab Republic consent for the continued presence of UNEF was withdrawn.

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13. As regards the practical possibility of the Assembly considering the request for UNEF's withdrawal, it is relevant to observe that the next regular session of the General Assembly was some four months off at the time the withdrawal request was made. The special session of the General Assembly which was meeting at the time could have considered the question, according to rule 19 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, only if two-thirds or 82 members voted for inscription of the item on the agenda. It is questionable, to say the least, whether the necessary support could have been mustered for such a controversial item.

IV

The issue of refusing or delaying response to the United Arab Republic request.

14. Consent of the host Government to the presence and operation of United Nations peace-keeping machinery is a basic prerequisite of all United Nations peace-keeping operations. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in defining the principles of the establishment and functioning of UNEF in his report (document A/3302) of 6 November 1956 to the General Assembly stated:

"The Force if established would be limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognized international law While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country."

The Secretary-General went on to point out that the situation might have been different had the Force been initiated by the Security Council. In a sentence immediately following on the extract just quoted, he said:

"This does not exclude the possibility that the Security Council could use such a Force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. I would not for the present consider it necessary to elaborate this point further, since no use of the Force under Chapter VII, with the rights in relation to Member States that this would entail, has been envisaged."

The General Assembly by paragraph 1 of Resolution 1001 (ES-I) expressed its approval of this and the other guiding principles.

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15. As recently as 24 May 1967 in relation to the current events, Prime Minister Pearson of Canada said to the House of Commons:

"I remember very well the background and I am not being critical of the Secretary-General because I have no doubt that on an examination of the documents one would come to the conclusion that what he did was right in terms of the documentary evidence. There was a special arrangement made between Mr. Hammarskjöld and President Nasser. I objected to that arrangement at the time because I thought it might cause a lot of trouble in the future."

16. The question of the right of a State to obtain the withdrawal of an international force after it has given consent for its presence on its territory touches upon an exceedingly sensitive attribute of sovereign authority. It is extremely unlikely that at this stage in international life any sovereign State would accept an international military force on its territory if there were to be any suggestion that the force would not be removed when the consent for its presence was withdrawn, or indeed, if there were any uncertainty about the State's right to withdraw that consent or as to what would be required to ensure the removal of the force. In fact, the rule of consent, for good and practical reasons in UNEF extended even beyond the question of the stationing of the Force on Egyptian territory. Informally, the consent of the Egyptian Government was obtained also on the national composition of the Force, since it was found that Governments were not willing to provide contingents for UNEF unless they could be assured that their troops would be welcome. In the light of such considerations, it is inconceivable that, once the United Arab Republic consent for the presence of the Force was withdrawn, any decision other than compliance with its request for withdrawal could seriously be taken.

17. It has been asserted that the so-called "good faith" accord (see document A/6669 of 18 May 1967, para 7) implied that Egypt's acceptance of General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 would oblige Egypt to continue to accept the presence of UNEF until the task of the Force was completed. Such a view, which reads more into the "good faith" understanding than is justified, also ignores the fact that this understanding was reached in mid-November 1956 and therefore could relate only to General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 which defined the task of UNEF in very general terms as being "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities". At that early stage the purpose of the Force in reality was

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to replace the withdrawing forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom, and to be, in fact, the condition for the withdrawal of those forces. Hostilities ceased, automatically in fact, once UNEF was deployed and thus its task at that time was completed. It was not until its resolution of 2 February 1957 that the General Assembly broadened the function of UNEF in its Resolution 1125 (XI) by stating that:

"the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report ...".

That broader task, clearly, is not completed, and it would be impossible to say at present when it will or can be completed. The Armistice has already endured for over eighteen years. But this was not the task envisaged or defined for UNEF when Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser reached the "good faith" understanding.

18. Quite apart, therefore, from the almost certain practical consequences for the personnel of UNEF of a refusal or a delay in responding to the United Arab Republic request, there would seem to be no basis in any agreement or decision of the United Nations for such a refusal or delay.

V

The question of continued UNEF operation once the United Arab Republic consent to its presence was withdrawn.

19. As stated above, the consent and active co-operation of the host country is essential to the effective operation and, indeed, to the very existence, of any United Nations peace-keeping operation, and the sovereign right of the host country to withdraw such consent and co-operation is not in question. The fact is that UNEF had been deployed on Egyptian and Egyptian-controlled territory for over ten-and-a-half years with the consent and co-operation of the Government of the United Arab Republic. Although it was envisaged in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 that the Force would be stationed on both sides of the line, Israel exercised its sovereign right to refuse the stationing of UNEF on its side, and the Force throughout its existence was stationed on the United Arab Republic side of the line only.

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20. In these circumstances the true basis for UNEF's effectiveness as a buffer and deterrent to infiltration was, throughout its existence, a voluntary undertaking by local United Arab Republic authorities with UNEF, that United Arab Republic troops would respect a defined buffer zone along the entire length of the line in which only UNEF would operate and from which United Arab Republic troops would be excluded. This undertaking was honoured for more than a decade, and Egyptian co-operation extended also to Sharm el Sheikh, Ras Nasrani and the Strait of Tiran. This undertaking was honoured although UNEF had no authority to challenge the right of United Arab Republic troops to be present anywhere on United Arab Republic territory.

21. It may be pointed out in passing that over the years UNEF dealt with numerous infiltrators coming from the Israel as well as from the United Arab Republic side of the line. It would hardly be logical to take the position that because UNEF has successfully maintained quiet along the line for more than 10 years, due in large measure to the co-operation of the United Arab Republic authorities, the United Arab Republic Government should now be told that it cannot unilaterally seek the removal of the Force and thus be penalized for its long co-operation with the international community in the interest of peace.

22. There are other practical factors relating to the above-mentioned arrangement which are highly relevant to the withdrawal of UNEF. First, once the United Arab Republic troops moved up to the line to place themselves in confrontation with the military forces of Israel, UNEF had, in fact, no further useful function. Secondly, if the Force was no longer welcome, it could not as a practical matter remain in the United Arab Republic, since the friction which would almost inevitably have arisen with the United Arab Republic Government, armed forces and the local population would have made the situation of the Force both humiliating and untenable. The dignity and the reputation of this pioneering force had to be protected. UNEF clearly had no mandate to try to stop United Arab Republic troops from moving freely about on their own territory. UNEF was never designed, moreover, to be a fighting force and was equipped only with personal arms for self-defence. This was a peace-keeping force, not an enforcement action. Its effectiveness was based entirely on voluntary co-operation.

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23. Quite apart from its position in the United Arab Republic, the request of that Government for UNEF's withdrawal automatically set off a disintegration of the Force, since two of the governments providing contingents quickly let the Secretary-General know that their contingents would be withdrawn, and there can be little doubt that other such notifications would not have been slow in forthcoming.

24. For all of the foregoing reasons, the operation, and even the continued existence of UNEF on United Arab Republic territory, after the withdrawal of United Arab Republic consent, would have been impossible, and any attempt to maintain the Force there would without question have had disastrous consequences.

VI

The allegation that the withdrawal of UNEF is the principal cause of the present crisis.

25. It has been said that the withdrawal of UNEF is a primary cause of the present crisis in the Near East. As the Secretary-General pointed out in his report of 26 May 1967 to the Security Council (document S/7906), this view "ignores the fact that the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the Near East is the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along, and of which the crisis situation created by the unexpected request for the withdrawal of UNEF is the latest expression". Certainly UNEF has served for more than 10 years as a very valuable instrument in helping to maintain quiet, especially between Israel and the United Arab Republic. Its withdrawal reveals once again in all its depth and danger the undiminishing conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours. It has also made acute the problem of access to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Strait of Tiran -- a problem which had been dormant for over 10 years only because of the presence of UNEF. But the presence of UNEF did not touch the basic problem of the Arab-Israel conflict -- it merely isolated, immobilized and covered up certain aspects of that conflict. At any time in the last 10 years either of the parties could have reactivated the conflict and, had they been determined to do so, UNEF's effectiveness would automatically have disappeared. Now in the context of the

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whole relationship of Israel with her Arab neighbours, the direct confrontation between Israel and the United Arab Republic has been revived, and UNEF has therefore lost its usefulness. In recognizing the extreme seriousness of the situation thus created, its true cause -- the Arab-Israel conflict -- must also be recognized. It is merely confusing to seek the cause elsewhere or to indulge in the sophistry that the conflict could have been solved simply if UNEF had stayed on. This, manifestly, it could not have done.

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