

PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1 JUNE - 9 NOV 1994

UNAMIR

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CNR 651 P1/2

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TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 November 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 3701
SUBJECT: Progress Report on UNAMIR

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1. We were informed this afternoon by the Permanent Mission of the United States that Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who is the current President of the Security Council, intends during a meeting with the Secretary-General tomorrow to request that the mandate of UNAMIR - which, as you know, will expire on 9 December - be extended before the end of this month. The US and other members of the Council seem to feel quite strongly that the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR should not take place under the presidency of the Rwandese Ambassador next month.

2. This implies that we will have to issue a progress report by 25 November at the latest, to enable the Security Council to consider it before taking a decision on the extension of the mandate of UNAMIR. In view of the strict deadlines under which we have to operate, we would need to receive a draft of the report by Wednesday, 16 November, so that it can be reviewed, in consultation with the other concerned departments, before it is submitted to the Secretary-General for his approval.

3. The report should provide an overview of the developments which have occurred since the last one (issued on 6 October) and of the progress made/difficulties encountered by UNAMIR in the implementation of the mandate entrusted to it under resolutions 918 and 925 (1994). It should follow the general format of the previous progress reports and include the usual political,

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military, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian sections, as well as information on the status of the UNAMIR radio station. It should also provide detailed justifications of any adjustments which may, in your view, be required to the current troop and personnel level, deployment or concept of operations of UNAMIR, as well as concluding observations on the overall situation in Rwanda and on the assistance the international community should provide to help promote peace and stability in the country.

3. We regret this short notice but trust that we can count on your understanding and cooperation in the preparation of this report within the specified timeframe. Many thanks and regards.



File: Security Council

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1994

NO: MIR

SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON UNAMIR

NO OF PAGES: 4

1. With reference to Mr. Annan's UNAMIR 3126 of 26 September on the above subject, and as requested, we are pleased to submit the following additional information:

- a) The programme for the voluntary surrender of arms mentioned in para. 28 of our revised draft report emanated from a decision by the new Government to disband the local gendarmerie force. It is to be noted that the Government was opposed to this force because of its collaboration with the French troops that controlled the HPZ. Following UNAMIR's replacement of the French forces in that zone, we invited the forces of the disbanded gendarmerie to voluntarily surrender their weapons to UNAMIR within eight days. The "gendarmerie" responded promptly and within the specified period, UNAMIR collected nearly 600 arms. The programme has been a complete success. The new Government has announced its intention to recruit and train a new national gendarmerie force. While interested members of the disbanded former gendarmerie force could be selected, on an individual basis, for reintegration into the future force, no specific guidelines or measures to that effect have been put in place as yet by the Government. Meanwhile, as requested by the Government, UNAMIR CIVPOL has been training a small group of new "gendarmes" who are scheduled to complete their six-week training shortly.

.../...

b) With reference to para. 34, and as you are aware, the main responsibilities of UNAMIR troops include escort duties, security and protection, as well as security, protection and escort for humanitarian operations. UNAMIR military observers, on their part, are principally engaged in liaison, observation and reporting functions. The tasks being performed by UNAMIR troops who are armed and military observers who are not, sometimes complement and in other instances, differ. Specifically, UNAMIR troops are currently carrying out the following tasks:

- providing armed escorts, as required;
- identifying and establishing safe haven areas for refugees and displaced persons and securing these areas through the provision of static guards and/or mobile patrols;
- conducting protective operations through roadblocks, check points (random and static), vital point protection, observation posts, cordon and search, patrols, etc.;
- monitoring of border crossings;
- controlling movement on the main routes;
- protecting airfields and airstrips;
- guarding United Nations installations and facilities;
- assisting humanitarian agencies in the distribution of relief supplies;
- carrying out reconnaissance operations and identifying food and water distribution points at the communal level;
- providing transport for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons;
- coordinating with the RPA on the security of the population;
- assisting affected persons to resettle by helping in the distribution of building materials, farming tools, etc.;
- assisting in maintaining and/or repairing roads and bridges, in providing water points and in restoring essential services and facilities;
- clearing mines, ordinances and booby-traps;
- assisting in providing medical support to refugees, displaced persons and the population in need;
- augmenting the air traffic control capability at Kigali international airport.

.../...

Specific tasks being performed by UNAMIR military observers include:

- identifying safe haven areas for displaced persons;
- monitoring border crossing points;
- providing security in refugee/displaced persons' camps in conjunction with co-located troops;
- providing unarmed escorts, as required;
- identifying and listing refugee/displaced persons' camps;
- assisting humanitarian agencies in distributing food, water and medical support;
- carrying out reconnaissance operations and identifying food and water distribution points at commune level;
- assisting in the organization of available resources for the movement of refugees/displaced persons;
- coordinating transport for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons;
- motivating the displaced persons to return to their homes;
- liaising with the RPA, as appropriate;
- assisting the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons;
- assisting in the coordination of activities of non-governmental organizations.

- c) We agree that para. 35 needs to be redrafted to reflect more clearly the point we wish to make about the shift in emphasis in UNAMIR's activities. Accordingly, we propose the retention of the first sentence of para. 35 and the redrafting of the second sentence as follows:

"Thus, emphasis in UNAMIR's activities is shifting from purely military-related security tasks, which are increasingly being assumed by the RPA, to humanitarian operations aimed at assisting the population in need, discouraging the outflow of people to refugee and displaced persons camps and encouraging refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes."

.../...

The third sentence should be deleted. Furthermore, we do not think the shift in emphasis alone necessarily warrants a change in our concept of operations. We feel that even with the operational adjustments we have been making to deal with the changed circumstances on the ground, the existing concept of operations adequately covers our needs. Our current concentration on the creation of conditions to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and displaced persons is largely an operational adjustment, not one of concept, which remains the same.

- d) We should like to draw your attention to para. 74, dealing with the UNAMIR CIVPOL, and to suggest that it be redrafted as follows:

"At present, the Civilian Police is organized as follows:

- At the central level: a Headquarters and a training department;
- At the divisional or provincial (prefecture) level, CIVPOL units are organized in teams.

The number of Civilian Police currently deployed with UNAMIR is 30 (10 from Ghana, 10 from Mali and 10 from Nigeria), out of an authorized total of 90. The earliest possible deployment of the remaining CIVPOL personnel will enable the force as a whole to discharge its complex and sensitive tasks more effectively."

2. We hope that the information provided above adequately responds to your request.
3. Regards.

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IMMEDIATE

10 SEP -8 P 12:22

TO:

KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM:

ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE:

8 September 1994

NUMBER:

2861

SUBJECT:

Report to the Security Council

1. As you are aware, the next progress report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda is scheduled to be submitted to the Security Council by 9 October 1994. As requested, under paragraph 17 of resolution 925 (1994), the report should describe the progress achieved by UNAMIR in the discharge of the various aspects of its mandate since the last report dated 3 August.

2. We feel that the report should be generally structured like the previous ones and include sections on the relevant political, military and humanitarian developments, stressing UNAMIR's support for humanitarian operations and its efforts to accelerate the return of refugees and establish secure conditions in Rwanda. The report should also cover the progress made in the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, the take-over from Opération Turquoise, as well as a brief description of your current operations in the various sectors and of the adjustments to the concept of operations authorized under resolutions 918 and 925 (1994) which may have been dictated by the evolution of conditions on the ground.

3. In addition, we believe that the report should contain a section on the current activities of the civilian police component of UNAMIR and on its proposed concept of operations once it is fully deployed. You will recall that the mandate of the civilian police component of the expanded UNAMIR, as

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described in paragraph 17(g) of the Secretary-General's report of 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565) was limited to maintaining liaison with the local authorities on matters relating to public security. We understand that the civilian police personnel of UNAMIR is essentially engaged at this time in the training of the new gendarmerie. We fully support this modification of the original concept of operations. However, this needs to be explained to the Members of the Security Council and to the countries, which have been asked to provide personnel so that they can identify candidates with the proper training and background.

4. In accordance with established procedures, the report must be submitted to the Secretary-General for his approval by 29 September at the latest. We would therefore be grateful if you could send us a draft by Wednesday 21 September, so that the various Departments concerned at Headquarters can have an opportunity to review the draft before it is submitted to the Secretary-General. Many thanks and regards.

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File: Security Council

CNR 425 P1/18

UNAMIR

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IMMEDIATE

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 27 JULY 1994

NUMBER: 2384

SUBJECT: REPORT TO COUNCIL

Many thanks for your draft report. As discussed today, attached is a redrafted version for your close review, particularly for accuracy. Please cable corrections, comments and suggestions (which can be handwritten on the draft if you prefer) to reach HQ by 0900 New York time.

Thanks and best regards.

*Sammy/PA
For your in m. Sub
attention PL.
Attn
EO 2877*

UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of operative paragraphs 17 and 11 of Security Council resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June and 929 (1994) of 22 June respectively by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 9 August on the progress made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of population at risk, the humanitarian situation, progress towards a cease-fire and political reconciliation as well as the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. The Secretariat presented an oral report on 7 July pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994), when the Council also was informed of the arrival in Kigali on 4 July of my new Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar Khan.

2. Since the adoption of these resolutions, the situation in Rwanda has been transformed. The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) has established military control over most of the country. About 1.5 million Rwandese have sought refuge in Zaire over a two-week period in July, creating a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic proportions. The former "Interim Government" fled, and on

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19 July, a Broad-Based Government of National Unity was formed, immediately calling for national reconciliation and the return of refugees without fear of persecution or reprisals.

II. MILITARY SITUATION

3. The RPF forces took full control of Kigali, the capital, on 4 July, Butare, the second largest city, on 5 July, and the former Government's stronghold, Ruhengeri, on 14 July. The retreating Rwanda Government Forces (RGF) concentrated in and around Gisenyi in the north-west, soon withdrawing into Zaire. On 17 July the RPF took Gisenyi and on 18 July unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effectively ending the civil war which broke out immediately after the break-down of the Arusha peace process on 6 April. (amidst country-wide massacres of RPF supporters.)

4. As the Security Council is aware, the foremost priority of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) since the start of the crisis was to bring about a cease-fire and a halt to the carnage. The Force Commander, Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, had intensified these efforts since early June, when the two sides initiated cease-fire talks at the military level under UNAMIR's auspices, and my Special Representative made this his first priority upon his arrival in Kigali.

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5. Although the Deputy Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Henry Anyidoho, succeeded in bringing the two sides together on most of the requirements for a cease-fire, their insistence on including rigid conditions prevented the conclusion of an agreement. On the side of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), guarantees were demanded that RPF was not willing to give, while RPF insisted on prior measures to halt the continuing massacres which RGF professed itself unable to deliver. There also was a strong indication that RPF was not prepared for a cease-fire until it ^{had} ~~has~~ secured its military goals. While at first these appeared to be the control of as much territory as it could secure, the crumbling of the RGF's fighting capacity from late June onwards evidently encouraged RPF to intensify its offensive and take control not only of the capital, but also the rear areas of RGF up to the Zairean border. Only the protection zone established by the French task force, Operation Turquoise, did not come under the control of RPF.

6. The swift RPF advance had the natural effect of causing large numbers of civilians to take flight from the areas of combat. This displacement of population may well have been containable, had not panic been caused by deliberately inflammatory broadcasts from radio stations controlled by the "Interim Government". These provoked a massive stampede of refugees across the border into Zaire in the north west,

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overwhelming humanitarian agencies and NGOs whose preparations had anticipated the simultaneous movement of refugees further south. Virtually the entire RGF retreated in disarray into Zaire, where it is no longer an organized fighting force, most of its personnel reportedly being disarmed by the Zairean authorities. Thus, for the present, the civil war in Rwanda has ended, with no significant military operations being reported since 18 July.

7. In the course of these events, the Government of France had announced on ---- its intention to dispatch a force to the region, to be based in Zaire but to operate inside Rwanda, to provide protection to a large number of civilians uprooted by the fighting from their homes, many fleeing into Zaire. This operation was authorized by the Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in resolution 929 of 22 June 1994. On 2 July, France announced that Operation Turquoise would establish a "humanitarian protected ^{on} zone" in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda, covering about one fifth of Rwandese territory. While expressing its strong opposition to the French move, the RPF ~~demonstrated its~~ ^{refrained from confronting the} ~~pragmatism by not seeking confrontation with~~ French forces which, on their side, avoided provocation. From the start, close cooperation at all levels was established between UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise, with UNAMIR liaison officers being stationed in Goma, headquarters of the French force, and close contact between both force commanders. Resolution 929 had

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authorized the deployment of the French force until 21 August 1994, and on -
---, the Government of France informed me of its decision to commence its
withdrawal by 31 July.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

8. The protracted violence in Rwanda has created an almost unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as 500,000 people have been killed, 3 million displaced internally and more than 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries. The situation remains volatile and extremely fluid, changing from day to day as large groups of people flee while others return to newly-created safe areas. This requires flexible humanitarian programmes responding to the distinctive as well as constantly changing needs.

9. In eastern Rwanda, more than 500,000 people have begun to return home, and their most pressing requirements relate to resettlement and rehabilitation. In Kigali, the new Government is seeking assistance to restore essential services such as electricity and water. In the humanitarian protection zone created by "Operation Turquoise" in the southwest, there is a massive internal displacement and the immediate requirement is for relief activities enabling people to stay as near to their homes as possible. In the

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already
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northwest, the flight of people into Zaire calls for a rapid response to their urgent basic needs -- food, water, medicine and shelter. (The chaotic situation in this area has been exacerbated by propaganda broadcasts by clandestine radio stations spreading fear among the population and encouraging them to flee the country.) With the outbreak of cholera in the refugee camps which is quickly spreading, water and medicines must reach these camps immediately. Each day in Goma, Zaire, 30 million litres of drinking water and 1,000 tons of food are needed to confront a desperate situation.

10. To respond to this complex situation, the UN humanitarian organizations, under the leadership of the UN Rwanda Emergency Office, have prepared a "United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda" covering emergency and rehabilitation needs through the end of the current year. To support these urgent activities \$434.8 million are required. In launching this appeal on 22 July, I urged the international community to contribute generously and in a timely manner to ensure that vital humanitarian programmes could be implemented. I am convening a pledging conference in Geneva on 2 August. I am encouraged by the initial positive response from governments and, indeed, from ordinary people willing to help. I would like to especially thank those countries which have made significant contributions.

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11. At my request, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Peter Hansen, recently ^{led an inter-agency} (undertook a) mission to Rwanda and to the region from 24 to 28 July. He was accompanied by senior representatives of all principal UN humanitarian organizations as well as from the NGO community. ^{During that} ~~his~~ mission ^{has} Mr. Hansen carried out an assessment of the humanitarian situation, and has taken a number of measures to ensure that the necessary coordination arrangements are in place. These include a clear division of responsibilities among the organizations of the UN system, an overall strategy to meet this extraordinary humanitarian challenge as well as a decision to move the headquarters of the UN Rwanda Emergency Office from Nairobi to Kigali. Along with my Special Representative in Rwanda, Mr. Hansen met with Vice President Kagame and other senior officials of the new ^{by which} Government in Rwanda to discuss the means (whereby) humanitarian aid can be delivered to all parts of the country and the urgent steps required to re-establish a climate conducive to the ^{safe} return of refugees and displaced persons.

12. While an immediate focus of humanitarian assistance must be the ^{lasting??} plight of refugees, the only (real) solution is for them to return to their home areas. It is reassuring that the new Government has indicated its commitment to encourage and ensure the protection of the people returning to Rwanda.

Reports indicate that some refugees have already started to return to Rwanda. ^{we have} ~~we have~~ ^{urged the Gov't to continue to demon} It is important that the refugees return quickly so that they can harvest crops

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before the end of July and prepare land for planting for the next season's crops. ~~Concrete action on the ground~~

13. I should like to express my appreciation to all relief personnel who are working in extremely difficult conditions to meet a humanitarian challenge of this scale. The courageous staff of the UNAMIR and the French-led multinational force have played and continue to play a critical role in saving lives and protecting people. I would also like to pay tribute to those neighbouring countries which have accepted and protected Rwandese refugees. Their generosity has made a difference between life and death for millions of fellow human-beings in need. At this time, it is essential that the international community mobilize necessary resources enabling humanitarian agencies to continue and to increase delivering urgently needed assistance.

IV. REVISED OPERATIONAL PLANS OF UNAMIR

14. I already have informed the Council in my letter of ^{20 June} ---- (document S/1994/728 number) of the deplorable delays in the reinforcement of UNAMIR as authorized by resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May. I shall not repeat my comments beyond stressing that the failure of Member States to reinforce UNAMIR ^{may have} speedily prevented it from attempting to mitigate the dimensions of

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the human suffering that accompanied the civil conflict and the deliberate massacres of civilians, (mainly supporters of RPF.)

15. With the situation on the ground in Rwanda having changed radically over the past few weeks, ^{UNAMIR} (the Force Commander) ^{it} has adjusted his operational plans to cope with the altered circumstances within the framework of the mandate established by the Security Council in its resolution 925 of 8 June.

The principal tasks for UNAMIR now are as follows:

- to ensure stability in the northwestern and southwestern regions of Rwanda;
- to stabilize and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of refugees and the displaced population; and
- to provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda as humanitarian agencies arrange the return of refugees.

16. Even with the severely limited resources possessed by UNAMIR, the ^{Mission} (Force Commander) ^{it} already has taken action. ~~He~~ has deployed a company

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along the border near Goma, as well as a number of observers in that region and in the zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. In the expectation that UNAMIR eventually will receive the 5500 troops authorized by the Security Council, ^{has been planned to take place} (the Force Commander has planned) deployment in five sectors, and as indicated in the annexed map and as follows:

- Sector I (northeast): 1 engineer company
- Sector II (southeast): 1 reinforced motorized company
- Sector III (south): 1 reinforced motorized company
- Sector IV (southwest): 3 mechanized/motorized infantry battalions
- Sector V (northwest): 1 mechanized/motorized infantry battalion

17. The Force Headquarters would remain in Kigali, with the minimum units required for protection, along with specialized units for communications and logistics, as well as the field hospital. UN Military Observers and UN Civilian Police Monitors will be deployed in all sectors according to operational requirements.

18. The principal areas of concern are in the northwest and southwest. The northwestern sector borders on Zaire near the vast throng of Rwandese

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refugees (of over a million) assembled there in the harshest of conditions. It is known that there are substantial numbers of members of the former RGF and militia, as well as extremist elements suspected of involvement in the massacres (of RPF supporters) mingled with the refugees. A similar situation prevails in the southwest. Further, these are the two regions through which refugees will transit when they return from Zaire. Large numbers of refugees are also expected to return from Tanzania into Sectors I and II, and a substantial number from Burundi into Sectors II and III, but these three sectors are not expected to present the problems anticipated in Sectors IV and V.

19. The situation in Sector IV is particularly pressing in view of the expressed ^{wish} (anxiety) of the French Government to withdraw by 21 August. In discussions with UNAMIR, the new ^{Rwandese} Government has indicated that it will not insist on taking control of this area immediately provided that UNAMIR would ensure its stability. For this purpose, it would be imperative that UNAMIR be able to deploy the three battalions intended for this sector. Should they not be available, I would hope that the French force would be authorized to extend its stay to prevent destabilization of the area. This situation is made more complex by the refusal of the new Government to accept as part of UNAMIR troops from three West African countries (who had been integrated into the French force) which had proposed their transfer to UNAMIR.

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V. POLITICAL PROSPECTS

20. The crisis in Rwanda is a new manifestation of tensions which have existed for centuries and have brought similar ethnic conflict, particularly over the last thirty years. The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed a year ago in the hope that the political balance that it stipulated would bring lasting stability to Rwanda through a pluralist approach establishing a transitional ^{broad-based} government, (including the numerous parties that had emerged) leading to elections. The breakdown of the political process set off by the suspicious crash of the Presidential aircraft on 6 April, (and) again unleashed (the) ethnic animosities leading to massacres on a genocidal scale and simultaneously ^{the} re igniting (a renewed) civil war.

21. While this war raged over the last three months, both the "Interim Government", established immediately after the death of ~~the~~ former President ^{Habyarimana} in the ~~air crash~~, as well as the RPF, professed some commitment to the principles of the Arusha Agreement. However, the "Interim Government" took the position that the Agreement was based on the fallacious premise that the historic ethnic animosity between the majority Hutu and the minority ^{resolved} Tutsi could be (restored) by a political formula. The only solution ^{in its view, was} ~~could be~~ an arrangement which could guarantee the rights not only of the minority but also of the majority so that one would not fear domination by the other,

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(which could be achieved neither through military means nor through simple elections.) On its part, the RPF maintained that while committed to the Arusha principles of a pluralist political compromise, the deliberate subversion of the Arusha process by extremist Hutu elements followed by the planned and deliberate massacres of Tutsi and moderate Hutu called for changes in the Arusha formula to ensure that this could not occur again.

22. For the present, the RPF has not only military but also political control of the country and has installed a "Broad-based Transitional Government of National Unity" on 19 July 1994 for a transitional period of five years. It has excluded the former government's party, the Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie et le Developpement (MRND) as well as an openly anti-Tutsi party the ^{Comite pour la Defense de la Republique} ~~Comite~~ Democratique Republicaine (CDR) which was not included in the transitional government established by the Arusha Agreement. In the present transitional government, the post of President, reserved for the MRND in the Arusha Agreement, has been allocated to Mr. Pasteur BIZIMUNGU of the RPF, and the post of Vice President, not provided for in the Arusha Agreement, has been allocated to Major-General Paul KAGAME, military commander of the RPF, who is also Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister is Mr. Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU of the MDR and the Deputy Prime Minister is Colonel Alexis KANYARENGWE of the RPF. Other portfolios have been allocated to the

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two parties as well as the Parti Social Deomocratique (PSD), and the Parti Liberal (PL), all of which were members of the previous transitional government. PDC?

23. It is evident that the highest priority at the moment is the resolution of the massive humanitarian crisis of refugees in Zaire and displaced persons in Rwanda, and the establishment of secure conditions to encourage and enable these unfortunate people to return to their homes. Only then can the new government ensure stable conditions in the ^{country} (city) after which it is expected to enter into political discussions with the MRND to work out political arrangements for the long term stability of Rwanda. Clearly, those members of the MRND who are identified as having responsibility for the organized massacres that engulfed Rwanda since early April cannot be considered eligible or deserving to participate in such negotiations. They must be tried and dealt with in accordance with the law.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

24. The agony of a small country which ^{suffers} brings the massacre of a substantial portion of its population and the dislocation of half its remaining inhabitants surely must be categorized as one of the most hideous events in this half century. It is all the more tragic in that the international community,

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through its hesitations, could not bring itself to intervene ^{move rapidly and more effectively} despite most of its Member-States having signed the Convention on Genocide. As I remarked in my report of 31 May (S/1994/640), by our failure we have acquiesced in the horrifying loss of human life and the suffering of an entire people. (To make amends) the international community, at the very least, must ensure that through the efforts of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the ^{Commission of Experts} (International Tribunal) established by Security Council resolution 935 (1994) that those (individuals) responsible (in their personal and official capacities) ^{in any way, for these premeditated} for unleashing and ^{slaughter of human beings} instigating this cataclysm in their country are brought to justice.

25. Further, it is incumbent upon the international community to do everything in its power to alleviate the appalling human suffering in the refugee camps in Zaire and to enable refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes ^{in conditions of security and dignity.} ^{international} or other safe areas in reasonable security. The governments ^{community should also contribute generously to} who possess the resources also must apply them toward the reconstruction and rehabilitation ^{of} so essential to bring Rwanda ^{that facilitating its return to normalcy & stability} to its feet again. I commend those governments ^{who have already provided assistance or} who already are moving toward these forms of tangible assistance.

26. The recently installed Transitional Government in Rwanda also bears a heavy responsibility in bringing its people together again in national

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reconciliation. Even in the wake of the tragedy that it has confronted, it must show magnanimity and not allow its military success to lead to the desire for ~~retribution~~ permanent dominance. It must ~~ensure that there are no~~ ^{refrain from} reprisals. It must enable families to regain their homes and ~~individuals~~ ^{citizens} to return to their jobs, professions and livelihoods. It must ~~accept in the national army, those~~ ^{strive to build a new broad-based} while excluding ~~these~~ ^{those} soldiers of the former armed forces and gendarmerie who did not deliberately engage in ~~wanton killings~~ ^{massacres}. It must install an equitable and transparent system of justice, ~~to try those suspected of instigating or participating in the~~ massacres of their countrymen.

27. These are overwhelming tasks ^{especially} for a fledgling government which has taken power in a wrecked and devastated country. It will require assistance in reestablishing systems of administration, justice, police, finance, education, health and all the other responsibilities a government must discharge. ~~It~~ ^{Country.} face the daunting challenge, it will require assistance, and I hope that governments will make this available on a bilateral basis or through the UN system. Nevertheless, ultimately it is the Rwandese who must assume these tasks, ^{as well as the primary responsibility for rebuilding their} and this can only be done if the government commits itself to genuine and full reconciliation.

28. The ultimate political aim inevitably must be the installation of a broad-based system of government that will give all elements of society,

irrespective of ethnic origin or social level a sense of security and a stake in the country. The Arusha Agreement still may provide principles for a framework for establishing such a system. The OAU and Tanzania, which were instrumental in the Arusha Agreement will have a special role to play. Rwanda's four neighbours have a special responsibility to promote stability in this recuperating country and to ensure that their territories are not used for further destabilization. All countries in the region must work to ensure that the repercussions of the crisis in Rwanda do not strike at Burundi, for then the effects might destabilize the entire region.

29. In conclusion, I should like to commend my Special Representative and the soldiers and other men and women in UNAMIR who have worked with dedication through a hazardous crises. I must especially commend the Force Commander, Major-General Dallaire, for his outstanding leadership under the most demanding conditions. In ending, I extend on my own behalf and on behalf of all members of the UN our heart-felt condolence to all in Rwanda who have lost members of their families in what would have been a nightmare had it not actually come to pass.

SRSG

(FL)

CNR 378 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUL 13

04:54

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 12 July 1994
 NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2213

SUBJECT: Secretary-General's progress report

1994 JUL 12 PM 4:30

1. As you are aware, resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June and 929 (1994) of 22 June requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council by 9 August a report on the progress made by UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, including progress towards a cease-fire and the resumption of the political settlement process, the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR and the humanitarian situation. We feel that, apart from the usual sections on the political, military and humanitarian aspects, it would be appropriate to include a brief narrative on the liaison and coordination activities between UNAMIR and the French-led force. //

2. In accordance with established procedures, this report must be submitted to the Secretary-General for his approval by 30 July 1994 at the latest. We would therefore be grateful if you could send us a draft by close of business on Wednesday, 20 July, so that the various Departments concerned at Headquarters can have an opportunity to review the draft before it is submitted to the Secretary-General. Many thanks and best regards.

Get ALO
 please coordinate
 with program director
 as discussed
 13/7

②
 Dr Kasia
 There is 3 weeks between
 these dates, plus time for our
 production here. This is
 ridiculous. your help please.
 13/7

SRSG

FL

CNR 378 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUL 13

04 541

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FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
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We need to
prepare a draft
in the next few
days. Secretary-General

UNAMIR

JUN 30

04:43

(FC)

E/OIR

File: 1) Security Council
2) IN CODE
CNR-362 P11

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 June 1994
NUMBER: 2112

SUBJECT: Report to the Security Council

IMMEDIATE

MS

1994 JUN 29 12:00:32

URGENT

Suzon

As soon as FC returns
he should see this to
enable us to receive the
report 15 days
directly.
20/6
JFC

1. As you are aware, operative paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994) adopted on 22 June requested the States concerned and the Secretary-General, as appropriate, to report to the Security Council within 15 days on the implementation of the French-led operation. We, of course, consider that this request is primarily addressed to France and we have ascertained, from the Permanent Mission here, that they will submit a written report to the Council by 6 July, either directly or through the Secretary-General.

2. On the other hand, we feel that it may be appropriate for the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a brief report focusing on the follow-up action taken in pursuance of operative paragraph 8 of resolution 929 (1994) which calls for the establishment of coordination mechanisms between UNAMIR and the French-led operation. This report would thus contain information on the liaison arrangements which have been put in place as well as your meeting with General Lafourcade in Goma. It should also include a brief overview of the military situation and of the state of our relations with the parties. In addition, we feel that the report should provide an update on the efforts of the Secretariat to obtain the troops and equipment necessary to the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR. However, this section of the report would be prepared by this Headquarters in the light of our on-going contacts with Member States.

3. We would be grateful if you could send us a short draft by Monday, 4 July, to enable us to have it approved and issued on Wednesday, 6 July. Many thanks and regards.

③
He has
the paper
draft sent
consult
with Col
Hosen on
with Larry
net.
Need it to
review end
of day.

NYK PLS PROTECT TICS

24N 17

UNOMUR



MONUOR

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

94 JUN -3 13 17

IMMEDIATE

CHR-295

CODE CABLE

OUTGOING FAX NO.
3 JUNE 1994

PAGE 1 OF 20

TO: MGEN DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR KIGALI	FROM: COL ASHAR ACTING CMO UNOMUR, KABALE
FAX NO: (07) 84266	FAX NO: 256 486-23818
SUBJECT: UNOMUR PERIODICAL REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 19 DECEMBER 1993 TO 3 JUNE 1994	

REFERENCE:

- A. UNAMIR OUTGOING CODE CABLE NO. CRN 194 AND MIR 1027 DATED 2 JUNE 1994

INTRODUCTION

1. UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 5/846(1993) OF 22 JUNE 1993 THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA/RWANDA (UNOMUR) WAS ESTABLISHED AND ACCORDINGLY UNOMUR STARTED MONITORING THE AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). AS STATED IN THE MANDATE, THE TASKS OF UNOMUR ARE:

- A. TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER.
- B. TO VERIFY THAT NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE REACHES RWANDA, FOCUS BEING PUT PRIMARILY IN THIS REGARD, ON TRANSIT OR TRANSPORT, BY ROADS OR TRACKS WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE VEHICLES OF LETHAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ACROSS THE BORDER, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER MATERIAL WHICH COULD BE OF MILITARY USE.

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0246 05.01 00-90

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2. THE MISSION HAS FOLLOWING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMPONENTS:

A. MILITARY STAFF - COMPOSED OF MILOBS FROM:

(1)	BANGLADESH	20
(2)	BOTSWANA	9
(3)	BRAZIL	13
(4)	HUNGARY	4
(5)	NETHERLANDS	10
(6)	SENEGAL	10
(7)	ZIMBABWE	10
(8)	SLOVAKIA	5
	TOTAL		81

B. CIVILIAN STAFF - IT HAS 11 INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN STAFF AND 7 LOCALLY RECRUITED STAFF.

3. BY NOW UNOMUR IS EIGHT (8) AND A HALF MONTH IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA. PRIOR TO THE RECENT CRISIS IN RWANDA, WE HAD BEEN MONITORING THE BORDER FROM SABINIO VOLCANO (SQ 8947) IN THE WEST UPTO LUBIRIZI (2360) IN THE EAST BASED ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF RPF ON THE RWANDAN SIDE. WITH THE PRESENT DEPLOYMENT OF RPF UPTO MIRAMA HILL (5183) WE HAVE ALSO EXTENDED OUR ACTIVITIES UPTO MIRAMA HILL BY HAVING A 24 HOURS MANNED OP/CP UNDER TENTS. TO FULFILL THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT WE HAVE NOW SEVEN (7) OPs/CPs MANNED ON 24 HOURS BASIS AS AGAINST TWO (2) OPs/CPs MANNED PREVIOUSLY (TILL EARLY MARCH 1994). OUT OF THE SEVEN (7) OPs/CPs, THREE (3) ARE UNDER PERMANENT STRUCTURE AND FOUR (4) ARE UNDER TENTS. THE INDUCTION OF THREE (3) HELICOPTERS IN EARLY APRIL 1994 HAS ALSO HELPED US ENORMOUSLY IN MAXIMIZING OUR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

CODE CABLE

AIM

4. THE AIM OF THIS REPORT IS TO GIVE A REVIEW OF UNOMUR ACTIVITIES FOR THE PERIOD COVERING 19 DECEMBER 1993 UPTO 3 JUNE 1994 WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON OUR EXTENDED MONITORING ACTIVITIES.

SCOPE

5. THE REPORT WILL COVER THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS:

- A. THE POLITICAL ASPECT.
- B. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT.
- C. OPERATIONAL ASPECT.
- D. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ASPECT.
- E. CONCLUSION.
- F. RECOMMENDATIONS.

POLITICAL ASPECT

6. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN UNOMUR OPERATIONAL AREA IS USUALLY CALM. THE POPULATION IN KABALE AND KISORO DISTRICTS (UNOMUR OPERATIONAL AREA), IS APPROXIMATELY A MILLION PLUS. IT IS A WELL KNOWN FACT THAT THE MAJORITY ARE OF RWANDESE ORIGIN - WHO FLED THE MASS MASSACRES IN THE LATE 90. MOST OF THEM ARE VERY CLOSE RELATIVES OF THE RPF AND AS SUCH (IN VERY BROAD TERMS), ARE VERY APPREHENSIVE (SENSITIVE) TO UNOMUR ACTIVITIES ALONG THE BORDER AND THEIR SILENT INTERFERENCE, ALTHOUGH COMMON KNOWLEDGE NO ONE TALKS ABOUT IT.

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CODE CABLE

7. ANOTHER CONCRETE FACT IS THAT THE RPF FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE NRA DURING THE UGANDAN BUSH WAR, WHICH DEFEATED OBOTE AND BROUGHT PRESIDENT MUSEVENI TO POWER IN 1986. THEY ARE, IN FACT, "BLOOD BROTHERS" SUCH THAT THE NRA (NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH UNOMUR) CAN DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE - MAY BE CLANDESTINELY - TO SUPPORT THEIR BROTHERS. OTHERS SOURCES STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE RPF HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFACTORILY REWARDED FOR PUTTING MUSEVENI IN POWER THAT IS WHY THEY HAVE THE PRIVILEGE OF CROSSING IN AND OUT UGANDA ANY TIME, ANY WHERE AS THEY WISH.

8. ABOUT THE CURRENT CRISIS IN RWANDA, AT HEART UGANDANS HAVE JOBLIFICATIONS BUT OUTWARDLY THEY EXPRESS THE SITUATION TO BE THE INTERNAL AFFAIR OF RWANDESE PEOPLE AND THEIR (UGANDAN'S) POINT OF VIEW ARE JUST LIKE ANY NEIGHBOURS AND AS SUCH, VERY CAUTIOUS IN PROJECTING THEIR ENTHUSIASM OVERTLY.

9. OVERALL, THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF BOTH THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, AS WELL AS THE GENERAL PUBLIC TOWARDS UNOMUR IS ACCEPTABLE. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THERE IS ALSO A VERY POWERFUL RPF LOBBY AT ALL LEVELS IN UGANDA. THEIR INFLUENCE AND POWER BASE CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY OR BE IGNORED.

10. ON THE WHOLE THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES AND THE RPF IN PARTICULAR ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF UNOMUR PARTICULARLY DUE TO THE CURRENT INTENSITY OF OUR OPERATIONAL/MONITORING ACTIVITIES.

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11. UNOMUR IS MADE UP OF TWO COMPONENTS, NAMELY THE MILITARY COMPONENTS AND THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT. LOCAL CIVILIAN STAFF HAS ALSO BEEN RECRUITED TO SUPPORT THE MISSION. THE DETAIL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IS ATTACHED AT ANNEX "A" AND "B" TO THIS REPORT. BY NOW THREE (3) OF THE CONTINGENTS FROM NETHERLANDS, ZIMBABWE AND SENEGAL HAVE BEEN ROTATED AFTER SIX (6) MONTHS TOUR OF DUTY. DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE PRESENT CONTINGENTS ARE AS UNDER:

A.	BANGLADESH	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
B.	BOTSWANA	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
C.	BRAZIL	END OF AUGUST 1993
D.	HUNGARIAN	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
E.	SLOVAKIA	EARLY NOVEMBER 1993
F.	NETHERLANDS	EARLY MARCH 1994
G.	SENEGAL	END OF MARCH 1994
H.	ZIMBABWE	EARLY MARCH 1994

12. THE HQ STAFF HAS BEEN REDUCED TO BARE MINIMUM REQUIRED. PRESENTLY WE ARE HAVING 9 MILITARY STAFF AS AGAINST 14 (TILL MARCH 1994). THIS WAS DONE IN ORDER TO CREATE THE 10TH TEAM FOR THE MISSION AND 7TH TEAM FOR AREA EAST. EACH TEAM CONSISTS OF 6 UNMO'S-PROPORTIONATELY DRAWN FROM VARIOUS CONTINGENTS.

OPERATIONAL ASPECT

13. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE - UNOMUR HAS DEVELOPED FOLLOWING CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BASED ON ONE MAIN HQ - AT KAELE AND TWO AREA HQS AT KISORO AND KAELE:

CODE CABLE

- A. TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER BY PHYSICALLY DEPLOYING STATIC OBSERVATION POSTS/CHECK POINTS (OPs/CPs) AT THE TWO MAJOR CROSSING POINTS AT KYANIKA, GRID RJ049620 AND KATUNA, GRID SP012428 ON A 24 HOUR BASIS. SECONDARY CROSSING POINTS ARE AT BIGAGA, GRID RJ907364, LUBIRIZI, GRID SP259619, KAFUNZO, GRID SP083478, KASHEKYE (SQ 8860) AND MIRAMA HILL (SQ 5183).
 - B. TO MOUNT RANDOM VEHICLE MOBILE PATROLS DURING DAY AND NIGHT TO COVER AREAS/ROUTES WHICH REQUIRES SURVEILLANCE.
 - C. TO MOUNT FOOT PATROL DURING DAY AND NIGHT COVERING AREAS/TRACKS WHICH CANNOT BE MONITORED BY MOBILE PATROL BUT REQUIRES TO BE SURVEILLED.
 - D. TO CARRY OUT AERIAL DAY PATROLS BY INSERTING UNMO'S BY HELICOPTER ON TO DOMINATING FEATURES WHICH PROVIDES GOOD OBSERVATION OF THE BORDER AREAS/ROUTES LEADING TO THE BORDER.
 - E. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BORDER AREAS/ROUTES LEADING TO THE BORDER PARTICULARLY BY COMMANDERS AND STAFF.
14. DEPLOYMENT - THE BORDER STRETCHES FOR APPROXIMATELY 170 KM FROM SABINIO VOLCANO IN THE WEST TO MIRAMA HILLS IN THE EAST. ABOUT 120 KM OF THE BORDER FROM SABINIO VOLCANO TO LUBIRIZI (UNDER RPF CONTROL) WHICH USED TO BE UNOMUR AOR TILL APRIL 1994. BUT PRESENTLY THE AOR HAS EXTENDED UPTO MIRAMA

CODE CABLE

HILLS. THE AREA HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO(2) - AREA EAST AND AREA WEST. AS OF 03 JUNE 1994, UNOMUR IS DEPLOYED AS GIVEN IN ANNEX "C".

15. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS - UNOMUR CONDUCTS ITS OPERATIONS THROUGH VIGOROUS PATROLLING OF THE WHOLE STRETCH OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA. THESE PATROLS ARE CARRIED OUT IN VARIOUS FORMS:

A. STATIC OPS/CPs

(1) THERE ARE SEVEN (7) PLACES WHICH ARE OCCUPIED AND MANNED ON 24 HOURS BASIS.

	<u>OPS/CPs</u>	<u>DATE OF MANNING</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
(A)	<u>KYANIKA</u>	27 NOVEMBER 93	PERMANENT STRUCTURE
(B)	<u>KATUNA</u>	13 NOVEMBER 94	PERMANENT STRUCTURE
(C)	<u>LUBIRIZI</u>	11 APRIL 94	PERMANENT STRUCTURE
(D)	<u>KASHEKYE</u>	11 APRIL 94	UNDER TENTS
(E)	<u>BIGAGA</u>	2 MAY 94	UNDER TENTS
(F)	<u>MIRAMA HILLS</u>	14 MAY 94	UNDER TENTS
(G)	<u>KAFUNZO</u>	3 JUNE 94	UNDER TENTS

(2) THE FIRST 3XCP/OP ARE HAVING PERMANENT STRUCTURES. ONE TEAM PERFORMS THE DUTY FOR A WEEK AND THEN ROTATED.

(3) THE REMAINING 4XCP/OP ARE UNDER TENTS. ONE PATROL OF ZIONMOS ALONGWITH ONE NRA SOLDIER PERFORM DUTIES FOR 24 HOURS AND THEN ROTATED BY ANOTHER PATROL FROM THE SAME TEAM.

(4) WE ARE EXPECTING TO HAVE PERMANENT STRUCTURES FOR KAFUNZO, MIRAMA HILLS AND BIGAGA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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(5) THE MAIN TASKS OF THE CP/OF IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT MOVEMENT OF TRAFFIC TO AND FROM RWANDA.

(6) CHECKING OF LOADS IS ALSO DONE BY UNLOADING THE STORES IF THERE IS ANY SUSPICION.

B. VEHICLE MOBILE PATROLS - THESE ARE DESIGNED TO COVER AREAS AND SECONDARY TRACKS THAT COULD BE USED BY VEHICLES TO FERRY MILITARY EQUIPMENT INTO RWANDA. MORE EMPHASIS (ON THESE PATROLS) HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE AREAS WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY OP/CP BUT REQUIRED TO BE MONITORED.

D. FOOT PATROLS - MOBILE VEHICLE PATROLS HAVE NORMALLY BEEN CONVERTED INTO FOOT PATROLS, AIMED AT GETTING TO PLACES THAT ARE INACCESSIBLE BY VEHICLE - AND TO IDENTIFY ANY FOOT PATHS THAT CROSS INTO RWANDA.

E. AERIAL PATROLS - AERIAL PATROLS ARE CARRIED OUT DURING DAY HOURS BY INSERTING 2XUNMO'S ON A DOMINATING FEATURES ALONG THE BORDER LINE FOR A PERIOD OF 6-8 HOURS. THEIR TASK IS TO OBSERVE THE BORDER AND IN PARTICULAR THE MOVEMENTS ALONG ROUTES/TRACKS LEADING TO THE BORDER.

E. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE PATROL - THESE ARE AERIAL PATROLS CONDUCTED BY COMDS AND STAFF FLYING OVER THE BORDER TO SURVEIL MOVEMENTS ALONG THE BORDER AND ROUTES LEADING TO THE BORDER.

16. COMMUNICATIONS - SO FAR, THERE IS NO SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH COMMUNICATIONS (COMMS) BY TELEPHONE, FAX ETC, BUT VOICE COMMS IS RATHER AN UNDER SCORE DUE TO THE HILLY NATURE OF OUR OPERATIONAL AREA.

CODE CABLE

A. HF SETS - ONE HF SET IS INSTALLED AT THE MISSION HQ TO HAVE COMMS WITH KAMPALA.

D. VHF SETS - A TOTAL OF (36) VEHICLES HAVE VHF SETS MOUNTED. THE NET IS OBVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY THE MISSION HQ. AS EARLIER MENTIONED, BECAUSE OF THE HILLY TERRAIN, DIRECT COMMS IS AT TIMES NOT POSSIBLE AND AS SUCH, A RELAY STATION IS DEPLOYED AS AND WHEN NECESSARY. A REPEATER STATION IS ALSO INSTALLED TO CIRCUMVENT THIS HICCUP. TO AUGMENT THE VEHICLE MOUNTED SETS, A TOTAL OF (49) WALKIE TALKIES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR COMMS.

17. HELICOPTERS - THE MISSION AT LONG LAST GOT THREE (3) HELICOPTERS IN EARLY APRIL 1994. THE INTEGRATION OF HELICOPTERS IN OUR PATROL ACTIVITIES HAS ENABLED US TO MAXIMIZE OUR OPERATIONAL EFFORT. THE HELICOPTER THOUGH HAVE THE DIFFICULTIES OF NIGHT FLYING (ALSO REFER TO OUR FAX NO. 656 DATED 01 MAY 1994 AND NO. 678 DATED 05 MAY 1994) BUT AT THE MOMENT USED FOR FOLLOWING PURPOSES:

- A. MEDEVAC
- B. TRANSPORTATION OF UNMO'S TO OPs/OPs.
- C. ROTATING UNMO'S IN OPs WHICH ARE MANNED ON 24 HOURS BASIS.
- D. DROPPING UNMO'S ON DOMINATING FEATURES FOR OBSERVATION.
- E. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE PATROLLING.
- F. AERIAL RECCE.
- G. TRANSPORTATION OF VIPS FROM KAMPALA TO KARALE AND BACK.

CODE CABLE

18. SECURITY - THE SECURITY SITUATION IN UGANDA IN GENERAL, IS NOT CERTAIN. AT THE MOMENT, THE HQs CPs/UPs AND EVERY MILIBS' RESIDENTIAL PLACE(S) ARE GUARDED BY THE NRA ROUND THE CLOCK. THE UN COLOURS THEMSELVES ARE ALSO AN AID TO SECURITY. THE NRA ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY TO OUR PATROLS.

19. RELATIONSHIP WITH NRA - THE LIAISON WITH NRA WERE USUALLY ALRIGHT. BUT IN THE RECENT PAST, SINCE WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR ACTIVITIES THE ATTITUDE OF NOT SHOWING DESIRED COOPERATION WERE NOTICED. SOME OF THE INSTANCES ARE GIVEN BELOW:

- A. NOT PROVIDING ESCORTS AS REQUIRED FOR PATROLS ALWAYS AND EVERY TIME.
- B. NOT ALLOWING US TO MONITOR AREAS WHICH ARE WITHIN OUR MANDATE.
- C. UNUSUAL DELAY IN ALLOWING US TO MONITOR MIRAMA HILL (ALSO REFER TO OUR CODE CABLE MIS 819 OF 9 MAY 1994).
- D. HARASSING OUR UNMO'S WITHOUT ANY VALID REASON (ALSO REFER TO OUR UNOMUR OUTGOING FAX NO. 814 OF 29 MAY 1994).

20. RELATIONSHIP WITH RPF - RPF DEPLOYED ON THE RWANDA SIDE OF THE BORDER ARE USUALLY UNCOOPERATIVE AND AT TIMES HOSTILE. THIS IS MANIFESTED BY THEIR FIRING AT OUR HELICOPTER AT MIRAMA HILL. A REQUEST WAS MADE THROUGH NRA AND UNAMIR (MILOB MULUNDI) TO HAVE A LIAISON MEETING BETWEEN RPF AUTHORITY MANNING THE BORDER AND ACTING CMO WAS ALSO NOT HONOURED AS YET.

21. UGANDA'S SUPPORT FOR RPF - THERE EXISTS A HARMONIOUS COOPERATION BETWEEN RPF AND UGANDAN GOVERNMENT AS EVIDENT FROM UNINTERRUPTED MOVEMENTS OF FOOD STUFFS AND MEMBERS OF RPF TO UGANDA (REFER TO OUR DAILY

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CODE CABLE

SITREPS TIME TO TIME). THERE IS NO DIRECT OR CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF TANGIBLE MATERIAL MILITARY SUPPORT TO RPF BY UGANDA THROUGH OUR AOR. HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY SUSPECTS, POSSIBLE MILITARY SUPPORT FROM UGANDA DURING THE PERIOD FROM MID APRIL TO 13 MAY 1994 THROUGH MIRAMA HILL/KAGITUMBA BORDER CROSSING (ALSO REFER TO OUR CODE CABLE NO. MISC 619 OF 09 MAY 1994).

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ASPECT

22. ADMINISTRATION - THE OVERALL ADMINISTRATION (ADMIN) OF UNOMUR RESTS WITH THE SENIOR ADMIN OFFICER (SAO) WHO IS A CIVILIAN AND PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UN. THE COOPERATION AND ATTITUDE OF CIVILIAN STAFF TOWARDS MILITARY COMPONENT ARE REMARKABLY GOOD. THE SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ARE GIVEN BELOW:

- A. PERSONNEL - UNOMUR HAS A TOTAL OF EIGHTY ONE (81) PERSONNEL WHICH INCLUDES 78 MILOBS AND THREE (3) MEMBER MEDICAL TEAM.
- B. CHANGE OF COMMAND - THE PREVIOUS ACTING CMO, COL MATIWAZA OF ZIMBABWE REPATRIATED TO OWN COUNTRY ON COMPLETION OF TOUR OF DUTY IN EARLY MARCH 1994. THE PRESENT ACTING CMO COL ASRAR FROM BANGLADESH IS PERFORMING THE DUTIES FROM 26 FEBRUARY 1994.
- C. LEAVE/CTO - LEAVE AND CTO IS AVAILABLE AS PER PLAN WHICH IS WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE. PRESENTLY MILOBS ARE PROCEEDING ON LEAVE/CTO AS PLANNED, MAINTAINING THAT 25% OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH CAN BE ON LEAVE/CTO AT ANY ONE TIME.

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CODE CABLE

- D. WELFARE - UNOMUR HAS A WELFARE FUND TO PROCURE DUTY FREE ITEMS AND RESALE TO MILOBS. THE FUND ENJOYS A MEMBERSHIP OF 20 MILOBS.
- E. MEDICAL - ALL THE MILOBS AND CIVILIAN STAFF ARE IN A VERY GOOD HEALTH CONDITION. THIS IS JUST A FORTUNATE STATE OF AFFAIRS GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE MISSION HAS DEFINITELY INADEQUATE MEDICAL FACILITIES. WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTER OUR CONCERN HAS ALSO EASED OUT.
- F. MEDALS - THE MISSION HAS NOW IN POSSESSION OF MEDALS. BUT UNFORTUNATELY BY THE TIME THE MEDALS WERE IN OUR HAND, THREE (3) OF THE CONTINGENTS ALREADY ROTATED. HOWEVER, MEDALS FOR THOSE CONTINGENTS ARE BEING SENT THROUGH UN/NYK.
- G. DISCIPLINE - THE OVERALL DISCIPLINE OF THE MILOBS IS QUITE GOOD. HOWEVER, FEW CASES OF MINOR NATURE WERE THERE WHO WERE DEALT LOCALLY.
- H. MORALE - THE MORALE OF THE MILOBS IS QUITE SATISFACTORY. THEY ARE NOW BETTER MOTIVATED TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE MANDATE/TASKS.
- I. PREPAREDNESS OF CONTINGENTS - IT HAS BEEN EXPERIENCED THAT SOME OF THE CONTINGENTS JOINED THE MISSION WITHOUT REQUISITE BACKGROUND AND PREPARATIONS LIKE:
- (1) LANGUAGE SKILLS
 - (2) DRIVING SKILLS (EVEN WITHOUT KNOWING DRIVING)
 - (3) WITHOUT PRESCRIBED PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.

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CODE CABLE

23. LOGISTICS - THE LOGISTICAL BACK UP TO UNOMUR HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. SALIENT ASPECTS OF LOGISTICS ARE GIVEN BELOW:

- A. TRANSPORT - THE WHOLE MISSION HAS A TOTAL OF 39 VEHICLES INCLUDING ONE TRUCK, ONE AMBULANCE AND ONE MINIBUS. THESE ARE SHARED AMONGST THE HQ STAFF (BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) AND PATROL TEAMS. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER IS ALRIGHT BUT THE QUALITY OF THE VEHICLES ARE NOT SATISFACTORY. THE PROBLEM OF SPARE PARTS, BATTERY AND CORRECT PATTERN OF TYRES ARE A CONSTANT ISSUE.
- B. CONSTRUCTION OF OP/CP - TILL MARCH 1994 WE HAD ONLY KATUNA AND KYANIKA AS PERMANENTLY CONSTRUCTED OP/CP. IT TOOK LONG TIME AND IN EARLY APRIL WE HAD THE OP/CP AT LUBIRIZI. THE CONTRACT OF BIGAGA/KAFUNZO AND MIRAMA HILLS HAVE BEEN FINALIZED BUT IT WILL USUALLY TAKE TIME TO HAVE THE ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED.
- C. SPARES/EQUIPMENT - IT USUALLY TAKES A LONG TIME TO GET SPARES AND ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENTS AVAILABLE IN PLACE. THIS IS DUE TO LONG 'BUREAUCRATIC' CHANNEL WHICH IS REALLY TIME CONSUMING.

CONCLUSION

24. THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNOMUR TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER HAS NEVER BEEN TAKEN HEALTHILY BY UGANDAN IN GENERAL AND NRA AND RPF IN PARTICULAR.

CODE CABLE

25. THE LAST THREE MONTHS MUCH EFFORT HAS BEEN PUT IN TO CHANGE THE MENTALITY OF THE UNMO'S TO CREATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A CONSIDERABLE INCREASE OF THE PATROL ACTIVITIES UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS WITHOUT MUCH COMFORT.

26. THE QUALITY OF THE PATROLLING IN THE BORDER AREA HAS BECOME MORE SPECIFIC AND IS STILL INCREASING.

27. THE REDUCTION OF MISSION HQ STAFF TO CREATE AN ADDITIONAL TEAM HAS HELPED IN MAXIMIZING OUR EFFORT IN INCREASING THE PATROL CAPACITY. MORESO HQ PERSONNEL IS ALSO INVOLVED IN CARRYING OUT PATROLS.

28. THE LONG AWAITED ARRIVAL OF THE HELICOPTERS HAS CONSIDERABLY CONTRIBUTED TO A MORE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF MONITORING.

29. THE EFFECT OF OUR EFFORT HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN DIMINISHED BY REQUISITE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM BECAUSE OF REASONS AS MENTIONED ABOVE: ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AS, OFC THE ROAD TIRES, SUFFICIENT SPARE PARTS, NECESSARY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT ETC. COULD NOT OR NOT ON TIME BE ACQUIRED. CONSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES WERE FREQUENTLY DELAYED.

30. WITH THE CHANGING SITUATION IN RWANDA AND PRESENT LEGITIMACY OF RPF, THE PURPOSE OF MONITORING THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER IS GRADUALLY LOSING ITS VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION.

CODE CABLE

31. AS THE RENEWED MANDATE PERIOD IS GOING TO TERMINATE ON 23 JUNE 1994, UNOMUR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MONITORING THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER VERY EFFECTIVELY AT LEAST DURING THE LAST 3 MONTHS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. THE JUSTIFICATION OF UNOMUR TO MONITOR THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER IS LOSING DUE TO THE CHANGED SITUATION IN RWANDA, AS SUCH IT WILL BE LOGICALLY NOT CORRECT TO EXTEND THE MANDATE PERIOD FROM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

33. SHOULD THE MISSION BE CLOSED, IT IS RECOMMENDED:

A. TO REPATRIATE THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENTS WHO HAVE COMPLETED MORE THAN 6 MONTHS IN THIS MISSION:

	<u>NO. OF</u> <u>MILOBS</u>	<u>DATE OF ARRIVAL IN</u> <u>THE MISSION</u>
(1) BANGLADESH	20	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
(2) BOTSWANA	9	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
(3) BRAZIL	13	END AUGUST 1993
(4) HUNGARY	4	EARLY SEPTEMBER 1993
(5) SLOVAKIA	5	EARLY NOVEMBER 1993
TOTAL	51	

B. TO ABSORB THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENTS EITHER IN UNAMIR OR ANY OTHER UN MISSION (SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF COUNTRY CONCERN) WHO HAVE JOINED THIS MISSION IN EARLY MARCH 1994

(1) NETHERLANDS	10
(2) SENEGAL	10
(3) ZIMBABWE	10
TOTAL	30

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CODE CABLE

- C. UNOMUR'S PRESENTLY HELD ASSETS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO UNAMIR. CONVERSELY, AUTHORITY MAY CONSIDER MAINTAINING A SMALL LOGISTIC LIAISON OFFICE AT KABALE WITH SOME ESSENTIAL (SKELETON) CIVILIAN STAFF. THIS WILL FACILITATE (THE SMOOTH FLOW OF) ALTERNATE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR UNAMIR BY ROAD FROM UGANDA.

34. SHOULD THE MISSION'S MANDATE PERIOD BE EXTENDED, FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS MAY BE CONSIDERED:

- A. AVIATION OFFICER OF A MISSION SHOULD NECESSARILY BE FAMILIAR WITH ORGANIZING AND CONTROLLING OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS AND SPEAK FLUENTLY THE LANGUAGE OF THE AIRCRAFT CREW. THE AVIATION OFFICER SHOULD BE A QUALIFIED OPERATIONAL HELICOPTER OFFICER (AIR MOBILE, SPECIAL FORCES ETC.), NOT A NORMAL UNMO. THIS APPOINTMENT SHOULD BE A DESIGNATED APPOINTMENT.
- B. ON ARRIVAL, MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE CHECKING IN OF PERSONNEL:
- (1) THEIR SPECIFIC MILITARY FUNCTIONAL SKILLS
 - (2) THEIR (ENGLISH) LANGUAGE SKILLS
 - (3) THEIR PRESCRIBED PERSONAL EQUIPMENT (AS PER THE GUIDANCE OF MILITARY OBSERVERS ON ASSIGNMENT)
 - (4) VEHICLE DRIVING SKILLS.
- C. IN CASE OF AN UNSATISFACTORY RATING OF (ONE OF) THE ABOVE MENTIONED ASPECTS THIS SHOULD BE REPORTED THROUGH THE MISSION'S HIGHER ECHELON TO THE NATIONAL COUNTRY AND UN/NYK WITH THE REQUEST/ADVISE FOR IMMEDIATE REPATRIATION AND REPLACEMENT.

CODE CABLE

- D. THE BALANCING OF APPOINTMENT ON THE BASIS OF NATIONALITY SHOULD GET LESS EMPHASIS THAN THE POSSIBILITIES OF APPOINTMENT ON THE BASIS OF SKILLS, EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND. CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE INFORMED ON THIS WELL IN ADVANCE AND MADE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF SENDING LESS QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.
- E. IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE FLUENT IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE MISSION.
- F. MORE RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO, IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE, SAO UNOMUR TO MAKE THE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM MORE FLEXIBLE, ADEQUATE REACTING, LESS BUREAUCRATIC AND TIME CONSUMING.

35. BEST REGARDS.

ANNEXES:

- A. ORGANIZATION OF UNOMUR (MILITARY COMPONENT)
- B. ORGANIZATION OF UNOMUR (CIVILIAN COMPONENT)
- C. DEPLOYMENT OF UNOMUR

UNOMUR




United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda-Rwanda


ANNEX A
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UNOMUR ORGANIGRAM Military Staff

Civilian Staff



UNDER CIVILIAN STAFF





ZNR 287 11/1

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

194 JUN -2 05:55

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 1 June 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1784
SUBJECT: UNOMUR: Report to the Security Council

1. As you are aware, in accordance with resolutions 846 (1993) and 891 (1993), the mandate of UNOMUR will expire on 22 June and the Secretary-General will have to submit a report to the Security Council before that date. In order to allow sufficient time for the concerned Departments at Headquarters to review the report and ensure its timely submission to the Secretary-General's office, it would be very much appreciated if you could send us a draft by Wednesday, 8 June.

2. The draft should cover developments which have occurred since the last report, with particular emphasis on the efforts made by UNOMUR to extend its monitoring activities to the whole border following the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda.

3. We are inclined to think that, in view of the embargo on arms deliveries to Rwanda decided under resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, UNOMUR has perhaps lost its "raison d'être", since there is no reason for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. Moreover, the assets of UNOMUR could, in the present circumstances, be better used to reinforce UNAMIR. We therefore feel that the Secretary-General should perhaps recommend that UNOMUR be shut down and its assets transferred to UNAMIR. If you agree with this approach, please include an appropriate narrative to this effect in the draft report. Thanks and best regards.

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