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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND

SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

CONFIDENTIAL

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JAPAN

## JAPAN

### I. Basic Information

Area:	381,945 sq.km.
Capital:	Tokyo
Population:	118.5 million
Official Language:	Japanese
GNP per Capita:	\$8,836 US (1982)

### II. Relations to the UN

Japan joined the United Nations on 18 December 1956. The Japanese government has considered co-operation with the United Nations as one of the major pillars of its foreign policy. The United Nations enjoys enthusiastic support among the Japanese people who tend to have an idealistic appreciation of its significance.

Japan has been a member of the Security Council in 1958-59, 1966-67, 1971-72, 1975-76, and 1981-82. It sits, inter alia, in the Conference on Disarmament, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, ECOSOC, the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Population Commission and ESCAP. It is a member of the International Law Commission, the UN Commission on Trade Law, and the Preparatory Commission of the Law of the Sea. It is a member of the UNDP Governing Council, the UNICEF Executive Board, the UNEP Governing Council and the World Food Council.

The United Nations University, the Asian Statistical Institute and the United Nations Regional Development Centre are located in Tokyo as well as a United Nations Information Centre and a UNDP Liaison Office.

Japan is the third largest contributor to the regular UN budget. It is currently assessed at 10.32 per cent for the period of 1983-85. Japan is also one of the largest contributors to the programmes financed by voluntary contributions. In 1984, it contributed \$58.8 million to UNDP, \$29.55 million to UNFPA, \$12.4 million to UNICEF, \$43.8 million to UNHCR, and \$8.5 million to UNRWA. Japan pledged a contribution of \$100 million to the United Nations University for the period 1973-1985 and has paid \$98 million so far. In view of its economic strength there has long been a belief in the Japanese Government that Japan should have Permanent Member status in the Security Council. There is, however, appreciation of the complications involved in such a change and the question is not being pushed.

As of March 1985, Japanese professional staff members working at the UN number 116, while the desirable range of the number of Japanese staff members is between 171 and 232, the mid-point being 201.53.

### III. Japan's Positions on Questions before the United Nations

#### 1. Peace-keeping Operations

Japan's Constitution renounces war and prohibits the development of a war-making potential. This has been interpreted to permit only self-defense military forces. Under the law governing these forces, they may not serve abroad. As a result, Japan is not able to provide troops for peace-keeping operations, even though it strongly supports the concept. Thought has been given to participation in UN truce supervisory operations since observers do not carry arms and could be seconded to the Foreign Office as in the case of military attachés. The question concerning revision of the Self-Defense Force Law remains under careful scrutiny inside and outside of the Government. Concern among Government officials over an adverse domestic reaction to the revision continues to be strong.

#### Iran-Iraq Conflict

The Japanese Government attaches paramount importance to a peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Japan and other Asian industrial nations (South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan particularly) are increasingly dependent on Iran's oil and that of other Gulf States whose petroleum moves through the Strait of Hormuz. About 80 per cent of the oil from States on the Gulf is shipped through Hormuz. Pipelines carry the remaining 20 per cent. Of the oil passing through Hormuz in the first quarter of 1983, 90 per cent went east to Asian industrial countries. Just 10 per cent went to Europe and the Americas. European nations -- particularly France and the Federal Republic of Germany -- are interested in expanding ties to Iraq's oil spigot. Japan, the country with most at stake, has attempted to counter with behind-the-scenes mediation efforts for the past three years. It has quietly been seeking to exert diplomatic leverage on Iran and Iraq by way of technical co-operation and trade with both countries.

Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe regarded highly the Secretary-General's initiative of June 1984 which produced agreement by both Iran and Iraq not to attack each other's civilian population centers. It was reported to the Japanese Foreign Ministry <sup>which</sup> was then attracted to an idea of extending this agreement to the international waters in the Gulf.

On 26 September 1984 during the 39th session of the General Assembly, Mr. Abe expressed the hope that Iran and Iraq would abide by the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and to respect the safety of



navigation in the international waters in the Gulf. This proposal for a partial cease-fire was said to have skillfully incorporated major claims and complaints of both countries; Iranian accusation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons; and Iraqi claim to include the safety of port facilities as a part of the preservation of safety of navigation in the Gulf. Iraq's port facilities had been damaged and unable to transport its oil through the Gulf. Its oil export was dependent on pipelines through Turkey.

The proposal was reported to have received support from the ~~Secretary-General~~ whom Mr. Abe asked for co-operation in its implementation. Mr. Abe had secured a positive response to his proposal from the Iraqi Government, but had failed to obtain a favorable response from the Iranian Government. It was said that Iran's positive response depended on the strength of the moderate factions in the ~~Tehran~~ Government. It was felt that the proposal would lose its effectiveness unless agreement was reached between Iran and Iraq within a year. Iraq would be likely to lose interest in the deal as its needs for port facilities on the Gulf would be greatly reduced by the opening of new pipelines through Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Abe's mediation efforts continued thereafter, but seemed to have been overtaken by the subsequent escalation of fighting between Iran and Iraq. Now, Iraq rejects the idea of a limited cease-fire and will agree to nothing less than a complete end of the war. Most recently, Iraq was reported to be willing to accept a moratorium, but only if it were a step toward complete cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, the ~~Secretary-General~~ has been able to maintain his links to both governments. He was able to get both countries to allow UN investigation teams to visit POW camps in Iran and Iraq in January 1985. Although the June 1984 moratorium on attacks against civilian targets has been broken, both governments requested the ~~Secretary-General~~ to retain his representatives in their capitals. Increasing confidence in the ~~Secretary-General~~ by both governments, in particular Iran, has cast a new light on the role of the ~~Secretary-General~~ for the future mediation of the conflict. Japan has not lost its enthusiasm for playing a role in the mediation efforts. The Japanese Government has invited Hojatolislam Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) to Tokyo in the early part of July.

#### Kampuchea

Japan considers that the core of the Kampuchean problem lies in the fact that the Kampuchean people have been denied their right to self-determination owing to foreign military interventions. It maintains that the only way to restore lasting peace to Kampuchea and to ensure the peace and security of the

region is by allowing the Kampuchean people to freely choose their own political future. Japan made a proposal at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1984 which consisted of: financial co-operation for peace-keeping activities in the event of last September's ASEAN appeal being implemented, with the consent of all the countries concerned; providing personnel and other services necessary, if free elections are held throughout the whole of Kampuchean territory under international supervision; and assistance in the construction of Indo-China after peace has been restored in Kampuchea.

#### Korea

While Japan supports, in principle, the unity of Korea, it supports UN membership for both South and North (advocated by South Korea, but opposed by North Korea) as long as such a step would be effective in the relaxation of tensions. Japan has a vital interest in the relaxation of tensions and maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula. President Chun Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea (ROK) paid an official visit to Japan in September 1984, the first time that the President of the ROK has done so.

#### Middle East

Japan believes that peace should be achieved through the early and complete implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and through recognition of, and respect for, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination. Japan considers it is essential that the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and Israel's right to exist should be mutually recognized and that the PLO, representing the Palestinian people, participate in the peace process. Japan has accepted a PLO office in Tokyo. Japan finds the situation in Lebanon deplorable and urged all the parties concerned to redouble their efforts for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and the attainment of national reconciliation.

#### Afghanistan

Japan maintains that the foreign troops in Afghanistan should be withdrawn immediately and that the problem should be solved in accordance with the principle of non-interference and respect for the right of self-determination. It supports the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative to facilitate a solution. Japan does not recognize the present regime in Afghanistan.

#### 2. Disarmament

Japan strongly supports disarmament efforts in the United Nations and provides direct financial assistance to several UN programmes. In June 1984, Japan sent

its Foreign Minister for the first time to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. At the Conference, he appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to resume negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces and on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. He proposed, for advancing the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, an approach whereby the "threshold" for a nuclear test ban would be gradually lowered as capabilities of verification are improved. Japan supports the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. It finds the need for a ban on chemical weapons and prevention of arms race in outer space vitally important.

3. The 40th Anniversary of the United Nations.

Japan pledges to fulfill international responsibilities and to work with other countries to revitalize the United Nations which is the only institutional foundation for peace agreed upon by many countries of the world. Japan reiterates its renunciation of force as a means of settling international disputes and pledges to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

4. African Crisis

Japan is of the view that, while the need to relieve starvation is of obvious urgency, the complex structural factors must be dealt with by comprehensive measures involving the international community. It proposes that all United Nations agencies be mobilized to draw up a unified plan of action for Africa, and it calls upon all the Member States of the United Nations to participate under such a plan, which Japan believes would help streamline a bewildering array of contradictory policy responses by various countries. As a start, Japan has pledged \$ US 100 million in food assistance to Africa in 1984. It is the second largest non-regional subscriber to the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund. The Japanese Government has, in co-operation with various private associations, conducted campaigns and fund raising activities. The Japanese private sector has raised \$ US 4.3 million for the UNICEF African Emergency Programme alone.

It would be very helpful for the success of future campaigns, if the Secretary-General would make a direct appeal to the Japanese public for assistance to the African crisis with a few words of encouragement on the fund raising activities by various civic groups.

5. Apartheid Policy of South Africa and Namibia

In accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, Japan has no diplomatic relations with South Africa, no investment in that country, no military co-operation, no co-operation in the field of nuclear weapon development or in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and no

exchange in the cultural, educational and sporting fields. Japan's relations with South Africa are confined to normal trade, and the Government is making efforts to reduce Japan's dependence on imports from South Africa. Japan has called upon South Africa to abandon its policy of racial discrimination. However, it does not endorse the encouragement of armed struggle or military assistance to a national liberation movement. On the question of Namibia, Japan believes the question should be solved on the basis of resolution 435, but it cannot support armed struggle. Japan has reservations on the assertion that SWAPO is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, because it considers this can only be determined through free and fair elections.

#### IV. Government

##### Parliamentary Democracy

##### Constitution:

Executive: Prime Minister (Head of Government)

Legislature: bicameral Diet (House of Representatives and House of Councilors)

Judicial: (Civil Law system)

##### Political Parties:

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Democratic Socialist Party (DSP),

Komeito (Clean Government Party), Japan Communist Party (JCP).

#### 1. Profile of Prime Minister Nakasone

Mr. Nakasone was elected Prime Minister of Japan in November 1982, and his second term was confirmed by the LDP in November 1984. According to the recent poll by ... major newspapers, his Government enjoys more than 50 per cent of public support. The newspapers attributed the popularity to his leadership in shaping Japan's foreign policy as a world power, which provided the Japanese public a sense of pride and confidence. Mr. Nakasone was first elected to the Diet in 1947. He had been consistently elected in the thirteen general elections held until 1982. He was seventy years old in 1985. Since the late 1960s he had filled several Cabinet posts and key party offices. Since 1966 he has also led an intraparty faction of his own.

Mr. Nakasone is one of those LDP politicians who had belonged to the Democratic Party (called Progressive or Reformists at different times) before that party merged with the then Liberal Party in 1955 to form the Liberal Democratic Party. There are some real and significant differences in the policy priorities of the Democrats and the Liberals. The Liberals tend to focus on economic issues; to them economic stability and prosperity are the most important objectives of

good government. As long as the democratic reforms introduced by the Allied Occupation Government after World War II help achieve rapid economic development and stability, they should be maintained and utilized. Democrats like Nakasone tend to emphasize ideological issues; for them, true salvation of the Japanese cannot be found purely in material affluence but must be sought in a spiritual national awakening. They have been committed, more or less, to an overhaul of the "occupation imposed" post-war regime.

Mr. Nakasone is the fourth Democrat who has managed to rise to the top of the LDP hierarchy. However, his view of the post-war reforms and the need to overhaul the existing constitutional system has never been popular with the majority of the nation's electorate. For his political survival and electoral success, Mr. Nakasone has had to moderate and sometimes conceal his deeper ideological convictions and commitments just as the three earlier Democrat line Prime Ministers had to do.

## 2. Foreign Policy

The Nakasone Government has advocated a need for Japan to integrate with the Western Alliance ostensibly to cope with an alleged military threat from the Soviet Union in East Asia. Since it took office in November 1982, the Government has taken significant steps towards expanding Japan's security ties to the West. The position of the Soviet Union in talks with the United States on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe (INF talks), led the Government to reconfirm its position that the security of Japan could not be dealt with in isolation from European security.

The trend culminated at the Williamsburg Summit of May 1983 when Mr. Nakasone joined other participating Western leaders in a Joint Statement endorsing a common defense policy for the West. This was the first time for a Japanese leader to do so. At previous summit meetings, Japan had been reluctant to take up defense as a summit issue since it had seen its own defense primarily in the regional context of a Japan-US security pact.

Since then, Mr. Nakasone has stressed the dimensions of Japan's security interests in the global strategic context. In doing so, his position gained the support of Japan's friendly Asian neighbors, in particular, the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN States, these being vital for Japan in respect to promoting its political position vis-à-vis other Western powers.

The Nakasone Government encourages close relations with China. Japan's economic co-operation with China in the latter's modernization process continues to expand. In the political domain, the two countries have quietly been co-operating with each other to bring about relaxation of tensions on the Korean

peninsula.

Japan's relations with the Soviet Union continue to be cool. The Nakasone Government stresses the solution of the territorial issues involving the northern islands off the coast of Hokkaido as a step toward a conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. It emphasizes its concern about the alleged Soviet deployment of military forces in the above-mentioned territories. Japan's financial and technological co-operation with the Soviet Union in Siberian development, which had attracted Japanese business in the past, has not been resumed.



Lower House of Japanese Parliament

Liberal Democratic Party	267
Socialist Party	113
Clean Government Party (Komeito)	59
Democratic Socialist Party	39
Communist Party	27
Others	<u>6</u>
	<u>511</u>

(Last election: Dec. 18, 1983)

Upper House of Japanese Parliament

Liberal Democratic Party	136
Socialist Party	43
Clean Government Party	27
Democratic Socialist Party	13
Communist Party	14
Others	<u>19</u>
	<u>252</u>

(Last election: June 26, 1983)

JAPAN

LIST OF CABINET MEMBERS

Prime Minister	Nakasone, Yasuhiro
Min. of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries	Sato, Moriyoshi
Min. of Construction	Kibe, Yoshiaki
Min. of Education	Matsunaga, Hikaru
Min. of Finance	Takeshita, Noboru
Min. of Foreign Affairs	Abe, Shintaro
Min. of Health and Welfare	Matsuka, Hiroyuki
Min. of Home Affairs	Furuya, Toru
Min. of International Trade and Industry	Murata, Reijiro
Min. of Justice	Shimaskai, Hitoshi
Min. of Labor	Yamaguchi, Toshio
Min. of Posts and Telecommunications	Sato, Megumu
Min. of Transport	Yamashita, Tokuo
Min. Without Portfolio	Komoto, Toshio
Chief Cabinet Secretary	Fujinami, Takao
Chmn. Atomic Energy Commission	Takeuchi, Reiichi
Chmn. Natl. Public Safety Commission	Furuya, Toru
Dir. Gen. Management and Coordination Agency	Gotoda, Masaharu
Dir. Gen. Economic Planning Agency	Kaneko, Ippei
Dir. Gen. Environmental Agency	Ishimoto, Shigeru
Dir. Gen. Natl. Land Agency	Kawamoto, Kakuzo
Dir. Gen. Okinawa Development Agency	Komoto, Toshio
Dir. Gen. Science and Technology Agency	Takeuchi, Reiichi



The Northern Islands - Japan-USSR Dispute

The so-called Northern Islands - which are also known as "Northern Territories" in Japan - are a group of small islands which lie at the southern end of the Kuril island chain, just off eastern Hokkaido. They are Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.

The Treaty for Exchanges of Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands was concluded between Japan and Russia in 1875. Under this Treaty, Sakhalin became Russian Territory and all the Kuril Islands became Japanese. Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Russia ceded to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin, south of 50 degrees north latitude. At the end of WWII, the Soviet Union occupied the Kuril Islands including the so-called Northern Islands as part of the territorial settlement between Japan and the Allied Powers.

The Cairo Declaration of 27 November 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 confirmed the principle of no territorial expansion by means of war as set forth in the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941 and declared that Japan was to lose "all the Pacific islands which it has acquired since the beginning of World War I, and that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."

The Yalta Agreement of 26 July 1945 stipulated that Southern Sakhalin and its adjacent islands were to be returned to the USSR and that the Kuril Islands be surrendered to the USSR, but did not define what the Kuril Islands included. Finally, by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 8 September 1951, Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the island adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."

Japan considers that the principle of no territorial expansion by means of war - that is, the renunciation of territory acquired by force since the beginning of World War I - should have been applied to all territorial settlements with the Allied Powers without exception. Furthermore, Japan views the Northern Islands as its national territory, historically distinct from the Kuril Islands, and therefore not subject to the Yalta Agreement. Japan insists that the question should be finally solved by a peace treaty.

The USSR, on the other hand, considers the Yalta Agreement as binding over these islands and has indicated that in any peace treaty it would require that Japan recognize USSR sovereignty over the Kuril Islands including the Northern Islands.

In purely legal terms, the positions of Japan and the USSR appear to be irreconcilable. Any resolution would have to be essentially political. The issue has been complicated further by increasing fishery problems in the area. It has always been an irritant in USSR-Japanese relations, but the seriousness of the issue has depended on overall political relations between the two countries. The Nakasone Government regards the issue to be in the forefront of his policy toward the USSR.



# THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY

New York Liaison Office  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 19 June 1985

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

TO: The Secretary-General  
United Nations

THROUGH: Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General  
Department of Public Information

FROM: Jose V. Abueva, Director *José V. Abueva*  
UNU New York Liaison Office

SUBJECT: The United Nations University and Japan

As you prepare for your visit to Tokyo, I have the honor to submit herewith a brief note on the relationship between the United Nations University and Japan, as requested by the Department of Public Information.

1. Japan's outstanding commitment to UN principles and ideals

Japan's commitment to the principles and ideals of the United Nations and its substantial and dependable financial support of the United Nations and its various agencies and institutions stand out in a world in which bilateral and unilateral actions are eroding multilateralism. Japan's fulfillment of its generous pledge to the UN University underscores such commitment and support, as does its hosting of the UN Centre for Regional Development, the UN Statistical Institute for Asia and the Pacific, and the UN Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.

2. Japan's continuing support of UNU

Japan has paid \$98 million of the \$100 million it had originally pledged towards the establishment and operation of the UNU. It has provided UNU's temporary headquarters and facilities since 1975. It is preparing plans for constructing the permanent UNU headquarters at a choice location in the centre of Tokyo. At the same time serious consideration is being given in Japan to the idea of establishing a research and training centre in the country as an institute of advanced studies of the UNU. (The first UNU research and training centre is the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) at Helsinki.)

3. UNU permanent headquarters

In recognition of the development and expansion of UNU's programme activities, and the acute shortage of temporary space for UNU's staff and visiting scholars, and for its facilities, records and supplies, the planning and construction of UNU's permanent headquarters need to be speeded up. The maintenance and security of the permanent headquarters building, as well as the growing activities of the UNU, will require new expenditures to be borne by the UNU budget. It is therefore important that the permanent headquarters be enabled to raise revenues through rental of part of its space and facilities to the UN and other suitable international organizations.

.. /

#### 4. Research and Training Centre in Japan

With a view to promoting greater international cooperation involving Japanese scholars and institutions and strengthening the intellectual capacity of the University Centre at the UNU headquarters in Tokyo, various consultative meetings have taken place in Tokyo towards the establishment of a research and training centre in Japan that would be global in its participation and outreach. The meetings have involved several Japanese officials and academics and scholars from other countries, including heads of prestigious institutes of advanced studies, along with UNU senior staff. The Council of the UNU has endorsed the early establishment of such a research and training centre as an institute of advanced studies and urged that initial programme activities be launched without waiting for the construction of the centre building or the permanent headquarters. A group of Japanese political leaders, businessmen and scholars has organized a foundation which is supporting the project. (The proposed centre was included in the original offer of the Government of Japan to the Secretary-General of the U.N. in June 1973.)

It is essential that the UNU and the Government of Japan work closely together for the earliest possible initiation of programme activities of the proposed research and training centre. This will prepare the ground for the early establishment of the proposed centre or institute. It is important that the accelerated planning and construction of the UNU permanent headquarters incorporate the requirements of the proposed centre or institute.

#### 5. Fund-raising for UNU

The sum of \$164,346,528 has been pledged to the Endowment Fund of the UNU, and \$134,230,426 was received as of 22 May 1985 from some 20 countries. In addition, the UNU has received \$6,582,555 in operating contributions. Except for Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, the largest contributors to the United Nations regular budget have not pledged support to the Endowment Fund. Thus most of the 20 present contributors to the Endowment Fund are developing countries. The UNU Council is reviewing the fund-raising strategy of the University with a view to raising more funds for its growing needs by presenting its work effectively and meeting the requirements of the present donors and potential new donors.

#### 6. Summing-up

- a. The United Nations and the UNU are deeply grateful to the Government of Japan for its commitment to and generous support of the ideals and work of both organizations.
- b. The UNU is also grateful to individual Japanese leaders, organizations and scholars for their contribution to the work of the University and its plans for the future.
- c. To alleviate the acute lack of working space and allow for the foreseeable growth of the UNU, it is important that the construction of the UNU permanent headquarters be accelerated. To meet additional costs of maintenance and security, it is necessary for the headquarters to be able to raise revenues by renting out space to UN and other suitable international organizations.
- d. The UNU and the Government of Japan need to work closely and urgently to initiate programme activities that will lead to the early establishment of the proposed research and training centre in Japan as an institute of advanced studies. The centre or institute would be in the best interests of Japan and the UNU because it will foster and develop greater collaborative relations between institutions, organizations and individual scholars in Japan and those in various parts of the world, especially in the developing countries. Incorporation of the requirements of the proposed centre in the planning and construction of the UNU permanent headquarters will ensure the early and integrated development of the centre vis-a-vis the permanent headquarters.
- e. The fund-raising strategy of the UNU is undergoing review and possible revision to fulfil the increasing financial requirements as envisaged in the medium-term perspective.



## THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY

20 June 1985

### Addendum to "The United Nations University and Japan"

1. The UNU badly needs additional space at its temporary headquarters at the Toho Seimei Building in Shibuya. The Secretary-General and the UNU would be grateful if the Government of Japan could meet this urgent need as requested by the Rector.
2. The original host country agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Japan regarding the establishment of the UNU needs to be liberally interpreted in order to allow the UNU to have the space and facilities at its permanent headquarters which it could use to earn income from various organizations and institutions (not only from UN and other international organizations).
3. The Council of the UNU wants the proposed research and training centre in Japan to be established as soon as practicable. Toward this end programme activities are being initiated which could then be housed temporarily at the UNU's permanent headquarters building when completed.

11 June 1985

JAPAN

Representation of Japan in geographical and non-geographical posts with the United Nations and some other UN organs

Briefing note for the Secretary-General's trip to Japan

A. Number of staff in the Secretariat and other organs

1. As of 31 May 1985, Japan has 117 staff members in geographic posts as against a desirable range of 172-233. Japan is, therefore, under-represented in the United Nations Secretariat.
2. In addition there were, as of May 1985, 44 Japan nationals on non-geographic posts at the United Nations Secretariat, 48 employed by UNDP and UNFPA, 22 by UNICEF, 2 by ITC, 1 by UNRWA, 1 by ICSC, 16 by UNHCR, 67 by UNU, 1 on Secondment to Specialized Agency and 2 on Special Leave Without Pay. The total number of staff in the above-mentioned organizations therefore equals 321.
3. Attached is a table containing statistical data on Japan's representation in the United Nations Secretariat for the last 10 years, as of 30 June of each year, which is the end of the year for the purpose of reporting to the General Assembly. This table also indicates the most recent data available for 30 June 1984. Attached as well is a list of the 321 nationals of this Member State within the United Nations Secretariat and other organizations. This list shows the names, levels of posts encumbered, functional titles, offices and duty stations where the staff members were employed as of May 1985.

B. Position of Japan in comparison with the other largest contributors to the United Nations budget

4. In absolute numbers of geographical staff, Japan, which is the third largest contributor, after USA and the USSR, occupies the fifth position, following, in addition to the above-mentioned States, France and Germany (FR), which are, respectively, the fifth and fourth largest contributors. Immediately following Japan is the United Kingdom, the sixth largest contributor. Of these States, four are founding Members of the Organization and Members of the Security Council, which have established a position in the Secretariat for their nationals over forty years. Japan and Germany (FR) have become Member States much more recently and owe their present position mainly to the recruitment efforts carried out in recent years.
5. The number of appointments of Japanese nationals normally is as high as between 5 and 10 per cent of the total of appointments in any given year. The rate of turnover, however, is also very high. During the years 1980-1984, 97 Japanese nationals were appointed. During the same years, 54 separated (10 of whom held career appointments). The proportion of separations to appointments

amounted to 55.7 per cent. In other words, the number of separations of Japanese nationals every year amounts to over half the number of their appointments. Therefore, it has been difficult to improve the representation of Japan in the Secretariat despite extraordinary efforts made. The Japanese government may wish to analyze the reason for such high turnover and, together with the Secretariat, find ways of making a long-term career with the United Nations more attractive to Japanese nationals.

C. Representation of Japan at the senior levels

6. Japan's staff position at the senior levels is not only not noticeably inferior to that of the other States mentioned in this note but actually compares favourably with that of both well-established Member States (such as the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and more recent ones (such as the Federal Republic of Germany). It is worth noting again that a number of nationals of countries such as France, the United Kingdom, the USA and others have reached the senior levels only after many years in the Secretariat.

7. On a point raised by the Japanese Ambassador comparing the concentration of Japanese at the P-2 level whereas the most numerous grade in the Secretariat is P-4, it is true that P-4's constitute the highest number of positions in the Secretariat. Of 3084 posts subject to geographical distribution in the Secretariat, as of 31 May 1985, 822 were P-4's, followed by P-3's (806), P-5's (580), P-1/P-2's (471), D-1 (259) and highest level posts, D-2 to USG (146). All the states mentioned in this note do better than Japan in this respect (see table B below). Where the percentage of senior posts (D-1 and above) is concerned, however, Japan does better than most, as shown below:

T A B L E A

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Total Number of Staff</u>	<u>Number of Staff at D-1 and above</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
France	130	21	16.2
United Kingdom	108	17	15.9
Japan	117	18	15.4
USSR	174	25	14.4
USA	474	44	9.3
GFR	119	7	5.9

8. Table B shows the distribution of staff by level of post among the six States with more staff, as well as among all other States and the Secretariat as a whole.



T A B L E B

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Total Staff</u>	<u>Total Senior Staff D-1 +</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total P-5</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total P-3/P-4</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total P-1/P-2</u>	<u>%</u>
USA	474	44	9.3	94	19.8	271	57.17	65	13.7
USSR	174	25	14.4	24	13.79	111	63.79	14	8.05
FRANCE	130	21	16.15	24	18.5	60	46.15	25	19.2
GFR	119	7	5.9	22	18.5	65	54.62	24	20.2
JAPAN	117	18	15.4	16	13.7	46	39.3	37	31.6
UK	107	17	15.88	22	20.56	51	47.66	17	15.89
OTHERS	1963	273	13.9	378	19.26	1024	52.17	289	14.72
GRAND TOTAL	3084	405	13.2	580	18.81	1628	52.79	471	15.27

9. The pattern revealed by Japan's staff distribution is of heavy concentration at the highest and lowest levels. This is the result of appointments - many at the senior levels, and many more at the entry levels, as a consequence of the use of competitive examinations - rather than of long-term careers and internal promotions, which tend to concentrate staff at the middle levels (P-3 to P-5).

#### D. Promotions of Japanese nationals

10. A preliminary analysis of the number of promotions of Professional staff by country would appear to reveal a pattern of promotions more favourable to other largest contributors than to the Japanese. This is partly because information on Professional promotions lump together staff on geographic and non-geographic posts, although promotion patterns are different in both types of posts. Promotions, moreover, are granted after a minimum period of service ranging between three and five years, depending on the grade to which staff are being promoted. The rate of promotion of Japanese nationals would be raised if they stayed in the Secretariat for a longer period of time, totalling in the majority of cases the minimum number of years needed to be eligible for promotion.

#### E. Entry-level posts

11. Consecutive General Assembly resolutions have mandated recruitment at the entry level through national competitive examinations. In addition to being an objective method for selection, examinations have been a primary means of improving the geographical representation of Member States and have, as a result, been organized primarily in inadequately represented Member States. Five examinations have been given in Japan (1975, 1981, and, since 1983, annually.) A total of 25 Japanese nationals have been recruited as a result.



F. Information on special issues

12. In recent exchanges between Secretariat and Japanese officials, a number of special issues have been raised:

13. a. "Discrimination" against Japanese nationals because of the Japanese educational system: the case of the appointment of Mr. Suehiro in Internal Audit.

14. There is no discrimination against any Member State because of its educational system. Japan shares with a great number of other countries an educational system where the first level university degree is considered fully a professional degree. It is a fact that the standard educational requirement for appointment to the Secretariat professional posts is of an advanced university degree. However, in most cases, the published and distributed Vacancy Announcements carry a proviso allowing the exchange of this advanced degree for additional years of experience. Mr. Suehiro applied in response to a published newspaper advertising in Japan which, by necessity was brief. Further advertising will indicate whether indeed there may be Japanese nationals with equivalent professional experience and a higher level university degree. Should no such candidates be forthcoming, the case of Mr. Suehiro may be reconsidered.

15. Incidentally, it should be noted that 44 of the 117 Japanese nationals on the staff of the Secretariat indeed possess at least a degree equivalent to a Master's and a number have full doctorates.

16. b. The case of Mr. Fukutani (D-2 in OGS) is still under consideration within the Office of Personnel Services.

17. c. In the case of Mr. Hayashi, his qualifications will be given every consideration by the appropriate departments and the Secretary-General's office should appropriate vacancies at the D-2 level occur.

## Recruitment Update

(Numbers in parentheses represent female staff members or candidates)

### JAPAN

1. Geographical Repr. Range:

Desirable range: 172-233

Midpoint: 202.33

Staff on board: 117(27)

(reflected in official statistics)

New staff: 4

(not yet reflected in official statistics)

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2/P-1</u>
Total: 121(27) (including new staff)	1	2	3	12(3)	16(1)	23(3)	26(7)	38(13)

2. Cases presented to APC/APB: 8(2) - 1 4 3(2)  
(during last 12 months)

3. Detail of APC/APB cases during last 12 months:

<u>Level</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Functional Title</u>	<u>Comments</u>
D-1	Katsuno, M.	PGAA Principal Officer	Recruited
P-4	Horiochi, M.	DIESA Soc. Affrs Officer	Recruited: not yet in official statistics
P-4	Ishigami, Y.	OFS Systems Analyst	Recruited: not yet in official statistics
P-4	Nakayama, S.	ESCAP Econ Affrs Officer	APB 13/11/84
P-4	Watanabe, M.	UNDRO Relief Coord Officer	Recruited: not yet in official statistics
P-3	Hasegawa, M.	UNOG Research Officer	Recruited
P-3	Matsumoto, Y.	UNCTAD Programmer/Analyst	EOD 2/83: Resigned 12/84: not included in official statistics
P-3	Nissanke, W.K.	UNCTAD Econ Affrs Officer	EOD: summer 1985

4. Staff reaching retirement:

1985: 1 (D-1)  
1986: 2 (1 D-2: 1 P-5)

5. Candidates on the computerized roster: 76(13)

6. Leading candidates:

P-4	Kiryu, M.	ESCAP	Econ. Affrs Officer	To be submitted APC
P-3	Fukasawa	UNCHS	Human Settlmnts Officer	Leading candidate
P-3	Yamakawa, R.	ESCAP	Econ Affairs Officer	Leading candidate

7. 1983 examination candidates:

P-2	Nagayoshi, N.	UNJSPF	Assoc. Accountant	Recruited
P-2	Kato, J.	IAD	Assoc. Auditor	Recruited
P-2	Ohta, H.	UNIDO	Assoc. Indus.Dev.Offcer	Recruited: not yet in official statistics
P-2	Fujita, M.	CTC	Assoc. TNC Officer	Recruited
P-2	Maki, K.	UNEP	Assoc. Finance Officer	Recruited
P-2	Nakajima, A.	ESCAP	Assoc. EAO	Recruited
P-2	Takase, C.	DIESA	Accoc. EAO	Recruited
P-2	Tamaru, M.	UNOG	Assoc. Finance Officer	Offer made 16/6/85 EOD July/August 1985
P-2	Takahara, A.	CTC		Declined offer 11/9/84
P-2	Kitagawa, C.			Withdrew candidature

8. 1984 competitive examination:

(Five posts were earmarked for this examination but only four successful candidates)

P-2	Gota, Niharu	OFS	Programmer/Analyst	EOD: June 1985
P-2	Okamoto, Masato	DIESA	Statistician	Offer made 18/4/85
P-2	Osaki, Keiko	DIESA	Pop Affrs Officer	Offer made 15/4/85
P-2	Takao, K.		Under consideration (no specific post)	

9. 1985 competitive examination:

Four posts have been earmarked for the 1985 competitive examination:  
in addition there are two posts for the reserve list

Prepared 17 June 1985

Division for Policy Co-ordination  
Office of Personnel Services

STAFF MEMBERS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF  
JAPAN  
IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION  
1975-1984\*

	<u>USG</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>D-2</u>	<u>D-1</u>	<u>P-5</u>	<u>P-4</u>	<u>P-3</u>	<u>P-2</u>	<u>P-1</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Desi- range</u>	<u>Contri- bution</u>	<u>Weighted range</u>	<u>Weighted Staff Position</u>
1975	-	1	1	1	9	17	21	10	5	65	107-150	7.15	3566-2494	1448.0
1976	-	1	1	1	9	23	18	12	5	70	117-162	7.15	4689-3301	1566
1977	-	1	1	1	12	21	20	11	2	69	136-184	8.66	4097-5543	1966
1978	1	-	1	3	13	23	17	13	3	74	136-183	8.64	4119-5573	2141
1979	1	-	1	2	14	20	20	13	2	73	135-182	8.64	4102-5550	2103
1980	1	-	1	4	18	22	17	15	2	80	148-201	9.58	4644-6283	2370
1981	1	-	-	6	18	21	16	16	2	80	163-220	9.58	6468-8751	3023
1982	1	-	2	5	20	21	20	31	1	101	161-217	9.58	6371-8620	3665
1983	1	-	3	8	18	19	19	37	1	106	173-234	10.32	6791-9188	3841
1984	1	1	3	10	16	21	26	34	1	113	172-233	10.32	6821-9228	4158

	<u>Staff at beginning of year</u>	<u>A P P O I N T M E N T S</u>			<u>S E P A R A T I O N S</u>			<u>Adjust- ments</u>		<u>Staff at end of year</u>
		<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Career</u>	<u>Non- career</u>	<u>Total</u>			
1975	74	-	7	7	4	10	14	-	-2	65
1976	65	5	7	12	2	5	7	-	-	70
1977	70	2	5	7	1	5	6	-	-2	69
1978	69	1	8	9	2	3	5	+2	-1	74
1979	74	1	10	11	4	5	9	+1	-4	73
1980	73	2	15	17	1	8	9	-	-1	80
1981	80	2	16	18	6	8	14	+1	-5	80
1982	80	10	19	29	2	8	10	+2	-	101
1983	101	1	14	15	1	11	12	+2	-	106
1984	106	-	18	18	-	10	10	+1	-2	113

\*as of June of each year

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The Secretary-General  
A:

DATE: 19 June 1985

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM: Patricio Ruedas  
DE: Under-Secretary-General  
for Administration and Management

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Office of General Services  
OBJET:

- ....
1. In the attached memorandum of 6 June, Mrs. Weil recommends the promotion of Mr. Per Sjögren (a Swedish national) to the D-2 post of Director, Purchase, Transportation and Commercial Services Division, as of 1 January 1986.
  2. In fact, this recommendation is a little more complex. It proposes, first, that the current incumbent of the post, Mr. Hiroshi Fukutani (a Japanese national appointed on a fixed-term basis on 2 January 1982) not be extended in that post beyond his current appointment, which expires on 1 January 1986. Given the difficulties of finding alternative placement at that level, this recommendation is tantamount to one of non-extension of this fixed-term appointment. Second, the recommendation is that, once the post is vacant, Mr. Sjögren be promoted to it. In view of the fact that you have reserved to yourself all decisions regarding appointments and extensions at, and promotions to, the D-2 level, your decision will be needed on both points.
  3. As regards the first issue, i.e. Mr. Fukutani, Mrs. Weil does not consider him an effective manager, and I have no reason to dispute her assessment. This is particularly critical in the Office of General Services, which has only two posts at the D-2 level, and requires, perhaps more than other offices, that the incumbent of each of these two posts cover fully and effectively the entire range of his or her responsibilities.
  4. On the other hand, Japan is an underrepresented country, and is even more underrepresented at the senior level. Also Mrs. Weil's predecessor, Mr. Timbrell, never informed Mr. Fukutani that he was not pleased with his services. The first of these considerations is political; I have already received representations on Mr. Fukutani from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan, Ambassador Kobayashi, and the Japanese Government will no doubt press you on this matter during your forthcoming visit to Japan. The second of these considerations is of a personnel nature, since Mr. Fukutani might state that, during three of his four years of service, he was led to believe that his performance was irreproachable.

5. A final consideration in the matter of Mr. Fukutani is that he was not a civil servant in his Government, so that, at almost 57 years of age, he would have nowhere to return. Nor would he have acquired a pension, since a pension accrues only after five years of service, whereas Mr. Fukutani would have only four years of service on completion of his current appointment.

6. As regards Mr. Sjögren, if the D-2 post in question were vacant, I would have no hesitation in endorsing Mrs. Weil's recommendation. Mr. Sjögren is excellent on all counts - variety of experience, qualifications and performance - and would, I am sure, be an excellent Director in the post in question.

7. In these circumstances, the obvious inclination is to have one's cake and eat it, i.e. to endeavour to place Mr. Fukutani elsewhere, at least for one further year, and to promote Mr. Sjögren to the post in question. I have sought the co-operation of OPS and OFS in this regard; as could be expected, in the limited time available since Mrs. Weil's recommendation of 6 June, they have been unable to identify any alternative placement for Mr. Fukutani.

8. As to the question whether a decision is needed now rather than in a few months time, you will note from Mrs. Weil's memorandum that she finds it necessary to firm up, not only Mr. Fukutani's succession, but also that of Mr. Sjögren. Advance planning for these moves should take place now.

9. Thus, in the final analysis there are two options: to extend Mr. Fukutani for one year in his current assignment, or to decide at this stage that Mr. Sjögren will be promoted into the D-2 post in question as of 2 January 1986 - with Mr. Fukutani probably leaving. The first option would not rock the boat; it would please Japan; it would be humane to Mr. Fukutani; but it would prolong a very unsatisfactory situation in OGS. The second option will be unwelcome to Japan and may be considered harsh to Mr. Fukutani; but will in all likelihood improve the effectiveness of the Office of General Services.

10. On balance therefore I recommend for your approval the more difficult of the two decisions, i.e. to decide at this stage that Mr. Sjögren will be promoted as proposed by Mrs. Weil. Mr. de Olivares, OPS and I myself should seek an alternative placement for Mr. Fukutani for a further year. If these efforts are unsuccessful, he would have to go.

cc Mr. Sjöberg  
(Japan file)

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The Secretary-General  
A:  
THROUGH: Mr. Patricio Ruedas  
S/C DE: Under-Secretary-General for  
Administration and Management  
FROM: Alice E. Weil  
DE: Assistant Secretary-General  
for General Services  
SUBJECT: OGS: Promotion of Mr. Per Sjögren to D-2  
OBJET:

DATE: 6 June 1985

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

*Alice E. Weil*

As I have already discussed with you, the post of Director, Purchase, Transportation and Commercial Services Division (one of the two D-2 posts in the whole of OGS), which is now encumbered by Mr. Hiroshi Fukutani (Japan), will be vacant as of 1 January 1986. It is my proposal that Mr. Per Sjögren (Sweden, D-1), now Chief of Buildings Management Service (BMS), be promoted to that post. The post covers procurement, contracting, travel, catering and postal administration and entails responsibility for the work of approximately 400 United Nations staff members and 200 contractual personnel.

Mr. Sjögren has been in UN, including UNDP, service for twenty-two years and has served in various duty stations in the Middle East, Africa and Europe. His last assignment in UNDP before joining my Office last year was for three years as Chief (D-1) of UNDP's Division of Administration and Management Services where he was responsible for: (a) maintenance and operations services including procurement for UNDP Headquarters; (b) office space for Headquarters and UNDP field offices; (c) UNDP communications and records; (d) UNDP field service and housing; and (e) travel services.

Mr. Sjögren's managerial skills and innovative approach to improving efficiency and economy were highly regarded in UNDP and also by UN officials, including myself, who had occasion to work with UNDP on common problems and services. After his transfer last year to this Office, his impact on the work of BMS was immediate and salutary. He is a good manager and an effective and demanding supervisor. He is versatile and articulate and able to conceive and develop projects as well as to carry them out with attention to detail. I know of no one better suited by experience and capability for this post.

I am requesting your approval now of Mr. Sjögren's promotion several months in advance of the vacancy because I need immediately to make related arrangements for other senior posts in my Office. I have already emphasized to you that OGS has very few managerial posts relative to the number of its staff and the range of its functions, so that such posts must be filled by specially experienced and high calibre professionals capable of discharging "line" responsibilities if we are to maintain reasonable standards of essential services.

Mr. Erich Jaros (Austria), an architect/engineer, now Chief (P-5) of the Buildings Management Section in UNIDO, Vienna, would greatly strengthen the Office because of his professional background, and his very considerable, and directly relevant UN experience over the last ten years. I have ascertained that he would be interested in coming to New York if assured of becoming Chief of BMS; that post will be vacant only in January 1986 and only if Mr. Sjögren replaces Mr. Fukutani. I consider Mr. Jaros the most suitable replacement for Mr. Sjögren as Chief of BMS. It would be highly desirable and useful to the Service if Mr. Jaros could spend September through December familiarizing himself with BMS at New York Headquarters, and this can be arranged.

Accordingly, I request your concurrence with my proposal to promote Mr. Sjögren.



AGENDA OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OF JAPAN

25 June 1985

1. Fortieth Anniversary of the UN
2. Political Problems
  - a) Middle East
    - i) Iran-Iraq
    - ii) Peace Negotiations in Middle East
    - iii) Afghanistan
  - b) Kampuchea
  - c) Central America (SG's visit)
  - d) Narcotic Drugs (SG's proposal)
3. Administrative and Budgetary Problems of the UN system
4. Other (if time permits)
  - a) North-South Dialogue
  - b) UN Support to African Countries
  - c) Problem of Southern Africa

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT TO JAPANSaturday 22 June 1985

1600 - Arrive at Narita on Japan Airlines flight JL005. Proceed to Okura Hotel. Informal dinner at Okura Hotel.

Sunday 23 June 1985

1115 - Leave Okura Hotel

1140 - 1240 - Visit to Ueno National Museum

1300 - 1315 - Meeting with Kabuki actor, Danjuro Ichikawa

1320 - 1420 - Informal lunch

1430 - 1510 - Visit Kabuki Theatre (stay for one act of Kabuki performance).

1550 - 1610 - Meeting at Okura Hotel with Mr. Daisaku Ikeda (Honorary President, Soka Gakkai International) and Mr. Hisami Yamazaki, (President, Soka Gakkai)

1635 - Leave Hotel

1700 - Take train from Ueno station to Mito

1823 - Arrive at Mito

evening - Dinner hosted by Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture, Mr. Fujio Takeuchi. Secretary-General to receive honorary citizenship of Ibaraki Prefecture.

Overnight at Daiichi Hotel.

Monday 24 June 1985

0920 - Leave Daiichi Hotel

0935 - Visit to EXPO Guest House (10 mins) (received by Mr. K. Ikawa, Commissioner-General of EXPO'85 and Mr. A. Matsui, Vice-Chairman of EXPO Association).

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Monday 24 June....

- 0950 - Visit to UN Peace Pavilion (20 mins)  
(received by Mr. D. Exley, Commissioner-General of the Pavilion, Mr. I. Hirayama, Japanese artist).
- 1015 - Visit to Japanese Government Pavilion (40 mins)  
(various technological attractions).
- 1100 - Ceremony at EXPO Plaza (20 mins)
  - Japanese and UN flag raising ("Kimigayo" and "Hymn to the UN")
  - Greetings from Commissioner-General of EXPO 85
  - Greetings from Vice-Chairman of EXPO Association
  - Address by the Guest of Honour (Secretary-General)
- 1120 - Events at UN Plaza (50 mins)
  - Address by UNA of Japan  
President Zentaro Kosaka to celebrate UN Day
  - Toho Music College Orchestra
  - Appeal for Peace (Youth and Women representatives)
  - Pop music groups
- 1230 - Arrival at EXPO Guest House.  
Luncheon hosted by the Commissioner-General of EXPO '85 and the Vice-Chairman of EXPO Association. Secretary-General to make short toast (in French).
- 1400 - Leave EXPO Guest House, return to UN Peace Pavilion for reception.
- 1507 - Depart from Tsuchiura Station
- 1555 - Arrive in Tokyo, Ueno Station. Change trains and depart at 1605 for Imperial Palace.
- 1630 - Audience for Secretary-General and Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar with the Emperor (at Imperial Palace).
- 1710 - Arrive at Okura Hotel

.... /

Monday 24 June ....

- 1740 - 1800 - Meeting with Rev. Nikkyo Niwano,  
Chairman, Rissho Koseikai.
- 1800 - 1820 - Meeting with Mr. Ryoichi Sasakawa,  
Chairman, Japan Shipbuilding Industry  
Foundation.
- 1900 - 2100 - Secretary-General to give address to  
UN Association of Japan, followed by  
dinner.

Tuesday 25 June 1985

- 0930 - 0945 - Interview with NHK, the national radio/t.v.  
network.
- 1015 - Leave Hotel
- 1020 - 1120 - Meeting with Minister for Foreign Affairs  
(Foreign Ministry)
- 1120 - 1130 - Ratification ceremony of UN Convention  
on the Elimination of All Forms of  
Discrimination against Women. Foreign  
Minister to ratify.
- 1200 - 1350 - Luncheon (stag) hosted by the Minister  
for Foreign Affairs at Iikura House.
- 1400 - 1500 - Meeting with the Prime Minister at his Office.
- 1515 - 1615 - Secretary-General's press conference at  
the Japan Correspondents' Club.  
Secretary-General to give brief opening  
remarks.
- 1620 - Leave for Narita airport
- 1800 - Depart Narita for San Francisco on  
Japan Airlines flight JL002.

GIFTS FOR VISIT TO JAPAN AND SAN FRANCISCO

JAPAN

Commissioner-General of EXPO  
Mr. K. Ikawa - PLAQUE

Vice-Chairman of EXPO Association  
Ambassador Matsui - PLAQUE

(Both plaques to be inscribed in English and Japanese. Mr. Akashi to arrange inscription in Japan).

UNA of Japan - PLAQUE (English only)

Japanese artist at EXPO - SG MEDAL  
Mr. Ikuo Hirayama

Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture - 3-MEDAL BOX  
Mr. Fujio Takeuchi

Note 1: No gifts will be exchanged with the Emperor, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. The visit is not an "official" one. Gifts were already exchanged at the last official visit by the Secretary-General in 1982.

Note 2: Suggest packing extra Charter, extra 3-Medal Box and extra Lucites for contingencies in Japan.

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PROGRAMME FOR MRS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR

TUESDAY, 25 JUNE 1985

0900	-	Leave hotel (Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar, Ms. Kane and Mr. Levtchenko)
1000 - 1100	-	Visit to Yonbancho Nursery
1120 - 1200	-	Visit to Japan Traditional Craft Centre
1215 - 1345	-	Luncheon hosted by Mrs. Shintaro Abe, wife of the Foreign Minister. (Restaurant Shimizu)
afternoon	-	Rest at Hotel.
1550	-	Leave Hotel for Japan Correspondents' Club to rejoin the Secretary-General.

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ROOM NUMBERS AT HOTEL OKURA

The Secretary-General  
Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar

Royal Suite  
(M 830)

Mr. Y. Akashi

M 820

Mr. J. Sutterlin

M 826

Mr. J. Sills

M 824

\* Mr. M. Stopford

M 827

\* Mr. J. Hrusovsky

M 833

\* Mr. G. Levtchenko

M 831

\* Ms. C. Kane

M 829

ICHIKAWA DANJURO XII

(Formerly Ichikawa Ebizo X)

As a direct descendent of the illustrious actor Ichikawa Danjuro I (1660-1704), one of the creators of Kabuki, Danjuro XII is the scion of one of the most distinguished lineages in the long history of Kabuki. Actors bearing the Danjuro name have created many of Kabuki's most heroic roles, and it was Danjuro VII (1791-1859) who established the celebrated listing of "Eighteen Favorite Plays" (Kabuki Juhachiban), which remain the special preserve of his heirs.

Danjuro XII was born in Tokyo in 1946, the eldest son of Danjuro XI. He made his debut in October 1953, at the age of six, under the stage-name of Ichikawa Shinnosuke (which is today the stage-name of his own six-year-old son). In 1969, he assumed the name Ichikawa Ebizo X in performances at Tokyo's Kabuki Theater of two of the most challenging roles traditionally associated with his family: the title role in Sukeroku and Togashi in Kanjincho. It was as Ebizo X that he toured the U.S. with the Grand Kabuki in 1982, appearing in the title role of Narukami and as the warrior hero of Masakado.

In April of this year Ebizo will succeed his father to the stage-name of Danjuro. The event will be heralded with extraordinary popular acclaim and unprecedented attention in the Japanese news media. Three full months of gala Kabuki performances are to be presented in Tokyo as tribute to the new Danjuro in the finest plays from the classical repertory.

The Danjuro line of actors are most celebrated for their performances of roles in the aragoto (literally, "rough stuff") style. Such plays exploit Kabuki's theatricality to the fullest, with highly stylized bravura acting, ornate costumes of massive proportions, and colorful, highly exaggerated makeup. Danjuro XII is known as one of the present day's greatest masters of this flamboyant acting style that has been associated with his family for more than three centuries. He is also skilled at the quieter roles of the sewamono domestic dramas, and has appeared with great success in the more naturalistic roles of new plays outside the Kabuki repertory.

# # # # #



PROGRAMME FOR DINNER HOSTED BY THE GOVERNOR OF IBARAKI PREFECTURE

Mito, 23 June 1985

1. Introduction of invit  es on both sides
2. Greetings by Governor
3. Governor bestows Secretary-General  
Honorary Citizenship of Ibaraki Prefecture
4. Words of appreciation by Secretary-General
5. Proceed to garden for seating at dinner tables

## FUJIO TAKEUCHI

Mr. Fujio Takeuchi is the Governor of Ibaraki and a specialist on urban development and renewal. Mr. Takeuchi has long been engaged in development projects throughout his career in the Japanese Government and Ibaraki Prefectural Government.

Graduating from Tokyo University in 1941, Mr. Takeuchi first joined the Ministry of Health and Welfare (1953). Then he moved to Housing Loan Corporation (Jyutaku Kinyū Koko) and in 1958 he joined the Ministry of Construction. He assumed such posts as Director of City Bureau (Toshikyoku Kyokuchō), Ministry of Construction, and Secretary-General of the Capital Region Development Commission (Shutoken Seibi Iinkai).

In 1971 he won a seat in the House of Councillors and in 1975 he was elected Governor of Ibaraki and he has been elected to the governorship for the third consecutive term. When he first joined the Capital Region Development Commission, he became involved in the development of Tsukuba Science City and has continued this task in one way or another to the present time.

He has written four books on city and urban development, one of which included the translation of an English book into Japanese.

He has a wife, Yoko, 58, and one daughter and two sons. He now lives at the official residence of the Governor, 2-1-33, Omachi, Mito-shi, Ibaraki 310.

AGENDA OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

25 June 1985

1. Fortieth Anniversary of the UN
2. International Affairs
  - a) Summit Meeting in Bonn
  - b) East-West Relations
  - c) Disarmament and Arms Control
3. Peace Keeping Operations
4. Administrative and Budgetary Problems of the UN system

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
TOKYO

Handed by Tabara 14/6/85  
Mr. Dayal  
Mr. Ryue  
May 30, 1985  
Tokyo mail file  
J  
H/6

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

Thank you for your letter of April 29, 1985, which I received in Bonn just before the opening of the Summit Meeting, held from May 2 to 4. It gives me very great pleasure to write to you concerning what was accomplished at the Bonn Summit Meeting, with particular emphasis on the points you referred to in your letter.

As Your Excellency pointed out, the Bonn Summit was held at a time when, although the world economy was on the way to recovery, many developing countries were still facing very considerable difficulties, particularly the problems of accumulated debt, low commodity prices and those of the countries of Africa which find themselves confronted by the terribly urgent and extremely daunting task of combatting the suffering resulting from famine.

I will not here quote in detail from the Bonn Economic Declaration, one important result of the Summit Meeting, as I feel sure that Your Excellency will already be familiar with it. It is of great importance, and is extremely encouraging, that the participating industrialized countries and the EC fully shared the determination to continue to work with the developing countries in a spirit of true partnership. It is also extremely meaningful that the participants were unanimously agreed upon the pressing need for sustained growth in world trade, lower interest rates, open

His Excellency  
Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar  
Secretary-General  
of the United Nations

markets, increase in flow of resources, including official development assistance, and also upon our readiness to participate in negotiations for further multiyear rescheduling of debts to governments and government agencies. With regard to Africa's critical economic situation, concerning which Your Excellency has been striving most energetically and indefatigably to arouse world public opinion, the participants made clear the very grave concern they feel regarding the situation, and agreed to continue and to strengthen assistance for Africa. In addition, we, the participating industrialized countries and the EC, reached meaningful agreement on the need to attain sustained non-inflationary economic growth and an early launching of a new GATT round in order to strengthen the multilateral trading system and to improve the functioning of the international monetary system.

Throughout the Summit Meeting, I had the points which you stressed in your letter very much in mind. Convinced that stable economic development for the developing countries is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire world, I emphasized the need to strengthen yet further our assistance for the developing countries' self-help efforts to attain solutions to their problems. Especially, with regard to official development assistance, I made clear Japan's determination to continue its efforts to steadily increase ODA, setting a new medium-term target for the period after 1986. I also stressed the importance of the transfer of technology and improvement of GSP.

At the Summit Meeting, we were unanimously agreed on the importance of continuing constructive dialogue with the developing countries in the existing international institutions. This is, I believe, the essential thinking underlying the points Your Excellency stressed in your letter.

I am happy to be able to assure Your Excellency of our readiness to continue our assistance in order that the various bodies of the United Nations, among them the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development


(UNCTAD), which have been making very significant contributions to solving the problems of the developing countries, shall be able to continue their contribution to enhancing the prosperity of the world economy through realistic and effective activities. Japan is ready to participate in these activities as positively as hitherto.

At the Bonn Summit Meeting, in addition to the Economic Declaration, the participants adopted the Political Declaration, in which we made clear our respect for the contribution made by genuine non-alignment and agreed to seek continuously to work with the developing countries so as to help them to build free and prosperous societies. In this connection, I fully share your opinion that the United Nations has a very important role to play in the attainment of solutions to the problems facing the world. The forthcoming Commemorative Session of the General Assembly will give Heads of State and Government a very meaningful opportunity to discuss the wide-ranging issues I have mentioned here.

I understand that Your Excellency will visit Japan soon to attend the UN Day at International Exposition TSUKUBA, Japan, 1985. I look forward to exchanging views with you on these matters on that occasion.

Finally, I should like to thank you again for letting me know your invaluable views in time for the Bonn Summit.

Very truly yours

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'Yasuhiro Nakasone'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name 'Yasuhiro' written in a large, sweeping loop.

Yasuhiro Nakasone  
Prime Minister of Japan

MJS 19-6  
CONFIDENTIAL

Briefing note for the Secretary-General

JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA, THE SOVIET  
UNION AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Japan and China

Japan and China established diplomatic relations in September 1972, on the occasion of Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Beijing. The Japanese Prime Minister's trip followed US President Nixon's visit to China earlier that year. The Sino/Japanese normalization marked an historic change in relations between the two former enemies. Japan unilaterally abrogated its 1952 peace treaty with Taiwan and severed its twenty-year-old diplomatic ties with that country. It was understood, however, that non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan would be maintained. China, for its part, dropped its demand for war reparations from Japan.

Subsequently, the two countries concluded agreements on trade (January 1974) and fisheries (August 1975) and began negotiations on a treaty of peace and friendship, which was signed in August 1978. The instruments of ratification of this treaty were exchanged during the visit which Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping paid to Tokyo in October 1978.

Since then, Sino/Japanese relations have grown increasingly warm and the two countries have achieved a remarkable degree of co-operation in various fields. Their natural economic complementarity has contributed to a phenomenal growth of bilateral trade. The two-way trade has soared from \$3.8 billion in 1975 to \$13.2 billion last year. As a result, Japan is now China's largest trading partner.

In April 1980, Japan became the first non-communist country to grant long-term economic aid to China, providing \$1.3 billion in low-interest loans to be used over a period of five years. A further seven-year programme of loans totalling \$2.1 billion was agreed upon in March 1984. During the same month, it was also announced that the countries had successfully completed negotiations on an agreement opening the door to the first Japanese export of nuclear-power-plant equipment to a communist country.

Political relations have also grown closer and there are no serious problems between the two countries at this time. In November 1983, Mr. Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, paid an official visit to Japan. Four months later, Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone became the fourth incumbent Japanese Prime Minister to visit China since 1972. During his stay in Beijing, Mr. Nakasone promised that Japan "would never allow a resurgence of militarism" and described the co-operation between the two countries as a "model" for the rest of the world. He also announced the establishment of a Sino/Japanese committee for "friendship in the 21st century".

In July 1984, Chinese Defence Minister Zang Aiping visited Tokyo and expressed support for the 1960 Japan/US security treaty, saying it was necessary for Japan's defence. He also made it clear that, despite its initial apprehensions, China was no longer opposed to Japan's current defence build up. His visit was the first by a Chinese Defence Minister to Japan.

This year, the President of the Chinese National Assembly, Mr. Peng Zhen, visited Japan from 21-23 April and was received by Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Nakasone. Last month, Mr. Haruo Natsume, Vice Minister of the Japanese Defence Agency, visited Beijing. Mr. Natsume is the highest-ranking Japanese defence official ever to visit China.

Japan and China seem to have entered a new era of stable relations. Tokyo is committed to active support of the "open door policy" and modernization drive of the current Chinese leadership, which is bringing benefits to both countries. Moreover, Prime Minister Nakasone considers that co-operation between Japan and China is an essential factor of peace and stability in the Asia/Pacific region. In this context, he recently stressed that the maintenance of Sino/Japanese "friendship" was one of his "most important policy priorities".

#### Japan and the Soviet Union

Soviet/Japanese relations in the post-war period have never been good, despite their normalization with the signing of a joint declaration in 1956. Since then, the two countries have maintained a working relationship which has undergone a gradual deterioration in recent years. This deterioration began in 1978, following the conclusion of the Sino/Japanese treaty of peace and friendship, to which Moscow had strenuously objected, denouncing it as "hostile to the Soviet Union". The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the ensuing increase of tension in East/West relations, as well as the growing buildup of Moscow's military forces in the Far East, Japan's own efforts to improve its defence capabilities and the downing of a South Korean airliner in September 1983, have contributed to a further decline in relations between the two countries.

For Japan, however, one of the main obstacles to an improvement of its relations with the USSR is the question of the "Northern Territories". This dispute has prevented the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries, which would put a formal end to the Second World War. The territory concerned is essentially composed of four islands lying off the north-eastern tip of Hokkaido, namely Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. They have a land area of about 5,000 square kilometres and are held by the Japanese to be distinct from the Kurile Islands chain which stretches further north to the Soviet Kamchatka Peninsula, forming a natural barrier between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean.



The Japanese legal argument is based on the fact that, in 1875, when Tokyo ceded Sakhalin Island to Russia in exchange for the Kuriles, the islands named in the agreement did not include the four to which Japan refers as the Northern Territories. Subsequently, in signing the Peace Treaty at San Francisco in 1951, Japan renounced all claims to both the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. In view of the 1875 treaty, however, Tokyo argues that renouncing the title to the Kuriles did not mean abandoning the title to the Northern Territories.

The Soviet Union occupied the Kurile Islands, including the Northern Territories, in September 1945 and does not admit the existence of a territorial dispute. It has progressively developed its military presence in the islands, especially since 1978. For Moscow, these islands have an important strategic value, as they help to protect the approaches to the main Soviet eastern naval bases in the Sea of Okhotsk. They are also surrounded by rich fishing grounds.

The Japanese Government has put considerable political effort into keeping the issue alive. In 1981, it declared 7 February as "Northern Territories Day" and well-publicized ceremonies are conducted every year at that time. Missions for the promotion of the "reversion" of the islands have also visited friendly countries, as well as the United Nations, over the last five years. The Japanese Government has pledged that it will continue to seek the return of these islands through peaceful negotiations, but there is no indication that the USSR will agree to relinquish them in the foreseeable future.

Recently, the two countries have, nevertheless, made some moves in the direction of better relations. A group of Members of the Japanese Diet, headed by Mr. Sakarauchi, a former Foreign Minister, visited Moscow in September 1984. A month later, Mr. Kunayev, a Member of the Soviet Politburo, led a parliamentary delegation to Tokyo. Mr. Kunayev is the most senior Soviet visitor to Japan since Foreign Minister Gromyko went there in 1976. During the last session of the General Assembly, Foreign Ministers Abe and Gromyko met briefly in New York.

In December 1984, annual trade talks, which had been interrupted since the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, were resumed in Tokyo. On that occasion, the Soviet foreign trade Vice-Minister stated that, instead of focussing on political differences, the two countries should take concrete steps to expand bilateral trade and economic cooperation. Trade between the two nations has slumped badly in recent years, as Japan joined in sanctions imposed on the USSR by the Western community in the wake of the Afghan crisis and the establishment of martial law in Poland.

Earlier this year, Prime Minister Nakasone attended the funeral of Soviet President Chernenko and met, on 14 March 1985, with General Secretary Gorbachev. After the meeting, which is the first in twelve years between the top leaders of the two countries, Mr. Nakasone said that both sides had agreed to seek an improvement of their strained relations.

Japan believes that the first step in that direction would be for Foreign Minister Gromyko to visit Tokyo in the near future. However, no date for such a visit has, as yet, been set. The Soviet side has been insisting that a visit by Mr. Gromyko should lead to "concrete results". This refers to a recent proposal by Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement under which it would renounce any use of nuclear weapons against Japan. In return, Tokyo would put into writing its three non-nuclear principles - not to possess, manufacture or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory. It has also been reported that Mr. Gromyko has indicated that the question of the Northern Territories should not be a "dominant" issue at talks during an eventual visit to Tokyo. The Japanese side has maintained, for its part, that there should be no such preconditions.

#### Japan and Southeast Asia

Since the late Sixties, Japan has been the leading investor, trade partner and aid donor to the ASEAN countries. ASEAN, on the other hand, has become a major source of raw materials and energy supplies to Tokyo, and an important market for Japanese manufactured products. Following the end of the Viet Nam war in 1975, Japan also began to develop economic co-operation and assistance programmes with Indochina, but this process was abruptly interrupted by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late-December 1978.

From the outset, Japan took an active interest in the Kampuchean problem and supported the stand of the ASEAN countries, as well as their efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement. It joined the ASEAN nations in co-sponsoring the various resolutions adopted on this issue by the General Assembly and participated in the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) held at New York in July 1981. It also joined the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference.

In May 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone paid official visits to all the ASEAN countries. During his trip, he promised that Tokyo's close relations with Beijing would not develop to the detriment of the ASEAN countries and that the latter would continue to enjoy top priority as recipients of Japanese economic aid. He reaffirmed Tokyo's strong support of the ASEAN stand on Kampuchea, as well as its determination not to resume aid to Viet Nam until that country had withdrawn its troops from Kampuchea. Mr. Nakasone also reportedly succeeded in assuaging the suspicions of ASEAN regarding his Government's decision to build up Japan's defence capabilities and to assume a larger share of the protection of 1,000 miles of sea lanes around its shores. The US has been pressing Tokyo to play a greater security role in the region, but this had raised fears among the ASEAN countries of a resurgence of Japanese militarism.

Since last year, Japan has attempted to take a somewhat more independent posture on the Kampuchean problem. While stressing its continuing support for ASEAN, it has sought to revive its bilateral dialogue with Viet Nam, suspended since the 1978 invasion of Kampuchea. On the occasion of the fortieth session of ESCAP, held at Tokyo in April 1984, Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe received Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Ha Van Lau and it was subsequently reported that both sides would seek to pursue such exchanges.

During the annual ASEAN Ministerial conference held at Jakarta in July 1984, the Japanese Foreign Minister unveiled a "three-point proposal" on the question of Kampuchea. Mr. Abe offered: (a) to make a financial contribution to peace-keeping activities following an effective partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops; (b) to provide assistance for the holding of free elections under international supervision in Kampuchea, following a total withdrawal; and, (c) to assist in the reconstruction of the economies of the Indochinese countries, after the restoration of peace in Kampuchea.

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Co Thach visited Japan in early October and held talks with Foreign Minister Abe, who stressed that there was a need to find a "common basis" for a dialogue between Hanoi and the ASEAN countries. The Japanese Foreign Minister also expressed his country's readiness to assist in creating an atmosphere conducive to such a dialogue. This raised speculations that Japan wished to act as an intermediary, but Mr. Co Thach made it clear that Tokyo would only qualify for such a role if it adopted a more "balanced" approach to the Kampuchean problem.


Subsequently, a Japanese parliamentary delegation, led by former Foreign Minister Sakurachi, visited Hanoi in January 1985 and met with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Co Thach and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. The Japanese delegation had also been scheduled to go to Phnom Penh, but that visit was cancelled, following strong representations by the ASEAN countries. Last year, ASEAN had also objected to an increase of Japan's modest assistance to Laos, insisting that it should be kept within a humanitarian context.

Earlier this month, Mr. Son Sann paid a six-day visit to Japan and was received by Foreign Minister Abe and Prime Minister Nakasone, who reiterated their support for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. They also assured him that Japan would continue its humanitarian assistance to the displaced Kampuchean population along the Thai/Kampuchean border. Prince Sihanouk had made a similar trip to Tokyo in May of last year.

Since 1979, Japan has made a major effort to provide humanitarian relief assistance to the Kampuchean people, both inside the country and along the border with Thailand. Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations Border Relief Operations, after the United States. The Japanese Government also continues to be a major donor to UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and other agencies, such as the ICRC, which are engaged in relief assistance activities for Indochinese refugees. Moreover, in the wake of the Indochinese refugee

crisis, Tokyo became involved in international resettlement efforts. For the first time ever, Japan agreed to the resettlement of refugees on its soil. The initial symbolic quota of 500 has been increased and up to 3,000 Indochinese refugees will now be allowed to settle permanently in Japan.

The question of Kampuchea will undoubtedly remain a basic obstacle to the promotion of any significant co-operation between Japan and Indochina. On the other hand, Japan and ASEAN have developed an interdependent and institutionalized relationship. Japan is a member of what is known as the "annual ASEAN conference with its dialogue partners". The other participants are the United States, Canada, the European Community, Australia and New Zealand. The next such meeting will take place in Kuala Lumpur, on 11 and 12 July 1985.



Rafeeuddin Ahmed  
20 June 1985

COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY

VISIT TO SAN FRANCISCO

25 - 27 June 1985

The Secretary-General

Mrs. Marcela Pérez de Cuéllar

- \* Mr. William Buffum, Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs
- \* Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
- \* Mr. Robert Muller, Assistant-Secretary-General, Preparations for the 40th Anniversary of the UN
- Mr. James Sutterlin, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General
- Mr. Joe Sills, Spokesman for the Secretary-General
- \* Ms. Phyllis Kaminsky, Acting Director, United Nations Information Centre, Washington
- Mr. Michael Stopford, Special Projects Officer, Department of Public Information
- Mr. John Hrusovsky, Chief Operations Officer
- Mr. Gerard Levtchenko, Operations Officer
- Ms. Clare Kane, Secretary to the Secretary-General

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- \* Mr. Buffum, Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Muller and Ms. Kaminsky will have arrived in San Francisco before the Secretary-General and party arrive from Tokyo on 25 June.

JH/lc  
21 May 1985

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

<u>Date</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Hours From GMT</u>	<u>Airline +Flgt Number</u>	<u>Equipmt.</u>	<u>Stops</u>
Fri 21 June	LV: New York (JFK)	1330	-4	JL 005	747	0
Sat 22 June	ARR: Tokyo (NRT) (Okura Hotel)	1610	+9			
Sun 23 June	LV: Tokyo	2130	+9	By Train		
	ARR: Tsukuba	2225	+9	Travel Time 55m		
	(Daiichi Hotel)					
Mon 24 June	LV: Tsukuba	1507	+9	By Train		
	ARR: Tokyo	1555	+9	Travel Time 55m		
	(Okura Hotel)					
Tues 25 June	LV: Tokyo (NRT)	1800	+9	JL 002	747	0
Tues 25 June	ARR: San Francisco	1105	-7			
	(Fairmont Hotel)					
Wed 26 June	San Francisco					
Thur 27 June	LV: San Francisco	1200	-7	PA 6	747	0
	ARR: New York (JFK)	2015	-4			

11 June 1985

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT TO SAN FRANCISCO

Tuesday 25 June 1985

- 1105 - Arrive in San Francisco on Japan Airlines flight JL002 from Tokyo. Proceed to Fairmont Hotel.
- 1900 - Private dinner given by Dianne Feinstein, Mayor of San Francisco, at Clift Hotel. Guests (about 120) will be prominent San Franciscans and UN supporters. Secretary-General to make short toast in response to Mayor.

Wednesday 26 June 1985

- 0900 - Leave Fairmont Hotel for Herbst Theatre
- 0910 - 0940 - Meeting with newly elected Board of Governors of San Francisco World Centre for the UN. Secretary-General (an Honorary Governor of the Centre) to make brief concluding remarks.
- 1000 - 1130 - Commemorative programme in the Herbst Theatre; Mayor Feinstein to preside. Short statements by President of General Assembly, President of the Security Council (Ambassador Alleyne) and Secretary-General. Musical performance by San Francisco Boys' Chorus. Flag ceremony for Member States.
- 1200 - Civic luncheon hosted by City of San Francisco in the Fairmont Hotel. Secretary-General to give major address after Luncheon. To be introduced by Mr. Neil Harlan, President of McKesson Corporation and Co-Chair of Anniversary Committee. Audience (about 1200) will comprise civic and state dignitaries, Californian UN supporters, consular corps and press.
- 1430 - Secretary-General's press conference at Fairmont Hotel.

Wednesday 26 June ....

- 1530 - 1800 - Secretary-General and Mrs. Pérez de Cuéllar to tour San Francisco harbour and visit Sausalito and Golden Gate area on board yacht.
- 1900 - Large formal dinner (black tie - about 500 guests) at Fairmont Hotel given by Mayor of San Francisco, United Nations Association and World Affairs Council. Prominent members of corporate community among invitees. Mr. George Keller, Chairman of Chevron and Co-Chair of Anniversary Committee, to preside. Secretary-General to make short response to toast by Mayor Feinstein. Secretary Shultz to give address.

Thursday 27 June 1985

- 0930 - Leave Fairmont Hotel to visit de Young Museum, including the Avery Brundage Asian Collection, and Golden Gate Park. Secretary-General to be escorted by Mr. Iain White, Director of Museum.
- 1200 - Secretary-General and party to leave San Francisco by Pan Am flight PA006.
- Arrive New York (Kennedy) at 2015



GIFTS FOR VISIT TO SAN FRANCISCO

SAN FRANCISCO

Mayor Dianne Feinstein - CHARTER (inscribed) AND  
PAPERWEIGHT

President of UNA of San Francisco  
Patricia K. Di Giorgio - PHOTOGRAPH (inscribed)  
(possibly also 3-MEDAL BOX)

Co-Chairman of Anniversary Commemoration  
(and Chairman of McKesson Corporation)  
Mr. Neil E. Harlan - ~~56~~ PEACE MEDAL

Co-Chairman of Anniversary Commemoration  
(and Chairman of Chevron)  
Mr. George M. Keller - ~~56~~ PEACE MEDAL

President of World Affairs Council of  
Northern California  
Peter Tarnoff - LUCITE

NOTE 1: Suggest packing 2 extra 3-Medal boxes, extra  
Lucites and Peace Medals for San Francisco.

NOTE 2: Secretary-General will be presented with gift  
(replica of cable car made from original parts)  
by the Mayor at private dinner on 25 June. He  
should present her with Charter on that occasion.

INSCRIPTIONS

CHARTER

To the Honorable Dianne Feinstein,  
Mayor of San Francisco,  
where the United Nations endeavours  
for peace and human dignity first began.  
With my warm appreciation

PHOTOGRAPH

To Pat Di Giorgio,  
A dedicated friend of the United Nations,  
With appreciation and best wishes.

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HERBST THEATER COMMEMORATION OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER DAY

Wednesday, June 26, 1985

10:00 a.m.

Presiding

Honorable Dianne Feinstein  
Mayor of San Francisco

Opening of the Commemoration  
Moment of silent prayer or meditation

Flag Ceremony

Welcome of Original Participants

General Carlos P. Romulo  
1945 Chairman of Delegation of the Philippine Commonwealth

Mr. Harold E. Stassen  
1945 Member of Delegation of United States of America

SPEAKERS

His Excellency Mr. Paul John Firmino Lusaka  
President of the General Assembly of the United Nations

His Excellency Mr. D.H.N. Alleyne  
President of Security Council of the United Nations

His Excellency Javier Pérez de Cuéllar  
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Special Performance by the San Francisco Boys Chorus  
Louis Magor Music Director

Closing of the Commemoration

DRAFT FOR INSTALLATION CEREMONY WORLD CENTRE

8:45 am - 9:10 am - Refreshments available

9:10 am - 9:20 am - Welcome                      Pat Di Giorgio, President, World Centre  
Introduction of Founding Committee; of Board of Governors

9:20 am - 9:25 am - Thanks to Founding Committee      Richard Gray  
President, World College West  
Member, UNA-SF  
Member, World Centre Founding Comm.

9:25 am - 9:30 am - Presentation of UN Charter to      Easton Rothwell,  
World Centre Board of Gov.      Executive Secretary  
1945 U.N. Charter

9:30 am - 9:40 am - Remarks by Dianne Feinstein, Mayor, City of San Francisco  
and by  
Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

9:40 am                      - Adjourn to Herbst Theater (door closes at 9:50 am).

CS|BW  
6-10-85

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

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CABLE ADDRESS — ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEWYORK

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
CABINET DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL

REFERENCE.

3 June 1985

Dear Mrs. Di Giorgio,

On behalf of the Secretary-General, I should like to thank you for your letter of 14 May 1985 concerning the World Centre in San Francisco.

I am pleased to tell you that the Secretary-General accepts your kind invitation to serve as an Honorary Governor of the World Centre. As you know, he appreciates the efforts which you and your colleagues at the World Centre are making in support of the United Nations and the promotion of international understanding and wishes you every further success. He looks forward to meeting with you in San Francisco and hearing of your future plans for the World Centre.

With best regards.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Virendra Dayal'.

Virendra Dayal  
Chef de Cabinet

Mrs. Patricia K. Di Giorgio  
President  
World Centre San Francisco  
One Maritime Plaza  
Suite 2300  
San Francisco  
CALIFORNIA 94111

# WORLD CENTRE

## SAN FRANCISCO

May 14, 1985

The Honorable Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar  
Office of the Secretary General  
United Nations  
New York, New York 10017

My dear Mr. Secretary-General,

During our last visit to the United Nations, I was so pleased to have been able to bring your staff up-to-date on the progress of the development of the World Centre.

We have reached an exciting point in the process of turning the dream of the World Centre into a reality. We are in the midst of recruiting the first Board of Governors for the World Centre San Francisco, as well as investigating potential sites in San Francisco on which to build the World Centre.

Mr. Secretary-General, I am asking for your kind consideration of this request to serve as an Honorary Governor. You are one of a few special individuals who have the capacity and expertise to make "things" happen. The World Centre is a monumental undertaking. It requires (and I think deserves) a Board of Governors which is philosophically committed to the importance of enhancing international understanding through multi-level educational processes. In the near future, we will be developing a large International Advisory Board.

In conjunction with the 40th Anniversary Charter Commemorative Celebrations here in San Francisco in June, we plan to publically announce the membership of the Honorary Board and the first Board of Governors. Mr. Secretary-General, I so hope you are at the top of the list of Honorary Governors. Your continuing endorsement and support - albeit from a distance - are crucial to the continuing success of the World Centre.

Will look forward to hearing from you. In the meantime,

Most sincerely,

*Pat Di Giorgio*

Patricia K. Di Giorgio  
President

TOUR OF SAN FRANCISCO HARBOUR ON BOARD YACHT

WEDNESDAY - 26 JUNE 1985

The hosts for this visit will be MR. AND MRS MEL OWEN.  
Their yacht, a 50 foot cruiser, is called "Pat Pending".  
Mr. Owen is a patent lawyer from the San Francisco area.

Also on board will be MR. AND MRS. BRUCE BLOCK.  
Mr. Block is Chairman of the Golden Fleet, the club to  
which all the larger yachts in the San Francisco area belong

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Confidential

Note for the Secretary-General

Iran/Iraq  
(Briefing for visit to Japan)

Background

A new phase in the Iran/Iraq conflict opened in March 1985 when Iraq, abandoning the moratorium on attacks on civilian areas arranged by the Secretary-General in June 1984, changed to a strategy of "comprehensive war" to force Iran to negotiations for comprehensive peace. After the Secretary-General's visits to Tehran and Baghdad in April during this phase, he reported to the Security Council that while both sides had reiterated their confidence in his efforts, it was essential that the Council engage both Iran and Iraq in a renewed examination of all aspects of the conflict. Further, he obtained the agreement of both Governments that his 8-point proposal, somewhat amended, could form a basis for discussions on reducing the level of the conflict and advancing toward a cessation of hostilities.

A six-week lull in attacks on civilian areas following the visit was ended by Iraq, on the ground, inter alia, that because the Security Council had not taken advantage of the lull to start political negotiations toward a cease-fire. The latest suspension by Iraq of attacks on civilian areas for 15 days is to give Iran "another chance" for negotiations, and on condition that Iran cease operations at the front. Iran rejected this move and insists that military operations will continue. Indeed Iran in two recent limited operations, one in the north and the other in the south, has strengthened its position in the Basra sector and apparently again is threatening the Basra/Baghdad highway. A larger Iranian offensive in the near future remains likely.

Present situation

Iran still refuses to return to the Security Council until the Council condemns Iraq for its aggression in 1980. Iran rejects any form of negotiations with the Iraqi President, and is intent on continuing military pressure aimed at his ouster. Iraq remains ready for any form of




political negotiations, while threatening coercion by unrestrained warfare, including resumption of attacks on civilian areas and the use of chemical weapons, if the latter is necessary to repel an Iranian offensive. If such weapons are used by either side (Iran has threatened retaliation) you would order an investigation.

Talks in Tokyo

The Japanese authorities no doubt will urge you to persevere in your mediation efforts. They may make specific suggestions which are likely to be based on components of the 8-point plan (which is designed to reduce the level of the conflict and uphold humanitarian considerations, this aspect being clearly linked to advancing toward a cessation of hostilities). You might wish to take the position that while you are prepared to pursue this plan, it is essential that you receive the support of the Security Council. The Council might find an opportunity to declare such support if it takes up the issues of prisoners of war or civilian areas, and uses them to pronounce on the broader issues. If such discussions were to commence, one aim could be to find a formula which would lead to Iran's re-engagement with the Security Council.

You might wish to keep in mind that the Iranians have asked that the proximity of your visit with that of the Iranian Speaker of the Majlis should not give the impression that Iran is using the Japanese as a channel for negotiations. Iran has reiterated that it is interested only in maintaining direct contact with the Secretary-General.

  
Iqbal Riza  
18 June 1985

## DÉFIANT LA COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE

# Pretoria dote la Namibie d'un gouvernement intérimaire

Windhoek. — L'histoire ne se répète jamais, dit-on, mais quelquefois elle bégaye singulièrement. Six ans après la mise en place en Namibie d'un conseil des ministres et d'une Assemblée nationale, qui ont disparu au début de l'année 1983 faute de réels pouvoirs, la colonie sud-africaine s'engage à nouveau sur cette voie. Pour mettre un terme au gouvernement par décret du territoire sous la houlette de l'administrateur général sud-africain, Pretoria avait décidé, le 18 avril, de doter la Namibie d'un gouvernement intérimaire, dit « d'unité nationale », et d'une Assemblée législative chargée de gérer le pays en attendant. Selon le chef de l'Etat, M. Pieter Botha, de trouver une solution qui aurait l'aval de la communauté internationale.

La mise en place de ces nouvelles institutions a eu lieu lundi 17 juin à Windhoek, où de nombreuses festivités avaient été organisées. Le président de la République, accompagné du ministre des affaires étrangères, M. « Pik » Botha, et du ministre de la défense, M. Magnus Malan, a effectué une courte visite dans la capitale namibienne pour signer la proclamation attribuant une partie du pouvoir à ces organes mis en place par la puissance tutélaire.

La cérémonie a eu lieu au Tintenpalast, bâtisse construite par les Allemands au début du siècle et dans laquelle siège l'administration sud-africaine. M. Botha a bien insisté sur le fait qu'il ne s'agissait que d'une étape sur la voie de l'indépendance, précisant que « les Nations unies peuvent jouer un rôle utile à condition que ce soit de façon impartiale ».

Ces institutions, qualifiées de « transitoires », ne doivent leur existence qu'au bon vouloir de Pretoria. A ses yeux, le peuple namibien « est incapable d'exercer son droit à l'autodétermination » en raison de l'intransigence de la SWAPO (Organisation du peuple du Sud-Ouest africain), qui refuse de négocier avec les « partis internes ». Six de ceux-ci sont regroupés au sein de la Conférence multipartite (MPC) créée en 1983. Ils ont toujours été considérés par la SWAPO comme des marionnettes destinées à combattre l'influence qu'elle s'est acquise en dix-neuf ans dans sa lutte pour l'indépendance.

Le nouveau gouvernement est composé de huit ministres issus de chacune de ces six formations, à l'exception de la DTA (Alliance démocratique de la Turn alle), qui en a trois car elle regroupe en son sein onze ethnies namibiennes. La présidence du cabinet sera assurée à tour de rôle par l'un de ces ministres, mais la périodicité n'a pas encore été fixée. Le premier d'entre eux sera M. David Bezuidenhout, du Parti du travail.

### Un référendum constitutionnel

L'Assemblée législative sera, pour sa part, composée de soixante-deux membres, huit de chaque parti et vingt-deux pour la DTA. Un Conseil constitutionnel de seize membres a également été mis en place. Il sera chargé, comme son nom l'indique, d'élaborer une Constitution qui devra être achevée au plus tard dans les dix-huit mois. Celle-ci devra ensuite être soumise à un référendum.

### De notre envoyé spécial

Tous les représentants de ces institutions ont été désignés. M. Botha a regretté que la MPC n'ait pas « un mandat du peuple » mais, a-t-il indiqué, « des élections nationales auraient compliqué les efforts actuels pour rechercher une indépendance de la Namibie reconnue internationalement ». Le nouvel administrateur général sud-africain, M. Louis Pienaar, ancien ambassadeur en France, qui remplacera, à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> juillet, M. Willie Van Niekerk, devra entériner toutes les lois votées par l'Assemblée.

Tout dépendra donc de la latitude que Pretoria laissera à la Conférence multipartite pour gérer le pays et y démanteler l'apartheid, et en modifier les structures de l'intérieur. Or, ne disposant pas d'une véritable représentativité, elle va se heurter à une administration réticente, dont une très grande partie est contrôlée par les Sud-Africains.

Un large fossé sépare les membres de cette coalition. Le chef du Parti national, M. Eben Van Zijl, et M. Andreas Shipanga (SWAPO démocratique) et Moses Katjiuongwa (SWANU) ne partagent pas du tout les mêmes conceptions. Le premier a rompu avec la SWAPO à la suite d'une rébellion menée pour le contrôle de l'organisation. Le deuxième, lui aussi proche de la SWAPO, a été mis en minorité par son mouvement parce qu'il était favorable à une intégration au sein de la Conférence multipartite.

Ces deux chefs, qui forment l'aile gauche de la MPC, donnent donc une base plus large au gouvernement que celle du défunt Conseil

des ministres, mais ils ne comblent pas le vide laissé par la SWAPO, qui rejette la tentative de Pretoria de les écarter du pouvoir. Ils estiment que eux seuls représentent la véritable majorité et que l'Afrique du Sud, une nouvelle fois, contourne la résolution 435 des Nations unies, qui, après l'instauration d'un cessez-le-feu, prévoit le retrait des troupes sud-africaines, la mise en place des forces de l'ONU et des élections libres. La MPC ne représente que très faiblement les ethnies Nama, Damars, Kavango et, surtout, les Ovambos, qui constituent un peu plus de 50 % de la population, estimée à 1,1 million d'habitants, parmi lesquels la SWAPO recrute la plus grande partie de ses militants et de ses combattants.

### La SWAPO dénonce le « cirque »

Lundi, la SWAPO et les Forces progressistes de Namibie avaient organisé une contre-manifestation dans la township de Katutura pour faire pièce à ce qu'elles ont appelé le « cirque de la MPC ». Un cirque d'ailleurs parfaitement organisé pour prouver au monde entier qu'elle avait le soutien de la nation. S'il y avait deux mille personnes à Katutura, près de quinze mille s'étaient rassemblées au stade de Windhoek pour une journée de réjouissances placée sous la surveillance d'un impressionnant service d'ordre et d'une présence militaire qui ne l'était pas moins.

Un spectacle complet allant du feu d'artifice au lâcher de pigeons,

en passant par les acrobaties aériennes, le lancer de parachutistes, le match de football, les chœurs, les pirouettes des gymnastes et le défilé militaire. Des festivités réglées à la perfection pour distraire les sympathisants de la MPC, convoyés par une armada de bus venus des quatre coins du pays et auxquels nourriture, boisson et bagages ont été offerts gracieusement. Cette cérémonie d'investiture de la MPC a dû coûter une petite fortune et s'est déroulée sous les yeux satisfaits de parlementaires et de représentants d'organisations diverses, venus des Etats-Unis, de Grande-Bretagne et de France pour fêter la nouvelle ère de l'histoire namibienne.

Pour la France, MM. Philippe Malaud et Guy Guernier, membres du Parlement européen, un sénateur (RPR), M. Auguste Cazale, M. Hervé Lavenir, ancien président de l'Union des chrétiens-

démocrates, sont venus apporter leur caution à la solution mise sur pied par Pretoria pour régler le problème namibien malgré la condamnation des pays occidentaux de l'ONU et du « groupe de contact » des cinq.

Ce nouveau pas de l'Afrique du Sud sur ce qu'elle présente comme étant la seule voie possible actuellement pour faire accéder la Namibie à l'indépendance après soixante-dix ans de tutelle est la troisième « gifle » infligée à l'opinion internationale en moins d'un mois. Le 21 mai, c'était l'échec de la tentative de sabotage à Cabinda, en territoire angolais, le 14 juin le raid de Gaborone, au Botswana, et aujourd'hui l'installation, dans la dernière colonie d'Afrique, d'un régime placé par M. Pieter Botha sous l'invocation de « Dieu tout-puissant ».

MICHEL BOLE-RICHARD.

## A TRAVERS LE MONDE

### Espagne

● UN GARDE CIVIL TUE DANS UN ATTENTAT. — Un caporal de la garde civile a été tué par balles le mardi 18 juin à Santurce, dans la province basque de Biscaye. Trois agresseurs ont tiré en pleine rue sur le caporal Eugenio Rocio Garcia, âgé de cinquante et un ans. Le garde civil est mort sur le coup et les agresseurs ont pris la fuite en voiture. — (AFP.)

### Nouvelle-Zélande

● SUCCÈS ÉLECTORAL DE L'OPPOSITION. — Le candidat du Parti national (opposition) a remporté, le 13 juin, l'élection partielle de Timaru, provoquée par le décès du speaker de la Chambre, Sir Basil Arthur. Ce résultat constitue un sérieux revers pour le premier ministre, M. Lange. Le Parti travailliste au pouvoir tenait, en effet, la circonscription de Timaru depuis cinquante-sept ans. — (UPI.)

Background Information for Secretary-General  
on Developments in southern Africa

1. Report of the Secretary-General on Namibia to the Security Council

On 6 June 1985, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on the question of Namibia. In that report, the Secretary-General stated that there had been no change in South Africa's position on the "linkage pre-condition". It had, therefore, not proven possible to finalize arrangements for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. The Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Namibia on 10 June 1985 and is expected to complete its deliberations on 18 June 1985.

2. Interim Government in Namibia

On 17 June 1985, South Africa installed an interim government in Namibia in contravention of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). The Secretary-General has made clear that all unilateral measures taken in Namibia in contravention of the above resolutions are null and void. No recognition will be accorded by the United Nations or by any Member State to any representatives or organs established by such acts.

3. New U.S. proposals for Withdrawal of Cuban Troops

In March 1985, the U.S. presented a new package of proposals to South Africa and Angola aimed at bridging the gap between

.../...

the positions of the two Governments on the question of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. So far, the U.S. has not received any response from either Angola or South Africa.

4. Disengagement of South African Forces from southern Angola

South Africa has informed the Secretary-General that it completed the disengagement of its forces from southern Angola in the second half of April 1985. The South African claim has been denied by the Government of Angola, which maintains that South African forces are still operating in Angola.

5. South African military incursions into Angola and Botswana

On 23 May 1985, Angola reported that its forces had clashed with South African ~~commandos~~ in the province of Cabinda in northern Angola. In response, South Africa confirmed that it had sent military reconnaissance teams into northern Angola to reconnoitre SWAPO and ANC military bases in the area.

On 14 June 1985, South African ~~commandos~~ also attacked Gaborone, capital of Botswana, under the pretext of striking at ANC bases in the capital.

Commenting on these developments, the Secretary-General stated the following:

.../...

"Our overall objective in southern Africa is to promote peace and regional harmony in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, recent events in the area raise serious questions about South Africa's willingness to abide by the basic norms of international behaviour. South Africa's military incursion into Angola last month, followed by its raid in Gaborone, Botswana, last Friday, constitute matters of the gravest concern. South Africa should be aware that such acts, no matter what the stated pretext, only serve to exacerbate tensions in the region and render more difficult the achievement of lasting peace. It is for this reason that South Africa should desist from violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours".

Angola and Botswana have called for Security Council meetings to consider South Africa's incursions into their respective countries.

The Council is expected to meet later this week to consider the complaints of these two countries.

Hisham Omayad

18 June 1985

6. Security Council resolution 566 (1985)  
Concerning the Question of Namibia

In its resolution 566 (1985) of 19 June 1985, the Security Council declared the installation of an interim government in Namibia to be illegal, null and void. It stated that no recognition would be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member State to it or to any representative or organ established in pursuance thereof.

In the same resolution the Secretary-General was mandated to resume immediate contact with South Africa with a view to obtaining its choice of the electoral system to be used for the election under United Nations supervision and control.

The Secretary-General will report to the Security Council on the implementation of its resolution not later than the first week of September 1985.

Confidential

Note for the Secretary-General

The question of Afghanistan

Mr. Cordovez visited Islamabad, Pakistan and Kabul from 23 May to 1 June 1985 for consultations to evaluate in detail the positions of the interlocutors on the four interrelated questions that they had agreed to include in the diplomatic process as a basis for the formulation for negotiated comprehensive settlement and to ascertain the substantive basis for another round of proximity talks.

With regard to the form of the comprehensive settlement, the interlocutors have agreed that it shall consist of a set of four instruments namely:

- (i). A bilateral agreement on non-interference and non-intervention to be finalized and signed by Afghanistan/Pakistan;
- (ii). A declaration(s) on international guarantees to be signed by the guarantors.
- (iii). A bilateral agreement on the voluntary return of refugees to be finalized and signed by Afghanistan/Pakistan; and
- (iv). An instrument setting out the interrelationship between the aforementioned instruments and a solution to the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops in accordance with an Afghan/Soviet agreement.

Other texts might be prepared as the need arises therefor.

The main outcome of the consultations was the agreement elicited on the link of the withdrawal of troops with the first three of the abovementioned instruments.

It was accordingly agreed to hold proximity talks at Geneva and that Mr. Cordovez of the Secretary-General would submit for that purpose draft texts prepared on the basis of the existing draft text on a comprehensive settlement. The proximity talks started in Geneva on 19 June 1985.

You might also wish to recapitulate that the proximity talks are taking place almost simultaneously with the talks between the US and USSR on the question of Afghanistan.



Sylvanus Tiewul  
21 June 1985

## Afghanistan

1. The proximity talks are being held precisely because I have been reassured that both sides are determined to achieve a political settlement.

2. During consultations in Islamabad and Kabul it was possible to remove a number of procedural difficulties that had obstructed the previous discussions and could have hindered the diplomatic process. I am confident that on that basis, the interlocutors will be able to take appropriate political decisions required to conclude the "package" envisaged in the settlement.

3. Discussions are now focussed on specific instruments and will therefore touch upon all substantive issues under consideration. It is difficult to predict the outcome of these talks. I can only say that our efforts are now very broadly supported by the international community.

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4. If the work during these talks is constructive I expect the parties to agree to accelerate the pace and to proceed with further negotiations during the summer. At the same time if there is no determination to give impetus to the process, then no purpose would be served by having further talks.

5. Press reports concerning the situation on the ground only prove that there is no military solution and that unless a political solution is found, more and more Afghans will suffer. This remains my primary concern.

6. The fact that this is the only effort aimed at achieving a political solution and my commitment to end the suffering of the Afghan people are the major consideration leading me to persevere.



## SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

### King Hussein's Initiative

1. During the past few months there has been some movement towards a resumption of negotiations regarding a settlement of the Middle East problem.
2. On 11 February 1985, King Hussein and Chairman Arafat concluded an agreement calling for Jordan and the PLO to move together towards the achievement of a settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of the following principles:
  - (a) Territory for peace as stipulated in United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions (but not mentioning specifically resolution 242).
  - (b) Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, to be exercised within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab States of Jordan and Palestine.
  - (c) Resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects.

On this basis, peace negotiations would be conducted under the auspices of an international conference in which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties to the conflict will participate, including the PLO within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

3. During his visit to Washington in March 1985, President Mubarak of Egypt expressed strong support for this agreement and proposed that the United States invite Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the United States to lay the groundwork to direct peace talks.

4. During his visit to Washington in early June 1985, King Hussein sought the support of the United States for his peace initiative along the following lines:

- (a) Contact between Jordan and the PLO to agree on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation acceptable to the United States.
- (b) Discussion between the US and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- (c) The convening of an international conference under United Nations auspices with the participation of the parties (with Palestinian participation within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation), the five permanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.
- (d) Negotiations between Israel and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation under the umbrella of the international conference.

5. On 6 June 1985, Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, in a speech to the Knesset, offered a five-point plan as an alternative to King Hussein's initiative. His plan contains the following points:

- (a) Continuation of United States contacts with Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinians who are not PLO members.
- (b) Naming of a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli team to prepare an agenda for a conference involving the United States.
- (c) Enlistment of the support of the Security Council for talks between the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and Israel.

(d) Appointment of "authentic Palestinian representatives" from the occupied territories.

(e) Opening of a peace conference within three months at an agreed venue.

Question of the International Conference

6. In 1983 and again in 1984, the General Assembly called for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East with the participation of the parties concerned, including the PLO on an equal footing, and the United States and the Soviet Union, to discuss the various aspects of the Middle East problem in accordance with certain guidelines laid down by the Assembly. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake preparatory measures to convene the conference in consultation with the parties and with the assistance of the Security Council.

7. So far the United States and Israel are firmly opposed to the conference proposed by the General Assembly. They feel that the conference would hamper direct negotiations. They also oppose the participation of the PLO and the Soviet Union.

8. The conference advocated by King Hussein differs from the General Assembly's proposal on two main points. First, the conference would not itself examine the various aspects of the Middle East problem but would act as an umbrella for negotiations between the parties directly concerned. Secondly, the PLO participation would be replaced by the participation of non-PLO Palestinians within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

9. The peace conference suggested by Shimon Peres presents major differences with the proposal of the General Assembly and King Hussein's initiative. It would be convened only after direct negotiations have taken place. While Peres has not dealt with the question of participation, it is assumed that Israel is still opposed to the participation of the PLO and the Soviet Union.

10. Following are, in synoptic form, the main differences between the peace conferences advocated by the General Assembly, King Hussein and Shimon Peres:

	<u>General Assembly</u>	<u>King Hussein</u>	<u>Peres</u>
Objective	Discuss all aspects of the Middle East problem according to guidelines defined by the General Assembly.	Provide umbrella for negotiations between parties.	Conference would be convened only after direct negotiations.
Participation	All parties including PLO. US, USSR and selected countries.	Parties with Palestinians within joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The 5 Permanent Members. The Secretary-General	No PLO, no USSR. Outside the UN framework.

11. Israel is opposed to King Hussein's proposed conference; so are Syria and other radical Arabs. But the United States has not rejected the idea and is studying it. King Hussein views his proposed international peace conference as a key element of his peace initiative. He has requested the Secretary-General to support the conference and eventually to convene it. Much will depend on the position of the United States. As a first step, the Secretary-General may wish to discuss this matter with Secretary of State Shultz when they meet in San Francisco in late June.

PROBLEM OF SOUTH LEBANON

Since March 1978, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed in South Lebanon. Its mandate as defined by Security Council resolution 425 was and still is to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, maintain international peace and security in the area and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority up to the internationally recognized boundaries. UNIFIL has not yet been able fully to carry out this mandate.

When early this year Israel expressed its intention to withdraw completely from Lebanon, the Secretary-General hoped that a solution of the problem of South Lebanon based on a complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces, the deployment of UNIFIL to the border, the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in South Lebanon and the taking of appropriate security arrangements to ensure the security of the population on both sides of the border could be reached. But this was not to be. The Naqoura talks arranged by the Secretary-General in November 1984, as well as later negotiations carried out by representatives of the Secretary-General separately with Israel and Lebanon, were inconclusive. No agreement could be reached on an agreed and coordinated plan for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the role of UNIFIL.

The situation of South Lebanon remains tense and unstable. On 6 June 1985 Israel completed its last phase of withdrawal and its combat units were reported to have left the remaining occupied territory in South Lebanon. But the withdrawal was by no means complete. Before its withdrawal, Israel established a security zone in the border area to be maintained by the so-called South Lebanon Army which is armed, financed and controlled by Israel. Israel left a number of soldiers and advisers in South Lebanon to assist the SLA.

UNIFIL not only cannot deploy to the border in accordance with its mandate but it has now to deal with the SLA which has established a number of positions inside the UNIFIL area of deployment. The difficulty of UNIFIL was recently exemplified by the detention of 21 Finnish soldiers by SLA armed elements. This incident was resolved with the release of the Finnish detainees after one week of tense negotiations.

The Secretary-General and his advisers as well as the Force Commander are continuing their efforts to induce Israel to abandon its plan for the security zone and to enable UNIFIL to deploy to the border in accordance with Security Council resolution 425. But so far no agreement has been achieved. The Secretary-General will submit a report on this subject to the Security Council in due course.

CYPRUS

Reply by the Secretary-General:

It is unfortunately true that the interventions during the Security Council meeting were not helpful at all. Such unconstructive statements only exacerbate the feeling of distrust of each side about the position of the other. However, I can assure you that the statements made in that chamber, no matter how unhelpful, have not discouraged me - if that was anybody's intention I can inform you that they failed. I have repeatedly appealed to both sides to refrain from making public statements that are at variance with the positions they have taken in the context of my mission of good offices. At this critical stage, I would hope that both sides could agree, as a manifestation of their good will and desire to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, to abstain from making any public statement and to concentrate their energy on co-operating with me.

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The fact remains, that the positions of the two sides have never been closer and that an agreement could be reached in the very near future if both parties are determined to do so.

My current effort which began some ten months ago, despite its periodic disappointments, has brought an agreement within reach. As you will recall, at the joint high level meeting in January, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the draft agreement contained in the documentation which I had presented, while the Greek Cypriot side stated it could only accept the documentation as a basis for negotiations. While it did not prove possible at that time to reconcile their respective positions, I considered it my duty to preserve and build upon the important progress which has been achieved during the final round of proximity talks in November/December of last year.

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Starting from the assumption that the Turkish Cypriot side would wish to stand by its acceptance of the documentation, provided the other side also agreed, I devoted much of my efforts in recent months to overcoming the difficulties which had arisen in January, while adhering to the substance of the documentation which the Turkish Cypriot side had accepted. As I reported to the Council, my contacts with the Greek Cypriot side proved positive. While the Turkish Cypriot side has not yet made known its views on the substance of my latest effort, I continue to assume that in its reply, which I expect to receive within the next few weeks, it would wish to stand by the position it took in January.

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I am convinced that the substance of the documentation which has been worked out over the past ten months provides the formula most likely to lead to a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. At the same time, I recognize that if the current effort is allowed to drag on there is a real danger that new difficulties may arise which will place the current opportunity beyond our grasp.

I therefore intend to intensify my diplomatic action. The time is passed for scoring political points; the time has come for the parties to demonstrate by their action and not by words that they truly want a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. The next few months will reveal whether the leaders of the two communities have the will to come to an agreement.





**Security Council**

*Cyprus*

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/565 (1985)  
14 June 1985

RESOLUTION 565 (1985)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2591st meeting,  
on 14 June 1985

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1985 (S/17227 and Add.2) and of 12 June 1985 (S/17227/Add.1),

Noting also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1985,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period, ending on 15 December 1985;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1985;
3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

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Nota para el Secretario General


AMERICA CENTRAL

1. Según los medios de prensa fracasó la reunión del Grupo de Contadora, que había sido convocada para seguir el análisis del articulado del Acta de Pacificación de Centroamérica, capítulo del armamentismo.

2. El fracaso se precipitó cuando la delegación de Nicaragua, expresó en el seno de la reunión que "con instrucciones de su Gobierno", la delegación se veía imposibilitada para discutir asuntos relacionados con el Acta de Pacificación si antes no se analizaban por el Grupo de Contadora otros asuntos que presentaría Nicaragua. En efecto, Nicaragua presentó a la consideración tres temas:

- el bloqueo económico de Estados Unidos a Nicaragua;
- ayuda de 27 millones de dólares de Estados Unidos a los "contras"; y
- amenazas de invasión de este país a Nicaragua.

3. La decisión nicaragüense provocó cierta incertidumbre entre los presentes, ya que la convocatoria de la reunión era para seguir el análisis e instrumentación del articulado del Acta de Pacificación. En vista de que Nicaragua no modificó su posición se dio por terminada la reunión sin acuerdo alguno.

  
A. Martinevic  
21 de junio de 1985

## NOTA PARA EL SECRETARIO GENERAL

### América Central

1. El Gobierno de Nicaragua anunció el 13 de los corrientes que aumentará sus planes de defensa militar ante la eventualidad de un incremento del accionar contrarrevolucionario después que se aprobó la ayuda no militar a los "contras" en la Cámara de Representantes por un monto de 27 millones de dólares, pero a la vez expresó su disposición de firmar un acuerdo de paz por medio de Contadora.

Además, expresó su respaldo a Contadora y la disposición de firmar el Acta de Paz de septiembre de 1984, así como reanudar el diálogo en Manzanillo para normalizar las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Nicaragua. Como se recordará a fines de abril, el Gobierno de Managua anunció el retiro de 100 asesores militares cubanos y la suspensión de la compra de material bélico sofisticado, como una medida para agilizar un arreglo político en Centroamérica.

2. La Comisión Investigadora de la OEA visitó "Las Crucitas" en la frontera Costa Rica-Nicaragua para determinar "en situ" los hechos descritos por el Canciller de Costa Rica, ante el Consejo Permanente de la OEA el pasado 7 de junio. Costa Rica denunció una agresión del ejército nicaragüense cuando violaron el territorio costarricense y atacaron una patrulla de la Guardia Civil matando a dos guardias e hiriendo a otros nueve.

La Comisión esta integrada por el Secretario General de la OEA y los Vice-Cancilleres del Grupo de Contadora con sus respectivos asesores militares. Al término de su misión, la Comisión deberá presentar un informe al Consejo Permanente de dicha Organización.

3. En la ciudad de Panamá, se inició una nueva reunión del Grupo de Contadora a nivel de Plenipotenciarios. La cita durará los días 18 y 19 del mes en curso. El tema central será el armamentismo, uno de los puntos que contiene el "Acta de Pacificación Centroamericana" cuyo articulado analizan los Plenipotenciarios desde febrero de este año, encontrando diferencias sustanciales en dicha área. Pese al esfuerzo del Grupo de Contadora no le ha sido posible poner de acuerdo a los cinco países de la región sobre aspectos sobresalientes del proyecto de tratado de paz de la región.


4. En El Salvador, continúan liberándose desde hace una semana fuertes combates entre el ejército y los guerrilleros del FMLN, obligando a centenares de ciudadanos salvadoreños a abandonar sus hogares en busca de lugares más seguros.

5. La crisis política que desde marzo último afectaba al Gobierno hondureño, quedó resuelta con la elección en el Congreso Nacional de nuevos magistrados para la Corte Suprema de Justicia. La elección da cumplimiento al pacto político suscrito en Tegucigalpa el pasado 20 de marzo a propuesta de las organizaciones sindicales, que en un momento llegaron a amenazar con una huelga general si no cesaba el enfrentamiento a que llevó la crisis institucional a los tres poderes del Estado.

\* \* \*

En cuanto al papel que desempeña las Naciones Unidas sobre el particular, el Secretario General podría decir lo siguiente:

Desde la aprobación de la resolución 530(1983), 562(1985) del Consejo de Seguridad, y en aplicación de las resoluciones 38/10 y 39/4 de la Asamblea General, el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas ha mantenido permanentemente informados tanto al Consejo como a la Asamblea, sobre la evolución de los acontecimiento en la región y sobre los periódicos contactos y consultas que con ese propósito ha venido realizando con los representantes de los gobiernos interesados. En dichas conversaciones el Secretario General ha subrayado la importancia de los esfuerzos que lleva acabo el Grupo de Contadora por encontrar una solución política negociada a los problemas centroamericanos, y la conveniencia de perservar en dichos esfuerzos.

  
A. Martićević  
19 de junio de 1985

Nota para el Secretario-General

AMERICA CENTRAL

I. Introduccion

1. En las dos últimas semanas se ha podido observar un progresivo empeoramiento de las relaciones entre Nicaragua y sus vecinos: Honduras y Costa Rica así como nuevos indicios de una posible intervención militar norteamericana en Nicaragua.

II. Posible intervención militar norteamericana en Nicaragua

2. El New York Times publicó el 4 y 5 de junio dos largos artículos sobre una posible intervención militar norteamericana en Nicaragua. En el primero de ellos, se señalaba que el "United States Southern Command" en Panamá, que anteriormente tenía como objetivo primordial la defensa del Canal, había en los dos últimos años, enfocado su atención casi exclusivamente sobre Nicaragua, por considerar a este país el principal peligro para la paz en Centroamérica. En el curso de los dos últimos años ha tenido lugar un enorme incremento armamentista, acompañado de la construcción o ampliación de ocho campos de aviación en Honduras, entre los cuales la pista de Palmerola tiene capacidad para el aterrizaje y despegue de cualquier tipo de avión norteamericano, incluidos "jumbos C-5" y aviones de transporte C-141.

3. Según un informe clasificado, de los seis "Commands" regionales que Estados Unidos tiene establecidos alrededor del globo, sólo el "Southern Command" tenía, a principios de año, repletos sus almacenes de combustible.

4. Desde 1983 los ejercicios militares del "Southern Command" se han venido realizando en Honduras, tomando como hipótesis un conflicto con Nicaragua. En los ejercicios que terminaron el 5 de mayo último se estudió, por primera vez, la forma en que el Pentágono manejaría a los periodistas en el caso de una súbita operación militar.

5. Paralelamente se ha estado discutiendo a altos niveles militares y políticos la posibilidad de una invasión. Siempre según el New York Times, parece ir ganando terreno la creencia que una invasión de Nicaragua no sería militarmente un segundo Viet Nam, sino que sería una operación relativamente fácil de cumplir. Según esta teoría los Estados Unidos estarían en posición de controlar 60% de la población nicaragüense en un período de 2 semanas. En un mes se podría establecer un nuevo gobierno con su propio ejército que recibiría asistencia militar norteamericana parecida a la que recibe el gobierno de El Salvador. Los sandinistas no tendrían la habilidad de llevar a cabo una guerrilla parecida a la del "Vietcong", en primer lugar porque no dispondrían de una línea de abastecimiento similar a la "Ho Chi Minh Trail", y en segundo lugar por carecer de técnicas guerrilleras y de apoyo popular comparables a las del F.L.N. vietnamita. En cambio la posición logística de Estados Unidos sería mucho más favorable que en Viet Nam al disponer de bases en Honduras, Panamá y Puerto Rico y al estar Nicaragua a cinco horas de vuelo de Estados Unidos.

6. Al mismo tiempo parece acrecentarse la impresión en Washington que todas las opciones de que dispone Estados Unidos para "cambiar la naturaleza" del régimen sandinista están destinadas al fracaso, salvo la intervención militar. En los últimos meses el Presidente Reagan, el Secretario de Estado Shultz y el Sub-secretario de Defensa Fred Iklé han comenzado a referirse a tal posibilidad, sobre todo como una alternativa en el caso que el Congreso no aprobase ayuda a los "Contras". El "Speaker" de la Cámara, Thomas O'Neill, el Senador Kennedy, así como otros miembros de la oposición demócrata han acusado a la Administración de buscar una oportunidad para enviar tropas a Nicaragua. Es opinión generalizada que tal oportunidad la brindaría la llegada a Nicaragua de aviones de caza sofisticados, la transformación del régimen sandinista en una "segunda Cuba" o un "error de cálculo" sandinista cara a Honduras o Costa Rica. Como es sabido, la aviación nicaragüense, a diferencia de la hondureña, carece de aviones sofisticados. Se ha mencionado, en los últimos meses, la posibilidad que Nicaragua adquiriese aviones checos tipo L-39 que, a diferencia de los MIG-21, tienen mejor capacidad para derribar los aviones ligeros utilizados por los "Contras". Washington ha declarado que la adquisición del L-39 sería inaceptable. En cuanto a las posibilidades de "una segunda Cuba" o de un "error de cálculo", es obvio que ambas se prestan a juicios altamente subjetivos.

7. También parece estar creciendo dentro de la administración la convicción de que la mayoría de los nicaragüenses acogerían con satisfacción una intervención militar estadounidense. En un artículo publicado desde Managua en el Washington Post del 12 de junio, los editorialistas conservadores Evans y Novak hacen pie en este punto: que el consenso de la oposición interna favorece la eliminación del régimen sandinista por Estados Unidos.

8. El problema principal que ha de confrontar la administración es la persistente oposición actual del Congreso, y sobre todo de la Cámara, así como por parte de la opinión pública a cualquier tipo de intervención militar directa. No obstante las cosas podrían cambiar en el caso de producirse una de las tres hipótesis anteriormente mencionadas.

9. Como alternativa a una intervención directa se menciona la imposición de un bloqueo naval de Nicaragua que podría ir acompañada de una invasión por los "Contras" con posible participación de fuerzas hondureñas. Es discutible si tal medida estaría sujeta al "War Powers Act" que requiere el asentimiento del Congreso en un plazo de 60 días, pero parece dudoso, en cualquier caso, que en el clima actual el Congreso se opusiese a tal medida.

### III. Voto en la Cámara de Representantes

10. Por un voto de 248 a 184, la Cámara de Representantes aprobó el 12 de este mes \$27 millones de ayuda no militar a los "Contras" a desembolsarse en los próximos nueve meses. A diferencia del Senado, la medida aprobada por la Cámara prohíbe la distribución de esta suma por la CIA. Al igual que el Senado la Cámara aprobó también terminar una ley que prohibía a las agencias de inteligencia intercambiar información con los "Contras".

11. El día anterior el Presidente Reagan había declarado que estaba resuelto a buscar soluciones políticas y no militares en América Central y que consideraría la posibilidad de reanudar el diálogo con Nicaragua, aunque añadiendo que consideraba prioritario la abertura de negociaciones entre el gobierno sandinista y los "Contras".



12. El cambio de actitud de la Cámara, que se logró gracias a una alianza de republicanos y demócratas sudños, parece obedecer no sólo al viaje de Ortega a Moscú sino también al temor de varios congresistas de ser acusados de timidez y blandura frente al Comunismo, lo que provocó que el líder de la mayoría demócrata en la Cámara, Jim Wright (un centrista de Texas), dijese que el país estaba pasando por un período reminisciente de la época McCartista.

13. La medida aprobada por la Cámara incluye \$2 millones para ayudar en la implementación de un posible tratado regional -presumiblemente bajo los auspicios de Contadora.

14. Aunque a breve plazo el voto aleja la posibilidad de una intervención militar directa en Nicaragua, que era la alternativa susurrada por la administración caso que le fuera negada la ayuda a los Contras, no cabe duda que se trata de una victoria para la administración y acrecienta a la larga las posibilidades de un conflicto armado en Centroamérica. El voto es también manifestación de la falta de solidez de las posiciones del Congreso y de la facilidad con que se pueden producir cambios de opinión en el mismo.


#### IV. Desarrollos en Nicaragua

15. El 10 de junio el Presidente Ortega propuso levantar el estado de emergencia en su país, en vigor desde mayo de 1982, si los Estados Unidos suspendían su asistencia a los "contras" y resumían las conversaciones de Manzanillo. La propuesta fué inmediatamente calificada por un portavoz de la Casa Blanca de "jugarreta" destinada a influenciar el voto en la Cámara de Representantes.

16. Al mismo tiempo el Presidente Ortega anunció que como resultado de los viajes que él y el Vice-Presidente Ramirez habían realizado por Europa, Nicaragua había recibido promesas de asistencia por valor de \$402 millones en alimentos, petróleo, materiales de recambio y créditos, la mitad por parte de países occidentales y la otra mitad por parte de los países socialistas.

17. Nicaragua parece haber aumentado su capacidad combativa de cara a los "contras" con el propósito no sólo de eliminar su presencia en el territorio nacional sino también de conseguir su retirada de las zonas fronterizas en Honduras y Costa Rica, lo que ha provocado protestas de esos dos países que han acusado a las fuerzas armadas sandinistas de violar su integridad territorial. Ambos países han rechazado una propuesta de Nicaragua de establecer sendas zonas desmilitarizadas a lo largo de sus fronteras con Nicaragua bajo la supervisión de patrullas de los países del Grupo de Contadora.

18. Por otro lado a raíz del incidente en la frontera de Costa Rica con Nicaragua que costó la vida a dos guardias civiles costarricenses, el Consejo Permanente de la OEA, reunido a petición de Costa Rica, acordó el 7 de junio "pedir a los Gobiernos de Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela que integren una comisión de Investigación la cual tendrá el concurso del Secretario-General de la OEA para determinar en el territorio de Costa Rica los hechos descritos en la sesión del Consejo Permanente". Como se puede observar el papel del Secretario General de la OEA no está aún claramente delineado proporcionándole un campo de acción bastante amplio. La Comisión en principio partirá para Costa Rica a fines de la presente semana.

  
Diego Cordovez  
13 de junio 1985

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

There are at present five United Nations peace-keeping operations: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Middle East; the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir.

The Government of Japan has given strong support to United Nations peace-keeping operations. It has contributed financially to all peace-keeping operations, but because of reasons of a constitutional and political nature, Japan has not contributed troops to peace-keeping operations.

Last year, Japan contributed \$200,000 to UNFICYP, more than most Member States but less than the Federal Republic of Germany (\$431,570), Greece (\$400,000), Norway (\$305,000), the United Kingdom (\$1,092,175) and the United States (\$4,500,000). Some of the troop-contributing countries have given less voluntary contributions than Japan but they absorb the cost of the troops they have provided to the UN. It is hoped that the Japanese Government will consider increasing its voluntary contributions for UNFICYP in order to help alleviate the financial difficulties faced by that Force.





TO: Jim Baker - SG/SPQ  
A:

DATE: 11 June 1985

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM: Keith Walton/OEOA  
DE:

SUBJECT:  
OBJET:

Briefing materials for visit  
of Secretary-General to Japan, June 1985

The Office for Emergency Operations in Africa continues to provide a "switchboard" function for the organizations of the United Nations system in respect of the matching of resources to needs for the affected African countries faced by the current emergency. Meetings have been held on a regular basis with donor countries and a list of priority projects has been placed before this group. Meetings have also taken place with affected African countries. Mr. Morse recently addressed the 19th session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (Rome, 27 May 1985) and will address the forthcoming session of the FAO Council.

At the field level, Mr. Winston Prattley has been appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Sudan in view of the increasing gravity of the situation there. Also at the field level, WFP has just completed a meeting of logistics experts for West Africa designed to remove critical bottlenecks in the supply of food aid.

With regard to relations with the private sector, OEOA has co-operated closely with the group USA for Africa in their recent air lift of urgent items to Ethiopia and Sudan. Mr. Morse and Mr. Strong attended the annual Interaction Forum as part of a continuing programme to develop close contacts with private voluntary organizations. Work in progress focusses on preparations for the Joint Meetings of ACC/CPC (Geneva, 2-3 July 1985) and the second regular session of ECOSOC, at which the week of 22-26 July will be devoted to a debate on Africa, following the conclusion of the OAU Summit heads of state meeting. In mid-May OEOA published a Status Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa (copy attached),

..... subsequently updated at the end of May by a supplement (copy attached).

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## ECONOMIC SITUATION IN AFRICA

Over the last year, attention has focused on emergency situations arising primarily from the continuing drought in Africa. To deal with this situation the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) was established at the end of 1984 to co-ordinate UN activities and to provide a framework for international co-operation. OEOA is staffed by seconded officials from relevant UN organizations and officials made available by some Governments.

At the Geneva Conference in March 1985, the un-met needs of the twenty most seriously affected countries were estimated at \$1.7 billion, consisting of food and (\$1.1 billion) basic agricultural inputs (\$213 million) essential health actions (\$8 million), relief survival items (\$60 million), essential water projects (\$81 million), and logistical inputs (\$45 million). The Geneva Conference was followed by country-specific meetings at which detailed projects were reviewed.

OEOA has been following the crises closely, consulting with the affected countries to revise estimated needs in the light of changing circumstances and with donor countries and organizations in an effort to meet these needs. In addition to enhancing co-ordination between the UN organizations directly involved, OEOA is making arrangements to enhance its ability to keep Governments and interested organization informed on current situations on an up-to-date basis. Most recently (15 May), OEOA met with donors in New York to present a refined list of critical needs which must be met in 2 - 3 months since the impending rainy season will seriously complicate distribution efforts.

The response of the donor community has been encouraging, in particular with regard to food aid where requirements for the next few months have generally been met. However, the need to meet non-food items remains urgent. Without agricultural inputs such as seeds, domestic production cannot resume. The problems of refugees and health conditions remain pressing. A major problem continues to be the logistics of internal distribution.

Japan has been generous in responding to the need for food aid, logistical support, agricultural inputs, relief survival items, and warehousing facilities. Particularly impressive was the public campaign to collect blankets which received wide popular support.

Despite extensive efforts by African Governments and the international community, the situation in the continent's most severely drought stricken countries is continuing to deteriorate, particularly in the northern hemisphere. While all emergency situations require urgent response, of particular concern are the situation in Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and Sudan.

In spite of some preliminary evidence that climatic conditions may improve in some parts of Africa this year, it is still too early to draw any conclusion about the future drought situation in specific countries. It is clear, however, that emergency operations will have to continue in 1986 and perhaps beyond. Some areas will undoubtedly continue to suffer from drought or sporadic rains. Even in areas with adequate rain, it will take time to restore normal production. The problems of internal and international displaced person, of health, etc. are durable.

The current crisis has served to highlight fundamental problems of economic development in Africa. Accordingly, in addition to responding to the emergency, it is imperative that parallel action be undertaken to restore and accelerate the pace of economic development in Africa. This is the basic theme of the Declaration on the Emergency Situation in Africa adopted by consensus at the 39th General Assembly and has consistently been emphasized by African leaders. The recent ECA Conference of Ministers (April 1985) adopted a memorandum calling for international action for relaunching the initiative for long-term development and economic growth covering such fields as population, food and agriculture, industrial development, infrastructural development, trade and finance, natural resources, drought and desertification and human resource development. This will also be the major theme of the OAU Heads of State and Governments meeting in Addis Ababa in July. The discussion will continue at ECOSOC and the 40th General Assembly. In this context, it is important that emergency activities contribute insofar as possible to long-term economic and social development.

There is general appreciation of the need to tackle the more fundamental problems confronting Africa. This will require that African countries review existing policies and in many instances adopt even more strenuous adjustment programmes in already difficult circumstances.

It will also require increased support of these efforts by the international community. In addition to their regular programmes, the organization of the United Nations system are attempting to augment and focus their efforts in this regard. For example, the UN is working on a crash programme to meet the need for improved economic management capacity. An important initiative was the establishment by the World Bank of a special facility currently amounting to slightly more than \$1 billion to assist countries willing to go through the adjustment process.

Finally, it is important to establish an international economic environment conducive to economic development in Africa. This involves critical issues such as debt, commodities, trade, etc. which have been and continue to be subject of discussion in the various fora of the United Nations.

Japan played an active and often leading role in these discussions and in supporting the related programmes of the United Nations system. It has also subscribed Y17.5 billion (approximately \$70 million) for the first year to the World Bank facility for Africa and promised additional contributions in subsequent years.

CONFIDENTIELNote pour le Secrétaire généralSUR LA QUESTION DU KAMPUCHEA

1. Au cours de la dernière saison sèche (novembre 1984-avril 1985), les troupes vietnamiennes se sont emparées de la plupart des camps de la résistance cambodgienne le long de la frontière Khméro-Thaïlandaise. Les hostilités ont contraint l'ensemble de la population civile de ces camps, soit environ 230,000 personnes, à se réfugier en Thaïlande.
2. L'offensive vietnamienne dans la région frontalière a été, de l'avis général, la plus importante des six dernières années. Elle a conduit à une série d'accrochages directs avec les troupes thaïlandaises, notamment en mars et au cours du mois de mai. Bangkok a accusé Hanoï de plusieurs incursions délibérées en territoire thaïlandais. Le Viet Nam a démenti ces accusations, mais le Ministre Co Thach aurait admis, en privé, que des "erreurs" étaient possibles en raison du tracé parfois incertain de la frontière. Contrairement aux années précédentes, les troupes vietnamiennes paraissent décidées à conserver indéfiniment le contrôle des camps de la résistance cambodgienne dans la région frontalière. Selon des informations confirmées récemment par la presse vietnamienne, les troupes de Hanoï ont entrepris la construction de fortifications dans une zone de "70 kilomètres" le long de la frontière. Ces fortifications sont apparemment destinées à limiter les infiltrations de la guérilla Khmère pendant la saison des pluies.
3. La situation à la frontière Khméro-Thaïlandaise reste relativement tendue. Au cours des dernières semaines, les hostilités entre maquisards cambodgiens et troupes vietnamiennes se sont poursuivies de manière sporadique en divers points de la région frontalière. Les autorités militaires thaïlandaises ont également signalé, le 12 juin, qu'elles s'efforçaient de repousser une nouvelle incursion vietnamienne dans le secteur nord de la frontière.
4. Par ailleurs, la résistance cambodgienne a annoncé une intensification de ses attaques de guérilla à l'intérieur du Kampuchea, y compris dans la région de Phnom Penh. Il est difficile, en l'absence d'informations indépendantes, d'évaluer avec précision l'envergure de ces attaques. Toutefois, selon des sources diplomatiques occidentales, les Khmers Rouges auraient récemment "massacré" 150 à 200 personnes, au cours d'une attaque contre un train près de Takéo, au sud-ouest de la capitale cambodgienne.
5. Le Viet Nam continue à mener de front l'action militaire et les initiatives diplomatiques. Après avoir accueilli le Secrétaire général en janvier, Hanoï a reçu successivement en visite officielle les Ministres des affaires étrangères d'Australie (6-9 mars) et d'Indonésie (14-17 mars). Le Ministre indonésien Mochtar, "interlocuteur" désigné de l'ASEAN sur la question du Kampuchea, est le premier Ministre des affaires étrangères de cette organisation à visiter le Viet Nam depuis 1980.

6. Au cours de leurs entretiens avec les Ministres australien et indonésien, les responsables vietnamiens ont réitéré, dans l'ensemble, les clarifications fournies au Secrétaire général sur les propositions du communiqué de Ho Chi Minh Ville du 18 janvier 1985. Ils ont réaffirmé leur volonté de parvenir à un règlement négocié du problème du Kampuchea d'ici 1987 et confirmé qu'un accord sur l'élimination de la "clique de Pol Pot" ouvrirait la voie à un retrait total des troupes vietnamiennes. Ils ont précisé au Ministre australien Hayden que, si "Pol Pot et Ieng Sary" étaient écartés, les Khmers Rouges pourraient rentrer au Kampuchea, après avoir déposé leurs armes. Ils se sont prononcés en faveur d'une réconciliation nationale entre les autorités de Phnom Penh d'une part, le Prince Sihanouk et M. Son Sann d'autre part. Cette réconciliation permettrait l'organisation d'élections générales au Kampuchea, dont Pol Pot et Ieng Sary seraient, bien entendu, exclus. Seul le parti communiste du Kampuchea pourrait se présenter, en tant que tel, à ces élections. Les autres cambodgiens, y compris Sihanouk et Son Sann, seraient autorisés à y prendre part comme candidats "indépendants".

7. Les responsables vietnamiens ont indiqué que les modalités de supervision des élections pourraient être discutées directement entre les autorités de Phnom Penh, le Prince Sihanouk et M. Son Sann. Ils ont estimé, par ailleurs, que la mise en oeuvre de toute solution devrait faire l'objet d'une forme de supervision et de garanties internationales. Ils proposent, à cet égard, la création d'une "commission internationale de supervision et de contrôle", mais n'excluent pas la mise sur pied d'une force multinationale, en cas de nécessité. Enfin, ils ont souligné à nouveau leur désir d'améliorer leurs relations avec les Etats-Unis et de voir ce pays contribuer au rétablissement de la paix et de la stabilité en Asie du Sud-Est.

8. A la fin du mois de mars, le Viet Nam a annoncé un quatrième "retrait partiel" de ses troupes. Ce retrait, amorcé le 3 avril, porterait sur 15,000 hommes et serait, selon Hanoï, le plus important depuis 1982. Les responsables vietnamiens soulignent, qu'en l'absence d'un règlement négocié, ils retireront la majeure partie de leurs troupes d'ici "cinq à dix ans" et que le problème du Kampuchea "se résoudra ainsi de lui-même". A l'instar des années précédentes, les pays de l'ASEAN, les Etats-Unis et la Chine ont émis des doutes sur le retrait partiel vietnamien qu'ils considèrent comme une simple "rotation" de troupes.

9. M. Mikhail Kapitsa, Vice-Ministre soviétique des affaires étrangères a effectué, en mars/avril 1985, une visite à certains pays de l'ASEAN et au Viet Nam, au cours de laquelle il a réaffirmé l'appui de Moscou à toute solution négociée de la question du Kampuchea. Tout en soulignant qu'il ne fallait pas "surestimer" l'influence que Moscou exercerait à Hanoï, M. Kapitsa a confirmé que l'URSS serait disposée à participer à la garantie internationale d'un éventuel règlement.

10. Les succès militaires remportés par les troupes vietnamiennes au cours de la saison sèche ont provoqué un certain durcissement de la position des pays de l'ASEAN, et notamment de la Thaïlande. Les pays de l'ASEAN ont accusé le Viet Nam de chercher à imposer une solution militaire au Kampuchea. Au mois



de février 1985, ils ont lancé pour la première fois un appel en faveur de l'accroissement de l'aide "militaire" accordée au Gouvernement de Coalition du Prince Sihanouk. Ils considèrent que les propositions de règlement négocié présentées par le Viet Nam ont un caractère essentiellement tactique et, qu'en tout état de cause, ces propositions ne sauraient être prises en considération, tant que les troupes de Hanoï poursuivront leurs attaques à la frontière Khméro-Thaïlandaise.

11. Toutefois, la Malaisie a récemment suggéré l'organisation de pourparlers indirects ("proximity talks") entre le Gouvernement de Coalition du Prince Sihanouk et les autorités de Phnom Penh. Le Ministre malaisien des affaires étrangères a précisé que ces pourparlers devraient s'inspirer de la formule adoptée pour la question de l'Afghanistan et qu'ils pourraient être conduits par un pays de l'ASEAN ou par tout autre intermédiaire acceptable par les deux parties. Cette proposition a reçu un aval de principe des Ministres des affaires étrangères de l'ASEAN à l'occasion de la célébration, fin avril, du trentième anniversaire de la Conférence de Bandoung. Elle a également été approuvée, "à titre personnel" par le Prince Sihanouk.

12. Au cours d'une réunion tenue à Bangkok les 28 et 29 mai, l'ASEAN a formellement soumis sa proposition de pourparlers indirects au Gouvernement de Coalition du Kampuchea Démocratique. Les représentants de la Coalition auraient expliqué qu'ils craignaient toute initiative susceptible de conduire à une reconnaissance, même implicite, du Gouvernement de Phnom Penh. Ils auraient également souligné que l'amorce d'un dialogue avec Phnom Penh risquait de banaliser le problème du Kampuchea, en le ramenant à un simple différend entre les diverses factions cambodgiennes, alors qu'il résulte en fait d'une agression étrangère. Ces réticences proviennent essentiellement des Khmers Rouges. Ceux-ci ont été jusqu'ici hostiles à toute négociation qui ne serait pas précédée d'un retrait des troupes vietnamiennes du Cambodge. Selon des informations non-confirmées, la Chine aurait également fait savoir discrètement qu'elle jugeait l'initiative de l'ASEAN inopportune, du moins dans les conditions actuelles. Intervenant quelques semaines après l'offensive militaire vietnamienne de la saison sèche, elle permettrait en effet à Hanoï et Phnom Penh de négocier à partir d'une position de force.

13. Les représentants du Gouvernement de Coalition ont donc demandé un "délai de réflexion". Il a cependant été convenu que la Coalition fournirait en principe une réponse officielle, avant la Conférence ministérielle annuelle des pays de l'ASEAN devant se tenir à Kuala Lumpur, les 8 et 9 juillet 1985. Pour des raisons évidentes, le Viet Nam et les autorités de Phnom Penh se sont jusqu'ici abstenus de toute réaction à la proposition malaisienne.

14. D'une manière générale, la position de la Chine sur la question du Kampuchea n'a pas évolué depuis la publication, en mars 1983, de sa proposition de règlement en "cinq points". Elle continue à dénoncer le manque de "sincérité" du Viet Nam. Elle continue également à exiger un engagement de retrait "inconditionnel" des troupes vietnamiennes, comme préalable à tout progrès vers une normalisation de ses relations avec Hanoï. Au début de l'année 1985, alors que l'offensive vietnamienne de la saison

sèche battait son plein, la Chine a menacé d'administrer une "deuxième leçon" à Hanoï. Toutefois, sa réaction sur le terrain a été extrêmement mesurée, sinon "décevante" pour ceux qui s'attendaient à une riposte plus ferme.

15. Pékin s'est attachée à minimiser les revers subis par la résistance cambodgienne et la plupart des observateurs s'accordent, pour l'instant, à exclure toute escalade dramatique de la tension larvée qui prévaut à la frontière Sino-Vietnamienne. Un conflit ouvert avec le Viet Nam lui imposerait, en effet, des sacrifices substantiels, qui risqueraient de compromettre son ambitieux programme de modernisation économique et industrielle. Un tel conflit aurait également pour conséquence de mettre un terme au processus d'amélioration de ses relations avec l'Union Soviétique, entamé en Octobre 1982. La Chine semble en fait s'être résignée à voir l'URSS établir une présence militaire durable au Viet Nam. Le Président Deng Xiaoping a, en effet, déclaré récemment qu'en cas de règlement du conflit cambodgien, Pékin ne s'opposerait pas au maintien des bases militaires soviétiques dans les ports vietnamiens de Danang et de Cam Ranh Bay.

16. Les Etats-Unis ont évité jusqu'ici de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans le conflit cambodgien, soulignant que le droit d'initiative revient aux pays de la région et notamment à ceux de l'ASEAN, dont ils appuient fermement la position. Ils ne reconnaissent pas le Gouvernement de Coalition du Kampuchea Démocratique et ont fait savoir qu'ils n'accepteraient "en aucun cas" le retour de Pol Pot et des Khmers Rouges au pouvoir au Cambodge.

L'administration américaine appuie cependant les groupes de Son Sann et du Prince Sihanouk. Elle leur a jusqu'ici accordé une assistance purement "humanitaire". Elle vient cependant de modifier sa position et a annoncé, le 9 avril 1985, qu'elle ne s'opposerait plus à l'octroi d'une aide à caractère militaire. Cette décision fait suite à une initiative de la Chambre des représentants, qui a récemment voté en faveur de l'octroi de crédits militaires de cinq millions de dollars aux factions de Son Sann et du Prince Sihanouk. M. Son Sann et le Prince Ranariddh (fils du Prince Sihanouk) ont été reçus par le Secrétaire d'état Shultz à Washington, le 10 avril.

L'administration américaine considère l'évacuation des troupes vietnamiennes du Cambodge comme la condition fondamentale de toute normalisation de ses relations avec Hanoï. Le Président Reagan a rappelé, le 6 juin, que cette normalisation était également liée à un règlement satisfaisant de la question des soldats américains disparus pendant la guerre contre le Viet Nam (MIAs).


17. Par ailleurs, après une longue période d'hésitation, le Pentagone a récemment donné son accord à la vente de douze avions de combat F-16 à la Thaïlande. En cas d'approbation par le Congrès, ce serait la première vente d'avions aussi perfectionnés en Asie du Sud-Est. Le Pentagone justifie cette mesure par la nécessité de fournir à la Thaïlande la "capacité de répondre à la menace croissante" que constitue, selon lui, le "déploiement récent de MiG-23s au Viet Nam".

## CONCLUSION

18. Au cours de la visite du Secrétaire général en Asie du Sud-Est en janvier/février 1985, l'ensemble des pays concernés ont réitéré leur appui à ses bons offices et l'ont encouragé à poursuivre ses efforts en vue d'un

règlement négocié de la question du Kampuchea. Le Secrétaire général a assuré ces pays qu'il continuerait à oeuvrer en vue de créer les conditions d'un tel règlement. Toutefois, les perspectives de progrès vers un dialogue constructif paraissent actuellement limitées. En effet, l'offensive vietnamienne de la saison sèche semble avoir persuadé les pays de l'ASEAN que Hanoï cherche à imposer un règlement qui assurerait, pour l'essentiel, le maintien du régime actuel de Phnom Penh.

19. Les pourparlers indirects proposés par la Malaisie pourraient faciliter la relance du processus diplomatique. En dernière analyse, toute solution durable du problème du Kampuchea passe en effet par la reconciliation des diverses factions cambodgiennes, même si elles restent pour l'instant imbriquées dans un jeu d'alliances apparemment incompatibles. Cependant, l'accueil réservé à l'initiative malaisienne par les Khmers Rouges conduit à douter de son acceptation éventuelle par le Gouvernement du Coalition du Kampuchea Démocratique. La Conférence de Kuala Lumpur permettra de se faire une meilleure idée du sort qui sera en définitive réservé à cette proposition.



Rafeuddin Ahmed  
17 juin 1985



Confidential

Note for the Secretary-General

Korea  
(Briefing for visit to Japan)

Increasing contacts and recent dialogue between North and South Korea are strong signs of de-escalation of tension, possibly irreversible, despite continuing mutual mistrust. The North still rejects the idea of cross-recognition and maintains its proposal for direct talks with the U.S. South Korea has formally endorsed the U.S. idea of four-party bilateral talks including China. The imminent transfer of power in North Korea might prove an impetus to further progress.


Specific areas of recent discussions are as follows:

Economic Relations: The first round of talks in November 1984 brought more progress than was expected. There was agreement to discuss such proposals as a North/South Committee on Economic Co-operation, joint development of underground and fishery resources, opening of communications, etc. In the second round in May 1985 there was a difference of views over how such measures should be implemented, but the talks were held in an unusually cordial atmosphere. The talks will resume on 20 June.

Re-unification of Families: This was the focus of talks in May between the Red Cross organisations from both sides. Both sides showed more flexibility than before on the issue of exchange of visits of separated families. Further detailed talks are to be held in July and August.

Parliamentary Relations: In early June the South responded positively to the North's proposal to hold a joint meeting of the two Parliaments, but the positions of the two sides on the modalities differ widely and an early meeting is not likely. The North has proposed a declaration of non-aggression, the South a unified constitution, as subjects for the next round of talks.

(In view of Japan's special interest in Korea, the detailed note of 10 June from Mr. Cordovez is attached.)

  
Iqbal Riza  
18 June 1985

16

Note for the Secretary-General

Korea

In connection with your forthcoming trip to Japan, where developments in the Korean Peninsula may be discussed, you may wish to have a review of the most recent exchanges between the two Koreas.

Three recent events have provided somewhat mixed - but generally encouraging - signals on prospects for further progress in North-South contacts.

The resumed economic talks held at Panmunjom on 17 May 1985 proved disappointing, particularly because the first session had made more-than-expected progress in November 1984. At the first session, while there was a difference in basic approach - the South giving priority to commodity trade while the North arguing for economic co-operation - both sides reacted positively in principle to such proposals as the establishment of a North-South committee on economic co-operation, joint development of underground resources, joint use of fishery resources, mutual opening of ports, restoration of a railroad link, etc. At the second session in May 1985, the South pressed for the immediate implementation of concrete measures on which there was general agreement; the North, on the other hand, proposed the setting up of a high-level joint committee for economic co-operation to be headed by deputy prime ministers from the two sides and elaborated on its organizational and procedural aspects. While the two sides failed to reach any agreement except to meet again on 20 June, it was reported that the atmosphere at the meeting was cordial and free of the acrimony and political posturing that had frequently characterized North-South discussions in the past.

The Red-Cross talks held on 28 and 29 May were more productive, with both sides reaffirming the five agenda items that had previously been agreed upon.\* The South made a

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\* The agenda contained the following items: (1) The question of ascertaining whether members of separated families are still alive and of exchanging such information and the addresses of those who are living; (2) the question of realizing free mutual visits of members of separated families; (3) the question of free exchange of mail; (4) the question of enabling free and voluntary reunion of separated families; and (5) other questions to be resolved in a humanitarian manner.

considerable concession when it accepted the North's position that the five items should be discussed simultaneously. The two sides also agreed that free travel of members of separated families between North and South - which the North demanded - should in principle be facilitated by respecting the wishes of the persons concerned. The North, for its part, showed a new flexibility in expression and attitude; for example, it characterized Red Cross activities as "realizing humanitarian principles" in addition to, as in the past, "contributing to national reunification." The two sides accepted in principle each other's initial concrete proposal, namely, a mutual exchange of visits by the first small group of separated families proposed by the South and a mutual exchange of folk art groups proposed by the North, both to be undertaken on or around 15 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the liberation of Korea. The details for these exchanges are to be discussed at a working-level meeting to be held on 15 July. They also agreed to hold the next full Red Cross meeting on 27 August.

Possibly of equal significance was the fact that, for the first time in 12 years, the 84-member North Korean delegation travelled to Seoul by road through the DMZ. Although the North took a hardline position in cancelling a visit to the Seoul Olympic Stadium, it refrained from its customary political rhetoric and the atmosphere was reported to have been cordial and at times even friendly. The chief delegates of both sides evaluated the session as positive.

After considerable delay caused by the difficulty in convening the newly-elected National Assembly, the South on 3 June sent a positive reply to the proposal made by the North in April to hold a joint meeting of the two parliaments. Such a meeting, however, is not in the cards in any immediate future as the positions of the two sides differ widely. The South said that the meeting should be attended by five MPs from each side and should discuss a unified constitution; a declaration of non-aggression, the topic proposed by the North, was more suitable for discussion by Government authorities, it said.


\* \* \*

Encouraging as they are, the three events mentioned above have not yet resulted in any concrete measures. Many, in and outside South Korea, are sceptical about North Korea's motives, suspecting that it has made these seemingly flexible moves only to establish more favourable conditions in the political arena for pressing forward its demand for tripartite meetings, from which the North has not deviated. That the North has not softened its political stand is also reflected in the topic it

has suggested for the proposed parliamentary talks - a declaration on non-aggression - and in its recently reiterated rejection of cross recognition. This last idea had again attracted interest when, after the Reagan-Chun talks in April, the United States indicated its intention to promote it. At about the same time, South Korea gave its first formal endorsement to the four-party talks that had been proposed by the United States, and China indicated that it was prepared to host a US-North Korea meeting at Beijing should such a meeting become possible.

Yet, the three recent developments, when taken together, give weight to the view that increasing contact and dialogue between the North and the South is an unmistakable, possibly irreversible, trend. This view is strengthened by the fact, from all indications, that at the same time a gradual transfer of power from Kim Il-Sung to Kim Jong-Il and the consolidation of the latter's position are underway.

In any event, the situation in the Korean peninsula is becoming more fluid and should be watched closely. The success or failure of the proposed limited exchange in August will be a key factor.



Diego Cordovez  
10 June 1985



TO: Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General  
A: for Public Information

DATE: 17 June 1985

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

REFERENCE:

DAG OUEG

RECEIVED

JUN 18 1985

FROM: William B. Buffum, Under-Secretary-General for *WB*  
DE: Political and General Assembly Affairs

File #:

Sent to:

Per

Action Info.

SUBJECT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT TO JAPAN - HIS INITIATIVE  
OBJET: ON NARCOTIC DRUG CONTROL.

REFERENCE: Your Memo. of 11 June 1985

... 1. Thus far there have been a number of positive reactions by various delegations regarding the Secretary-General's 24 May initiative in the ECOSOC proposing a world conference convened at ministerial level in 1987 to deal with all aspects of drug abuse. (We are attaching a copy of Secretary-General's statement in ECOSOC). It is particularly noteworthy that the Prime Minister of Malaysia in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 13 June has conveyed the full endorsement of the Malaysian Government for the proposed conference. Moreover, the Ambassadors of Bolivia and Venezuela have expressed strong support for the conference.

2. Should the Japanese ask for any further details regarding the Secretary-General's views on the conference, we should indicate that he is flexible about the modalities of the conference. Moreover, it should be noted at this juncture that we believe that it would be in the best interests of Member States and the institution if the Commission on Narcotic Drugs is authorized by the Assembly to serve as the appropriate preparatory body for the conference.

# United Nations

## Press Release

Department of Public Information  
Press Section  
United Nations, New York



CAUTION: ADVANCE TEXT  
Not for use before 3:30 p.m. EDT  
Friday, 24 May

SG/SM/3700  
ECOSOC/4844  
24 May 1985

### SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT ON DRUG ABUSE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Following is the text of a statement by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on the issue of drug abuse, to be delivered today to the Economic and Social Council:

Drug abuse presents as destructive a threat to this and coming generations as the plagues which swept many parts of the world in earlier centuries. Unless controlled, its effect will be more insidious and devastating. I spoke to the Third Committee last November in appreciation of action being taken by the General Assembly to assist in the fight against drug abuse and to indicate what I was doing to mobilize greater efforts by the United Nations system. I have asked to address the Economic and Social Council on the same subject because I believe an even more concerted and determined struggle on the part of the entire international community is now required. Indeed, in my view, the time has come for the United Nations to undertake a bold and new offensive to combat drug trafficking and abuse.

Illicit drugs, wherever they are produced or used, contaminate and corrupt, weakening the very fabric of society. Increasing world-wide abuse is destroying uncounted useful lives. These problems have already profoundly afflicted every region in the world.

Individual cases of drug abuse now run into the millions. Tragically, many of those most seriously affected are young people to whose concerns and interests the present year is particularly dedicated. All too frequently, the abuse of drugs, often in combination with alcohol, can lead to death, bringing grief and pain to countless families around the world.

The suffering of individuals is not the only cost. Illicit drugs and crime go hand-in-hand. The allure of tremendous profits constitutes a potent attraction to criminals, and drug trafficking frequently entails other criminal acts, including bribery, larceny, the corruption of public officials and even murder. Moreover, there may well be links between illicit international drug networks and armed terrorist groups which have sought to subvert Governments.

It must also be stressed that trafficking in illegal drugs represents a heavy toll on many national economies. The cost must be counted in literally

(more)  
For information media — not an official record



24 May 1985

billions of dollars, traceable to the time lost in the workplace, to the substantial burden imposed on judicial and penal systems, and to the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts.

The personnel, raw materials and equipment used in the illicit manufacture and transport of narcotic drugs are all too readily obtainable. Even as the demand for older drugs spreads to new markets and regions, new drugs are being developed. Many of these drugs are both easy and cheap to synthesize, and sometimes more lethal than the older ones. Thus, as we look toward the future, the potential for even more widespread danger is evident.

There has long been awareness in the United Nations of the drug menace and, with near unanimity, Member States have called for a wide range of counter-measures. Last year, the General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions including a proposal for the preparation of a new convention designed to combat more effectively the traffic in illicit drugs. Moreover, new international initiatives involving the highest levels of government have been devoted to this issue over the past year. But it is evident that the existing instruments and resources are inadequate to deal with a problem of such magnitude. We need a more concerted, a more comprehensive, and a truly world-wide effort to reduce the plague of illicit drugs. I believe the moment has arrived for the international community to expand its efforts in a global undertaking to meet this peril.

I accordingly propose that a world conference be convened at the ministerial level in 1987 to deal with all aspects of drug abuse.

Specifically, the conference should be multi-disciplinary in nature and focus on the following key areas: (1) the promotion of education and community participation in prevention and reduction of the demand for illicit drugs; (2) crop substitution and other methods of reduction of supply; (3) improved methods to limit the use of narcotics to medical and scientific purposes; (4) forfeiture of illegally acquired proceeds and the extradition of persons arrested for drug-related crimes; (5) strengthening of resources of law enforcement authorities; (6) treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts.

The conference should serve to raise the level of world awareness of the dangers we face, mobilize the full potential of the United Nations system, reinforce other intergovernmental, non-governmental and regional initiatives, and encourage Governments to concert their efforts and to devote greater resources to combat drug abuse and trafficking.

I believe the United Nations is uniquely qualified to play a major catalytic role in enhancing efforts to deal with this problem.

I hope that Member States will favourably consider this proposal and thereby give new impetus to the struggle to free the world of the deadly scourge of drug abuse. In this fortieth anniversary year, such action could constitute a major contribution to the common good, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

\* \* \* \* \*

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UNITED NATIONS

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



NATIONS UNIES

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The Secretary-General  
A:

DATE: 19 June 1985

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

REFERENCE:

FROM: Jean Ripert, Director-General  
DE:

SUBJECT: Your visit to Japan  
OBJET:

The following main points may be of interest in your discussions with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Japan:

I. The international economic situation

In your recent letter to the participants at the Bonn summit (copy attached), you had drawn their attention to a number of concerns you have regarding the world economic situation, trade, debt, finance, and Africa. This analysis essentially remains valid. The draft statement to ECOSOC updates the Secretariat's views on the economic situation, and may be useful in your discussions.

A few key points are nonetheless listed below:

i. The importance of spreading growth and sustaining the recovery process more widely requires coordinated policies among the major industrial countries.

ii. The Japanese government greatly emphasizes the importance of opening up international trade by reducing the protectionist barriers. The new round in GATT is to be welcomed, but should be prepared in such a way that the interests of all countries, including developing countries, are fully reflected. But this will take time. Consequently financial policies are extremely important.

iii. The Japanese government continues to increase aid to developing countries, but their overall performance in relation to GNP is still weak. They have given particular support to UNDP and IDA, and hope could be expressed for a continuation.

iv. The debt problem, including those of smaller debtor countries, needs to be directly addressed through more generous rescheduling and write-offs.

v. In addition to emergency action for Africa, attention must now be turned to strengthening their long-term development.



## II. North/South issues

The Japanese government, while giving much rhetorical support to the cause of development, continues to abide by a "hard line", not far removed from that of the United States. To a large extent this is politically determined.

Japan is highly dependent on raw materials from developing countries, and on developing country markets for exports. A more forthcoming position on the part of Japan is very much in their interest. They have a critical role in sustaining dynamic growth in the developing regions of Asia.

The Japanese government could be encouraged to play a more active role in the economic discussion in the United Nations. Since they have given particular importance to the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations you may wish to underline the opportunity afforded by the General Assembly later this year to make progress on some specific issues.

One suggestion is to give some attention to economic issues at the high-level meeting of the Security Council. Another is to form a small committee of the General Assembly to look into the possibilities and modalities of progress, and to report back to the General Assembly's forty-first session.

\* \* \*

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

29 April 1985

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

As your summit meeting in Bonn approaches, I would like to take the opportunity once again to share with you a few thoughts on some of the major issues which will be before you. Fortunately, this meeting coincides with signs of relaxation in international political tensions, and also with improvements in the economic situation. These circumstances should help strengthen international economic co-operation.

The economic situation has obviously improved in the industrial countries. However, serious concerns remain about the unevenness of the recovery, and the uncertain future. The United States economy, after having provided a major and timely stimulus to the rest of the world, has begun to slow down as expected. Recovery in Europe has not been strong enough even to halt the increase in unemployment.

In this context, all industrial countries should make every effort to achieve and maintain the highest possible level of non-inflationary growth. More balanced and concerted fiscal and monetary policies will help reduce interest rates and the instability of exchange rates. Sustained expansion of the industrial countries on this basis would facilitate the adjustment process in the world economy, and ease the burdens involved.

Today, much of the burden of adjusting to current difficulties is being borne by the developing countries,

His Excellency  
Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone  
Prime Minister of Japan  
Tokyo

especially those with debt problems. Serious declines in the real per capita incomes of many of these countries are generating grave social and political tensions that threaten the fabric of society and create dangerous divisions within the international community. Even on optimistic assumptions, these countries are not expected to regain their pre-crisis levels of real per capita income until the late 1980s or early 1990s. This is particularly true of sub-Saharan Africa.

I recognize the need for adjustment as part of sound domestic policies, but the costs of adjustment should be more equitably shared internationally. This calls for action in the fields of both trade and finance. A new round of trade negotiations, reflecting the interests of all parties, would help stem the tide of protectionism. But there is need for measures to roll back existing trade barriers. The forthcoming renegotiation of the Multifibre Arrangement would be a concrete opportunity to do so in a field of great importance to many developing countries. For those dependent on commodity exports specific action is necessary to strengthen prices and revenues.

The debt problem should be addressed more directly through multi-year rescheduling of official and private debt, including interest and principal. In the case of the official debt of poorer countries a write-off might be the only appropriate solution. Furthermore, the overall decline in aid needs to be reversed, and conditions created to encourage other capital flows including new commercial lending and direct investment.

In my communication to the London summit I had drawn your particular attention to the needs of sub-Saharan African countries. Media exposure last fall of their dramatic difficulties has evoked generous reactions of private and public solidarity. I would like to express my appreciation for your government's contribution. Fortunately, progress has also been made in ensuring a better co-ordination between the donor community and the African countries. But these efforts must persist, for African countries continue to suffer from long-standing structural problems compounded by natural calamities. Their own efforts to mobilize domestic resources, and adapt their policies where required, need to be buttressed by emergency as well as rehabilitation and development aid from external sources. These requirements are far from being met.


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It is to be hoped that the forthcoming trade negotiations and the discussions on the future of the international monetary system will address the short-term as well as the longer-term structural aspects of many of these problems. This determination to address problems through multilateral co-operation is to be welcomed. It is, however, important that the wider membership of the international community, especially the developing countries, should fully participate in them.

While these discussions and negotiations are taken up in separate technical fora, the inherent connections between the trade, monetary and financial issues should be continuously examined.

The role of the United Nations in this context is highly relevant. Apart from contributing on specific negotiations, the United Nations, including UNCTAD, should be used to provide sustained and high-level political impulse to such talks. I have suggested to heads of state and government of all members of the United Nations that they should consider attending the General Assembly later this year to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Organization, and to recommit themselves to the goals and objectives of the Charter. That would provide them with an excellent opportunity to have wider discussion of the issues raised above, and give the much needed political impetus to the necessary action.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

## JAPAN'S POSITION ON DISARMAMENT AND RELATED ISSUES

### 1. Basic Policy of Japan

Japan has committed itself under its Constitution not to become a military power. Thus its defence expenditures for many years have been restricted to less than one per cent of GNP. Japan maintains a policy known as the Three Non-Nuclear Principles - not to possess nuclear weapons, not to produce them and not to permit their entry into Japan.

### 2. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Japan attaches highest importance to nuclear disarmament and seeks to achieve the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTB). In June 1984, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe attended the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and proposed to make an in-depth study of a "step-by-step formula" in order to break the impasse on the issue of verification of a nuclear-test ban.

With Australia, Canada and other States, Japan co-sponsored again, in 1984, a draft resolution on a test ban treaty, where it stated its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 124 to 0 with 29 abstentions.

### 3. Non-Proliferation Treaty

Japan is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and seeks to strengthen its regime. In June 1984, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe attended the CD and urged States, not parties to the NPT to accede to it at the earliest date. Japanese Ambassador Imai to the Conference on Disarmament will act as Chairman of Main Committee III of the Third Review Conference of NPT to be held in Geneva from 27 August 1985.

/.....

4. Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Japan places great importance on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In April 1974, Japan submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

5. Participation in the United Nations Bodies

a) Japan has been a member of the CD since 1969 and is represented in the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

b) Participation in Study Groups - Japan has participated in a number of study groups including the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, the Reduction of Military Budgets, All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race as well as Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones.

6. World Disarmament Campaign

Japan supports the Campaign and has pledged US\$50,000 to that effect. Furthermore, it is an active supporter of Disarmament Week and has participated in regional seminars. Mr. Jan Mårtenson, Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs has been invited to Japan to attend among others the peace memorial service to be held in Hiroshima on 6 August 1985.

7. United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament

Since 1983, Japan has invited every year the participants of the United Nations Disarmament Fellowships Programme to visit Japan to see Hiroshima and Nagasaki (so far 50). The participants of the 1985 Disarmament Fellowships Programme will travel to Japan this year at its invitation.

8. Data Processing Service

Japan contributed both human and financial resources to establish the Data Processing Service within the Department for Disarmament Affairs (then Centre for Disarmament) in 1980. Japan has since rendered continuous support

for the improvement and exapansion of the Service.

9. Parliamentarians for Disarmament

In May 1981, the Japanese Parliamentary Association for the Promotion of International Disarmament was established by 80 members of the Japanese Diet. Today the Association, which is headed by former Prime Minister Takeo Miki, has 280 members representing all the political parties in Japan.