

UNARMED

G3 UNIT - OPERATION HOPE

19 NOV 1994 - 3 JAN 1995

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

SECURITY OF OPS

Relative Strength

1. Degradation of sy will be insignificant:
 - a. Threat to own forces in sectors almost NIL. *Threat assessment*
 - b. Threat to Rwandese? RPA can be relied upon for the period of the ops since its in their interest. ✓

2. This ops should not require national clearance. It fall within mandate. ?

✓ 3/5 If Force has 6 Bns, why are only 5 listed at para 4j? Total coys sub-para (1) - (5) is 8, not 7.

INDBATT could raise 2 more, to bring total to 10? *(Indian bn 12 coys)*

Ground

5.
 - a. Could discuss Objectives as a sub-para? ✓
 - b. That will help when we come to 'Assessment of Tasks' para.
 - c. Ground appreciation should also identify:
 - (1) Likely Assy Areas. *} further recon*
 - (2) Likely FUPs, LD or Start Lines.
 - (3) Holding/Screening Facility (for Force). Units/Coys need their own too. ✓
 - (4) Boundaries. *further recon*
 - (5) Bridges along approaches that may require some engr effort to be able to take the traffic. ✓
 - (6) Key terrain (ie key objective). *Kibeho centre*
6. What does this mean? Is it during approach march or throughout ops? ✓

7. Once cut offs are in posn, and we don't anticipate effective attach on us (or do we?) ^{NO}
do we require to worry about flank security? There is no significant deduction out of this factor. (Ref para 8). *during*

8. Lack of cover and concealment should be considered an advantage for us since we don't need to conceal our forces, once the ops begins. In fact we need to be conspicuous for deterrent effect. On the other hand it is a disadvantage to the objective criminals as they will have no cover to escape under. *surprise*

9. See (7) above. In addition, coys (own tps) will have to provide own inner cordons which could double as own security.

10a. How was D-11 arrived at, at this stage?
Guess para 9a - c are what total 11 days? ✓

too short? dawn/dusk?

11. 5 Days for the ops will be too long. 30 hrs maximum. Otherwise fatigue will set in and the chances of targets escaping will arise. Surprise entirely lost.

12. Why is 13 Dec so critical? Why would RPA take unilateral action if that date is not met? *not critical - significant delay*

13. Since we're considering all 15 objectives, then 15 x coys required. Right? *technically yes.*

14. Not required. ✓

15. Total str reqd will be 18 coys. But can be considerably reduced if:

a. Coys security FUP could join search after others have passed through FUP. Saves 3 coys (assuming Approaching A x B are used simultaneously). ✓

b. Some few (2 or 3) coys should just hold southern half of objective while search effort is concentrated on northern half. The south can be tackled in phase 2. Especially so, as it seems the conc of criminals and arms is in the north. Otherwise lets cfm from RPA. ✓

16. Why should comd/con of 7-coy force be beyond our resources? With the RPA we only need coord/coop, not con. Why is max practical UNAMIR force only four coys? Could be more. The deduction contradicts para 4k. *span of control* *in HQ*

17. Approach B is also good & both A & B could be used simultaneously. ✓

Courses of Action

18. Opposition. Good Appreciation.

19. Own Courses. Lets look at possibility of using approach B as well, may be simultaneously with 'A'. ✓

COMD'S GUIDANCE

- 7244 only continues
20. a. Intended ops is within mandate. what- does JAHHA have to do here?
- b. Risk to UNAMIR tps from the opposition should be minimal. ✓
21. Troops to task? Writer should suggest based on his appreciation. ✓
which nationalities
22. Tasks/Roles? As at (21) above. ✓
- a. RPA - already indicated. ✓
- b. CIVPOL - normal police role in cordon & search.
ie take part in search, arrests. ✓



OPERATION HOPE

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* UNAMIR therefore decided to be pro-active and disarm and arrest possible criminals by occupying the camps and by conducting a cordon and search operation from 4:30 a.m. wednesday, Dec 14 to 8:00 a.m. on Dec 15, 1994. UNAMIR confiscated over 1 000 war like weapons of all kind and arrested 43 potential criminals, in a non violent fashion. All suspected criminals were interviewed and registered with relevant humanitarian agencies.

* A total of 1552 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda troops, military observers and support staff participated in operation Hope.

<u>Contributing Contingents</u>		<u>Weapons confiscated</u>	
Ethiopia	302	Machetes	810
Ghana	238	Spears	58
Tunisia	202	Axes	190
French African Contingent	134	Bayonets	4
Zambia	161	7.62 rounds	21
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* UNAMIR intends to maintain a presence in those two camps in an attempt to create a climate of confidence and security among the displaced and discourage criminals from returning.

Prepared by Captain E. Gessler, UNAMIR Public Affairs Officer



UNAMIR - MINUAR

FACT SHEET

THE NUMBERS GAME

UNAMIR

HAS RENDERED THE KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT OPERATIONAL

IS TRAINING RWANDAN GENDARMES

HAS IMMUNISED OVER 60 000 RWANDANS

HAS TREATED WELL OVER 170 000 RWANDAN PATIENTS AND CONTINUES TO TREAT AN AVERAGE OF WELL OVER 300 PATIENTS A DAY

HAS TRANSPORTED WELL OVER 45 000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS BACK TO THEIR COMMUNES

HAS CLEARED SEVERAL THOUSANDS OF UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS (2 820)

HAS LAUNCHED MINE AWARENESS PROGRAMS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES

IS PROVIDING SECURITY AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS AND IS PRESENT IN MOST OF THE DP CAMPS IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA

IS CONDUCTING DAY CLINICS IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY TO ASSIST THE LOCAL MEDICAL AUTHORITIES IN RETRAINING OF MEDICAL STAFF

HAS REPAIRED ELECTRICITY LINES, BRIDGES, ROADS, INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND WATER SERVICES FOR VARIOUS TOWNS AND COMMUNES

HAS ESCORTED HUNDREDS OF HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOYS

HAS CONDUCTED CORDON & SEARCH OPERATION IN CAMPS AND CONFISCATED OVER 1000 OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ARRESTED 43 POSSIBLE CRIMINALS

OPERATION OVERTURE
PLAN TO CLEAR THE
CRIMINAL ELEMENT FROM KIBEHO AND NDAGO DP CAMPS
(Updated 3 Dec 94)

Mission

1. To clear the criminal element from Kibeho and Ndago DP camps in order to establish a security environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

Execution

2. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA battalions will form the cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will conduct the search. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR company will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A two-three platoon support/reserve element will be located at Kibeho. A preliminary operation to increase UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

Grouping and Tasks

3. Grouping General grouping is as follows:

- a. Tactical HQ - HQ UNAMIR;
- b. Remaining OPCON:
 - (1) Inf Bn (-) - two companies;
 - (2) Inf Bn (-) - two companies;
 - (3) Inf Bn (-) - two companies;
 - (4) Two independent infantry companies;
 - (5) One independent infantry company (-) - two platoons;
 - (6) 20 x MILOB Teams;
 - (7) MP Coy (-);
 - (8) Logistic element (tpt);
 - (9) Casualty clearing Post;
 - (9) CIVPOL Detachment;
 - (11) UN Agency Detachment (UNHCR, UNREO, Human Rights Commission)
 - (12) Interpreter Detachment (30 pers).
- b. In Cooperation:

- (1) Two RPA Bn;
- (2) 30 x RPA liaison teams.

4. Tasks:

a. UNAMIR element:

- (1) Establish preliminary presence in the camps (Coy GHANBATT and MILOBS);
- (2) Coordinate the operation;
- (3) Secure FUP;
- (4) Clear company objectives;
- (5) Arrest criminals;
- (6) Confiscate unauthorised weapons, equipment and stores;
- (7) Provide blocking force;
- (8) Route marking/traffic control;
- (9) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facility;
- (10) Augment 1st line transport resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water;
- (11) Treat and evacuate casualties;
- (12) Conduct medical screening of detainees;
- (13) Escort detainees to designated detention centre;
- (14) Conduct liaison and monitor proceedings;
- (15) Maintain post operation presence in the camps;
- (16) Provide reserve.

b. RPA element:

- (1) Cordon camps;
- (2) Arrest and disarm escapees;
- (3) Provide liaison teams;
- (4) Identify criminals/wanted persons;
- (5) Conduct screening process under UN supervision;
- (6) Escort detainees to designated detention facility;
- (7) Provide post operation security.

5. Coordinating Instructions

a. Timings

(1) Planning:

- (a) D Day - 14 Dec 94 - Op commences;
- (b) D-1 - Move to assy area complete/preliminary Op complete;
- (c) D-2 - Move to assy area commences;
- (d) D-3 - Coy comd O Gp;
- (e) D-4 - Coy level recon;
- (f) D-5 - DFC/Bn Comd recon;
- (g) D-6 - FC O Gp;
- (h) D-7 - FC approval of OPORD;
- (i) D-8 - Spt plans complete;
- (j) D-9 - FC approval of outline plan and commence preliminary Op;
- (k) D-10 - Staff guidance on outline concept.

(2) Operational:

- (a) H-3hrs - Cordon in position;
- (b) H-1hr - FUP secure;
- (c) H-30 - Occupy FUP/blocking force in position;
- (d) H Hr - 1st light D Day;
- (e) H + 3hrs - Holding/screening facility established;

b. Control measures (indicative only)-see overlay:

- (1) Company level objectives numbered sequentially from North to South and East to West;
- (2) Report lines - From assy area to FUP;
- (3) FUP;
- (4) Axis of search;
- (5) Routes - Green (primary), red (secondary);
- (6) Axis of search - Main road Kibeho/Ndago.

c. Air

- (1) Two helo in direct support from 131500 to 171700 Dec 94 as fol

- (a) Command and Control; and
- (b) AME.

d. Reconnaissance Restricted to company R Gp level. OPSEC remains paramount

e. Battle procedure

- (1) WNGO to be iss by 051000 Dec 94;
- (2) OPORD to be iss by 091600 Dec 94.

f. Legal

- (1) Representative of Prosecutor's Office to conduct proceedings at screening/holding facility;
- (2) UNHCR, ICRC and UNHR supervision to be provided;
- (3) Detainee handling plan (Annex ?).

g. ROE Minimum force applies. No change to current ROE.

Administration and Logistics

6. General Adminord to be issued separately by 101600 Dec 94.

7. Key Factors The exact timing of D Day will be largely dependant on the logistic capacity to support the operation;

a. Ammo 1st line - unit responsibility.

b. Rations and Water

- (1) Two days CRP on the man;
- (2) Four days resup to be available to sustain the operation.

a. Transport capacity;

- (1) Requirement to deploy approx 1200 pers plus stores and equipment.
- (2) Requirement for dumping (defence stores, general stores, rations and water) at Butare should be considered;
- (3) Movt of detainees from holding/screening facility to designated detention centre (probably Gikongoro);
- (4) Troop redeployment;
- (5) Future Ops requirements - Op HOMEWARD.

c. Medical

- (1) Med plan to be completed by 7 Dec 94;

- (2) CCP estb by 140900 Dec 94
- d. MP - responsible for
 - (1) TC between Butare and Kibeho;
 - (2) Detainee Handling
 - (a) Establishment of facility by 140700 Dec 94;
 - (b) Security.
- e. CIVPOL
 - (1) Monitor screening process;
 - (2) Monitor incarceration of detainees at designated detention facility

Command and Signals

- 8. HQ.
 - a. Tac HQ - Kibeho (see overlay);
 - b. Suggested HQ manning:
 - (1) G3 OPS;
 - (2) G3 OPS 2;
 - (3) G3 INT;
 - (4) Sig Offr
 - (5) Clerk;
 - (6) CLO;
 - (7) RPA liaison and interpreter;
 - (8) Rad Det.

9. Communications

- a. FSO to develop comms spt plan by 7 Dec (Annex ?);
- b. Frequencies and Callsigns - CEOI for the operation to be issued;
- c. Loan of 2 x Motorola and spare batteries to RPA BHQ.

10. Liaison CLO to develop liaison support plan by 7 Dec (Annex ?).

- a. Allocation of RPA liaison teams and determination of RPA protection parties;
- b. Allocation of interpreters;
- c. Determination of UNAMIR liaison requirements;

- d. Negotiate presence of representative from Prosecutor's Office at screening/holding facility by 140900 Dec 94.

11. Nicknames

- a. FUP secure;
- b. Blocking force in position;
- c. Reserve deploy to line AB.



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3/1

OPERATION HOPE

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ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS TO REMOVE EXTREMIST/CRIMINAL ELEMENTS FROM DP CAMPS

Introduction

1. Incidents of criminal activity and intimidation in Sectors 3 and 4A have been increasing over the past few weeks, to the extent that NGO operations have been suspended in some areas. Military information estimates indicate that extremist and criminal elements are operating from DP Camps in Sector 4A.

2. Unless this trend is reversed, it will be extremely difficult to create a security environment which will encourage DPs to return to their homes. Accordingly, it is anticipated that the removal of undesirable elements will sufficiently motivate the moderate inhabitants to abandon the camps.

Aim

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the options available to remove the extremist/criminal element from DP Camps in Sector 4A.

Options

4. The following options are presented:

a. Option 1 Cordon and search operation wholly conducted by UNAMIR.

(1) Advantages

- (a) Operation is conducted by a neutral force;
- (b) Possibility of compromise by significant RPA participation is eliminated;
- (c) Coordination will be optimised;
- (d) UNAMIR has the flexibility to select the time and place of the operation.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) Outbreak of violence, with attendant collateral casualties, is possible;
- (b) Possible compromise of Op RONDAVAL;
- (c) Size of UNAMIR force available may limit objectives to smaller, less problematic camps;
- (d) Some RPA involvement may be necessary for identification purposes, therefore, an element of compromise is introduced.

b. Option 2 Cordon and search conducted by the RPA under UNAMIR supervision.

(1) Advantages

- (a) The risk of casualties to UNAMIR troops is minimised;

DFC/COS

1. The atch assessment is presented for consideration by you and the FC.
2. Your guidance for further planning is requested

E3 Plans
As discussed, go ahead please!
2/11 DR/19/11

G3 PLANS

- (b) UNAMIR supervision might have a reassuring effect on the camp population

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) The risk of violence is high;
- (b) An outbreak of violence would create a protection dilemma for UNAMIR supervision troops;
- (c) UNAMIR complicity may be claimed if the operation turns sour;
- (d) Possible compromise of Op RONDAVAL.

Who is able to identify easily a disadvantage? Is it UNAMIR or RPA.

Option 3 Cordon and search operation in cooperation with the RPA. This option would utilise UNAMIR and RPA troops with the RPA providing the cordon and UNAMIR, the search element:

(1) Advantages

- (a) BBGNU support would add impetus to the effect of the operation;
- (b) A more cooperative approach to the conduct of UNAMIR operations in general may be forthcoming;
- (c) RPA contact with DPs is marginalised, while involvement is maintained;
- (d) UNAMIR troop commitment would be limited to a manageable proportion.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) DP confidence in the neutrality of UNAMIR may be affected ;
- (b) The risk of violence, with the possibility of UNAMIR casualties, is inherent;
- (c) Compromise of Op RONDAVAL is possible;

C d. Option 4 Establish security in home communes with the aim of instilling a level of confidence sufficient to attract DPs to voluntarily abandon their camps. This is a relatively manpower intensive option which would require continuous UNAMIR presence in the camps and would probably require RPA cooperation.

(1) Advantages

- (a) Least risk of violence;
- (b) The option accords with the concept of Op RONDAVAL;

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) This indirect approach presents some risk that the aim might not be satisfactorily achieved in that extremist elements would probably migrate to other camps.
- (b) Failure to directly address the requirement to separate extremists might not engender sufficient confidence in DPs.

- (c) The indirect approach might not meet RPA satisfaction.
- (d) The requirement for NGO participation and cooperation might extend the planning process.

Discussion

5. Clearly, an option which attracts the least likelihood of violence (Option 4) is preferable, however, as time progresses, the situation appears to deteriorate. Accordingly, if time is to be of the essence, Options 1, 2 or 3 would be the most expedient. Option 1 is least likely to compromise UNAMIR neutrality although it is the most manpower intensive in terms of UN troop requirement. Option 2 potentially presents the greatest risk of violence and Option 3 is a compromise which provides for RPA participation/cooperation; which risks UNAMIR neutrality to some extent, but is most likely to achieve the aim without significantly reducing the Force's capacity to maintain the current level of security.

Recommendation

6. Option 4 is the recommended course of action, however, it is further recommended that planning for Option 3 be conducted concurrently in the event that the time delay becomes unacceptable.



A. D. BRIMELOW
LTCOL
G3 PLANS

Nov 94

AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

GENERAL

1. OP - HOPE was a cordon and search Op undertaken by UNAMIR in co-ordination with RPA to clear Kibeho and Ndago - IDP camps (Sector 4) of criminal elements who were indulging in looting, acts of banditry and wanton killings aimed at discouraging IDPs in those camps from voluntarily going back to their respective home communes.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to highlight the conduct and problems encountered by UNAMIR during OP HOPE.

CONDUCT

3. Level of Participation.

a. UNAMIR Troops. The op was conducted from 13 - 15 Dec 94. A total of 1,552 UNAMIR tps, MILOBS and support staff participated in the op, details of which are given below:

Ethiobatt	-	302
Ghana	-	238
Tunisia	-	202
French African Contingent	-	134
Zambia	-	161
Nigeria	-	140
India	-	95
Australia	-	50
Canada	-	36
MILOBS	-	79
Mil Police	-	37
HQ Staff	-	21

b. RPA. The RPA contributed two Battalions during the operation as the outer cordon troops. In addition, they provided a small number of liaison officers.

4. Personnel Arrested and Weapons Confiscated. A total of 44 suspected criminals were taken into custody during the Op and handed over to the office of the prosecutor in GIKONGORO in the presence of Human Right and ICRC representative. Details of weapons confiscated were as follows:

a.	Machete	-	810)	
b.	Spear	-	58)	
c.	Axes	-	190)	
d.	Bayonets	-	4)	
e.	7.62mm Rounds	-	21)	These were sorted out and
f.	Magazines	-	1)	those considered not real
g.	Swords	-	5)	killing weapons were
)	returned to the owners.
)	Whilst the very dangerous
)	ones are being held by
)	UNAMIR MP Coy.
h.	Knives	-	214)	
i.	Harpoon	-	16)	
j.	Sickles	-	10)	

5. Post Operation Presence. UNAMIR continues to maintain a strong presence in those two camps in an attempt to create a climate of confidence and security amongst the displaced persons and discourage criminals from returning.

HIGHLIGHTS

6. The following are worthy of mention:

- a. There was neither a UNAMIR nor IDP casualty throughout the entire operation. The planning was thorough and professionally executed.
- b. The population co-operated fully with UNAMIR troops and showed no signs of fear, resentment or panic. Instead they remained calm and quite content with whatever steps we went through to make the place free of the criminals to allow them to take a decision on their own to return to their home communes.
- c. The operation, has without doubt sent out a clear signal to those criminal elements in Zairean and Tanzanian camps that some day, an operation of this nature will be launched to get rid of them also.
- d. The humane and orderly way in which the whole operation was conducted is also worth mentioning.

e. The success of the operation raised the morale of the troops that participated. They felt a sense of achievement.

f. UNAMIR has proved that it is not in Rwanda to only make complaints about RPA's rush actions to disperse IDPs from the camps, but that UNAMIR is prepared to take action to improve security throughout the country within its mandate.

g. The operation has made the RPA show a lot more tolerance towards the IDPs so far as their proposed forceful ejection programme is concerned.

h. Last but not the least OP HOPE has been a confidence building mechanism for UNAMIR.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

7. The following problems were encountered :

a. RPA liaison and identification teams were far too inadequate; so were UNAMIR interpreters.

b. The secrecy of the operation could not be maintained in spite of best efforts due to the involvement of NGOs at the latter stages of planning of the operation.

c. Government judicial authorities were not available as planned, with the result that handing over of detainees was initially a problem. UNAMIR was however able to finally handover the 44 suspects to the public prosecutor and we are maintaining a very close watch over how those suspects are being treated. We are already forwarding periodic reports to DPKO on the suspects.

d. UNAMIR lacks second line TCV support which made troop movement from their respective AOR to the mentioned IDP camps a tedious exercise. The vehicle problem if not solved, will result in our operations coming to a complete halt in the first quarter of 1995.

e. As at now some of the contingents still do not have basic personal equipment such as flak jackets and ballistic helmets.

CONCLUSION

8. The operation was extremely successful, and the morale of troops was very high. RPA exercised remarkable restraint and their conduct during the operation was commendable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. For future Force cordon and search operations the following are recommended:

- a. The second line holding of TCVs should not be less than 100.
- b. A Force Military Legal Officer be included in UNAMIR organization and appointed accordingly.

Date.....

HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen.
DFC