

Yugoslavia - POLITICAL
- 1944 and 1945

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CENTRAL REGISTRY

OUT-CHARGE FORM

Date 26/3/47

File No. Yugoslavia - Political

Subject 1 - Recent changes in Yugo govt
2 - Weekly Intelligence Summary

Control No. _____

Letter, memorandum, telegram, cables, last date _____

Requested by _____ Extension _____

For Records

Division _____ Room No. _____

Searcher _____

MILOŠ P. MIOVIĆ
Yugoslav Legation
Washington D.C.

M. Mice
V.E. Day, May 8th, 1945

F.
Dear Mr. Xanthaky,

In this very minute I come from listening to the proclamation of the VE-Day. The bells are ringing; I would like to embrace those I love, some of whom I have left in the old country a few days ago, some I have not seen from the beginning of the war and do not even know, whether they have waited for this day. Now all of them are thousands of miles away and my letters shall not reach them for weeks.

But I also have the desire to say a few words to some new friend in the new world overhere, which was so immensely distant before four years and which became more and more close to our continent through the common efforts and sacrifices in this war.

So I adress to your little son. I have brought him a small gift from my little boy: a clumsy copy of the russian Tommy-gun, made by a primitive craftsman in Belgrade.

My little Peter could not speak yet, when he already knew airplanes, bombs and guns. He said v-v-v-, when a plane flew over us, he said "bum" to the exploding bombs around of us, when we were waiting in some dark cellar for our turn to come.

It is a funny coincidence, that I hand this toy on the day, when guns promise to become toys in a part of the world. Give God to your son that, in a long life, he might know guns only as toys.

One more word I wanted to tell him: guns, having revealed all the bestiality of the human race, hidden for centuries in the deepest corners of its souls; having celebrated orgies of cruelty and animosity, have anyway, against their purpose, served also to a different end: they served, sometimes, to make friends.

I am, Dear Sir,

Mr. George Xanthaky,
c/o U.N.R.R.A.
Washington D.C.

Yours faithfully

M. Mice

Yugoslavia - Political
Handwritten file
CHH
F
On March 7, 1945 the Agreement of November 1, 1944 between Marshal Josip Broz Tito, President of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, and Dr. Ivan Subasich, Premier of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London, was consummated. A few days before the three regents took oath to the King in accordance with the 1931 Constitution. The Regents are:

1. Dr. Srdjan Budisavljević, Serb from Croatia, President of the Independent Democratic Party, Minister of the Interior in the first Yugoslav Government-in-Exile;
2. Dr. Ante Mandić, an old Croatian politician from Istria who was not active in politics for many years;
3. Dusan Sernec, Slovene, former member of the Slovene People's Party (Clerical) and Minister of Finance in the provisional government of Marshal Tito.

The composition of the unified government, appointed by a decree of the Regents, which will work until the Constituent Assembly is convened, is as follows:

Premier and Minister
of National Defense

Marshal Josip Broz TITO
Croat, President of National Liberation
Committee, Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, Communist Party

Vice-Premier I

Milan GROL
Serb from Serbia, President of the
(Serbian) Democratic Party, Minister
of Foreign Affairs in the Government-
in-Exile in London in 1943

Vice-Premier II and
Minister for Constituent
Assembly

Edward KARDELJ
Slovene, Vice-President of AVNOJ
(Anti-Fascist Council of the National
Liberation of Yugoslavia), Communist
Party

Foreign Affairs

Dr. Ivan ŠUBAŠIĆ
Croat, Croatian Peasant Party, Premier
of the Government-in-Exile June 1944-
March 1945

Interior

Rev. Vladimir ZEČEVIĆ
Serb from Serbia, Orthodox priest,
Minister of the Interior in the pro-
visional government of Marshal Tito

Justice	Franjo FROL Croat, left wing of the Croat Peasant Party, Minister of Justice in the provisional government of Marshal Tito
Finance	General Sreten ŽUJOVIĆ-CRNI Serb from Serbia, Communist Party, Minister of Communications in the provisional government of Marshal Tito
Communications	Colonel Todor VUJASINOVIĆ Serb from Bosnia, Minister of Mines in the provisional government of Marshal Tito
Information	Sava KOSANOVIĆ Serb from Croatia, Secretary General of the Independent Democratic Party, Minister of Interior and Social Policy in the Subasic government in London
Forests	Colonel Sulejman FILIPOVIĆ Moslem from Bosnia, Minister of Forests in the provisional government of Marshal Tito
Mines	Bane ANDREJEV Macedonian, prominent in the National Liberation Movement
Internal Colonization	Professor Sreten VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ Serb from Serbia, formerly belonged to the (Serbian) Democratic Party, Minister of Agriculture and Supply in the Subasic government in London
Industry	Andrija HEBRANG Croat, Communist Party, Minister of Industry in the provisional government of Marshal Tito
Trade and Supply	Nikola PETROVIĆ Serb from Vojvodina, Minister of Trade and Supply in the provisional government of Marshal Tito

Education

Vladimir RIBNIKAR
Serb from Serbia, Editor of the most influential Yugoslav newspaper the Belgrade Politika, Minister of Information in the provisional government of Marshal Tito

Agriculture

Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ
Serb from Bosnia, Member of the (Serbian) Agrarian Party, prominent in the National Liberation Movement

Public Health

Dr. Zlatan SREMEČ
Croat, Minister of Public Health in the provisional government of Marshal Tito

Social Welfare

Dr. Anton KRŽIŠNIK
Slovene, Minister of Social Welfare in the provisional government of Marshal Tito

Public Works

Dr. Rade PRIBIĆEVIĆ
Serb from Croatia, Independent Democratic Party, Minister of Public Works in the provisional government of Marshal Tito

Post and Telegraphs

Dr. Drago MARUŠIĆ
Slovene, Minister of Justice in the Subasic government in London

Ministers without Portfolio:

Dr. Juraj ŠUTEJ
Croat from Bosnia, Croatian Peasant Party, Minister of Finance in Subasic government in London

Dr. Josip SMODLAKA
Croat from Dalmatia, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the provisional government of Marshal Tito

Ministers for the Federal States:

Serbia

Jaša PRODANOVIĆ
Serb from Serbia, President of the Serbian Republican Party

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Rodoljub ČOLAKOVIĆ
Serb from Bosnia, formerly Secretary
of AVNOJ

Slovenia:

Dr. Edvard KOČBEK
Slovene, formerly Minister of Educa-
tion in the provisional government
of Marshal Tito

Montenegro and Boka

General Milovan DJILAS
Montenegrin, Communist Party, Editor
Communist Party newspaper Borba,
Belgrade

Croatia

Dr. Pavle GREGORIĆ
Croat, Vice-President of the Croat
Anti-Fascist Council of National
Liberation

Macedonia

Mane ČUČKOV
Macedonian, formerly Minister of
Agriculture in the provisional
government of Marshal Tito

The ministers took the oath to the nation before the Praesidium of
the AVNOJ.



ROYAL YUGOSLAV EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

Obn.Br. 125

February 15, 1945.

H. Xanthaky

My dear Mr. Director General:

Thank you for your letter of February 6, 1945, advising me of your decision to have Mr. Roy F. Hendrickson, Deputy Director General of Supplies, act on your behalf in the discussions of UNRRA operations in Yugoslavia with my Government.

According to your desire, I have sent a cable to my Government asking them to render all assistance possible to your representatives who are going to Yugoslavia for the above purpose.

Very sincerely yours,

Ivan Franges

Ivan Franges,
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
of Yugoslavia.

The Honorable,
Herbert H. Lehman,
Director General,
United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration,
Dupont Circle Apartments,
Washington, D.C.

3046

EX-71
Yugoslav Political

26 October 1944

TO: Michail Menshikov
FROM: George Lanthaky
SUBJECT: Yugoslav Operations

Major Gross (US-CCAC) informed me this morning that a cable had been received yesterday from Maitland Wilson in which the Theater Commander urged acceptance by CCAC of the proposal made by him last week for a military period in Yugoslavia. The substance of Wilson's proposal is contained in my memorandum of conversation with Major Gross of last Saturday. He said further that yesterday's cable indicates clearly that Wilson feels "that it would be bad to proceed on the basis proposed in the discussions which have been held in Washington during the past two weeks. As you know, these decisions contemplate operations without any military period whatsoever.

Major Gross said that a decision would be reached today. He indicated that the Theater Commander's proposal may be accepted and that there will be a military period in Yugoslavia. The discussions at Caserta, Gross informs me, have been held with Tito's representatives and representatives of the government. It is assumed by CCAC that any agreement entered into by Wilson with the Yugoslavs will have the complete support and approval of Tito.

In the event that CCAC decides to cable approval of General Wilson's proposal, we will be informed of the text of the cable prior to its transmission.

Yugoslavia - Political

October 21, 1944

DRAFT

Cable to Subasic

I have just learned of the liberation of Belgrade and rejoice as do all freedom-loving people in this glorious news. The superb resistance of the people of Yugoslavia and the heroic feats of the armies of resistance under the leadership of Marshal Tito have aroused the admiration of ~~xxx~~ the peoples of all the United Nations. UNRRA of course is eager to cooperate with you in bringing help and assistance to the people of Yugoslavia.

Copy to Cochran at Caserta with instructions to pay his respects to Tito on behalf of the Governor and hand Tito copy of the cable.

The above dictated by George Xanthaky over the telephone to New York. George said it was cleared with Caustin and Salisbury.

Yugoslav - Political

Draft

21 October 1944

To Premier Subashi tel

Cable to Cochran: Following cable sent today by DG. *1*

I have just learned of the liberation of Belgrade and rejoice as do all other freedom-loving people in this glorious news. The superb resistance of the people of Yugoslavia and the heroic feats of the armies of resistance under the leadership of Marshal Tito have aroused the admiration of the peoples of all the United Nations. UNRRA of course is eager to cooperate with you in bringing help and assistance to the gallant Yugoslav people.

Would you, on behalf Director General, express his personal congratulations and good wishes to Marshal Tito and same time transmit to Tito copy of cable.

C
O
P
Y

Draft

21 October 1944

His Excellency Dr. Ivan Subasitch
Prime Minister Royal Yugoslav Government
London, England

I have just learned of the liberation of Belgrade and rejoice as do all other freedom-loving people in this glorious news. The superb resistance of the people of Yugoslavia and the heroic feats of the armies of resistance under the leadership of Marshal Tito have aroused the admiration of the peoples of all the United Nations. UNRRA of course is eager to cooperate with you in bringing help and assistance to the gallant Yugoslav people.

GXanthaky/acc

D r a f t.

21 October 1944

CABLE

His Excellency Dr. Ivan Subasitch
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Cable to Cochran: Following cable sent today by DG: above cable quoted.

Para. Would you, on behalf Director General, express his personal congratulations and good wishes to Marshal Tito and same time transmit to Tito copy of cable.

GXanthaky/acc

Yugoslav Political

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MAJOR ERNEST GROSS (US, CCAC) ON SATURDAY,
OCTOBER 21, 1944

Major Gross called and informed me that CCAC had received a cable from Maitland Wilson, the substance of which is as follows:

1. Wilson has been discussing the Yugoslav relief distribution problem with representatives of Tito and the Royal Yugoslav Government.
2. Wilson makes the following recommendations:
 - a. That military supplies be turned over to the local Yugoslav authorities at the various ports.
 - b. That distribution will be through channels selected by the local Yugoslav authorities on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis.
 - c. That military headquarters will send two observers to observe operations at each port, and two observers at each main center of distribution, as well as not exceeding 25 traveling observers who shall have complete freedom of movement within the country to observe operations.
 - d. The observers may be either military or UNRRA officials; they will take no actual part in distribution.
 - e. The Military commander will be free to utilize such UNRRA personnel as will be placed under his command.
 - f. The Yugoslavs are presently clearing the terms with their higher authorities.
 - g. Wilson is prepared to sign this Agreement on October 30th with the Yugoslavs, if they agree.

Major Gross informed me that the US-UK Military and political officials will meet immediately to explore the proposal and arrive at a combined viewpoint. Immediately upon having reached such a combined viewpoint, the matter will be discussed fully with UNRRA on an "if, as, and when basis." Major Gross stressed the fact that the Wilson proposal will be considered without prejudice to and in the light of the current conversations of the past two weeks between UNRRA and CCAC which contemplate operations in Yugoslavia without any military period and indicated that the final decision might well be that there should not be any military period in Yugoslavia.

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Xanthaky/tep
21 October 1944

NOTE ON PROPOSED CABLE AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE OF PROPOSED
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES
RELATING TO CIVILIAN RELIEF DURING THE MILITARY PERIOD IN
YUGOSLAVIA

The annexed memorandum of conversation states the main terms of the Agreement which the Theater Commander is authorized to sign pursuant to the proposed cable which is also annexed. You will note that the cable authorizing the signing of the Agreement requests that certain additions or amendments be made prior to signature.

The most important change relates to the number of observers who will inspect the distribution function. The Agreement fixes a definite number. The amendment proposes that there be no ceiling placed on the number of observers but that the number should be left indeterminate and should be as many as are necessary to enable the Military Commander to be certain that a fair and equitable distribution is being effected. It is the intention of the cable that the Theater Commander should have complete discretion in determining when additional observers are required.

The proposed Agreement, particularly paragraphs b and e are inconsistent with the AML Agreement and its Interpretation. This raises the question of the applicability of the AML Agreement to the Yugoslav operation. The US-UK Military have clearly indicated that they believe its is inapplicable. In order that UNRRA's position during this period, viz a viz the Military and the Yugoslav Government, be clearly defined, I would propose that CCS transmit a separate cable to the Theater Commander requesting that, to the fullest extent possible, the terms and intention of the AML Agreement and Interpretation govern the UNRRA-Military relationship in this operation.

2X

Yugoslav Political

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

1344 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 October 44

TO: George Xanthaky
FROM: Norman Leon Gold

In accordance with your request by telephone 21 October,
I am attaching a copy of the minutes of the meeting regarding
the Yugoslaves held 17 October. I am sorry this was delayed,
but the minutes have just now been completed.

Attachment.

Norman Leon Gold

*Note has been approved
- by the D.G.
H. G. Austin
25 Oct.*

C. FOTITCH
5118 Chevy Chase Parkway
Chevy Chase 8, D. C.

October 12, 1944

My dear Director-General:

On September 28, on radio station "Free Yugoslavia" a statement was made by certain "authoritative and competent quarters" about the activities of UNRRA in Yugoslavia. According to this statement, the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia has informed UNRRA that they refuse to accept help of the UNRRA if the relief sent to Yugoslavia is to be distributed by the special machinery of the UNRRA. According to this statement the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia "explains its demand that peoples authorities should distribute relief among our people by the fact that Yugoslavia distinguishes herself from the majority of nations of Europe inasmuch as firstly, at the very beginning of enemy's attack and occupation she continued the struggle alone and is liberating herself thanks to her national army of liberation and secondly, during the struggle against the invader the organs of peoples authority were formed on liberated territory."

It is not known to me what further steps, if any, were taken by the present Yugoslav government with UNRRA to give effect to this request of the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia, which if accepted, would give no possibility whatsoever to the authority of the UNRRA to control the distribution of relief among the people of Yugoslavia. It is obvious that the refusal of the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia to accept such control was made with definite political objects in view, to put pressure on the majority of the people in Yugoslavia to recognize and to accept the authority of this body.

The claim of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia to represent the peoples of Yugoslavia does not answer the real situation in the country, especially the affirmation that "organs of peoples authority were formed on liberated territory and these organs are local national liberation committees elected on democratic principles and enjoying full confidence of the people". Such an affirmation is contrary to the truth and facts, and is deliberately made in order to mislead public opinion. For anyone who is familiar with the present situation in Yugoslavia, such statements that the "elections have already been carried out," what is more, "on democratic principles", is an offense to common sense and to the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves.

As a member of the Central National Committee of Yugoslavia which represents all Serbian and Slovenian political parties, as well as some democratic elements from Croatia, and consequently is the authoritative representative of the great majority of the people, I feel bound, my dear Director-General, to draw your attention to this request which, if accepted, would be resented by them.

The people of Yugoslavia are eagerly awaiting the much needed aid and help from the UNRRA immediately upon their liberation, but they cannot believe for one moment that a United Nations organization would permit itself to be used by a Partisan group for the latter's political aims. Such an action would be in direct opposition to Resolution No. 7 adopted at Atlantic City, which provides that "at no time shall relief and rehabilitation supplies be used as a political weapon, and no discrimination shall be made in the distribution of relief supplies because of race, creed, or political beliefs."

The very fact that the Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia refuses the participation and control of the organs of UNRRA for the distribution of relief and supplies in Yugoslavia is conclusive evidence that they intend to use those supplies as a political weapon in order to deprive the majority of the population, which has refused to accept its authority, of all help and assistance.

Even if this request is supported by the present Yugoslav government, I must make a protest and oppose it in the name of the Central National Committee of Yugoslavia, which in its resolution of July 23 of this year declared that, "they do not commit themselves to the acts of the government of Dr. Ivan Subashich, and reserve for themselves full liberty of action towards this government and full liberty to take such measures as are found necessary for the protection of national and state interests."

Yours very sincerely,

Constantin Fotitch
Member of the Central National
Committee of Yugoslavia

The Honorable
Herbert H. Lehman
Director-General
United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration
Washington, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 October 1944

To: George Xanthaky
From: Joel Gordon
Subject: Agenda for Discussion of Supply Problem with CCAC in
Absence of Military Period in Yugoslavia

This memorandum outlines the matters relating to supplies which must be agreed upon with CCAC if UNRRA accepts direct responsibility for relief and rehabilitation operations in Yugoslavia without a military period.

It would seem desirable for UNRRA to express to the military its willingness to assume such responsibility on condition that (1) a mutually satisfactory agreement can be negotiated by UNRRA with the Yugoslav government (no real difficulty should be encountered on this score despite recent events), (2) appropriate agreements can be worked out with the CCAC on their making available supplies intended for Yugoslavia and (b) necessary shipping space for transportation of these supplies to Yugoslavia.

We should seek agreement on the following points:

1. Will all supplies listed in CCAC 20 and specifically earmarked for Yugoslavia be made available to UNRRA for Yugoslavia?
 - a. Will a proportionate share of the supplies in CCAC 20 which are not at present broken down by country be allocated to Yugoslavia? (UNRRA will be glad to submit its suggestions to the CCAC on this matter.)
 - b. Will a proportionate share of supplies already stockpiled in the Middle East for the Balkans be earmarked and set aside for shipment to Yugoslavia?
 - c. Will the remaining supplies provided by CCAC 20 but not yet stockpiled in the Middle East be made available on requisition from UNRRA?
2. Will all supplies be made available without cost to UNRRA?
3. Will the military deliver such supplies into the custody of UNRRA representatives at the ports in Yugoslavia on requisition of

11 October 1944

of UNRRA? And, if possible, on separate ships from those carrying military supplies?

4. Will the military agree to UNRRA negotiating with the Yugoslav government for turning over to UNRRA all or part of the proceeds of the sale of such supplies for financing administrative expenses and purchases of relief supplies in the country? (Note: This is recommended so that a uniform policy may be observed both during the period of military and UNRRA supply.)

5. Will the military agree to UNRRA's accepting custody but not title to such supplies and to UNRRA's transferring title to the Yugoslav government on behalf of the military? (Note: This is recommended to avoid any impression that UNRRA's supplies are being increased by transfer of supplies financed from appropriations to the War Department.)

I believe that we should seek affirmative agreement on the above matters. Other less desirable alternatives are, of course, possible if the military disagrees on these points.

Of only somewhat lesser importance are the following points:

1. In view of the fact that the military will not be bringing in with their military transport and other equipment, which have been relied upon under the military plan and not provided for in CCAC 20, can the military

a. Loan the use of such equipment (already in the theatre) for a limited period of time until UNRRA equipment can be procured or

b. Arrange for the sale to UNRRA of such equipment.

It should be pointed in the discussion of the above that UNRRA procurement has been premised on the existence of a military period, that UNRRA has experienced difficulties in getting allocations and priorities for supplies and for shipping space and that UNRRA may be faced with bringing in supplies over and above those provided for in CCAC 20.

The feasibility of UNRRA operation without a military period is dependent on the arrangements which can be worked out on the above. A formal agreement will need to be negotiated with the military before UNRRA is in a position to initiate negotiations with the Yugoslav government.

Gregg's Political

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

1344 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

4 October 1944

To: Mr. George Xanthaky

From: Morse Salisbury *W.S.*

Here is an earlier story by Paul Ward indicating how closely he is following the developments in the Balkans. He's the one with whom I talked on the telephone while you were in my office today.

Attachment

U.K.:

Jacklin π State & War

1. No military period
2. No Agency.
3. Own arrangements.
4. as principal

Consider

by Secmed {
ccac.}

AY MORNING, OCTOBER 2,

ately after learning via Washington that the Anglo-American terms drawn up at Cairo would have kept the Red army out of Bulgaria.

The terms the Russian action forced London and Washington to scrap, it is understood, provided only for the "neutralization" of Bulgaria—for the disarming and internment of the German forces there, the severance of all Axis ties, and complete cessation of all hostile action against the Allies, whose forces, in turn, would have foregone the excuse to occupy that strategic Balkan corner.

Excuse For Invading Bulgaria

The official Russian excuse for Moscow's sudden decision was that the Bulgarian Government was being dilatory and engaging in suspiciously hostile acts and that, besides, the Red army needed to enter Bulgaria as part of its sweep toward Germany's backdoor that has now carried it into Yugoslavia.

Russian versions of the "Bulgarian incident" stress that the British and American officers who had been in Sofia more than a week prior to their ouster, did not constitute an "official" mission. This accords with the view in informed quarters here that the mission ventured into Bulgaria without either asking Soviet permission or

Urban League Desires Pe

By GEORGE
(Continued)

industrial secretary of the Baltimore Urban League.

In his speech Mr. Ross referred to Baltimore as one of two Eastern cities which may be subject to racial tensions in the post-war era. Mr. Ross prefaced his reference to Baltimore and to major cities in the West, South and North by stating he was not a special pleader to advance the interest of one race against another.

"Equal Work Opportunity"

He declared that he felt it the obligation of every American "to remove inequalities which have crept into our national life, and I believe that the ultimate provision of equal work opportunity for all Americans will enrich our national economic life and do wonders for America's soul."

Congress and the courts of the United States have always given special protection to citizens against whom special circumstances were operating unfairly, he said.

"If it be held that discrimination

Tito Is Reported Cool To Western Powers

Yugoslav Leader's Attitude Said To Complicate So-Called Soviet "Bulgarian Incident"

By PAUL W. WARD

(Washington Bureau of The Sun)

Washington, Oct. 1—Further complications in the Allies' Balkan situation came to light here today as indications accumulated that the so-called "Bulgarian incident" of last week is reaching the amicable settlement forecast by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State.

Among the new complications were well-authenticated reports that Marshal Tito and his forces in Yugoslavia are exhibiting increasing coolness to the western powers and that Moscow is displeased with the Allied "invasion" of the Balkans via Albania.

As for the so-called "Bulgarian incident"—arising from the Soviet high command's expulsion of British and American officers from Bulgaria last Monday—it is reliably reported that Marshal Stalin has given assurances that the ban will be lifted.

Formal Protest To Kremlin

Those assurances are understood to have followed swiftly the presentation to the Kremlin of what was little more than a formal protest, but at last report none of the ousted officers had yet been readmitted to Bulgaria. Nor was it clear whether the British as well as the Americans are to be readmitted.

That among the Russians there is a tendency to distinguish between the two is suggested by unofficial reports that the American officers ousted from Bulgaria were provided air transport to Turkey whereas their British colleagues

were shipped across the frontier in boxcars.

Meanwhile, what dispatches from Bern described as "an official announcement from Sofia" said the three Bulgarian regents—Prince Cyril, Bogdan Philoff and Peter Bagrovski—had been handed over to the Russians for deportation to Moscow, where they will stand trial. The announcement, as reported, said they had been under house arrest since the Bulgarian *coup d'etat* and that their surrender was agreed on as one of the preliminaries for the signature of an armistice.

Russians Take Charge

The report added to the accumulating evidence that the Russians have assumed full charge of the situation in that corner of the Balkans where the British, with American backing, had assumed the initiative until Moscow declared war on Sofia September 5.

It was noted here that London and Washington let Moscow take the initiative in the negotiation of the Romanian armistice and that a Red army marshal signed for all three powers those Romanian terms which—according to a press conference statement he made the day they were signed—were not known in detail to Secretary Hull.

On the other hand, it was pointed out, the British—with the Americans seconding them—took

(Continued on Page 5, Column 4)

Here is Domremy where Joan of Arc was born and even in wartime a place for pilgrims and wonderment as to on just which hillsides she tended her sheep and listened to her voices. The hillsides are still dotted with sheep, descended no doubt from Joan's own flocks precisely as Domremy's present inhabitants are descendants of Joan's contemporaries, however little they suggest 15th century heroism.

Meuse, Marne Unimpressive

Here the Meuse is so tiny it gives little suggestion of the broad stream which it becomes before it reaches Holland. Equally unimpressive is the Marne as it washes past Chaumont. This is an easy hour's journey away over the picturesque road, at the side of which one sees only a few burned out German vehicles and such signs of rearguard fighting which lately went on here for ten days.

The landmarks are familiar after a quarter of a century's absence and there is no difficulty in picking one's way through the narrow streets to a restaurant which was good in 1917 and still is good.

The only familiar face was that of M. le Maire, who looks exactly as he did when he received President Wilson on his triumphal tour in December, 1918.

He was enormously pleased to be called by name—he was not the only one to be astonished at this feat of memory either—and responded with eager inquiries for Generals Pershing, Harbord and other old friends from American headquarters of that day.

Germans Stole Silver

His explanation of why he was eating in a restaurant instead of at home was quite simple. The Germans' last attention to his comfortable house had been to steal all the silver and linen and other portables.

The journey was immediately continued to the old barracks where the headquarters had been. The central building, which had held General Pershing's office and those of his principal staff, had been set afire so that the roof had fallen in and had destroyed the fourth and third floors. The small cage that I had occupied at that time had been charred to a crisp

long since. So was her daughter and so was the latter's husband, a tired army officer.

Granddaughter Missing

What caused special dismay, however, was the word that the granddaughter had been missing for eight weeks. She was Mme. Mercelle Parde, who will be remembered by Bryn Mawr College students 20 years ago, for in that day she was exchange professor in French there.

She had been a young teacher in the Chaumont Lycee during the other war and in her free time had also served as a nurse in the local French hospital.

Afterward she had been among the French teachers of special promise selected by their government for assignment to American colleges on an exchange basis. Then she had returned to France and became principal of a large Lycee at Dijon. Here she had continued without interruption until August 4. On that day she had been arrested by the German Gestapo on unstated charges and since that time there has been no word from her.

A Devoted Patriot

She was a woman of high breeding, unusual intelligence and literary taste. For all her shyness she was a devoted patriot who seemed to have refused to conduct her school save as a French woman should.

Her life had been useful to a whole generation of her students and to France and could have been useful for many years to come.

It cannot be doubted that she would have given her life for France if such sacrifice had been called for. Probably no one except German Gestapo could have dreamed of demanding it if that indeed be the melancholy explanation of this eight-week silence.

Mistinguette Still Insures Her Legs

Paris, Oct. 1 (AP)—Mlle. Mistinguette, blonde singing star of the Casino de Paris for the last quarter of a century, still has her legs insured for fabulous sums.

"When I was in New York they

1944

giving the Russians advance notice it was coming.

When it was noted that the Russian commander waited nearly a fortnight to give the Allied representatives the gate, the suggestion was voiced that there might have been no trouble at all had the mission been wholly American instead of part British.

Part Of Russian Front

It was pointed out that Romania is accepted by the western powers as definitely a part of the Russian front, and that London and Washington had less juridical claim to place observers in Romania than they had to place them in Bulgaria, a nation against which Russia did not declare war until less than a month ago.

That neither the British nor the Americans are "wanted" in Bulgaria or other parts of the Balkans by the USSR is taken for granted here. But there is avowed confidence that, at least in a limited way, they will be admitted to Bulgaria and Romania once the situations there have been "regulated" by the creation of Allied control commissions for the two countries.

Last week Tito's Yugoslav National Liberation Committee granted the Red army formal permission to enter Yugoslavia; announced it

would not permit the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to operate in Yugoslavia, and rebuked the western powers for claiming they had rendered substantial aid to Tito's forces.

A broadcast said Tito's Partisan forces had begun the struggle to liberate Yugoslavia alone and would finish it that way.

Sir William Mulock Dead At 101

Toronto, Oct. 1 (AP)—Sir William Mulock, 101-year-old chancellor of the University of Toronto, died today. Sir William was a former chief justice of Ontario and was the last surviving member of the Dominion Cabinet of Sir Wilfred Laurier, in which he served as postmaster general.

Gifts

AUTHENTIC-DISTINCTIVE

Not Likely to Be Duplicated

PURNELL'S

407 NORTH CHARLES STREET
Paintings Expertly Restored

CHINESE TALKS TO OPEN TODAY

Details Of Defining Aggression May Delay Accord

Washington, Oct. 1 (AP)—Chinese talks with American and British delegations beginning tomorrow morning at Dumbarton Oaks are expected to reach quick agreement on most major points.

Questions on details, however, may require thorough exploration, at Chinese suggestion, before these initial conversations on a world security organization are wound up.

Outlined In Detail

Ambassador Wellington Koo, Chinese delegation chief, has outlined China's desires in considerable detail and they appear to dovetail

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7

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7

*Is "Family"
At Sears!*

ply Your Needs

ne Home! For The Car!



s Open

IGHT

-30

Told President Permanent FEPC

C. DORSCH

(from Page 1)

"Two opposing attitudes will confront these cities when the day comes for the war plants to taper off and the peacetime plants to get up steam for boilers. The first attitude is wholly destructive. It would forget that Negroes were invited to come there to help build desperately needed ships and planes and tanks.

"Sort Of Defeatism"

"It would ask them, upon the disappearance of the emergency, to go back home, go anywhere, but not stay and compete with the home folks for jobs. This is the sort of defeatism which carries in its train very real and easily tagged dangers.

"The worst one is the reliance on emotionalism instead of common sense. Make this a racial matter, try to solve it by arousing antagonisms and at once the chances of sound community action fly out the window.

Continuing his advice to Baltimore and other large cities...

E SUN, BALTIMORE, MONDA

TITO REPORTED COOL TO ALLIES

Attitude Said To Complicate "Bulgarian Incident"

By PAUL W. WARD

(Continued from Page 1)

the initiative in negotiating Bulgarian armistice terms at Cairo. The Bulgarian armistice was about to be signed there when Moscow—without prior consultation with London and Washington—suddenly declared war on Bulgaria, invaded that country and took command of the situation.

Armistice Moves Ruined

The armistice negotiations were knocked into the proverbial cocked hat by this Russian move, and as of today no armistice has been signed, nor is there any official news of progress in negotiations toward one.

According to reports not officially denied, the Russians declared war and seized Bulgaria immedi-

Baltimore Sun

2 Oct

FOR THE PRESS
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, today issued the following statement:

Conflicting reports concerning the relationship of UNRRA to the relief operations on behalf of liberated Yugoslav people indicate the need for clarification. These are the facts:

1. The procurement and distribution of civilian relief supplies and services during the period of military operation in liberated Yugoslavia is the responsibility of the liberating military forces.
2. UNRRA stands ready to assist the liberating military forces if assistance is requested. In providing such assistance UNRRA is bound by Council Resolution No. 2 to make such arrangements as will insure fair and equitable distribution of relief goods without discrimination because of race, creed, or political belief.
3. At the invitation of Supreme Allied Headquarters for the Mediterranean Theatre, tentative arrangements have been made for UNRRA to discharge certain relief tasks in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. The arrangements have been approved in principle by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Under the arrangements UNRRA would act as the agent of the military.
4. The provision of civilian relief during the post-military period is the responsibility of the Government of the area.
5. UNRRA stands ready to assist the Government of Yugoslavia in the post-military period if assistance is requested.
6. The Government of Yugoslavia has asked UNRRA to provide assistance to the distressed peoples of that war-torn country. In giving this assistance,

UNRRA will be concerned as in the military period under Council Resolution No. 2, with seeing that "relief and rehabilitation in all its aspects shall be distributed or dispensed fairly on the basis of the relative needs in that area, and without discrimination because of race, creed, or political belief." To achieve this end UNRRA will consign relief supplies to its representatives in Yugoslavia and exercise a supervisory control over the distribution of such supplies in order that the 44 member governments may have continuing assurance through regular observation that relief supplies are available to all of the population without discrimination because of race, creed, or political belief. This is the mandate of the member governments. UNRRA will of course insist upon full compliance with that mandate.

When the aggressors have been pushed back from Yugoslav soil arrangements will be made for aiding these peoples, I am sure, in a manner consistent with the principles established by the member nations creating UNRRA, and in full recognition of the sovereignty of the Yugoslav Government.

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UNRRA
Form No. AD-2
(20 June 1944)

ROUTE SLIP

Date 4/10

To Mr. Lawley

Room No. 312

- | | |
|--|---------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Approval | REMARKS |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Comment | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Necessary Action | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note and Return | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Note and File | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Investigate | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Signature | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> See Me | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> As Requested | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> For your
information | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Per telephone
conversation | |

From Salisbury

Room No. 520

4/10/44

FOLLOWING TO SALISBURY FROM PHILLIPS, DATED OCTOBER 032030:

Following is the gist of statement we are making verbally and not for direct quotation:

In response to press inquiries concerning Yugoslav broadcast "Statement broadcast by the Free Yugoslav Radio on September 29 to the effect that National Committee of Liberation had declined to accept help offered by UNRRA because UNRRA insisted that this help should be distributed by organs and institutions which UNRRA proposed to set up in Yugoslavia appears to be due to some misunderstanding. The European Regional Office is not aware of any offer of assistance having been made by UNRRA to Yugoslavia under the conditions alleged insofar as UNRRA provides relief to any country. The Atlantic City resolutions prescribe that the responsibilities for distribution should in general be borne by the government or recognized national authority in any area and that the normal agencies of distribution should be used to the maximum practicable extent. The contributing governments will of course expect the Administration to see that relief is fairly distributed in accordance with the decisions of the Council but so long as the Yugoslav authorities are willing to agree as stated in the broadcast that representatives of UNRRA are afforded the necessary means of assuring themselves that the local distribution arrangements are operating fairly. No difficulty is anticipated in arriving at mutually satisfactory arrangements."

Inquiries so far include besides New York Times, Reuters, London Times, Manchester Guardian and London Telegraph.

c/c Mr. Xanthaky ✓

Mr. Gordon ✓

Mr. Jackson

Mr. Feller

Mr. Thompson

*Yugoslavia -
Political*

4 October 1944

Mr. Rudolf Bicanic
Member of the Council for Yugoslavia
2221 R Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Bicanic:

This will acknowledge your letter of September thirtieth in which you refer to the Balkan Mission Agreement which was informally discussed with you in Montreal.

As was clearly explained to you in the course of these discussions, the agreement covers UNRRA's activities during the period in which the U.S. and U.K. Military authorities would be undertaking the responsibility for furnishing relief supplies.

Since the agreement which was discussed with you relates exclusively to this period, UNRRA was not competent to invite the Yugoslav Government to participate in any discussions with the military with respect to its specific terms. Such an invitation could have come only from the competent Military authorities. Moreover, it was explained to you that the agreement has not been formally ratified and that there was grave question if the arrangements set forth, particularly those relating to distribution, would be extended to Yugoslavia.

You will, I am sure, also recall that we informed you that the Administration was unable to enter into any kind of definite discussions with you until a determination had been reached by the Military authorities regarding the entire question of whether or not there would be, in Yugoslavia, a period in which responsibility for relief supply would be assumed by the U.S. and U.K. Military, and if so the exact terms under which UNRRA would be asked to participate in relief operations during this period. The only definite statement which we could and did make with respect to the period of military responsibility was, that if UNRRA did perform any service or distribution functions, it would be obligated, under the resolutions of the Council, to see:

"That at no time shall relief and rehabilitation supplies be used as a political weapon and no discrimination shall be made in the distribution of relief supplies because of race, creed, or political belief."

Mr. Rudolf Bicanic

- 2 -

4 October 1944

It was also explained to you that this basic principle applied to the post-military as well as the Military period.

In view of the foregoing, I am constrained to feel that your letter was premature. I trust, however, that we shall have the opportunity of further discussing the matter when I have received definite word from the Military authorities regarding the specific arrangements for relief operations during the period of Military responsibility. In any event, as was explained to you in Montreal, we should be happy to discuss with you immediately specific details and arrangements relating to relief and rehabilitation operations in your country during the period in which responsibility for the financing and furnishing of relief and rehabilitation supplies is the direct obligation of UNRRA.

Very sincerely yours,

Herbert H. Lehman
Director General

GXanthaky/tep

Yugoslav Political

SECRET

Mr. Rudolf Bicanic
Member of the Council for Yugoslavia
2221 R Street N W
Washington DC

My dear Mr. Bicanic:

This will acknowledge your letter of September thirtieth in which you refer to the Balkan Mission Agreement which was informally discussed with you in Montreal.

As was ~~already~~ explained to you in the course of these discussions, the agreement covers UNRRA's activities during the military period. Under the resolutions of policy of the First Session of the Council, the Administration during this period may operate only "From such a time and for such purposes as may be agreed upon by the military command and the Administration, and subject to such control as the military command may find necessary."

Since the agreement which was discussed with you relates exclusively to the military period, UNRRA was not competent under the terms of the policy resolutions to invite the Yugoslav Government to participate in any discussions with the military with respect to its specific terms.

Such an invitation could have come only from the Allied Military Authorities. Moreover, it was explained to you that the Agreement has not been formally ratified and that there was grave question if the arrangements set forth, particularly those relating to distribution, would be extended to Yugoslavia.

You will, I am sure, also recall that we informed you that the

Administration was unable to enter into any kind of definite discussions with you until a determination had been reached by the military authorities regarding the entire question of whether or not there would be a military period in Yugoslavia, and if so the exact terms under which UNRRA would be asked to participate in relief operations during this period. The only definite statement which we could and did make with respect to the period of military responsibility was, that if UNRRA did perform any service or distribution functions, it would be obligated, under the resolutions of the Council, to see:

"That at no time shall relief and rehabilitation supplies be used as a political weapon and no discrimination shall be made in the distribution of relief supplies because of race, creed or political belief."

It was also explained to you that this basic principle applied to the military as well as the post-military period.

In view of the foregoing, I am constrained to feel that your letter was premature. I trust, however, that we shall have the opportunity of further discussing the matter when I have received definite word from the military authorities regarding the specific arrangements for relief operations during the period of military responsibility.

Very sincerely yours,

Herbert H. Lehman
Director General

Xanthaky/bs
3 October 1944

Yugoslavia - Political

COPY

2221 R Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
September 30, 1944

My dear Mr. Director General:

With reference to our conversations at Montreal, I have the honor to inform you that I have had the opportunity of studying the Balkan Mission Agreement which was handed to me informally by the Administration.

At first glance I was able to ascertain that the Agreement is not in accordance with the point of view of the Yugoslav Government, and I feel it my duty to put it informally before you.

The said Agreement interferes directly with the sovereignty of the Yugoslav State, and I shall mention only a few examples. The Balkan Mission Agreement was concluded without participation either of the Yugoslav Government or of the Yugoslav Military Authorities, although it deals with such a vital matter as the relief and rehabilitation for Yugoslavia after many years of great sufferings and sacrifices in the war for liberation from the foreign yoke of Nazi-Fascist invaders.

Further, the Balkan Mission Agreement assigns to the UNRRA the right to determine the persons to whom and the media through which relief supplies shall be distributed. According to the interpretation of the Agreement, paragraph 7, the military authorities may at their discretion refuse to permit the import or distribution of relief supplies if, in their opinion, conditions of chaos or anarchy exist in the area.

No independent allied national administration could agree with these arrangements which are going far beyond supervision and control as conceived in the resolutions of the UNRRA Council. I am under the impression that by carrying out relief and rehabilitation in such a way UNRRA would actually take the place of our national administration, or at least duplicate it, and I do not see any reason for it.

The military authorities who carry out military operations in Yugoslavia are those of the National Liberation Army headed by Marshall Tito. There exists in the country the provisional administration of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia with its administrative units.

The Honorable
Herbert H. Lehman
Director General
UNRRA
Dupont Circle, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

The Honorable Herbert H. Lehman

September 30, 1944

The Royal Yugoslav Government is taking full account of all these facts since they are the very basis on which this government is founded.

In the meantime, I have transmitted the text of the Balkan Mission Agreement to my Government and I shall communicate its answer to you as soon as I receive it.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Director General,

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Rudolf Bicanic
Member of the Council for
Yugoslavia

RB:AS

29 September 1944

OWI OVERHEAD TO PHILLIPS FROM SALISBURY

Associated Press reports broadcast 28 September by free Yugo-
slav radio saying Marshal Tito refuses accept UNRRA aid because
UNRRA insists on operating distribution machinery itself. What
is your line on this to London press? Reply immediately. We
are saying here that the whole matter remains to be determined;
that there is probably some garbling in transmission of messages
concerning conversations with Yugoslav delegation at Montreal
which leads to impression UNRRA trying control whole distribution
machinery. Latter obviously untrue under declared policy using
existing machinery wherever possible. However, as trustee for
44 United Nations and in compliance with Atlantic City resolutions
UNRRA must exercise some check-up and supervision to see that
discrimination is avoided and goods are distributed under ration-
ing and price control.

c/c Mr. Hugh Jackson
Mr. Xanthaky
Mr. Blinn
Mr. Joel Gordon
Mr. James Johnson
Mr. Lacey

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

NAME OR SUBJECT Yugoslavia - Political FILE NO.

DATE 18 September 1944

REMARKS: CAWA from Matthews in Cairo to Governor Lehman re:
Dr. Stoyan Gavrilovic's visit with Marshal Tito re:
Yugoslavia's political situation.

SEE

Balkan Mission - Reports

NAME OR SUBJECT FILE NO.

DIRECTIONS:

FILE THIS SHEET UNDER NAME OR SUBJECT AT TOP.

DESCRIBE PAPERS FULLY UNDER "REMARKS".

FILE PAPERS FOR WHICH THIS FORM IS TO BE SUBSTITUTED, UNDER NAME OR SUBJECT LISTED UNDER "SEE".

Yugoslavia - Political

4 September 1944

TO : Michail Menshikov
FROM : George Xanthaky
SUBJECT: Yugoslav Developments

Last week, it had been reported that Dr. Mihajlo Konstantinovich had been appointed as Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States. I checked with Dr. Franges who is Charges d'Affaires at the Embassy in Washington, and he informed me that there is now serious question as to whether Konstantinovich will come to the United States. He says that the Yugoslav delegation to the UNRRA Conference in Montreal will be made up in London, and in all likelihood will be headed by Kusanovich whom you will recall we met in the Governor's office about a month ago. According to Franges's latest information, it is quite likely that Kusanovich will remain in the United States as Ambassador.

Franges will not go to Montreal for the Conference. However, the entire group which will attend will come back to Washington and remain here for at least ten days to discuss in detail Yugoslav relief and rehabilitation problems with the Administration.

For your information, I am attaching data concerning Dr. Konstantinovich.

GXanthaky/tep

INFORMATION RE DR. MIHAJLO KONSTANTINOVICH

Professor Konstantinovich is about 45 years of age and a Serb from Serbia. He has been a professor of law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade. During his teaching years, up to September 1939, he was one of the four or five leading members of the Society for Legal Philosophy and Sociology, a society of social-scientists connected with Belgrade University. In this group were organized practically all liberal university people engaged in social sciences and it paid special interest in guiding younger people. The group was of pure Yugoslav orientation and cooperated closely with the representatives of the Democratic-Peasant Coalition (Croatian Peasant Party plus the Independent Democratic Party) engaged in similar work.

During 1938 and up to September 1939, Professor Konstantinovich was one of the experts (with Professors George Tasich and Ivan Krbek) who drafted the Sporazum, the Serbo-Croat agreement of August 26, 1939, creating the autonomous Banovina Croatia. In the following Cvetkovich-Matchek government he was a Minister of State, seemingly in charge of implementing the constitutional and administrative set-up of the state according to the ideas of Sporazum.

In March of 1941 after the signature of the Tri-Partite pact in Vienna by Yugoslavia he resigned his position in the government, but was not included in the Simovich government.

He was living in the Middle East, and reportedly kept aloof from the groups controlling the Yugoslav Government in Exile until Subasich came in.

Konstantinovich is a close and trusted friend of Premier Subasich, and that may be the chief reason for his selection.

UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

1344 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 September 1944

TO: George Kanthaky
M. Meshikov

FROM: Joel Gordon

SUBJECT: New Yugoslav Ambassador to U. S.

Dr. Franges has confirmed the report that Dr. Mihajlo (Michael) Konstantinovich has been appointed as the Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States. I am outlining below some information obtained by Mr. Tomasevich from the press and secondary sources.

1. Professor Konstantinovich is about 45 years of age and a Serb from Serbia. He has been a professor of law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Belgrade. During his teaching years, up to September 1939, he was one of the four or five leading members of the Society for Legal Philosophy and Sociology, a society of social-scientists connected with Belgrade University. In this group were organized practically all liberal university people engaged in social sciences and it paid special interest in guiding younger people. The group was of pure Yugoslav orientation and cooperated closely with the representatives of the Democratic-Peasant Coalition (Croatian Peasant Party plus the Independent Democratic Party) engaged in similar work.

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Yugoslavian Politics

4 September 1944

TO : Michail Menshikov
FROM : George Xanthaky
SUBJECT: Yugoslav Developments

Last week, it had been reported that Dr. Mihajlo Konstantinovich had been appointed as Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States. I checked with Dr. Franges who is Charges d'Affaires at the Embassy in Washington, and he informed me that there is now serious question as to whether Konstantinovich will come to the United States. He says that the Yugoslav delegation to the UNRRA Conference in Montreal will be made up in London, and in all likelihood will be headed by Kosanovich whom you will recall we met in the Governor's office about a month ago. According to Franges's latest information, it is quite likely that Kosanovich will remain in the United States as Ambassador.

Franges will not go to Montreal for the Conference. However, the entire group which will attend will come back to Washington and remain here for at least ten days to discuss in detail Yugoslav relief and rehabilitation problems with the Administration.

For your information, I am attaching data concerning Dr. Konstantinovich.

GXanthaky/tep

INFORMATION RE DR. MIHAJLO KONSTANTINOVICH

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Yugoslav Political

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Joel Gordon/ek

Yugoslavia - Political

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

29 August 1944

TO: George Xanthaky
FROM: Joel Gordon *JS*
SUBJECT: The Role of UNRRA in Yugoslavia under Proposed AML Plan

The latest report from Cairo (letter of 9 August 1944, Matthews to Xanthaky) indicates that the AML proposes to operate the following plan in Yugoslavia:

"Goods to become the property of the Yugoslav authorities on arrival at the port. Warehousing to be under the control of the local authorities. If Serbia is supplied through Salonika, warehouse at Salonika to be under AML control . . . In Yugoslavia, AML rely on the doctrine of unfailing trust. In Greece, they are prepared to envisage far closer inspection and control on distribution. Attitude towards Yugoslavia is not dictated by any belief in the greater trustworthiness of Yugoslavs, but simply by the feeling that Tito will be too strong to brook interference, and that not enough Allied forces will be available to ensure proper distribution."

If this plan is put into operation, the role of UNRRA will differ from that which is envisaged in the agreement between UNRRA and the military of a distribution organization acting as agent for the military under their direction in the country. This memorandum raises a number of questions about the new relationships created by this plan between the military, UNRRA and the Yugoslav Government, new problems in the administration of relief and rehabilitation posed, and suggests some immediate courses of action by UNRRA.

1. If the Allied military are not present in Yugoslavia upon its liberation and restrict their activity to making supplies available to the Yugoslav Government at ports of entry, will there be a "military period" of operation? Obviously, there would not be such a period in terms of which we have been thinking; the present plan of the AML does not provide for any inspection and control of distribution of supplies provided by the military - this is the basic responsibility which UNRRA would assume during a military period in any country under the pending agreement between UNRRA and the military.

29 August 1944

2. Under the proposed AML plan, the following courses of action are open to UNRRA:

- (a) Take steps to assume immediate relief and rehabilitation operations in Yugoslavia by reimbursing the military for supplies it will make available and treating such supplies as UNRRA supplies;
- (b) Postpone participation in relief and rehabilitation operations in Yugoslavia until the military has indicated that it will no longer make supplies available and that UNRRA should assume responsibility therefor;
- (c) Take steps to assume immediate relief and rehabilitation operations except for supplies and their distribution.

The disadvantage of the first course of action would be that UNRRA could not conserve its funds during the period that the military were making its own supplies available without charge. On the other hand, failure to participate in relief and rehabilitation operations during this period would mean:

- (1) Important decisions in the early period shaping future relief and rehabilitation plans would be developed without regard to UNRRA policies;
- (2) The experience to be gained by UNRRA during this period would be lost;
- (3) There would be no natural transition from the military to the UNRRA period.

In view of the above considerations the third course of action suggested seems most practical and realistically related to the AML plan.

3. It would be my recommendation that UNRRA develop its plans on the basis of the proposed AML plan which precludes UNRRA control and inspection of supplies provided by the military. This plan should provide for a mission to Yugoslavia during the period of military supply which will make available to the Yugoslav Government all of the relief and rehabilitation services of the Administration with the exception of supply. With respect to supply UNRRA should (1) provide for observers so that necessary familiarity with distribution problems can be acquired for the later period of UNRRA supplies,

and (2) provide for active planning in the country with the government as to specific needs for UNRRA supplies after military supplies are no longer available.

4. To effectuate the plan outlined above, the following steps should be taken:

(a) The headquarters office should contact the military in Washington

- (1) to determine the degree of finality of the AML plan for Yugoslavia as we understand it
- (2) to determine what role the military have in mind for UNRRA under their plan and if the above plan would be acceptable to them
- (3) to determine whether the military have made their plan known to the Yugoslav Government and whether any agreement has been concluded
- (4) in the absence of such agreement to urge that an agreement be concluded with the Yugoslav Government and that UNRRA participate in the development of such an agreement so that the respective roles of the military and UNRRA and the responsibilities of the government are considered jointly.

(b) The military in Washington should be requested to issue a directive to the theatre commander along the above lines, if this is appropriate.

(c) Depending upon the extent to which agreements can be reached in Washington and communicated as directives to the field, UNRRA should direct the office in Cairo to proceed along similar lines with the AML in the field.

(d) In the event that the military wish to conclude an agreement with the Yugoslav Government without the participation of UNRRA, we should proceed to open discussions directly with the Yugoslav Government, if appropriate, relative to what UNRRA can do with respect to matters other than supply.

28 August 1944

5. If the plan of operation outlined above is adopted, the only significant change in the organization and functioning of the mission would be with respect to distribution. We would not need during this period as large a number of distribution, transport, warehousing and related personnel. A selected number of top personnel in these fields would be sufficient for observing purposes.

I believe that we should discuss with Mr. Menshikov the basic problems outlined in this memorandum.

cc: Mr. Menshikov

EXEMPTION FOND
PASSEPORT

Yugoslavia Political

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

CONFIDENTIAL

26 August 1944

TO: George Xanthaky
FROM: Joel Gordon *JG*
SUBJECT: Discussion with Mr. Cannon, State Department

In a discussion at the State Department on August 26, Mr. Cannon of the Southeastern European Division expressed the following opinions on the situation in Yugoslavia:

1. It appears there might be no "military period" in Yugoslavia comparable to that in Greece; in the absence of Allied military direction of distribution in Yugoslavia, greater responsibility may devolve upon UNRRA.
2. Since UNRRA personnel in Yugoslavia may not be working under military direction and supervision as in Greece, it will be essential that UNRRA have personnel of high calibre capable of acting without close direction.
3. Was UNRRA ready and able to assume the necessary responsibility in Yugoslavia, especially since the situation might develop more rapidly than we previously expected. It appeared that there was a feeling that we might not be equipped to meet the situation at this time.

The above comments of Mr. Cannon, which I have paraphrased as accurately as possible, raise some important questions for us:

1. Do we have sufficient top-side staff in Cairo or on the way for the Yugoslav Mission? Recruitment at the lower levels has proceeded more rapidly than for the top levels.
2. To what extent have we clarified with the military our responsibility under the arrangement that might prevail for Yugoslavia? If supplies are turned over by the military to the government in Yugoslavia and there are no Allied military forces there, how could we act as "agents" for the military along the lines of our past thinking?
3. If UNRRA is confronted with a much larger immediate responsibility, should we not reorient our thinking and planning which has hitherto proceeded on the assumption of a military period with military

direction? If it appears that there will be military supply and direction only to the extent of delivering supplies to ports of entry, many problems of internal transportation and distribution for which we have been relying generally on the military may become our direct responsibility.

In the light of the AML plan contained in the recent letter from Mr. Matthews and the comments of Mr. Cannon, I believe we must re-think our role in the period of military supply, take necessary steps to clarify our relationship with the military and the government, and revise our planning accordingly.

11 August 1944

Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman
Combined Civil Affairs Committee
The War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the C.C.A.C. consider the following request for increasing the volume of civilian relief supplies now being sent into those parts of Yugoslavia which have been liberated and are under the control of Marshal Tito. This Administration has given this request its most serious consideration and I am greatly concerned that the urgently needed assistance be rendered as quickly as possible.

During my visit to Cairo last March, representatives of Marshal Tito presented me with a letter addressed to the Council of UNRRA in which he stated Yugoslavia's urgent need for help in the territories under his control. Subsequently, Mr. Klentsov, Soviet member of the Council and Central Committee of UNRRA, put a similar specific proposal before me suggesting that 2,000 tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies should be made available by UNRRA to representatives of Marshal Tito at Bari. Mr. Klentsov stated at that time that the Soviet Government would be ready to participate in the provision of transport for these supplies to the extent agreed upon by the Combined Military Authorities and to the extent that this was necessary. More recently Mr. Kosanovich, member of the present Yugoslav Cabinet, together with Mr. Franges, member-alternate of the Council for Yugoslavia, made an informal request, which he said will shortly be repeated officially, for relief supplies and services of which his Government was convinced the people of Yugoslavia stood in most urgent need. He also indicated a possibility that small fishing vessels could be utilized to transport supplies from Bari to Yugoslavia.

I understand that some relief to civilians is now being given by the Combined Military Authorities and I fully appreciate that it may be very difficult to increase the volume of these supplies. I am enclosing for your information copies of communications bearing on these matters exchanged between Sir William Matthews, Chief of the UNRRA Mission in Cairo, and this office. I need not say that I realize the seriousness of the obstacles to which these communications refer but I am also deeply conscious of UNRRA's responsibility to do all it can to improve the conditions which prevail among the people of Yugoslavia.

Mr. John J. McCloy

- 2 -

Therefore, I should be grateful if you would request the C.C.A.C. to consider means for increasing the volume of supplies now being sent to Yugoslavia by the military. In view of the transport limitations cited by Sir William Matthews, I should like to draw the C.C.A.C.'s attention particularly to, first, the offer made by the Soviet Government to assist in the provision of transport and, second, to the possibility, to which Mr. Kosanovich has referred, that a number of small fishing vessels might be utilized to transport supplies from Bari to the liberated areas of Yugoslavia. In view of these possibilities, it is hoped that the Combined Military Authorities may find it possible to achieve promptly some increase in supplies.

Alternatively, should the C.C.A.C. decide that such an increase in supplies cannot be undertaken by the military authorities the Administration would ask the C.C.A.C. to arrange to make a quantity of supplies, of say 2,000 tons of foodstuffs and medical goods, available to UNRRA at Bari subject to reimbursement by UNRRA. In this case, UNRRA would, of course, cooperate fully with the Combined Military Authorities and with the representatives of the Yugoslav Government in all arrangements for the movement and distribution of these supplies, using, if possible, the additional facilities to which the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments have drawn attention. Any distribution arrangements in Yugoslavia developed by UNRRA and the Yugoslav Government would naturally be subject to the approval of the Combined Military Authorities.

The foregoing proposal is made solely to meet the emergency situation which now exists, prior to the opening of the entire territory and without prejudice to the assumption of general responsibility by the military for supplies, as is contemplated in the present planning by the Allied Military Forces for the Balkans.

I should appreciate it if you could advise me as soon as the C.C.A.C. has considered this matter; and if it is considered desirable I would be ready to discuss the question with the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert H. Lehman
Director General

Enclosures
DG/HECaustin/EC/gc

Yugoslav Political

20 July 1944

TO: Michail Menshikov X
FROM: George Xanthaky
SUBJECT: Yugoslav Cabinet

The Cabinet members appointed directly by Tito were --

1. Drago Marusich, Minister of Justice, former Governor of Slovenia.
2. Sreten Vukosavljevich, Minister of Supply, Agriculture, Mines and Forests. A Serb, former professor of law, and one of the leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party.

The best information we can get on the whereabouts of the Cabinet at the moment is --

1. Ivan Subasich, en route from Bari to London.
2. Sava Kosanovich, will leave the U.S. for London on July 25 or 26.
3. Dr. Juraj Sutej, in London.
4. Professor Izidor Cankar, en route from Canada to London.
5. Drago Marusich, en route from Bari to London.
6. Professor Sreten Vukosavljevich, en route from Bari to London.

GXanthaky/eg

Yugoslavia Political

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

CONFIDENTIAL.

19 July 1944

To: Governor H. Lehman X

From: George Xanthaky


Subject: Further developments regarding
Yugoslavian situation

I saw Cavendish Cannon this afternoon.
Since last night new developments are:

1. It is reliably reported that the two Cabinet members designated by Tito have left for London.
2. Cannon believes that they left with Tito's consent.

Cannon is securing for me a copy of the Tito-Subasich agreement. He hopes to have it by tomorrow morning.

GXanthaky/acc



Yugoslav Political

HQST CONFIDENTIAL

19 July 1944

To: Michail Menshikov X
From: George Ianthaky
Subject: Memorandum of conversation with Cavendish Cannon,
Chief of Yugoslav Desk, State Department, on Tuesday,
July 18, 1944, on developments in Yugoslav political
situation

Cannon informs me that the newspaper stories which appeared yesterday reporting a rift in Subasic-Tito relations are indicative of the turbulent turn which the Yugoslav situation has taken within the last few days.

He informed me that Tito has evidently thus far failed to perform the agreement he made with Subasic. Tito is sending his military representative to London but is not sending the two cabinet members whom he specifically designated. It appears that when Tito and Subasic had their original meeting, the terms of the agreement were reduced to writing. They were to be made public after the entire cabinet had been formed; and on a mutually agreed date. Parts of the agreement were "leaked" to a reporter for the London Daily Herald and both Subasic and the British were incensed. Thereafter a conference was to be held in Italy between Subasic and Tito and Maitland Wilson. Subasic and Maitland Wilson appeared. Tito didn't. Tito explained that his failure to attend was caused by the fact that his supporters in Croatia and Slovenia were opposed to the reconciliation.

The situation has been further complicated by the claim that Tito's people "leaked" the entire substance of the accord to radio and newspapers, despite the original agreement.

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July 13, 1944

To: Mr. Menshikov X
From: Mr. Kanthaky
Subject: Memorandum of conversation with Cavendish Cannon,
Chief of Yugoslav Desk, U.S. State Department,
on July 13, 1944

1. Status of Ambassador Fotitch

Ambassador Fotitch was officially notified this morning that he has been relieved of his post as Ambassador and that the United States Government would recognize Ivan Franges, Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy, as the official diplomatic representative of the newly constituted Yugoslav Government, pending the appointment of an ambassador. The action was taken at the request of the Yugoslav Government - in - Exile in London which was made on Monday, July 10. The appointment is effective as of Friday, July 14.

2. Proposal to move Yugoslav Government - in - exile to London

On June 23, 1944 I informed you of the proposal made by the Yugoslav Government - in - exile to the United States Government regarding the removal of the Yugoslav Government from Cairo to London and the attitude of the U.S. State Department in connection therewith. Mr. Cannon informs me that the President has approved the State Department's approval. The net result of the action is that all U.S. activity in connection with Yugoslavia as well as Greece and Albania and other Balkan economic and relief and rehabilitation problems will continue to be handled in Cairo and not London.

3. British proposal to shift AML-Yugoslav planning to Algiers

The U.S. political authorities are definitely opposed to the British proposal. Strong representations are being made both here and in Algiers and Cairo against the move. I will keep you advised of any developments. One of the major arguments advanced by the U.S. Government against the move is the serious handicap which would confront UNRRA if the proposal is approved. Foy Kohler, Assistant Chief of the Near East Division, confirmed Mr. Cannon's statements with respect to the U.S. attitude on the proposed change.

4. Preliminary note on Yugoslav Government

The Yugoslav cabinet consists of the Prime Minister and five other cabinet members. Under the agreement pursuant to which Subasic accepted the Premiership, Marshall Tito was given the absolute right to name two of the cabinet members and the right to approve the other three members. In effect it is a wholly Tito Government. The two Serbian members of the cabinet are strongly pro-Tito, one of them being his direct appointee. Neither of them were born in old Serbia. This accounts for Ambassador Fotitch's claim that they are not "true Serbs". Cannon spoke very highly of Subasic, whom he thinks is an honest, competent and trustworthy man. He also spoke highly of Kesanovich, whom he described as honest and dynamic but intensely partisan in his views.

cc Governor Lehman

MR. JACKSON

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From: Mr. Lanthaky

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on July 13, 1944

1. Status of Ambassador Fotitch

Ambassador Fotitch was officially notified this morning that he has been relieved of his post as Ambassador and that the United States Government would recognize Ivan Franges, Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy, as the official diplomatic representative of the newly constituted Yugoslav Government, pending the appointment of an ambassador. The action was taken at the request of the Yugoslav Government - in - Exile in London which was made on Monday, July 10. The appointment is effective as of Friday, July 14.

2. Proposal to move Yugoslav Government - in - exile to London

On June 23, 1944 I informed you of the proposal made by the Yugoslav Government - in - exile to the United States Government regarding the removal of the Yugoslav Government from Cairo to London and the attitude of the U.S. State Department in connection therewith. Mr. Cannon informs me that the President has approved the State Department's approval. The net result of the action is that all U.S. activity in connection with Yugoslavia as well as Greece and Albania and other Balkan economic and relief and rehabilitation problems will continue to be handled in Cairo and not London.

3. British proposal to shift AML-Yugoslav planning to Algiers

The U.S. political authorities are definitely opposed to the British proposal. Strong representations are being made both here and in Algiers and Cairo against the move. I will keep you advised of any developments. One of the major arguments advanced by the U.S. Government against the move is the serious handicap which would confront UNRRA if the proposal is approved. Foy Kohler, Assistant Chief of the Near East Division, confirmed Mr. Cannon's statements with respect to the U.S. attitude on the proposed change.

4. Preliminary note on Yugoslav Government

The Yugoslav cabinet consists of the Prime Minister and five other cabinet members. Under the agreement pursuant to which Subasic accepted the Premiership, Marshall Tito was given the absolute right to name two of the cabinet members and the right to approve the other three members. In effect it is a wholly Tito Government. The two Serbian members of the cabinet are strongly pro-Tito, one of them being his direct appointee. Neither of them were born in old Serbia. This accounts for Ambassador Potitch's claim that they are not "true Serbs". Cannon spoke very highly of Subasic, whom he thinks is an honest, competent and trustworthy man. He also spoke highly of Kosanovich, whom he described as honest and dynamic but intensely partisan in his views.

cc Governor Lehman

MR. CAUSTIN

July 13, 1944

To: Mr. Menshikov
From: Mr. Lanthaly
Subject: Memorandum of conversation with Cavendish Cannon,
Chief of Yugoslav Desk, U.S. State Department,
on July 13, 1944

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cc Governor Lehman

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF

FOREIGN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OPERATIONS

July 9, 1943

To: Mr. Johnson

From: Mr. Xanthaky

Thank you for the memo and clipping on Yugoslavia. I have spoken to the Governor about the same and hope something develops along the lines you suggest.

G. X.

Yugoslav Political

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF

FOREIGN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OPERATIONS

July 7, 1943

To: Mr. George Xanthaky

From: James G. Johnson, Jr. *JGJ*

Attached is an article on the political problem in Yugoslavia. You may be interested in it for what it is worth.

You will note the statement that the Yugoslav Government, like the Greek Government, is planning to move to Cairo and that Mikhailovitch will take his military orders from the British.

This suggests to me that OFRRO should consider at once the advisability of sending one or two top level men to Cairo to keep in touch with the situation and planning there and to be prepared to move into Greece or Yugoslavia from that area with the British. We should, of course, discuss this idea thoroughly with our own Army before proceeding to put it into effect, but I am afraid that we are merely hiding our heads in the sand if we do not recognize the importance of what is going on in Cairo at the present time.

Do you think that it would be worth while to raise this problem at this time and to try to set in motion the necessary action looking towards the detailing of personnel to serve in Cairo?

July 7, 1943

—Balkan Politics—

By Ernest Lindley

Efforts To Unify Guerillas

AS IN the invasion of French North Africa, political preparation goes hand in hand with military preparation at every stage



LINDLEY

of the invasion of Europe. Careful political preparation can materially lessen the risks and losses of the military invaders, especially when it reaches men who bear arms or who have other means of giving military aid—whether presently they be friends or nominal enemies. The problem of organizing the maximum of assistance inside Europe to collaborate with the Allied military forces at the right time and in the most helpful ways varies from nation to nation. In some, the lines of communication, while possibly difficult, clearly head up in governments in exile. In others, they are snarled up by the feuding of political factions; Yugoslavia is an outstanding example.

In the case of Yugoslavia, there has been a cleavage in the government-in-exile itself, between the advocates of Greater Serbia and representatives of the Croats and Slovenes. (This statement may be oversimplified; many personalities and shadings of opinions have been involved.) Recently King Peter issued a proclamation intended to abate the political quarrel. He endorsed all Yugoslav forces resisting the enemy, and promised social reforms and equal political and religious rights. He also decreed a reorganization of the cabinet. This was regarded in Washington as a move in the right direction.

C-3

RECENT REPORTS indicate that the camarilla of extreme Pan-Serbs around the King has been broken up. Some of its members have been detailed to

Scotland for paratroop training. Radoye Kzenevich, the King's tutor, who enjoyed the special title of minister to the court, is reported to have tendered his resignation. He was considered a key man in the Pan-Serb group. At this writing, the King's action on the resignation has not been disclosed.

The split in the government-in-exile encouraged, although it did not correspond to, the split among the Yugoslav guerilla forces. The Russian influence entered here, in support of the Partisan bands. In 1941 and 1942 the Russians wanted constant turmoil in Yugoslavia to take some of the German weight off themselves. General Mikhailovitch, leader of the Serb Patriot guerillas, preferred to limit his activities until the Allies could provision him. His strategy was approved by British and American military leaders. The two factions accused each other of brigandage and frequently fought each other.

When the North African victory made it easier to provision Mikhailovitch, he was instructed to try to get together with the Partisans and to maintain no contacts with the Italians, from whom the Partisans had accused him of getting supplies.

The British and Yugoslav governments in turn appealed for Russian support of the effort at unity. The Kremlin has been reserved. But the Communist press has abated its attacks on Mikhailovitch, and the Russian military authorities appear agreeable to setting up Partisan-Patriot liaison. In lieu of a unified command, which does not yet seem attainable, the separate blows can be coordinated only through liaison.

PRESENT PLANS call for early transfer of a part of the Yugoslav government to Cairo, headquarters of the British Middle East Command. There the cabinet members will have direct contact with the Yugoslav refugees and means of keeping in close touch with Mikhailovitch, who will, however, take his military orders from the British.

The transfer of the Greek government to Cairo, accomplished months ago, has worked to the satisfaction of all concerned. The Middle East Command has been able to send officers into Greece to direct the remnants of the Greek and British armies which have defied capture since Greece was overrun more than two years ago. Liaison between these guerillas and Cairo is secure.

Despite the enemy's overwhelming numerical force, the guerillas are seriously hampering German supplies. The rail trip from Salonika to Athens, an overnight run through the mountain passes before the war, is now reported to average 1 to 12 days, owing to tunnel and bridge blowups by saboteurs. This single-track line has been an important feeder of the German garrison and fortress engineers at Athens.

As Allied control of Mediterranean waters and the air over them and the lower fringe of Europe expands and is strengthened, and now that supplies are available for shipment by plane, submarine, and in smugglers' boats, guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia and Greece may be expected to increase, despite strenuous efforts by the Axis to stamp it out.

Yugoslavia - Political

June 23, 1944

To: Michail Menshikov
From: George Xanthaky
Subject: Memorandum of conversation with Cavendish Cannon,
Chief of Yugoslav Desk, U.S. State Department,
on June 23, 1944

Cannon informs me that the Yugoslav Government has informed the U.S. Government that it intends to transfer the seat of the Government-in-Exile from Cairo to London. It has requested the U.S. Government to transfer Lincoln MacVeagh from Cairo to London. The State Department will advise the President that in its opinion it is unwise to transfer MacVeagh to London. It will further state that it believes that the center of all the Balkan activity is in the Middle East and more particularly in Cairo. It will urge the President to designate Mr. Schonfeld, who has been acting as Ambassador-at-Large to the other governments in exile, as Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government.

Mr. Fotich has protested to his government against his removal as Ambassador. However, he has received no instructions from his own government since the date of the announcement of his removal. Cannon is of the opinion that Fotich's successor will be named shortly. To all intents and purposes he has ceased to function as Ambassador since last week.

Xanthaky/ba

Yugoslavia - Political

9 June 1944

SECRET

TO: M. Menshikov
George Xanthaky *GP*

FROM: George Perazich

SUBJECT: Secret Memorandum Sent to Us by the Office of Strategic Services

The memorandum quoted below brings out some of the problems that have been called to my attention from several sources which I thought would be of interest to you. A similar point of view on the subject has also been expressed in Mr. Gerstenzang's memorandum to you, Appendix E.

"In a conversation (16 May) with one of our officers, Colonel Milentije Popovich, Representative of the National Committee, indicated the seriousness of the refugee and food problems in Yugoslavia. He first discussed the question of the refugees and divided them into two groups: (a) those evacuated from the coastal areas of Yugoslavia who upon arrival to Cairo had received satisfactory Allied assistance; and (b) those hundreds of thousands (200-300,000) who fled Hitlerian and quisling persecutions and found refuge in the liberated territories. The latter are a burden to the National Liberation Army. They are not productive; they left their farms and their livestock in order to escape fascist persecution. Those fit for military service are in the Liberation Army; others move from one area to another as military needs require. They are without food, clothes and medical attention.

"Yugoslavia, says Colonel Popovich, is a special case for the Allies. National Liberation Army is considered an Allied Army. This Allied Army has liberated a good deal of the Yugoslav territory and about five million inhabitants. Consequently, the liberated territory, according to UNRRA decisions, qualifies for immediate relief. The refugees in the liberated territory should be beneficiaries of the Allied funds for the refugees. Yet it appears that the Allies are not considering the question of relief for the liberated territory, nor are they planning to assist the refugees in the

9 June 1944

liberated territories. Colonel Popovich asks, what European country has suffered more in blood than in Yugoslavia? What country has more serious food and refugee problems than Yugoslavia? Every delay in relief means additional deaths. Hundreds of people are starving--they should not be permitted to die.

"When the food and clothing is made available for Yugoslavia, who will distribute them? For the Partisans this question is of great importance. Will the UNRRA control the distribution of relief? If so, will the National Committee of Yugoslavia, "the legal Government of Yugoslavia" be a member of UNRRA?

"The Partisans urge the recognition of National Committee as "the legal Government of Yugoslavia". They ask, "how can we be expected to accept relief from the Yugoslav-Refugee-Government which represents no one, has no liberated territory, and is the enemy of the Yugoslav peoples"? Governor Lehman is said to have promised the Partisans that in June when UNRRA meets the request for a Partisan representation in that body will be discussed. Though the Partisans do not say so openly, they insinuate that UNRRA will hardly support the Partisan request for representation so long as the Allies do not recognize the Partisan National Committee as "the legal Government of Yugoslavia". Meanwhile the Partisan press is filled with appeals for Allied recognition of the National Government and for food and supplies."

GPerazich/ga

Yugoslavia. Political

The Director General transmits herewith
for the information of the Right Honorable
Ben Smith the attached copy of a communication
sent to him during his recent visit in Cairo.

Attachment:

Letter from Marshal Tito, April 2, 1944

Washington,

April 14, 1944

The Director General transmits herewith
for the information of the Honorable Dean Acheson
the attached copy of a communication sent to
him during his recent visit in Cairo.

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Washington

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Attachment:

Letter from Marshal Tito, April 3, 1944

Washington,

April 14, 1944

TO THE COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND
REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION (UNRRA)

The peoples of Yugoslavia in the course of their three years struggle against the occupier have organized their Army of National Liberation, which has liberated a great part, not only of the former Yugoslavia, but certain areas outside the frontiers of the former Yugoslavia, which were under foreign rule. On this liberated territory the peoples of Yugoslavia have created their rule, based on the principle of full democracy. They possess their supreme legislative and executive representative organ, the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, and their legal national Government, the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia.

The National Liberation Army now controls about 150,000 square kilometers of Yugoslav territory and on the greater part of that territory there are no other authorities but those deriving from the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia. On this liberated territory, successfully defended by the National Liberation Army, there are about 5,000,000 inhabitants.

These peoples, who are under extremely difficult conditions and at the cost of innumerable sacrifices, offering resistance to the German aggressor and his henchmen, are in urgent need of help, still during the war, and after the liberation of the whole country they will require a special aid to reconstruct the devastated areas. The needs of these peoples cannot be expressed abroad but by their legitimate representatives, those chosen by them to this end, i.e. the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia.

The governments of the United Nations have acknowledged the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia as their Ally, but the opportunity is not given to the people who have created this Army, to expose their present and future needs in inter-allied committees.

Thus the peoples of Yugoslavia are not represented in the UNRRA, the representative of the Yugoslav exile government in Cairo who has been accepted as member of the UNRRA not being informed of the real necessities of the people, - since he has no connection with them - and in the second place, this representative is not awarded the confidence of the peoples of Yugoslavia, who justly consider him and the government which has delegated him, as their enemies.

In order to repair this injustice towards the peoples of Yugoslavia, the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia demands their representative to be received in the Council of the UNRRA. The National Liberation Committee of Yugoslav puts forward this demand on the basis of the following facts:

1. In the Preamble of the Convention of the UNRRA it is said that aid must be tendered immediately after the liberation, achieved by the military efforts of the United Nations, and that it is necessary to undertake measures for the return of prisoners and refugees. The peoples of Yugoslavia have already liberated a great part of their country and that part has undoubtedly won the right to Allied aid. This aid can be asked for and received only through a delegate of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia.

2. In the Convention it is said that members of the UNRRA can be "Governments and authorities". If the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia is not yet acknowledged by the Allied governments as a government, there can be no doubt about the National Liberation Committee having the character of legal national authority. "Authority" in this sense is acknowledged to the French National Committee of Liberation. Besides this, a Danish expert, member of the Danish Council in London, takes part in the activity of the Technical Committee of the Inter-Allied Committee for post-war needs (founded on the Conference in September 1941 at St. James Palace). Bearing in mind these precedents, the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia considers that they can not be denied at least the same rights granted to the French National Committee of Liberation and the Danish Council in London.

3. In paragraph one point two of the Convention of the UNRRA it is said that the activity of the UNRRA extends to the regions under control of some of the United Nations. This can unconditionally be applied to the liberated territory of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia.

4. In the Resolution of the UNRRA in number 18, which refers to the Committee in European matters, in point three, the possibility of receiving new members is provided for. Likewise, in the Resolution number 26 point three, the Committee is given the right of joining on new members.

According to what has been said above, the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia demands their representative to be received in the Council of the UNRRA.

The 2nd of April, 1944

President
of the National Liberation
Committee of Yugoslavia,

Marshal of Yugoslavia

(signed) J.B. Tito

Yugoslav Political

~~SECRET~~

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The 2nd of April, 1944

President
of the National Liberation
Committee of Yugoslavia,

Marshal of Yugoslavia

(signed) J.B. Tito

Tenor of agreement concluded on June 16, 1944, between the Royal Yugoslav Government (RYG) and the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia (NLCY):

NLCY and RYG have agreed on the following points:

(A) RYG abroad must be composed of progressive, democratic people who have not been compromised by taking part in the fight against the national liberation movement. Main task of this government should be organization of Allied assistance to National Liberation Army and to all those who in future will fight against Yugoslavia's common enemy, in order to unite all forces in a single national front. It will also be duty of RYG to organize supply of food for Yugoslav population, and to bring into accord the work of Yugoslavia's representation abroad and of the international organizations with the safeguarding of Yugoslav national rights, with the needs of the people and with the National Liberation fight in the country.

(B) NLCY and the Royal Government of Dr. Subasic will establish organs for the coordination of their efforts in the fight against the enemy, in reconstruction work and in foreign policy; these organs should also pave the way to speedy establishment of a single representation of the state.

(C) NLCY considers that at present it is unnecessary to stress and to aggravate question of the King and Monarchy because today this question does not represent an obstacle to collaboration between NLCY and Subasic's Government since both sides have accepted the principle that the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves shall after the war finally decide upon the organization of the state.

(D) Subasic's Government will issue a declaration which will:

(One) Recognize the national and democratic achievements won by the nations of Yugoslavia during their three years' fight which represent the basis of the democratic and federal organization of the Yugoslav state community; and also recognize the provisional administration now established in the country as the executive organ of the anti-Fascist Council and the NLCY;

(Two) Give full acknowledgment to the national fighting forces organized in the National Liberation Army under the command of the Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz-Tito; and definitely condemn all national traitors who have openly or secretly collaborated with the enemy;

(Three) Call upon the whole people to unite all fighting forces with the National Liberation Army within a single front.

(E) On

(E) On the other hand, the Marshal of Yugoslavia will issue a declaration on the collaboration with the Royal Government, in his capacity as President of the NLCY, and will once more state that for the duration of the war the question of the final organization of the state will not be discussed.

Contents of this agreement will be published after Subasic has formed his Government.

RED CROSS HELPS EXILED YUGOSLAVS

Determined Band of Refugees Reluctant at First to Take Any Aid from Anyone

By Turner Catledge

CAIRO, Egypt, Feb. 2- Because some kind person many months ago knitted a pretty red sweater for the Red Cross Chapter of Larchmont, N. Y., a bright-eyed little Yugoslav boy named Ivica Javorcic is warm and happy in a desert refugee camp tonight.

In the same tent with Ivica is Vinka Maglica, also 4 years of age, who is warm because some one in New Orleans took the time and care to knit a sweater for the Red Cross. In the next tent 3 year old Fred Nagola wears a sweater knitted in Bradenton, Fla., while their mothers and older sisters are wearing garments made for or collected by local Red Cross chapters over the length and breadth of that happier land.

These children and women are members of a group of Yugoslav refugees who are now in a camp near here. They are all Partisan followers of Marshal Tito (Josip Broz) and were brought here by the British Middle East Refugee Relief Administration, who asked the American Red Cross to assist in the emergency phase of settling these people. The Red Cross had on hand in Middle East warehouses thousands of units of clothing, including many sweaters, which it threw into the breach to help tide the victims over until more permanent relief organizations might take up the job.

Form Own Governing Body

For the operation Charles Bailey of Boston, Mass., director of civilian relief in the Middle East corralled a group of women and men from other Red Cross jobs and took them along to meet the refugees and help distribute clothing to women and children. There are many men and boys also among the refugees, but their clothing needs are compelled to wait until the women and children have been assisted.

Both Red Cross and British Middle East Relief officials said it was the most unusual group of refugees ever handled. They had been thoroughly organized into self-governing units before they left Yugoslavia. The British and the Red Cross made the fullest use of this organization.

It is a real object lesson in determination and stoicism to see their attitude. From strapping young women and men to people dying of old age, and children just beg enough to walk, it was an air almost of defiance.

"We were ordered to get out by our own officers, otherwise we would have stayed and fought and died to the last man," said one of the few who could speak English, Looking around him at

determined faces, one could understand what he meant.

"The first thing most of them wanted to do was to get to work producing something for the fighters back home.

COPY

AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. The Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has given serious consideration to proposals which have been made to the Administration that it should undertake the provision of relief supplies and services to the civil population of those areas of Yugoslavia at present under the control of General Tito.
2. The Administration is greatly concerned to render to Yugoslavia whatever aid is possible as rapidly as arrangements can be effected, and subject to the reaching of an agreement with the Yugoslav Government and with the military authorities which will safeguard the Administration's position as required by the UNRRA Agreement and the Resolutions of the Council.
3. The Administration's readiness to aid the Yugoslav people is already evidenced by its acceptance of responsibility for many thousand Yugoslav refugees; if it is to extend this aid in other forms promptly it is most urgent that the Yugoslav Government provide certain information and specific assurances to the Administration without delay.
4. The information and assurances needed should satisfy the following inquiries:
 - (a) Does the Yugoslav Government believe that there are at present clearly established liberated areas within Yugoslavia to which it is now practicable for relief supplies to be sent and distributed among the civilian population and for health and other services to be provided in accordance with the general principles and policies adopted by the Council of the Administration?
 - (b) If the Yugoslav Government does believe that such assistance is now practicable, does it request the Administration to provide such aid?
 - (c) If the Yugoslav Government requests the immediate assistance of the Administration is it prepared to invite representatives of the Administration to be present in the liberated territory for the purpose of assisting in the administration of the distribution of relief supplies in order to assure adherence to the policies adopted by the Council, and to aid in providing essential relief and rehabilitation services?
 - (d) What assurances can the Yugoslav Government give at the present moment as to the methods of distribution of supplies which would be followed, and can they assure that supplies provided for the suffering victims of war will not fall in the hands of the enemy?
 - (e) Finally, will the Yugoslav Government provide information as to the amount and type of relief supplies which it believes to be most urgently needed, having in mind the serious limitations upon transport, etc., which are likely to prevail, and as to the types of specialists who are most needed to assist in providing relief and rehabilitation services?

COPY

- 2 -

5. The Administration wishes to repeat its assurances to the Yugoslav Government that it desires to render prompt aid to the Yugoslav people as far as is practicable. It is, however, necessary to note that even if affirmative answers can be given to the foregoing questions, it may prove to be impossible, either by reasons of the general relationships obtaining with the military at the moment or the present military and transport situation, to provide such aid immediately.

21 July 1944

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COPY

- 2 -

5. The Administration wishes to repeat its assurances to the Yugoslav Government that it desires to render prompt aid to the Yugoslav people as far as is practicable. It is, however, necessary to note that even if affirmative answers can be given to the foregoing questions, it may prove to be impossible, either by reasons of the general relationships obtaining with the military at the moment or the present military and transport situation, to provide such aid immediately.

21 July 1944

COPY

AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. The Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has given serious consideration to proposals which have been made to the Administration that it should undertake the provision of relief supplies and services to the civil population of those areas of Yugoslavia at present under the control of General Tito.
2. The Administration is greatly concerned to render to Yugoslavia whatever aid is possible as rapidly as arrangements can be effected, and subject to the reaching of an agreement with the Yugoslav Government and with the military authorities which will safeguard the Administration's position as required by the UNRRA Agreement and the Resolutions of the Council.
3. The Administration's readiness to aid the Yugoslav people is already evidenced by its acceptance of responsibility for many thousand Yugoslav refugees; if it is to extend this aid in other forms promptly it is most urgent that the Yugoslav Government provide certain information and specific assurances to the Administration without delay.
4. The information and assurances needed should satisfy the following inquiries:
 - (a) Does the Yugoslav Government believe that there are at present clearly established liberated areas within Yugoslavia to which it is now practicable for relief supplies to be sent and distributed among the civilian population and for health and other services to be provided in accordance with the general principles and policies adopted by the Council of the Administration?
 - (b) If the Yugoslav Government does believe that such assistance is now practicable, does it request the Administration to provide such aid?
 - (c) If the Yugoslav Government requests the immediate assistance of the Administration is it prepared to invite representatives of the Administration to be present in the liberated territory for the purpose of assisting in the administration of the distribution of relief supplies in order to assure adherence to the policies adopted by the Council, and to aid in providing essential relief and rehabilitation services?
 - (d) What assurances can the Yugoslav Government give at the present moment as to the methods of distribution of supplies which would be followed, and can they assure that supplies provided for the suffering victims of war will not fall in the hands of the enemy?
 - (e) Finally, will the Yugoslav Government provide information as to the amount and type of relief supplies which it believes to be most urgently needed, having in mind the serious limitations upon transport, etc., which are likely to prevail, and as to the types of specialists who are most needed to assist in providing relief and rehabilitation services?

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21 July 1944

Radio Free Yugoslavia broadcast at 1905 hours on September 28 statement "authorized by competent quarters" that UNRRA had refused to accept suggestion of Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation that distribution of relief supplies promised to Yugoslavia should be affected through organs of peoples' authority, insisting on installation of special distribution machinery by itself. National Committee had informed UNRRA that the Committee under such circumstances was forced to refuse its help.

Statement added that the Committee had been prepared to admit a few of UNRRA controlling delegates who would have been given an opportunity of seeing that relief was equitably distributed.

Xanthoxy
In view of last paragraph, I wonder about wisdom of proposed cable to London.
FCCL A218

JG
Yugoslav Political
RADIO FREE YUGOSLAVIA (CLANDESTINE) IN SERBO-CROAT AT
2:05 PM (BEAM UNKNOWN)

(TEXT) "WE ARE AUTHORIZED BY COMPETENT QUARTERS
TO MAKE KNOWN THE FOLLOWING:

"SINCE UNRRA HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE SUGGESTION OF THE
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA THAT
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF WHICH HAS BEEN PROMISED TO
YUGOSLAVIA BE EFFECTED THROUGH THE ORGANS OF PEOPLES
AUTHORITY BUT INSISTS THAT THIS RELIEF BE DISTRIBUTED
BY SPECIAL MACHINERY WHICH UNRRA WISHES TO INSTALL IN
YUGOSLAVIA, THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATION OF
YUGOSLAVIA HAS INFORMED UNRRA THAT UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES
IT IS FORCED TO REFUSE ITS HELP.

"THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE EXPLAINS ITS DEMAND THAT
PEOPLES AUTHORITIES SHOULD DISTRIBUTE RELIEF AMONG OUR
PEOPLE BY THE FACT THAT YUGOSLAVIA DISTINGUISHES HERSELF
FROM THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS OF EUROPE INASMUCH AS FIRSTLY,
AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF ENEMY'S ATTACK AND OCCUPATION SHE
CONTINUED THE STRUGGLE ALONE AND IS LIBERATING HERSELF
THANKS TO HER NATIONAL ARMY OF LIBERATION AND SECONDLY,
DURING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INVADER THE ORGANS OF
PEOPLES AUTHORITY WERE FORMED ON LIBERATED TERRITORY.
THESE ARE LOCAL NATIONAL LIBERATION COMMITTEES ELECTED ON
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND ENJOYING FULL CONFIDENCE OF THE
PEOPLE.

"THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

WAS PREPARED TO RECEIVE FEW UNRRA CONTROLLING DELEGATES
WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY OF SEEING THAT
RELIEF IS DISTRIBUTED EQUITABLY."

HG 9/28-450P

Yugoslav Political

SECRET

Please return to
GEORGE KANTHAKY
United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration

COPY

SECRET

APPENDIX A

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SACMED

The C.C.A.C. has been informally notified by UNRRA that it has received a request from the Yugoslav Government that UNRRA should operate in Yugoslavia *as early as possible.* ~~as early as possible.~~

Subject to your views it is proposed that UNRRA should be notified as follows:-

(A) The military authorities have no objection, subject to UNRRA's obtaining any necessary consent from the national authorities, to UNRRA undertaking in Yugoslavia as early as possible after liberation any or all of the tasks envisaged by the UNRRA resolutions.

(B) The date when UNRRA could be permitted to begin such operations *so far as concerns any port or area in which you have a military concern* would be a matter for decision by you but should be as early as possible consistent with the military situation.

(C) UNRRA in undertaking such operations would not be the agent of the military and there would be no military responsibility for relief in Yugoslavia other than as set out in subparagraphs (E) to (H) below.

(D) UNRRA would from the outset be financially responsible for relief supplies including those made available from the military programme as contemplated in subparagraph (E) below.

Let. (E) The military authorities would make available to UNRRA to cover the *supplies equivalent to 10% of the quantities programmed* initial stages after liberation a quantity of supplies to be agreed by the C.C.A.C. out of the military programme. *for Yugoslavia under C.C.A.C. 20/1* Thereafter UNRRA would be responsible for procuring its own relief supplies. *See* (A)

(F) Pending the completion of other arrangements the military would be responsible for shipping the relief supplies referred to in subparagraph (E) above to ports in Yugoslavia and handing them over to UNRRA at such ports. Until arrangements can be completed whereby UNRRA is enabled to make its own shipping arrangements, the military authorities would continue to provide shipping to the maximum extent possible consistent with military

SECRET

SECRET

Supplementary
to P.C.A.C.

commitments for additional supplies procured by UNRRA. (B)

(G) The procedure for calling forward of supplies by UNRRA through the military for delivery in ports in Yugoslavia would be worked out in the Theatre in consultation with UNRRA. It would be clearly understood that although the military would give all cooperation in meeting UNRRA's request for the shipment of relief supplies to Yugoslavia the actual quantities ^{called forward} and rates of shipment would be subject to your control and decisions as to availability of shipping, reception capacity of ports ^{overriding} and military necessities.

(H) Your responsibility for relief and rehabilitation in Yugoslavia would be limited to the provision of the agreed supplies out of the military programme as in sub-paragraph (E) above and the making of the necessary arrangements for the shipping of supplies to ports in Yugoslavia as in sub-paragraphs (F) and (G) above. Your responsibility for the provision of personnel would be limited to those necessary for carrying out such tasks in liaison with UNRRA representatives.

The above proposals have been informally discussed and tentatively agreed with UNRRA in Washington. You will no doubt wish to take them into account in the negotiations referred to in NAF 792 and 794.

Your early recommendations are requested.

9th October 1944
JM:hb

Supplies equivalent to 2/3 of the quantities
allocated to Yugoslavia by CCAC
7/20

Programmed for

and with equality of
treatment as between
Greece and others

Last 2 months -
allocation

SECRET

SECRET

1. Feasibility of shipping + shipping are available.

Can we get the
main thing in 30
days within the
first 120 days?

1. 7/5/20

2. You ship in
multi ship 4 mos.
sub to get treatment
greece, Yugoslavia

Out of Phase A for Backus

Days

1. no time for

2.

1. Carve out 6 mo commitment for Yugoslavia
2. Army will send up stock or allocations to get stock
3. Shipping to same extent

SECRET