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CROATIA

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ACC. 2011/0195



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen
CRYPTO FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL

PAGE 1 OF 2

CC: GOULDING, ANNAN, GHAREKHAN. NEW YORK
AKASHI, ZAGREB

FROM: STOLTENBERG

DATE: 18 MAY 1994

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

1. Lord Owen and I saw President Tudjman, Foreign Minister Granic and Defence Minister Susak for almost two hours in Zagreb today. We briefed them on our visits to President Milosevic and Dr Karadzic. We gave Tudjman the message of good wishes from Milosevic and transmitted the latter's wish for the development of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb. President Tudjman was interested to learn of the reactions of Milosevic and Karadzic to last Friday's Ministerial Communiqué. We answered along the lines of the cable I sent you on our meetings.

2. President Tudjman expressed support for the 51-49% territorial formula for Bosnia and Herzegovina and he thought that it was in the interest of both the Bosniacs and the Bosnian Serbs to accept it. He hoped that the Bosnian Serbs would not turn it down and thereby give the Bosniacs a pretext to continue with the military option.

3. Tudjman stated that the implementation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation is tied to the establishment of the Confederation between the Federation and Croatia. Both he and Susak thought this was relevant to the allocation of the 51% of territory for the Federation.

4. Granic said that in his contacts with the Bosniacs they attached importance to territory as well as to guarantees for the implementation of any peace agreement. They would prefer American forces, which would probably only serve under American command. Our interlocutors recognised that the Serbs are unlikely to accept NATO forces in their areas. This therefore raised the possibility of NATO forces being used in the Federation and UN forces in the Serb areas. It also came up for discussion that in the event that a settlement was concluded showing grey areas, they would in all likelihood have to have United Nations forces stationed on them.

5. President Tudjman and his associates are aware of policy differences between Izetbegovic and Silajdzic and while pledging themselves committed to the implementation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation they are not "starry-eyed" in their opinions of the Muslim leadership. They are prepared for various types of evolution in the Croat-Muslim relationship.

6. On the situation in the UNPAs President Tudjman said that the Serbs were still breaching the ceasefire and stalling in the negotiations. He is prepared for the next round of talks to take place "anywhere in Croatia". He said that if the Serbs maintained their attitude and the stalemate continued, and if UNPROFOR was not able to fulfil its mandate, he would not agree to a further extension of UNPROFOR's mandate.

7. President Tudjman thought that the election of "Milosevic's people" in Knin (Martić) had not resulted in the expected changes of policy. It could therefore be concluded that the leadership in Knin was continuing to pursue what are in effect Milosevic's policies. He therefore felt that the course of action to be pursued would be to implement Security Council decisions calling for monitoring of borders so as to cut off assistance coming in from Serbia and Montenegro.

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

94 MAY 17 10:58

Page 1 of 7

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 17 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z-763

SUBJECT: ALLEGED SERB VIOLATIONS OF CROATIA CEASE-FIRE

IMMEDIATE

CODE RESTRICTED

We have already reported to you about our discussions at Knin on 9 May 1994 with the Krajina Serbs (Refer our 716 of 9 May 1994). Attached is the text of my opening statement, in which I expressed my grave concern regarding the cease-fire violations, especially by the Serbs. We are coordinating our approaches on this matter with the EU troika as well as with Russian Ambassador Kerestedijanc and US Ambassador Galbraith. Indeed, the meeting with them on 10 May 1994 took place at my invitation at UNPROFOR Headquarters. At that meeting there was an informal general exchange on the cease-fire and on economic talks. UNPROFOR gave its latest assessment of the Serb and Croat compliance with the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994. The Force Commander pointed out that any divergence in assessment arose from the methodology of evaluation and emphasized the need to introduce not only quantitative but qualitative elements into the exercise. He also pointed out that UNPROFOR Headquarter's previous assessment had been based on mathematical estimates, while the field commanders tended to be more optimistic because of their judgement that the great majority of violations were trivial and technical in nature and that there was a positive momentum towards full compliance.

Both the Force Commander and the Deputy Force Commander have been spending a lot of time and energy during the last week to ensure substantial progress towards full compliance. The UNPROFOR civilian police and UNMOs have also been endeavoring to complete their deployment in the zone of separation, since this is one of the factors hindering the full implementation.

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We should be able to send you, on 19 May 1994, a definitive report on the subject, which, it is hoped, will record full compliance or at least a very substantial reduction in violations.

Regards.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: FC, DFC

UNPROFORZAGREB

MR AKASHI'S MEETING IN KNIN, 9 MAY 1994: OPENING STATEMENT

Thank you for your warm welcome to Knin. I am very pleased to be back here and to enjoy your hospitality for the second time since I took over as SRSG. I apologize for having had to postpone this visit due to other pressing obligations, but I am glad of the opportunity meetings such as these provide for discussing openly and frankly the challenges and opportunities we face as we move down the path of peace towards an ultimate political solution to the devastating conflict that you have lived through for more than three years now.

On 29 March this year, both conflicting sides took a major step forward in signing the general Ceasefire Agreement in Zagreb with the active participation of the international community. For the first time in over a year the guns have fallen silent, saving lives and allowing hope to ordinary people that they might once again live normal lives in normal conditions.

The Ceasefire Agreement is not an end, it is a beginning. Its provisions, so painstakingly negotiated to meet both sides concerns, envisaged three phases to the process of normalization. The first phase was to secure a cessation of shooting, disengagement of military forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons, creation of a zone of separation under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR, and negotiations for the reduction of forces within 10 kilometres of the former contact line.

The second phase was the commencement of negotiations between the parties on a number of economic issues of mutual benefit and it was clearly stated that any agreement reached on economic issues should "not prejudice the final political arrangements to be concluded between the parties."

The third phase is to be the political negotiations for a final settlement.

The overall strategy of the Ceasefire Agreement was carefully and, I believe, realistically planned and agreed, so that military conflict would end immediately, economic normalization would follow, and a political settlement would be found as these other phases were addressed. In this process you carried the hopes of your own people, of people on the other side, and of the whole international community.

Now, forty days since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement it is appropriate for us to take stock of what has been achieved, what remains to be done, and what the environment is for making further progress.

An objective evaluation of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement shows that the shooting has, in effect stopped; most, but not all weapons have been pulled back, and most, but not all military forces have been separated. But practically no deadline under the Ceasefire Agreement has been met and the greatest delays in compliance have been from your side. I will not claim that the picture is one-sided. We do see violations on the other side. But the clear majority of violations have taken place on your side.

I have resisted pressures to publicize this in the media because I believe I should bring this information to your attention directly - to try to create light, not heat. But I fear that we are entering a very critical stage in the ceasefire implementation process. I am concerned that if we do not solve the outstanding problems and particularly in the zone of separation, these could end up putting the agreement itself under serious pressure. Violations from one side could easily be used as excuses for subsequent violations from the other and thereby undermine the credibility of the agreement itself.

We have done our utmost to avoid such a situation where one side or other loses confidence in the ceasefire agreement and resorts to other means to achieve its objectives. Such a development would not be in your interests, or in the interests of the other side. Similarly, it is in no one's interest for either side to seek to use the Ceasefire Agreement as a shield behind which to pursue unrealistic positions.

As I see it, the task now is to urgently complete the first phase of full implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, and to move on to the fertile ground of seeking agreement on economic issues which do not prejudge your positions on the question of the final political settlement. Economic improvement will consolidate the ceasefire, and it is only through these economic negotiations that it may be possible to meet the concerns you have about restoring your economy.

I understand that with your new team you have needed time to decide on your positions and strategy for these economic negotiations. I have been informed that you will meet tomorrow among yourselves to decide on these matters, and I would appeal to you to make decisions that allow flexibility which would enable both parties to start negotiations very soon, and preferably within the next ten days. I am very concerned that over the past forty days some momentum has been lost and the patience of parties to the Agreement and of the international community has been stretched thin to the point where further delays to the commencement of economic talks because of technical objections to venue or agenda will be viewed very negatively.

I know that the ICFY negotiators have given you a draft paper for the economic negotiations. This is not a finalized document. They are now eagerly waiting for your positions on the substance of the negotiations so that a balanced and more complete paper can be provided as quickly as possible. I hope that you will be able to provide your positions very soon and thereby allow them to complete their own preparations.

I should reiterate that there is a relationship between the ceasefire agreement and the start of economic negotiations. The sooner we start the economic negotiations the better we will be able to consolidate what we have already achieved - that is the ceasefire agreement. And the longer it takes to start economic negotiations, the more we risk undermining the ceasefire itself. I would ask you to keep this in mind as I see this as a consideration which should not be underestimated.

Mr Martić and colleagues,

I have been very appreciative of your intervention concerning the successful deployment of Jorbat in Sector North, and I believe you understand that I have made every effort to be as forthcoming as possible to your concerns within the limits of my mandate. I have responded positively to your urgent request for fuel for humanitarian purposes and those deliveries will commence very soon. I have also abstained from public comments with regard to my concerns in the belief that solutions can be found by working with the parties and not against them.

But I am deeply concerned that after forty days the Ceasefire Agreement is not yet implemented and the economic talks have not yet begun. The pressures to disengage from, or attempt to rewrite the Agreement are growing and, in the course of this, doubt in the sincerity of the parties is being raised. We must not lose momentum and go backwards because that way conflict and war lie. We must move forward, comply with the Ceasefire Agreement and start the economic talks in a spirit of flexibility and compromise to the mutual benefit of both sides. If the will exists, UNPROFOR and the international community is willing to help you find pragmatic solutions to economic problems while agreeing to disagree for the moment on the very complex political settlement.

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COMMUNICATIONS

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'94 MAY 16 15:4

UNDP Telecomm. Unit

Patrols & Missions

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IMMEDIATE

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Reg. 010/13

010/12 ✓

Page 1 of 11

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

SSN 949

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

CODED CABLE

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Y. Akashi

DATE: 16 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z- 759

SUBJECT: SECTOR SOUTH & NORTH AND FYROM

Please see attached two reports which the Force Commander and I believe may be of interest to you.

Regards.

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CZN 707

FC'S 12-05-1994 2/11

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
MEMORANDUM

To: FC, Gen DE LAPRESLE

From: CMO, BGen BASTIAANS

Info: CMDR Sector N
SMO Sector N
CMDR Sector S
SMO Sector S

Date: 11 May 1994

DATE
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Your Ref:

Our Ref:

Subject: Report on the Visit of CMO to Sector South and Sector North.

1. General. From 1 to 5 May 1994 CMO visited UNMO's in Sectors North and South. CMO took also the opportunity to meet DCdr HV OZ Gospic, Cmd HV OG Sibenik, Cdr HV Bde in Sinj, Chairman of the RSK commission General Novakovic, Cdr of ARSK Dalmatia Corps and Cdr ARSK Lika Corps.

2. Deputy Commander HV OZ GOSPIC. The meeting with Brigadier Zeljko Prpic was held in a friendly atmosphere. It was open discussion about cease-fire agreement. Brigadier stressed that this agreement must be considered by the UN, all world community as well as RSK as the first step in process of integration of Krajina into Croatia. This process of integration must be accomplished in a very short time. He stated the agreement provides peaceful life for population but pointed out that Croatia should be ready for military solution of this problem as well. On his point of view RSK is not fulfilling the agreement and still has troops in the zone of separation and heavy weapons 10 km and 20 km zones.

3. Commander of HV OG Sibenik and Commander HV brigade in Sinj. There was meeting with Commander of HV OG Sibenik Colonel Bennet and Commander HV brigade from Sinj Colonel Sundov. They stated

that Croatian side was fulfilling the agreement and very satisfied about UNMO's activity to monitor the situation. UNMOs have almost complete freedom of movement on HV territory but it is not acceptable for HV have UNPROFOR units active on the Croatian territory crossing HV line of separation. UNPROFOR battalions must operate in UNPAs and inside the zone of separation. On their opinion serious consequence can have incident which took place on 18 Apr 94 in Dragisici village when two HV soldiers were captured by ARSK. UNPROFOR must assist HV in releasing these soldiers and also be responsible for protection civil population within the zone of separation. They stressed that the opposite side had a lot of violations of the agreement and in some areas have not started yet to withdraw troops and equipment. In Kenbat AOR ARSK soldiers have been observed by HV on Ops of Kenbat (in one place confirmed by CMO). The main problem also now is mine danger in the zone of separation. HV side is ready to clean mines but they don't have proper plans of minefields. They also would like to push the problem of croatian population returning inside the zone of separation.

4. Chairman of the Krajina Central Commission for the implementation of the agreement and Commander of North Dalmatian Corps. This meeting was held in friendly atmosphere. RSK side stressed their appreciation of UNMO's activity for monitoring implementation of the agreement and stated that RSK is ready to fulfill all points of agreement but after breach of the previous they don't trust Croatia side and local population of RSK don't trust UNPROFOR as well. According abovementioned reason they asked to increase UNMOs activity on the croatian territory and stressed that according their information HV creates obstacles for UNMOs to monitor agreement. RSK representative also adduced facts of violations of the agreement from HV: still presence of HV troops in the line of separation, weapons and military equipment in 10 km and 20 km zones, convoys with weapons and military equipment close to zone of separation. That's why General Novakovic proposed to organize helicopter flight inspections along the lines of separation with UNMOs on board. It will be possible to start such inspection from sectors East and North where the situation more or less quiet. He also proposed to have meeting with CMO on regular base at least one time per month. TR

5. Meeting with Commander of Lika Corps. From ARSK side the Corps commander Colonel Sevo and Chief of Staff Colonel Dakovic attended the meeting. The Corps commander stated that RSK side is very happy about signed agreement and current peaceful situation in AOR but they still do not trust HV and they do not expect that this

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agreement is lasting a long time. They have a very good relations with CZEBAT and POLBAT and very satisfied about activity of UNMOs. But some problems with JORBAT exist. Commander pointed out that it is not necessary to have JORBAT in villages Dugovo polje and Lapac, jordanian soldiers have created problems in relations with local population and he does not like to see JORBAT on a boundary with the 5 Corps BiH. Col Sevo stated that RSK side would like to know about status of Divo selo village which now under protection of UNPROFOR. Regarding continuous fighting in Binac pocket ARSK should have troops and weapons in this area for protection of the boundary and also it is necessary to have cease-fire agreement between BiH the 5 Corps and ARSK Lika Corps.

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ANNEX TO MEMORANDUM

CROATIAN SIDE'S VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT STRESSED BY GENERAL NOVAKOVIC:

SECTOR WEST

- ON 28 APR 94 TWO BUSES OF HV SOLDIERS ARRIVED TO AREA PAKRAC, LIPIC;
- ON 31 APR 94 BAT OF 121 BDE DEPLOYED IN NOVO GRADISKA;
- IN AREA DARUVAR AND POKRAC HV REGULAR UNITS CHANGED MILITARY UNIFORM INTO POLICE;

SECTOR NORTH

- PRESENCE OF HV TANKS IN JASTREBARSKO;
- PRESENCE OF ARTILLERY IN VELIKA BUNA;
- PRESENCE OF MRLSs IN ZAZINA;
- PRESENCE OF ARTILLERY (TWO BATTERIES OF LARGE CALIBRE) AND SPECIAL FORCES IN ZUPANE;

SECTOR SOUTH

- CONCENTRATION OF HV TROOPS IN AREAS OF SPLIT, SIBENIK, ZADAR, MASLANICA;
- TRANSPORTATION OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM SPLIT VIA KARLOVAC AND FURTHER;
- HV SOLDIERS AND CIVIL POPULATION ENTER THE ZONE OF SEPARATION;
- ACTIVITY OF HV RECCE PATROLS IN VELEBIT MOUNTAINS AREA.

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'94 MAY 10 16:37

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REG #010/12

CZN-669
CZG-350

P/4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK-1644Z
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 10 MAY 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 722

SUBJECT : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

'94 MAY 10 17:08

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Further to my code cable UNPROFOR Z-716 of 9 May 1994, I held a meeting today with President Tudjman at the Presidential Palace in order to brief him on my talks with the Knin authorities yesterday. Also in attendance was the Force Commander, General de Lapresle and Mr Sarinic, Head of the Croatian Delegation for Negotiations with Serbs.

2. On the issue of the cease-fire violations, I informed President Tudjman that we had held frank and forthright discussions with the Knin authorities on this issue. I expressed UNPROFOR's shared concern with the Croatian government over these violations, notwithstanding that most were the result of technicalities and that the Sector Commander felt that none were very serious. I informed the President that although some 99% of heavy weapons and troops had been withdrawn from the zone of separation, UNPROFOR would insist on total compliance of the CFA, as any violations, no matter how minor, could degenerate into larger disputes. Mr Martić had, I continued, not contested the Serb responsibility for the majority of violations and had expressed the "RSK's" intention to ensure full compliance within a period of ten days. I was hopeful that the Serbs would comply and expressed appreciation for the restraint and cooperation shown by the Croatian side on this matter. I also indicated that UNPROFOR was partially responsible for the lack of respect of the CFA due to our failure to deploy CIVPOL elements and establish observation points as agreed. I assured him that we would do all possible to expedite our deployment in the near future.

3. On economic matters, I expressed my view that the Serbs appeared to have an active interest in participating in economic talks. They had proposed that the date of the first talks be 18 May, with the question of the venue to be determined in the interim. The issue of the agenda also needed to be resolved as the Serbs were unhappy with the agenda put forward by ICFY - I have recommended to them that they present their own suggestions for the agenda, perhaps including SCR 820 as an agenda item, as suggested in the letter to me from Mr Sarinic, on the condition that this sensitive issue not be a precondition for future talks. I suggested to President Tudjman that Ambassador Eide, through shuttle diplomacy between the Knin authorities and Mr Sarinic, finalize the venue and other outstanding issues for the talks.

4. President Tudjman expressed his appreciation for UNPROFOR's involvement in the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. He stressed Croatia's insistence on full compliance with the agreement by the "RSK", stating that public pressure in Croatia would not allow for anything less. He further stated that it should be made absolutely clear to the Serbs that Croatia would not accept any interpretation of the separation line which saw it as some form of delineation of borders between the "RSK" and Croatia. In addition, while Croatia was in favour of the continuation of economic and political talks, it was "out of the question" that these should be held outside of Croatian territory. Finally, the date of 18 May was unsuitable as it coincided with the Assembly Meeting of the Parliament. President Tudjman first suggested that the meeting be moved forward to 16 May but, following Sarinic's recommendation that progress on the full implementation of the CFA first be assessed, he then proposed 20 May as an alternative date. It was agreed that if all the conditions were met by 16 May, the meeting would be held then, if not, the date would be 20 May, again conditional on full compliance with the CFA.

5. Turning to the issue of a political solution to the problem of the UNPAs, President Tudjman said that the patience of Croatia was at an end and that it was increasingly difficult for the government to convince the population of the usefulness of continuing with a political approach. He said that if no results were seen, he would request the United Nations to change UNPROFOR's mandate to one of ensuring compliance with SCR 769. Later in our conversation, he went further to say that if no progress were made on reintegrating the UNPAs into Croatia or on the opening of communications links, he would not agree to an

extension of UNPROFOR's mandate as Croatia would not allow itself to be "he pulled by the nose by Belgrade policies."

6. Both President Tudjman and Mr Sarinic referred to comments made to them by Belgrade officials as a way of demonstrating the impasse they were currently faced with. President Tudjman said that President Milosevic had told him that he could not get on with "the old team" in Knin and that Martić would be more amenable to influence - he referred in particular to Milosevic's claim that once the Zagreb-Knin-Belgrade railroad was opened, 90% of the UNPA problems could be resolved. Both these comments had proved erroneous as the Croats had, on the contrary, seen a deterioration of the situation since Martić had taken power. Mr Sarinic said that the current Belgrade policy could best be illustrated by a comment made by the Serbian Foreign Minister who, it was reported, had recommended that Croatia recognise the Krajina as "in 15 or 20 years they [the Krajina] will come back to you because they will see that they would fair much better under Croatia."

7. I told President Tudjman that I fully understood the impatience of Croatia at the lack of a resolution of the UNPA situation. I also agreed that it was in no one's interest to have a "Cyprusization" of the situation in Croatia. I reaffirmed UNPROFOR's intention to ensure full compliance of the CFA by the Serbs and expressed my confidence that the economic talks could provide the basis for an ultimate political solution. However, the historical hangovers of the Serbs required a step by step approach, both to build confidence and encourage flexibility by the "RSK". I felt it would be a pity to postpone the economic talks over a dispute on the venue, believing that once these talks are started, they will acquire a momentum of their own. I requested that, at this stage, no possible venue site should be rejected out of hand.

8. Mr Sarinic said that Geneva as a venue would be unacceptable and recommended that Ambassador Ahren's suggestion of Sisak or Petrinja be followed up. President Tudjman said that other alternatives could be Zagreb or Knin or "anywhere between Zagreb and Knin". He also informed me that he has recently appointed a well known Serb economist and scholar as part of the Croatian delegation to the talks.

9. In response to my query for his assessment on the federation/confederation agreement

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with BH, President Tudjman said that although agreement has been reached in Vienna on the set-up of the government, the issue of the delineation of the cantons remains outstanding. He had instructed the Croatian delegation to do all possible to "bridge the differences" on this matter and was confident of progress. He also said that Croatia fully supported the proposals on territory put forward by the Contact Group if "they will achieve peace." He then requested a brief on the situation in Brcko and showed particular interest in the situation "on the Muslim side". General de Lapresle informed the President of the current situation in Brcko, stating that our improved information on the area was in part due to the cooperation shown by the Croatian side in allowing for the deployment of UNMOs on their side of the Sava river. Our UNMOs, and the team led by the HCA, had given a reassuring assessment of the situation on both sides of the Sava, with no signs evident of an imminent attack by any side.

10. Mr Sarinic, towards the end of the meeting, informed me that the Croatian side would be ready to enter into negotiations on the question of tolls and taxes charged to UNPROFOR on Thursday 12 May. He hoped that these negotiations would result in the signing of a "financial cease-fire agreement" between Croatia and UNPROFOR. While I appreciated his prompt response to our deep concerns on this issue, I pointed out that the United Nations, according to international convention, should be exempt from the charges being imposed by the Croatian government. President Tudjman said that he hoped we would bear in mind that Croatia had been destroyed in the war during our negotiations on this issue. While we will keep you informed of negotiations at this end, I would again recommend that you follow up this issue at your end.

11. At the conclusion of the meeting, I informed President Tudjman that I had spoken to Dr Karadzic about his proposed visit to BH. He was eager to hear Dr Karadzic's reaction, which had been positive, and said that he would follow up on the visit shortly.

12. Regards.

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UNPROFORUNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONSTO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

'94 MAY -9 20:58

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 9 MAY 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-716

SUBJECT : BRIEF NOTES ON THE RESULTS OF TODAY'S MEETING WITH
THE AUTHORITIES IN KNIN.

DISTRIBUTION:

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JAS.
WS BP GA SC
DK ED

MAY -9 21:00

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

1. Earlier today, I held talks with the Serb leadership in Knin, and was accompanied by the Force Commander General De Lapresle, and Ambassador Eide, the ICFY representative. We were received by Messrs Milan Martić ("President" of the so-called RSK), Borislav Mikelić (the "Prime Minister"), Milan Babić (the "Minister of Foreign Affairs"), Rade Tanjga (the "Minister of Defence"), Ilija Prijić (the "Minister of the Interior"), General Celeketic (the Commander of "RSK" forces) and Colonel Novakovic (the chief Serb military negotiator).

2. The agenda for today's discussions comprised: 1) an evaluation of the current cease-fire agreement (CFA), 2) the second, economic, stage of the peace process, and 3) "RSK"/UNPROFOR relations.

3. I began the proceedings with an assessment of the current situation in relation to the general peace effort. In spite of commendable success in silencing the guns, I informed the Knin leadership that numerous violations of the CFA of 29 March had been recorded, and this we found wholly unacceptable. I made it known to the Serb authorities that although both sides were culpable in this regard, our evidence indicated that the Serbs were responsible for the majority of the transgressions. General De Lapresle later told our hosts that over the last few weeks, of forty-eight violations, thirty had been attributable to Serb forces.

4. In light of this, I assured the Serbs that while I had done everything to ease the peace process forward, UNPROFOR and ICFY now needed to see the complete implementation of the cease-fire. I stressed that further delays could well place the whole CFA in jeopardy. Flexibility and compromise were thus of the utmost importance.

5. Mr. Martić confessed at the outset that there had been some violations from the Serb side, but that many were influenced by the corresponding negative attitude of the Croats to the CFA. Nevertheless, Mr. Martić reiterated the commitment of his "government" to the full implementation of the CFA of 29 March. As a sign of the seriousness with which he

UNOG Telecom. Unit

Palais des Nations

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viewed this issue. Mr. Martić pledged himself and his "government" to the complete implementation of the CFA within ten days. Naturally, I welcomed this news.

6. Mr. Martić then open the debate on the future economic negotiations between the "RSK" and Croatia. The Serb leader said that while the venue had not yet been decided on, he none the less proposed that the first session of economic talks be held on 18 May. He emphasised, however, that the site for these talks had to be a neutral location, either at a crossing point within the "Zone of Separation" or preferably in Geneva, where technical support was available.

7. I again greeted the news that a date had been proposed, but I reminded Martić that the question of location was a matter for both parties to fathom. Insofar as they required technical support, I assured them that UNPROFOR would do its best to assist.

8. Ambassador Eide of ICFY also urged the Serbs to show greater flexibility on the question of a site for the economic discussions. The "RSK" "Government" responded by expressing its regret over some of the points in ICFY's draft proposal, which it argued had painted the agenda as too pro-Croat. Ambassador Eide quickly disabused the authorities of the view that the draft was anything more than a menu of proposals being offered solely for discussion; noting that it only required Knin's input for a more balanced appearance. While they did not pass final judgement on the draft, the Serbs subsequently offered a few examples of what they considered as suitable items for the economic agenda. More work is obviously needed here.

9. The final chapter of today's session covered UNPROFOR's relations with Knin. It was decided that a joint working group should be set up to review and assess administrative issues such as: salaries to local staff, insurance claims etc.

10. Tomorrow, I intend to see President Tudjman in order to convey to him the results of today's meeting with the local authorities in Knin. The meeting itself was cordial and business-like. I believe that some solid progress can be made, provided that both parties retain their faith in the current peace process.

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IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB
INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT
DATE: 28 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: Z-652
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 27 APRIL 1994

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
Unit
94 APR 28 13:34
APR 28 13:46

1. On 27 April Ambassador Eide had a short meeting with Mr Sarinic, with the intention of discussing the present state of progress towards economic negotiations. However, just before the meeting Eide received a copy of the letter dated 26 April from Sarinic to Akashi on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. In light of this, and a request from Col Duburg for a meeting with Sarinic as Eide started the meeting, he was joined by Duburg and BGen Peeters.
2. Sarinic was rather taken aback that Eide did not immediately approve of his letter. He said that the only way he could see to resolve the impasse with Knin was to implement resolution 769, since the connection between Belgrade and Knin was now more apparent than ever, and had to be physically cut. He cited Milosovic's influence over Martić, the milicija and army as key, as well as Mikelic's statements about financial, communications and political unification of the Serb "states". He also said that the international community, and specifically UNPROFOR, was not firm enough with the Serbs. His intention with this letter was to give a kick to the process.
3. Eide, Peeters and Duburg each cautioned Sarinic against the course he was taking. Eide emphasised the potential cost to Croatia of starting a process which could lead the ceasefire agreement to unravel. Peeters and Duburg concentrated on the military aspects, raising a question over the accuracy of information being supplied to Sarinic by his own military, and also stressing the risk of taking the path to confrontation that Sarinic seemed to be favouring.
4. Sarinic had to leave to a subsequent engagement, so there was no satisfactory conclusion to the meeting. However, this meeting and other indicators suggest that we may be in for a difficult period, particularly if the Serbs take much longer to start economic negotiations.

ENDALL

IMMEDIATE

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TRANSLATION

Zagreb, April 26, 1994

*His Excellency
Yasushi Akashi
Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General*

Your Excellency,

Almost a month has elapsed since the signing of the Cease-Fire Agreement between the delegations of the Republic of Croatia and of the Serbs from the provisionally occupied territories, and I have accordingly deemed it necessary to present the Croatian view regarding the results of implementation of the Agreement, and the problems we have been encountering in this regard.

Let me remind you, Your Excellency, that the negotiations and the signing of the Agreement were attended by the entire international community, which is the co-signatory of the Agreement and, accordingly, has also assumed the responsibility for its implementation. I have personally, at the very start of the negotiations, raised the question concerning UNPROFOR's capability to implement the Agreement on the ground, and I was given the answer that there would be no problems in that regard.

The negotiations were principally based on the assumption that the Cease-Fire Agreement was only the first step in the normalization of relations, and that it would immediately be followed-up by negotiations on the opening of communication routes, the pipeline, power transmission lines etc., or generally on the normalization of the economic situation. The final part of the negotiations is to be devoted to a political settlement, i.e., to the modalities of UNPA integration into the juridical-economic system of the Republic of Croatia, with the respect of the high standards of minority rights incorporated into the Constitution and Constitutional Law of the Republic of Croatia along with the guarantee of the international community. The sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia has never been questioned, and this has been the clear and resolute position of the international community confirmed in several UN Security Council resolutions, and other documents having an international and juridical bearing.

Where are we today in the implementation of all these commitments which we have all assumed?

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1. Implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement of March 29, 1994

In accordance with the signed Agreement, the Croatian side has thus far implemented all the points of the Agreement except for a smaller part of what was agreed, the latter referring primarily to mine clearance on the ground and to the functioning of the police force to be organized by UNPROFOR.

According to verified data available to the Croatian side, the Serbian side has not complied with many commitments it had undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, among which we would particularly like to draw attention to the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the separation of forces (points 3 and 4 of the Agreement). After our frequent requests that these matters be complied with, the UNPROFOR has asked for our patience so as to give time to the Serbian side to comply with its commitments. We have accepted the proposal for the purpose of implementation of the Agreement and in order to maintain the reputation of UNPROFOR.

At the latest meeting of the mid-level Joint Commission for the implementation of the cease fire held at the Turanj check-point on April 23, 1994, we heard UNPROFOR evaluations on the implementation of the Agreement thus far, with which we were not pleased.

Twenty days after the signing of the Agreement, an evaluation that the implementation is proceeding well, but not in accordance with the Agreement, and that both sides have a positive approach and display the wish to implement the Agreement, gives the Serbian side, which has not fully complied with any point of the Agreement, the right to keep behaving in the same way, avoiding the implementation of the Agreement without any consequences.

In the view of the Croatian side, the Agreement is spelt quite clearly, the deadlines for the implementation of the individual points have been defined, and there can therefore be no further discussion and delay in implementation, and the signatory sides are liable to respect what has been signed.

The Serbian side has not withdrawn its heavy weapons by April 4, 1994; it has not withdrawn its forces to the separation line by April 8, 1994; it has not accepted the operation of the police as proposed by UNCIVPOL on April 7, 1994; it has delayed the separation of forces asking for many changes of the signed lines on the maps, and this operation has not accordingly been completed by April 13, 1994; the meeting meant to agree the modality of force reduction in a zone 10 km from either side of the force separation line was not prepared or organized on April 19, 1994; the reduction of forces to be carried out within 5 days was not effected; mine clearance in the separation zone has not started on time. In addition to the foregoing, there has been a misinterpretation of point 4 of the Agreement, i.e., of the part referring to the operation of police and militia personnel in the separation zone, as regulated more accurately in points 9 and 10 of Annex B.

All this shows that the Agreement has been implemented only in a smaller part, that its essential points (heavy weapon withdrawal, point 3, and force separation, point 4) have not been implemented fully, and that it was therefore not possible to assess that the implementation of the Agreement is proceeding well, and that both sides have a positive

approach to the implementation of the Agreement.

In our view, the Serbian side is deliberately delaying the implementation of the commitments assumed under the Agreement, wishing to gain time and eventually evade the said commitments.

Unfortunately, I have to conclude that such a behaviour of the Serbian side is encouraged by the surprising tolerance of UNPROFOR.

During the aforementioned Joint Commission meeting at the Turanj check-point we proposed that the key commitments from the Agreements (points 3 and 4) be implemented within the next 48 hours, but the Serbian side turned this down. We also proposed that the police force should start operating immediately as proposed by UNCIVPOL, but this was again turned down by the Serbs who, on the contrary, asked for the continuous presence and stay of the Serbian militia in the separation zone, which is contrary to the Agreement. The Serbs were requested to dislocate their heavy weapons to several sites and at smaller distances as compared with the distances accepted in the Agreement, which we cannot accept, particularly for longer-range missile systems (R-65 and Orkan).

The Croatian side requested that the next meeting be held by no later than 7 days, while UNPROFOR suggested the date of May 10, 1994, which means another 17 days of nonimplementation of the commitments assumed by the Agreement.

Analogously, no agreement has been reached with regard to the venue of the new meeting. That is, UNPROFOR suggested, as possible venues for the meeting, Knin, Plitvice and Topusko, but the Serbian side rejected the proposal arguing that the meetings must be held on the "border", at the crossing points.

2. Continuation of Negotiations on the Normalization of the Situation in the Economy

During the March 29, 1994 negotiations in Zagreb it was in principle agreed that the first meeting would be held on April 12, 1994, in the same place. During the talks I held on the occasion with the members of the delegation of the local Serbs, they accepted the proposal. As far as the venue of the negotiations is concerned, we have declared our readiness to go to Knin or Plitvice or any other place within the Republic of Croatia.

Today, on April 27, 1994, there are not even any indications as to when the first meeting could be held, in spite of the many contacts and initiatives taken so far.

At present the Serbian side links the participation in negotiations with the abrogation of part of Security Council Resolution 820 on the control of imports and exports in the UNPAs. This can be included in the agenda of the negotiations, but never as a condition for participation. Other conditions have also been given about the venue, i.e., about the meeting to be held outside Croatia, and so on and so forth.

I am asking myself, Your Excellency, how long can the Serbs be permitted to "lead on" the entire international community?

3. Normalization of the Overall Situation and the Political Settlement of the UNPAs

The Republic of Croatia is endeavouring to create a favourable climate for the negotiations on this delicate issue. In this regard, you may have noted that the authorities of the Republic of Croatia have not been making any extreme statements, and that they have continuously laid emphasis on the peaceful solution of the problem.

Conversely, the representatives of the Serbs from the provisionally occupied areas have continuously been increasing the strain to extreme limits, as if they did not want to lag behind their brethren in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are trying to equate the Cease-Fire Agreement with the "delimitation of the two states", and their goal is "Cyprization" of Croatia.

Thus, Messrs. Martić, Mikić etc. are talking about the need to initiate the process of succession, an exit to the sea, a corridor to Hungary, Slovenia, etc. Their request that meetings be held only at the "border" or abroad is also significant in this sense.

4. Conclusion

We are aware, Your Excellency, of the link between the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the behaviour of the Serbs in the UNPAs, but we are as convinced that such a behaviour and arrogance should no longer be tolerated, and that it can only produce undesirable results.

You have asked us to be restrained and to provide you, with our behaviour, space for sustained action in terms of implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement. You have even thanked us in this regard, but you must appreciate that we cannot rest satisfied with praises while no results are being achieved.

I am convinced that there will be no positive results until the international community forces the Serbs to comply with the decisions and signed commitments instead of flouting everyone and getting away with it. From our point of view, the establishment of border control such as envisioned by UN Security Council Resolution 769 is the "conditio sine qua non" for calming down the situation and creating the conditions for the resolution of the crisis, the more so as the link of Belgrade with Knin is now stronger than ever.

Rest assured, Your Excellency, of my personal and particular consideration.

*Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Croatia for
Negotiations with the Serbs from Provisionally Occupied
Territories, and of the State Commission for Relations
with UNPROFOR*

Hrvoje Šarinić

~~Croatian Relations~~

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

IMMEDIATE

TO: '94 APR 13 14:43 STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

'94 APR 13 14:40

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

IMMEDIATE

NUMBER: Z-576SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH MR SARINIC AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN
13 APRIL 1994

SSN-672

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1. Ambassadors Eide and Ahrens had meetings today with Mr Sarinic and then with President Tudjman, who was accompanied by Mr Sarinic and Mr Radic, at Ahrens request. Tudjman said that his priorities were for UNPROFOR to take control of the Croatian borders with Yugoslavia and Bosnia, and to be given close air support if they were frustrated in this, and to make progress during the next six months on economic reintegration of the UNPAs, including the opening of routes.

2. Sarinic and then Tudjman raised the question of the venue for the first meeting on economic matters, which should have taken place the day before in the embassy of the Russian Federation in Zagreb. They said that there was no question of negotiations taking place outside Croatia. Eide replied to both that we would do our utmost to convince the Serbs to withdraw their insistence on going abroad for further meetings. We would stick to Zagreb as the preferred venue, but would also maintain the possibility of meeting in, for instance, Knin or Plitvice. However, the most important thing was to maintain the momentum gained by the agreement on a ceasefire and to make it visible, through economic measures, that the people of the Serb held territories would benefit greatly economically by a reunification with Croatia. If it proved impossible to bring the Serbs to a meeting within Croatia we would have to return to this question and look at it again.

3. Sarinic and Tudjman both raised issues over the implementation of the ceasefire, referring to the Serb military activity in Sector East and the failure of the visit to Jasenovac. Eide assured them that the Serb military activity was being taken very seriously by UNPROFOR, who hoped to contain the problem. Sarinic agreed that he would maintain a low profile on the matter for a little longer to allow UNPROFOR time to act. Eide pointed out, more firmly with Sarinic alone, that while we, and the Serbs, fully supported the visit by members of the Jewish community to Jasenovac, we did not find it particularly constructive that the Croatian government substituted members of the delegation that had been agreed by the Serbs with high-ranking Croatian military officers in uniform. Tudjman's reply was that they were now selecting the delegation for the next attempted visit, to take place in the near future.

4. Ahrens raised the question of the constitutional rights of the Serbs within Croatia, saying that he did not believe that the Serbs needed any more autonomy than was already foreseen in the Croatian constitution, but that the Serb areas should be demilitarised, which was not yet accepted in the constitution.

ENDALL

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CZN 465 CZG 214

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UNPROFOR
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IMMEDIATE

SSN 581

'94 MAR 30 -5 :13

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 29 March 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-507

SUBJECT : CROATIAN AIR FORCE MIG-21s

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1. In reply to your Cable 879 of 28 March 94, with respect to possible additional aircraft in Croatia's inventory, it must be reiterated that the previous assessed Croatian Air Force holding of MIG-21 was sixteen (16). However, as stated in UNPROFOR Z-491 of 28 Mar 94, this does not necessarily indicate that new airframes have arrived in Croatia.
2. In late Jan 94, UNPROFOR reported that the Croatian Air Force had thirteen (13) MIG-21 aircraft which were operational and several more which may have been in various states of repair. Given the large pre-war holdings of the JNA and the worldwide availability of MIG-21 spare parts, it is certainly not inconceivable that, as stated in Ambassador Nobile's letter of 27 October 93 to Mr Sardenberg, aircraft have been re-assembled. It is our assessment that Croatia has the technical capabilities to effect such reconstruction, and as such the source of the aircraft involved in this incremental buildup is extremely difficult to determine.
3. UNPROFOR will continue to provide you with updated information as it becomes available.

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Palais des Nations
'94 MAR 30 -5 :22

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations


CNZ 304 CYZ 140 P1/1

'94 MAR 29 -3:40
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CODED CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 28 MARCH 1994
NUMBER: **879**
SUBJECT: Croatian Air Force MIG-21s

Attn. SRSG/FC



171 MAR 29 P 9:20

With reference to your Z-491, please clarify whether UNPROFOR's and the ECMM's observations indeed would indicate additional fighter aircraft in Croatia's inventory. Should this be the case, we would obviously have to report the finding to the Sanctions Committee.

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

'94 MAR 28 10:14

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Page 1 of 1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK -1010Z
INFO: AKASHI, C/O ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 28 March 1994

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR-Z-491

SUBJECT: CROATIAN AIR FORCE MIG-21s

94 MAR 28 10:14

UNOC Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Further to earlier correspondence on the above subject, this is to convey the following information.

2. On 25 March 1994, UNMOS at Pleso airport observed nine MIG-21s at the Pleso airbase and a further seven MIG-21s at the Zmaj hangar. On the same day, ECMM reported three airframes at Pula. The total number of airframes is now assessed as being 19.

3. The previously assessed total was 16. This new report does not necessarily indicate that any new airframes have arrived in Croatia, but may rather be the result of refined reporting and a coincident report from ECMM that made it possible to distinguish with certainty between airframes at Pleso and Pula.

ENDALL.

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'94 MAR 21 19:28 UNPROFOR

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COMMUNICATIONS

'94 MAR 21 19:10

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 21 MARCH 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 455

CODE RESTRICTED

SUBJECT : UPDATE ON TRLO RIDGE INCIDENT

1. Further to my meeting with Mr Martić in Knin on 18 March 1994 (ref: UNPROFOR Code Cable Z-445 of 19 March 1994) and my request to him for "RSK" cooperation in allowing UNPROFOR to supervise the withdrawal of the trapped Croatian Army patrol on Trlo ridge, General Novaković has confirmed to Colonel Oehring, Sector Commander of Sector South, that the assurances given to me by Mr Martić to review the issue still stand.

2. As a result, it has been agreed that a meeting, chaired by UNPROFOR, will take place tomorrow, 22 March 1994, at 1000 hrs, at a UNPROFOR check-point in Medak between the local "RSK" Commander Suput and Croatian Brigadier Gabricević to finalise an agreement for the withdrawal of the patrol. It is expected that the two sides will agree on boundaries for interim lines on both sides of the disputed area and that UNPROFOR will then be allowed to escort the patrol to Croatian positions existing prior to 5 March 1994. In order to avoid another Medak situation, the "RSK" will, however, demand that UNPROFOR then leave the area to permit Serbs to move back into positions previously occupied by them prior to 5 March.

3. Barring any complications, it is hoped that the Croatian Army patrol can be withdrawn sometime tomorrow or, at the most, within the next two days. Civil affairs and the Sector Commander believe that the positive attitude on the part of the "RSK" is a direct result of my meeting with Mr Martić and are thus confident of a speedy resolution to the problem.

4. I shall keep you informed of developments.

5. Regards.

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CODE CABLE

CZG-161

Page 1/1 SSN-438

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

94 MAR 16 13:19

TO: Lord Owen, ICFY Geneva
Mr. Stoltenberg, ICFY Geneva

FROM: *for* G. Ahrens/S. Coutinho, *ICFY*
ICFY, 24626X

DATE: 16 March 1994

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Galbraith

-
1. On 15 March, Ahrens, assisted by Coutinho, met with the American Ambassador in Zagreb.
 2. Ambassador Galbraith showed support for the following basic principles:
 - no changes to Croatia's outer borders;
 - far-reaching autonomy for areas where the Serbs were a majority before the conflict (Sectors North and South);
 - farthest-reaching minority rights for the other areas of what is presently called "RSK"; and
 - return of refugees.

Galbraith particularly stressed that the borders should not be changed although he believed that it sometimes crossed Tudjman's mind.

3. Galbraith agreed that, regarding the Krajina, there were no major differences between the US and other western countries. The major difference between Europe and the US, he said, was connected to the lifting of sanctions and that would be discussed this week-end.
4. Claiming that he was just engaging in "brainstorming", Galbraith explained that the canton system being put in place in Bosnia seemed successful and could also be used in Croatia as a model for the Krajina problem. He added that the Serbs in Croatia could be offered similar rights to those the Croats were given in Bosnia. He did not elaborate.

Comment: Elements from the Bosnian solution might indeed be used for the internal statute of an autonomous Serb Krajina. The participation in the central Government the Croats enjoy in Bosnia or the cantonization of the whole Republic are, however, questionable in the case of the Krajina and Croatia. From what Galbraith said, it was not clear how far he would have the Bosnian parallel, nor, whether this was his idea or, indeed, the present American policy.

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

Page 1/2

CODE CABLE

'94 MAR 16 10:04

CZG-158

TO: Lord Owen, ICFY Geneva
Mr. Stoltenberg, ICFY Geneva

FROM: *for* G. Ahrens/S. Coutinho *Signature*

DATE: 16 March 1994 UNPROFOR Z-414

SUBJECT: Meeting with Churkin

-
1. On 15 March, Ahrens, accompanied by Coutinho, visited the Russian Ambassador in Zagreb who was unexpectedly in the company of Vice Minister Churkin. The meeting lasted one hour and focused entirely on Croatia.
 2. Churkin told us that during his last talk with President Milosevic in Belgrade yesterday (14 March) he had tried to push Milosevic to speak about Krajina but Milosevic never went into details. According to Churkin Milosevic supported the 3 step approach envisaged by ICFY, but for further details he referred to Knin.
 3. Regarding Mr. Martić, Churkin said that he had met him once by chance when he saw Karadžić in Pale in mid February over lunch. Churkin said that he had been strongly criticized by Martić because of Russia's support for not changing Croatia's outer borders. This had caused a bad atmosphere throughout their meeting.
 4. Churkin asked us about our negotiations and said that he was in favour of a cease fire in the sense of the 4 December draft. He added that concerning the final status of the UNPAs, Russia supported the proposed principles:
 - no changes to Croatia's outer borders;
 - far-reaching autonomy for areas where the Serbs were a majority before the conflict (Sectors North and South). The exact delimitation should be worked out in negotiations;
 - far-reaching minority rights for the other areas of what is presently called "RSK". Churkin also considered demilitarization for these areas; and
 - return of refugees.

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CZG-158

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5. Churkin believed that these contacts with ICFY should continue. Ahrens agreed and added that any ideas Russia might have concerning the talks would be welcome.
6. Throughout the meeting Churkin various times repeated Russia's support for our principles. He showed tendency to give the Serbs as much as possible and mentioned demilitarizing all 4 sectors. This might indeed be discussed.

It is difficult to say how much Churkin and Russia will in the end be prepared to put pressure on Belgrade and Knin so that they accept Croatia's borders. The Krajina Serbs in their Massada complex probably trust that the Russian leadership will not be able to justify at home any forced return of the Serbs under Croatian rule. So far, without saying as much, Churkin agrees that a solution to the Krajina problem will be extremely difficult.

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1 OF 2

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94 MAR 14 12:10

94 MAR 14 12:40

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TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 14 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-399

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 8 MARCH 1994

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1. On 8 March Ambassadors Eide and Ahrens met Mr Sarinic. Discussion centred on the implications of the present negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the steps that could be taken in the mean time. Ambassador Ahrens started off with a general review of the current situation in light of the Washington agreement. Eide outlined the present state in the ICFY negotiations and asked Sarinic for clarification of the situation regarding the inspection of the Obrovac poles and Zadar water supply.

2. Sarinic confirmed that they had expected the day before to be able to send a Croatian team to inspect the water supply system to Zadar, and that today Bjegovic and another should have gone to Rijeka to inspect the poles, then return to Zagreb to sign an agreement on their use with Sarinic. This had been arranged by Sarinic and intermediaries of Milosovic, but had not worked out in practice. The Serbs said that it was not possible due to the Croat shelling in the Gospic area. However, Sarinic had information that it would take 6 to 8 months to repair the water supply anyway, so the Serbs had not been serious.

3. Sarinic said that they believed that the Serbs were knocked back by recent events: the Sarajevo and Washington agreements and the shooting down of four jets. Throughout the crisis they had been afraid of a deal between the Croats and Muslims, but all previous agreements had failed. However, they could see that this agreement was stronger, because it had full backing by the US. Because of this the Serbs were watching, and did not want to act before the situation was clear.

4. Sarinic went on to say that he was still trying to get in touch with Simic, but he was never available. Sarinic said that he was still trying to sort out the problem of the house put at the Croats' disposal in Belgrade. Knezevic, the Serb representative, had been in Zagreb and inspected their house, but as yet there was no comment from the Serbs. The second item he had to discuss with Simic was the opening of the Zagreb to Belgrade motorway, and this was the telephone line. It was clear that at the moment the Serbs did not want to meet with either the Croats or ICFY, said Sarinic.

5. Ahrens reverted to the ceasefire draft of 4 December 1993, asking Sarinic to clarify the Croatian position. Sarinic replied that it was very clear, and that he saw a link between the new UNPROFOR mandate and the ceasefire agreement. Sarinic said that they insisted

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on a new mandate which respected all Security Council resolutions, and particularly resolutions 769 and 871. If resolution 769 was fulfilled, almost everything was solved. Regarding the ceasefire, they were looking for an overall ceasefire, but not on the basis of the 4 December 1993 draft. They wanted a symmetrical withdrawal of forces along the confrontation line. There would be no extra withdrawal in "special areas" such as Maslenica. Sarinic said that his military were not happy with a 2km withdrawal in the Velebit area, but that the first thing to do was for UNPROFOR to map out the actual confrontation line.

6. Ahrens questioned the logic of leaving the 4 December draft when there had been general acceptance of it by everyone other than the Krajina Serbs. Eide stressed that the Serbs would probably reject the Croatian position on the ceasefire, but that the next thing to do was to identify the Serb position and to see if there was a basis for further and direct discussions. Eide also agreed with Sarinic's summary of the Serb position, saying that the Serbs knew that very soon Krajina would probably be on the agenda of the Washington-led negotiations. In this situation both sides would, naturally, tend to dig themselves in to prepare for what could come next. Eide appealed to Sarinic to ensure that the Croats did not take any action which would push the Serbs further into the corner than they already were, as this only made the negotiations more difficult and could lead to escalation.

7. Sarinic said that he hoped the present hiatus in the negotiations would not last too long, and that in the mean time there were small things that could still be done: a meeting with Martić would be useful, and the exchange of people for family visits at the weekend. In the wider context, the problem of the withdrawal of Croatian forces in three areas was now secondary. The problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina was half solved. Sarinic said that he did not think that the Serbs would join the Federation, but if they did, the Croats would have to reexamine the confederation with Croatia. But assuming that half the problem of Bosnia was solved, the UNPAs would be the next main item on the agenda. Sarinic said that in this case, the Croatian position would be that the UNPAs were taken by the Serbs by force and that everything else followed on from that. The Croatian position would be to just separate the troops and then negotiate on the political settlement.

8. Ahrens recommended utmost caution by Croatia. The Croats were often too optimistic. Sarinic replied that if it seemed so, it was a deliberate strategy on their part. For example, they had now decided to send Zvonimir Marković to Belgrade to say to the Serbs "I am here", and then force them to accept that progress was being made.

ENDALL

CZG 145

File copy 3920 010/12

TO: UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS UNIT
STUTTENBERG SWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
Palais des Nations

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB
MAR 14 12:11

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT
MAR 14 12:40

DATE: 14 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2-397

1 OF 1 SSN

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CODED CABLE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GRANIC - 8 MARCH 1994

1. On 8 March Ambassadors Eide and Ahrens met Foreign Minister Granic at Ahrens' request. The meeting was delayed by a phone call to Granic from Izetbegovic, who wanted to discuss an exchange or release of prisoners, and was curtailed by the expected arrival of Ambassador Redman on his way from Belgrade.

2. Granic started by saying that they were very busy at the moment. The situation in Vienna was alright and they were satisfied. There were still some outstanding questions on the final situation with Mostar; the next two years with EU administration were alright, but they still needed to work on the long term solution. Then they would see what would happen with the Serbs. Granic said that the Serbs would refuse to join the Federation, then they would try to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina and want to join a federation with Serbia. The US would not give them permission. The price for leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to be the absolute recognition of Croatia within its borders. Croatia would ask the US for a very strong obligation regarding the UNPAs.

3. Ahrens outlined the current state of the ICFY negotiations. The current Vienna negotiations the further discussions with the Serbs would also affect our next steps. Granic replied that he thought that in no more than seven days the EU, US and Russia would have to clarify their position regarding the Serbs. Redman might already have some news from his meetings in Belgrade the same day. Granic said that we should call him later that evening to find out what Redman had said. Ahrens said that if Croatia needed more help then he could get his national bureaucracy in motion to provide support.

4. Granic said that he had spoken twice that day to Izetbegovic on the release of prisoners, and that they would close their camp in the next seven days. He said that by Saturday 12 March they would have the final statement they were sending to the Secretary General or Security Council on the prolongation of the mandate. They would extend the mandate, but they needed something in return, and the US must help. The most important thing was a stable Federation and Confederation, recognition of Croatian borders and serious negotiations with the Serbs.

5. Eide said that over the last few days there had been an escalation in tension and activity. He called on the Croats to minimise such activity as far as possible at the moment in light of the delicate situation. Granic agreed and said that they planned no action.

8. At 2330 Eide and Ahrens telephoned Granic. He said that he had met Redman and that the discussion had centred on Bosnia rather than the UNPAs. There was nothing of substance in the conversation.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 207 CYZ 098 P1/3

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'94 MAR -4 -4 :20

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CODED CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 3 MARCH 1994
NUMBER: MSC- 624
SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Nobile

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1. The Croatian Permanent Representative and his Deputy today had an informal meeting with Tharoor and Schmitz in which the visitors addressed some of the same issues raised in your meeting with President Tudjman (your Z-336). Ambassador Nobile was eager to explore whether the forthcoming report on the renewal of the mandate was likely to contain recommendations to strengthen UNPROFOR's mandate in the UNPAs. He was advised that in respect of Croatia the report would basically take stock of the present situation, and analyse the options facing the Force. He should not, therefore, expect any dramatic new proposals or significant changes in the thrust of the report. Of course, UNPROFOR stood ready, in tandem with ICFY, to assist in the re-establishment of economic and communications links between the UNPAs and Croatia proper, as well as to take advantage of positive developments in the external environment that could have a beneficial effect on the UNPAs.

CNZ 207 CYZ 098 P2/3

2. Concrete concerns raised by Ambassador Nobile included
- the violation of sanctions in Sector East and Serb attempts to economically integrate that Sector into the FRY;
 - the need to prevent any moves towards a unification of the "Republic of Serb Krajina" and the "Republika Srpska"; and
 - the need to close the Udbina airport from where the Galeb aircraft shot down by NATO had originated. (We would appreciate your comments on this point).

3. Ambassador Nobile also suggested that the SRSG establish contact with Serb Members of the Croatian Parliament in order to demonstrate that the Knin authorities were not the sole spokesmen for all Serbs in Croatia. Though ~~we~~ pointed out the limitations of your mandate, we have no objection to your widening the circle of your local contacts to include appropriate Members of Parliament, including Serbs.

4. Ambassador Nobile also expressed his Government's wish for a high-profile NATO and/or United States military presence in Croatia. In this context, he emphasized the desirability of extending close air support to UNPROFOR in Croatia, since this would strengthen the posture of the Force and enable it to command more respect among the Serb military leadership in Knin. (He was advised to bring this to the attention of the United States delegation, which had previously objected to the extension

CNZ 207 CYZ 098 P3/3

or CAS to Croatia.) He further expressed the hope that once UNPROFOR had obtained additional troops for Bosnia and Herzegovina and achieved its objectives in that country, these troops could be redeployed to reinforce UNPROFOR in Croatia.

5. Ambassador Nobile is travelling to Zagreb for a high-level "brainstorming" 9-12 March. It is therefore unlikely that Croatia will take any initiative in regard to UNPROFOR's mandate before the finalization of the Secretary-General's report.

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TO: 94 MAR -2 14:06 STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

IMMEDIATE

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

IMMEDIATE

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 2 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: 327

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 1 MARCH 1994

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

1. Ambassador Eide had a meeting with Mr Sarinic on 1 March at which a number of issues of substance were discussed. Sarinic introduced new information suggesting that it would take several months to repair the water supply infrastructure for Zadar. Sarinic also clarified the Croatian position on the terms of a ceasefire, starting with confirmation of the actual confrontation line by UNPROFOR, and going for a 2km separation of forces on each side of the confrontation line. Eide raised the question of opening a dialogue on political matters, which was greeted favourably by Sarinic.

2. Sarinic started by mentioning that Mr Knezevic, the head of the Serbian office in Zagreb, was coming to Zagreb the following day to look at the house being offered by the Croats. He said that he had been trying to get in touch with Simic and would talk to him the following day. He would be asking Simic about the opening of the motorway, the restoration of telephone communications between Zagreb and Belgrade, and the house offered by the Serbs in Belgrade for the Croatian office, which was presently not acceptable. Sarinic mentioned that he had recently had long conversations with Milosovic and Milinovic. Both had been telling him to reconnect the telephone lines and that the difference between a 381 and 385 international code was insignificant. Sarinic said that he had reminded them that this was not the case.

3. Sarinic then said that he had just been told that the water supply system for Zadar was badly damaged and would take six to eight months to repair. The Serbs knew this when they offered the deal of poles for Obrovac in return for the water supply, he said, and thus they were not serious about fulfilling their part of the bargain. Sarinic said that he would ask the Serbs to accept that a Croatian team of experts should check the facilities, in the same way that they were allowing a Serb delegation to inspect the poles. This Serb delegation was supposed to have come the day before or today (this may be connected to the reference by Bjegovic to Akashi in Belgrade about a meeting to discuss electricity that should have taken place on 28 February). Sarinic said that the value of the poles was between 2.5 and 3 million DM, but still Croatia was prepared to give them to the Serbs. When asked whether an inspection of the facilities by a UN team would be acceptable, he said that a UN team could accompany the Croatian team, but that if the Serbs inspected the poles, then they should inspect the water supply system.

4. Turning to the question of ceasefire, Sarinic said that they were not prepared to go through several more rounds of fruitless negotiations. First the actual confrontation line

should be checked and registered on the ground by UNPROFOR because there were some differences when they came to look at maps. Then both parties should withdraw 2km from the agreed confrontation line, leaving a 4km zone into which UNPROFOR could deploy. Sarinic said that before the withdrawal of infantry, heavy weapons would have to be put into storage 20km from the confrontation line, taking into account some special circumstances such as lack of space outside Sector South. The lines of separation would have to be adapted to the terrain, Sarinic said, thus UNPROFOR would have to have an input to this process as UNPROFOR troops would move into the gap and would have to be able to occupy safe ground.

5. Colonel Wood then showed Sarinic a Croatian military map outlining the current forward lines of troops and proposed lines of separation in the Miljevici Plateau area. There followed a debate on whether UNPROFOR would be able to move into the proposed buffer zone, and on the next steps from the military point of view. Cot had proposed to the Serbs a meeting at which military details could be discussed and they were awaiting a response.

6. Sarinic said that the negotiations in Washington would have some impact on their relationship with Krajina. He said that regarding political input to the proposed military meeting, he was in favour of letting the military meet and sort out their technical questions. However, if the Serbs wanted political representation, then he was prepared to go. In that case he would need at least a short meeting first with Martić in order to outline his position. This would be the Croatian proposal, to have the military sort out a symmetrical withdrawal along the confrontation line. Eide said that Akashi had recommended to Martić that he should get the military to have talks, and that Martić had replied that there could be no meeting of military until there had been a political solution. We would attempt to clarify this statement with Martić. Eide then clarified whether Sarinic's statement that he did not want several rounds of negotiations meant, in fact, that this proposal was now presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. This would certainly be unhelpful and would enable the Serbs to claim that it was merely a propaganda move. Sarinic said that while he did not want to indulge in fruitless negotiations, he did accept that it might take some time to make progress.

7. Eide then asked Sarinic whether it might now be a good idea to open an initial dialogue about a political solution. He was at this stage primarily thinking of sounding out the Serb position in some detail and making sure that they understood the full potential of what is being offered to them. Sarinic replied that only today he had been speaking to the commission for normalisation of relations between Serbs and Croats, and they had discussed the need for a dialogue between the two thirds of Serbs in Croatia and the one third who were in Krajina. They needed to be able to explain that life was possible in Croatia and that their interests were looked after. Thus there was a need to be able to explain the Croatian constitution and so on. Sarinic said that he was ready to put together a team who could explain all the advantages and the security of being an integrated part of Croatia.

8. Sarinic then said that we should insist on the free movement of people to visit their relatives at weekends. If the Serbs refused this we should find out why and then address the issues they raised. If they still refused then we should make their intransigence public. Sarinic finally said that we should ask the Serbs whether they would accept visits by Croatian journalists, as delegations of Serb journalists were accepted in Zagreb.

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CZN-295

CZG-103

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 1 MARCH 1994
NUMBER: Z-323
SUBJECT: Croatian Army withdrawal from BH

COUED CABLE

Y. Kashi

'94 MAR -1 22:23

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Re your UNPROFOR 598 of 28 February on an "agreement" between myself and Mr. Sarinic related to Croatian Army withdrawal from BH and further to our Z-284 of 25 February, the meeting referred to by the Ambassador of Croatia was held on 21 February 1994 wherein Mr. Sarinic announced their readiness to sign an overall cease-fire agreement.

2. In the course of the meeting, General Petkovic requested UNPROFOR (SPABAT and BRITBAT) inspect the withdrawal of Croatian Army volunteers which he claimed had taken place over 16-18 February 1994. The DFC agreed to issue an instruction to BH Comd to look for evidence of Croatian Army forces in the areas discussed. The DFC stressed that this would be a one-time effort and that UNPROFOR would monitor, but not control any such withdrawal.

3. As reported in our Z-284, paragraph 4, an additional report on UNPROFOR's observations to date will be forthcoming shortly.

4. There was no agreement to create a Joint Commission for this activity, rather UNPROFOR was promised full freedom of movement by the Bosnian Croat authorities. The forthcoming report will detail the extent to which this was granted.

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'94 MAR -1 21:46

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 25 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-247.

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND MARTIC

1. In a meeting with 'RSK President' Martić in Belgrade today to discuss, among other things, the Sava bridge incident, agreement was reached on the following:-

- a) immediate instructions were to be given for the withdrawal of serb militia forces from the bridge.
- b) re-establishment of the status quo ante.
- c) General Cot, with his Serb counter-part, would verify progress on withdrawal and also discuss possible future mutually acceptable control mechanisms on Sunday 27 February at the bridge. It was suggested by Martić that UNPROFOR and Serb militia man joint checkpoints on the bridge, with UNPROFOR's role being a monitoring one. We, for our part, have suggested that these checkpoints be separate, with UNPROFOR's role being to ensure no weapons are being brought into the UNPAs, as is our mandate.

2. On the shelling of the Maslenica bridge on 22 February, Martić maintained that this had been retaliatory action for Croatian extremist element attacks on Serb civilians in Benkovac and surrounding areas. He gave his assurances that the Serbs would not open fire again.

3. Bjegovic, who was also present at the meeting, spoke at length of the economic initiatives that the 'RSK' intended to pursue in Western Slavonia. These included:-

- a soon to be completed prefabricated structure to prevent the flooding of the Sava bridge.
- cultivation of land in the Pakrac area, dependent on the removal of an UNPROFOR check-point to allow access to the region.
- introduction of customs/control measures at the Sava bridge.

Bjegovic also mentioned that there would be a meeting with the Croats on Monday on the subject of electricity. The Serbs intended to present the Croats with various projects which they believed would be accepted.

4. Our attempts to persuade the Serbs to sign a general cease-fire agreement prior to a political settlement were unsuccessful. Martić was insistent that there ~~be~~ could be no meeting between the

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military prior to an overall political agreement between Tudjman and himself. He believed that the cease-fire agreement would be a natural outcome from the peace accord and suggested that a high level political meeting should be organized in either Athens, Moscow or, if need be, Geneva. However, he agreed that he would get back to us in seven to ten days on the issue of a military meeting, after having consulted with the parliament.

5. Following our meeting with Martić, we held discussions with President Milosevic at the Presidential palace. I firstly briefed him on my meeting with Martić and requested his encouragement and support for our efforts to achieve progress on the UNPA problem. I further requested his continued assistance, and influence, with Karadžić in ensuring total compliance by the Bosnian Serbs on the control of heavy weapons in Sarajevo.

6. Milosevic was confident that UNPROFOR would have no problems with the BSA on their commitments in the Sarajevo agreement but cautioned that the Muslims should be warned not to use their withdrawal from Sarajevo as an opportunity to exploit the situation. General Cot pointed out that any such action on the side of the BiH would constitute a breach of the agreement and recommended that the Serbs could themselves exploit the current situation by allowing full freedom of movement within the city, thereby defusing international criticism that while there was a cease-fire in Sarajevo, the siege of the city continued. To this, Milosevic replied that no-one was more interested in freedom of movement than the Serbs who numbered some 60,000 within the city. However, he denied that Sarajevo was under siege, maintaining that Serbs had not come to besiege any city, but had been living in the territory for over 100 years.

7. Requested to give his views on the recent cease-fire agreement between the HVO and the BiH, Milosevic was doubtful that a cease-fire between the two sides would be achieved in the near future. He believed that the fighting would not cease until the Muslims stopped their attack on Vitez, Novi Travnik and Busovaca - an attack which he was convinced was aimed at gaining a corridor to Mostar and from there to the sea. He strongly believed that the international community should focus on resolving these central issues as other outstanding disputes would be solved in the natural process following a peace accord. In this regard, he made particular mention of the question of Mostar, suggesting that the European Union administration of the city be pursued to balance the process currently underway in Sarajevo.

8. Continuing, Milosevic spoke of the "high level of cruelty" exacted by the HVO and BiH in central and southern Bosnia and said that the repercussions of this would be hard to resolve from a distance - that is, by either Zagreb or Sarajevo. He said he would like to believe that after the Sarajevo process was completed, there would be greater flexibility at negotiations for a peace accord. However, he recommended that the Co-chairmen would need to coordinate positions of the parties prior to any future discussions in order to avoid another failure. The two major problems he foresaw were:-

- a) agreement on the administration of Sarajevo - on this issue he said that the Serbs had already agreed that the city should be under UN administration for a period of two years.
- B) access to the sea for the Muslims - here, he maintained that the Croats would never agree to giving up Neum, not least as such an action would cut Croatia in half. This point would be difficult to resolve but had nothing to do with the Serbs.

9. Following my request for his assistance in convincing Karadzic of the urgency of reopening Tuzla airport as soon as possible and my assurances that UNPROFOR would do its best to address the concerns of the Serbs, Milosevic said that, as long as the airport was used strictly for humanitarian purposes, the BiH armija was removed from the airport and it was placed under UNPROFOR control, he could see no objection to its opening by Karadzic. However, he suggested that the best means of assuring the Serbs that the airport would not be mis-used would be to accept the presence of some 30 Serb customs and police officials, to work in parallel with UNPROFOR, to control incoming cargo. The Foreign Minister also suggested that UNPROFOR look into the re-opening of Banja Luka simultaneously with Tuzla. I referred to the need for air corridors to be established, for example between Belgrade and Tuzla.

10. On his views on the general situation, Milosevic stated that he had always believed that following a peace accord, there would be no need for substantial foreign troops in the Former Yugoslavia. He said that the Serbs had no intention to attack the Muslims but if the latter required reassurance with the presence of troops 'that was up to them'. He believed that two factors would have a major impact on the situation:-

- a) the lifting of sanctions. This would restore the credibility of the European Union which had stated that if the Serbs signed the peace accord there would be a gradual lifting of sanctions on Serbia. The Serbs had met their part of the bargain but the EU had not.
- b) an equal approach to all the parties in the conflict and an end to the current practise of blaming the Serbs for anything that happened.

Concluding, Milosevic said that we should rest assured that the only ambition of the Serbs was to support peace.

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IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA '94

FEB 23 11:50

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: LZG-078

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 23 FEBRUARY 1994

1. Following the meeting this morning between Mr Akashi and Mr Sarinic, attended by Ambassador Eide, Eide had a brief meeting with Mr Sarinic to discuss the way ahead.

2. Sarinic started by protesting that it had been the Serbs who had fired first at Mas'lenica bridge the day before. He admitted that there were days when the Croats fired more shells than the Serbs, and Eide pointed out that not only did there seem to be more Croatian shells fired than Serb, but that there were clear examples of when the Croats fired first.

3. Eide then said that we needed to look at the strategy to be followed from here. Initially we intended to go immediately to Knin so that there was some high level reaction to yesterday's shelling. We had proposed reversion to the 4 December 1992 draft of the ceasefire as a basis for work, but this was now proving difficult, not least due to the change in the Croatian position, which had been made clear at the meeting with Mr Akashi. At the same time the present truce was clearly not sufficient, and there was a need to achieve greater security without months of negotiation.

4. Sarinic replied that whatever we did, we should start with Belgrade and then go to Knin. However, he agreed that there was a need to first give a reaction to the shelling, and then to address the question of ceasefire. He said that he would phone Simic today. One of the things they would discuss was the reconnection of telephone lines. The problem was that Belgrade had connected the Krajina telephones to the Belgrade exchange, which meant that an international caller dialled 381 (for Serbia) rather than 385 (for Croatia) when dialling Knin, for example. Sarinic said that he had told Simic that Croatia would only reconnect the telephone lines when Krajina was disconnected by Belgrade. Croatia would then connect Krajina. Simic was supposed to give Sarinic an answer to this proposal. Sarinic said that he was going to tell Simic that they could not tolerate this gradual integration of Krajina into the greater Serbia.

5. Eide said that this was just one of the many elements of economic reconstruction which had a political symbolism. There would be more progress if the political symbolism was dropped and Croatia demonstrated that they were the economic magnet for Krajina.

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6. Sarinic replied that on this he disagreed. The Serbs were just playing for time and would never agree to economic development. 95% of the population might see the point and want to be part of Croatia for economic reasons, but there was 5% who were in control and wanted to stay there. The way to change this was to exert pressure on their boss, Milosovic. The only thing that the Serbs understood was force, as had been proven last week in Sarajevo. The message we should be giving to Milosovic was that if he did not make more than the token effort he had so far with the Knin Serbs, then sanctions would not be lifted.

7. Eide said that despite the Croatian position on political symbolism, the alternative was to look for ways to demonstrate to the 95% that their future lay with Croatia. So there was a need to work both on Milosovic and the population of Krajina.

8. Sarinic agreed, and said that for example this was why they were proposing that at the weekend people should be allowed to travel freely to visit relatives on both sides of the confrontation line. To keep things simple they should, perhaps, have to specify in advance exactly where they wanted to go and whom they intended to visit. When Eide mentioned the proposal to pay pensions, Sarinic agreed that it would be possible to pay them in Zadar, for example, as long as they were paid to the individual and not to a "government representative". However, he said that the authorities in Knin would never agree to this.

9. We agreed to arrange our next meeting on Friday 25 February.

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

94 FEB 20 15:23

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICHY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: Z - 260

SUBJECT: SECTOR WEST - SITUATION AT SAVA BRIDGE

Please find attached a description of the situation in the Sava Bridge area. The matter is under close observation. Please note the linkage between this activity and the threat of air strikes around Sarajevo.

Regards,

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

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94 FEB 20 15:31

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INTER-OFFICE MEMO

TO: SRSG

FROM: FC

DATE: 20 FEB 94

SUBJECT: SECTOR WEST - SITUATION AT SAVA BRIDGE

1. Attached at Annex A is an assessment of the ongoing situation at the SAVA Bridge in Sector West. Annex B is a summary of UNPROFOR's reaction.
2. The situation is potentially very explosive. Not only is there the risk of violence between UNPROFOR and Serbs but a deterioration in relations between Croatia and "RSK" as well.
3. I ask that there should be urgent direct intervention at your level with the most senior political authorities in KNIN in order to defuse the situation.

SRSG's Office

Date: 20/2-94

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ANNEX A

ARSK MOBILIZATION IN SAVA BRIDGE AREA

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 180830A FEB 94, AROUND 80 X ARSK/MILITIA PERSONNEL ARMED WITH PERSONAL WEAPONS SURROUNDED THE CHECK POINT AT THE SAVA BRIDGE (XL 7602). THEY ALSO SURROUNDED THE DORNI VAROS COY HQ (XL 773037). CO NEPBAT WAS PERMITTED ACCESS THROUGH THE ARSK CHECKPOINT TO NEGOTIATE AT THE BRIDGE.
2. AT 181045A FEB 94 IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE ARSK HAD REMOVED 2 X TRUCKS FROM A GARAGE NEAR THE STARA GRADISKA STORAGE HOUSE AT GRID XL 763018. REINFORCEMENTS WERE STILL UNABLE TO REACH THE BRIDGE, HOWEVER THEY WERE DEPLOYED FROM JORBAT AND NEPBAT.
3. AT 181340A FEB 94 IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE ARSK HAD FORCED OPEN THE CONTAINER LOCATED ON THE BRIDGE, WHICH WAS USED AS ACCOMMODATION AND CONTROL ROOM FOR THE CHECKPOINT. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT THE SERB POLICE ARE IN CHARGE OF THE INCIDENT AND ARE COMMANDED BY MARKO RELIC THE CHIEF OF POLICE FROM OKUCANI. COMMENT: RELIC IS THE FORMER COMD OF 13 BDE ARSK BASED IN SLUNJ. HIS APPOINTMENT AS POLICE CHIEF WAS IN LINE WITH PRESIDENT MARTIC'S POLICY OF INCREASED CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE ARSK. COMMENT ENDS.
4. A NUMBER OF ARSK CHECKPOINTS/ROAD BLOCKS AS FOLLOWS:
 - A. 4 X ROAD BLOCKS AT THE SAVA BRIDGE.
 - B. 2 X CPs ON THE ROAD TO DORNI VAROS.
 - C. 3 X CPs ON THE ROAD TO HQ NEPBAT AT PUSTARA (XL 7408).
 - D. 2 X CPs ON THE ROAD TO STARA GRADISKA STORAGE AREA.
5. THE WEAPONS CARRIED BY THE ARSK/MILITIA WERE SEEN TO INCLUDE 6 X ROCKET LAUNCHERS, TYPE NK. CIVILIAN TRANSIT THOUGHT THE AREA WAS NOT HINDERED BUT ALL UN MOVEMENT WAS OBSTRUCTED. CO NEPBAT WAS UNABLE TO PERSUADE THE ARSK TO WITHDRAW. NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMD TDF REGT OKUCANI, COL CELAKETIC AND THE POLICE CHIEF, MR RELIC, ARE ONGOING.
6. THE CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT THE BRIDGE IS COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SERBS AND THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 100 SOLDIERS ARMED WITH RIFLES, SIDE ARMS, HAND GRENADES, MGS AND ROCKET LAUNCHERS IN THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE BRIDGE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE TROOPS ARE THE ADVANCE PARTY OF A BN, THE REMAINDER OF WHICH, TOGETHER WITH HEAVY WEAPONS, IS STATIONED ON THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE BRIDGE.
7. 100 X NEPBAT PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AREA OF THE BRIDGE AND THE COY LOCATION OF DORNI VAROS AND ARE CUT OFF FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE BN DUE TO THE ARSK ROAD BLOCKS.
8. THE ARSK WITHIN SECTOR WEST ARE POORLY EQUIPPED AS THEIR

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LARGEST OF THESE AND IS THE ONLY ONE WHICH HOLDS HEAVY WEAPONS. EXACT DETAILS OF THE WEAPONS HELD IN THE STORAGE HOUSE ARE NOT KNOWN, HOWEVER THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 9 X TANKS WHICH INCLUDE 2 X M-84. THE REMAINING TANKS ARE BELIEVED TO BE T-54/55. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF APCs, HEAVY ARTY, MORTARS AND HAND HELD ROCKET LAUNCHERS ARE ALSO HELD IN THE STORAGE HOUSE, TOGETHER WITH AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF AMMUNITION. ACCESS TO THE STORAGE HOUSE IS CONTROLLED BY 20 X NEPBAT PERSONNEL AND A NUMBER OF ARSK SOLDIERS. HOWEVER UNPROFOR DOES NOT HAVE TOTAL CONTROL OVER ACCESS. WEAPONS WERE REMOVED BY THE ARSK IN THE PAST, ON 24 JAN 93, FOLLOWING THE 22 JAN 93 HV OFFENSIVE.

ASSESSMENT

9. THE POSSIBILITY OF REINFORCEMENT OF SECTOR WEST BEING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THIS ACTION IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHTLY INCREASED LEVEL OF TENSION OVER THE LAST WEEKS DUE TO HV ACTIVITY AROUND PIVARE AND SAGOVINA, IT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT AN ACTION OF THIS SCALE. IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY THAT THE ARSK HAVE ANY MAJOR OFFENSIVE PLANS IN THE AREA OF SECTOR WEST.

10. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE ACTION BY THE ARSK OF TAKING CONTROL OF THE BRIDGE IS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE THREAT OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE BSA AROUND SARAJEVO. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED THE STARA GRADISKA STORE HOUSE AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF HEAVY WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE STORE HOUSE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE TROOPS CONTROLLING THE BRIDGE WILL BACK DOWN WITHOUT STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM KNIN OR FORCIBLE MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY UNPROFOR. THE SITUATION THEREFORE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO ESCALATE.

1994-02-20 15:33 6035819

UNPROFOR (S/N 6035819)

006 P

SECTOR WEST

2473 20-02-94 13:04

(05) #1

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UNPROFOR

TVA 1316	TOT	SWHR 553	SG: EL	DATE: 20-02
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PAGE 1 OF 1

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL CRYPTO EYES ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO: T640	DTG: 201310A FEB '94
TO: HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB	FROM: SECTOR WEST HQ
FAX NO:	FAX:
ATTN: OPS	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER : MAJ. PANDE TITLE : DS00 RELEASING OFFR: SAME SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : SC, DSC, SCOS, SOO, MIO, SLO FAX NO :	
SUBJECT : INCIDENT AT SAVA BRIDGE - SINC REP	

- MESSAGE -

REF : OUR FAX NO T-628 DTG 191935A FEB, '94
OUR FAX NO T-636 DTG 200945A FEB, '94

1. AT 1045HRS, 15 TO 20 TDF/POLICE SOLDIERS CAME CLOSE TO THE APCs OF NEPBAT BMR LOCATED AT XL 767022 CARRYING RIFLES, MACHINE GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND GRENADES WITH THE POSSIBLE INTENTION OF PROVOKATING NEPBAT TROOPS. THEY HAVE ALSO PLACED TWO (2) MORE VEHICLES ON THE SITE AS ROAD BLOCK TOWARDS SAVA BRIDGE.
2. NEPBAT HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TILL NOW TO ACT WITH RESTRAINTS.
3. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS.
4. REGARDS.

SRSG CMO NATO W.
FC CSO FE
HCA SSO CMIO
COS OSO SECT WEST.



Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
to the United Nations Office at
Geneva

File Copy

010/12

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JM

Date: February 18, 1994

To:

All missions accredited to the UN office at Geneva,
ICFY and humanitarian organisations

From:

Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Pages:

3

including the cover page

COMMENTS:

Sirs,

Please find attached a letter of the Secretary
General of the United Nations, Mr. B. Boutros-Ghali
relating the military involvement - aggression of the
Republic of Croatia in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

Sincerely yours

Mustafa Bijedii
Ambassador



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

17 February 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I should like to refer to my letter dated 1 February 1994 (S/1994/109) and your statement dated 3 February 1994 (S/PRST/6) regarding the presence of Croatian Army units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the statement of 3 February 1994, the Security Council requested that I monitor closely the situation and report to the Council within two weeks on progress towards the complete and full withdrawal of all elements of the Croatian Army (HV) as well as military equipment from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As mentioned in my letter dated 1 February 1994, the ability of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to observe developments throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is limited. UNPROFOR is, therefore, not in a position to verify in a systematic fashion whether all elements of the Croatian Army and the equipment concerned are being withdrawn. The following observations of UNPROFOR should be seen in this context.

On 10 February, UNPROFOR observed a convoy of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), consisting of 21 trucks and other equipment, leaving the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina via the Lipa checkpoint. One of these trucks had markings of the Fifth HV Brigade. The convoy also included a bus carrying 36 soldiers with insignia of an independent Croatian Army unit from Zagreb. The event was video-taped by a uniformed cameraman of the HV or HVO.

His Excellency
Mr. Roble Olhaye
President of the Security Council
New York

In a letter dated 11 February 1994 addressed to me, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granic, stated, inter alia, that the Republic would approach my Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to agree on a monitoring mechanism which would verify strict compliance with the Security Council's request.

In a letter dated 15 February 1994 addressed to my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, the Head of the Office for the United Nations and the European Union of the Croatian Foreign Ministry, Mr. Budimir Plestina, stated, inter alia, that on 16 February Croatian Army elements would leave the front line of the wider region of the river Neretva. The departure of these elements would commence at 10:00 hours and be accomplished by 17:00 hours of the same day in the region of Metkovic.


As of 17 February, UNPROFOR has not yet received any concrete proposals for a monitoring arrangement nor have any of the troop movements indicated in the above letter been observed.

In the absence of any observations of HV withdrawal movements beyond that on 10 February, UNPROFOR continues to assess that there still may be 5,000 HV troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although no HV command posts nor any full HV brigades operating as formed units have been identified.

It appears that HV troops are now being more circumspect and may be removing their HV insignia while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and replacing them with those of the HVO. UNPROFOR believes that HV insignia on a number of vehicles have been erased or repainted.

UNPROFOR will continue to monitor developments to the extent possible.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 154 CYZ 085 P1/3

(ZAG: Pls Protect Sarajevo)

010/12

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

94 FEB 18 -5 :09

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AP/J-PC

TC-M

JM

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1994
NUMBER: MSC- 487

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Croatian Army units from Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Attached please find for your attention the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on the above subject.

2. The Croatian Permanent Representative insists that his information (see our earlier clear fax) regarding the withdrawal of a sizeable number of HV troops from the Neretva region to Metkovic on 16 February is correct. He also insists that on that day General Bobetko made contact with the Spanish Battalion Command in Medugorje. We would appreciate your comments in this regard.

3. Please keep us informed on any relevant developments which may require an addendum of the letter to the Security Council.



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

CNZ 154 CYZ 085 P2/3

cc: Mr. Annan
Mr. Goulding
Mr. de Soto

17 February 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I should like to refer to my letter dated 1 February 1994 (S/1994/109) and your statement dated 3 February 1994 (S/PRST/6) regarding the presence of Croatian Army units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the statement of 3 February 1994, the Security Council requested that I monitor closely the situation and report to the Council within two weeks on progress towards the complete and full withdrawal of all elements of the Croatian Army (HV) as well as military equipment from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As mentioned in my letter dated 1 February 1994, the ability of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to observe developments throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is limited. UNPROFOR is, therefore, not in a position to verify in a systematic fashion whether all elements of the Croatian Army and the equipment concerned are being withdrawn. The following observations of UNPROFOR should be seen in this context.

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His Excellency
Mr. Roble Olhaye
President of the Security Council
New York

CNZ 154 CYZ 085 P3/3

In a letter dated 11 February 1994 addressed to me, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granic, stated, inter alia, that the Republic would approach my Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to agree on a monitoring mechanism which would verify strict compliance with the Security Council's request.

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
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It appears that HV troops are now being more circumspect and may be removing their HV insignia while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and replacing them with those of the HVO. UNPROFOR believes that HV insignia on a number of vehicles have been erased or repainted.

UNPROFOR will continue to monitor developments to the extent possible.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

UNUC Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CN2 151 CYZ 083 P1/1
(ZAG: Pls Protect Sarajevo)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'94 FEB 16 23:35

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ATTN. COT
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO ATTN. ROSE
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1994
NUMBER: MSC- 472
SUBJECT: Report to Security Council regarding presence of HV
elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

According to the Croatian Permanent Representative in New York, HV and/or HVO military commanders have approached the Spanish Battalion in Medugorje with a proposal for an arrangement to monitor the withdrawal of HV troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The withdrawal is supposed to start at 17:00 hrs your time today. Please advise by "most immediate" cable whether you can confirm the above. Should the Spanish Battalion indeed have been approached, we would need your comments as to whether the proposed monitoring arrangements are feasible and satisfactory.

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CZN-213

CZG-55

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING

IMMEDIATE

SSN-163
UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

FEB 16 19:08

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
DATE : 16 FEBRUARY 1994
NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 240
SUBJECT : HV ELEMENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. In reply to your MSC 469 of 15 February 1994, the draft letter which was attached accurately reflects UNPROFOR's position with respect to the withdrawal of HV elements from BH.

2. I attach a letter received from the Croatian authorities in which details are provided on troop withdrawals. UNPROFOR has already provided information on what was observed on 10 February 1994; this should not be taken as a denial of the Croatian claim, but only as a statement of fact. At the time of writing, UNPROFOR elements had not reported any signs of the withdrawal mentioned in the third para of the attachment to this cable. Should this occur, the information will be forwarded to you in a timely manner.

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UNUC Telecom. Unit

Palais des Nations

'94 FEB 16 19:20

INTERNAL: FC, HCA, DFC, COS.

CZN-213/CZG-55



REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE
ZAGREB

Class: 018-05/94-01/
No.: 512-05-01/94-62

Zagreb, 15th February 1994

2/2 CC'd: FC
DFC
HCA
COS
CMO
RECEIVED
16-02-1994
SRSG's office

- Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Mr. Yasushi Akashi
- UNPROFOR Force Commander General Jean Cot

Dear Sirs:

I have the pleasure to provide you with the information on the withdrawal of Croatian volunteers from Uskoplje-Rama front in B-H to Croatia, accomplished on 10th February 1994.

The convoy, consisting of 44 vehicles with 12 heavy artillery weapons and appertaining ammunition, 3 busses and approx. 850 volunteers, returned to the Republic of Croatia. The convoy passed the route Prozor - Lipa - Kamensko without difficulties, crossed to the Republic of Croatia at Kamensko crossing at 17:00 hrs and proceeded to Split. On its route, the convoy encountered ten individual vehicles and two convoys of the UN protection force.

I would also like to inform you, dear Sirs, that tomorrow, 16th February, the CA elements will leave the front-line of the wider region of river Neretva. The departure will commence at 10:00 and will be accomplished until 17:00 hrs, the same day, in the region of Metković.

Dear Sirs, please advise the UN Secretary-General Mr. B. E. Ghali and other UN authorities of the mentioned.

I would also very much appreciate if you would confirm the receipt of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

OFFICE FOR UN AND EC

Head of Office
Mr. Budimir Pleština

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

CNZ 149 CYZ 081 P1/4

(ZAG: Pls Protect Sarajevo)

~~OUTGOING CODE CABLE~~

94 FEB 16 5:12

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR,
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓

FROM: *fr* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *X Shumma*

DATE: 15 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: MSC- 469

SUBJECT: Report to Security Council regarding presence of HV
elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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1. Attached for your urgent comments please find a draft letter of the Secretary-General to the Security Council as requested by the Council in the Presidential Statement dated 3 February.

2. The letter of the Croatian Foreign Minister, Dr. Granic, to the Secretary-General dated 11 February will now be published as a Security Council document. According to that letter, the Croatian Government will approach UNPROFOR with a view to establishing a monitoring mechanism to verify the strict compliance with the Security Council request. It appears that the Government has not approached UNPROFOR as yet. I believe that should the Government approach you tomorrow such a development should be incorporated in the Secretary-General's

CN2 149 CYZ 081 F2/4

letter. The Croatian Permanent Representative will be reminding his Government of the deadline set by Security Council.

3. Since you will be away from Headquarters tomorrow, please designate a focal point in your office who could respond to any further queries from this end.

weeks on progress towards the complete and full withdrawal of all elements of the Croatian Army (HV) as well as military equipment, from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As mentioned in my letter dated 1 February 1994, the ability of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to observe developments throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is limited. UNPROFOR is, therefore, not in a position to verify in a systematic fashion whether all elements of the Croatian Army and the equipment concerned are being withdrawn. The following observations of UNPROFOR have to be seen in this context.

On 10 February 1994, UNPROFOR observed a convoy of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) consisting of 21 trucks and other equipment, leaving the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina via the Lipa checkpoint. One of these trucks had markings of the fifth HV brigade. The convoy also included a bus carrying 36 soldiers with insignia of an independent Croatian Army unit from Zagreb. The event was video-taped by a HV or HVO cameraman wearing uniform.

His Excellency
Mr. M. Roble Olhaye
President of the Security Council
New York

CNZ 149 CYZ 081 P4/4

In the absence of any further observations of HV withdrawal movements, UNPROFOR judges that there still may be as many as 5,000 HV troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, UNPROFOR has not found any command structures nor any HV brigades operating as formed units.

It appears that HV troops are now more circumspect and may have been removing their HV insignia and replacing them with those of the HVO. UNPROFOR believes that HV insignia on numerous vehicles have been repainted or erased.

UNPROFOR will continue to monitor developments.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

CNZ 147 CYZ 080 P1/4
(ZAG: Pls Protect Sarajevo)

010/12

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IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1994
NUMBER: MSC- 459
SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Croatian Army units from Bosnia and Herzegovina

[Handwritten signature]

14 FEB 15

Attached please find a self-explanatory letter on the above subject from the Foreign Minister of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granic.

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Palais des Nations
94 FEB 15 -3 :20



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTER

H.E. Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Secretary General of the
United Nations

NEW YORK

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that a significant progress has been achieved during the talks between Mr. Haris Silajdžić and myself in Geneva on February 9 and 10, 1994.

In our Joint Statement both sides have agreed to continue and intensify their talks and specifically:

a) to separately renew their appeal to the Security Council and request that international control be established along all the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of achieving a peaceful solution;

b) that the military commanders of the two sides meet within the next seven days in order to work out the remaining details concerning the overall cease-fire;

c) that negotiations on the unconditional exchange of detainees will be speeded up and that both sides will further co-operate in the search for missing persons;

d) that deliberations and negotiations about all possible modalities of the future relations between Bosniak-Moslems and Bosnian-Croats, as well as between the two states, will be continued taking into consideration the principles and arrangements already agreed upon;

e) future political solutions notwithstanding, that both sides should secure the return of refugees to their homes following the restoration of peace.

As to the point a) in the Joint Statement, the Government of Croatia would like to reiterate its position concerning the control of its internationally recognized borders, the borders with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY (Serbia/Montenegro), and in particular the control of its borders with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Republic of Croatia maintains its firm opinion that strict adherence to the Security Council Resolution 769 (1992) is essential for the implementation of the mandate of the peace-keeping forces in Croatia, as it is for the implementation of Resolutions 757 (1192), 787 (1992) and in particular 820 (1993).

Similarly, my Government believes that the complete and effective control of all the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of equal importance and would strengthen the possibility for a peaceful solution to the conflict along the lines of the European Union Action Plan. In this regard, the implementation of the resolutions 787 (1992) - in particular its paragraph 16 - and Resolution 838 (1993) is crucial.

The Republic of Croatia has on several occasions, specifically in documents S/25766, S/25885 and in particular S/25874, requested that the international observers be positioned entirely on its territory in order to monitor the border of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Government firmly reiterates this position.

However, fully aware of the considerable financial and personnel strains resulting from the possible use of numerous ground troops, as suggested in the Secretary General's Report S/26018 and Add. 1, my Government would instead propose the use, with the authorization of the Security Council, of aerial surveillance and air power of NATO which could be undertaken by appropriately equipped aircraft of the Member states already implementing Security Council Resolution 816 (1993).

Pursuing full normalization of Moslem-Croat relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as betterment of co-operation between the two neighbouring states in accordance with the initiative presented by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, in Bonn on January 10, 1994, my Government further proposes that a special team of international inspectors undertake an in-depth inquiry and establish true facts concerning the alleged presence of foreign elements in various military formations engaged in operations on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a peace promoting step in co-operation with the Security Council and as good will gesture towards the Sarajevo Government - in the meantime my Government expresses its readiness to withdraw certain units from the border areas with Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the recent Security Council request. But my Government also calls upon the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to immediately order its Army to cease all hostilities and offensive actions against Croatian population centres, especially in the region of Central Bosnia. Following the cessation of hostilities we shall issue an appeal to all Croat volunteers in Central Bosnia to lay down their arms and return to their normal, civilian lives.

The Republic of Croatia is ready to call off the units of the Croatian Army on the left bank of the Neretva River and elements of the Croatian Army on the right bank of the Neretva River. The Republic of Croatia would approach the Special Envoy of the Secretary General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina to agree on the monitoring mechanism which would verify the strict compliance with the Security Council request. We would propose to the UNPROFOR representatives that withdrawal be completed by February 15, 1994.

Furthermore, as a measure aimed at easing the tensions in the area, the Government of the Republic of Croatia would advise HVO command to withdraw a part of its heavy weaponry in Central Bosnia and to declare cease-fire in the town of Mostar unilaterally.

CNZ 147 CYZ 080 P4/4

My Government hopes that the continuation of constructive negotiations between Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian-Moslem sides and the implementation of the agreed cease-fire would create conditions conducive to further easing of military tensions between the two sides, pending the search for an overall political solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In order to make this appeal truly effective and to further contribute to the return to normalcy in the area, as well as to prevent even greater suffering of the Croatian civilians and the new wave of refugees, my Government demands once again that the Security Council provide firm guarantees for the safety of the four remaining Croatian enclaves in Central Bosnia (Vitez, Novi Travnik, Usora and Žepče), subjected to the ongoing offensive of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.


The Government of the Republic of Croatia reiterates its strong support for the European Union Action Plan of November 22, 1993. At the same time my Government welcomes the finally achieved consensus among European countries, the United States and other UN members to continue to work along its lines in order to reach a peaceful and comprehensive settlement to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore it also welcomes the readiness to use NATO forces, if necessary, to end the long suffering of the civilians in the besieged city of Sarajevo.

The Republic of Croatia believes that the Security Council has to continue to play a decisive role in finding a lasting and comprehensive solution to the crisis in accordance with all the previous UN S resolutions.

I kindly request that you inform the distinguished Members of the Security Council of the contents of this letter.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zagreb, February 11, 1994



Dr Mate Granić
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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SSN-50

12G-012

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UNRECORDED
COMMUNICATIONS
IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA '94 FEB -4 14:11

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB *Spur*

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 4 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: 2-166

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 3 FEBRUARY 1994

IMMEDIATE

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1. Last night Ambassador Eide had a fortyfive minute meeting with Mr Sarinic, who had to leave to another appointment, to brief him on our progress this week. It was agreed to have a further meeting today in order to go into more detail of some of the points raised.

2. Sarinic started by saying that they had identified a house for the Serbian representatives in Zagreb in the Salata area. He then asked if we had learned who the Serbs would appoint as their representative. Eide explained that we had asked this specific question of Simic, but that he had said that they would take a decision in the next couple of days. Sarinic confirmed that the main interest of the dialogue between Granic and Simic would be humanitarian issues.

3. Sarinic asked if the Serbs had mentioned Obrovac and the ceasefire. He said that it would be interesting to know whether they put the question of the ceasefire as a condition of the second phase, or whether they would accept to negotiate some economic issues without an overall ceasefire. Sarinic then asked if we had raised the question of a face to face meeting with the Serbs. Eide explained that we had told them about our interest in having a meeting at the level of the Co-Chairmen at some point soon, and mentioned the Serbs' preoccupation with meeting at the same level. On the ceasefire, the Serbs had indicated that General Novakovic would only meet General Bobetko, for example.

4. Sarinic outlined his future movements and then asked for an indication of the further details that we needed to discuss the next day so that they could prepare for our meeting. Eide said that roads was a subject. Sarinic reverted to our description of how Simic had repeatedly turned all questions of roads over to Martic as the correct person to deal with them. Sarinic said that he had thought about the problem and the strategy and discussed it with Tudjman. He said that at the very beginning they should try not to be too ambitious, concentrating on one item as a test.

5. Eide said that the Serbs did not see much interest for themselves in opening the road. A wider package had to be developed, including elements of interest to the Serbs, for instance on agriculture and energy.

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C28-012 7/2

6. As far as they were concerned, Sarinic said, the opening of the highway from Zagreb to Slavonski Brod would be a test of the Serbs' goodwill. From the technical point of view it was an easy road to open. He said that he knew the Serbs were very interested in energy, and they were open to that. They wanted to open the road, then they could go for a list of items which could be introduced after two weeks, then a month, and so on.

7. Eide agreed, then moved on to the subject of agriculture, saying that if something was to be done, it would have to be done fast because of the spring season. We had spoken to UNHCR, and they had a small programme for displaced people. Croatia actually had all the seeds and so on that were required. If Croatia could show some good will in this, it would be good.

8. Sarinic said that he would be very happy to discuss fuel, fertiliser and oil for farming. They had been discussing for a long time the deal of Obrovac power station in return for water for Zadar. They could have it now. Sarinic said that he had told Bjegovic that he would be happy to send a couple of experts to help bring the power station back into commission. That was a very concrete step which would show whether they were interested or not. On agriculture, he agreed, we could tell them that they had seed, fertiliser and oil.

9. Sarinic then said that he proposed three steps: the highway through Sector West, then poles for Obrovac and water for Zadar, then seed, fertiliser and oil for the spring planting. These steps were easy to realise. They could not accept access to the sea, however. Sarinic asked if the Serbs had talked about the three villages, and we said that they had not. Then he asked if they had mentioned Peruca. Sarinic said that they were working on Peruca and had installed a 20MW generator, which was not yet working. They were ready to supply and receive energy in order to restart life. But they would not discuss the division of energy as if between two states. Obrovac and water for Zadar were a start towards the normalisation of life. Croatia, as the Government of Croatia, would provide seed in Croatia and also there. They would be very large as far as the financing of such an operation was concerned. They did not have too much money, but for such a political enterprise to work they had to make such a sacrifice. Sarinic asked if we wanted them to think about these items and come up with a concrete proposal, which Eide said would be a good idea.

ENDALL

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SSN-45
UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
S. 1/1

'94 FEB -4 10:55
TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 4 FEBRUARY 1994
NUMBER: 2-164
SUBJECT: CROATIAN TROOPS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

'94 FEB -4 10:48

1. Thank you for your informative cable 366. Your background information on the Presidential Statement adopted on 3 February was particularly useful.

2. In the absence of Foreign Minister Granic, I have spoken with Vice Prime Minister Kostovic and Presidential Adviser Sarinic regarding the deep concern expressed by the Security Council and the prospect of more serious action to be taken if no improvement is seen on the withdrawal of Croatian Army troops and equipment from Bosnia Herzegovina. In view of the Council's request to the SecGen to make a progress report in 2 weeks time, I emphasized the need for UNPROFOR to see positive steps from the Croatian side soon. Regards.

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Palais des Nations

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TO: '94 FEB -4 -4 :38 AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *thadiphan*

DATE: 3 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: 366

SUBJECT: Croatian troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina

NSN FEB - 3 2 10 09

IMMEDIATE

1. Please find enclosed a self-explanatory Presidential Statement adopted by the Security Council tonight. The text reflects drafting compromises in which the non-aligned caucus' insistence on the use of the term "aggression" to describe Croatian actions finally yielded to the preference of the UK, US and France that milder language be used. Similarly the threat of "economic measures" in the sixth paragraph has become "other serious measures", but the phrase is clearly intended to point towards the consideration of economic sanctions if Croatian troops and equipment are not withdrawn.
2. The crucial issue for UNPROFOR is the fifth paragraph, since the Secretary-General will evidently rely principally on reports from you of progress toward the withdrawal of Croatian Army troops and equipment from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council fully understands the constraints on your ability to monitor such movements, and you are not expected to redeploy any of your assets from their present pressing tasks to enable you to do this. However, it is expected by members of the Council that UNPROFOR should, in the normal course, become aware of significant withdrawals of Croatian forces, just as you were able to report the presence of these forces in the first place. In addition to information from UNPROFOR, the Secretary-General will take into account any information provided by Member States, as well as the claims of the Governments of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Your input into his report should be received here by Monday 14 February.

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CNZ-116 CYL-6/ P2/2

adopted 3 Feb 1994, 9 pm

S/PRST/1994/6
Revised draft

The Security Council is deeply concerned that the Republic of Croatia has deployed elements of the Croatian Army (HV) along with heavy military equipment in the central and southern parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as described in the Secretary-General's letter of 1 February 1994 (S/1994/109).

The Security Council strongly condemns the Republic of Croatia for this serious hostile act against a Member State of the United Nations, which constitutes a violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 752 (1992), in which the Council demanded an immediate end to all forms of interference and full respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council demands that the Republic of Croatia withdraw forthwith all elements of the Croatian Army (HV) along with military equipment and fully respect the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force or "ethnic cleansing", and condemns such acquisition as well as the practice of "ethnic cleansing" by whomever committed.

The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to monitor closely the situation and report to the Council within two weeks from the date of the present statement on progress towards the complete and full withdrawal of all elements of the Croatian Army (HV), as well as military equipment, from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council will consider other serious measures if the Republic of Croatia fails to put an immediate end to all forms of interference in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Security Council reiterates its statement of 7 January 1994 (S/PRST/1994/1), in which it expressed its deep concern at the continuing widespread hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council calls once more on all the parties to cease hostilities throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to honour the commitments they have entered into and refrain from actions which escalate or widen the conflict. It calls upon them to negotiate in earnest in the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to achieve an early settlement.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

CN2 - 110 / CY7 - 065 P1/3

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'94 FEB -2 -4 :20

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *hashi/hansen*

DATE: 1 February 1994

NUMBER: 338

SUBJECT: Croatian military activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina

CODED CABLE

Please find attached for your information a letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council today on the above-mentioned subject.

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THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

CNZ - 110 / CYZ - 065 P2/3

1 February 1994

Dear Mr. President,

At its informal consultations on Friday, 28 January 1994, the Security Council asked UNPROFOR to provide an urgent report on the letter of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated January 28, 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council (Document S/1994/95). As you may recall, at that time my Representative in the Security Council, Under-Secretary-General Gharekhan, advised the Council that UNPROFOR had not had any new reports of significant military activity in its area of operations, but recalled that in the past UNPROFOR had observed small numbers of armed personnel in Croatian army uniforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had so informed the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Although UNPROFOR's ability to observe developments throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina is limited, it has provided the following information reflecting, to the best of its ability, its judgement of the involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

His Excellency,
Mr. M. Roble Olhaye
President of the Security Council
New York

CNE - 110 / CY2 - 065 P3/3


The Croatian Army has directly supported the HVO in terms of manpower, equipment and weapons for some time. Initially the level of support was limited to individual and small sub-units, many of them volunteers. As the offensives of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government forces against the HVO have become successful, the numbers of Croatian soldiers appear to have increased. It is assessed that in total there is the equivalent of three Croatian Brigades of regular Army personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, approximately 3000 to 5000 (this is an estimation, as it is impossible with UNPROFOR's assets to obtain required information for a more accurate account). There have been confirmed reports by UNPROFOR personnel that elements (troops and equipment) from the following Croatian Army (HV) units are indeed present in central and southern Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- a. 1 Guards Brigade
- b. 2 Guards Brigade
- c. 5 Guards Brigade
- d. 7 Guards Brigade
- e. 114 Brigade
- f. 116 Brigade, 4th battalion; and
- g. Special military police

Equipment includes heavy artillery and multi-barreled rocket launchers (MBRL). Most recently a M-77 MBRL entered Bosnia and Herzegovina at Metkovic on 23 January 1994. UNPROFOR is unable to confirm positively any Croatian Army tank activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also in January, the Monitoring and Close Air Support Coordination Centre (MCCC) has confirmed four helicopter flights from Croatia that crossed into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I trust that this information will be useful to the Security Council in its consideration of the situation brought to its attention by the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina in document S/1994/95.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

UNOC Telecomm. Unit

CZG 082 Palais des Nations

SSN 009

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

'94 JAN 31 20:27

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'94 JAN 31 19:36

CODED CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB *Sub M*

DATE: 31 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-144

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 31 JANUARY 1994

DISTRIBUTION:

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1. This morning Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide had a meeting with Mr Sarinic at his request, before we travelled to Belgrade. During the business like meeting Mr Sarinic outlined the current Croatian thinking on the normalisation of relations with Belgrade, the Bosnian Serbs and the "RSK", following the joint declarations signed on 19 January.

2. Mr Sarinic said that the intention of the Croatian Government was to go as far and as fast as possible following the declaration. He said that last week Mr Granic had spoken to Mr Simic in Geneva about the possibility of opening the motorway from Zagreb to Slavonski Brod, at least, by 12 February. Sarinic said that Simic would be in Zagreb on 12 February. He said that they would try to convince the Serbs to open the highway that far, which would enable road traffic to go from Zagreb to Banja Luka. He said that there were a lot of technical questions; they had the list prepared by Mr McLeod and they had their own list. Sarinic said that they wanted the first step to be symbolic. They also wanted to open this part first and then see if they could extend it to Belgrade.

3. Sarinic also said that they wanted to open the railway from Zagreb to Banja Luka. They had taken some steps towards that already. He had spoken to Bishop Karamica, the Bishop of Banja Luka, who had visited his office last week. The Bishop had in turn spoken to General Talic, commander of the Banja Luka Corps and number two in the Bosnian Serb Army. Sarinic said that Talic was very strong in Banja Luka and was also reasonable. He was prepared to help and to protect roads and the railway and so on. Sarinic said that in Banja Luka they badly needed fertiliser and seed, and oil, and there they were not in conflict with the sanctions.

4. Regarding the provisions of resolution 820, which says that all imports to Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be authorised by the government in Sarajevo, Sarinic said that they hoped to prepare everything and then put pressure on Izetbegovic and Silajdzic. Sarinic said that there were 40,000 Croats still living in the Banja Luka area, and that the Bishop was looking after them. On the other hand, the Croats of Bosnia had signed a similar agreement with Pale, and something must be done. That was the reason why they wanted to penetrate Bosnia and see how they could normalise the situation. Karadzic is automatically for that, he said, and the Bishop had spoken to Karadzic.

5. Sarinic said that this was a common approach. Bishop Karamica had already been helped six months ago with fertiliser and seed. This had been distributed well between the Serb and Croat population. Now the situation was even better. Bishop Karamica had spoken to Talic, who was in favour of progress. When reminded of the implications of resolution 820, Sarinic replied that this did not break the embargo.

6. Changing the subject slightly, Sarinic said that he would like us to be aware of what was going on and to be informed. He said that we should not take action at this stage, but should leave Bishop Karamica and Talic to get on with it. The Serbs always told him that they should just leave UNPROFOR aside and solve the problems between themselves. However, he was telling us what was going on; we should just take care and let it go on. Sarinic said that he was in regular contact with Goran Milinovic, Milosovic's Chief of Cabinet. They were talking on the phone twice a day at the moment.

7. Sarinic came back to the meeting between Granic and Simic. He said that he considered Simic to be the strong man there. Simic had said that 12 February seemed to be a bit soon. It was already public that Simic was coming to Zagreb on the 12th, and they might make their intention to open the motorway public in three or four days, when they were sure that the two parties agreed. He said that he was going to be away from Zagreb until Wednesday, and that they would not do anything before then. But the President had told him that they should just abandon the soft man approach now and should just go for it.

8. Sarinic then said that he would outline for us their policy over the next fifteen days to month. First they were going to open their respective offices. For that they would respect the date of 15 February. Today or tomorrow Sarinic said that he would find a suitable house for the Serbs. They had already declared that their new Ambassador would be Markovic. He had been appointed six months previously, and he would be there as head of the office. Sarinic said that they had been hesitating about that because they still did not know who the Serb would be, but he thought that he would know today or tomorrow. It would be useful if we could find out today in Belgrade, he said.

9. The second step, Sarinic said, was the opening of the Zagreb to Belgrade motorway. This they would do in two parts: through Sector West on 12 February, after which they would immediately push forward to open the rest through Sector East. The two presidents would meet at the border and shake hands.

10. Sarinic said that they did not know what the reaction would be in Belgrade. They were pleased that Martić had won. But Martić was a problem for them because they did not know how he was going to behave. They hoped that he would follow Milosovic's instructions. Milosovic had done his best to elect Martić, so there should be something in it. Sarinic said that he was also trying to get in touch with Martić. He had put forward a small and discrete message to Martić that he was ready to meet with him. There was a group of economists from Belgrade in Zagreb at the moment, looking at economic joint interests. Milosovic had said that they would be a good means of communicating a message to Martić, so that was what Sarinic was doing. Thus Martić would be their central problem, said Sarinic. He thought that the Serbs in Belgrade knew this and that they were getting very strong about it.

11. On the ceasefire, Sarinic said that he had spoken to General Cot last week, and that on 2 to 4 February the military would be meeting on a French aircraft carrier. We said that our latest information was that the Serbs were not prepared to have this meeting yet, because they were still deciding how they wanted to play their strategy. Sarinic also said that he had issued an instruction to General Stipetic to sign an extension of the current truce until 28 February, and this should have been taken to Knin on Saturday for signature by the Serbs. We said that we had not heard that the Serbs had signed.

12. Sarinic said that he had told his people not to go into details at this stage with the ceasefire, since that would not produce results. Thus they would just extend the truce and go for confidence building measures at the local level in order to build it up. He said that the shelling in Sector South was now at an acceptable level, so they should concentrate instead on economic and political matters rather than the ceasefire.

13. They were now approaching the politically final stage with the approaching end of the mandate of UNPROFOR and the signing of the agreement with the Serbs, said Sarinic. From his point of view it did not make sense to go back to the same sequence of discussions that they had used before. Now they must go straight to the political solution.

14. Sarinic agreed that part of the problem in Croatia was to improve the image of Croatian handling of the indigenous Serb population. He said that, for example, the General Manager of the Rijeka Banka was retiring, and there were two men under him, a Serb and a Croat. The Serb had spent four years in Switzerland and was the better candidate. Thus Sarinic was pushing him as the new General Manager. Then they would be able to demonstrate that the Serbs were doing well. He also said that in the staff of the National Bank of Croatia there were 9.4% Serbs.

15. Reverting to the ceasefire, Sarinic said that the forces on the confrontation line were in contact at the moment, and the fundamental problem was how to separate them. If they could get on with economic steps first, by opening roads, for example, then they would have to solve the military questions where the road crossed the confrontation line.

16. Sarinic said that he expected to be able to talk to us about more details on Thursday, 3 February. We agreed to keep in touch.

ENDALL

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UNDG 081 Recomm. Unit
CZA-081 Palais des Nations

P.1/3

SSN 010/12

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TO: '94 JAN 31 18:00 ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -1745 Z IMMEDIATE

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 31 JANUARY 1994

CODED CABLE

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-143

SUBJECT: PLANNED VISIT OF MR VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKY
TO CROATIAN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
LETTER FROM CROATIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

Attached, for your information, is a copy of a letter I received today from
Dr. Ivo Sanader, Deputy Foreign Minister, Republic of Croatia, along with my reply.

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FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**


31 January 1994

Dear Dr. Sanader,

Please refer to your letter of 31 January 1994 concerning Mr. Zhirinovsky's plans to visit the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia.

I should first like to assure you that UNPROFOR will in no way facilitate or cooperate with the visit in question. However, I must also bring to your attention that, regrettably, UNPROFOR is not in a position to prevent his entry into the UNPAs, as we have neither the mandate nor physical means of preventing his movement into those areas.

Yours sincerely,


Yasushi Akashi
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Dr Ivo Sanader
Deputy Foreign Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Croatia
Zagreb

Fax: 42 75 94 or 45 17 95

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
41000 ZAGREB, Trg Nikole Šubića Zrinskog 7-8
Phone: (+385 41) 46 99 64 - Fax: (+385 41) 42 75 94, 45 17 95

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SRSG's office

CC: ~~Amgen~~
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Pls prepare
response
for YA.

H.E. Mr Yasushi Akashi
Special Representative to the UN Secretary General
Z a g r e b

Zagreb, 31 January 1994

Your Excellency,

We have been informed by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Zagreb that Mr Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, actually visiting Belgrade, is planning to visit the Croatian occupied territories under protection of the UN forces, in particular the city of Vukovar.

Since Mr Zhirinovsky is not paying an official visit to the Republic of Croatia, and there has been no request made to the proper Croatian authorities for permission to visit the Croatian occupied territories, the Government of the Republic of Croatia kindly requests from the UNPROFOR authorities to deny permission to Mr Vladimir Zhirinovsky to visit Sector East and the city of Vukovar.

Kindly requesting Your cooperation in this matter of great sensitivity, and expecting Your kind reply on the actions taken by the UNPROFOR authorities, I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

I also take the liberty to simultaneously inform of this letter General Jean Cot, UNPROFOR Force Commander.

Sincerely Yours,


Dr. Ivo Sanader
Deputy Foreign Minister

++ CICY ++

1994-01-29 15:45

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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ZAG: Pls protect Sarajevo

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TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB attn COT

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

INFO: AKASHI, SARAJEVO attn ROSE

FROM: *for* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *Manihaman*

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: 317

SUBJECT: Alleged Croatian Army Activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina

JAN 30 P 0 30

Thank you for your useful Z-134 on the above subject. The information contained therein will be shared with the Security Council on Monday. Before we finalize the text, however, we would be grateful if you would let us have any additional findings or corrections (as suggested in your para 5) by 0900 hours 31 January, failing which it would be helpful to receive a short message by that time confirming that the contents of your Z-134 represent all you have to tell us at this time. We are most grateful for your prompt response to our queries.

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'94 JAN 28 -8:23

TO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

FROM: MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: Z-126

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'94 JAN 28 -8:35

UNPROFOR
Palais des Nations

SUBJECT: INITIAL CLARIFICATION OF THE CROATIAN POSITION ON CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE OPENING OF HIGHWAYS

1. This afternoon I had a one hour meeting at my request with Mr Grabovac, Chief of Staff to Mr Sarinic, in order to gain initial clarification of the Croatian position regarding the "Considerations for the Opening of Highways" paper which I had faxed him the day before. During a friendly and productive meeting it became clear that the Croatian Government had not considered these questions in detail when they decided to open the highways, and that they were currently addressing the problem. We reached a number of useful positions relating to these questions, which Mr Grabovac said he would present to Mr Sarinic for approval.

2. Have the parties involved agreed to the opening of the highways, not only at the top level, but also at the local level where the roads will actually have to be opened? Mr Grabovac said that clearly they had agreed with the authorities in Belgrade, but it was less clear with the local authorities. He had just returned from a meeting with Mr Tomas, who had been tasked to clarify this question in his face to face meetings with the local Serb authorities. I said that we were planning to go to Belgrade and Knin on Monday and Tuesday of next week, and that we would also address these questions with our interlocutors there. We agreed to meet again to compare notes next week.

3. What categories of transport will be allowed to use the routes? (Who will be allowed to use them, what kind of vehicles, what kind of goods?) Mr Grabovac started by saying that they did not know what categories of vehicles should use the road. I discussed the graduated approach that we had been thinking about in our strategy paper, to which he replied that there were basically three types of vehicle: trucks, coaches and cars. It might be possible to see coaches and trucks using the routes to start with. We discussed the possibility of a regular coach service operating from Zagreb to Split and Osijek, and from Knin to Erdut, Hungary and Italy; this seemed to be a good idea.

4. Will the opening of the routes allow Serbs to transit between Sectors West and East, for example? Or will they only be open for travellers between Croatia and Serbia? Mr Grabovac saw no problem for the local Serbs to travel out of the UNPAs, both to move into Croatian held territory and to transit it. He said that he would find out exactly what the formalities would be for a Serb entering Croatian held territory, with the aim of reducing

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these to the minimum (a security check) in order to make it possible for people to travel freely as soon as the necessary confidence had been reached. I also mentioned our concept of opening the routes to international travellers, looking ahead to the tourist season. Mr Grabovac agreed that this would be a worthwhile aim, if we could make enough progress.

5. **What level of formalities will be carried out at crossing points? If security checks are carried out, who will do this?** We agreed that a simple system would be for UNPROFOR, who have a mandate to conduct security checks on the edges of the UNPAs, to conduct a security check on vehicles entering or leaving the UNPAs, with a Croatian policeman and Serb militia watching to ensure fair play. This would remove the possibility of a Serb militia checkpoint stopping, searching and harassing Croats, for example.

6. **What regulations will vehicles have to observe in terms of stopping and deviating from the routes, and what security will be required?** Mr Grabovac said that in principle Croatia had no objection to the local Serbs driving anywhere in Croatia, although it might be some time before they could do that. We agreed that to start with the most simple solution would be for convoys to be run on a regular basis. In principle UNPROFOR should provide a token escort, but not a guarantee of security, and the convoys would probably also be escorted by the local police as they drove through any particular area. Once this became routine, the need for both convoys and escorts would reduce.

7. **What is the impact of resolution 820 on the opening of traffic along these highways?** I said that we were looking into this question, and Mr Grabovac said that they had tasked Mr Tomas with also producing some answers having consulted international law experts. He said that in principle the Croatian Government would not object to the free movement of goods within Croatia, including the Serb held areas. He was concerned about the implications of the sanctions on Serbia for the opening of the highway to Belgrade, but agreed that it was of more use to Croatia to be able to transit Sector West than Sector East.

8. Following our discussion on the opening of highways, I mentioned that we were also very keen to make progress on the spring planting issue. I asked if he could contact the relevant Croatian Ministry to gather as much information as possible on the details of types and quantities of seeds, fertilisers and insecticides that might be needed in the Serb controlled areas, as this would assist us in our planning.

ENDALL

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94 JAN 27 -9 149

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *W* EIDE, ICFY, ZAGREB *Suma*

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1994

NUMBER: *E-121*

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO THE OPENING OF HIGHWAYS

1. Attached you will find the minutes from a meeting between Mr Akashi and Mr Sarinic concerning the opening of routes, in particular the highway Zagreb-Belgrade. You will also find a preliminary list we have drafted, concerning issues which will have to be settled in connection with the opening of the highways.

2. After discussions we have held today it seems that the Croats have not yet devoted much attention to the issues referred to in our list. They will have an expert group meet in the morning tomorrow, Thursday. We will know the results in the afternoon.

3. On Saturday it is our intention to go to Sector West in order to see and have a preliminary discussion with our own UN military and Civil Affairs representatives to clarify more precisely some of the issues.

4. Mr Sarinic asked us for a copy of the attached list of issues to be solved in connection with the opening of the highways. He considered it to be useful and encouraged us to raise the same issues with the Serbs in Belgrade. It seems that the discussion between Belgrade and Zagreb has so far focussed on the key political issues and that there has been little or no discussion of the more tricky problems which will have to be solved prior to the implementation of their political agreement.

5. However, Mr Sarinic has told us that a delegation from Belgrade visited Zagreb this week and handed over a rather long document outlining some of the items they hoped to transport from Croatia to Serbia. Many of the items are clearly covered by the existing embargo.

ENDALL

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94 JAN 27 10:17

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NOTE TO THE FILE

on the meeting of Mr. Akashi with
Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, Head of the Commission for Relations
with UNPROFOR
held at 12:00 hrs 25.01.94 at UNPROFOR HQ

Mr. Sarinic was accompanied by Mr. Milivoj Tomas, Deputy
Head of the Commission.

Mr. Akashi had with him Amb. Eide/ICFY, Brig.Gen.
Peters/SNEGO and Mr. Guerassiev/CA.

1. Mr. Sarinic stressed that Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic were determined to proceed as soon, as fast and as far as possible with the practical implementation of the Croat-Serb Declaration signed in Geneva. They intended to concentrate initially on establishing telecommunications between Zagreb, Belgrade and UNPAs and opening the highway Zagreb-Belgrade, the latter being viewed as an act of important political symbolism. That should be achieved as rapidly as possible, and he is in contact with President Milosevic who is fully cooperative. In this regard, Croatian Government will appreciate UNPROFOR's participation in these initiatives in whatever role and capacity Mr. Akashi deems appropriate.

2. Mr. Akashi expressed his satisfaction with the Declaration as an important step in normalizing relations between FRY and Croatia and noted that its thrust fully coincides with the premise of the second stage of UNPROFOR peacebuilding strategy, first stage being the consolidation of the ceasefire and third one - the achievement of political settlement. UNPROFOR is fully committed to serving as the catalyst of this process.

3. Mr. Akashi mentioned in this connexion a number of practical issues that have to be addressed in implementing the new initiatives, such as the implications of sanctions regime under SecCon resolution 820 for exchanges between Serbia and Croatia, modalities of running the checkpoints along the autoroute, defining the categories of international and local travellers that would have access to newly opened routes, arrangements for Serb residents of different Sectors allowing them to travel between Sectors, etc. (a detailed list of issues is attached). It should be also clear what role UNPROFOR is expected to play in this new setting.

4. Mr. Sarinic responded that while he is aware of all these concerns, the intent of both Presidents is to go as rapidly as possible with practical actions and sort out all these issues in parallel. He mentioned that President Milosevic gave assurance of seeing to it that traffic goes normally through Western Slavonia. He noted that as long as they have the guarantee from Milosevic, that will substitute for formal ceasefire. As for the checkpoints, they should be manned by Croatian and Serb police and UNPROFOR, and all secondary roads entering the highway should be also covered by checkpoints.

5. Mr. Sarinic noted that he is concerned with strictly observing the embargo regime and will appreciate UNPROFOR's advice in this regard. He sought, in particular, a clarification

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in regard to telecommunications.

6. A number of practical issues in regard to deployment of Malaysian and Pakistani contingents and the delivery of arms and materiel were also discussed. Mr. Sarinic also shared his pessimism about the prospects of peace agreement in BH.

6. Mr. Sarinic suggested to revive the mechanism of Commissions dealing with economic issues

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE OPENING OF HIGHWAYS

1. Below are a number of topics which will have to be clarified with regard to the opening of highways through UNPAs between Zagreb and Belgrade, Zagreb and Banja Luka and between Zagreb and Split via Knin. At this moment it is not, of course, fully known what the authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade have agreed upon. Consequently the list could be shorter or longer, depending on the true situation.
2. Have the parties involved agreed to the opening of the highways, not only at the top level, but also at the local level where the roads will actually have to be opened?
3. What categories of transport will be allowed to use the routes? (Who will be allowed to use them, what kind of vehicles, what kind of goods?)
4. Will the opening of the routes allow Serbs to transit between Sectors West and East, for example? Or will they only be open for travellers between Croatia and Serbia?
5. What level of formalities will be carried out at crossing points? If security checks are carried out, who will do this?
6. What regulations will vehicles have to observe in terms of stopping and deviating from the routes, and what security will be required?
7. What is the impact of resolution 820 on the opening of traffic along these highways?
8. There are two areas where ICFY/UNPROFOR involvement seems to be required:
 - a. Negotiating agreement of all parties to the modalities required for the opening of the highways.
 - b. Contributing to the implementation of these modalities.