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ACC. 1998/0278



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

CRN-419

1995 NOV 28 P 2:31

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 28 November 1995

NO.: MIR 4026

Vu

NO. OF PAGES: 1

6.5

SUBJECT: Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council

1. Please refer to your code cable no.3654 dated 27 November 1995. The following amendments are suggested:

a) Last sentence of para.8 may read:

"The Commission is shortly expected to pursue its investigations in Zaire"

b) Penultimate sentence of para.9 may read:

"After initial delays, 6000 prisoners have been transferred over the past ten days to the extensions and temporary centres. This has led to decongestion in two of the worst prisons of Rwanda, namely Gitarama and Kibungo. Further transfers of prisoners are expected in the weeks ahead.


c) You may wish to add the following final sentence to para.15:

"Judge Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recently paid visits to Zambia, Kenya and Rwanda. He subsequently announced that the first indictment would be processed by the International Tribunal in Arusha on December 12, 1995.

Best regards.

SRSG

UNAMIR
1995 NOV 28 P 2:36



CNR 335 P 1/21

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 27 November 1995
NUMBER: 3654
SUBJECT: Draft Report of SecGen on Rwanda

S. J. Rize

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As discussed, please find attached copy of the SecGen's draft report on Rwanda, as transmitted to DPA. Grateful your comments by tomorrow, 28 November (0900 NYT) >

Many thanks and best regards.

*Copy FC
ED*

28-11-95



UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

1995 DEC -8 P 1:36

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: GOULDING/KITTANI/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN/AIMÉ, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 8 December 1995

NO.: MIR 4149

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: The Cairo Summit Declaration

1. With reference to the recent Cairo Summit, sponsored by former President Carter and taking note of his letter to the Secretary-General, I give below my comments and recommendations relating to the Cairo Declaration (copy attached). It is evident that UN support is expected pursuant to the following decisions of the Declaration:

i) Separate camps for intimidators

2. With reference to Zaire and Tanzania's commitment to 'remove and isolate' the identified intimidators from the refugee camps in their respective territories [Para (c) of the communique], the international community is expected to provide the resources to achieve this objective.

Comment

3. This proposal of separating the intimidators from the ordinary people in the camps was examined in December 1994/January 1995. At the time, it was felt that the international community was not inclined to provide the resources or the personnel to achieve the objective. The proposal was shelved and, instead, UNHCR has recruited a Zairean special force assisted by Dutch police officers to exercise greater discipline in the camps. This force does not, however, cover the camps of the ex-FAR which are not part of UNHCR's responsibility.

(SRSG)

ii) Prevention of military training

4. Para (d) requires Heads of State to prevent military training and delivery of weapons to military groups among refugees. Zaire and Tanzania may expect UN Assistance in fulfilling this objective.

iii) Location of Radio

5. The regional States would also expect technological and financial support to locate and suppress radio stations (para e).

iv) Judiciary

6. International support is also solicited in Rwanda for the revival of the judiciary and improvement of prisons (para. j).

Comment:

7. Donor countries are already providing bilateral funding through the Geneva Roundtable Conference on Rwanda for the revival of the judiciary. Progress in that respect might have been more significant if the Government had not persisted in its refusal to use the services of the foreign magistrates and legal experts offered by the International Community. As regards prison improvement, funds have been scarce. This situation is likely to continue as the main donor countries are reluctant to assist in prison construction.

v) Social and Economic Development

8. The International Community is also requested to mobilize financial resources to bring economic and social development to the region.

vi) The follow-up meeting

9. A follow-up meeting to the Cairo Summit is expected in February 1996. At this meeting, President Carter wishes to expand the attendance to UN Agencies and other interested parties, observers etc.

Comment

10. The Cairo Declaration encompasses most of the ground already covered in the Bujumbura and Nairobi Declarations. The main differences are that: (i) there is no reference to compensation for Zaire and Tanzania; (ii) no mention of security zones inside Rwanda

[previously insisted on by Tanzania] iii) A reference, at Cairo, to assets {para. m} which had previously been avoided. As before, the problem will lie in the implementation. Frankly, I find it hard to believe that Zaire will provide Rwanda with information on militants intending to infiltrate across the border. Or, that they will separate the intimidators or would actively stop militarization in the camps. Similarly, Rwanda is unlikely to move 'expeditiously and innovatively' to try and release those not guilty of serious crimes.

11. The success or failure of the Declaration can only be assessed in the context of implementation. However, regional countries may well look to the UN and the international community to provide them with the resources to achieve the stated objectives. In other words, implementation of the Cairo Declaration may become dependent on the provision of resources.

12. In responding to President Carter's letter, the Secretary-General may wish to welcome the initiative and to support the Summit objectives. However, Secretary-General may draw President Carter's attention to the international community's previous reluctance to provide funding for the separation of camps that had been perceived a year ago. It may, nevertheless, be worth trying again. As regards funding of economic and social projects for returning refugees and the revival of the Judiciary, the International Community has already pledged funding for such projects at the Round Table Conferences on Rwanda.

13. More importantly, the Secretary-General may wish to take the opportunity to remind President Carter that the problems of the sub-region are essentially political and therefore require political solutions. While meetings such as the Cairo summit are useful as they facilitate contacts and understanding among leaders of the subregion, they are not likely to produce long term solutions leading to lasting peace and security. All the more so because they tend to focus on the refugee problem which is one of the consequences and not the cause of the political issues of the sub-region. The United Nations' proposal for a regional conference is aimed at tackling the political issues and recommending measures that would guarantee security and stability in the sub-region. Therefore, a Cairo II, even with the participation of UN Agencies, is not likely to solve the problem if it confines its focus on the same agenda as Cairo I.

Best regards.

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UNAMIR



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CRN 426

UNAMIR

MOST IMMEDIATE

1995 DEC -6 P 4: 14

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN/AIME, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 6 DECEMBER 1995

NO.: MIR 4/15

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: UNAMIR MANDATE

1. I discussed the Rwandese and UK, US, German draft resolutions with FC Gen. Tousignant today. The following are our comments/recommendations relating to the two draft resolutions:

- a) Basically, we should continue to hold out for a 3 month continuation of the status quo in formed troop strength. We could reduce MILOBs and CIVPOL. If the status quo is not accepted, we may phase-out as recommended in Secretary-General's report. It should be made clear that we are doing so at the request of the Rwandese Government.
- b) If, however, a reduction is found to be unavoidable, the figure of 800 proposed by Rwanda is not feasible and should not be accepted. The following is a table that we consider to be bare minimum:

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UNAMIR

<u>Existing Strength</u>		<u>Minimum Possible</u>
Engineers	203	200
Logistics	85	85
Communications	125	50
Military Police	38	10
HQ Staff	36	20
Protection Guard		
[593 (Rest), 123 (Tribunal)]	716	715
4 Sectors of Company Strength	600	0
(125 each)		
Milobs	285	100
CIVPOL	85	0
Miscellaneous	-	20
	<u>2173 approx</u>	<u>1200</u>

2. You will see that the main difference would be in the Kigali guard unit. For these guard duties our requirement is 125 (company strength) for the Tribunal and 590 for other duties. The Rwandese have told us that the Tribunal should be guarded by UN Security Police (and not by UNAMIR) and that for the remaining guard duties in Kigali only 200 are needed. This rationalisation is not acceptable. A reduction to 1200 is the maximum possible. This would mean no presence in the prefectures, no CIVPOL and thinning out of MILOBS to about one third of their current strength.

3. The reference to the equipment issue in the UK draft is appropriate, although Rwanda will want to maintain its formulation. The issue would, in any case, have to be decided by the General Assembly and Rwanda can take it, even now, to the Fifth Committee for an appropriate resolution.

4. It is important to confirm the existing SOFA.

5. It would be advisable to build into the resolution a reference to UNAMIR being given a reasonable period (71 days) to phase-out its troops and equipment after the completion of the 3 month mandate.

6. It is also suggested that UNAMIR may be given a role to play in the refugee camps in order to encourage voluntary repatriation which implies crossing the borders. In this context Radio UNAMIR's important role as a channel of communication with the refugees could be mentioned in the resolution.

7. If there are further points, I shall convey them on the telephone.

Best regards.