

Cable File.

New York Code Cables

Incoming and outgoing

61/10/1960 - 31/10/1960

1/3

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC

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UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-0734

BOX 5

FILE 3

ACC. DAG 3/1.6.1.2.0.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
Date : 31 October 1960
No : 3058

Mr Kelly
4/11
Have action Col Mitro to
cable Albertville JK 2
x 1

Following Note Verbale dated 28 October received from Permanent Mission of Belgium:

"La Mission permanente de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. D'ordre de son Gouvernement elle a l'honneur de porter les informations ci-après à sa connaissance. Par des télégrammes adressés les 18, 19 et 20 octobre au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à Bruxelles et qui viennent de parvenir à ce département, la Compagnie des Grands Lacs Africains signale ce qui suit: Une situation anarchique régnerait dans la région de Kabalo. Un des agents de la Société, Monsieur Rubay, est prisonnier des Balubas; depuis le début du mois l'on est sans nouvelles de lui. Sept autres agents de la Société sont actuellement à Kabalo dans une situation critique. Le trafic, qui avait repris au début d'octobre, entre le Maniema et le Katanga est, en conséquence de l'anarchie actuelle, à nouveau paralysé depuis le 19 octobre sur les trois branches du réseau. L'économie du Maniema et celle du Katanga risque d'en être sérieusement affectées. La Mission permanente serait très reconnaissante à Monsieur le Secrétaire général de bien vouloir effectuer une enquête à ce sujet et examiner la possibilité de remédier à cet état de choses. Les renseignements qui précèdent ont déjà été transmis par téléphone aux services intéressés du Secrétariat. La Mission permanente saisit cette occasion etc."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 31 October 1960

No : 3055

Following sent Nkrumah:

"Your cabled message of 31 October has been received and has been referred to Ambassador Dayal and General Von Horn for their consideration and comment. I may, however, by way of immediate reply, make certain comments on the statements presented in your message. I note your reference to the representations made to Ambassador Dayal on ~~or~~ about 21 October by the representatives of the African States in Leopoldville. As you are no doubt aware, Ambassador Dayal has had frequent consultations with the African envoys and has seriously considered their views, although you will agree that there is no legal relationship between them nor any basis for assuming that the actions taken by Ambassador Dayal must reflect their views. I may inform you that all along it has been the policy of the United Nations in the Congo to afford protection in the form of guard details of UN troops to all responsible Congo governmental authorities who have requested it. It is, I would think, quite well known that Mr. Lumumba and his residence have been well protected by the United Nations. In this regard, I may add that prior to the new role of Colonel Mobutu, Mr. Lumumba had always demanded a mixed guard of ANC and UN troops at his residence. I note the complaint about freeing Mr. Lumumba's residence of ANC interference. I am sure that you are aware that this would require a military initiative outside the terms of reference for the Force. It will not surprise you that we also receive other complaints to the effect that the UN troops should not prevent the ANC from forcibly removing Mr. Lumumba from the residence of the Prime Minister. Such requests, as

you know, have always been rejected. The reference in your message to Parliament is somewhat unclear since it does not indicate how and by whom the Parliament is to be called into session in the first place. As Ambassador Quaison-Sackey no doubt has informed your Government, Ambassador Dayal and I are very much in favour of a meeting of the Congo Parliament with its full membership and have given all possible encouragement to such a meeting. The UN is ready to afford every assistance possible in transporting and protecting the members of Parliament and to achieve the atmosphere of calm in which you rightly say the Parliament should open. I certainly share your concern about the ANC and I can assure you that Ambassador Dayal has done all that could be done within the limits of the authority permitted the UN Force to neutralize the ANC as a threat to security and political stability in the Congo Republic. But that authority has always been limited and the UN cannot be justly criticized for refusing to violate its terms of reference and to inject itself directly into the Congo power struggle. At any rate, our information is that as a result of the firm stand taken by our people about the ANC, there has been a considerable improvement in the law and order situation in Leopoldville in the past few days. Moreover, I must say quite emphatically, that there is no basis for assuming that the replacement of the Ghanaian by the Tunisian troops in Leopoldville will in any way react adversely on the effectiveness of the UN in helping to maintain law and order there in accordance with the principles laid down by the Security Council for the United Nations operation in the Congo. Referring to the suggested visit of your Chief of Defence Staff to Leopoldville, that visit was cleared by me on 21 October, and I assumed that arrangements for his visit would have been made there and that he would be in Leopoldville soon after October 26. In my previous messages, I have pointed out that the shift of the Ghana troops from Leopoldville is a routine matter and that its staging would cover a period of several weeks. It has no doubt been reported to you that the first elements of the Ghanaian contingent to arrive in Kasai Province have been enthusiastically welcomed by the local people. As to the advice to

which your message makes reference, it may be noted that the suggestion of the move of the Ghanaians out of Leopoldville was, indeed, first made by representatives of Ghana in the city. As was indicated by me to the Security Council at the very beginning and accepted by that Council, the UN Force in the Congo must be under the exclusive command of the United Nations. Control over its movements and actions, therefore, cannot be subject to the wishes or advice of individual governments, even though they may contribute contingents to it, nor to the demands of any official in the host government. To relinquish this principle would reduce the command of an international force to chaos and lead to its rapid dissolution.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary General of the United Nations"

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To: Dayal, Von Horn
From: Bunche
Date: 31 OCT 1960
Number: 3054

Re our 2998 and 1204 and ONUC B-1326.

1. In our 1204 we informed about the Movement Control Team from Liberia consisting of Major Samuel B. Pearson and the seven sergeants and corporals listed by name. Cooks travel agency informed us that this team did arrive in Leopoldville 24 August.
2. Moroccan mission informed us 26 August that 2 Moroccan Movement Control Teams were sent to the Congo August 16/7. Please confirm the accuracy or inaccuracy of this information.
3. We are now requesting four Movement Control Teams from Pakistan and one each from Denmark and Norway, each of one officer and seven ORS.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLOVILLE
From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
Date : 31 October 1960
No : 3049

Following telegram received this morning from Nkrumah. We are preparing interim reply which will be forwarded to you. Need however your urgent comments. Text follows:


"On about 21 October representatives of the African States made a representation to Dayal which asked amongst other things that (1) UN forces guard the residence of all ministers and parliamentarians in Leopoldville (2) Lumumba's residence should be freed completely of interference by the ANC in order that visitors could come and go in the normal way (3) that Parliament should be opened in an atmosphere of calm. Reports from Leopoldville indicate that far from taking really effective action to neutralise the ANC from politics these soldiers are still roaming the streets attacking people indiscriminately and that by removing the Ghana contingent the UN forces which were already weak in numbers have been reduced to such a strength as to be quite ineffective in maintaining law and order nor will the arrival of the Tunisian contingent correct this situation. As you surely know the key to restoring normal government is for Parliament to meet. I had already proposed that the Ghana contingent remain in Leopoldville until Parliament had met. This proposal has apparently been rejected. We now have definite information that there is a price on Lumumba's head. I therefore propose that my field squadron at present in Leopoldville remain there for the present time with the specific task of protecting Lumumba, his cabinet and parliamentarians. Perhaps you would wish my Chief of Defence Staff to visit Leopoldville and with my special representative discuss the whole question with Dayal. Mobutu has clearly not obeyed UN instructions to confine his troops to barracks. The strong and effective military action I recommended long ago has never been taken with a result

that what virtually amounts to anarchy reigns in Congo's capital city. I cannot continue to associate my country with an operation which has resulted in the legal Prime Minister living in fear of his life and one in which all the advice of myself and my military advisers has been consistently ignored. Lumumba himself has requested that his protection should include Ghanaian troops. Rejection of such a request can but be misinterpreted as calculated. Request early reply."

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal
From : SecGen
Date : 29 October 1960
Number : 3041

It might be a good idea if you were to be available here for backstage talks which will certainly follow publication your report prior to possible debate in General Assembly or Secco. There is much to be straightened out in all quarters. How would a short visit here fit into your view of risks and possibilities in Leo and their bearing on your presence? Alternative might be that Rikhye come for the same purpose, and other possibilities may also exist but it should be kept in mind that main contacts here would be with Afro-Asians.



INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal
From : SecGen
Date : 29 October 1960
Number : 3039

Your B - 1319. Suggest that your spokesman make statement according to lines indicated in our cable 2946.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal
From : SecGen
Date : 29 October 1960
Number : 3038

This is the note which will be delivered to the Belgians in the course of the day:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations has the honour to present his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations and wishes to inform him that he has now received official information from his special representative in the Congo to the effect that 37 members of the Armee Nationale Congolaise have, by agreement between Belgian authorities and Colonel Mobutu, been sent to Belgium for military training in Belgium Military Schools. The Secretary-General also wishes to draw attention to information, confirmed today by the local UN representative in Elizabethville, according to which 47 Cadets of the so-called Katanga Army have been sent for identical purposes from Katanga to Belgian Military Schools.

As responsible for appropriate action in implementation of the resolution it is the duty of the Secretary General to draw the urgent attention of the Government of Belgium to the fact that such arrangements for military training are in contravention of the letter and the spirit of paragraph six of the General Assembly Resolution of 20 September,

whereby the General Assembly has called upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war, military personnel and " other assistance for military purposes" in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of the resolution and of the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960.

In this connexion it should be noted that these arrangements have not repeat not been made with any legal authority of the Republic of the Congo recognised as such by the General Assembly or the Security Council.

The Secretary-General would like to request the Government of Belgium to give its urgent attention to the matter and ~~to~~ inform him as to what steps it intends to take in order to establish compliance with the provisions of the resolution mentioned above."

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal
From : SecGen
Date : 29 October 1960
Number : 3036 - 3037

6 v 9
7 v 8

The Advisory Committee held a meeting this morning, in the course of which it was agreed that the Conciliation Committee (the name has not yet been officially decided) should be composed of the Afro-Asian members of the Advisory Committee, that is to say, it is to be composed of Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Malaya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic. It was formally concluded that the nomination of the members of this committee should be made by the Governments involved who could choose a member of the Advisory Committee, their representative in Leo or any other person. It was particularly underlined by me, and accepted by the Advisory Committee, that asking Governments to appoint the members of Conciliation Committee would not mean that members would represent their Governments; they would, in fact, collectively represent the UN.

how?

In regard to the terms of reference, it was agreed that they would flow from paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution, but that a special group should discuss the details of the terms of reference within the next few days in preparation of elaboration of text by Advisory Committee. This will certainly take some time.

over/

2.

The Committee discussed the question of prior contact or consulation with personalities in the Congo. They agreed to my suggestion that, at this stage, you should inform the authorities about the present position which would be roughly the following:

1. The Advisory Committee has decided, in implementation of para 3 of the General Assembly Resolution, that a Commission should be established and sent to the Congo;

2. The Advisory Committee is of the view that this commission should be composed of the countries as stated above, and it should be specially emphasized that they collectively represent the Afro-Asian members of this Committee.

3. For the time being, para 3 of the resolution would provide the commissions general terms of reference, but the committee will devote further studies to the question of the full terms of reference. In explanation of para 3 it should be made clear that group would not go into investigation of or judgment on internal constitutional issues.

It was especially stated that in any contact which you may have with Mr. Kasavubu, reference may be made to the cable which he addressed to me on the question of the composition of the Commission but that, as stated above, it could not be the Commissions task to examine the legality of any act essentially of an internal nature.

New Subject. Reference your B - 1322. I fully share your views expressed therein. Although the Committee took certain steps today in regard to the composition of a commission it will still be some time before it will be ready to depart for the Congo.

over/

3.

Following report from you on experiences when you give parties concerned information on situation in accordance with this letter it might still be decided that coming of Committee to Congo should be more carefully prepared by special agent.

TELEGRAMME EN DATE DU 27 OCTOBRE 1960 ADRESSE PAR LE PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU
AU PRESIDENT DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DES NATIONS UNIES, AVEC COPIE AU
SECRETAIRE GENERAL ET AU REPRESENTANT SPECIAL

Apprenons qu'une commission composée délégués pays africains dont troupes sont en mission au Congo dans cadre ONU désirent venir ici en vue examiner légalité acte révocation Lumumba posé par Chef Etat. Permettons attirer votre attention sur fait que c'est là une affaire interne du Congo. Nos délégués à New York ont fourni et peuvent encore fournir explications voulues à ce sujet. D'autre part même si Commission internationale voulait s'intéresser à cette question sommes formellement opposés accorder monopole à quelques pays africains. Le fait d'avoir troupes au Congo n'est pas critère suffisant et valable pour s'arroger monopole. Une telle commission devrait alors comprendre représentants tous les pays africains indépendants. Haute considération.

KASAVUBU

TELEGRAMME EN DATE DU 27 OCTOBRE 1960 ADRESSE PAR LE PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU
AU PRESIDENT DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DES NATIONS UNIES, AVEC COPIE AU
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KASAVUBU

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: Operator

From: Operator, New York

Date: 29 OCT 1960

Number: 3029

Your 2106.

Our 3011 last sentence should read "details to follow"

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: LINNER
FROM: MACFARQUHAR, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 3012

Your ONUC 2007. Under present circumstances we would see nothing abnormal in formal or informal limitations on withdrawals from Caisse provided you feel first that this would not prevent parastatals from making essential local payments and second that probable consequent reduction of inpayments into Caisse would not make measure self-defeating. If advances to Caisse become necessary we have no objection to your second proposal provided it would not directly or indirectly reduce the borrowing ability of the Central Government. View your third suggestion with great misgivings as long as Central Bank lending limit to Congo Government not raised substantially.

Ref

Distribution: Mr. Linner

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS
UNIES AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT :

This message is apparently incomplete and is being serviced.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 3011

Reference your B-1309 and our 2929.

United States requested to airlift Nigerian battalion, including equipment and vehicles to places indicated in your 1986. US has now discovered that LST's could not be available for sealifting Nigerians or Malis. They have reduced cost to approximately \$350,000. Airlift will commence as soon as possible on shuttle basis and take about 14 days for completion. Mali battalion will be airlifted to Dakar on return flights. Details *to follow*.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Big Article / Mr. Dumas
Mr. French inputs -
Ad
29/X*

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 3010

Reference Berendsen's cable ELEO 84 (ELINY 5) of 28 October 1960. It is my view that no undue security risk should be taken in connexion with Sendwe's visit to Northern Katanga. I am sure that the effect of this visit on Mr. Tshombe was seen by you before arrangements were made. While it is impossible for me to assess fully the suggestions in para 2 of Berendsen's cable, I have the feeling that they deserve most careful scrutiny.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 29 October 1960

No : 3008

Following is text of Note Verbale dated 26 October received from Permanent Mission of Belgium:

"La Mission permanente de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général. Elle a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance la communication suivante que son Gouvernement a reçue de Monsieur le Résident général à Usumbura au sujet d'un incident survenu lors du survol du camp militaire de Bukavu par un avion Sabena:

'Sabena signale faits suivants. Mercredi 21 septembre avion OOAUP Ligne 439 USA Bukavu Kalima Kindu Punia Stanleyville immobilisé au sol à Kamembe suite à crevaison réservoirs d'aile gauche. Pilote avoir nettement senti impact objet non encore identifié alors que survolait camp militaire Bukavu pour approche finale. Plus que probable objet être balle arme à feu. Enquête en cours dont premiers résultats seront connus fin de journée après démontage réservoirs. ONU enquête également tandis que Président Niroho aurait refusé s'intéresser à l'incident disant que le Congo n'était sûrement pas en cause.'

La Mission permanente serait reconnaissante à Monsieur le Secrétaire général de bien vouloir envisager la possibilité de lui faire connaître le résultat de l'enquête qui aurait été effectuée à ce sujet par ses services au Congo."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 2998

Reference our 2789 and ONUC 2075, Movement Control teams. We requested in letters of 5 August at least one and, if possible, several Movement Control teams from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ireland, Liberia, Mali, Morocco and Sweden, each team to consist of one Captain, two Sergeants, one clerk and four Corporals or Lance Corporals. Subsequently, Liberia provided one team and Morocco and Sweden two teams each, which are now in the Congo. Ghana and Ireland have answered negatively. No answers have yet been received from Ethiopia, Guinea and Mali despite repeated reminders, and we believe chances of obtaining trained Movement Control teams from these countries are negligible. We now suggest requesting a small Movement Control headquarters of 15 to 20 men and two Movement Control teams each of 8 men from Pakistan, and one Movement Control team each from Denmark and Norway. Before making formal requests, however, would appreciate your comments.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL- McDIARMID, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 28 October 1960

No : 2993

Nwokedi has accepted UN offer and informs intention
travel to Leopoldville 21 November.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 28 October 1960

No : 2990

Belgian Mission has transmitted a letter with annexes which state inter alia that security of persons and goods by UN is insufficient in the areas where "Société Minière du Beceka" and "Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo" have their seats of operation. "Société Minière Beceka" reported 30 September from Congo that trouble was renewed on 27 August 1960 with arrival of Congolese troops in Bakwanga. Of 180 houses, 65 completely sacked and looted; depot of trucks and cars removed entirely, namely 135 trucks and 50 cars; food stocks raided in houses and shops; stocks of gas removed; garage and most offices of administrative services looted. "Administrateur délégué" of Beceka arrested on 28 August and expelled from Congo on 2 September. Of 120 European agents in Bakwanga, 85 were evacuated, 30 remained for upkeep of equipment. Operation stopped on 27 August as 4,000 Baluba workers fled. While European population suffered only arrests, brutalities, threats, the many acts of atrocity committed against Balubas appeared systematic, may be qualified genocide. Since 23 September, with the withdrawal of Congolese troops and announcement of the armistice, quiet has begun to return. Corporation intends shortly to resume activities. To that effect it has gradually recalled its European cadres, it hopes for a normal resumption of its operations by end 1960. Management of same corporation in Brussels stresses on 5 October that during pillages and hostilities in Bakwanga UN Tunisian troops remained totally passive. It therefore requests that UN troops whatever their nationality should henceforth assure efficiently,

diligently and impartially security of persons and goods, as well as public order, this being an essential condition for resumption of normal activities. "Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo" reported from Brussels on 19 September on basis of information then given by Commander of UN Tunisian troops in Tshikapa that order of retreat would come shortly: if security of persons and goods cannot be assured by an efficient and large police force, this would force departure of European agents and result in stoppage of many activities which previously occupied 7,000 Congolese workers.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal

From : SecGen

Date : 28 October 1960

/ 2055. a. A.

Number : 2989

Reference B - 1191 and B - 1314.

Note your statement about next step being "to get Kettain to press on with whatever training program he has drawn up", from which inference seems to me that you are not fully informed on the program. In this regard, I recall paragraph 1 of my 2433 of 6 October, to which there has been no reply beyond B - 1191, which did not dispose of the specific query.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal
From : SecGen
Date : 28 October 1960
Number : 2986

Poland, this months président of Secco, has strongly suggested that a new report on the situation in Congo be made soon. I agree that we should prepare such report not later than Tuesday. Consequently I should like to ask you to prepare as soon as possible such a report, ^{paying}~~giving~~ proper attention to the activities of Mobutu and Commissioners and your relations with them, particularly in regard to the activities of ANC. The Tshombe problem should also be properly presented. I would, with legal comments, add from here the recent notes addressed to the Belgians. All detailed and substantiated information regarding the "return" of the Belgians should be urgently transmitted. To the proper extent, and as you see fit, you should yourself include this information in your report, explaining the relationship between the "return" and the opening created by the passivity in present constitutional circumstances forced upon us by our impartiality.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: LINNER
From: MacFARQUHAR
Date: 28 October 1960
Number: 2980

Your 2022 and 2063. Three commissaires discussions with Katanga. Undesirable for UNations to participate and Umbricht not repeat not authorize to take part in final negotiations. He might, however, advise Ndele before he goes to Brazzaville that while general effect of talks may be good he should try to eliminate references to "customs union" and "Katanga delegation". Central government should not repeat not associate itself with any document which impairs its subsequent standing in international economic negotiations.

If these arrangements between commissaires and Katanga do not repeat not take care of question posed in your ONUC-1924 we are inclined to let Drbin continue rather than take any action which might encourage separatism.

Quesada

Distr:
Linner - 1
Dayal - 2✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: Von HORN

From: RUNCHE

Date: 28 October 1960

Number: 2979

Reference ONUC-2008 and 2012. Inadvisable for UN to request or to recommend to governments promotions of their military personnel in the temporary service of the UN. As matter of policy, UN should not repeat not intervene in any way in military promotion processes. Understand problem for you created by upgrading of posts held by officers whose services you desire to retain. But most we should do in such circumstances would be to ask government concerned for a replacement at the higher rank, explaining the reason. Government might, of course, then see fit to promote the incumbent.

Ref m

Distr:

Von Horn - 1

Dayal - 2 ✓

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To: DAYAL, Von HORN
From: SECGEN
Date: 28 October 1960
Number: 2978

Reference B-1307.

1. Following is substantive paragraph of note sent to Representative of Ghana on twenty-seventh. Reads:

"The Secretary-General notes with pleasure that the Government of Ghana has agreed that the Ghana police contingent, except for its small traffic section, may remain in the Congo provided that arrangements are made for it to stay with the Ghana Army contingent, wherever it may be, since the police contingent is not repeat not self-administering and relies on the Army for support. Assurance is given that such arrangements will be made. The request is also granted for the early withdrawal of the small traffic section, about thirty strong, with motorcycles."

2. Will request police units from Nigeria. In this regard, please advise on comparative numbers of the "full self-contained police companies" to be requested from Nigeria and the existing Ghana police unit.

Distr:
Dayal -2 ✓
Von Horn -1

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: DAYAL
From: SEC GEN
Date: 28 October 1960
Number: 2977

Reuters reported today from Bruxelles that Yav, described as Katanga Defense Minister arrived "with 47 Katanga Army cadets who are to undergo eight months training in Belgian military schools". Please give us whatever information can be secured in E'ville concerning this matter.

*Repeats
Brussels
29/10*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: LINNER
From: BUNCHE
Date: 28 October 1960
Number: 2957

Reference ONUC-2023.

Would greatly appreciate your assistance in refreshing my memory on the question of the employment of Israeli aviation technicians. Since this specific matter arose after my departure from Leopoldville, the reference to my "original decision" in your message must relate to something earlier. Would this be my position with regard to the sending of the Israeli medical team to Luluabourg or to something else which now escapes me?

replied

Distr:
Linner - 1
Dayal - 2✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: Von HORN
From: BUNCHE
Date: 28 October 1960
Number: 2956

Reference ONUC-2062. Proceeding as indicated my 2790 and will take early advantage of opportunity to present question to Congo Advisory Committee. Question onraised here by representatives of participating governments.

Ref M

Distr:
Von Horn-1
Dayal -2✓

INCOMING CODE

To : Dayal
From : SecGen
Date : 27 October 1960
Number : 2946

Reur B 1306, I approve the general instructions which you have given to Berendsen as outlined in your B 1296. I do not believe it wise for me to approach Tshombe directly at this time, but it might be well for you to address a message to him on my behalf stating inter alia:

1. That the UN entered Katanga not as a result of any agreement with Mr Tshombe or the provincial authorities in Katanga but in pursuance of the general and specific resolutions of the Security Council ;
2. Consequently, there can be no question of accreditation of UN personnel to the provincial authorities and it is not for Mr Tshombe or any other of his associates to dictate to the UN what personnel it should maintain there;
3. It should be clear to Mr Tshombe that the UN cannot be a party to any internal disputes and that it will continue to discharge its functions of maintaining order and peace in the territory to the best of its ability and that, in that effort, it must be able to count fully on responsible authorities;
4. In view of the experience concerning investigations of charges in the northern Katanga area, the UN will not in the future participate on any Mixed Commissions of Investigations. If investigations^{should} become necessary, they can be undertaken solely by the UN, particularly in areas where, by agreement with Katanga authorities, the UN has undertaken special responsibilities.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 27 October 1960
Number : 2945

From informal discussions which took place yesterday among Afro-Asian members of the Advisory Committee on the Congo, it now seems possible that the conciliation committee, to be established in accordance with paragraph 3 of SecCos resolution of 20 September, will be composed of 15 members, that is to say all Afro-Asian members of the committee, some of whom are eager to leave rather soon.

ND
28/1

INCOMING CLEAR

ETAT PRIORITE
(unnumbered)

New York, le 27 octobre 1960

Son Excellence Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu
Président de la République du Congo
Léopoldville

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre en date du 21 octobre 1960 par laquelle, vous référant à votre lettre du 21 septembre où vous accréditez Monsieur Justin Bomboko en qualité de représentant de la République du Congo auprès de l'Assemblée générale, vous m'informez que durant l'absence provisoire de New York de Monsieur Bomboko, Monsieur Cyrille Adoula, sénateur, le remplacera avec pour suppléant Monsieur Cardozo. Je tiens à vous faire savoir que cette lettre sera portée à l'attention de l'Assemblée générale dès qu'elle examinera le projet de résolution soumis conjointement par le Ghana, la Guinée, l'Inde, le Maroc et la République Arabe Unie sur la question de la représentation du Gouvernement central de la République du Congo (Léopoldville) à l'ONU. Votre communication sera bien entendu soumise également à l'attention de la Commission de vérification des pouvoirs. Haute considération.

Frederick M. Boland
Président de l'Assemblée générale

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 2929

Reference ONUC 1986.

1. Approaching USA immediately as to their ability to undertake airlift and cost thereof on basis of revised requirements set forth your message. Expect definite word on 27th will advise soonest.
2. Please advise promptly on prospects of UK airlift mentioned B-1286 as endorsed in my 2847. We would regard such an arrangement very favorably.
3. Puzzled by your suggestion that LST's lifting Malaysians might lift second repeat second Nigerian battalion. No request has been made for a second Nigerian battalion.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

JD

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 2928

Reference 2890. Following message received from representative of Ghana on 26 October. Reads:

"The Government of Ghana has agreed that the Ghana police contingent, less the small traffic section mentioned in the following paragraph, may remain in the Congo, provided that arrangements are made for them to stay with the Ghana army contingent wherever it may be. The reason for this stipulation is that the Ghana police contingent is not a self-administering unit, but relies on the army for support.

The Government of Ghana also requests that a small traffic section, about thirty strong, with motorcycles, are urgently required for duty in Ghana and permission is accordingly requested for their withdrawal as soon as possible."

Would appreciate your comments concerning reply, recalling also our 2890.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 26 October 1960

No : 2927

Following is text of cable received to-day from Kasa-Vubu:

"Protestons énergiquement contre message Président Nkrumah demandant maintien troupes ghanéennes à Léopoldville. Son allégation affirmant que événements dernières quarante-huit heures à Léopoldville sont justifiés par départ deux bataillons ghanéens de Léopoldville est contraire à la vérité et dénuée de tout fondement. Troupes ghanéennes et guinéennes se sont mal comportées vis-à-vis population congolaise qui éprouve en ce moment une réelle antipathie à leur égard. Des arrestations ont été opérées des civils congolais portant uniformes ghanéens reçus de soldats ghanéens et guinéens. On a saisi uniforme général ghanéen chez parlementaire congolais. Uniforme reçu soldats ghanéens. D'autre part immixtion partisane et intéressée Nkrumah dans affaires internes du Congo accentue antipathie population congolaise vis-à-vis Ghana. Cette antipathie vis-à-vis troupes ghanéennes et guinéennes va croissante et risque de devenir une hostilité dont les conséquences sont imprévisibles. A plusieurs reprises population congolaise manifeste publiquement vif désir retrait immédiat ces troupes du territoire République Congo. Renvoyez troupes ghanéennes et guinéennes de notre territoire. Attirons particulière attention du Secrétaire général ONU sur fait qu'il se rendrait responsable des conséquences qui peuvent résulter du maintien troupes ghanéennes et guinéennes au Congo."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: DAYAL, Von HORN
From: SECGEN
Date: 26 October 1960
Numbers: 2923, 2924 and 2925

Reference B-1260

Agree fully with reasons for and objectives sought in Draft Revised Directives. Advise modifications as indicated below. Suggested new language is underlined and suggested deletions are in brackets.

ONUC operations directives

Security and the maintenance of law and order

This directive [is in simplification of] replaces all previous directives to Commanding Officers regarding their responsibilities in ensuring security and the maintenance of law and order in the areas under their command.

General

2. The UN Force [is serving] in the Congo serves as a temporary security force at the request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. It [operates in accordance with] acts under the mandate of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July and 9 August, and [any additional resolutions of the General Assembly] resolution 1474 of the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Its purpose is to assist the government in the restoration and maintenance of law and order and particularly to take all possible measures for the protection of life throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo, with the ultimate purpose of safeguarding international peace and security.

3. The UN Force in the Congo is [therefore] a peace force. It carries arms in order to lend weight to its authority and [to act] as a deterrent, but these arms may be used only in self-defence, as explained in the directive. The UN Force is in no sense an occupying force. It seeks only to help achieve security

in which government and administration can function effectively. Thus, its main purpose is to assist the government in creating conditions of peace
[not repeat not an army of occupation and it has not repeat not come to administer the country but only to assist the government in creating peaceful conditions] in which the Congolese people may themselves be able to develop their political freedom and economic prosperity. The UN Force, therefore, must respect the sovereignty, independence and national integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

Responsibilities of the Congolese authorities

4. The UN Force [will] shall not repeat not be a party to or in any way intervene in or influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise. [Therefore] This, of course, does not repeat not preclude the UN from humanitarian measures to prevent bloodshed, such as serving as a buffer in inter-tribal conflict, lending its good offices to local disputants and arranging cease fires. Where more than one authority claims to exercise the powers of government, at whatever level, the UN can take no position as to which ⁸ [of any authorities is the recognized authority] authority should be recognized. [It will when it is necessary to do so in the interests of law and order, deal with any authority which de facto is administering an area and maintaining law and order there according to generally accepted principles.]
The UN Force, in pursuance of its efforts to maintain law and order, may make necessary contacts for this purpose with those officials on the spot who may be exercising authority, without, however, thereby implying any attitude or position with regard to the legal status of such officials.

5. The responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is primarily that of the Congolese authorities. The aim of the UN Force is to assist these authorities in the carrying out of their responsibilities. Therefore, in the event of a disturbance, actual or potential, UN commanders [will] wherever

possible, will, in the first instance, rely on [endeavour to induce] the appropriate competent Congolese authorities, administrative, police or military, to take the necessary lawful measures [deal with the situation by lawful means], or, if necessary, try to induce them to do so, and may give them [such] assistance [as may be necessary] toward that end.

6. [Only when] Should the Congolese authorities [are not in a position] be unable to deal with a situation adequately, or when it is apparent that they intend to apply or when they do apply unduly harsh and repressive measures not sanctioned by law and in violation of humanitarian principles, then and only then will the UN Force take further appropriate steps to fulfil its responsibilities in the protection of life, law and order.

Self Defence.

7. As a peace/force, the UN Force may not take the initiative in the use of armed force. It is however, entitled to use force in self-defence, but only as a last resort after other means e.g. negotiation or persuasion, have failed. In the following types of cases UN troops are entitled to respond with force to an armed attack upon them:

(A) Attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardising their safety;

(B) [Forcible] attempts by force to disarm them;

(C) Attempts [forcibly] by force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities, as ordered by their commanders [for assisting in the restoration and maintenance of law and order];

(D) Violation by force of United Nations promises and attempts at arrest or abduction of UN personnel, civil or military.

The minimum force necessary will be used in all such cases in order to prevent as far as possible the loss of human life or serious injury to person.

...../.....

8. In the [regrettable] event of firing being resorted to for purposes of self-defence, the following principles [will] shall apply;

- (A) The object throughout is to deter and not to cause loss of life;
- (B) It follows that firing should be low and not aimed at vital parts;
- (C) In the case of mob attack, the leaders should be picked out for deterrent action;
- (D) Firing must at all times be controlled and not indiscriminate;
- (E) The officer in charge will keep a record of the number of rounds fired;
- (F) Firing into the air should be avoided as it [brings into contempt the deterrent effect of firing]. May be provocative without strengthening respect for the force.

Protection against marauders or armed bands.

9. (A) Whenever a threat of attack develops towards a particular area either by marauders or armed bands, UN commanders will endeavour to pacify the area through the Congolese authorities as described in para 5 above, or failing that, where possible, by [offering UN good offices to the opposing parties]. Direct approach to the attackers. Mobile patrols should immediately be organised to manifest the presence of UN in the threatened or disturbed area, in whatever strength is available. Loud speakers and other appropriate means may be used to calm and restrain public excitement.

(B) If all attempts at peaceful settlement fail, UN commanders should recommend to the Supreme Commander that such [threatful] threatened areas be declared as under UN protection by means of the deployment of UN troops. [Where UN troops may be deployed for the purpose]. In the event [of their receiving specific instructions to that effect, the UN commanders will announce that the entry into such area of marauders or armed bands, as the case may be, will be opposed by force, if necessary, in the interests of law and order.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, VON HORN
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1960
NUMBER: 2925

Continuation of 2924.

(c) If, notwithstanding these warnings, attempts are made to attack, envelop or infiltrate the UN positions, thus jeopardising the safety of UN troops, they will defend themselves and their positions by resisting and driving off the attackers with such minimum use of force, including firing, as may be necessary.

10. It follows from para 9 that if UN units arrive at the scene of an actual conflict between marauders and civilians or between opposing armed bands, they ~~they~~ will, in the interests of law and order, immediately call on the participants to break off the conflict. If the participants fail to comply, UN commanders will immediately take appropriate steps to separate the combatants and to prevent further lawlessness, bloodshed, pillaging or looting. If the UN troops are then attacked, they may use such degree of force as may be necessary in the exercise of their right of self-defence, including firing.

11. Persons observed to be engaged in looting, but not fighting, on the scene of such conflicts will be called upon by UN troops to desist and surrender. If they desist from looting and flee, firing should not be resorted to in order to apprehend them. On the other hand, if they refuse to desist from looting, force may be employed to stop them, and, if they attack, the principle of

...../..

self-defence applies and resort may be (held) had to the minimum firing necessary.

Disruption of Agencies of Public Order

12. The obligation of the UN Force to assist in the maintenance of law and order is in no way diminished where it happens that elements of Congolese forces may themselves be engaged in general lawlessness. Where soldiers, gendarmerie or police have broken away from their command and are no longer under the control of the authorities, or where they engage in the unlawful killing of unarmed civilians or the pillaging of towns and villages, or in any flagrant violation of elementary human rights, they constitute a danger to public order and safety and an immediate report on the situation should be sent to the Supreme Commander. If such units appear to be operating under any form of leadership, UN commanders will use their good offices to (prevent the execution of such measures) stop all such activities, by direct consultation with that leadership or by reference to the nearest authorities of the civil government, the ANC or the gendarmerie. If these endeavours fail, every effort should be made to disarm or neutralise (them) the lawless elements and to confine them to barracks. Any further action should be taken only on receipt of specific instructions from the Supreme Commander.

UN Property and Existing Installations

13. UN troops are responsible for the protection of UN property. In addition, essential public utilities such as electricity works, waterworks, etc. should (also) be given such protection as may be necessary when they are threatened by public disorder, and where any damage or destruction to them would cause hindrance to a UN operation or acute hardship to the civilian population.

14. (a) Protection of UN or other essential installations may be provided by means of mobile patrols or static guards, as appropriate.

(b) Physical force may be used, if necessary, to protect such installations.

(c) Such force may extend to the minimum degree of firing necessary as a last resort.

Conclusions

15. In carrying out their responsibilities for assisting in the maintenance of law and order in the Congo, the UN troops are expected to act with tact and moderation at all times. The very presence of armed and disciplined troops, skillfully deployed, can act as a powerful deterrent (against) to the forces of disorder and violence. When force has to be used it should be kept to (a) the minimum required for the attainment of the objective. It is expected that the actions of the UN troops will always be inspired by the aims and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, VON HORN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK

Date : 26 October 1960

No : 2919

Reference B-1303. Conakry informed of authorization.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 26 October 1960

No : 2917

May we have your comments as soon as possible on following letter dated 21 October received from Permanent Mission of Belgium:

"La Mission permanente de la Belgique se réfère à la correspondance qu'elle a eu l'honneur d'échanger avec le Secrétaire général au sujet de l'évacuation de la base de Kamina. Ainsi que Monsieur le Secrétaire général ne l'ignore pas, les autorités locales de l'ONU au Congo avaient préparé de concert avec une délégation du Ministère de la Défense nationale de Belgique à Kamina, un plan d'évacuation de cette base qui prévoyait notamment la mise à la disposition de l'ONU de 36 techniciens belges après le 1er décembre 1960. Or il résulte d'un message en date du 14 octobre 1960 que le Chef de la Délégation du Ministère de la Défense nationale vient d'adresser à son département à Bruxelles, qu'à présent les autorités de l'ONU souhaiteraient le maintien, après le 15 novembre, d'environ 200 techniciens belges et ce jusqu'à une date pouvant aller au-delà du 31 décembre 1960. Si le Gouvernement belge est en principe d'accord au sujet de cette demande, il souhaiterait obtenir de Monsieur le Secrétaire général la confirmation officielle de cette requête. Il serait entendu qu'au cas où la présence de ce plus grand nombre de techniciens belges serait désirée, les frais résultant de ce maintien soient supportés par l'ONU. La Mission permanente souhaiterait obtenir les vues de Monsieur le Secrétaire général sur ces deux points à sa plus prompte convenance et il saisit cette occasion de lui renouveler les assurances de sa plus haute considération."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: DAYAL
From: SEC GEN
Date: 26 October 1960
Number: 2909

Mr. Cordosa, Commissioner of National Education, and Mr. Cyrille Adoula, Senator, who arrived here two days ago, today gave a press conference at which they made the following points:

1. They had no repeat no confidence in the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Dayal, because he was supporting a pro-Lumumba line;
2. They demanded the withdrawal of Ghana and Guinea troops at least from the Leopoldville area;
3. They had no repeat no interest in an early meeting of Parliament;
4. They demanded that Lumumba be removed from his Prime Minister's residence;
5. They praised Tshombe, now that he no longer maintained relations with the Belgians, except for a few Belgian officers.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: LINNER
From: MacFARQUHAR
Date: 26 October 1960
Number: 2898

Your ONUC-1567 Israeli Aviation Technicians. As Sec-Gen has received representation from Israel Mission, please advise "special circumstances" preventing our acceptance Israeli offer. They claim posts still unfilled.

Distr.
Linner-1
Dayal -2 ✓

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 25 October 1960

No : 2893

Following is text of letter received to-day by President of Assembly over signature of Joseph Kasa-Vubu:

"Nous avons l'honneur de nous référer à notre lettre du 21 septembre 1960 par laquelle nous avons accrédité Monsieur Justin Bomboko en qualité de représentant de la République du Congo auprès de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU. Monsieur Bomboko qui reste toujours chef de délégation, étant provisoirement retenu à Léopoldville, nous avons désigné Monsieur Cyrille Adoula, sénateur, pour le remplacer pendant son absence. Monsieur Adoula est accompagné de Monsieur Mario Cardoso pour le cas où lui-même devrait s'absenter. Monsieur Cardoso remplacerait alors Monsieur Bomboko. Nous demandons à Votre Excellence de bien vouloir accueillir favorablement Messieurs Adoula et Cardoso."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: DAYAL, Von HORN
From: SECGEN
Date: 26 October 1960
Number: 2890

Reference B-1299.

1. Indication in Ghana message that UN New York has been informed that police unit will be withdrawn if separated from Ghana contingent is inaccurate, as no such word has been received as yet.
2. Agree that we should not demand retention of police if Nkrumah is insistent on his position. Replacements could be sought from Nigeria. The question occurs, however, whether the Ghana police could not serve a useful purpose in Luluabourg and elsewhere in Kasai. Fact must be faced that objection to splitting up contingent, although also "interference" is more difficult to handle from our side than deployment.

Distr. ✓
Dayal-2 ✓
Von Horn-1

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, VON HORN, LEOPOLDVIOLE
From : SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEWYORK
Date : 25 October 1960
No : 2899

Following message received from Touré on 25 October.

Reads:

"Honneur vous prier bien vouloir autoriser à
s'absenter General Diane Lansana, Commandant en
chef troupes guinéennes ONU au Congo, qu'appelons
en consultation. Très haute considération "

Propose grant authorisation if no objection your side.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEWYORK
Date : 23 October 1960
No : 2858

Following received yesterday from Tschombe:

"Lettre à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies
à New York.

Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies,

Ai l'honneur de vous faire part de ce qui suit. Comme vous le savez le Gouvernement du Katanga a conclu récemment à Elisabethville avec votre envoyé spécial, le Général Rikhye, un accord prévoyant la création de zones de défense dans certaines régions du Nord Katanga où les forces des Nations Unies interviendraient dans le maintien de l'ordre d'une façon plus active avec le degré de force nécessaire. La mission consisterait principalement à empêcher la circulation et l'action des bandes armées et à prévenir des actes de pillage et de protéger les installations vitales à l'économie du pays. Le 20 octobre écoulé furent portés à la connaissance de mon Gouvernement certains faits qui indiquaient que principalement dans la région de Kabalo les forces des Nations Unies chargées de l'exécution de la mission décrite ci-dessus avaient failli gravement aux devoirs qui leur étaient prescrits. Elles s'étaient rendues coupables de certains excès et de passivité dans leur attitude vis-à-vis des bandes armées.

Au reçu de ces nouvelles et devant la gravité des faits, le Gouvernement katangais s'est vu contraint d'adresser une protestation immédiate auprès du délégué permanent des Nations Unies à Elisabethville.

Il a en même temps pris l'initiative de proposer à Monsieur Berendsen qu'il accompagne dans le plus bref délai possible le Ministre de l'Intérieur, Monsieur Munongo, à Kabalo pour effectuer une enquête sur place.

Au retour de cette mission le 21 octobre 1960, le Ministre de l'Intérieur fit tenir son rapport et communiqua ses conclusions. Celles-ci font apparaître que la plupart des faits incriminés s'avéraient exacts d'après les nombreux témoignages et constatations écrites faits sur les lieux.

Des atrocités inqualifiables ont été commises par des bandes armées dans la circonscription urbaine de Kabalo sans la moindre intervention des forces des Nations Unies.

Cependant, niant l'évidence et refusant même au délégué du Gouvernement katangais de confronter ses constatations avec celles des observateurs de l'ONU cités comme témoins par des réfugiés, Monsieur le Représentant des Nations Unies à Elisabethville a minimisé délibérément les événements en méconnaissant complètement les témoignages enregistrés.

Il a été même jusqu'à insinuer que les autorités katangaises auraient sciemment exagéré les événements en vue de mettre fin à la mission de pacification confiée à l'ONU en vertu des accords mentionnés plus haut.

Je m'élève violemment contre de telles allégations qui ne sont pas dignes d'un représentant d'un organisme mondial dont le premiersouci devrait être d'observer une absolue objectivité en toutes circonstances. Il m'a été donné du reste de constater dans d'autres occasions un manque complet de clairvoyance et une indécision incompréhensible de la part de son représentant.

Celui-ci a manifesté à diverses reprises une incompréhension totale des problèmes katangais et même un manque d'esprit de collaboration avec le Gouvernement.

Le Gouvernement du Katanga estime que par son comportement il nuit grandement aux bons rapports qu'il a toujours été désireux d'entretenir avec les Nations Unies.

En agissant de la sorte Monsieur Berendsen dessert incontestablement les intérêts de votre organisation auprès des populations katangaises.

Eu égard à ce qui précède, je me vois dans l'obligation de vous demander de bien vouloir envisager à très bref délai le rappel de Monsieur

Berendsen, votre représentant à Elisabethville et son remplacement par une personne plus qualifiée.

Je me propose également de vous suggérer incessamment d'appliquer des mesures similaires envers certains officiers du sous-commandement de l'ONU à Elisabethville dont le comportement et l'attitude anti-katangaïse me paraissent également entraîner des sanctions et au sujet desquels une enquête est en cours.

Dans l'esprit de mon Gouvernement, les mesures que je vous propose de prendre ne mettent nullement en cause l'attachement du Katanga aux principes défendus par les Nations Unies. Tout comme par le passé, il accepte pleinement de collaborer loyalement avec vous à l'exécution des décisions prises par les Nations Unies, particulièrement dans le domaine du maintien de l'ordre.

C'est dans le même esprit que le Gouvernement katangaïse a accepté récemment de reconnaître aux forces de l'ONU le droit d'intensifier ses patrouilles en vue de la pacification de certaines régions du Katanga.

Il entend respecter ses engagements dans ce domaine dans toute la mesure où les forces de l'ONU s'acquittent de leur mission en toute loyauté et sans porter atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de l'Etat katangaïse qui est seul responsable en dernier ressort de la protection des vies et des biens des populations.

Je saisis l'occasion pour vous renouveler l'assurance de ma haute considération.

PRESIDENT TSHOMBE "

INCOMING CODE

TO: Dayal
FROM: Secgen
DATE: 24 October 1960
NUMBER: 2860

Your various cables re present situation, your actions and the reactions you meet have been studied with the greatest interest and naturally some concern as regards the difficulties you are facing. We highly appreciate the firmness and tact with which you manouvre and also how you use our feeble instruments to the best effect.

It is annoying to sit here and to be of so little use in your assistance but we have really little or no advice to add regarding the stands you have already chosen yourself. It is charmingly ironical counterpoint daily to be told here how we have disorganised the central Government, paralyzed Administration, put up Mobutu, support Tshombe and act for the Belgians at the same time as your reports, and even the newspapers in their biased way, tell about the attacks on UN from those same quarters. The role of strict impartiality is not one for somebody who "wants to be loved". Aesthetically the balance would be perfect if both sides in the cold war used the same degree of publicity in voicing their dissatisfaction.

You have got Tshombe's letter re Berendsen etc. We have of course got UN communique from E'ville and your 1293. You are absolutely right that a detailed refutation of allegations in last mentioned cable is necessary. It would serve also as check on our people and as excellent basis for our reply, if any, to Tshombe regarding his complaints against Berendsen.

...../..

At all events we simply have to wait with reaction to Tshombe approach to us until field is much more clear in substance; we naturally should neither protect nor hang anybody without having the facts but pending full knowledge our people on the spot should have the full benefit of the doubt (this as matter of principle; in the concrete case I cannot doubt reliability of UN findings.)

New subject. You may wish to give us again summary of your personal ideas about where we go from here. I believe our reactions are mutually well coordinated, but it would be helpful both for constructive purposes, for harmonising views and as guidance for talks with delegations and in Advisory Committee to get your ideas and suggestions, fully realising their highly hypothetical and necessarily tentative character.

Sincerely hope that tomorrow's manifestation of UN will work out well in all directions.

INCOMING DODE

TO: Von Horn
FROM: Bunche
DATE: 24 October 1960
NUMBER: 2859

h

*Shaw Big the letter -
I did not know the
telegram had issued re Maj Dutta
jr
24/10*

Dayal's

1. We hope/direct approach bears fruit. Otherwise, if Government of India continues to insist on return of Major Dutta, we cannot retain him. Still hoping for UAR replacement.
2. On basis of our experience with recruitment here, we are convinced that procedure you suggest for meeting additional requirements for personnel is decidedly unworkable. Governments not willing to make "offers" of "contributions". We usually must press them hard to meet our specific and formal requests for assistance and must follow this up with prodding.

cc: Mr. Dayal

INCOMING CODE

ND

TO: Linner
FROM: MacFarquhar
DATE: 23 October 1960
NUMBER: 2854

Your ONUC-1938 recruitment of judges.

In circumstances stated we are initiating prerecruitment action but prefer to postpone commitment on principle until consultation mid-week with Advisory Committee for which it will be test case.

cc: Mr. Dayal

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, VON HORN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 22 October 1960

No : 2850

Reference B-1277 and further to my 2768.

1. USA confirms its great reluctance to undertake further airlifts for UN except in "emergencies".
2. USA informs, however, its willingness to lift approximately 700 Nigerians from Nigeria to Kindu and to take Mali Battalion back. They indicated, however, that it was not likely that USA would undertake to lift Nigerian equipment and vehicles.
3. In view of unlikelihood of being able to airlift Mali vehicles, and also Nigerian unless UK can do it, what possibility is there that vehicles used by Malis could be taken over by Nigerians? Mali vehicles would have to be replaced or reimbursed, of course. Also what are prospects for temporary local procurement of vehicles for Nigerians pending lift by sea, rail and river.
4. Revised costs now given by USA are following:
 - (a) Nigerian Battalion of 700 men, approximately 80 vehicles and 225,000 pounds of equipment - \$500,000;
 - (b) 700 Nigerians and 25,000 pounds of equipment from Nigeria to Kindu - \$300,000;
 - (c) Airlifting 700 men, Nigeria to Kindu - \$186,400;
 - (d) Sealifting 80 Nigerian vehicles and 225,000 pounds of equipment, Lagos to Matadi - \$9,000.
5. Very frankly, cost of this proposed airlift causes most serious concern here and we hope your final recommendation on basis of above information will bear this very much in mind.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

n

TO: Dayal, Von Horn

FROM: Secgen

DATE: 23 October 1960

NUMBER: 2847

Reference B-1286.

UK aircraft fully acceptable for external airlift of Nigerians
from Nigeria to any point in the Congo.

cc: Supreme Commander

INCOMING CODE

TO: Dayal, Von Horn
FROM: Bunche
DATE: 22 Oct. 1960
NUMBER: 2837

Following is text of message of President of Ghana in reply to Secgen's letter of 14 October, received on 21 October from Delegation.
Reads:

"I would, of course, not repeat not wish to interfere with the normal function of the United Nations military command in the Congo and the Secretary-General is, I hope, aware that such attempted interference has never taken place. It may be true that no official representations have been made against Ghana troops recently, but it is also true that unofficial propaganda has continued. Quite apart from the political objections to the move at the present time, there will undoubtedly be serious security repercussions in Leopoldville. Incidents there are already on the increase and eye can attribute these only to the fact that the move of Ghana troops has become public knowledge. I do not repeat not think that the retention of Ghana police alone in the city presents a good solution. The unit itself is not repeat not organized to administer itself and relies on the Ghana Brigade for assistance. If the police are retained, I suggest that some other Ghana army unit must also stay, such as the Field Squadron, which has just arrived and is fresh, but still consider that the whole move is ill-favoured. United Nations Headquarters in Leopoldville has only to ask the views of the average civilian trader in the city to realize the danger of moving my troops at the present time.

In the light of these considerations, I am convinced that the move

...../.....

at the present time is ill-advised and should be suspended if the situation in Leopoldville is not repeat not to be allowed to deteriorate".

*We have taken
all appropriate
steps to
improve it.*

Your comments appreciated soonest.

INCOMING CLEAR

New York, le 19 octobre 1960

No.: (unnumbered) 2340Z

Son Excellence

Monsieur Kasa-Vubu

Président République Congo

Léopoldville (Congo)

J'ai l'honneur accuser réception votre télégramme du 14
octobre 1960 qui a retenu toute mon attention et tiens à vous
informer qu'il sera communiqué aux Etats Membres dès que cette
question viendra en discussion devant l'Assemblée générale STOP
Haute considération

FREDERICK H. ROLAND

PRESIDENT ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

(transmitted by letter of 20 October 1960)

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
Date : 21 October 1960
No : 2824

Following is summary of letter addressed to SecGen by Mr. Badibanga, Delegate of President Kasa-Vubu in New York dated 20 October 1960:

"Ai l'honneur vous rappeler deux incidents survenus récemment à Léopoldville et dont répercussions politiques sont loin d'être apurées. (1) Tournée effectuée par Lumumba dans nombreux lieux publics ou sous protection troupes du Ghana - Il a appelé population locale à révolte contre autorités légales. (2) Agression commise 15 octobre sur personne du Commissaire général Ndele en présence approbatrice d'un détachement du Ghana.

Depuis lors autres incidents se sont produits quotidiennement dénongant duplicité Ghana.

Mardi 18 octobre bruit s'est répandu à Léopoldville que des civils lumumbistes avaient été reconnus sous uniforme contingent ghanéen. Dans soirée sept soi-disant officiers ghanéens qui ne parlaient que langue locale et n'étaient autres que congolais lumumbistes déguisés étaient arrêtés. Convient préciser qu'ils étaient armés et portaient insignes Nations Unies.

Le lendemain, alors que sur ordre autorités légales les prisonniers étaient en voie de transfert vers prison en dehors de Léopoldville, un détachement ghanéen intervint et s'opposa à leur embarquement. Sous menace des armes les agents autorités congolaises ont dû obtempérer.

Ces faits ne sont pas pour nous surprendre. Dans correspondance secrète récemment rendue publique Président du Ghana avait en effet assuré Lumumba qu'il luttait en sa faveur et avait envisagé que troupes ghanéennes pourraient être remises à disposition de Lumumba. Nkrumah n'a pu mettre ce plan officiellement en exécution grâce à clairvoyance groupe afro-asiatique qui malgré vantardises Président du Ghana a refusé se laisser mobiliser. Mais pour parvenir à ses fins, il n'hésite même pas à tricher avec l'honneur des Nations Unies.

Ces faits présentent différents aspects déplorables sur lesquels j'ai instruction attirer votre attention et celle Assemblée générale.

D'une part, il est trop facile de monter à la tribune de l'Assemblée pour proclamer que par l'absence de M. Lumumba le désordre existe au Congo alors que simultanément on s'efforce par moyens inavouables de démolir l'autorité légale existante.

D'autre part, une action de cette nature ne saurait être considérée autrement que comme une flagrante ingérence dans affaires intérieures d'un pays. Il s'agit typiquement d'un acte par lequel un gouvernement étranger tente par la force d'armes fournies clandestinement et grâce à des cadres venus de l'extérieur d'installer au pouvoir une minorité favorable à ses intérêts.

En fin, je me dois dans l'intérêt de l'Organisation à laquelle République Congo est fière d'appartenir attirer votre attention sur préjudice moral que ne man uerait pas de rejaillir sur Nations Unies si elles devaient rester muettes et par conséquent acquiescer à l'utilisation de leur uniforme d'une manière si peu compatible avec les buts et principes qui les animent.

Pour le Chef de l'Etat

(signé) L. S. Badibanga
Délégué "

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal, Von Horn
From ; Bunche
Date : 20 October 1960
Number : 2790

Reference ONUC 1713.

1. We will approach question of rotation in two steps. Will first broach subject informally in Advisory Committee with a later letter as follow - up to participating Governments setting forth general principles and desirable arrangements from point of view of safeguarding UN interests.

2. Necessary to proceed cautiously on this subject, since nothing can be said at this stage about duration of the Congo Force. Moreover, it is desirable to avoid planting idea of rotation where it may not now actively exist. In any event, we must insist on acceptance of our basic position of a minimum tour of a duty of six months.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

To : Dayal, Von Horn
From : SecGen
Date : 20 October 1960
Number : 2789

Because of its obvious importance to effectiveness ~~to~~ of ONUC and protection of UN interest, development of a highly efficient Movement Control Operation is of major concern. There would seem to be indications that present situation in this sphere in ONUC falls short of desired ⁵norm. In any case, would like to have your fully frank appraisal of existing Movement Control arrangements and your specific suggestions for strengthening this essential activity, whether by Military or Civilian means.

ND

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn