

~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

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M.B. 18 Nov 2011

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 31

FILE 7

ACC. 1998/0278

**UNAMIR - MINUAR****"POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS"**

Peace and stability in the Rwandan society is conspicuously felt in the smooth working of socio-political institutions. A climate of trust and confidence continues to consolidate itself and normalcy is increasingly witnessed in the promotion of development activities. However, areas bordering Zaire are susceptible to insecure and un-certain conditions with frequent attempts of sabotage by infiltrators. The situation has necessitated imposition of curfew in some of the prefectures.

On the external front, relations with neighbouring countries are improving with frequent exchange of visits between Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania. In particular, Rwanda is seriously engaged in a working relationship with Zaire and currently negotiations are being held for the transfer of Rwandan assets by Zaire. The visits of the facilitators of the Cairo Conference to Rwanda and its neighbours, have positively contributed in promoting stability in the sub-region. Tanzania is extending meaningful cooperation in facilitating the return of Rwandan refugees. The intimidators are being separated and sent in different camps. Zambia on the other hand has been asked, during Rwandan Foreign Ministers visit to that country, to under-take extradition of genocide suspects, so that the process of justice takes its natural course.

UNAMIR's current mandate specifically related to the return of refugees, so as to restore peace and stability in the region. In this connection representatives of UNHCR, Governments of Burundi and Rwanda, visited camps in Burundi and persuaded the refugees to return home. Burundi intends to initiate the progressive closure of refugee camps and therefore the refugees are expected to return within six months. It has also been observed that a delegation of the Rwandan

Government went to Burundi and held discussions with the Burundian Government and UNHCR representatives, to ensure quick return of all refugees from Burundi. The Rwandan Prime Minister also went to Tanzania and addressed the refugees in the camps and encouraged them to return home. The coordinator of Rwanda/Burundi Emergency Unit visited Kigali and informed that, following an agreement at the Tripartite Commission held in Geneva between Zaire/Rwanda/UNHCR on 20 December 1995, Zaire had advised that it too, was also going along with the closure of refugee camps and could start with the closure of one camp in northern Goma and then one in Bukavu, that this exercise would start any time from 1 February 1996. The Rwandan Government has also been requested to conduct mass information campaigns of inviting the refugees to come home. In this connection substantial preparations have been made in-side Rwanda, so as to be able to receive large number of refugees.

The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda has begun issuing indictments as reported earlier. Recently a team of investigators and technicians including doctors carried exhumation tests on 300 bodies to collect evidence for genocide activities. The judicial system of Rwanda would take time to develop fully because of resource constraints. The national courts are also not functioning fully because of lack of means. This section of Rwandan society need to be strengthened soonest possible.

The opening of rehabilitated and new detention centres brought a partial and short-term easing to the problem of lack of space. However over crowding of prisons is yet no less alarming. The ICRC witnessed severe over crowding of up to five detainees to one square metre. This meant that detainees are unable to lie down and it made their access to basic requirements such as water, food latrines, and health care very precarious. In extreme cases, the poor conditions resulted in infection, gangrene and eventually amputation of limbs.


Javed A. Khan

Political Affairs Officer



RESTRICTED

DISCUSSION PAPER: RISKS OF AN IMPLOSION INSIDE RWANDA

1. The International Independent Investigation Commission on Kibeho found that the RPA soldiers on the ground exceeded their directives by using excessive force during the operation to close the camps for the internally-displaced persons in southwest Rwanda. The National Assembly recently requested the Rwandese Government to submit a new list of nominees from which the Assembly could elect the six members of the Supreme Court, claiming that the Minister of Justice (a Hutu) had included some individuals on the original list who are suspected of past Interahamwe sympathies or affiliations. There is a widely-held belief that both within the Government and the population at large, Hutus favour the strengthening of UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda, while Tutsis are perceived to favour UNAMIR's departure. Furthermore, Tutsis, both within the Government and in the society as a whole are seen as overwhelmingly anxious to bring to justice alleged participants in the genocide while Hutus are viewed as more concerned about national reconciliation. The defection of two prominent Hutu members of the regime, Mr. Jean-Marie Vianney Ndajimana, who was Foreign Minister when he fled in October 1994, and Mr. Jean Damascène Ntakirutimana, who was Director of the Prime Minister's Cabinet until early June 1995, and both of whom belonged to the Prime Minister's MDR party, is widely assessed as exposing deep schisms and tensions within the current leadership in Kigali, especially along ethnic and political lines. The departure "on study leave" in Belgium of Kigali's only State Prosecutor, Mr. François Xavier Nsanzuwera, at a time when personnel are urgently needed to help revive Rwanda's paralyzed judicial system and his public criticisms, in Brussels, of the Rwandese Government, is also widely viewed as an indication of serious frictions within the Government. There have been public disagreements between the Vice-President and Minister of Defence (a Tutsi) and the Prime Minister (a Hutu) over the role of the largely Tutsi national army in the country, with the Prime Minister calling for greater restraints on the RPA. There is a broad perception of military dominance in the country, with the civilian administration seen as a mere façade and the real power said to be vested in the army. There are increasing reports of a growing rift within the RPA itself, especially between English-speaking Rwandese troops from Uganda who occupy the most senior positions, and the French-speaking Rwandese troops from Burundi who are said to resent seriously their less favourable positions.

2. These differences are, by and of themselves, not unusual and common to other societies and governments, as well as to Rwanda's immediate past history. Moreover, it is difficult to assess their seriousness, depth or reach within the country. Nevertheless, the unfolding of these divergences at a time when the country is yet to recover fully from the ravages of war and genocide and is rather facing an increased danger of destabilization, is significant and potentially alarming.

3. The current Government came to power largely because the RPF and moderate Hutu politicians and other leaders also opposed to the Habyarimana regime mounted a united and cohesive strategy that led to military, political and public relations victories. When the new Government took office on 19 July 1994 following the RPA's defeat of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), RPA troops were hailed nationally as well as internationally as

disciplined and courageous liberators. There was also much international goodwill towards Rwanda as the international community looked to the new leaders to turn Rwanda away from its tragic past towards a more peaceful future. Since then however, increasing reports of RPA atrocities, including in particular the Gersony allegations in August/September 1994 and the Kibeho massacres in April 1995, may have tarnished not only the RPA's but also the new Government's international reputation and may also have contributed to internal frictions both within the regime and in the society as a whole.

4. The nearly \$700 million pledged to the Government of Rwanda at the UNDP-sponsored Round Table Conference in January 1995 demonstrate the international community's support for the Government and its interest in strengthening the Government's capacity to govern effectively. The sluggish and limited disbursements of the funds, however, could reflect growing uneasiness about developments in Rwanda, including the Government's performance. This situation, coupled with the slow pace of progress in bringing to justice the perpetrators of the genocide, could deepen frustrations and widen gaps within Rwandese society as well as contribute to increased insecurity in the country.

5. With the Rwandese economy having virtually collapsed, the continued withholding of foreign economic and financial assistance could be catastrophic, leading to deeper and more widespread poverty, heightened social tensions, armed robberies and political acrimonies as some members of the regime (e.g. moderate Hutus) blame their more hardline partners (e.g. RPF) for policies and practices and an overall climate discouraging the quicker flow of international support. At the same time, the slow commencement of national and international trials of suspected genocide perpetrators could encourage more revenge killings. Such a development may not only fuel further inter-ethnic strife but could also hamper refugee repatriation efforts.


6. The international community has recently been paying growing attention to the potentially destabilizing activities of armed elements in the Rwandese refugee camps in the neighbouring countries, especially those in Zaire and Tanzania, who are reportedly intensifying preparations for possible attacks against Rwanda. This aspect is indubitably significant. However, in order to be fully effective in preventing a new round of hostilities in Rwanda, both the external and internal threats should be taken into account. There seems to be a close link between both aspects. For instance, the armed elements in the refugee camps could use large-scale or sustained violence and other malpractices against Hutus inside Rwanda as a pretext for launching attacks, supposedly to save the perceived victimized group. Furthermore, the growing perception of widening and deepening rifts within the Rwandese Government and society might also encourage those armed elements to invade the country, calculating that with a divided army, Government and society, Rwanda is vulnerable. At the same time, it is conceivable that the Government, fearing that Hutus and political opponents inside the country may secretly be collaborating with and aiding the former regime, could strike out against such groups. Such a measure could provoke a wider conflict, especially if forces of the former regime launch counter-measures.

7. Despite the current Government's efforts to minimize the ethnic factor in building a new Rwandese society and power-structure, there are strong indications that the level of inter-ethnic suspicion and hostility remains disturbingly high. Despite their strong merits, the Government's efforts are still at an early stage to have had a meaningful impact. Furthermore, if Rwanda's history as well as developments elsewhere in Africa are taken as a guide, those efforts might even ultimately be futile as ethnic solidarity has frequently emerged as a resilient, enduring and decisive factor for forging alliances in African societies.

8. The toxic mix of ethnic and political rivalries is especially pronounced in Rwanda with its long history of ethnic and political violence as well as its massive poverty. Such violence is an ever-present threat in the country and can break out at any time. Thus, against the background of existing and seemingly worsening tensions in the country, two scenarios may be possible: At best, it can be said that these problems are not unusual for any government and that with time, the new and largely inexperienced regime in power in Kigali will succeed in containing the situation, especially if foreign assistance materializes, the International Tribunal begins to function and movement is initiated on the political front towards dialogue and genuine power-sharing among Rwandese not implicated in the genocide. On the other hand, the present problems could fester, worsen and lead to an internal implosion which in turn could provoke renewed civil war and genocide.

9. The Rwandese situation remains volatile and is constantly evolving. What appears certain, however, is that there is an urgent need to address in a more determined and concrete manner the internal and external challenges that increasingly threaten to plunge the country once again into chaos and destruction. UNAMIR finds itself in a rather ironic position in the context of the situation: hated by the former (Hutu) regime which accused the Mission of helping the RPF to achieve power in Rwanda, UNAMIR is today denounced by many Tutsis, including members of Government, for not protecting the victims of genocide and is seen as protecting Hutus inside the country. It is therefore conceivable that when UNAMIR phases out, some moderate Hutus in the Government as well as many ordinary Hutu citizens may also leave the country and refugee repatriation will come almost to a halt. The primary responsibility for reversing the present drift and for preventing the regime from unravelling rests with the Government. However, the international community also has an important role to play and to this end should continue and indeed intensify its efforts to assist in stabilizing the internal situation, preventing threats of destabilization from the outside from becoming a reality and facilitating the repatriation of Rwanda's 2 million refugees.

10. In view of the above, and taking into account, inter alia, Security Council resolution 997 of 9 June 1995, the United Nations Secretariat may wish to draw up a programme of action which should, among other things, pursue initiatives, within the framework of the good offices mandate provided for in the resolution, aimed at evolving a workable, acceptable and lasting political solution based on the principle of power-sharing upon which the Arusha Peace Agreement is founded.



Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser
15 June 1995

cc.: SRSB - FC - ED



11 April 1995

NOTE TO SRSG

It is evident from the daily broadcasts of Radio Rwanda in recent weeks that a tendentious campaign against UNAMIR is being conducted on state-run media. Despite our formal protests against such negative propaganda to the authorities, this campaign based upon misinformation and intimidation continues unabated and is spreading to the society as a whole. This is a major source of concern as it could result in an increase in the number and severity of aggressive acts against UNAMIR and other UN personnel and installations in Rwanda, and undermine our credibility and overall effectiveness. Consequently, we should contemplate and implement an effective response to counter the effects of such a nefarious campaign. Such a response should be based mainly on a public education and information programme aimed at producing a factual and objective understanding of the UN's mission in Rwanda, as most of the allegations made are vicious, unfounded, exaggerated and simply uninformed. In this regard, I recommend the following courses of action:

1. From UN Headquarters in New York, either the Spokesman for the Secretary-General or some other medium, should address this issue publicly (preferably at the noon briefing), and should express concern over this unwarranted maligning of the UN which only serves to detract from the important collaborative efforts undertaken between the UN community and the Rwandese Government with a view to rebuilding the country. It should also be emphasised that the Government is responsible for the security of all UN personnel in Rwanda.

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2. On the ground, UNAMIR and other UN personnel should actively seek to inform and educate the public on our role and activities both during and after the recent conflict in Rwanda. UNAMIR in particular, through its radio broadcasts, may wish to start a daily or regular civic education programme on the UN within the context of the Organisation's 50th anniversary celebrations. In this manner, we could describe the evolution of the UN and explain how the Organisation functions as a system. With regard specifically to UNAMIR, we should indicate the role of the Security Council in its formation and in the elaboration of the mission's mandate. We should clearly point out that UNAMIR simply executes decisions taken by the 15-member Council of which Rwanda has been a member since January 1994. It should be added that a peace-keeping mission, such as UNAMIR, operating under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter cannot enter and operate inside a country without the express approval of the host country. Furthermore, it should be noted that the UN does not have any forces at its own disposal -- peace-keeping forces are contributed by member-states which can withdraw them at will; after the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers serving with UNAMIR, the Belgian Government unilaterally withdrew the remaining elements of its contingent. Those

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Shahmy/plan

UNAMIR forces that were maintained by the Security Council during the conflict carried out important life-saving tasks under extremely hazardous conditions, especially as many of the UNAMIR personnel involved were unarmed military observers. These facts, I believe, should be brought out.

3. It would be preferable that the measures described above as part of a vigorous programme of education and clarification be implemented by staff in the SRSG's office, in particular, radio and other information personnel. The SRSG himself may, nevertheless, continue to raise these points in his private discussions and other contacts with senior Government officials.

I agree
with the strategy.

It is conceivable that the ongoing campaign against UNAMIR is calculated to influence the mission's future mandate, including the redirection to the Rwandese Government of the mission's resources. If such is the case, this could again be a misreading of the way in which the UN system functions. The public should, in an appropriate education and information format, be apprised of the fact that UNAMIR is only an executing arm of the Security Council, and not a decision-making body. Should Rwanda or any other country wish to influence the mission's mandate, the proper approach would be to do so within the Security Council or bilaterally through discussion with the various Council members.

It is also conceivable that the Government unable, due to lack of resources, to improve conditions for its people, is using UNAMIR and the entire international community as an excuse for its problems and constraints. If this is the Government's strategy, effective countermeasures on our part would be difficult and futile.


Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

cc: ED

Please see my remarks on the margins

Shahmmy J. Khan
11-4

PA



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. A.H. Kabia
Executive Director

FROM: Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

DATE: 6 February 1995

SUBJECT: Proposed schedule of visits to prefectures of Rwanda

Further to my note to you dated 1 February 1995 in which I proposed visiting the different prefectures in Rwanda outside Kigali, I would like to submit for your consideration and approval the following schedule of visits. If the itinerary meets with your approval, I propose beginning the programme of visits this week in the order of priority listed below. As stated previously, the visits to the sectors where our Political Information Officers are currently located would be taken with them.

1. Gitarama
2. Butare and Gikongoro
3. Cyangugu
4. Kibuye
5. Gisenyi
6. Ruhengiri
7. Byumba
8. Kibungo



1 February 1995

- NOTE TO ED -

As you are aware, the political temperature in the country and in the subregion as a whole, seems to be heating up again. This could have important implications for the work of UNAMIR, especially with regard to the discharge of our mandate relating to the use of our good offices to promote national reconciliation. The attack against the MDR journalist, Mr. Edouard Mutsinzi, as well as the numerous incidents of violence which our SITREPS indicate are taking place throughout the country, could be seen as symptoms of this seemingly worsening political malaise. In this connection, therefore, I would like to propose the following measures for your consideration:

- a) UNAMIR should follow political developments more closely and systematically. In this connection, we should seek to accelerate the recruitment and deployment of the three remaining political information officers. We should also provide more support for those officers already deployed, for instance by ensuring that they receive our daily SITREPS, radio news transcripts, newspapers and magazines, as well as office and other supplies. I therefore propose for your consideration and approval that Ms. Ladan Rafii, Political/Legal Officer in the OSRSG, be designated to liaise with the PIOs. In this function, she would receive and analyze their reports with a view to finding solutions to problems or requests that the PIOs might raise. Naturally, substantive political issues raised in those reports will continue to be dealt with by the senior officers involved, namely the SRSG, yourself and, as appropriate, the Political Adviser;
- b) the Political Adviser and other officers in the political unit of the OSRSG should visit the various préfectures and sectors on a regular basis or as often as warranted by events;
- c) the officers of the political unit should meet at least once a week with you to review developments and, as necessary or appropriate, prepare briefing notes, position papers or recommendations to the SRSG and/or New York.

2. I hope the above ideas and suggestions, which are submitted as a result of a preliminary reflection on possible ways and means of strengthening our political activities, will meet with your positive consideration.

Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

EVACUATION PLAN FOR RWANDA

1. The security situation in Rwanda which had gradually been returning to normalcy since the end of the civil war and the installation of a new government in July 1994, changed rapidly at the beginning of 1995 and has steadily worsened since. There has been an increase in banditry, theft of United Nations vehicles and other property, attacks on UNAMIR military installations, personal assaults on international civilian staff and arrests or detentions of locally-recruited staff of United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda. This atmosphere of insecurity, though a nationwide phenomenon, is particularly acute in cities and other large towns, especially Kigali, the capital and the largest metropolitan area.
2. Despite the Government's efforts to control the situation, there are increasing reports of cross-border infiltrations by elements of the defeated former Government forces who have taken refuge in neighbouring countries, in particular, Zaire and Tanzania, which are a contributing factor to the deteriorating security situation. In their attempts to maintain internal security, the Rwandese national army (RPA) has resorted to conducting more searches at military check-points and road barriers. However, due to the scarcity of resources, these measures have not alleviated tensions within the country. The international community is trying to assist Rwanda in the reestablishment of law and order by training a national police force and rebuilding its judicial system.
3. The security situation in Rwanda should be seen against the backdrop of the political conflict which is the reason for UNAMIR's continued presence in the country. Until a lasting solution is found, including the return and resettlement of the estimated 2 million Rwandese refugees, Rwanda is likely to remain a conflict area resulting in continued tensions and insecurity.



SRSG/NV/51/95

NOTE VERBALE

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) would like to present its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda, and has the honour to refer to the recent demonstrations expressing anti-UNAMIR sentiment held at UNAMIR Headquarters in Kigali on Tuesday, 11 April 1995, and at a UNAMIR installation at the Meridien Hotel in Gisenyi on Wednesday, 12 April 1995.

While UNAMIR respects the public's right to freedom of expression which is a cornerstone of the rights protected in a free and democratic society, it takes exception to the fact that the said demonstrations included provocative statements that not only distorted the past and present role and activities of UNAMIR in Rwanda, but were aimed at inciting the people to commit acts of violence against UNAMIR personnel.

In particular, UNAMIR would like to express its deep concern over the fact that some of the inflammatory remarks and explicit incitements to violence during the demonstrations were made by senior Rwandese Government officials, including the Prefect of Kigali, Major Rose Kabuye, and a Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. As a consequence of this, UNAMIR premises in Gisenyi were ransacked, UNAMIR personnel were insulted and handled roughly, and some of its equipment was removed unlawfully. In Kigali, some UNAMIR staff members have been the target of aggressive verbal abuse and its vehicles have been stoned.

As you are aware, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, through his Spokesman, has deplored "the fact that speeches of a highly inflammatory nature, and containing completely unfounded allegations, were made against UNAMIR and the United Nations". Furthermore, the Secretary-General "particularly regrets that some responsible officials in Rwanda attended the demonstration and are reported to have made unfortunate statements". A copy of this press release is attached for your information.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda avails itself of this occasion to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda the assurances of its highest consideration.

See
Kigali, 13 April 1995

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation
of the Republic of Rwanda
Kigali



UN NATIONS

Press Release Secretary-General

Department of Public Information • News Coverage Service • New York

SG/SM/5611

11 April 1995

**SECRETARY-GENERAL, DEPLORES INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES AGAINST UNAMIR, URGES ALL
SEGMENTS OF RWANDESE SOCIETY TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT**

The following statement on Rwanda was issued today by the Spokesman for the Secretary-General:

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has been informed by his Special Representative in Rwanda of a demonstration held outside the headquarters of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) today.

The Secretary-General deplores the fact that speeches of a highly inflammatory nature, and containing completely unfounded allegations, were made against UNAMIR and the United Nations. He particularly regrets that some responsible officials in Rwanda attended the demonstration and are reported to have made unfortunate statements.

The Secretary-General calls on all segments of Rwandese society to exercise restraint at this critical time in order not to exacerbate tensions further. He also hopes that the Government of Rwanda will do everything possible to ensure that UNAMIR receives, at every level, the cooperation necessary for carrying out its mandate.

* * * *



11 April 1995

NOTE TO SRSG

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unilaterally withdrew the remaining elements of its contingent. Those UNAMIR forces that were maintained by the Security Council during the conflict carried out important life-saving tasks under extremely hazardous conditions, especially as many of the UNAMIR personnel involved were unarmed military observers. These facts, I believe, should be brought out.

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Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

cc: ED

RWANDA: SUMMARY OF KIBEHO INQUIRY

Following the high number of casualties which resulted from the attempted closure by the RPA of the Kibeho camp for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in south-western Rwanda between 18 to 23 April 1995, an Independent International Commission of Inquiry was established on 3 May 1995 to investigate circumstances surrounding the incident. The Commission, composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Organization of African Unity, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, the United Nations and the United States, presented its report to the President of Rwanda on 18 May 1995.

In the report, the Commission gives an account of the events leading to the decision by the Government of Rwanda to close down all IDP camps on Rwandese territory. The report provides a chronological summary of events at Kibeho during the attempted closure operation. It omits any reference to the actual number of fatalities which, the Commission claims, it was unable to determine due to logistical and time constraints. It states that there is evidence to indicate that many suffered injuries from machetes (used by civilians), stampede and weapons fire, although the exact proportions cannot be determined, and that bodies were buried outside the Kibeho camp.

According to the Commission, the operation of the Government of Rwanda to close the IDP camps was well-planned, but failures occurred in its implementation and ensuing panic. The RPA's response to the threat was deemed disproportionate and a violation of international law, and the RPA failed to distinguish between hostile and non-hostile targets and engaged in indiscriminate firing. There was also credible evidence that individual RPA soldiers conducted summary executions. The Commission found that the following factors contributed to the RPA's behaviour: deficiencies in communications systems, equipment (the RPA has limited means with which to apply force), training (the RPA is trained as a guerrilla army, and not a law enforcement body), and experience (the RPA had never engaged in a similar operation of this kind). Additionally, the RPA command failed to appreciate the determination with which hard-core elements (that is, extremists most likely involved in criminal activity) would refuse to leave the camp voluntarily. The report criticises UNAMIR for its inadequate response to the acts of intimidation and violence against other IDPs undertaken by these hard-core criminal elements within UNAMIR protected zones.

In its conclusions, the Commission stated that the Kibeho tragedy resulted neither from a planned action by Rwandese authorities to kill a certain group of people, nor was it an accident which could not have been prevented. It regretted that United Nations agencies and NGOs were not able to contribute more efficiently to the speedy evacuation of IDPs from the camp. It added that unarmed IDPs were subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm in violation of human rights and humanitarian law by RPA military personnel, as well as by armed elements among the IDPs themselves.

Among its various recommendations, the Commission called upon the United Nations system to review its chain-of-command and its operations procedures to ensure that, in the future, "an entire operation is not held hostage or bogged down by one or several agencies and organisations with limited mandates and responsibilities." It further recommended that the international community continue encouraging and assisting Rwanda in its efforts to achieve justice, national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Observations and recommendations

- a) The Secretary-General may commend the Rwandese Government's decision for an international inquiry on Kibeho. The Commission's input helped to allay misgivings in the international community on human rights issues.
- b) The conclusions and recommendations of the Kibeho Commission absolved the Government of pre-meditated action. Its recommendations relating to observation of human rights may be implemented by the Government.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

Background Readings

**Lecture on Dispute Resolution
by Joseph V. Montville**

February 1, 1995, 11:00 a.m.

Dag Hammarskjold Library Auditorium

*For circulation to
all professional
staff of CDA.*

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The readings attached are provided as background to a lecture by Mr. Joseph Montville, Senior Associate and Director of the Conflict Resolution Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies. This lecture is open to all members of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs.

Mr. Montville, through his background in diplomacy coupled with expertise in ethnic conflict and "psychodynamic" approaches to dispute resolution, is in a unique position to provide this overview lecture on a strategic approach to dispute resolution and the latter's potential applicability to the current peacemaking challenges of the United Nations. He has worked or had significant involvements in the Baltics, the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa. For many years he has worked as one of the hand-full of practitioners of the "problem-solving workshop" in international conflict resolution. This approach relies on in-depth conversations between senior representatives of parties in conflict. Through involvement sustained over periods of months and years, these practitioners guide a process of dialogue which achieves significant levels of understanding between parties, leading to the joint development of creative policy options conducive to large scale, non-violent dispute resolution.

The first article, "Psychodynamic Approaches", introduces the field and some of the implications for peacemaking. "A Report on a Workshop in Riga, Latvia" provides a glimpse into the type of dialogue which can occur in "problem-solving workshops". The "Rwanda/Burundi Reconciliation Initiative Concept Paper" is an example of a comprehensive strategy informed by Mr. Montville's work. The latter, particularly, points to some programmatic implications this work may have for the United Nations. Finally, Mr. Montville's curriculum vitae is attached for your information.

It is hoped that this lecture will provide new perspectives on peacemaking and stimulate further dialogue within the Department of Political Affairs on the connection between official and non-official work in international peacemaking.

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United State Institute of Peace

PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACHES

Joseph V. Montville

"Until recently we believed that we would, throughout our life, be able to live simply as human beings, but now we ask ourselves, what is human? Are we human? How human are we? Will we always and in every manner succeed in being human?"

Introduction

The statement was made by a Croatian clergyman in a seminar in Zagreb in June 1992. For the purposes of this chapter, the quote expresses with simple eloquence the profound sense of loss in victims of political violence. It introduces the case for psychodynamic approaches in international conflict management and resolution where traumatic, unhealed losses from the distant or recent past dominate the individual and collective psychologies of a group or nation. The thesis here is that any conflict resolution method which does not address the psychological needs of the victims and victimizers can only have a superficial effect on the resolution especially of ethnic and sectarian conflict.

The Croatian continued:

"Many of our near ones are no more, and many will go through their entire life physically or mentally handicapped. Many homes have been destroyed (both materially and spiritually), many families driven out, exiled or even exterminated....We are overburdened with the wickedness which occurred in our past, the evil done to our ancestors, and which our forebears committed. We are threatened with the reduction of our life horizons into extremely narrow dimensions. Everything beyond mere survival becomes inappropriate....Our human dignity is at risk. Our suffering is destroying us (Shenk, 1993, p. 64)."

Theorists and practitioners of international conflict management and resolution have a moral obligation to understand and respect the depth of hurt of the peoples we propose to help. ~~We must proceed with modesty, care, professional skill and commitment to the analysis of the historic and psychodynamic dimensions of what is essentially a task in healing in the relationships between the groups and nations whose conflict we approach.~~ Conflict resolution theory and practice have evolved to the point where there can no longer be ambiguity about this obligation. This chapter attempts to explain how to go about the task.

Taking a History

The medical metaphor is apt when the idea of healing is introduced into the discussion of the methods of international conflict resolution. In the psychodynamic approach, the third party team in an interactive problem-solving workshop or seminar, for example, will have at least one member with clinical experience in individual and small group work. The job of this person is to tactfully help participants express inter alia basic anxieties about national identity, rage over past assaults and losses, fears about present and future safety and security, and perceptions of the adversary side.

People coming from violent conflict experiences often go to great lengths to avoid honest expression of basic emotional preoccupations. They use well known psychological defenses. Yet it is only such expressions of feelings which can reveal the agenda for healing in a conflict resolution process. And without searching discussion of healing needs, workshops can go on for days, weeks or even years without ~~providing insight~~ about how to end violence and genuinely resolve the conflict.

The specific techniques and dynamics of the psychologically sensitive problem-solving workshop are described extensively in Volkan, Montville and Julius, The Psychodynamics of International Relationships (Lexington, 1990 and 1991), and they need not be repeated in this chapter. However, it would be useful to outline

some general guidelines. The first step in planning a workshop is the careful selection of the representatives of the groups or nations in conflict for participation in the process. They should have keen intellect, knowledge of history, emotional maturity, leadership qualities and the ability to influence high-level, official political thinking and decision-making.

Senior political leaders in intense conflict situations are rarely the best candidates for psychodynamic work because they are generally emotionally deeply invested in their sense of self and therefore not susceptible to change simply through new insight; and they are also limited in their room to manoeuvre by the negative emotions of their constituencies. Their ability to "learn," acknowledge and articulate new and potentially healing insights gained in workshops is limited by the need for the insights to be acquired also by their mass of followers.

Senior political leaders are unlikely to risk their positions by getting out in front of their followers with a moral or peacemaking initiatives toward the enemy, unless a good deal of official and unofficial "pre-negotiation" work has been done. This is a political reality which careful conflict resolution strategies must take into account. Intellectual or spiritual leaders from other sectors of a community or nation may have to undertake the moral responsibility, paving the way for politicians to "catch up" with and hopefully transform this

fundamental leadership by others into official policy.

Other authors in this collection describe the characteristic interactions of the participants in the workshop. The focus of this chapter is the psychological tasks of the workshop and, more broadly, the work to be done to influence and transform public opinion in the nations in conflict. Thus the concept of international conflict management and resolution described here consists of several simultaneous and mutually reinforcing processes.

While the problem-solving workshop is the foundation stone of the strategy, there may also be actions to influence public opinion via the news and information media as well as theater, art and educational programs. There might also be carefully planned initiatives like joint teams of respected historians formed to fill the "blank pages of history," speeches by political figures, and the establishment of truth commissions to document moral culpability in past violence and aggression. There could also be simultaneous investment programs designed to enhance material well-being for broad sectors of a population in what is called "functional diplomacy." Water resource development in the Arab-Israeli dispute would be an example.

The early presentation of fears, grievances and political demands by the more victimized group is predictable and normal in a

workshop. After initially creating a sense of safe space for the participants, psychologically sensitive third parties will attempt to persuade them fairly early on to "walk through history" with each other. "Walk" is the operative term. We prefer not to "run" with a torrent of accusations and condemnations, but rather encourage the thoughtful expression by representatives of each side of the unhealed wounds in their historical relationship.

This is almost always a profound learning experience for each side since victimizers traditionally employ the psychological mechanisms of avoidance and denial of unpleasant truths about their behavior and that of their forebears. ~~And victims are~~ ~~ordinarily so intensely absorbed by their own losses that they~~ ~~rarely understand the complexities and moral ambiguities in the~~ ~~past of their oppressors, who may also have been victims at some~~ ~~point.~~ ~~This is why revision of history books--getting the story~~ ~~straight--is quite common in successful political reconciliation~~ ~~processes~~ (Willis, 1965, Montville, 1986, 1990, and Luttwak, 1994).

Taking a reasonably accurate history of a conflicted relationship in effect sets out the agenda for healing in a psychologically informed conflict resolution strategy. Participants in a workshop will lay out what Volkan (1992) calls their "chosen traumas", those losses in history which have greatest symbolic

meaning for their profound sense of victimhood and which continue to nourish their feeling of unacknowledged injustice. We will deal further on with the critical importance of acknowledgement in ethnic and sectarian conflict resolution. For the present it would be useful to look briefly at two case studies for the impact of historic loss on contemporary violent conflict.

Understanding the Mind of Serbia

Most students of Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, credit a speech he gave in Kosovo in April, 1987, as the beginning of his ascendance to power. In the speech, he implored the Serbian minority to stay in the province even though it was economically distressed. Kosovo's population was 90% Albanian, but the province was also the birthplace and symbolic center of Serbia's national identity. The Serbian Orthodox monasteries of Kosovo are a legacy of a tribal chieftain, Stefan Nemanja, who established the first independent Serbian state in the twelfth century A.D.

On June 28, 1989, Milosevic returned to Kosovo to celebrate the 600th anniversary of Serbia's national day which, ironically, marks the defeat of Serb forces by the Ottoman army at the Battle of Kosovo. About two million Serbs from Yugoslavia and around the world gathered at the site for the event which commemorated the loss as an enduring sacrifice of the Serbian nation for the benefit of Christian Europe. "Six centuries ago," Milosevic

said, "Serbia defended itself on Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. She found herself on the ramparts for the defense of European culture, religion and European society as a whole (Emmert, 1993)."

The Serbian epic poem declares, "Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian blood and comes not to fight at Kosovo...Let nothing grow from his hand...until his name is extinguished forever." Thus Kosovo represents for modern Serbs not only the signature event in the establishment of national identity, but also a gift for which Europe shows no gratitude. Furthermore, Serb leaders rationalize their contemporary genocidal violence in Bosnia as the continuation of their struggle against Islamic "fundamentalism," again in the face of an ungrateful Christian Europe.

Psychologically, there is a direct link between the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustashe genocide which killed tens of thousands of Serbs during World War II, and the loss at Kosovo, five centuries earlier. In each case, the Serbs perceived Europe as indifferent to their sacrifices. And each case nourished the profound sense of victimhood which tells Serbs that the world cares nothing for their sacrifices and losses. The majority of Serbs, who have kept Milosevic in power, appear live in an awesome loneliness in which they conclude that they may use any means to defend their identity from extinction.

Thus even as piecemeal deals are worked out by international negotiators between Serbia and its enemies in the current Yugoslav tragedy, the "Kosovo complex" retains the power to explode into a much more dangerous Balkan war which could involve Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Any strategy which aims to resolve the Balkan conflict once and for all, must, ironically, focus on aggressive and, yes, genocidal Serbia's powerful sense of historic victimhood. To neglect it is to keep the time bomb ticking.

The Uncivil War in Northern Ireland

Unlike Milosevic, The Irish Republican Army (IRA) does not command anything close to majority support either in the Republic or among the Catholics in Northern Ireland, but it endures as an expression of Irish victimhood in the historic relationship with England. When one understands the psychology of victimhood and its capacity to flourish generation after generation unless dealt with, it becomes easier to comprehend the meaning of the IRA's mortar attacks on Heathrow Airport, car bombs in the British Parliament's parking garage, the rockets fired at No. 10 Downing Street and every other incidence of IRA terrorism. And terrorism it is, denounced vigorously by the Irish government and the great majority of Irish Catholics in the Republic and in Northern Ireland.

But there is a remarkable persistence and determination in the hatred of the tiny minority of IRA militants against Britain. A

symbolic walk through the history of the Anglo-Irish relationship helps to explain why. Such a walk could be a valuable stimulus to English memory and a contribution to current peacemaking efforts for Northern Ireland.

By all available evidence, official Britain persists in avoiding or denying its historic moral responsibility to the Irish people for a centuries old record of extraordinary violence and repression. In light of the psychodynamic theory to be elaborated below, this contemporary resistance to acknowledgement of and contrition for past aggression keeps alive an Irish instinct toward violent defense of the collective self expressed, among other ways, in IRA terror.

Britain, in effect, refuses to disarm the Irish psychology of victimhood and thus undermines its hope to completely isolate IRA terrorism in the Irish body politic. There is no illusion here that a major healing process in the English-Irish relationship would automatically end IRA--or for that matter Protestant loyalist--terrorism. But the contention is that without a psychologically meaningful reconciliation effort, peace talks on Northern Ireland are not likely to be genuinely successful.

Any number of historical works could be used to "take the history" of English oppression of the Irish people, but The Story of the Irish Race, by Seamas MacManus (1993), first published in

1921 and in its 22nd printing in 1993, is representative. In a chapter called "Suppressing the Race," the author begins by saying, "Through these many dread centuries England's energies were concentrated upon an effort, seemingly, to annihilate the Irish race (p. 399)." MacManus quotes a letter from the eminent English conservative statesman and political philosopher, Edmund Burke:

"All the penal laws of that unparalleled code of oppression [imposed by Cromwell in the 17th century] were manifestly the effects of national hatred and scorn towards a conquered people whom the victors delighted to trample upon and were not at all afraid to provoke. They were not the effect of their fears, but of their security...whilst that temper prevailed, and it prevailed in all its force to a time within our memory, every measure was pleasing and popular just in proportion as it tended to harass and ruin a set of people who were looked upon as enemies to God and man; indeed, as a race of savages who were a disgrace to human nature itself (p. 399)."

MacManus states that worse than England's terrible sword was its "far more dreadful 'justice'....For many cruel centuries British law in Ireland only took notice of the native as a subject on which to exercise its repressive or exterminating power (p.

399)." We have the record of a 14th century trial with the defense saying there was no murder since the slain was only an Irishman and the prosecution saying that the man killed was not Irish by a Dane. A statute in the same century permitted an Englishman to execute a transgressing Irishman on sight without trial. The statute of Kilkenny of 1367 made it high treason for Anglo-Normans to dress like the Irish, speak the Irish language, practice Irish customs and law, or intermarry with the Irish.

In the 16th century, Elizabeth I's parliament enacted that every Roman Catholic priest found in Ireland after a certain date was guilty of rebellion, should be hanged, his bowels burned and his head impaled on a pole in a public place. A historian describes a nation once rich in agriculture as reduced to wretchedness under Elizabeth. "Out of every corner of the woods and glenns, [the Irish] came creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs could not bear them; they looked like anatomies of death; they spake like ghosts crying out of their graves; they did eate the dead carrions, happy where they could find them; yea, and one another soone after (p. 403)."

A 19th century English historian writes that, "The slaughter of Irishmen was looked upon as literally the slaughter of wild beasts. Not only men, but even women and children who fell into the hands of the English, were deliberately and systematically butchered (p. 404)." A Scottish Protestant writes of the

Elizabethan era saying, "Men, women and children wherever found were put indiscriminately to death. The soldiery was mad for blood. Priests were murdered at the altar, children at their mother's breast. The beauty of woman, the venerableness of age, the innocence of youth was no protection against these sanguinary demons in human form (p. 404)."

Oliver Cromwell landed at Dublin in 1647, with 17,000 men in a vengeful Puritan army, "Bible-reading, psalm-singing soldiers of God--fearfully daring, fiercely fanatical, papist hating....and looking on the inhabitants as idol-worshipping Canaanites who were cursed of God, and to be extirpated by the sword (P. 423)."

Cromwell's Christian soldiers slaughtered thousands of men, women and children at Drogheda, "in the streets, in the lanes, in the yards, in the gardens, in the cellars, on their own hearthstone (p. 424)."

At Wexford Cromwell made no distinction between defenseless civilians and armed soldiers, "nor could the shrieks and prayers of three hundred females who had gathered round the great Cross in the market-place, preserve them from the swords of these ruthless barbarians," quoting Lingard's History of England (p. 425).

Britain through the 17th century had conducted a policy of active genocide against the Irish race. In the 19th century there was a policy which could be called passive genocide.

By the 19th century, the potato was the primary food of the Irish

peasant majority. Cereals, meat, and dairy products were produced, but they were sold largely to England. When the potato blight hit in 1845, followed by complete crop failures in 1846 and 1848, the export pattern of other foods to England was maintained. Peasants died of starvation. Trevelyan, then permanent head of the English Treasury, is quoted as saying, "To feed or clothe the dying would be to interfere with the free market."

The Irish population was estimated at 8.5 million in 1848. By 1851, emigration and starvation had reduced it to 6 million. (Today the population stands at about 4.5 million.) The famine had a powerful psycho-social impact. There was a sense of cumulative degradation in both those who remained and those who emigrated to North America. A historian wrote, "The famine left hatred behind. Between Ireland and England the memory of what was done and endured has lain like a sword (Montville, 1982)."

At the risk of appearing glib and insensitive, this author suggests that a little bit of genocide goes a long way. This aphorism is offered as a shorthand insight on how rage and fear wrapped up in a psychology of victimhood feed on the memory of egregious injustice unacknowledged. It suggests that victimizers and even uninvolved nations and their leaders are likely to have events blow up in their faces unless they bravely confront the contemporary political and security consequences of unhealed

wounds from the past.

The Psychology of Victimhood and the Power of Acknowledgement

There are several essays on the origins and characteristics of ethnic and sectarian victimhood psychology in Volkan, et al, The Psychodynamics of International Relationships citd above. What follows is a summary adaptation of the basic points in the literature.

In the course of life, people experience varying levels of anxiety about their safety and survival. This is normal. By adhering to the social institutions of family, employment and community, human beings develop real and psychological defenses against unexpected hurts in life. These can include the unexpected death of a loved one, a criminal assault, a serious accident or disability, bankruptcy or war. Through membership in a social system, people believe they are protected from adversity by their faith in the system. They also acquire a sense of personal power and self-worth.

Victimization destroys this defensive structure. It exposes the individual victim or the victimized group or nation to unrelieved, conscious anxiety about real threats to their existence. It perpetuates and communicates from one generation to the next a strong sense of justice denied and a need for continuous vigilance in defense of the collective self. Time

does not heal the wounds of victims. They find it extremely difficult to trust and to get on with life. They are trapped in a process of arrested and uncompleted mourning for losses which have neither been recognized nor acknowledged by the perpetrators or their descendents.

There are three major characteristics of victimization. One, the individual, group or nation has experienced a major traumatic loss of freedom, physical or mental capacity, life, property, territory, security and/or faith in the future. Two, the violence or aggression which caused the loss cannot be justified by any sense of law or morality. And three, there is an enduring, if not always conscious, fear among the victims that the victimizers, or their descendents, by refusing to acknowledge their injustice and to express contrition, are only waiting for a chance to return and attack again.

History, of course, is the story of victims and victimizers. Indeed, the advent of ethnic and sectarian conflict resolution theory and practice, unofficial or "track two" diplomacy (Davidson and Montville, 1981-82, Montville, 1986), and the concepts of preventive engagement (Dellums, 1993), or constructive engagement (Perry, 1994), and preventive diplomacy (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) represent conceptual initiatives designed to head off the tragedies which engender victimization and the perpetuation of political violence.

The critical first step in an international conflict resolution process which aims at genuine reconciliation is acknowledgement by the aggressor group or nation or its successors if current leaders have no direct responsibility for the unjust actions. Acknowledgement is the act of explicitly describing and accepting moral responsibility for the violent acts or events which caused the traumatic losses to the victims. Explicit description of the acts for which guilt is acknowledged is necessary so that the victims can be assured that none of the violations are overlooked in the subsequent contrition and forgiveness transaction which is the ultimate aim of the healing process and which is the psychological foundation of genuine reconciliation (Montville, 1993).

Herman (1992) compiled an exhaustive case record of individual victims of trauma--kidnapping, torture, rape, physical and sexual abuse--and found that each required explicit description and acknowledgement of the violent events and clear confirmation by the authorities and therapists of the injustice of the acts, before the victims could begin to respond to therapy. As stated above in the third of three main components of victimhood psychology, victims have a deep rooted fear that without explicit acknowledgment that the acts were a crime by any standard, the aggressor is simply waiting for another opportunity to commit the crime.

Richard Hovannisian, a historian at UCLA, interviewed five hundred survivors of the wartime massacres and forced march of Armenians in Anatolia in 1915 and 1916 by the last of the Ottoman regimes. He compiled a tragic record of victimization of a people and said, simply, "We want Turkey to admit its guilt. We want acknowledgement. Our homelands, our property was all taken....The major grievance is the indifference of the world community. That this slaughter remained unpunished, and so did not serve as a preventative (Rosenfeld, 1985)." (The Turkish government acknowledged the occurrence of "a great tragedy" in 1915 but denied there was a deliberate Ottoman policy of genocide against the Armenians.)

Acknowledgement may require detailed preparation. One of the most dramatic and morally responsible acts of acknowledgement occurred in 1991, when the Chancellor of Austria, Franz Vranitsky, citing exhaustive research by an Austrian historian, accepted responsibility for Austria's complicity in the Holocaust. The historian had used state archives and other sources to unequivocally document the complicity of Austrian officials and non-governmental organizations, businesses and individuals in the Nazi campaign of persecution of the Jews in the late 1930's and of participation in the execution of the genocide during the war.

Up to the time of Vranitzky's revelation, in a speech televised live to the nation on July 6, Austrians had denied any complicity in the Holocaust, and, indeed, claimed that Austria had been Hitler's first victim. To his enduring credit, Vranitsky said in his speech, "Austrian politicians have always put off making this confession. I would like to do this explicitly, also in the name of the Austrian government, as a measure of the relationship we must have to our history, as a standard for the political culture of our country (quoted in Montville, 1993)."

(The author has worked for several years with Protestant and Catholic politicians and other leaders in Northern Ireland in conflict resolution processes and witnessed the continuing physical and moral costs of its sectarian violence. He has yearned for the moment when an English Vranitzky might come forward and acknowledge in as profound a way as the history of the Anglo-Irish relationship requires, the moral responsibility of Britain to the Irish people.)

Poland, Russia and the Katyn Forest Massacres

Yet another, extremely important example of detailed work to fill in the blank pages of history is the case of Russia's acknowledgment of its retroactive moral responsibility for the murder of 26,000 Polish officers and other imprisoned citizens in March, 1940. The event is known as the Katyn massacres for the name of the forest in Belarus where most of the Poles were held. The Polish-Russian collaboration on archival research,

Gorbachev's partial and then Yelstin's complete and unqualified acknowledgement of Soviet government responsibility for the order to execute the Poles stands as an impressive model of psychologically sensitive conflict resolution process.

Poland and Russia have had a historical relationship burdened with violence, conquest and accumulated grievance, the balance of which has been clearly on the Polish side. When Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to rehabilitate the Polish relationship with the Soviet Union during his revolutionary campaign of glasnost and perestroika, he found a willing response in the Polish Communist Party and also the intelligentsia. But a representation of the latter--writers, artists, journalists, philosophers and social scientists--published open letters to Gorbachev insisting that before his initiative to Poland could be accepted, the Soviet Union must acknowledge responsibility for the murder of the Polish officers whose bodies had been found in the Katyn Forest. The murders were seen as a cold-blooded act by Stalin to destroy the young leadership generation of an independent country, a selective, class genocide.

The Soviets had always admitted that the Poles at Katyn were part of a contingent of 15,000 reserve officers seized by the Red Army in 1939, when the Soviet Union absorbed eastern Poland under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. But Moscow insisted from the beginning that the massacre had been carried out by Hitler's troops in

1941, after the German Army overran the Soviet camp where the officers were interned. Successive Communist governments in Warsaw had backed the Soviet story, but accumulating evidence pointed to the NKVD as the murder instrument, acting on Stalin's orders.

In 1987, General Wojciech Jaruzelski announced that a joint Soviet-Polish commission was being established to examine the "blank spots" in the record of bilateral relations. Also to be studied were the 1939 Soviet-German treaty dividing Poland and the 1944 Warsaw uprising, in which many Polish and Western observers believe that Soviets paused to let the Nazis finish off the pro-Western Polish leadership before occupying the city.

In a remarkable account entitled "The Katyn Documents: Politics and History, " Louisa Vinton (1993) provides a detailed description of what is destined to be a classic model for an acknowledgement/contrition/forgiveness transaction between two groups or nations determined to reconcile and start a new relationship based on mutual trust restored through painstaking work. There is little doubt that beyond the genuinely liberal instinct of Gorbachev and his staff of brilliant reformers, Moscow was trying to shore up Jaruzelski and the legitimacy of the Polish party at a time of incipient upheaval in Eastern Europe. By March, 1989, the Soviet side was still studying the documents, but the Polish government officially announced its

conclusion that the Soviets were responsible for Katyn.

Gorbachev eventually accepted Soviet responsibility for Katyn in April 1990, after the Communist government in Warsaw had collapsed. But the admission was only partial, limiting the blame to the NKVD. It was not until October 14, 1992, that President Boris Yeltsin sent a special envoy to President Walesa with two sets of photocopied secret Soviet documents which proved that Stalin and several Politburo members signed Resolution number 144, dated March 5, 1940, instructing the NKVD to execute 14,700 Polish officers and other prisoners of war. The order included 11,000 other Polish civilians and state officials who were imprisoned by the Red Army in 1939. There were numerous other documents in Yeltsin's package including handwritten reports and memoranda from the Khrushchev period. Later, Moscow released other documents on Soviet-Polish relations including secret protocols from the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.

There is no suggestion that this unprecedented act of revelation of the most damning of state secrets was entirely an act of moral compulsion. Yeltsin's gift of documents also embarrassed Gorbachev by revealing critical material that Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev say he withheld from the Poles. And the act also served to further discredit the Communist Party in Russian and international opinion, a continuing goal of Yeltsin in his political struggles. Nonetheless, the release by Yeltsin, the

successor to the victimizers, and, almost as important, the delivery by special envoy of the Katyn documents to Lech Walesa, the formal representative of the victimized Polish nation, in a ceremony of acknowledgement and contrition was existentially an act of vision and extraordinary political courage. Certainly the reactions of Walesa attest to this judgment.

As Vinton (1993) reports, "The publication of the Politburo resolution had an enormous impact in Poland. President Walesa was visibly moved by the revelations and, wiping tears away, handed the microphone over to the poet Czeslaw Milosz during the announcement of the transfer of the documents (p. 21)." One Polish journalist wrote that the release had "epochal significance." The weekly "Politkya" said that "contemporary Polish-Russian relations in the moral sphere now have the chance to throw off the burden of the past." Walesa said that Yeltsin had made a "heroic decision" which none of his predecessors had had the courage to make.

Vinton (1993) shows admirable insight into the psychodynamic tasks in political conflict resolution in the following analysis:

"Many outside observers were puzzled by the strength of the Polish reaction, as the facts of the case had long been known, especially in Poland. The relevant point for the Poles, however, was moral and political, rather

than historical. A truth known to them but denied public confirmation for fifty years had at last been acknowledged. The revelations reinforced the sense that Poland's relations with Russia could only become normal once all the facts about the past had been revealed (p. 24, emphasis added)."

Justice in Times of Transition

It is encouraging to note that an American non-governmental organization which is neither self-consciously associated with conflict resolution nor psychodynamically oriented has had a psychologically important conflict resolution impact in several countries in transition from dictatorship to democracy. The ~~Foundation for a Civil Society in New York~~ supports a major ~~program called the Project on Justice in Times of Transition.~~ Conceived and chaired by Timothy Phillips, a Boston-based public policy consultant, ~~the Justice Project brings together political leaders, policy makers, jurists, human rights activists and writers to confer on basic issues of civil liberties, human rights and national reconciliation in former Communist states of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet republics, the Baltic states as well as South Africa and Latin America.~~

The original focus of the Justice Project was the protection of civil liberties and respect for the rule of law during the transition from totalitarianism to democracy in the former

Communist countries of Europe. The Project soon came to focus on the fundamental task of "coming to terms with the past," which included confronting the legacy of human rights abuses. The use and function of truth commissions was explored with Eastern Europeans being informed by former Argentinian President Raul Alfonsin and former Chilean Truth Commission member Jose Zalaquett on the experience of their two countries.

Launched at a major conference in Salzburg in 1992, the Project helped organize an unprecedented three day meeting in January, 1993, in San Salvador called "Reconciliation in Times of Transition" which involved President Alfredo Christiani and FMLN military chieftain Juaquin Villalobos, Defense Minister Emilio Ponce and senior representatives of the military, business, government, labor, NGO and former guerilla sectors of Salvadorian society. The very presence of once bitter enemies in one conference hall caused veteran observers of Salvadoran politics and warfare to shake their heads in wonder and disbelief. In June, 1994, at a similar Justice Project conference in Nicaragua, Oscar Santamaria, Foreign Minister of El Salvador, cited the January, 1993 meeting as one of two key events contributing to national resonciliation in his country.

While the importance of acknowledging historic wrongs was emphasized by some of the plenary speakers, including this writer, and all Salvadoran presenters spoke of the need for

healing the wounds of the past, there were no acknowledgements of responsibility for specific acts of aggression. Unlike the Katyn Forest case, the deaths in El Salvador were perhaps too recent, and the perpetrators too concerned about criminal liability to be frank about their roles. However, part of the acknowledgement function had been carried out by two truth commissions, one international and one domestic, whose findings had been generally known to the public and were to result shortly after the conference in public condemnation of senior military officers and certain guerilla leaders. The former were forced into early retirement and the latter were declared ineligible for political office.

The Project on Justice in Times of Transition has become a transferable consultation in increasing demand. Czech President Havel and Hungarian President Gombaszegi are ~~strong supporters of~~ ~~the Justice Project as a mechanism for reconciliation.~~ ~~The~~ Project was invited to South Africa by Nelson Mandela to assist in a post-election healing process. In March, 1994, the Project helped organize a conference in Capetown which introduced its model of transitional justice to a high-level multi-racial audience of south African opinion leaders. And within two months, ~~the new Mandela government established a national~~ ~~commission on truth and reconciliation modelled on the Chilean~~ ~~example which had been presented at the conference.~~ Finally, the Justice Project is helping the Slovak Republic to inculcate the

values of civil society, and, quite remarkably, has brought national leaders in theses democratizing processes in Guatemala and El Salvador to Moscow to work with their moral and intellectual counterparts on parallel projects.

Contrition and Forgiveness

Clearly one of the most daunting tasks in the psychodynamic approach to international conflict resolution is to persuade victimizers or their descendents to offer meaningful, unambiguous and unqualified apology to the victimized group or nation. There have been inspiring cases such as President Yeltsin's initiative with the Katyn documents, Chancellor Vranitsky's speech to the Austrian people, and President Walesa's formal apology to the Jewish people for Polish antisemitism and complicity in the Holocaust offered in the Israeli Knesset and other examples at lower or non-official levels (Montville, 1989, 1993).

Beyond the fact that meaningful apology requires moral courage, there is the inhibition that the victimized individual, group or nation might use the apology as a weapon to exact crippling reparations or to visit political revenge upon the leaders or body offering the apology. Many observers of the Turkish-Armenian case believe one of the obstacles to unambiguous acceptance by Turkey of responsibility for the 1915-16 massacres of Armenians is the fear that Armenians would demand massive

financial compensation. An official of the Russian Foreign Ministry who supports a Katyn-style turn-over to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia of incriminating Poliburo documents on Stalin's Baltic annexation decisions, told this writer in April 1994, that Moscow could not do so because of fears that Latvia and Estonia would use the acknowledgement to justify the forced repatriation of their large Russian-speaking minorities.

In a non-political case which otherwise parallels the ethnic and sectarian conflicts reviewed in this chapter, the dilemma of legal and political liability competed with the moral compulsion to accept responsibility and to apologize. Catholic bishops of Ottawa and Toronto, who fully accepted the Church's symbolic responsibility for sexual and physical victimization of boys in certain Christian Brothers schools in Canada between 1930 and 1974, and who had met with and apologized to many of the victims nevertheless worried about potential legal liabilities (Roche, 1993). The mediator arranged for the organization of the victimized men to affirm that they were approaching the Church on pastoral rather than legal grounds. The resulting mediated agreement which included reasonable compensation is remarkable for forthrightly stating the role of apology in a healing process for victims of traumatic loss. Thus,

~~"Apologies are at the heart of the reconciliation process"~~ In fact, healing from the personal

devastation of abuse cannot occur without apologies. Dedicated to reconciliation and healing, this Agreement wishes to facilitate apologies by those responsible where injuries are found to have occurred as a result of the process for validation of claims established in this Agreement. It is the aim of this Agreement to restore trust in the spiritual and secular institutions of society (Roche, 1993, p. 59)."

Despite the difficulties in carrying out contrition/forgiveness transactions between victimizers and their victims, there are signs that the idea is becoming more powerful in the public discussion of the resolution of protracted ethnic and sectarian conflict. The American writer Cynthia Ozick joined the debate in the wake of the murder of Muslim worshippers by a deranged Israeli settler at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron in February 1994. In an op-ed piece in the "New York Times," Ozick urged contrition as a primary assertion of effective leadership, an example of the political power of sorrow, shame and grief.

"What is required...as an element of realpolitik is an understanding that mutual contrition, even more than the resolution of issues of acreage and border patrols, must be the next step in the [Israel-Palestinian] peace process....Hardheaded politicians will no doubt scoff at the notion of mutual contrition as a way of...enhancing

the negotiations. They will think it too soft a proposal, smacking of the useless high ground, unserious, devoid of pragmatism. But no way...can be more serious, more allied to truth-telling, more effective and more profoundly practical (March 2, 1994, p. A15)."

No less a student of the meaning of Jewishness in the modern era that Hannah Arendt (1958) has written that forgiveness was essential to human freedom. "Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start over again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new." Lawrence Weschler, a staff writer for "The New Yorker," and participant in the Project on Justice in Times of Transition, quoted Arendt and in an eloquence of his own wrote

"True forgiveness is achieved in community: it is something people do for each other and with each other--and, at a certain point, for free. It is history working itself out as grace, and it can be accomplished only in truth. That truth, however, is not merely knowledge: it is acknowledgement, it is a coming-to-terms-with, and it is a labor (April 5, 1993, pp. 4,6)."

Cynthia Ozick, the late Hannah Arendt and Lawrence Weschler each in their distinct way have played a leadership role--literally showing the way--in trying to instruct the broad public in the essence of peacemaking. Each has recognized the difficulty for senior political leaders of consistently or even intermittantly exerting moral leadership in the raucus and sometimes violent arena of politics. And so there seems to be a constant need for moral-- lifesaving--leadership from other sectors of society.

As the pioneers of the new field of international conflict management and resolution walk toward the outstretched arms of groups and nations desperately seeking help to escape their past and present tragedies, it seems clear that a moral task devolves on them in the process. And that task is to respect the suffering of their clients by learning what must be learned about their history and their losses and helping them to move through the processes necessary to come to terms with their past. If conflict resolution practitioners go about their work with a compassion informed by profound knowledge and skill, they can help people to heal and get on with the rest of their lives. And they will be able to take justifiable satisfaction with their accomplishments.

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*Draft, incomplete data.

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World Vision Relief & Development, Inc.

**RWANDA/BURUNDI RECONCILIATION INITIATIVE
CONCEPT PAPER**

November 15, 1994 to November 14, 1996

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October 17, 1994

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the aftermath of the humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda where an estimated 500,000 people have been killed, international assistance efforts are gathering momentum—feeding displaced persons and refugees, caring for unaccompanied children, supporting farmers who are trying to resume food production, and rekindling a basic health infrastructure among other vital tasks. However, despite the progress being made on the recovery front, there remains a foreboding malaise among Rwandans and international aid workers alike, that all of these efforts could go for naught unless the root causes of the crisis—hate and fear—are addressed. The situation is discouraging as the perpetrators of the atrocities, now largely outside the country, have shown little sense of remorse or acknowledgement of wrongdoing. In short, without genuine reconciliation, the massive genocide the world has recently witnessed is bound to occur again, as history has demonstrated.

Observers inside and outside of Rwanda have recognized the vital need for reconciliation, and this has been widely discussed across many circles, including at World Vision. However, while many have identified the need for reconciliation, few people or organizations know what they can constructively do to contribute to a solution. In grappling with this question, World Vision has begun a dialogue with professionals experienced in other conflict resolution situations in general and Mr. Joe Montville, a leading thinker and writer in the field of conflict resolution from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in particular.

Through his study, analysis, and participation in conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, Mr. Montville has identified a series of steps that have been effective in facilitating a conflict resolution process. Using this framework, coupled with its own experience and presence in the region, World Vision is proposing to support a systematic reconciliation process in Rwanda and Burundi.

While this concept paper covers a two-year time frame, World Vision anticipates being involved in this process for a much longer period, perhaps up to a generation, given the deep-seated, attitudinal factors that are underlying this conflict. As the reconciliation process will ultimately affect all of the citizens in Rwanda and Burundi, the beneficiaries from this initiative would be the combined total population of these countries of 13 million people. The overall cost of this initiative is expected to be \$700,728.

II. BACKGROUND

Widespread carnage, precipitated by the suspicious plane crash killing Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira on April 6, 1994 left an unknown number of Rwandans dead and mutilated. Estimates vary greatly, though close observers speculate that some 500,000–1,000,000 people may have been massacred in the time since the plane crash. Many more people have been displaced internally (an estimated 1.3 million), are in hiding, or have become refugees (over 450,000) in the neighboring countries of Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire. Those who have survived are suffering from trauma wounds, particularly on their arms and heads; shock at the loss of loved ones and the violence they have witnessed; fear of assaults; and uncertainty over how they will provide for themselves.

In the hours and days following the plane crash, most of the moderate Hutu and Tutsi leadership were systematically targeted for execution. Independent United Nations and humanitarian assistance staff have not been spared, with numerous staff dying when they tried to intervene or assist. Most observers agree that the minority Tutsi population has suffered the majority of deaths. With the onset of the killings, the dormant civil war in Rwanda was rekindled. By mid-July, the rebel Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF) gained control

of the country, causing an estimated 1.5 million Hutus, including the bulk of the military and political leadership, to flee to Zaire, where they remain today.

Underlying causes for the ethnic conflict are complex and long-standing. There has been an established caste system in Rwanda, divided along ethnic lines since the 17th century. The ruling class were the minority Tutsi (14 percent) who controlled the poorer, mostly agrarian Hutus (85 percent). Forty years of colonization of the region by Belgium starting in 1919 deepened this class and ethnic division. The domination of the majority by the minority without any institutionalized opportunities for change created widespread and deep-seated resentment among the Hutu. While the Hutu ultimately gained control over the government in 1959, retributions and counter-retributions have continued in various forms since independence in 1961. The transition of power to the Hutus led to the exodus of roughly 40–70% of Rwanda's Tutsi population between 1959 and 1964. Many of these went to Uganda, where a large Tutsi refugee population has remained until the present. The stateless status of these Tutsi was an important underlying catalyst for today's friction.

Other periods of intense ethnic violence occurred in 1959, 1961, 1963, 1973, and during the civil war of 1990–1993. However, none of those previous episodes were as widespread and condensed in their killing as the present. The issue of overpopulation is undoubtedly a contributing element to the current crisis. With a population density of 255/km², Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa. As some 93 percent of the inhabitants earn their subsistence through agriculture (with an average landholding of .5 ha), competition for available land area is intense.

World Vision is currently operationally involved in agriculture, health, targeted food assistance, care for unaccompanied children, and refugee assistance in Rwanda and eastern Zaire, covering six geographic areas and benefitting approximately 635,000 people. The value of this humanitarian assistance operation is roughly \$15 million. As is its tradition, **World Vision intends to follow its immediate emergency response in Rwanda with a long-term commitment aimed at ameliorating the underlying social and economic conditions that have contributed to the current crisis.**

World Vision's response to Rwanda was facilitated by its involvement in Rwanda prior to this crisis, assisting Burundi refugees in the Butare and Kibungo prefectures of the south. In addition, World Vision has large ongoing programs in Uganda and Tanzania that have given World Vision built-in staging points for the current emergency operations. The Rwandan effort has also been assisted through World Vision's established emergency programs in the East Africa region in Somalia and Sudan.

World Vision has been involved in reconciliation efforts in Burundi through local churches following the ethnic conflict that claimed an estimated 50,000 lives there in October 1993. **Recognizing that the recourse to violence to resolve political or ethnic differences was a never-ending solution, the local church leaders set out to try and shift public attitudes towards greater tolerance.** With this aim in mind, the church leaders with the financial and technical support of World Vision, produced a series of radio broadcasts for the general population on topics concerning alternatives to violence to resolve differences, valuing diversity in a modern society, the never-ending cycle of violence and revenge, respect for human life, the importance of stability for economic progress to occur, etc. With the cooperation of the national radio station, these programs have been airing for 14 hours per week since early in 1994.

While World Vision does not have extensive experience in the arena of conflict resolution, it is aware that **its extensive grass-roots linkages through the local churches in these overwhelmingly Christian nations present it a rare opportunity to reach nonpolitical leaders who carry the moral influence of their communities and are committed to reaching a solution.** Moreover, calling upon Christian values, which extend to followers of all ethnic and political persuasions in these conflicts, offers an immediate point of common ground. Finally, as

researchers in the field of conflict resolution have recognized, non-official channels of dialogue or track II diplomacy are often the most effective in intra-national disputes such as this. This effort would be consistent with that emphasis.

III. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

Goal: To help create a social environment among the general population in Burundi and Rwanda that is supportive of peaceful conflict resolution.

Objectives:

1. Positive attitudes toward peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict among the general population will be expressed by at least 70 percent of people surveyed in October 1996.
2. There will be public acknowledgement by respected Hutu and Tutsi leaders of past wrongs committed by their respective populations by October 1996.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The conflict resolution process to be pursued will involve a series of steps aimed at bringing leaders of each of the warring ethnic groups to a point of acknowledging past wrongs committed by their brethren, expressing regret, and fostering forgiveness on the part of the population as a whole for harmful actions taken in the past. This process will be implemented by working with respected nonpolitical leaders from each side of the conflict to examine the past, come to an understanding of why there have been acts of violence between the groups, and jointly develop a strategy for changing public attitudes that lead to attacks and retribution between Hutus and Tutsis.

A. Planning

The first steps will be to meet with leaders of local communities, church leaders, government officials, and national NGOs to gain a better understanding of the issues involved, program possibilities, and potential partners in the country suffering conflict. This essential first step provides a reconciliation effort with a initial "lay of the land" as to what the real issues are among the opposing communities, as well as which individuals and entities involved exert most influence in the conflict.

Actions Taken:

- World Vision has already begun the process of collecting information and networking with local leaders—making key contacts with the African Evangelistic Enterprise (AEE) in Rwanda, the Protestant Council of Rwanda (CPR), and the Catholic Rwandan Bishop's Council. All of these groups have indicated interest in pursuing a reconciliation strategy.
- James Mageria, World Vision's Vice President for Africa, has been actively engaged in the dialogue, drawing on his own contacts in the region, and is currently in Rwanda, travelling with respected regional leaders in the effort to meet and talk to Rwandan leaders who would be part of the reconciliation strategy.
- World Vision has identified an individual, David Montague, who will serve as the on-the-ground point person for continuing discussions in Rwanda. David is the former President of the AEE—U.S. Office and, given his previous relationships from living in East and Southern Africa, brings many pertinent associations to the task.

B. Selection of Leadership Group

A group of leaders representing different sectors of each community, not to exceed 15 people, would be recruited and then selected through a three- to five-day problem-solving workshop. Leaders would be sought among political activists, the intelligentsia, church leaders, former military, teachers, the medical and mental health community, trade unions, print and electronic media, business, and the arts. A key criteria in the selection of each individual is that they carry a far-reaching projection of moral authority within their respective communities. In addition, these individuals would clearly acknowledge the individual and human rights of the other side and value them as people. Most importantly, the leadership group should be willing to commit themselves to working to develop the intellectual and moral basis of a settlement of the conflict.

The workshop is an intensive engagement that aims to facilitate revelation of the underlying fears and resentments driving ethnic tensions while simultaneously promoting the development of "working trust" and personal alliances among the multi-ethnic leaders. The workshop would eventually evolve into a steering committee for the overall reconciliation effort. It would provide a sounding board on the status of intercommunal relationships, as well as a prescriptive mechanism for proposing specific programs.

The selection of the leadership group is considered the most important step, as they will act as a steering group for the reconciliation effort and therefore will influence all other actions taken in this process.

Action Steps:

- As a follow-up to the planning process, nominations of leadership group committee candidates would be made from the network of contacts developed. Candidates would be interviewed to determine their commitment to the principles of the reconciliation learning process. Additional assessments as to the moral influence these leaders would have with their respective communities would be made at this stage. Decisions on who is selected would be made by a committee including local independent leadership, David Montague, and an experienced reconciliation consultant(s) after the three- to five-day problem-solving workshop.

C. Walk Through History

A small commission of respected historians from the groups in conflict is to be recruited. After initially creating a sense of safe space for the participants, the chosen historians will "walk through the history" of their relationship together. The commission's task, begun initially with several consultants as third-party facilitators, will be to underline the historic grievances that are contended to have gone unacknowledged and unatoned for and to acknowledge the wounds for which their people have been responsible. The record of the commission's deliberations will, first, become the "agenda for healing" in the interethnic relationship, and second, will be the basis for the revision of published histories in general and school texts at all levels in particular.

The "walk through history" is a tool to achieve the broader aim of getting both sides to begin acknowledging responsibility for group disrespect, repression, crimes, and aggressions in the past. *Acknowledgement* of the injustice of the acts committed is a prerequisite for dealing with the genuine fear of future ethnic-based atrocities and therefore the incentive for preemptive actions by the threatened side—referred to as

"victimhood psychology," an attitude that inhibits concrete movement towards reconciliation.

Another means of establishing the acknowledgement of past wrongs is through "~~public commissions~~," which formally verify and document atrocities committed. While this level of activity is normally taken at the national and international level, it tangentially is achieving the same end of moving a people towards acknowledgement of evil. This ~~step in the reconciliation process allows for justice (as supported by the international observers) to be carried out and removes the compulsion of the aggrieved group to take revenge.~~

One of the most difficult tasks to international conflict resolution is to persuade victimizers or their descendants to offer a meaningful, unambiguous, and unqualified apology to the victimized group or nation. Such an apology coming from a national leader who is seen as speaking for a people requires moral courage. However, apologies are at the heart of the reconciliation process and long-term resolution of conflict. Despite the difficulties in offering public *contrition* from victimizers to their victims, there are signs that the idea is becoming more powerful in the public discussion of the resolution of protracted ethnic and sectarian conflict. Contemporary examples of public apology include President Yeltsin's admission of Soviet responsibility for the Katyn massacre in World War II, President Walesa's formal apology to the Jewish people for Polish anti-semitism and complicity in the holocaust, Chancellor of Austria Franz Vranitsky's accepting responsibility for Austria's collusion in the extermination of Jews, and public apologies offered by the Government of Japan to the various peoples in Asia it oppressed during WWII.

Forgiveness completes the reconciliation process and allows a people to realize freedom from their past and move on. With the acknowledgement and contrition offered by a group's former tormentors, the victimized people are more secure in their need to ensure the wrong committed has been publicly recognized and established in history. With this assurance completed, the openness and ability of antagonists to forgive rather than seek revenge is vastly improved.

Action Steps:

- Building on the experience of other reconciliation initiatives, the identification of able, honest, and courageous historians can be assisted through the use of international historians who would spend time identifying and speaking with potential participants. The identification of likely candidates would be assisted through contacts during the planning stage as well.

D. Agenda for Healing

~~At an appropriate point in the process, the "agenda for healing" developed by the historians will be presented to the leadership group in a problem-solving workshop for the purpose of trying to set into motion the most effective acknowledgement/contrition/forgiveness transactions that are feasible.~~ The steering committee would also consider the most effective means via mass media and otherwise to make the findings of the historians available to the public. It would also consider proposals to key political leaders for major speeches, declarations and symbolic acts of acknowledgement of past wrongs, the mourning of losses, and appropriate expressions of regret.

Action Steps:

- Facilitate leadership group in conceptualization and articulation of "agenda for healing." This will serve as the implementation plan that will be followed thereafter.
- In the articulation of a reconciliation agenda, key players who will be responsible for certain roles must be identified. Coordination of whatever activities are decided upon will be necessary to ensure coherence to the established strategy is maintained.

E. Information Dissemination Strategies

Once a reconciliation strategy has been developed by the leadership group, there are numerous vehicles to disseminate this message. Some common techniques include:

- **Using news and information media, theater, art, and educational programs** to reach the general population and promote alternative means of solving disputes.
- **Establishing a network of NGOs**—To further expand and disseminate the adages of reconciliation, a network of NGOs engaged in projects that bring ethnic groups together in the pursuit of mutually beneficial goals is to be formed and supported. Projects that are seen as benefitting all sectors of a society are particularly effective in this technique (e.g., water resource development in the Arab-Israeli dispute). This network would serve as a transmission vehicle to everyday citizens for new insights and new ways of thinking about the relationship between ethnic groups, which would be generated in the leadership group and commission of historians.
- **Network of clergy**—Similar to the creation of a NGO network, creating a network of ethnically diverse clergy who accepted the task of using their moral authority for dialogue and healing would provide another avenue to disseminate a message of reconciliation and mutual respect. Given their daily opportunities to communicate to the grass-roots of a community, the engagement of church leaders in this mechanism of the effort could generate significant impacts in attitudinal shifts. Likewise, the clergy could benefit from the insights and perspective of the steering committee and historians.

Action Steps:

- Information dissemination is a key area in which World Vision could make a valuable contribution through funding support, as well as applying its media resource capacity.
- Build on the experience gained in Burundi where World Vision is currently supporting partner agencies ~~in the development of radio programs on the value of tolerance, the futility of violence as a means of settling disputes, and promoting an attitude of reconciliation in general~~. These programs are of a high quality and through arrangements with local radio stations are aired over 14 hours per week. Given the similarity in ethnic make-up between Burundi and Rwanda, these broadcasts could be copied and used in the reconciliation dissemination strategy for Rwanda. This would save on production costs and time.
- The production of additional radio broadcasts may also be required. The AEE, in collaboration with the Rwanda Protestant Council, has expressed interest and has the basic resources (human and technical) to produce additional reconciliation programming. Financial support for the production of the programming and the purchase of air time would be required.

- Negotiations with the national radio station in Rwanda to buy air time would be required. Given that there is only one main radio station, support for smaller emissions should also be considered. Another alternative is to work with the French NGO Reporters Without Borders which is currently broadcasting news and health information in Rwanda and Zaire in the effort to counteract earlier ethnically biased reporting, assist in the public health campaigns, and give refugees information about conditions in Rwanda.
- In addition to radio broadcasts, a reconciliation strategy could also effectively use the print media through editorials, front page articles, or ads. The AEE indicates that such articles are already being written and will soon be ready. Financial support primarily involving access to computers and costs for space is required to support this activity.
- A national conference among church leaders in Rwanda would be a method of organizing the nation's clergy around common reconciliation themes, which they could take back to their congregations. This would be consistent with the networking of religious leaders suggested in the conceptual framework. If deemed appropriate, the conference could be facilitated by a high-profile church leader such as Desmond Tutu.
- Support the costs for the revision and dissemination of history books in Rwanda and Burundi based on the findings from the historians' "walk through history."

F. Training in the Art and Science of Conciliation, Mediation, and Interest-Based Negotiation

In the attempt to introduce and institutionalize a mindset of peaceful conflict resolution, training workshops on the concept and mechanics of mediation are facilitated. Ideally, these are organized around specific areas such as management/labor relations, local government authorities, and law enforcement officials. In addition to contributing to improved resolution of conflict in these specific tasks, the skills learned would eventually become part of the social fabric. These workshops would be facilitated by experienced mediators and trainers.

Action Steps:

- Organize regional workshops of lay and religious leaders who have daily contact with the general population and who could be in positions of mediating conflict (i.e., teachers, nurses, doctors, local government officials, sports figures, university professors, farmer leaders, etc.).
- To assist children in coping with the trauma they have endured through the violence, displacement, separation, and anxiety over the future, World Vision has been planning for the introduction of counseling services to the unaccompanied minors it is currently caring for. The costs and cultural barriers of bringing in psychiatrists to provide one-on-one counseling are seen as prohibitive. However, the current strategy is to conduct training workshops among the caretakers or other adult authorities who have contact with the children. In this way, these figures of stability in the lives of the children will possess some skills with which to talk to the children. Getting the children to talk about their experiences rather than hold them in is seen as the most essential achievement. While this initiative is being administered under the unaccompanied minors sector, it would overlap with a broad reconciliation strategy and therefore could be targeted as such.

G. Implementation Plan Timeline

Activity	August- November '94	December '94- May '95	June- November '95	December '95- May '96	June- November '96
Planning	***	***			
Selection of Leadership Group		***			
Walk through History		***	***		
Agencies for Healing			***	***	
Information Dissemination	***	***	***	***	***
Mediation Training				***	***

V. MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING


As the initiatives outlined above rely heavily on local leadership and community institutions for their implementation, World Vision does not expect to have a large number of staff in Rwanda managing this activity. Rather, World Vision sees its role as a facilitator of the process and, in fact, sees its remaining in the background as essential for the long-term success of this effort.

World Vision will have a senior-level team leader to coordinate its reconciliation initiatives. As mentioned earlier, this individual will be David Montague, who has an extensive institutional network in the region as well as significant negotiating experience. He will be assisted by two deputies who will participate in the initial canvassing of local ideas and leadership in the early stages of the process as well as follow up on discussions with key players during the course of the dialogue to keep momentum moving forward. Given the numerous meetings and workshops this process would involve, World Vision would engage a full-time administrator to organize the planning and undertaking of each of these events. This initiative would have an administrative support person as well.

The progress the initiative was having on public attitudes towards reconciliation in Burundi and Rwanda would be assessed through biennial surveys that would be conducted. These would be undertaken in a culturally appropriate and sensitive manner using cluster samples of the general population randomly selected or through responses provided by focus groups.

SRSG's Mission to Addis Ababa: Briefing Notes

Further to my note of 8 December on the above subject, and with reference, in particular, to the proposal in paragraph 5 of the note that the SRSG meet with the African Group accredited to the OAU, I attach an information note showing the African countries contributing troops to UNAMIR. In the SRSG's meeting with the OAU Secretary-General and/or African Group, he may wish, on behalf of the U.N., to express appreciation for Africa's contribution to UNAMIR in this domain.



Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser
10 December 1994

cc: SRSG
ED
DFC

AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UNAMIR AS AT 9/12/94

A. FORMED TROOPS

<u>NAME OF COUNTRY</u>	<u>NO. OF TROOPS</u>
1. ETHIOPIA	807
2. FRAFBATT (CHAD, CONGO, GUINEA BISSAU, NIGER, SENEGAL)	486
3. GHANA	820
4. MALAWI	169
5. MALI	200
6. NIGERIA	329
7. TUNISIA	837
8. ZAMBIA	447

A TOTAL OF 12 AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING 4,095 TROOPS OUT OF A CURRENT UNAMIR TOTAL OF 5,909.

B. MILITARY OBSERVERS

1. GHANA	56
2. GUINEA	15
3. GUINEA BISSAU	1
4. KENYA	2
5. MALAWI	8
6. MALI	29
7. NIGERIA	16
8. TUNISIA	15
9. ZAMBIA	10
10. ZIMBABWE	26

A TOTAL OF 10 AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING 178 MILITARY OBSERVERS OUT OF A CURRENT UNAMIR TOTAL OF 301.

C. CIVILIAN POLICE

1. DJIBOUTI	15
2. GHANA	10
3. MALI	10
4. NIGERIA	10
5. ZAMBIA	10

A TOTAL OF 5 AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING 55 CIVILIAN POLICE OUT OF A CURRENT UNAMIR TOTAL OF 80.

NOTE FOR THE FILE

On 22 November 1994, the SRSG attended a meeting with the following UNHCR officials: Mr. Dennis McNamara (Director, Division of International Protection), Mr. Sanda Kimbimbi (Senior Legal Officer for Africa), Mr. W.R. Urasa (Representative for Rwanda), and Mr. W. van Hovell (Deputy Representative for Rwanda). The Force Commander and a Political/Legal Officer were also present.

The meeting commenced with a general overview of the situation of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries and displaced persons within Rwanda, and the threats posed to humanitarian relief operations in these camps. Mr. McNamara emphasised that the focus of the repatriation efforts should be to ensure the safety and security of the first group of repatriated refugees, as this would have a significant bearing on the remainder of the refugee population's desire for repatriation.

In response to an enquiry made by the SRSG, both Mr. McNamara and Mr. Urasa assured him that UNHCR's policy was to provide assistance to both refugees and displaced persons, regardless of the particular category to which a returnee belonged. They added that due to recent world events, UNHCR had become increasingly involved in assisting both groups of people and, in fact, views the situation of displaced persons as a "litmus test" for the entire reintegration process. In this regard, the SRSG suggested that the number of people being assisted in their return should not be underestimated (approximately 30,000 internally for the month of November).

The next issue to be addressed was the moral dilemma involved in providing humanitarian relief to criminal and armed elements within the camps, and the syphoning off of relief supplies by these individuals. Mr. McNamara assured the participants that the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees governing UNHCR's mandate specifically excludes criminals from receiving aid, but that the UNHCR did not have the necessary political and military means of enforcing the exclusion clauses in the refugee camps. Until such measures could be implemented effectively, they were obliged to continue feeding and protecting the entire camp populations, regardless of the ensuing consequences. The Force Commander added that there was a need to define with greater precision which individuals constitute "criminal" elements in order to distinguish between those who are deserving of protection and those who are not.

All the participants agreed that now that the international community's focus had shifted from the crisis phase to the long-term development needs of the country, the humanitarian relief agencies faced more difficulties due to the problems of donor fatigue and the misconceived perception that the country had now become properly functional.

Mr. McNamara concluded by stating that UNHCR was very supportive of the role of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and that it intended to work closely, but discreetly, with the Tribunal and the human rights teams. He reiterated the importance of obtaining some indictments of war criminals, and stated that the Deputy Prosecutor of the Tribunal for Rwanda had yet to be nominated. The SRSG advised that it would be preferable not to have a West African francophone appointed to this position due to certain perceptions held by the current Rwandan Government.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ladan M. Rafii', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Ladan M. Rafii
Political/Legal Officer
23 November 1994