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Mr. Juby N 9/3

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ETATPRIORITE

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LEO ;

MOST IMMEDIATE 1647 DAYAL FROM SEC GEN. FOLLOWING CABLE SENT
DIRECTLY TO KASAVUBU:

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

AU COURS DES DISCUSSIONS QUI ONT EU LIEU APRES LES INCIDENTS
DEPLORABLES DE MATADI, D'APRES LES RENSEIGNEMENTS QUE

J'AI RECUS, CERTAINES CONDITIONS ONT ETE ENONCEES TOUCHANT LES ;
P2 ;

ACTIVITIES DE L'ONU AU CONGO, LA LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT,
LE DEPLOIEMENT DES TROUPES, L'USAGE DE CERTAINES FACILITES,
ETC... JE TIENS, A CET EGARD, A APPELER VOTRE ATTENTION SUR
CERTAINS ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DE LA PRESENCE DE L'ONU AU
CONGO. BIEN ENTENDU, NOUS ;

P3 ;

ENONS PARFAITEMENT COMPTE DU FAIT QUE L'ACTION INITIALE

replied

DE L'ONU A ETE ENTREPRISE COMME SUITE A UNE DEMANDE DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO. MAIS JE SUIS CERTAIN QUE, DE VOTRE COTE, VOUS SAVEZ AUSSI QUE CETTE ACTION A ETE ENTREPRISE PARCE QU'ELLE A ETE JUGEE ;

P4 ;

NECESSAIRE EN RAISON DE L'EXISTENCE D'UNE MENACE A

LA PAIX ET A LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES. C'EST AINSI QUE, DANS SA RESOLUTION DU 22 JUILLET 1960 ET DANS SES RESOLUTIONS ULTERIEURES, LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE A EXPRESSEMENT LIE LE MAINTIEN DE L'ORDRE PUBLIC AU CONGO AU MAINTIEN DE ;

P5 ;

LA PAIX ET DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES ET A INDIQUE CLAIREMENT QUE LE FONDEMENT ESSENTIEL DE LA DECISION DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE ETAIT LE SOUCI DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ET DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES. LES CONSIDERATIONS REGISSANT LES RELATIONS ENTRE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO ET L'ONU, ;

P6 ;

PAR CONSEQUENT, NE DOIVENT PAS ETRE ENVISAGEES UNIQUEMENT COMPTE TENU DE LA DEMANDE DU GOUVERNEMENT ET DE CE QUI EN DECOULE. LE STATUT, LES DROITS ET LES FONCTIONS DE L'ONU SONT ESSENTIELLEMENT DETERMINEES PAR LE FAIT QUE L'ACTION EN QUESTION A ETE ENTREPRISE POUR LUTTER CONTRE UNE ;

P7 ;

MENACE INTERNATIONALE A LA PAIX. CET ELEMENT PREND UNE IMPORTANCE PARTICULIERE LORSQU'IL S'AGIT D'INTERPRETER L'ENGAGEMENT QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO A PRIS LE 27 JUILLET 1960 ET QUAND IL EST CONVENU QUE "LORSQU'IL EXERCERA SES DROITS SOUVERAINS A PROPOS DE TOUTE QUESTION CONCERNANT LA PRESENCE ;

P8 ;

ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA FORCE DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO, IL SE GUIDERA, DE BONNE FOI, SUR LE FAIT QU'IL A DEMANDE A L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES UNE ASSISTANCE

DE SECURITE DES 14 ET 22 ;

P9 ;

JUILLET 1961 SEMICLN IL DECLARE EGALEMENT QU'IL ASSURERA LA LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT A L'INTERIEUR DU PAYS POUR LA FORCE ET ACCORDERA LES PRIVILEGES ET IMMUNITES NECESSAIRES A TOUT LE PERSONNEL ASSOCIE AUX ACTIVITES DE LA FORCE''. VOUS NOTEREZ QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT S'EST ENGAGE ('LORSQU'IL EXERCERA SES DROITS SOUVERAINS ;

P10 ;

A PROPOS DE TOUTE QUESTION CONCERNANT LA PRESENCE ET LE FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA FORCE DE L'ONU'' A SE GUIDER DE BONNE FOI SUR SON ACCEPTATION DES RESOLUTIONS DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE DES 14 ET 22 JUILLET 1960 ET, SPECIFIQUEMENT, A ASSURER LA LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT DE LA FORCE. ;

P11 ;

CET ENGAGEMENT A DE TOUTE EVIDENCE CONSERVE SA FORCE JURIDIQUE ET DOIT ETRE CONSIDERE COMME INTERDISANT AU GOUVERNEMENT TOUTE ACTION QUI EMPECHERAIT LA FORCE DE L'ONU DE FONCTIONNER CONFORMEMENT AUX RESOLUTIONS, SELON LES MODALITES NECESSAIRES POUR LUI PERMETTRE D'ELIMINER LA MENACE A LA PAIX ET A LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES. ;

P12 ;

CELA VAUT, EN PARTICULIER, POUR LA LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT DE LA FORCE. COMME AUTRE ELEMENT DE LA SITUATION JURIDIQUE, VOUS AUREZ NOTE QUE, DANS SA RESOLUTION DU 9 AOUT 1960, LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE A EXPLICITEMENT DECLARE QUE TOUS LES ETATS MEMBRES SONT TENUS, ;

P13 ;

CONFORMEMENT AUX ARTICLES 25 ET 49 DE LA CHARTE, D'ACCEPTER ET D'EXECUTER LES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL ET, EN PARTICULIER, DE S'OFFRIR MUTUELLEMENT ASSISTANCE DANS L'EXECUTION DES MESURES DECIDEES PAR LE CONSEIL. CETTE DISPOSITION INTERDIT

MANIFESTEMENT A TOUS LES ETATS MEMBRES, Y COMPRIS, EN

L'OCCURRENCE, ;

P14 ;

L'ETAT HOTE, DE PRENDRE DES MESURES QUI RENDRAIENT
L'OPERATION DE L'ONU INEFFICACE, EU EGARD A SON OBJET
DELICAT, OU L'EMPECHERAIENT DE CONTINUER A FONCTIONNER AVEC
SUCCES EN FAIT, LES ETATS MEMBRES SONT DANS L'OBLIGATION
DE FACILITER L'OPERATION, POSITIVEMENT ET ACTIVEMENT.

VOUS CONSTATEREZ, ;

P15 ;

D'APRES LES TEXTES EN QUESTION, QUE LES RELATIONS ENTRE L'ONU
ET LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO, NE SONT PAS DE
SIMPLES RELATIONS CONTRACTUELLES PERMETTANT A LA REPUBLIQUE
D'IMPOSER SES CONDITIONS EN TANT QU'ETAT HOTE ET, PAR LA,
DE DECIDER LES CONDITIONS DANS LESQUELLES L'ONU ;

P16 ;

EXERCE SON ACTIVITE. IL S'AGIT PLUTOT DE RELATIONS REGIES
PAR DES DECISIONS OBLIGATOIRES DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE.
DE CE FAIT, AUCUN GOUVERNEMENT, Y COMPRIS LE GOUVERNEMENT
HOTE, NE PEUT DETERMINER PAR UNE ACTION UNILATERALE COMMENT
DES MESURES PRISES PAR LE CONSEIL DANS CES CONDITIONS DOIVENT ;

P17 ;

ETRE EXECUTEES. LA DECISION A CET EGARD NE PEUT ETRE PRISE
QUE PAR LE CONSEIL LUI-MEME OU SUR LA BASE D'UNE DELEGATION
EXPRESSE DE POUVOIRS DE SA PART. IL EST PARTICULIEREMENT IM-
PORTANT QUE SEUL LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE PUISSE DECIDER DE
LA CESSATION DE L'OPERATION ET QUE , ;

P18 ;

PAR CONSEQUENT, LES CONDITIONS QUI, PAR LEURS REPERCUSSIONS
SUR L'OPERATION, LUI OTERAIENT LA BASE DONT ELLE A BESOIN,
AIENT A ETRE EXAMINEES DIRECTEMENT PAR LE CONSEIL QUI,
DE TOUTE EVIDENCE, N'APPROUVERA PAS DE TELLES CONDITIONS,

A MOINS QU'IL NE

P19 ;

A LA PAIX ET A LA SECURITE A CESSER. JE SUIS SUR QUE, DANS L'EXAMEN DE LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, VOUS TIENDREZ PLEINEMENT COMPTE DES ASPECTS JURIDIQUES FONDAMENTAUX QUE JE VIENS DE RAPPELER. EN VOUS EXPOSANT CES ASPECTS, J'ESTIME DEVOIR PORTER AUSSI A VOTRE ATTENTION UN AUTRE ;

P20 ;

FAIT A PRENDRE EN CONSIDERATION EN L'OCCURRENCE. DANS LES CONVERSATIONS DE CESSEZ-LE-FEU A MATADI, APRES L'INCIDENT DU 5 MARS 1961, M. DELVAUX A RECONNU, SELON LES INFORMATIONS QUI ME SONT PARVENUES, QUE LA LIBERTE DE MOUVEMENT DU PERSONEL ET DES APPROVISIONNEMENTS DE LA FORCE DE ;

P21 ;

L'ONU EXIGE QUE DES TROUPES DE L'ONU SOIENT STATIONNÉES A MATADI. LA SEULE RESERVE FAITE PAR M. DELVAUX CONCERNAIT L'INOPPORTUNITE DU DEPLOIEMENT DE TROUPES SOUDANAISES A MATADI SEMBLANT DANS LE MESSAGE QUE JE VOUS AI ADRESSE LE 4 MARS 1961, JE VOUS AI DEJA FAIT CONNAITRE MES VUES ;

P22 ;

EN CE QUI CONCERNE CETTE RESERVE, EN INDIQUANT QUE L'ONU NE PEUT L'ACCEPTER COMME UNE CONDITION, CAR IL S'AGIRAIT LA D'UNE INGERENCE DANS CE QUI DOIT ETRE EXCLUSIVEMENT UNE RESPONSABILITE DE L'ONU. LA NECESSITE POUR L'ONU D'ETRE DANS UNE SITUATION MILITAIRE SATISFAISANTE A MATADI A ENCORE ETE ;

P23 ;

RECONNUE, CLAIREMENT ET SANS CONDITIONS, DANS LE MESSAGE QUE LA DELEGATION DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO M'A COMMUNIQUE LE 7 MARS 1961. CEPENDANT, JE TIENS A VOUS SIGNALER QU'AU COURS DE CES CONTACTS ET DE CONTACTS ULTERIEURS, NOUS AVONS EU LE SENTIMENT QU'IL EXISTAIT UN ;

P24 ;

DESIR D'INTRODUIRE DES CONDITIONS ALLANT CONSIDERABLEMENT PLUS LOIN QUE CELLE MENTIONNEE PAR M. DELVAUX A MATADI LE 5 MARS 1961, ET DEJA REJETEE PAR NOUS. SI UN EFFORT DANS CE SENS EST FAIT OU DEVAIT ETRE FAIT, CELA SIGNIFIERAIT MANIFESTEMENT QUE LES AUTORITES CONGOLAISES REVIENDRAIENT SUR LEUR ;

P25 ;

PAROLE CE QUI, J'EN SUIS CONVAINCU, NE PEUT ETRE VOTRE INTENTION. IL EST UN DERNIER POINT SUR LEQUEL IL PARAIT UTILE DE FAIRE QUELQUES BREVES OBSERVATIONS. APPAREMMENT, CERTAINES UNITES CONGOLAISES ONT CRU COMPRENDRE QUE LA RECENTE RESOLUTION DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE EXIGE LE "DESARMEMENT ;

P26 ;

DE L'ANC" ET AUTORISE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE A CETTE FIN. A CET EGARD, JE VOUDRAIS FAIRE OBSERVER QUE LE PARAGRAPHE B-2 DE LA RESOLUTION ADOPTEE LES 20 ET 21 FEVRIER 1961 PAR LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE, QUI TRAITE DES UNITES ET DU PERSONNEL ARMES CONGOLAIS, ;

P27 ;

NE VISE PAS UN DESARMEMENT DES TROUPES, MAIS DEMANDE INSTAMMENT QUE L'ON S'EMPLOIE DE NOUVEAU A ORGANISER ET A FORMER L'ANC, EN DEHORS DE TOUTE INGERENCE POLITIQUE. JE SUIS CERTAIN QUE VOUS L'AVEZ CLAIREMENT COMPRIS VOUS-MEME, AINSI QU'IL RESSORT DE VOTRE MESSAGE DU 6 MARS 1961 ;

P28 ;

AUQUEL JE SOUHAITE REPONDRE DES QUE J'AURAI EU LA POSSIBILITE D'ETUDIER DE PLUS PRES VOS SUGGESTION. CE PARAGRAPHE DU DISPOSITIF DE LA RESOLUTION N'AUTORISE PAS NON PLUS L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARMEE MEME POUR PARVENIR A CE BUT LIMITE. D'AUTRE PART, LE PARAGRAPHE A-1 DE CETTE RESOLUTION, ;

P29 ;

QUI AUTORISE LE RECOURS A LA FORCE, INDIQUE QU'IL SERAIT FAIT USAGE DE LA FORCE, "SI BESOIN EST, EN DERNIER RESSORT",

POUR ASSURER LE RESPECT DE DISPOSITIONS CONCERNANT DES CEsSEZ-
LE-FEU ET DE SMESUE ANALOGUES VISANT A EMPEC LA GUERRE
CIVILE SEMICLN RIEN N'INDIQUE, DANS CE ;

P30 ;

PARAGRAPHE, QUE L'AUTORISATION DE RECOURIR A LA FORCE
"EN DERNIER RESSORT" S'APPLIQUE A L'ASSISTANCE CONCERNANT
LA REORGANISATION DE L'ARMEE. VOUS VOUS RAPPELLEZ QUE,
DANS LES DECLARATIONS QUE J'AI FAITES AU CONSEIL AU SUJET
DU CONTROLE ET DE LA DISCIPLINE DE L'ANC, J'AI SEULEMENT
EMIS L'IDEE ;

P31 ;

QUE L'ONU POURRAIT DEVOIR RECOURIR A LA FORCE DANS LE CAS
D'UNITES QUI SE SERAIENT SOUSTRAITES A L'AUTORITE DE
LEUR PROPRE COMMANDEMENT ET QUI MENACERAIENT LA POPULATION. *On lui a
Rien de l'ONU*
QUANT A LA QUESTION PLUS GENERALE, J'AI INDIQUE SANS AUCUNE
AMBIGUITE QUE LA REORGANISATION DE L'ANC DEVRAIT ETRE
ENTREPRISE EN COOPERATION ;

P32 ;

AVEC LES AUTORITES CONGOLAISES. J'ESTIME QUE CE PRINCIPE
CONTINUE DE CORRESPONDRE A LA POSITION ADMISE DE L'ONU.
MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, LES PROBLEMES SUR LESQUELS J'APPELLE
ICI VOTRE ATTENTION CONCERNENT TOUS UNE QUESTION D'IM-
PORTANCE CAPITALE TOUCHANT LES POSSIBILITES, POUR L'ONU,
DE CONTINUER A FOURNIR SON ASSISTANCE ;

P33 ;

A LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO. JE SUIS CERTAIN QUE VOUS SOUHAITEZ
VOIR POURSUIVRE CETTE ASSISTANCE DANS UN ESPRIT DE COLLABORATION
ET DE CONFIANCE, ET JE SUIS DONC CERTAIN AUSSI QUE VOUS VEILLEREZ
A CE QUE, DANS LA SITUATION DELICATE ACTUELLE, AUCUNE ACTION
INCONSIDEREE N'ENTRAINE DE NOUVELLES ;

P34 ;

SITUATIONS DEPLORABLES SEMICLN JE SUIS CERTAIN QUE VOUS VEI-
LIEREZ A CE QUE, DANS TOUTE LA MESURE OU CELA EST NECESSAIRE,

TOUTES OUVERTURES SOIENT DONNEES POUR LA MISE AU POINT
DE FORMULES PRATIQUES ET APPLICABLES TOUCHANT LA CONTINUATION
DES ACTIVITES DE L'ONU, EN TENANT PLEINEMENT COMPTE DES
ASPECTS ;

P35 ;

JURIDIQUES QUE JE VIENS D'EXPOSER DANS LE PRESENT TELE-
GRAMME, AUSSI BIEN QUE DE NOS BESOINS POUR ASSURER
LE SUCCES DE L'OPERATION. JE SUIS PERSUADE QUE VOUS EXER-
CEREZ A CETTE FIN TOUTE VOTRE INFLUENCE PERSONNELLE
ET JE PUIS, POUR MA PART, VOUS ASSURER QUE NOUS DEMEURONS
ANIMES ;

P36/46 ;

LES MEMES INTENTIONS, TOUT EN ETANT, NATURELLEMENT,
OBLIGES DE MAINTENIR FERMEMENT LES
PRINCIPES AUXQUELS TOUS LES ETATS MEMBRES DOIVENT SE CONFORMER
DANS L'INTERET DE LEURS EFFORTS COMMUNS, DEPLOYES PAR L'INTER-
MEDIAIRE DE L'ORGANISATION.

TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'ONU "

COL 1647 22 1960 27 1960 14 22 1961 14 22 1960 9 1960 25 49 5 1961
4 1961 7 1961 5 1961 B-2 20 21 1961 6 1961 A-1 "

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 8 March 1961

No : 1625

A. Further to my 1615 following is English text of note verbale dated 7 March 1961 from delegation of the Republic of the Congo reproduced as document S/4758/Add.5:

"The Permanent Delegation of the Republic of the Congo presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit to him herewith, upon the instructions of its Government, a statement regarding the incidents at Banana, Matadi and Boma in which elements of the Congolese National Army clashed with United Nations forces.

The Permanent Delegation would be glad if the Secretary-General would kindly bring this document to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

The Government of the Republic of the Congo sent a mission to the spot to investigate the origin of these regrettable incidents. The mission, under the leadership of Mr. Delvaux, comprised Major Kiembe, Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army, and Mr. Ebeye, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Group. The mission collected the following information: At about 3 p.m. on Friday, 3 March 1961, a United Nations aircraft landed a civilian passenger at Moanda who had no identity papers. On account of this the six Congolese soldiers who were guarding the airfield refused him permission to land. However, at the request of a United Nations official who was there, these soldiers allowed the civilian passenger to go to the Mangrove hotel for a meal. From that hotel a civilian official of the United Nations telephoned the headquarters at Kitona to ask for reinforcements. A little later a contingent of about a dozen men, all

Sudanese, arrived at the hotel. They were equipped with four jeeps and a lorry. After contacting the United Nations civilians inside the hotel, they moved off towards the Moanda plain. There they surrounded the six soldiers of the Congolese National Army and tried to disarm them. One sergeant and one soldier managed to escape. As they were fleeing, the sergeant was wounded in one thigh but he managed nevertheless to get to the hospital in a civilian lorry. One soldier managed to get back to the camp, where he reported the matter to the Commanding Officer, who gave the alarm. Meanwhile, a Sudanese officer went to the camp to return the Congolese soldiers who had been arrested on the Moanda plain. A Congolese soldier, who had heard the alarm sounded, came running up to take up his post but he was killed by the Sudanese soldiers. This incident at Moanda gave the signal for the opening of the hostilities at Banana and Metadi.

At 9 a.m. on Saturday, 4 March, a number of Sudanese soldiers arrived at Metadi to protect the building occupied by the Canadian Signal Unit. A discussion arose between the soldiers of the Congolese National Army and the Canadian soldiers on why the building was being protected. While the discussion was in progress, the United Nations soldiers fired on the building. The Congolese officer escaped and gave the alarm at the camp. The ANC soldiers, who were engaged in mortar practice, fired several rounds in the direction of the United Nations soldiers. This misunderstanding set off the hostilities at Metadi. A telephone conversation with Mr. Dayal resulted in a cease-fire. The latter did not take effect until after the Sudanese soldiers had fired on an ambulance of the Congolese National Army, at about 2 p.m.

At 7.45 a.m. on Sunday, 5 March, Sudanese soldiers opened fire in the direction of the Congolese military camp. Returning the fire, the Congolese National Army destroyed the Palace cinema, near which the Sudanese soldiers were deployed. A cease-fire was arranged at the initiative of Minister Delvaux and Major Ingila, the local Commanding

Officer. Negotiations were held between the two Commanding Officers. While they were under way, a further engagement took place between the ANC troops and the Sudanese soldiers, who had opened fire on the Congolese troops while the latter were in their camp.

Their patience exhausted, the Congolese soldiers took the offensive and, after a twenty-minute engagement, desarmed the United Nations forces. An agreement was then reached by the competent authorities on both sides. The terms of the agreement were as follows:

1. The Sudanese troops shall leave the town of Matadi this day by train for Leopoldville, taking with them their arms, ammunition and other equipment;

2. With a view to ensuring security at the time of departure, the Minister himself, together with a staff officer of the National Army and a United Nations officer, shall be present when the said troops board the train;

3. The Minister shall dispatch a staff officer of the National Army to ensure the security of the troops during the journey from Matadi to Leopoldville. Furthermore, he shall establish personal contact with the various units of the National Army with a view to ensuring security and assistance during the journey;

4. Full security shall be provided while the troops are being transported from their base to the station where they will board the train. The Minister undertakes to report to his Government on the precise circumstances of the Matadi incidents, while for his part the Sudanese Army Captain shall submit his report to the United Nations at Leopoldville.

(Signed) S. A. Hafiz Sudanese Captain

For the Congolese Government: (Signed) A. Delvaux Resident Minister of the Interior, FF.

Witnesses for the United Nations: (Signed) Bouffard, Cl.

For the National Army: (Signed) Kiembe.

The Permanent Mission has been authorized to bring the following information to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

The deplorable incidents in which elements of the Congolese National Army clashed with United Nations forces seem to be an outgrowth of the continuing uncertainty of the Congolese National Army concerning the intentions of the United Nations forces. These misunderstandings could be dispelled if it was clearly apparent that the responsible civil and military authorities intend to implement the resolution of 21 February 1961 only in consultation with the legitimate authorities of the Republic of the Congo and in agreement with them. With regard to the interpretation to be given to this resolution, it should be emphasized that the bulletin issued by the Headquarters of the Congolese National Army to which reference is made in document S/4758 cannot be regarded as reflecting in any way the views of policy of the Head of State or the Government of the Republic of the Congo.

The Permanent Mission is, furthermore, authorized to state that the Congolese authorities have no objection to the presence of the United Nations forces at Matadi and that they have no prejudice against the forces made available to the United Nations by the Sudan, whose people are friends of the Congolese people. The Republic of the Congo deeply regrets the fact that misunderstandings caused a temporary clash between troops of the Congolese National Army and members of the Canadian and Sudanese forces."

B. Contents of your O-651 reproduced to-day as document S/4758/Add.6 subtitled: "Cable dated 7 March 1961 addressed to the President of the Republic of the Congo by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo."

MATADI

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 8 March 1961

No : 1619

Following is text of note presented on 7th by Mr. Bahizi. It was distributed informally to Congo Advisory Committee and is being issued as Secco document. Comments will come separately later. Reads:

La délégation permanente de la République du Congo présente ses compliments au Secrétaire général et a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir sous ce pli, sur instructions de son Gouvernement, une mise au point relative aux incidents qui ont opposé à Banana, Matadi et Boma des éléments de l'Armée nationale congolaise et des forces de l'ONU. La délégation permanente serait reconnaissante au Secrétaire général de vouloir bien porter ce document à la connaissance des membres de l'Assemblée générale. Elle saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Secrétaire général les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Le Gouvernement de la République du Congo a envoyé une mission sur place pour enquêter sur l'origine de ces incidents regrettables. La mission, dirigée par le Ministre Delvaux comprenait le Major Kiembe, Chef d'Etat-Major de l'Armée nationale congolaise et Monsieur Ebeya, Commandant du 2ème groupement. Cette mission a recueilli les informations suivantes: Vendredi 3 mars 1961, vers 15 heures, un avion de l'O.N.U. a débarqué à Moanda un passager civil qui n'était pourvu d'aucun papier d'identité. De ce fait, les six militaires congolais qui gardaient l'aérodrome lui ont refusé l'autorisation de débarquer.

Maltefois, à la demande d'un agent de l'O.N.U. qui était sur place, ces militaires ont autorisé le passager civil à se rendre à l'hôtel Mangrove pour s'y restaurer. De cet hôtel, un agent civil de l'O.N.U. a téléphoné au Quartier général à Kitona pour y demander du renfort. Quelque temps après une section comprenant environ douze hommes, tous soudanais, est arrivée à l'hôtel. Ils étaient équipés de quatre jeeps et d'un camion. Après avoir pris contact avec les civils de l'O.N.U. à l'intérieur de l'hôtel, ils se sont dirigés vers la plaine de Moanda. Là, ils ont encerclé les six soldats de l'Armée nationale congolaise et ont tenté de les désarmer. Un sergent et un soldat sont parvenus à s'enfuir. Au moment de la fuite, le sergent a été blessé à la cuisse mais est néanmoins parvenu à atteindre l'hôpital dans un camion civil. Le soldat a pu rejoindre le camp et a fait un rapport au Commandant qui a donné l'alerte. Entre temps, un officier soudanais est entré au camp pour remettre les militaires congolais qui avaient été arrêtés à la plaine de Moanda. Un soldat congolais, qui avait entendu sonner l'alerte est arrivé en courant afin de regagner son poste mais a été abattu par les soldats soudanais. Cet incident à Moanda a donné le signal du début des hostilités de Banana et Matadi.

Samedi 4 mars, à 9 h. du matin, plusieurs soldats soudanais sont arrivés à Matadi pour protéger l'immeuble qu'occupait le corps de signaleurs canadiens. Une discussion est intervenue entre les soldats de l'A.N.C. et les soldats canadiens au sujet de la raison de cette protection de l'immeuble. Au cours de cette discussion, les soldats de l'O.N.U. ont fait feu sur l'immeuble. L'officier congolais s'est échappé et a donné l'alerte au camp. Les soldats de l'A.N.C. qui effectuaient un exercice de tir à mortier, ont lancé quelques projectiles en direction des soldats de l'O.N.U. Ce malentendu a déclenché les hostilités de Matadi. Une discussion téléphonique avec Monsieur Dayal a conduit à un cessez-le-feu. Celui-ci n'est intervenu qu'après que les soldats soudanais ont fait feu sur l'ambulance de l'Armée nationale congolaise, vers 14 h.

Dimanche 5 mars, à 7 h. 45, des soldats soudanais ont ouvert le feu en

direction du camp militaire de l'Armée nationale congolaise. Ripostant à ce tir, l'Armée nationale congolaise a détruit le cinéma "Le Palace" à proximité duquel se trouvaient les soldats soudanais. Un cessez-le-feu est intervenu à l'initiative du Ministre Delvaux et du Commandant de la place, le Major Ingila. Des pourparlers se sont poursuivis entre les commandants de part et d'autre. Au cours de ces pourparlers, un nouvel engagement a eu lieu entre les troupes de l'A.N.C. et les soldats soudanais qui avaient ouvert le feu sur les troupes congolaises alors qu'elles se trouvaient dans leur camp. Excédés, les soldats congolais ont pris l'offensive et après un engagement de vingt minutes, ont désarmé les forces de l'O.N.U. Un accord est ensuite intervenu entre les autorités compétentes de part et d'autre. Le procès-verbal de cet accord est reproduit ci-dessous:

1.- Les troupes soudanaises quitteront la ville de Matadi ce jour par train à destination de Léopoldville, emportant avec eux leurs armes et munitions et autre matériel;

2.- Pour assurer la sécurité au moment du départ, le Ministre assistera lui-même avec un officier de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée nationale et un officier de l'ONU à l'embarquement desdites troupes;

3.- Le Ministre dépêchera un membre de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée nationale pour assurer toute sécurité des troupes pendant le transport de Matadi à Léopoldville. En outre, il prendra personnellement contact avec les différentes unités de l'Armée nationale pour assurer sécurité et aide pendant le transport;

4.- Toute sécurité sera apportée au transport des troupes sur le trajet de leur base à la gare, lieu de leur embarquement. Le Ministre se charge de faire rapport à son Gouvernement de la situation exacte des incidents de Matadi, vice-versa, le Capitaine de l'Armée soudanaise présentera son rapport à l'Organisation des Nations Unies de Léopoldville.

Pour le Gouvernement congolais
Le Ministre résident
(se) A. Delvaux
Ministre de l'Intérieur

Le Capitaine soudanais
(se) S. A. Hafiz

Les témoins
Pour l'O.N.U.
(se) Bouffard, Cl.

Pour l'Armée nationale
(se) Kiembe

La délégation permanente a été autorisée à porter les indications suivantes à la connaissance des membres de l'Assemblée générale. Les incidents déplorables qui ont opposé des éléments de l'Armée nationale congolaise et des forces de l'O.N.U. semblent liés à l'incertitude qui persiste au sein de l'Armée nationale congolaise quant aux intentions des forces de l'O.N.U. Ces malentendus pourraient être dissipés s'il apparaissait clairement que les autorités civiles et militaires responsables n'envisagent pas de mettre en application la résolution du 21 février 1961 autrement qu'en consultation avec les autorités légales de la République du Congo et en accord avec ces autorités. Au sujet de l'interprétation à donner à cette résolution, il importe de souligner que le bulletin de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée nationale congolaise cité dans le document S/4758 ne peut être considéré à aucun titre comme reflétant l'opinion ou la politique, ni du Chef de l'Etat, ni du Gouvernement de la République du Congo. La délégation permanente est autorisée à préciser par ailleurs que les autorités congolaises n'ont pas d'objection à la présence des forces de l'O.N.U. à Matadi, et qu'elles n'éprouvent aucun préjugé défavorable à l'égard des forces mises à la disposition de l'O.N.U. par le Soudan, dont le peuple est ami du peuple congolais. La République du Congo regrette vivement que des malentendus aient momentanément opposé des troupes de l'A.N.C. et des membres des forces canadiennes et soudanaises."

D-656

being typed as document

*Kiron
Mat Ban*

Text of other annexes already available in New York
as follows :

Annex I see D-524

Annex II see D-542

Annex III " D-546

Annex V " New York cable 1534 - 6 March

Annex VI " D-644

Annex VII " D-651

SUDANESE TROOPS IN MATADI WAS FORCED TO ACCEPT THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
DICTATED BY THE CONGOLESE DELEGATION CMA EMERGES CLEARLY
FROM THE TRANSCRIPT OF HIS TESTIMONY ON THIS POINT CLN
QUOTE AT ABOUT 1030 HOURS ON 5 MARCH CMA MAJOR
BOUFFARD CMA RINGING UP FROM THE AIRSTRIP CMA INSTRUCTED
ME TO CEASE FIRE AND KEEP OUR HEADS DOWN AS THEY WERE ABOUT
TO NEGOTIATE A CEASE -FIRE STOP THIS WE DID STOP AT ABOUT 1130
HOURS THE CANADIAN DOCTOR CAME TO ME IN THE INSIDE OF THE
CAMP AND TOLD ME THAT I WAS WANTED BY THE PEOPLE FROM
LEO TO DISCUSS A CEASE-FIRE AND THAT I WAS TO COME UNARMED
STOP I WENT TO A HOUSE ON THE EDGE OF THE TOWN STOP
JUST WHEN THE CONFERENCE WAS READY TO COMMENCE CMA FIRING
BROKE OUT AGAIN CMA PARTICULARLY MORTAR FIRE STOP I INFORMED
THE CONFERENCE THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE FIRE CMA THAT
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS A CEASEFIRE STOP
THE PEOPLE AT THE CONFERENCE MERELY TOOK COVER STOP THE
FIRING APPEARED TO CONTINUE FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR STOP
ONE OF THE ANC OFFICERS WHO WENT OUT CAME BACK TO THE CONFERENCE
AND INFORMED US THAT THE FIRING HAD COME FIRST FROM THE
SUDANESE CAMP AND THE HOTEL STOP THEY THE
CONGOLESE ALL AGREED WITH THIS ALTHOUGH I TOLD
THEM THIS COULDN'T BE THE CASE AS I HAD NOT THE TYPE OF
WEAPONS BEING USED CMA SUCH AS 3 MORTARS AND RECOILLESS
WEAPONS STOP THE CONFERENCE STARTED AGIN AND MINISTER
DELVAUX WAS SPEAKING FRENCH AND HIS WORDS WERE BEING
INTERPRETED TO ME BY MAJOR BOUFFARD STOP MINISTER DELVAUX
SAID THE SUDANESE MUST LEAVE MATADI OR THEY WOULD BRING
REINFORCEMENTS FROM THYSVILLE AND ATTACK THE SUDANESE CAMP
STOP I SAID THAT ALL I WANTED WAS A CHANCE TO GATHER MY
TROOPS AND I WAS WILLING TO LEAVE MATADI AS SOON AS I COULD
STOP AT THIS TIME CMA I WAS ADVISED BY MAJOR BOUFFARD THAT
THIS WAS THE ONLY PORT AVAILABLE AND THAT I SHOULD NOT LEAVE
MATADI UNLESS I HAD ORDERS FROM LEO STOP I SAID I HAD NO
AMMUNITION LEFT AND I DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY CASUALTIES
HAD BEEN INFLICTED ON MY MEN IN THE CAMP AS A RESULT OF
THE LATEST HAAVY FIRING STOP I THEREFORE
HAD NO OPTION BUT TO GET OUT OF MATADI STOP MAJOR
BOUFFARD SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
MINISTER ABOUT FORCES REMAINING IN MATADI BUT I INFORMED
HIM THAT UNDER THE CONDITIONS I COULD NOT POSSIBLY STAY THERE
STOP MINISTER DELVAUX DID NOT LIKE MAJOR BOUFFARD'S SUGGESTIONS
AND HE FORBDE HIM TO CONTINUE WITH THE INTERPRETATION STOP
THE MANAGER OF THE HOTEL NOW BECAME THE INTERPRETER
BETWEEN MYSELF AND MR DELVAUX STOP I CAME TO AN AGREEMENT
WITH THE MINISTER THAT WE WOULD LEAVE WITH ALL OUR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
STOP UNQUOTE

26 . THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES ARS ATTACHED AS ANNEX IV STOP

27. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED CMA MAJOR BOUFFARD
CMA ACCORDING TO HIS TESTIMONY CMA QUOTE MADE IT CLEAR
THAT AS LONG AS UN REMAINED IN THE CONGO CMA UN TROOPS
WOULD HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED IN MATADI CLN TO WHICH MR
DELVAUX REPLIED THAT HE REALIZED THIS FACT AND THAT WITHDRAWAL
WAS DEMANDEF ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE
SUDANESE TROOPS PRESENT IN MATADI AT THAT TIME UNQUOTE STOP

28. IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS CONTAINED IN THE WITHDRAWAL
AGREEMENT CMA FORMAL ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN BY MR DELVAUX
THAT IN CONSIDERATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUDANESE
TROOPS CMA CONGOLESE AUTHORITES WILL ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SAFEGUARDING FOR THE UN ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT CMA
RATIONS OR STORES LEFT BEHIND BY THOSE TROOPS CMA SO THAT
UN TROOPS COMING TO RELIEVE THEM COULD IMMEDIATELY AVAIL
THEMSELVES OF SUCH STORES STOP THE MATADI DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
CMA WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT CMA WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THIS TASK
AND HE AGREED TO CARRY OUT THIS UNDERTAKING STOP
29. NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISION OF THE CEASE FIRE

21. AS OBSERVED FROM THE SUDANESE HQS AT THE GENERAL
BUILDING CA THE SITUATION APPEARED CMA IN THE
WORDS OF THE COMPANY - COMMANDER CMA CPT SAYED ABDEL HAFIZ
CMA AS FOLLOWS QUOTE: ABOUT 1130 HOURS ON SATU AY
CMA 4TH MARCH CMA I WAS IN THE SUDANESE CAMP WHEN FIRING
OPENED UP ON THE CAMP AND ALSO ON THE CANADIAN SIGNAL STATION
STOP THIS FIRING CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE ANC CAMP
AND ALSO FROM SEVERAL DIRECTIONS OUTSIDE OF THE CAMP STOP
THIS FIRING CONSISTED OF RIFLE CMA LMG CMA HMG CMA 3
INCH MORTARS CMA 37 MM ANTI-TNK SHOTS AND CONTINUED
FOR A BOUT 2 HOURS STOP FROM OUR CAMP WE RETURNED THE FIRE
IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION FROM WHICH WE THOUGHT THE FIRING
WAS COMING STOP FIRING STOPPED AT 1330 HOURS AND
RESTARTED FROM THE ANC SIDE AFTER ABOUT TWO HOURS CMA
I.E. ABOUT 1530 HRS AND CONTINUED UNTIL ABOUT 1800
HOURS STOP DURING THE CEASE - FIRE CMA I CONTACTED
BY PHONE THE HOTEL AND DISCOVERED THAT NO FIRING HAD
TAKEN PLACE BY SUDANESE TROOPS IN THAT AREA STOP THE SAME
HELD GOOD FOR THE AIRSTRIP STOP I GOT NO REPLY FROM THE HELICOPTER
STRIP AND IN THE CASE OF THE CANADIAN SIGNAL STATION I WAS
INFORMED THAT THEY WERE SUBJECTED TO HEAVY FIRE STOP

THERE WERE TWO SUDANESE WOUNDED AND ONE DEAD STOP DURING
THE CEASE - FIRE CMA IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER
SUPPLY WAS CUT STOP DURING THE FIRING CMA AT ABOUT
1730 HOURS CMA CAPT FENGER CMA MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER
CMA MATADI CMA CAME TO OUR CAMP IN A VOLKSWAGEN WITH
A WHITE FLAG STOP AT THIS STAGE THE SUDANESE HAD DEPLOYED IN
A PERIMETER DEFENCE AROUND THE GENERAL AREA
OF THE CAMP STOP HE WAS TRYING TO CONTACT ME AND WAS BEING
BROUGHT TO ME BY A LT WHEN THE LT WAS SHOT IN THE ARM STOP
CAPTAIN FENGER EVENTUALLY GOT TO ME AND TOLD ME THAT ONE
OF THE PLATOON COMMANDERS WAS SHOT STOP HE TOLD ME THAT HE

OF THE PLATOON COMMANDERS WAS SHOT STOP HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A CESE-FIRE WITH THE A INISTRATOR OF THE ANC STOP CI FENGER THEN TRIED TO CON...CT THE ADMINISTRATORS OFFICS BUT FAILED STOP HE THEN REMAINED WITH US IN THE CAMP UP TO 2200 HOURS STOP I DO NOT KNOW HOW THE CEASE -FIRE CAME ABOUT AND I AVAILED MYSELF OF IT TO CHECK AGAIN WITH THE OUT-STATIONS STOP I CONTACTED THE AIRSTRIP AND THE METROPOLE HOTEL AND DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND THAT THEY HAD NOT FIRED STOP I COULD NOT CONTACT THE CANADIAN SIGNALS STATION NOR THE HELICOPTER STATION STOP IN THE CAMP AT THIS STAGE WE HAD ONE OFFICER AND TWO SOLDIERS WOUNDED STOP MEANTIME CMA DURING THE CESE-FIRE CMA SOME OF THE SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN ON GUARD AT THE CANADIAN RADIO STATION FILTERED BACK INTO OUR CAMP (3 OF THEM) STOP THEY WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED STOP THEY REPORTED THAT THE CANADIAN SIGNAL DETACHEMENT HAD BEEN TAKEN PRISONER STOP THE ANC HAD ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THE SUDANESE PRISONERS ALSO BUT THEY HAD GOT AWAY AND WERE FIRED ON WHEN TRYING TO GET BACK TO THE CAMP STOP THREE OF THEM HAD BEEN DETAINED AS PRISONERS CMA LEAVING BEHIND ONE DEAD STOP WITH REGARD TO OUR CASUALTIES CMA WE HAD NO DOCTOR IN THE CAMP AND THE ONLY MEDICAL AIDE THAT WAS AVAILABLE WAS A CORPORAL STOP I TRIED TO CONTACT THE DOCTOR AT THE HOSPITAL BUT FAILED STOP OUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION DURING THE NIGHT WAS THAT WE WERE SURROUNDED BY ABOUT 1000 CMA INCLUDING POLICE AND CIVILIANS STOP WE DECIDED TO HOLD OUR AREA TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY STOP UNQUOTE

22. ACCORDING TO CAPT BELANGER CMA WHO AS NOTED ABOVE CMA WAS WAITING IN A RAVINE SURROUNDED BY ANC PERSONNEL AND EAGELY LISTENING FOR EVERY SOUND CMA QUOTE AT ABOUT 0500 HOURS ON 5 MARCH FIRE WAS OPENED FROM AN ANC MACHINE GUN WHICH WAS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF MY POSITION STO UNQUOTE OTHER WITNESSES TESTIFIED THAT THIS FIRE CMA WHICH CONTINUED SPORADICALLY FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS FOR SEVERAL HOURS CMA WAS DIRECTED MAINLY AT THE SUDANESE HQS BUILDING STOP

23. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS ON 5 MARCH

23. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS ON 5 MARCH FIRING CEASED STOP AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME CMA COL KIEMBE CMA THE ANC ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF CMA ACCOMPANIED BY A UN LIAISON OFFICER MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA ARRIVED FROM KITONA AT THE MATADI AIR STRIP AND PROCEEDED TO THE ANC CAMP CMA WHERE THEY WERE JOINED BY MR A. DELVAUX CMA MEMBER OF THE ILEO GOVERNMENT CMA MAJOR PWATI CMA CAPT MUSIMBANE FROM ANC HQ CMA THE LOCAL ANC COMMANDER CMA MAJOR INGILLA CMA AND LOCAL OFFICIALS STOP FROM THERE CMA THE PARTY MOVED TO THE "VETERANS BUILDING" CMA LOCATED ON HIGH GROUND CMA ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE ANC CAMP AND ABOUT 1200 YARDS FROM THE SUDANESE HQS BUILDING AND AFFORDING A GOOD VIEW OF BOTH POSITIONS CMA WHERE THE MEETING TO DISCUSS THE TERMS FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WAS TO TAKE PLACE STOP ON THE UN SIDE THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED CMA IN ADDITION TO MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA CMA BY THE COMMANDER OF THE SUDANESE TROOPS IN MATADI CMA CAPT HAFIZ CMA AND BY THE UN MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER CMA CAPT FINGER STOP RED CROSS OFFICIALS WERE ALSO PRESENT STOP THE MEETING OPENED SHORTLY BEFORE NOON STOP

24. AT EXACTLY 1200 HOURS CMA FIRING STARTED AGAIN STOP CAPTAIN BELANGER CMA WHO WAS STILL HIDING IN A RAVINE CMA TESTIFIED THAT QUOTE I DISTICTLY HEARD THAT THE FIRST SHOT IN THIS FIRING CAME FROM A 75 MM RECOILLESS GUN CMA FOLLOWED BY OTHER WEAPONS UNQUOTE STOP UN TROOPS AT MATADI HAD ONLY RIFLES AND LIGHT MACHINE GUNS STOP ACCORDING TO THE TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA WHO AS IN A GOOD POSITION TO OBSERVE THE SHOOTING FROM A POINT OF VANTAGE ON HIGH GROUND CMA QUOTE THIS CONCERTED FIRE FROM VARIOUS WEAPONS CMA INCLUDING HEAVY MORTAR AND 75 MM RECOILLESS GUNS CMA CONSISTED MAINLY OF SHOTS AGAINST THE SUDANESE HQS STOP THIS WAS CLEARLY VISIBLE FROM THE IMPACT SOMKE AND COULD ALSO BE DEDUCTED FROM SOUND STOP IT IS MY (MAJOR BOUFFARDS) CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THE BARRAGE WAS STAGED AT A PRE-ARRANGED TIME BY THE ANC IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE STOP IN THE OPINION OF MILITARY EXPERTS CMA SUCH CONCRTED AND EXACTLY TIME FIRE FROM VARIOUS TYPES OF WEAPONS IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS POINTS TO A PREARRANGED FIRING PROGRAMME AND IS INCONSIDENT WITH AN IMPROVISED RETALIATORY SHOOTING IN ANSWER TO THE OPENING OF FIRE BY ANOTHER PARTY STOP

CAPT BELANGER TOLD THE SUDANESE C.C. THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF CMA ON NEWS OF INCIPIENT TROUBLE CMA THE SUDANESE COMPANY WOULD ASSUME PROTECTION OF HIS PREMISES STOP

19. ON THE MORNING OF 4 MARCH CMA UN PERSONNEL WHO WENT ABOUT THEIR DUTIES IN TOWN NOTICED THAT THE STREETS WERE UNUSUALLY EMPTY AND THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE EXCITEMENT AMONG THE POPULATION STOP AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS THAT MORNING CMA FOLLOWING A WARNING FROM THE UN MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER AND RECEIPT OF INFORMATION ABOUT SUSPICIOUS MOVEMENTS OF ANC TROOPS INDICATING AN ATTEMPT TO SURROUND THE UN COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE CMA A SMALL SUDANESE GUARD CMA CONSISTING OF 7 MEN WITH ONE BRENGUN AND SIX 303 RIFLES CMA POSTED AT THE CANADIAN SIGNALS BUILDING STOP

20. ACCORDING TO THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY CAPT BELANGER CMA HE RETURNED TO HIS STATION FROM A TRIP INTO THE CITY AT ABOUT 1130 HOURS AND AT THAT TIME DISCOVERED THAT THE ANC HAD A BREN GUN ABOUT 15 YARDS OUTSIDE THE BUILDING POINTING AT THE FRONT DOOR STOP EXTRACTS FROM HIS TESTIMONY FOLLOW CLN
QUOTE AT ABOUT 1140 HOURS I CMA (CAPTAIN BELANGER) HEARD A BURST OF GUNFIRE CLN THOSE WERE THE FIRST SHOTS THAT I HEARD FIRED ON THAT DAY SEMICLN FROM THE FACT THAT THESE SHOTS BROKE WINDOWS IN THE BUILDING OCCUPIED BY THE SIGNALS DETACHMENT I CAN DEFINITELY ESTABLISH THAT THESE SHOTS CAME FROM THE OUTSIDE AND WERE FIRED BY THE ANC STOP AFTER THE FIRST SHOTS WERE FIRED THE SUDANESE FIRED BACK IMMEDIATELY STOP THE EXCHANGE OF SMALL ARMS FIRE LASTED FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES STOP AT ABOUT 1200 HOURS THE ANC STARTED FIRING ON THE BUILDING OCCUPIED BY THE CANADIAN DETACHMENT WITH 37 MM ARMOUR-PIERCING SHELLS CMA STARTING THE FIRING DIRECTLY AT THE ROOF AND WORKING DOWN TOWARDS THE GROUND FLOOR STOP THESE SHOTS WERE FIRED FROM A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 400 YARDS STOP SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUED STOP AT THE SAME TIME I NOTICED THE SOUND OF MORTAR BEING FIRED FROM THE ANC CAMP APPARENTLY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE DETACHMENT GUARDING THE HELIPORT STOP BY THE SOUND OF THE SHOTS THE WEAPONS EMPLOYED WERE 3 INCH MORTAR STOP ONE SUDANESE SOLDIER WAS WOUNDED BY BULLETS AND SHRAPNEL STOP AT APPROX 1400 HRS A CEASE FIRE WAS ARRANGED THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER CMA CAPT FENGER STOP THE TERMS OF THE CEASE FIRE WERE TO STAY AT OUR POSITIONS CMA TO CEASE FIRE AND TO ALLOW ONE ANC JEEP TO GO DOWN THE HILL CARRYING A WHITE FLAG AND TO PASS THE CANADIAN BUILDING CMA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE WAS RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE STOP THIS CEASE FIRE WAS STRICTLY OBSERVED BY THE UN FORCES STOP AT APPROX 1545 HRS I STEPPED OUT CMA UNARMED CMA FROM THE FRONT DOOR OF THE BUILDING CMA IN ORDER TO VERIFY WHETHER THE ANC JEEP WITH WHITE FLAG WAS COMING STOP I DISCOVERED THAT THE ANC HAD IN THE MEANWHILE A DETACHMENT OF APPROX 15 MEN AROUND THE BACK OF THE CANADIAN SIGNALS BUILDING AND ANOTHER DETACHMENT OF ABOUT 15 MEN ON THE SIDE OF THE BUILDING STOP THEY HAD ALSO MOVED A LARGER DETACHMENT OF APPROX 30 MEN COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE HQ WHERE THE SUDANESE APPARENTLY OBSERVED THE CEASE FIRE AS NO SHOTS WERE HEARD FIRED FROM THAT DIRECTION WHEN THE ANC DETACHMENT APPROACHED STOP QUOTE UPON STEPPING OUT FROM THE FRONT DOOR I FOUND MYSELF CONFRONTED WITH THE ANC DETACHMENT WHICH HAD INFILTRATED TO THE SIDE OF THE BUILDING COLON THE ANC POINTED THEIR GUNS AT ME IN A MANNER WHICH LEFT ME NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MOVE WITH THEM IN THE DIRECTION AWAY FROM THE HOUSE STOP PARA WHEN THE GROUP SURROUNDING ME MOVED ABOUT 50 YARDS AWAY FIRE WAS OPENED FROM THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE HQ PERHAPS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERMIT ME TO ESCAPE STOP I SEIZED THIS OPPORTUNITY AND ATTEMPTED TO WRESTLE A SUB-MACHINE GUN FROM THE NEAREST CONGOLESE SOLDIER SEMICOLON ALTHOUGH I DID NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING THE GUN CMA I MANAGED TO FLEE THE GROUP SURROUNDING ME IN THE DIRECTION OF A SMALL RAVINE CROSSING THE CITY BETWEEN THE CANADIAN SIGNALS HOUSE AND THE SUDANESE HQ CMA WHERE I HID STOP AT THIS STAGE GENERAL FIRING RESUMED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE AND 37 MM ARMOUR PIERCING GUNS STOP THIS FIRING LASTED FOR ABOUT 2 1/2 HOURS STOP AT ABOUT 1815 HOURS I HEARD WILD SCREAMING INDICATING THAT THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT POSITION HAD BEEN CAPTURED STOP FIRING STOPPED FOR A WHILE BUT RESUMED IN A SPORADIC MANNER IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE HQ STOP I FOUND MY ESCAPE ROUTE BLOCKED ON ALL SIDES BY ANC POSITIONS AND DECIDED TO CONTINUE HIDING IN THE RAVINE IN A SPOT ABOUT 700 YARDS DISTANT FROM THE SUDANESE HQ STOP

16. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM BANUNA WAS OF COURSE A PURELY TEMPORARY EXISTENT STOP ARRANGEMENTS WERE IMMEDIATELY MADE FOR THE DEPARTURE TO BANANA OF THE CONGOLESE ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF CMA COL KIEMBE CMA ACCOMPANIED BY A UN LIAISON OFFICER CMA MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA IN ORDER TO ARRANGE ON THE SPOT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE RETURN OF THE UN GARRISON TO BANANA STOP SIMULTANEOUSLY 124 INDONESIAN TROOPS WERE FLOWN TO KITONA TO REINFORCE THAT BASE AND TO RELIEVE THE SUDANESE TROOPS WHO CMA IT WAS HOPED AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS CMA WOULD RETURN TO BANANA STOP THE CARRYING OUT OF THESE PLANS WAS HOWEVER PREVENTED BY THE SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN MATADI STOP

2. MATADI STOP

17. ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO CMA THE GUARD DUTIES OVER UN INSTALLATIONS AND STORES IN MATADI WERE TAKEN OVER FROM MOROCCAN TROOPS BY A MUCH SMALLER SUDANESE UNIT OF ABOUT COMPANY STRENGTH STOP A CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT OF 9 MEN AND A SMALL MOVEMENT CONTROL DETACHMENT WERE ALSO IN MATADI CLN THIS PERSONNEL CARRIED ONLY SIDEARMS STOP UN PREMISES IN MATADI ARE WIDELY SCATTERED STOP THE TOWN STRETCHES ALONG THE RIVER BANK AND CLIMBS UP THE SURROUNDING HILLS CLN THE ANC CAMP OCCUPIES THE TOP OF ONE SUCH HILL AT THE EDGE OF THE CITY STOP THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT IS LOCATED IN A HOUSE ABOUT 150 METRES FROM THE GATE OF THE ANC CAMP CLN THE MAIN BODY OF THE SUDANESE TROOPS WAS STATIONED IN A LOWER PART OF THE CITY CMA IN A BUILDING KNOWN AS THE "CINEMA" CMA ABOUT 1,000 METRES FROM THE SIGNALS CENTRE STOP THE MOVEMENT CONTROL DETACHMENT AND SOME OFFICERS QUARTERS WERE AT THE HOTEL METROPOLE CMA LOCATED IN STILL ANOTHER PART OF THE CITY CLN IN ADDITION CMA SMALL DETACHMENTS OF SUDANESE TROOPS WERE POSTED TO PERFORM GUARD DUTIES AT THE HELIPORT CMA ROUGHLY HALF WAY BETWEEN THE ANC CAMP AND THE RIVER CMA AT THE AIRSTRIP CMA AND ELSEWHERE STOP

18. WHEN THE SUDANESE FIRST ARRIVED IN MATADI CMA THE ANC AND THE LOCAL POPULATION APPEARED TO BE FRIENDLY AND WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THEM CMA BUT VERY SOON THERE WAS A COMPLETE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND A STATE OF TENSION DEVELOPED FOR NO APPARENT REASON STOP ON 3 MARCH CMA AS THE NEWS ABOUT THE EVENTS IN MOANDA AND BANANA BEGAN TO FILTER THROUGH CMA THE ANC GAVE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED ACTIVITY STOP ON THE EVENING OF THAT DAY CMA THE LOCAL TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE SUDANESE COMPANY HQS STOP AND THEIR OUTPOSTS WENT OUT OF COMMISSION STOP THAT NIGHT CAPT BELANGER CMA C.O. OF THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT CMA WAS ENTERTAINED AT DINNER BY THE SUDANESE OFFICERS CMA WHO INFORMED HIM OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS STOP

12. AT 1315 HOURS ON 3 MARCH, COL ABDUL HAMID, COMMANDER OF THE SUDANESE CONTINGENT, WAS PROCEEDING TO MOANDA AIRFIELD WHERE HE INTENDED TO BOARD A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TO LEOPOLDVILLE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND AND AN ESCORT OF ABOUT A DOZEN SOLDIERS. AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE MOANDA AIRSTRIP, HE WAS WRONGFULLY STOPPED BY AN ANC DETACHMENT WHICH TOOK UP FIRING POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. COL HAMID DISMOUNTED TOGETHER WITH 6 OF HIS MEN WHO WERE IN A JEEP BEHIND HIM. AT THIS MOMENT ONE SHOT FIRED SEMICLN IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY WHO FIRED THE FIRST SHOT. THE FIRST SHOT WAS FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF ABOUT FIVE SHOTS, WHICH WERE FIRED BY THE SUDANESE INTO THE AIR. COL HAMID ORDERED HIS MEN TO CEASE FIRE SEMICLN WHEREUPON 4 ANC SOLDIERS DROPPED THEIR WEAPONS SEMICLN TWO SURRENDERED AND THE REST FLED. COL HAMID INSTRUCTED HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND TO RETURN THE CAPTURED ANC SOLDIERS AND ARMS TO THEIR CAMP IN BANANA AND BOARDED THE PLANE FOR LEOPOLDVILLE AS SCHEDULED.

B. BANANA INCIDENT

13. A FULL INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT COULD NOT YET BE CARRIED OUT DUE TO THE INTERRUPTION OF FLIGHTS BETWEEN LEOPOLDVILLE AND KITONA. THE FOLLOWING TWO PARAGRAPHS DESCRIBE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AS THEY WERE REPORTED BY SIGNAL AT THE TIME THEY OCCURRED CLN

14. THE SUDANESE CONVOY WHICH ACCOMPANIED ON 3 MARCH COL HAMID TO MOANDA AIRFIELD PROCEEDED FROM THERE TO THE ANC CAMP IN BANANA IN ORDER TO RETURN THE CAPTURED WEAPONS AND TWO SOLDIERS. AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE ANC CAMP, THE SUDANESE CONVOY STOPPED AND DISCUSSION ENSUED ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE TWO DETAINED SOLDIERS. WHILE THIS DISCUSSION WAS IN PROGRESS, A CONGOLESE SOLDIER APPROACHED THE SUDANESE PARTY FROM THE REAR AND FIRED TWO SHOTS IN THEIR DIRECTION. THE SUDANESE RETURNED FIRE, KILLING THE CONGOLESE SOLDIER, AND WERE IN TURN SUBJECTED TO FIRE FROM THE ANC CAMP. THE SUDANESE CONVOY WITHDREW TO THEIR CAMP, TAKING ALONG THE WEAPON OF THE KILLED SOLDIER. THIS OCCURRED AT ABOUT 1600 HOURS ON 3 MARCH.

15. AT 1615 HOURS THE ANC OPENED FIRE AT BANANA BASE. APPROXIMATELY 12 SHELLS LANDED INSIDE THE UN ENCAMPMENT AND ONE SUDANESE WAS WOUNDED. THE SMALL UN DETACHMENT RETURNED FIRE WHICH LASTED UNTIL ABOUT 1700 HOURS. AT 2045 HOURS THE ANC RESUMED SHELLING OF THE BASE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TRIED TO ENTER BANANA BY USING BOATS. AT 0030 HOURS ON 4 MARCH, THE SUDANESE TROOPS IN BANANA WERE PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW TO KITONA, BOTH BECAUSE THEIR POSITION WAS BECOMING UNTENABLE IN VIEW OF THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE ATTACKING ANC CMA AND ALSO IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE TROOPS AT THE MORE IMPORTANT KITONA BASE STOP

7. IN THE LAST DAYS OF FEBRUARY, THE ANC IN THE DAKONGO AREA SUDDENLY IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON UN MOVEMENTS, OVER-FLIGHTS OR USE OF AIRFIELDS. ON 28 FEBRUARY THE ONUC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR OF KITONA BASE AND A SERGEANT-MECHANIC WERE ARRESTED BY THE ANC AT BOMA ON THE PRETEXT THAT THEY DID NOT POSSESS A VALID TRAVEL PERMIT. SEMICLN THEY WERE DETAINED FOR SIX HOURS AND THE SERGEANT'S WEAPON WAS CONFISCATED.

8. ON THE MORNING OF 3 MARCH UN TROOPS OBSERVED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ANC PATROLS WHICH WERE MORE HEAVILY ARMED THAN USUAL. THE SAME MORNING TWO INCIDENTS OCCURRED SEMICLN

A. TWO UN HELICOPTERS, THREE MEMBERS OF THEIR CREW AND A UN CIVILIAN EXPERT WHOM THEY TRANSPORTED TO GOMA FOR RENDERING ASSISTANCE IN THE REFLOATING OF A TANKER WERE ARRESTED AND DETAINED BY THE ANC.

B. A UN STAFF MEMBER WHO ARRIVED IN MOANDA BY A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TO TAKE UP HIS DUTIES AS RADIO OFFICER WAS ARRESTED UPON ARRIVAL BY THE ANC AND HIS LUGGAGE SEIZED. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION FOREIGN MINISTER BOMBOKO EXPLAINED THAT THE REASON FOR THIS ACTION WAS THE STAFF MEMBERS FAILURE TO CARRY A UN IDENTIFICATION.

9. THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND INCIDENTS SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT SOMETHING WAS AFOOT. UN TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE AREA, AWARE OF THEIR VULNERABILITY, TOOK THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS FOR THEIR SECURITY. ONE OF SUCH MEASURES WAS A WARNING TO OFFICERS NOT TO MOVE OUTSIDE THEIR CAMPS WITHOUT AN ARMED ESCORT.

10. IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF RISING TENSION AND INDICATIONS OF AN HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF ANC PERSONNEL AGAINST THE UN THAT THE FIGHTING WHICH ERUPTED AT MOANDA, BANANA AND MATADI FINDS ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

II. ARMED CLASHES ON 3, 4 AND 5 MARCH

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A. MOANDA INCIDENT.

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THE NORTH SHORE OF THE RIVER, AND ONE, THE MOANDA
CAIRFIELD, ABOUT HALF WAY BETWEEN KITONA AND BANANA
BASE. THE LATTER TWO ARE USED BY COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS.

22. THE UN FORCES WITHDRAWAL FROM MATADI CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO BY ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT STOP THIS WITHDRAWAL ALSO PREVENTS THE UN FORCE TO ITS LIFE LINE TO THE SEA STOP THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS LINE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD CAN BE JUDGED FROM THE FACT THAT IN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS ALONE 33 SHIPS WITH UN SUPPLIES ARE DUE TO BERTH AT MATADI CMA NOT COUNTING TROOPS TRANSPORTS STOP THE USS BLATCHFORD CMA ON WHICH THE INDOONESIAN CONTINGENT WAS DUE TO BE REPATRIATED FROM MATADI ON 7 MARCH CMA REMAINS ANCHORED OUTSIDE TO ESTUARY OF THE CONGO RIVER STOP

3. WITHOUT THE UN PRESENCE AT MATADI CMA ARMS CMA AMMUNITION AND OTHER WAR MATERIAL CAN ENTER UNCHECKED INTO THE CONGO SEMICOLON THIS CMA OBVIOUSLY CMA CAN HAVE INMEASURABLE CONSEQUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR SITUATION STOP

III NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES

31. IMMEDIATELY UPON OBTAINING THE NEWS OF THE SHELLING OF BANANA DAGE CMA THE FORCE COMMANDER CONTACTED THE CONGOLESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE CMA IN COOPERATION WITH THEM CMA THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND TO PREVENT A FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION STOP AS STATED IN PARA 16 ABOVE CMA ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE TO THE AFFECTED AREA OF THE ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE ARMY CMA ACCOMPANIED BY A UN LIAISON OFFICER STOP THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED CMA HOWEVER CMA IN COMPLETING THEIR MISSION WITH THE DESIRED RESULTS STOP 32. AS REGARDS THE MATADI SITUATION CMA ATTEMPTS TO STEER BY NEGOTIATIONS THE TREND TOWARDS ARMED CLASHES WERE HAMPERED BY VARIOUS CMA TO SOME EXTENT FORTUITOUS CMA CIRCUMSTANCES COLON THE ABSENCE OF THE CHIEF OF STATE AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS AT THE MADAGASCAR CONFERENCE SEMICOLON THE SUSPICION AND EXCITEMENT OF THE ANC FOSTERED BY DISTORTED INTERPRETATIONS GIVEN BY THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES OF THE PURPORT OF THE 21 FEBRUARY RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SEMICOLON THE INTRANSIGENCE AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE UN OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE GOVERNMENT SEMICOLON AND THE UNFORTUNATE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FULLSTOP 33. ON 6 MARCH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE VISITED FOREIGN MINISTER BOMBONO CONGO WHO WAS STILL CONVALESCING FROM AN OPERATION ON IN ORDER TO DELIVER TO HIM FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (ATTACHED AS ANNEX V) CMA AND TO DISCUSS MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE THE UN POSITIONS IN MATADI AND BANANA FULLSTOP MR. BOMBONO'S REACTION WAS THAT IN THE FIRST PLACE THE INCIDENTS MUST BE FULLY INVESTIGATED AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM SEMICOLON WHICH MR BOMBONO CLAIMED TO REST WITH THE UN CONGO ESTABLISHED FULLSTOP ONLY AFTER THIS HAD BEEN DONE AND THE ANC EXONERATED CMA COULD THE QUESTIONS OF RETURNING THE CONFISCATED WEAPONS AND OTHER UN STORES SEMICOLON AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH UN FORCES COULD RE-ENTER MATADI AND BANA BE DISCUSSED FULLSTOP

34. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AGREED THAT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CAUSES OF THE ARMED CLASHES WAS NOT ONLY A DESIRABLE CMA BUT IN FACT CONSTITUTED AN INDISPENSABLE STEP UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES STOP SUCH AN INVESTIGATION MUST HOWEVER PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY REGULATIONS AND WOULD NECESSARILY TAKE SOME TIME STOP IN VIEW OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MATADI FOR UN OPERATIONS AND OF THE UN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CUSTODY OF BANANA DAGE CMA THE UN COULD NOT ADMIT THAT ITS CONTROL OVER THESE TWO PLACES SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL ALL THE INVESTIGATIONS ARE COMPLETED STOP THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT SEPARATELY BY BOTH SIDES CMA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ALSO BE HELD FOR DISCUSSING THE PROCEDURES AND MODALITIES UNDER WHICH UN FORCES WOULD CMA IN COOPERATION WITH CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES CMA RETURN AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE TO MATADI AND BANANA STOP THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE INVITED THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE GOVERNMENT CMA MR DELVAUX CMA WHO JOINED THE MEETING AT A LATER STAGE CMA TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS WITH HIM AND THE FORCE COMMANDER LATER THAT DAY ON THE LATEST CMA THE FOLLOWING MORNING STOP

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BASE. THE LATTER TWO ARE USED BY COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS.

7. IN THE LAST DAYS OF FEBRUARY, THE ANC IN THE DAKONGO AREA SUDDENLY IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON UN MOVEMENT, OVER-FLIGHTS OR USE OF AIRFIELDS. ON 26 FEBRUARY, THE ONUC CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATOR OF KITONA BASE AND A SERGEANT-MECHANIC WERE ARRESTED BY THE ANC AT BOMA ON THE PRETEXT THAT THEY DID NOT POSSESS A VALID TRAVEL PERMIT. SINCE THEY WERE DETAINED FOR SIX HOURS AND THE SERGEANT'S WEAPON WAS CONFISCATED.

8. ON THE MORNING OF 3 MARCH UN TROOPS OBSERVED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ANC PATROLS WHICH WERE MORE HEAVILY ARMED THAN USUAL. THE SAME MORNING TWO INCIDENTS OCCURRED SINCE

A. TWO UN HELICOPTERS, THREE MEMBERS OF THEIR CREW AND A UN CIVILIAN EXPERT WHOM THEY TRANSPORTED TO GOMA FOR RENDERING ASSISTANCE IN THE REFLOATING OF A TANKER WERE ARRESTED AND DETAINED BY THE ANC.

B. A UN STAFF MEMBER WHO ARRIVED IN MOANDA BY A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TO TAKE UP HIS DUTIES AS RADIO OFFICER WAS ARRESTED UPON ARRIVAL BY THE ANC AND HIS LUGGAGE SEIZED. (IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION FOREIGN MINISTER DOMBOKO EXPLAINED THAT THE REASON FOR THIS ACTION WAS THE STAFF MEMBER'S FAILURE TO CARRY A UN IDENTIFICATION.)

9. THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND INCIDENTS SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT SOMETHING WAS AFOOT. UN TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE AREA, AWARE OF THEIR VULNERABILITY, TOOK THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS FOR THEIR SECURITY. ONE OF SUCH MEASURES WAS A WARNING TO OFFICERS NOT TO MOVE OUTSIDE THEIR CAMPS WITHOUT AN ARMED ESCORT.

10. IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF RISING TENSION AND INDICATIONS OF AN HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF ANC PERSONNEL AGAINST THE UN THAT THE FIGHTING WHICH ERUPTED AT MOANDA, BANANA AND MATADI FINDS ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

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A. MOANDA INCIDENT.

12. AT 1315 HOURS ON 3 MARCH, COL ABDUL HAMID, COMMANDER OF THE SUDANESE CONTINGENT, WAS PROCEEDING TO MOANDA AIRFIELD WHERE HE INTENDED TO BOARD A COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TO LEOPOLDVILLE.

HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND AND AN ESCORT OF ABOUT A DOZEN SOLDIERS. AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE MOANDA AIRSTRIP, HE WAS WRONGFULLY STOPPED BY AN ANC DETACHMENT WHICH TOOK UP FIRING POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. COL HAMID DISMOUNTED TOGETHER WITH 6 OF HIS MEN WHO WERE IN A JEEP BEHIND HIM. AT THIS MOMENT ONE SHOT FIRED SINCE IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY WHO FIRED THE FIRST SHOT. THE FIRST SHOT WAS FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF ABOUT FIVE SHOTS, WHICH WERE FIRED BY THE SUDANESE INTO THE AIR. COL HAMID ORDERED HIS MEN TO CEASE FIRE, WHEREUPON 4 ANC SOLDIERS DROPPED THEIR WEAPONS, TWO SURRENDERED AND THE REST FLED. COL HAMID INSTRUCTED HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND TO RETURN THE CAPTURED ANC SOLDIERS AND ARMS TO THEIR CAMP IN BANANA AND BOARDED THE PLANE FOR LEOPOLDVILLE AS SCHEDULED.

B. BANANA INCIDENT

13. A FULL INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT COULD NOT YET BE CARRIED OUT DUE TO THE INTERRUPTION OF FLIGHTS BETWEEN LEOPOLDVILLE AND KITONA. THE FOLLOWING TWO PARAGRAPHS DESCRIBE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AS THEY WERE REPORTED BY SIGNAL AT THE TIME THEY OCCURRED CLN

14. THE SUDANESE CONVOY WHICH ACCOMPANIED ON 3 MARCH COL HAMID TO MOANDA AIRFIELD PROCEEDED FROM THERE TO THE ANC CAMP IN BANANA IN ORDER TO RETURN THE CAPTURED WEAPONS AND TWO SOLDIERS. AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE ANC CAMP, THE SUDANESE CONVOY STOPPED AND DISCUSSION ENSUED ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE TWO DETAINED SOLDIERS. WHILE THIS DISCUSSION WAS IN PROGRESS, A CONGOLESE SOLDIER APPROACHED THE SUDANESE PARTY FROM THE REAR AND FIRED TWO SHOTS IN THEIR DIRECTION. THE SUDANESE RETURNED FIRE, KILLING THE CONGOLESE SOLDIER, AND WERE IN TURN SUBJECTED TO FIRE FROM THE ANC CAMP. THE SUDANESE CONVOY WITHDREW TO THEIR CAMP, TAKING ALONG THE WEAPON OF THE KILLED SOLDIER. THIS OCCURRED AT ABOUT 1600 HOURS ON 3 MARCH.

15. AT 1615 HOURS THE ANC OPENED FIRE AT BANANA BASE. APPROXIMATELY 12 SHELLS LANDED INSIDE THE UN ENCAMPMENT AND ONE SUDANESE WAS WOUNDED. THE SMALL UN DETACHMENT RETURNED FIRE WHICH LASTED UNTIL ABOUT 1700 HOURS. AT 2045 HOURS THE ANC RESUMED SHELLING OF THE BASE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TRIED TO ENTER BANANA BY USING BOATS. AT 0030 HOURS ON 4 MARCH, THE SUDANESE TROOPS IN BANANA WERE PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW TO KITONA, BOTH BECAUSE THEIR POSITION WAS BECOMING UNTENABLE IN VIEW OF THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE ATTACKING ANC CMA AND ALSO IN ORDER TO CONCENTRATE TROOPS AT THE MORE IMPORTANT KITONA BASE STOP

16. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM BANANA WAS OF COURSE A PURELY TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT STOP ARRANGEMENTS WERE IMMEDIATELY MADE FOR THE DEPARTURE TO BANANA OF THE CONGOLESE ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF CMA COL KIEMBE CMA ACCOMPANIED BY A UN LIAISON OFFICER CMA MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA IN ORDER TO ARRANGE ON THE SPOT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE RETURN OF THE UN GARRISON TO BANANA STOP SIMULTANEOUSLY 124 INDONESIAN TROOPS WERE FLOWN TO KITONA TO REINFORCE THAT BASE AND TO RELIEVE THE SUDANESE TROOPS WHO CMA IT WAS HOPED AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS CMA WOULD RETURN TO BANANA STOP THE CARRYING OUT OF THESE PLANS WAS HOWEVER PREVENTED BY THE SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN MATADI STOP

C 1. MATADI STOP

17. ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO CMA THE GUARD DUTIES OVER UN INSTALLATIONS AND STORES IN MATADI WERE TAKEN OVER FROM MOROCCAN TROOPS BY A MUCH SMALLER SUDANESE UNIT OF ABOUT COMPANY STRENGTH STOP A CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT OF 9 MEN AND A SMALL MOVEMENT CONTROL DETACHMENT WERE ALSO IN MATADI CLN THIS PERSONNEL CARRIED ONLY SIDEARMS STOP UN PREMISES IN MATADI ARE WIDELY SCATTERED STOP THE TOWN STRETCHES ALONG THE RIVER BANK AND CLIMBS UP THE SURROUNDING HILLS CLN THE ANC CAMP OCCUPIES THE TOP OF ONE SUCH HILL AT THE EDGE OF THE CITY STOP THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT IS LOCATED IN A HOUSE ABOUT 150 METRES FROM THE GATE OF THE ANC CAMP. ~~CLN~~ THE MAIN BODY OF THE SUDANESE TROOPS WAS STATIONED IN A LOWER PART OF THE CITY CMA IN A BUILDING KNOWN AS THE "CINEMA" CMA ABOUT 1,000 METRES FROM THE SIGNALS CENTRE STOP THE MOVEMENT CONTROL DETACHMENT AND SOME OFFICERS QUARTERS WERE AT THE HOTEL METROPOLE CMA LOCATED IN STILL ANOTHER PART OF THE CITY. ~~CLN~~ IN ADDITION CMA SMALL DETACHMENTS OF SUDANESE TROOPS WERE POSTED TO PERFORM GUARD DUTIES AT THE HELIPORT CMA ROUGHLY HALF WAY BETWEEN THE ANC CAMP AND THE RIVER CMA AT THE AIRSTRIP CMA AND ELSEWHERE STOP

18. WHEN THE SUDANESE FIRST ARRIVED IN MATADI CMA THE ANC AND THE LOCAL POPULATION APPEARED TO BE FRIENDLY AND WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THEM CMA BUT VERY SOON THERE WAS A COMPLETE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND A STATE OF TENSION DEVELOPED FOR NO APPARENT REASON STOP ON 3 MARCH CMA AS THE NEWS ABOUT THE EVENTS IN MOANDA AND BANANA BEGAN TO FILTER THROUGH CMA THE ANC GAVE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED ACTIVITY STOP ON THE EVENING OF THAT DAY CMA THE LOCAL TELEPHONE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE SUDANESE COMPANY HQS ~~AND~~ AND THEIR OUTPOSTS WENT OUT OF COMMISSION STOP THAT NIGHT CAPT DELANGER CMA C.O. OF THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT CMA WAS ENTERTAINED AT DINNER BY THE SUDANESE OFFICERS CMA WHO INFORMED HIM OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS STOP

CAPT DELANGER TOLD THE SUDANESE C.O. THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF CMA ON NEWS OF INCIPIENT TROUBLE CMA THE SUDANESE COMPANY WOULD ASSUME PROTECTION OF HIS PREMISES STOP

19. ON THE MORNING OF 4 MARCH CMA UN PERSONNEL WHO WENT ABOUT THEIR DUTIES IN TOWN NOTICED THAT THE STREETS WERE UNUSUALLY EMPTY AND THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE EXCITEMENT AMONG THE POPULATION STOP AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS THAT MORNING CMA FOLLOWING A WARNING FROM THE UN MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER AND RECEIPT OF INFORMATION ABOUT SUSPICIOUS MOVEMENTS OF ANC TROOPS INDICATING AN ATTEMPT TO SURROUND THE UN COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE CMA A SMALL SUDANESE GUARD CMA CONSISTING OF 7 MEN WITH ONE BRENGUN AND SIX 303 RIFLES CMA POSTED AT THE CANADIAN SIGNALS BUILDING STOP

20. ACCORDING TO THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY CAPT DELANGER CMA HE RETURNED TO HIS STATION FROM A TRIP INTO THE CITY AT ABOUT 1130 HOURS AND AT THAT TIME DISCOVERED THAT THE ANC HAD A BREN GUN ABOUT 15 YARDS OUTSIDE THE BUILDING POINTING AT THE FRONT DOOR STOP EXTRACTS FROM HIS TESTIMONY FOLLOW CLN
QUOTE AT ABOUT 1140 HOURS I ~~WAS~~ (CAPTAIN DELANGER) HEARD A BURST OF GUNFIRE CLN THOSE WERE THE FIRST SHOTS THAT I HEARD FIRED ON THAT DAY SEMICOLON FROM THE FACT THAT THESE SHOTS BROKE WINDOWS IN THE BUILDING OCCUPIED BY THE SIGNALS DETACHMENT I CAN DEFINITELY ESTABLISH THAT THESE SHOTS CAME FROM THE OUTSIDE AND WERE FIRED BY THE ANC STOP
AFTER THE FIRST SHOTS WERE FIRED THE SUDANESE FIRED BACK IMMEDIATELY STOP THE EXCHANGE OF SMALL ARMS FIRE LASTED FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES STOP AT ABOUT 1200 HOURS THE ANC STARTED FIRING ON THE BUILDING OCCUPIED BY THE CANADIAN DETACHMENT WITH 37 MM ARMOUR-PIERCING SHELLS CMA STARTING THE FIRING DIRECTLY AT THE ROOF AND WORKING DOWN TOWARDS THE GROUND FLOOR STOP THESE SHOTS WERE FIRED FROM A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 400 YARDS STOP SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUED STOP AT THE SAME TIME I NOTICED THE SOUND OF MORTAR BEING FIRED FROM THE ANC CAMP APPARENTLY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE DETACHMENT GUARDING THE HELIPORT STOP BY THE SOUND OF THE SHOTS THE WEAPONS EMPLOYED WERE 3 INCH MORTAR STOP ONE SUDANESE SOLDIER WAS WOUNDED BY BULLETS AND SHRAPNEL STOP AT APPROX 1400 HRS A CEASE FIRE WAS ARRANGED THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER CMA CAPT FENGER STOP THE TERMS OF THE CEASE FIRE WERE TO STAY AT OUR POSITIONS CMA TO CEASE FIRE AND TO ALLOW ONE ANC JEEP TO GO DOWN THE HILL CARRYING A WHITE FLAG AND TO PASS THE CANADIAN BUILDING CMA UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE WAS RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE STOP THIS CEASE FIRE WAS STRICTLY OBSERVED BY THE UN FORCES STOP AT APPROX 1545 HRS I STEPPED OUT CMA UNARMED CMA FROM THE FRONT DOOR OF THE BUILDING CMA IN ORDER TO VERIFY WHETHER THE ANC JEEP WITH WHITE FLAG WAS COMING STOP I DISCOVERED THAT THE ANC HAD IN THE MEANTIME A DETACHMENT OF APPROX 15 MEN AROUND THE BACK OF THE CANADIAN SIGNALS BUILDING AND ANOTHER DETACHMENT OF ABOUT 15 MEN ON THE SIDE OF THE BUILDING STOP THEY HAD ALSO MOVED A LARGER DETACHMENT OF APPROX 30 MEN COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE HQ WHERE THE SUDANESE APPARENTLY OBSERVED THE CEASE FIRE AS NO SHOTS WERE HEARD FIRED FROM THAT DIRECTION WHEN THE ANC DETACHMENT APPROACHED STOP QUOTE UPON STEPPING OUT FROM THE FRONT DOOR I FOUND MYSELF CONFRONTED WITH THE ANC DETACHMENT WHICH HAD INFILTRATED TO THE SIDE OF THE BUILDING COLON THE ANC POINTED THEIR GUNS AT ME IN A MANNER WHICH LEFT ME NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MOVE WITH THEM IN THE DIRECTION AWAY FROM THE HOUSE STOP PARA WHEN THE GROUP SURROUNDING ME MOVED ABOUT 50 YARDS AWAY FIRE WAS OPENED FROM THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE HQ PERHAPS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERMIT ME TO ESCAPE STOP I SEIZED THIS OPPORTUNITY AND ATTEMPTED TO WRESTLE A SUB-MACHINE GUN FROM THE NEAREST CONGOLESE SOLDIER SEMICOLON ALTHOUGH I DID NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING THE GUN CMA I MANAGED TO FLEE THE GROUP SURROUNDING ME IN THE DIRECTION OF A SMALL RAVINE CROSSING THE CITY BETWEEN THE CANADIAN SIGNALS HOUSE AND THE SUDANESE HQ CMA WHERE I HID STOP AT THIS STAGE GENERAL FIRING RESUMED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE AND 37 MM ARMOUR PIERCING GUNS STOP THIS FIRING LASTED FOR ABOUT 2 1/2 HOURS STOP AT ABOUT 1615 HOURS I HEARD WILD SCREAMING INDICATING THAT THE CANADIAN SIGNALS DETACHMENT POSITION HAD BEEN CAPTURED STOP FIRING STOPPED FOR A WHILE BUT RESUMED IN A SPORADIC MANNER IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SUDANESE HQ STOP I FOUND MY ESCAPE ROUTE BLOCKED ON ALL SIDES BY ANC POSITIONS AND DECIDED TO CONTINUE HIDING IN THE RAVINE IN A SPOT ABOUT 700 YARDS DISTANT FROM THE SUDANESE HQ STOP

21. AS OBSERVED FROM THE SUDANESE HQS AT THE "CINEMA BUILDING" CA THE SITUATION APPEARED CMA IN THE WORDS OF THE COMPANY COMMANDER CMA CPT SAYED ADD: HAFIZ CMA AS FOLLOWS QUOTED "ABOUT 1130 HOURS ON SATU. MY CMA 4TH MARCH CMA I WAS IN THE SUDANESE CAMP WHEN FIRING OPENED UP ON THE CAMP AND ALSO ON THE CANADIAN SIGNAL STATION STOP THIS FIRING CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE ANG CAMP AND ALSO FROM SEVERAL DIRECTIONS OUTSIDE OF THE CAMP STOP THIS FIRING CONSISTED OF RIFLE CMA LMG CMA HMC CMA 3 INCH MORTARS CMA 37 MM ANTI-TNK SHOTS AND CONTINUED FOR ABOUT 2 HOURS STOP FROM OUR CAMP WE RETURNED THE FIRE IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION FROM WHICH WE THOUGHT THE FIRING WAS COMING STOP FIRING STOPPED AT 1330 HOURS AND RESTARTED FROM THE ANG SIDE AFTER ABOUT TWO HOURS CMA I.E. ABOUT 1530 HRS AND CONTINUED UNTIL ABOUT 1800 HOURS STOP DURING THE CEASE - FIRE CMA I CONTACTED BY PHONE THE HOTEL AND DISCOVERED THAT NO FIRING HAD TAKEN PLACE BY SUDANESE TROOPS IN THAT AREA STOP THE SAME HELD GOOD FOR THE AIRSTRIP STOP I GOT NO REPLY FROM THE HELICOPTER STRIP AND IN THE CASE OF THE CANADIAN SIGNAL STATION I WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WERE SUBJECTED TO HEAVY FIRE STOP

THERE WERE TWO SUDANESE WOUNDED AND ONE DEAD STOP DURING THE CEASE - FIRE CMA IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER SUPPLY WAS CUT STOP DURING THE FIRING CMA AT ABOUT 1730 HOURS CMA CPT FENGER CMA MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER CMA MATADI CMA CAME TO OUR CAMP IN A VOLKSWAGEN WITH A WHITE FLAG STOP AT THIS STAGE THE SUDANESE HAD DEPLOYED IN A PERIMETER DEFENCE AROUND THE GENERAL AREA OF THE CAMP STOP HE WAS TRYING TO CONTACT ME AND WAS BEING BROUGHT TO ME BY A LT WHEN THE LT WAS SHOT IN THE ARM STOP CAPTAIN FENGER EVENTUALLY GOT TO ME AND TOLD ME THAT ONE OF THE PLATOON COMMANDERS WAS SHOT STOP HE TOLD ME THAT HE

OF THE PLATOON COMMANDERS WAS SHOT STOP HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A CESE-FIRE WITH THE ADMIN STRATOR OF THE ANC STOP CAPT FENCER THEN TRIED TO CONTACT THE ADMINISTRATORS OFFICS BUT FAILED STOP HE THEN REMAINED WITH US IN THE CAMP UP TO 2000 HOURS STOP I DO NOT KNOW HOW THE CEASE -FIRE CAME ABOUT AND I AVAILLED MYSELF OF IT TO CHECK AGAIN WITH THE OUT-STATIONS STOP I CONTACTED THE AIRSTRIP AND THE METROPOLE HOTEL AND DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES AND THAT THEY HAD NOT FIRED STOP I COULD NOT CONTACT THE CANADIAN SIGNALS STATION NOR THE HELICOPTER STATION STOP IN THE CAMP AT THIS STAGE WE HAD ONE OFFICER AND TWO SOLDIERS WOUNDED STOP SEANLINE CMA DURING THE CESE-FIRE CMA SOME OF THE SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN ON GUARD AT THE CANADIAN RADIO STATION FILTERED BACK INTO OUR CAMP (3 OF THEM) STOP THEY WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED STOP THEY REPORTED THAT THEY CANADIAN SIGNAL DETAILMENT HAD BEEN TAKEN PRISONER STOP THE ANC HAD ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THE SUDANESE PRISONERS ALSO BUT THEY HAD GOT AWAY AND WERE FIRED ON WHEN TRYING TO GET BACK TO THE CAMP STOP THREE OF THEM HAD BEEN DETAINED AS PRISONERS CMA LEAVING BEHIND ONE DEAD STOP WITH REGARD TO OUR CASUALTIES CMA WE HAD NO DOCTOR IN THE CAMP AND THE ONLY MEDICAL AIDE THAT WAS AVAILABLE WAS A CORPORAL STOP I TRIED TO CONTACT THE DOCTOR AT THE HOSPITAL BUT FAILED STOP OUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION DURING THE NIGHT WAS THAT WE WERE SURROUNDED BY ABOUT 1000 CMA INCLUDING POLICE AND CIVILIANS STOP WE DECIDED TO HOLD OUR AREA TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY STOP UNQUOTE

22. ACCORDING TO CAPT DELANGER CMA WHO AS NOTED ABOVE CMA WAS WAITING IN A BAVINE SURROUNDED BY ANC PERSONNEL AND EAGELY LISTENING FOR EVERY SOUND CMA QUOTE AT ABOUT 0500 HOURS ON 3 MARCH FIRE WAS OPENED FROM AN ANC MACHINE GUN WHICH WAS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF MY POSITION STOP UNQUOTE OTHER WITNESSES TESTIFIED THAT THIS FIRE CMA WHICH CONTINUED SPORADICALLY FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS FOR SEVERAL HOURS CMA WAS DIRECTED MAINLY AT THE SUDANESE HIS BUILDING STOP

23. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS ON 3 MARCH

23. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 HOURS ON 3 MARCH
FIRING CEASED STOP ABOUT THE SAME TIME CMA C. KIEMBE CMA
THE ANC ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF CMA ACCOMPANIED BY A UN
LIAISON OFFICER MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA ARRIVED FROM KITONA
AT THE MATADI AIR STRIP AND PROCEEDED TO THE ANC CAMP
CMA WHERE THEY WERE JOINED BY MR A. DELVAUX CMA
MEMBER OF THE ILEO GOVERNMENT CMA MAJOR PWATI CMA CAPT
MUSIMBANE FROM ANC HQ CMA THE LOCAL ANC COMMANDER CMA MAJOR
INGILLA CMA AND LOCAL OFFICIALS STOP FROM THERE CMA THE
PARTY MOVED TO THE "VETERANS BUILDING" CMA LOCATED
ON HIGH GROUND CMA ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE ANC CAMP AND
ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE SUDANESE HQS BUILDING AND
AFFORDING A GOOD VIEW OF BOTH POSITIONS CMA WHERE THE MEETING
TO DISCUSS THE TERMS FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WAS
TO TAKE PLACE STOP ON THE UN SIDE THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED
CMA IN ADDITION TO MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA BY THE
COMMANDER OF THE SUDANESE TROOPS IN MATADI CMA CAPT
HAIL CMA AND BY THE UN MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER CMA CAPT
FINGER STOP RED CROSS OFFICIALS WERE ALSO PRESENT STOP THE
MEETING OPENED SHORTLY BEFORE NOON STOP

24. AT EXACTLY 1200 HOURS CMA FIRING STARTED AGAIN
STOP CAPTAIN BELANGER CMA WHO WAS STILL HIDING IN A RAVINE
CMA TESTIFIED THAT QUOTE I DISTINCTLY HEARD THAT THE
FIRST SHOT IN THIS FIRING CAME FROM A 75 MM RECOILLESS
GUN CMA FOLLOWED BY OTHER WEAPONS UNQUOTE STOP UN TROOPS
AT MATADI HAD ONLY RIFLES AND LIGHT MACHINE GUNS STOP
ACCORDING TO THE TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BOUFFARD CMA WHO AS
IN A GOOD POSITION TO OBSERVE THE SHOOTING FROM A
POINT OF VANTAGE ON HIGH GROUND CMA QUOTE THIS CONCENTRED
FIRE FROM VARIOUS WEAPONS CMA INCLUDING HEAVY MORTAR
AND 75 MM RECOILLESS GUNS CMA CONSISTED MAINLY OF SHOTS
AGAINST THE SUDANESE HQS STOP THIS WAS CLEARLY VISIBLE FROM
THE IMPACT SMOKE AND COULD ALSO BE DEDUCTED FROM SOUND STOP
IT IS MY (MAJOR BOUFFARD'S) CONSIDERED OPINION THAT
THE BARRAGE WAS STAGED AT A PRE-ARRANGED TIME BY THE ANC
IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE STOP
IN THE OPINION OF MILITARY EXPERTS CMA SUCH CONCENTRED AND
EXACTLY TIMED FIRE FROM VARIOUS TYPES OF WEAPONS IN DIFFERENT
POSITIONS POINTS TO A PRE-ARRANGED FIRING PROGRAMME AND
IS INCONSISTENT WITH AN IMPROVISED RETALIATORY SHOOTING
IN ANSWER TO THE OPENING OF FIRE BY ANOTHER PARTY STOP

unquote

*secretly
copy -
March 74*

29. THE UN FORCES WITHDRAWAL FROM NATADI CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO BY ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. STOP THIS WITHDRAWAL ALSO EXPOSES THE UN FORCE TO ITS LIFE LINE TO THE SEA STOP THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS LINK TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD CAN BE JUDGED FROM THE FACT THAT IN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS ALONE 33 SHIPS WITH UN SUPPLIES ARE DUE TO DEPART AT NATADI CMA NOT COUNTING TROOPS TRANSPORT STOP THE USS BLATCHFORD CMA ON WHICH THE INDOONESIAN CONTINGENT WAS DUE TO BE REPATRIATED FROM NATADI ON 7 MARCH CMA REMAINS ANCHORED OUTSIDE TO ESTUARY OF THE CONGO RIVER STOP

30. WITHOUT THE UN PRESENCE AT NATADI CMA ARMS CMA AMMUNITION AND OTHER WAR MATERIAL CAN ENTER UNCHECKED INTO THE CONGO SINCE THIS CMA OBVIOUSLY CMA CAN HAVE MEASURABLE CONSEQUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR SITUATION STOP

III NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES

31. IMMEDIATELY UPON OBTAINING THE NEWS OF THE SUELLING OF BANANA DAGE CMA THE FORCE COMMANDER CONTACTED THE CONGOLESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE CMA IN COOPERATION WITH THEM CMA THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND TO PREVENT A FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION STOP AS STATED IN PARA 16 ABOVE CMA ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE TO THE AFFECTED AREA OF THE ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE ARMY CMA ACCOMPANIED BY A UN LIAISON OFFICER STOP THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED CMA HOWEVER CMA IN COMPLETING THEIR MISSION WITH THE DESIRED RESULTS STOP 32. AS REGARDS THE NATADI SITUATION CMA ATTEMPTS TO STOP BY NEGOTIATIONS THE TREND TOWARDS ARMED CLASHES WERE HAWVERED BY VARIOUS CMA TO SOME EXTENT FORTUITOUS CMA CIRCUMSTANCES COLON THE ABSENCE OF THE CHIEF OF STATE AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS AT THE MADAGASCAR CONFERENCE SEMICOLON THE SUSPICION AND EXCITEMENT OF THE ANC FOSTERED BY DISTORTED INTERPRETATIONS GIVEN BY THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES OF THE PURPOSE OF THE 22 FEBRUARY RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SEMICOLON THE INTRANSIGENCE AND HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE UN OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE GOVERNMENT SEMICOLON AND THE UNFORTUNATE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FULLSTOP 33. ON 6 MARCH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE VISITED FOREIGN MINISTER DONDOSO CONIA WHO WAS STILL CONVALESCING FROM AN OPERATION ON IN ORDER TO DELIVER TO HIM FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRESIDENT NASA-VUDU A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (ATTACHED AS ANNEX V) CMA AND TO DISCUSS MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE THE UN POSITIONS IN NATADI AND BANANA FULLSTOP MR. DONDOSO'S REACTION WAS THAT IN THE FIRST PLACE THE INCIDENTS MUST BE FULLY INVESTIGATED AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM SEMICOLON WHICH MR DONDOSO CLAIMED TO REST WITH THE UN CONIA ESTABLISHED FULLSTOP ONLY AFTER THIS HAD BEEN DONE AND THE ANC EXONERATED CMA COULD THE QUESTIONS OF RETURNING THE CONFISCATED WEAPONS AND OTHER UN STORES SEMICOLON AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH UN FORCES COULD RE-ENTER NATADI AND BANANA BE DISCUSSED FULLSTOP

34. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AGREED THAT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CAUSES OF THE ARMED CLASHES WAS NOT ONLY A DESIRABLE CMA BUT IN FACT CONSTITUTED AN INDISPENSABLE STEP UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES STOP SUCH AN INVESTIGATION MUST HOWEVER PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESPECTIVE MILITARY REGULATIONS AND WOULD NECESSARILY TAKE SOME TIME STOP IN VIEW OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF NATADI FOR UN OPERATIONS AND OF THE UN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CUSTODY OF BANANA DAGE CMA THE UN COULD NOT ADMIT THAT ITS CONTROL OVER THESE TWO PLACES SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL ALL THE INVESTIGATIONS ARE COMPLETED STOP THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THEREFORE PROVED THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT SEPARATELY BY BOTH SIDES CMA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ALSO BE HELD FOR DISCUSSING THE PROCEDURES AND MODALITIES UNDER WHICH UN FORCES WOULD CMA IN COOPERATION WITH CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES CMA RETURN AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE TO NATADI AND BANANA STOP THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE INVITED THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE GOVERNMENT CMA MR DELVALE CMA WHO JOINED THE MEETING AT A LATER STAGE CMA TO DISCUSS THESE CIRCUMS WITH HIM AND THE FORCE COMMANDER LATER THAT DAY ON THE LATEST CMA THE FOLLOWING MORNING STOP

35. THIS MEETING WAS TWICE POSTPONED BY MR DELVAUX CMA FIRST TO 1800 HOURS ON 7 MARCH AND THEN TO 0900 HOURS ON 8 MARCH BUT IT EVENTUALLY TOOK PLACE AT 1800 HOURS IN THE OFFICE OF THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER MR MASSA CMA WHO ASSUMED CHARGE OF THIS OFFICE THE SAME MORNING CMA MR DELVAUX HAVING HELD ACTING CHARGE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE CMA ACCORDING TO HIS OWN STATEMENT CMA ONLY FOR TWO DAYS STOP

36. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 7 MARCH CMA MR DELVAUX ISSUED TO THE PRESS A SIGNED COMMUNIQUE THE TEXT OF WHICH IS ATTACHED AS ANNEX VI STOP

37. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADDRESSED ON 7 MARCH TO PRESIDENT KASA-VUHU CMA WHO IS IN TANZANIA CMA A MESSAGE WHICH IS REPRODUCED AS ANNEX VII STOP

IN WITH CONTINUATION OUR CVD U-656 1

38. AT THE MEETING HELD ON 8 MARCH WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER MASSA CMA ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER NASONGO AND ACTING INTERIOR MINISTER DELVAUX, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE REITERATED HIS WISH TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURES FOR THE SPEEDIEST POSSIBLE RETURN OF THE UN FORCE TO ITS PREVIOUS STATIONS IN BANANA AND MATADI.

THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION COULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY AFTER THE UN HAD WITHDRAWN THE STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS THE CONGOLESE WHO HAD OPENED FIRE AT MATADI. THE FORCE COMMANDER POINTED OUT THAT THE INQUIRIES HELD BY A COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, NONE OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE OF EITHER SUDANESE OR CANADIAN NATIONALITY, HAVE FULLY SUBSTANTIATED THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WHICH HE BASED HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT KASAVUBU REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 33 ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER MAINTAINED THAT NO RETURN OF THE UN FORCE TO MATADI COULD BE DISCUSSED SO LONG AS THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY WAS NOT SETTLED AND HE EXPRESSED THE FIRM VIEW THAT IT WAS THE UN SUDANESE TROOPS WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HOSTILITIES. IF HOWEVER THE UN MADE THIS ADMISSION, HE WAS READY TO AGREE TO THE IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION OF THE RETURN OF UN TROOPS TO BANANA AND MATADI.

THIS POSITION WAS OF COURSE QUITE INADMISSIBLE.

29. UPON THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S REQUEST THAT THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER SHOULD CLEARLY STATE THE POSITION OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES OF THE REGARD TO THE PEACEFUL RE-TOCATION OF THE UN POSITION IN KANAI AND NATADI, SO THAT THIS INFORMATION COULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT INADVISABLE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING TENSION, FOR THE UN TO SEND ITS TROOPS TO NATADI. 53 175059. OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS TO WHAT STEPS THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES WERE TAKING TO REDUCE THIS TENSION, REMAINED UNANSWERED.

30. FINALLY, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER MADE THE FOLLOWING DEMANDS AS A CONDITION FOR FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UN AND THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES :

- (A) NO UN TROOPSHIPS MAY ENTER NATADI AND RIVER PILOTS HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN TO LEND THEIR SERVICES TO SUCH VESSELS.
- (B) ALL UN AIR TRAFFIC MUST BE CONTROLLED BY THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES AND SUBJECT TO THEIR PERMISSION :
- (C) JOINT CONTROL MUST BE ESTABLISHED OVER ALL AIRFIELDS AND OTHER STRATEGIC POINTS NOW UNDER THE CONTROL OF UN.
- (D) ALL PERMANENT MOVEMENTS OF UN TROOPS MUST BE SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND UN TROOPS MUST OBTAIN ENTRY AND EXIT PERMITS.
- (E) ALL PATROLLING OF UN TROOPS WITH ARMS IN LEOPOLDVILLE CITY MUST CEASE.

31. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT HE WOULD CONVEY THE ABOVE CONDITIONS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IMMEDIATELY, POINTING OUT THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE FIRST FOUR. AS REGARDS (E) GENERAL MACDON STATED THAT HE HAD TRIED SINCE A FORTNIGHT TO OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF THE ANG ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT UN-ANG PATROLS IN LEOPOLDVILLE CITY, BUT WITHOUT RESULT. HE WOULD ALSO CONSIDER WITHDRAWING EXISTING ORDERS, WHICH HAD TO BE ISSUED IN VIEW OF THE ATTACKS ON UN PERSONNEL, REGARDING THE CARRYING OF PERSONAL ARMS.

32. THE CONFERENCE THUS ENDED ON THIS INCONCLUSIVE NOTE.
UNQUOTE "

HWITH ANNEX IV TO CABLE D-YTY. TEX

HWITH ANNEX IV TO CABLE D-656. TEXT OF OTHER ANNEXES ALREADY
AVAILABLE IN NEW YORK AS FOLLOWS :

ANNEX I SEE OUR D-524

ANNEX II SEE D-542

ANNEX III SEE D-546

ANNEX V SEE NEW YORK CABLE 1534 - 6 MARCH

ANNEX VI SEE D-644

ANNEX VII SEE D-651.

ANNEX IV

KC.

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
ETAT DE LEOPOLDVILLE.-
DISTRICT DU BAS-CONGO
TERRITOIRE DE NATADI.-

PROC-VERBAL ADMINISTRATIF.

L'AN MIL NEUF CENT SOIXANTE ET UN, LE SIEME JOUR DU MOIS
D MARS,

SUITE AUX EVENEMENTS GRAVES QUI SE SONT DEROULES LE
SAMEDI 4 ET DIMANCHE 5 MARS 1961, DANS LA
VILLE DE MATADI, SPECIALEMENT LE TIR DU 5 MARS 1961
DE 12H. A 12H.30, IL A ETE CONVENU ENTRE LE
MINISTRE DELVAUX, REPRESENTANT LE 1ER MINISTRE ET
LE MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE
DU CONGO, ET LE CAPITAINE SOUDANAIS S.A. HAFIZ,
RESPONSABLE DES TROUPES DE LONU A MATADI, EN PRESENCE
DU MAJOR BOUFFARD, CLEMENT, REPRESENTANT DE LONU
ET DU CHEF DETAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE
KIEMBE.

1E LES TROUPES SOUDANEISES QUITTERONT LA VILLE DE MATADI
CE JOUR, PAR TRAIN A DESTINATION DE LEOPOLDVILLE,
EMPORTANT AVEC EUX LEURS ARMES ET MUNITIONS ET AUTRE
MATERIEL MILITAIRE.

2E POUR ASSURER LA SECURITE AU MOMENT DU DEPART,
LE MINISTRE ASSISTERA LUI-MEME, AVEC UN OFFICIER DE
LETAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE ET UN OFFICIER DE LONU
A L'EMBARQUEMENT DES DITES TROUPES.

3E LE MINISTRE DEPECHERA UN MEMBRE DE LETAT-MAJOR DE
L'ARMEE NATIONALE POUR ASSURER TOUTE SECURITE DES TROUPES
PENDANT LE TRANSPORT DE MATADI A LEOPOLDVILLE. EN OUTRE,
IL PRENDRA PERSONNELLEMENT CONTACT AVEC LES DIFFERENTES
UNITES DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE POUR ASSURER SECURITE ET AIDE
PENDANT LE TRANSPORT.-

4E TOUTE SECURITE SERA APPOURTÉE AU TRANSPORT DES TROUPES
SUR LE TRAJET DE LEUR BASE A LA GARE LIEU DE LEUR
EMBARQUEMENT.-

LE MINISTRE SE CHARGE DE FAIRE RAPPORT A SON GOUVERNE-
MENT DE LA SITUATION EXACTE DES INCIDENTS DE MATADI,
VICE-VERSA, LE CAPITAINE DE L'ARMEE SOUDANAISE PRESENTERA
SON RAPPORT A L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES DE LEOPOLD-
VILLE.-

LE CAPITAINE SOUDANAIS
S.A. HAFIZ

POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT CONGOLAIS
LE MINISTRE RESIDENT
A. DELVAUX

MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR, FF.

LES TEMOINS :

POUR LONU
BOUFFARD, CL.

POUR L'ARMEE CONGOLAISE
KIEMBE

P.S. : A DEFAUT DU DEPART DES TROUPES SOUDANAISES
DANS LE DELAI PREVU CI-DESSUS LE MINISTRE
A. DELVAUX, PRENDRA TOUTES SES RESPONSABILITES
POUR FAIRE VENIR DES REINFORCS AFIN D'ASSURER LA SE-
CURITE DES HABITANTS DE MATADI, EN DECLENCHANT
UNE OFFENSIVE GENERALE CONTRE LES TROUPES
DE LONU.

✓ WITH ANNEX IV TO CABLE D-VTV. THE

WITH ANNEX IV TO CABLE D-896. TEXT OF OTHER ANNEXES ALREADY
AVAILABLE IN NEW YORK AS FOLLOWS :

ANNEX I SEE OUR D-524
ANNEX II SEE D-542
ANNEX III SEE D-546
ANNEX V SEE NEW YORK CABLE 1534 - 6 MARCH
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ANNEX IV

FC.
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
ETAT DE LEOPOLDVILLE.-
DISTRICT DU BAS-CONGO
TERRITOIRES DE MAYADI.-

The duress under which the Commander of the

SUDANESE TROOPS IN MATADI WAS FORCED TO ACCEPT THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
DICTATED BY THE CONGOLESE DELEGATION CMA MAJOR BOUFFARD
FROM THE TROOPERS OF HIS TESTIMONY ON THAT POINT CLN
QUOTE AT ABOUT 1130 HOURS ON 5 MARCH CMA MAJOR
BOUFFARD CMA RINGING UP FROM THE AIRSTRIP CMA INSTRUCTED
ME TO CEASE FIRE AND KEEP OUR HEADS DOWN AS THEY WERE ABOUT
TO NEGOTIATE A CEASE-FIRE STOP THIS WE DID STOP AT ABOUT 1130
HOURS THE CANADIAN DOCTOR CAME TO ME IN THE INSIDE OF THE
CAMP AND TOLD ME THAT I WAS WANTED BY THE PEOPLE FROM
LEO TO DISCUSS A CEASE-FIRE AND THAT I WAS TO COME UNARMED
STOP I WENT TO A HOUSE ON THE EDGE OF THE TOWN STOP
JUST WHEN THE CONFERENCE WAS READY TO COMMENCE CMA FIRING
BROKE OUT AGAIN CMA PARTICULARLY MORTAR FIRE STOP I INFORMED
THE CONFERENCE THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE FIRE CMA THAT
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS A CEASEFIRE STOP
THE PEOPLE AT THE CONFERENCE MERELY TOOK COVER STOP THE
FIRING APPEARED TO CONTINUE FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR STOP
ONE OF THE ANC OFFICERS WHO WENT OUT CAME BACK TO THE CONFERENCE
AND INFORMED US THAT THE FIRING HAD COME FIRST FROM THE
SUDANESE CAMP AND THE HOTEL STOP THEY (THE
CONGOLESE) ALL AGREED WITH THIS ALTHOUGH I TOLD
THEM THIS COULDN'T BE THE CASE AS I HAD NOT THE TYPE OF
WEAPONS BEING USED CMA SUCH AS 3 MORTARS AND RECOILLESS
WEAPONS STOP THE CONFERENCE STARTED AGAIN AND MINISTER
DELVAUX WAS SPEAKING FRENCH AND HIS WORDS WERE BEING
INTERPRETED TO ME BY MAJOR BOUFFARD STOP MINISTER DELVAUX
SAID THE SUDANESE MUST LEAVE MATADI OR THEY WOULD BRING
REINFORCEMENTS FROM THYSVILLE AND ATTACK THE SUDANESE CAMP
STOP I SAID THAT ALL I WANTED WAS A CHANCE TO GATHER MY
TROOPS AND I WAS WILLING TO LEAVE MATADI AS SOON AS I COULD
STOP AT THIS TIME CMA I WAS ADVISED BY MAJOR BOUFFARD THAT
THIS WAS THE ONLY PORT AVAILABLE AND THAT I SHOULD NOT LEAVE
MATADI UNLESS I HAD ORDERS FROM LEO STOP I SAID I HAD NO
AMMUNITION LEFT AND I DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY CASUALTIES
HAD BEEN INFLICTED ON MY MEN IN THE CAMP AS A RESULT OF
THE LATEST HEAVY FIRING STOP I THEREFORE
HAD NO OPTION BUT TO GET OUT OF MATADI STOP MAJOR
BOUFFARD SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE
MINISTERS ABOUT FORCES REMAINING IN MATADI BUT I INFORMED
HIM THAT UNDER THE CONDITIONS I COULD NOT POSSIBLY STAY THERE
STOP MINISTER DELVAUX DID NOT LIKE MAJOR BOUFFARD'S SUGGESTIONS
AND HE FORWARDED HIM TO CONTINUE WITH THE INTERPRETATION STOP
THE MANAGER OF THE HOTEL NOW BECAME THE INTERPRETER
BETWEEN MYSELF AND MR DELVAUX STOP I CAME TO AN AGREEMENT
WITH THE MINISTER THAT WE WOULD LEAVE WITH ALL OUR ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
STOP UNQUOTE

26. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES ARE ATTACHED AS ANNEX IV STOP

27. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED CMA MAJOR BOUFFARD
CMA ACCORDING TO HIS TESTIMONY CMA QUOTE MADE IT CLEAR
THAT AS LONG AS UN REMAINED IN THE CONGO CMA UN TROOPS
WOULD HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED IN MATADI CLN TO WHICH MR
DELVAUX REPLIED THAT HE REALIZED THIS FACT AND THAT WITHDRAWAL
WAS DEMANDED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE
SUDANESE TROOPS PRESENT IN MATADI AT THAT TIME UNQUOTE STOP

28. IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS CONTAINED IN THE WITHDRAWAL
AGREEMENT CMA FORMAL ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN BY MR DELVAUX
THAT IN CONSIDERATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUDANESE
TROOPS CMA CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES WILL ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SAFEGUARDING FOR THE UN ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT CMA
RATIONS OR STORES LEFT BEHIND BY THOSE TROOPS CMA SO THAT
UN TROOPS COMING TO RELIEVE THEM COULD IMMEDIATELY AVAIL
THEMSELVES OF SUCH STORES STOP THE MATADI DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
CMA WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT CMA WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THIS TASK
AND HE AGREED TO CARRY OUT THIS UNDERTAKING STOP

29. NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISION OF THE CEASE FIRE

35. THIS MEETING WAS TWICE POSTPONED BY MR DELVAUX CMA FIRST TO 1800 HOURS ON 7 MARCH AND THEN TO 0900 HOURS ON 8 MARCH STOP IT EVENTUALLY TOOK PLACE AT 1000 HOURS IN THE OFFICE OF THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER MR MASSA CMA WHO ASSUMED CHARGE OF THIS OFFICE THE SAME MORNING CMA MR DELVAUX HAVING HELD ACTING CHARGE OF THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE CMA ACCORDING TO HIS OWN STATEMENT CMA ONLY FOR TWO DAYS STOP

36. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 7 MARCH CMA MR DELVAUX ISSUED TO THE PRESS A SIGNED COMMUNIQUE THE TEXT OF WHICH IS ATTACHED AS ANNEX VI STOP

37. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADDRESSED ON 7 MARCH TO PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU CMA WHO IS IN TANANARIVE CMA A MESSAGE WHICH IS REPRODUCED AS ANNEX VII STOP

WITH CONTINUATION OUR CY9 D-656 :

38. AT THE MEETING HELD ON 8 MARCH WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER MASSA CMA ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KASONGO AND ACTING INTERIOR MINISTER DELVAUX, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE REITERATED HIS WISH TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURES FOR THE SPEEDIEST POSSIBLE RETURN OF THE UN FORCE TO ITS PREVIOUS STATIONS IN BANANA AND MATADI.

THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION COULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY AFTER THE UN HAD WITHDRAWN THE STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS THE CONGOLESE WHO HAD OPENED FIRE AT MATADI. THE FORCE COMMANDER POINTED OUT THAT THE INQUIRIES HELD BY A COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, NONE OF WHOSE MEMBERS WERE OF EITHER SUDANESE OR CANADIAN NATIONALITY, HAVE FULLY ESTABLISHED THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WHICH HE BASED HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT KASAVUBU REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 33 ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER MAINTAINED THAT NO RETURN OF THE UN FORCE TO MATADI COULD BE DISCUSSED SO LONG AS THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY WAS NOT SETTLED AND HE EXPRESSED THE FIRM VIEW THAT IT WAS THE UN SUDANESE TROOPS WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HOSTILITIES. IF HOWEVER THE UN MADE THIS ADMISSION, HE WAS READY TO AGREE TO THE IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION OF THE RETURN OF UN TROOPS TO BANANA AND MATADI.

THIS POSITION WAS OF COURSE QUITE INADMISSIBLE.

39. UPON THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S REQUEST THAT THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER SHOULD CLEARLY STATE THE POSITION OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES REGARD TO THE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF THE UN POSITION IN BANANA AND MATADI, SO THAT THIS INFORMATION COULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT INADVISABLE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING TENSION, FOR THE UN TO SEND ITS TROOPS TO MATADI. 53 173589. OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS TO WHAT STEPS THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES WERE TAKING TO REDUCE THIS TENSION, REMAINED UNANSWERED.

34. FINALLY, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER MADE THE FOLLOWING DEMANDS AS A CONDITION FOR FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UN AND THE LEOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES :

- (A) NO UN TROOPSHIPS MAY ENTER MATADI AND RIVER PILOTS HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN TO LEND THEIR SERVICES TO SUCH VESSELS.
- (B) ALL UN AIR TRAFFIC MUST BE CONTROLLED BY THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES AND SUBJECT TO THEIR PERMISSION ;
- (C) JOINT CONTROL MUST BE ESTABLISHED OVER ALL AIRFIELDS AND OTHER STRATEGIC POINTS NOW UNDER THE CONTROL OF UN.
- (D) ALL PERMANENT MOVEMENTS OF UN TROOPS MUST BE SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND UN TROOPS MUST OBTAIN ENTRY AND EXIT PERMITS.
- (E) ALL PATROLLING OF UN GROUPS WITH ARMS IN LEOPOLDVILLE CITY MUST CEASE.

41. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT HE WOULD CONVEY THE ABOVE CONDITIONS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IMMEDIATELY, POINTING OUT THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE FIRST FOUR. AS REGARDS (E) GENERAL MACROIN STATED THAT HE HAD TRIED SINCE A FORTNIGHT TO OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF THE ANC ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT UN-ANC PATROLS IN LEOPOLDVILLE CITY, BUT WITHOUT RESULT. HE WOULD ALSO CONSIDER WITHDRAWING EXISTING ORDERS, WHICH HAD TO BE ISSUED IN VIEW OF THE ATTACKS ON UN PERSONNEL, REGARDING THE CARRYING OF PERSONAL ARMS.

42. THE CONFERENCE THUS ENDED ON THIS INCONCLUSIVE NOTE.
UNQUOTE "

PROCES-VERBAL ADMINISTRATIF.

DAN MIL NEUF CENT SOIXANTE ET UN, LE DEUXIEME JOUR DU MOIS
3 MARS.

SUITE AUX EVENEMENTS GRAVES QUI SE SONT DEROULES LE
SAMEDI 4 ET DIMANCHE 5 MARS 1961, DANS LA
VILLE DE MATADI, SPECIALEMENT LE TIR DU 5 MARS 1961
DE 12H. A 12H.30, IL A ETE CONVENU ENTRE LE
MINISTRE DELVAUX, REPRESENTANT LE 1ER MINISTRE ET
LE MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE
DU CONGO, ET LE CAPITAINE SOUDANAIS S.A. RAFI2,
RESPONSABLE DES TROUPES DE LOUJ A MATADI, EN PRESENCE
DU MAJOR DOUFFARD, CLEMENT, REPRESENTANT DE LOUJ
ET DU CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE
KIENDE.

1E LES TROUPES SOUDANEISES QUITTERONT LA VILLE DE MATADI
CE JOUR, PAR TRAIN A DESTINATION DE LEOPOLDVILLE,
EMPORTANT AVEC EUX LEURS ARMES ET MUNITIONS ET AUTRE
MATERIEL MILITAIRE.

2E POUR ASSURER LA SECURITE AU MOMENT DU DEPART,
LE MINISTRE ASSISTERA LUI-MEME, AVEC UN OFFICIER DE
L'ETAT-MAJOR DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE ET UN OFFICIER DE LOUJ
A L'EMBARQUEMENT DES DITES TROUPES.

3E LE MINISTRE DEVENIRA UN MEMBRE DE L'ETAT-MAJOR DE
L'ARMEE NATIONALE POUR ASSURER TOUTE SECURITE DES TROUPES
PENDANT LE TRANSPORT DE MATADI A LEOPOLDVILLE. EN OUTRE,
IL PRENDRA PERSONNELLEMENT CONTACT AVEC LES DIFFERENTES
UNITES DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE POUR ASSURER SECURITE ET AIDE
PENDANT LE TRANSPORT.-

4E TOUTE SECURITE SERA AFFORTEE AU TRANSPORT DES TROUPES
SUR LE TRAJET DE LEUR BASE A LA GARE LIEU DE LEUR
EMBARQUEMENT.-

LE MINISTRE SE CHARGE DE FAIRE RAPPORT A SON GOUVERNE-
MENT DE LA SITUATION EXACTE DES INCIDENTS DE MATADI.
VICE-VERSA, LE CAPITAINE DE L'ARMEE SOUDANAISE PRESENTERA
SON RAPPORT A L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES DE LEOPOLD-
VILLE.-

LE CAPITAINE SOUDANAIS
S.A. RAFI2

POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT CONGOLAIS
LE MINISTRE RESIDENT
A. DELVAUX

MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR, FF.

LES TEMOINS :

POUR LOUJ
DOUFFARD, CL.

POUR L'ARMEE CONGOLAISE
KIENDE

P.S. : A DEFAUT DU DEPART DES TROUPES SOUDANAISES
DANS LE DELAI PREVU CI-DESSUS LE MINISTRE
A. DELVAUX, PRENDRA TOUTES SES RESPONSABILITES
POUR FAIRE VENIR DES RENFORTS AFIN D'ASSURER LA SE-
CURITE DES HABITANTS DE MATADI. EN DECLENCHANT
UNE OFFENSIVE GENERALE CONTRE LES TROUPES
DE LOUJ.

D-656

Annex IV

Original French

Kg.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
State of Leopoldville
District of Bas-Congo
Territory of Matadi

Translation

s/4761

ADMINISTRATIVE PROTOCOL

The year nineteen hundred and sixty-one, the fifth day of the month of March,

Following the serious events which occurred Saturday 4 and Sunday 5 March 1961, in the city of Matadi, in particular the firing of 5 March 1961 from 12 h. to 12 h. 20, it was agreed between Minister Delvaux, representing the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, and the Sudanese Captain S.A. Hafiz, responsible for UN troops in Matadi, in the presence of Major Bouffard, Clément, representing the UN, and the Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army, Kiembe:

1. The Sudanese troops will leave the town of Matadi to-day, by train, for Leopoldville, taking with them their arms and ammunition and other military material.
2. In order to ensure security at the time of departure, the Minister will be present himself, with an officer of the Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army and a UN officer, when the troops embark.
3. The Minister will send a member of the Chief of Staff of the National Army in order to ensure complete security of the troops during transport from Matadi to Leopoldville. In addition, he will personally be in contact with the different units of the National Army in order to ensure security and help during the transportation.
4. Security will be ensured during the transport of the troops from their base to the station - place of embarkation.

The Minister undertakes to make a report to his government on the exact situation of the incidents at Matadi; vice-versa, the Captain of the Sudanese Army will present his report to the United Nations Organization in Leopoldville.

THE SUDANESE CAPTAIN
S.A. HAFIZ

FOR THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT
THE RESIDENT MINISTER
A. DELVAUX
Minister of the Interior, ff.

THE WITNESSES

For UNO
BOUFFARD, Cl.

For the Congolese Army
KIEMBE

P.S. In the event of failure of the Sudanese troops to depart within the above time-limit, the Minister A. Delvaux will take the necessary steps to obtain reinforcements in order to safeguard the population of Matadi by launching a general offensive against the UN troops.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 7 March 1961

No : 1583

In addition to report from you on Banane-Matedi incidents, requested but not yet received, I must also have most urgently a report covering any talks or negotiations you have had on question with Delvaux or other Congolese officials, and any communications received from them. In reporting to Security Council and quite likely calling for a meeting, in light of Delvaux's stand, if officially maintained as stated in press conference, I cannot lean on transcript of that conference sent in D-644 and D-645, although it may, if accurate, be used as annex to your report, if desirable.

100-100000

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 7 March 1961

No : 1575

Report contained in your cable D-636 issued to-day as document S/4758/Add.3 entitled "Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on recent developments in the Leopoldville area." and subtitled "Report dated 6 March to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo concerning events in Metedi." ONUC cable 1168 incorporated as footnote as follows: "General McKeown, Commander of the UN Force, subsequently reported that Captain Belanger was back in Leopoldville, safe and well."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 9 March 1961

No : 1561

Report contained in your D-656 reproduced as document S/4761 entitled "Report dated 8 March to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo on the events relating to the armed clashes which took place between United Nations troops and Congolese forces at Moanda, Banana and Matadi on 3 to 5 March 1961." Your annexes 2, 4 and 6 have been renumbered 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Your remaining annexes 1, 3, 5 and 7 have already been issued in documents S/4750/Add.3, S/4753, S/4758/Add.4 and S/4758/Add.6 respectively. Where reference is made to these annexes in your D-656, reference is made in document S/4761 to the relevant documents.

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D- 636 SEGGEN FROM DAYAL

Following information on events in Matadi made public here today:

"On 3 March 1961 UN forces in the Matadi/Kitona area observed that the ANC patrols were carrying unusually heavy armament. Shortly thereafter ANC roadblocks began to impede ONUC movements and a helicopter crew at Boma was arrested. Simultaneously ANC troops at Banana tried to prevent the access of the Sudanese CO, Lt.Col. Abdul Hamid, to board a plane and fired at his party. In the resulting exchange of fire two ANC were captured and disarmed by Sudanese. In the evening of 3 March the ANC shelled Banana Camp.

In the early afternoon of 4 March, an ANC unit attempted to dislodge the Sudanese detachment guarding the Canadian Signals at Matadi, and an exchange of fire ensued. The ANC brought heavy armaments including armour piercing 37 mm guns with which they fired at the building, crashing signals equipment and killing one Sudanese soldier. As the Sudanese were armed only with rifles and LMGs and could therefore not effectively respond to this attack, the Canadian detachment commander, Captain Belanger, who showed extreme gallantry under fire, went out unarmed to meet the ANC Commander and arrange a cease fire. He has not been seen or heard of since. Firing stopped after some 45 minutes, but resumed at 1800 hrs when the ANC used

T. O. R.

BY:

Room 640, Tel: 180

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

T. O. D.

6.3.61

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Mortars and heavy machine guns against lightly armed UN troops.

On 5 March the ANC attacked the Sudanese unit with heavy weapons at 0830 hrs; and again at 1200 hrs while a conference to arrange a cease fire was being held. The second unprovoked firing in which the ANC concentrated all the weapons at their disposal could be explained only as an attempt to force the hand of the UN cease fire negotiators.

The cease fire negotiations on 5 March were held between the Acting Prime Minister of the Leopoldville Government, Mr. Delvaux, ANC Chief of Staff Major Kiembe, local ANC commanders and various other personalities on the Congolese side, and Major Bouffard, the Sudanese Coy Commander and the Matadi Movement Control Officer on the UN side. Red Cross officials also attended. The Congolese delegation demanded that the Sudanese withdraw immediately, failing which they would be subject to an attack by the entire Thysville Garrison including their artillery and armour. To avoid further bloodshed the UN negotiators saw no alternative but to agree to a temporary withdrawal of the Sudanese troops who were transported by train to Leopoldville the same night. Assurances were obtained that UN stores in Matadi would be safeguarded, and the Movement Control detachment would remain there until arrival of new UN troops. The Congolese delegation also claimed that troops which were to replace the Sudanese in Matadi had to be of a nationality acceptable to the

T. O. R.

BY: Room 640, Tel: 180

Drafted by :

Authorized :

T. O. D.

Date : 6.3.61

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Congolese Government, a condition which the UN cease fire delegation had, of course, no authority to discuss.

The attacks of the ANC against UN troops in Matadi resulted in two Sudanese soldiers killed, one officer and three other ranks seriously injured and nine others hospitalized. Twelve Sudanese soldiers are missing, in addition to Captain Belanger, about whose fate we have grave apprehensions.

The gallantry of the Canadian and Sudanese personnel, who held on to their positions despite heavy losses and against an overwhelming superiority of the attacking forces both in number and armaments, cannot be sufficiently emphasized. Their devotion to duty and readiness to lay down their lives must be highly commended."

New subject: Before boarding the train at Matadi all Sudanese were disarmed. This operation was directed by Mr. Delvaux, who promised that the arms would be shipped later and returned.

Alga 5654 - 100.000 - 10/60

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BY:

Room 640, Tel: 180

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LEOPOLDVILLE ;

1534 IMMEDIATE DAYAL PLEASE TRANSMIT TO KASAVUBU, OR TO HIM,

OPENLY, THROUGH WHOEVER MAY BE CONSIDERED TO BE TOP CONGOLESE QUOTE

PORTE PAROLE UNQUOTE, URGENTLY FOLLOWING NOTE. IN ANY CASE

THIS NOTE WILL AT THE SAME TIME GIVE YOU A BASIS FOR ;

P2 ;

NEGOTIATION CONCERNING THE REENTRY OF UN FORCES INTO MATADI.

QUOTE FAISANT SUITE A LA LETTRE QUE JE VOUS AI ENVOYEE LE 3

MARS 1961, LES GRAVES EVENEMENTS DES DERNIERES HEURES

MOBLIGENT A VOUS ADRESSER LES PROTESTATIONS LES PLUS

ENERGIQUES AU SUJET DES ACTES ILLEGAUX QUE LANC, AVEC ;

P3 ;

LIMPLICATIONS APPARENTE DE MINISTRES DU REGIME ILEO, A

PERPETRES DEPUIS LE 3 MARS, DANS LA REGION DU BAS-CONGO

CONTRE DES UNITES RELEVANT DU COMMANDEMENT DE LONU. CETTE

EVOLUTION POSE DES QUESTIONS DE PRINCIPE DES PLUS SERIEUSES

AU SUJET DE LOPERATION QUE LONU A ENTREPRISE COMME SUITE A ;

P4 ;

UN APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, EN VERTU DUNE

DECISION DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE, DANS LEXERCICE DE SES

FONCTIONS TOUCHANT LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ET DE LA SECURITE

INTERNATIONALES. APRES LES INCIDENTS GRAVES A BANANA,

SUIVIS DINCIDENTS PLUS GRAVES ENCORE A MATADI, OU ;

P5 ;

DES SOLDATS DE LANC ONT, SANS PROVOCATION, ATTAQUE DES

UNITES DE LONU QUI VAQUAIENT AUX ACTIVITES DONT ELLES

ETAIENT CHARGEES, UNE MENACE INADMISSIBLE DEMPLOI DE FORCE

A ETE FAITE POUR CONTRAINDRE LUNITE SOUDANAISE DE LONU

A EVACUER MATADI. SA CE PROPOS, JE DOIS APPELER DURGENCE ;

P6 ;

VOTRE ATTENTION SUR LES POINTS SUIVANTS: PREMIEREMENT, AGISSANT SOUS UN MANDAT DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE, LES NATIONS UNIES DOIVENT CONSERVER UNE COMPLETE LIBERTE DE DECISION EN CE QUE CONCERNE LE DEPLOIEMENT DES CONTINGENTS NATIONAUX

LORS DE L'EXECUTION DE L'OPERATION DE L'ONU. DANS L'EXERCICE DE LEUR RESPONSABILITE, ;

P7 ;

L'AFFECTATION DE CONTINGENTS PARTICULIERS AURA TOUJOURS LIEU, BIEN ENTENDU, COMPTE DUMENT TENU DE TOUTES LES CIRCONSTANCES PERTINENTES. IL ME FAUT CONSIDERER COMME INADMISSIBLE TOUTE TENTATIVE VISANT A INFLUENCER L'ONUC A CET EGARD, PAR LA FORCE OU AUTREMENT SEMICOLON CELA S'APPLIQUE EVIDEMENT A LA TENTATIVE DE POSER ;

P8 ;

LES CONDITIONS QUANT AU CHOIX DES UNITES DESTINEES A MATADI. JE NE PEUX PAS PERMETTRE UNE INTERPRETATION DU RETRAIT FORCE, AUJOURD'HUI, DU DETACHEMENT SOUDANAIS DE MATADI, COMME UNE DEROGATION A CETTE POSITION DE PRINCIPE. DEUXIEMEMENT, LA PRESENCE DE LA FORCE DE L'ONU A MATADI ;

P9 ;

EST UNE (CONDITION VITALE DE L'EXECUTION DE L'OPERATION DE L'ONU AU CONGO, PARTICULIEREMENT POUR CE QUI EST DEMPECHER LA GUERRE CIVILE ET D'ARRETER LES OPERATIONS MILITAIRES SEMICOLON COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, LA RESOLUTION DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE AUTORISE A CETTE FIN LE RECOURS A LA FORCE, SI ;

P10 ;

BESOIN EST, EN DERNIER RESSORT. CE POINT S'APPLIQUE NECESSAIREMENT, EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'AFFECTATION DE CONTINGENTS PARTICULIERS, A LA LUMIERE DES PRINCIPES ENONCES A LA LIGNEE QUI PRECEDE SEMICOLON POUR L'APPLICATION DE CES PRINCIPES L'ONU, DE SON PROPRE CHEF, TIENT COMPTE DE TOUS LES FACTEURS ;

P11 ;

ESSENTIELS A L'EXECUTION DE LA TACHE DE LA FORCE. IL N'EST GUERE BESOIN DE SOULIGNER QUE LES DECISIONS A PRENDRE PAR LES AUTORITES DE LEOPOLDVILLE DANS LES QUELQUES HEURES QUI SUIVENT SERONT CRUCIAUX SI TANT EST QUE CES AUTORITES

VEUILLENT CONVAINCRE LE MONDE QUELLES DEMEURENT ENGAGEES,
COMME VOUS ;

P12 ;

MEN AVEZ DONNE LASSURANCE, A COOPERER AVEC LES NATIONS
UNIES ET NON A LES DEFIER. JE VOUS DEMANDE DE PRENDRE
URGENCE DES MESURES POUR RETROUVER ET FAIRE RETOURNER
IMMEDIATEMENT A LEURS UNITES UN MEMBRE DU CONTINGENT
CANADIEN, UN MEMBRE DU CONTINGENT TUNISIEN ET LES SEPT
SOLDATS SOUDANAIS ;

P13 ;

DISPARUS, AINSI QUE POUR FAIRE OBSERVER LE CESSZ-LE-FEU
QUI A ETE ORDONNE. LES QUELQUES HEURES QUI SUIVENT DONNE
RONT AUSSI SUR CES POINTS AUX AUTORITES CONGOLAISES UNE
OCCASION DES PLUS IMPORTANTES DE MONTRER QUELLES SONT
DISPOSEES A REPUDIER DES ACTES ET ATTITUDES DEPLORABLES ET
A REPRENDRE EN MAIN, ;

P14 ;

AVEC LA COOPERATION ET LASSISTANCE DE LONU, LES ELEMENTS
INDISCIPLINES ET IRRESPONSABLES (ANC ET CIVILS). DE TOUTE
FACON, LENTIERE RESPONSABILITE DES EVENEMENTS PASSES NE
POURRA QUE VOUS INCOMBER, AINSI QU'A CES AUTORITES. EN
CONCLUSION, JE DOIS SOULIGNER DE NOUVEAU L'IMPORTANCE DES
PRINCIPES POSES ;

P15/44 ;

DANS LES ALINEAS QUI PRECEDENT. SI, CONTRE MA FERME ATTENTE,
LA SITUATION A MATADI NEST PAS IMMEDIATEMENT REDRESSEE,
LA QUESTION DEVIENDRA BIEN ENTENDU UN SUJET DE PREOCCUPATION
PRESSANTE POUR LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE. LE SECRETAIRE
GENERAL DAG HAMMARSKJOLD UNQUOTE ;

SECGEN "

COL 1534 3 1961 3 "(PLS MAKE CK IN ABOVE 744)

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 4 March 1961

No : 1514

Tunisian Delegation makes anxious enquiries about fate of
Tunisian officer reported to have been kidnapped and wishes most
urgently any additional details which can be given.

MATFD ?

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 4 March 1961

No : 1513

Following is text of report issued under symbol S/4758 entitled "Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on recent developments in the Leopoldville area". Text:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations has the honour to refer to certain communications which relate to recent events in the Leopoldville area. Taken together these events seem to reflect tendencies with a serious bearing for the implementation of the resolution which the Security Council adopted on 21 February 1961, and requiring urgent attention.

In this context the Secretary-General wishes to draw the Council's attention to the following excerpts from the military bulletin of the ANC Headquarters in Leopoldville dated 3 March 1961 as transmitted to him by his Special Representative in the Congo:

'The Security Council has just taken two decisions which seriously endanger the freedom of our country. In the first place, it has decided that all technicians must be expelled from the Congo. These technicians are either Belgians who, with the assent of the Congolese, have agreed to remain in the service of the Republic, or foreign specialists, hired by the legal authorities. In the second place the United Nations has dreamt of disarming the Congolese National Army.

A military man without arms is not a military man. A country without military men is not a country. The United Nations considers us children, for if a child possesses arms, they must be taken from him.

By disarming the ANC, the United Nations takes away from the authorities of the country the only means of ensuring respect for law

and order. In this way, the entire world will picture the Congolese as being incapable of leading themselves. It will then be a simple matter for the United Nations to place us under trusteeship, and our cherished fatherland once again will become a colony.

Shall we permit this to happen? Never. We the military, the elite of the nation, must form a solid bloc to prevent the United Nations from arrogating any power unto itself. Everything must be done to safeguard our complete freedom. It is better to die than again to fall under foreign domination.

All the military are confined to barracks. All measures must be taken to take action at the slightest alarm. The only orders that are to be carried out are those given by the military authorities. Any incident arising between the United Nations and the ANC must be reported as a matter of urgency to the responsible military superiors. We wish to live at peace with everyone and we do not seek a fight, but if we are attacked, we will not back away from any sacrifice... Let us prove to the entire world that our Army is worthy of the name.'

The communications brought to the attention of the Security Council are the following:

A. Note verbale dated 1 March 1961 addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Congo (see attached text A).

B. Note verbale dated 3 March 1961 from the delegation of the Republic of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting a letter dated 2 March 1961 from the President of the Republic of the Congo (with a note verbale to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo dated 1 March 1961) (see attached text B).

C. Report from the Sudanese Battalion to Operations Headquarters, ONUC, Leopoldville, dated 3 March 1961 (see attached text C).

D. Letter dated 3 March 1961 addressed to the President of the Republic of the Congo by the Secretary-General (see attached text D).

E. Note verbale dated 3 March 1961 addressed to the President of the Republic of the Congo by the Secretary-General."

For text of Annex A see your cable D-601.

For Annex B see my cable 1488.

For Annex C see your cable D-598.

For Annex D see my cable 1510.

Annex E will be issued as addendum this morning.