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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

BOUNDARIES RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

MILOB GP HQ

Ref:

TO : FHQ

Date : 18 Jul 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : 6463.0/OpS

SUBJECT : HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ZONE

BOUNDARIES RECCE - REPORT

1. Attached please find mentioned report for further action.

2. Many thanks. eastern boundary of the present humanitarian protection zone (HPZ) and assess the situation along the boundary.

CONDUCT

2. The recce was conducted from 14-17 Jul 94 using two vehicles. Team went physically to east of RPA positions on the front line. Movement between many positions was done. S Iliya provided a Capt as a guide, while in each position area the team was conducted around by the company commander who also provided troops for protection.

Handwritten signature
S ILIYA
Lt Col
S O O

LIMITATIONS ON RECCE

1. Team was instructed not to cross the boundary, is not to go forward of RPA deployment. This was strictly adhered to.

Please read and file.

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8/21/94

SDO *Handwritten signature*
major

3 no. 1 (COO)
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MILOB GP HQ

HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ZONE (HPZ)
BOUNDARIES RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

Refs:

A.	Map KIBUYE	1	: 50,000
B.	Map BIRAMBO	1	: 50,000
C.	Map GITARAMA	1	: 50,000
D.	Map GIKONGORO	1	: 50,000
E.	Map BUTARE	1	: 50,000
F.	Map AKANYARU	1	: 50,000

MISSION

1. Define the Eastern boundary of the French Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) and assess the situation along the boundary.

CONDUCT

2. The recce was conducted from 14-17 Jul 94 using two vehicles. Team went physically to most of RPA positions on the frontline. Movement between many positions was done on foot. RPA HQ KIGALI provided a Capt as a guide, while in each battalion area the team was conducted around by the company commander who also provided troops for protection.

LIMITATIONS ON RECCE

3. a. Team was instructed not to cross the boundary, ie not to go forward of RPA deployment. This was strictly adhered to.

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b. Team was unable to recce North and North-west from BIRAMBO (GR 4662). Route to the area (GITARAMA-KIBUYE ROAD) was said by RPA to be mined and therefore unsafe. Mine clearing operations are said to be in progress and that the recce can continue when the area is cleared.

RPA FRONTLINE DISPOSITIONS

4. a. Grid References : See Annex 'A'.
- b. Map markings : See Annex 'C'.

HPZ BOUNDARY

5. See Annex 'B' and Annex 'C', overlay.

SITUATION ON THE BOUNDARY

6. a. RPA Activities
 - (1) Deployment in Section/Platoon Defended Positions on hill features.
 - (2) Dominates the riverline and bridges by patrols and fire.
 - (3) Appears to be conducting offensive operations towards KIBUYE PREFECTURE.
- b. FRENCH Coalition Force Activities
 - (1) Conducts helicopter-borne patrols and land vehicle patrols along the boundary. (Info provided by RPA local commanders.
 - (2) Vehicle patrols said to be trespassing over KIBUYE Prefecture boundary towards East, resulting in clashes with RPA. Specific encounters reported by RPA:

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(a) 14 Jul 94 - at SANZA (GR 5271)

(b) 16 Jul 94 - RAMBURA (GR 4572)

RPA did not disclose outcome of encounters.

(3) Seen to be allowing RGF tps to operate forward to the HPZ boundary. Recce Team on 14 Jul 94, between 1150 - 1210 hrs observed two Sections of RGF on recce in general area of bridge GR 602222. One Section remained behind at the bridge. Other section departed on a white Nissan Pick-up truck.

c. RGF Activities. See para 6.b. (3) above.

d. Mines. RPA local commanders said that on 16 Jul 94 one of their TCVs hit a land mine at GR 507717. Recce Team could not verify.

e. General Situation

(1) Calm along GIKONGORO Prefecture boundary.

(2) Likely fighting involving RPA, RGF East of KIBUYE Prefecture boundary. Minor encounters also between RPA and French forces in the same area.

CONCLUSION

7. The HPZ Boundary can be clearly defined for most part by river line as detailed at Annex 'B' and Annex 'C' (Overlay). The situation in that area is calm. However, North of GR 5156, the boundary defies clear demarcation as the military situation in the KIBUYE Prefecture area is still unstable.

ANNEXES :

- A. RPA Dispositions (Grid Refs)
- B. HPZ Boundary (Grid Refs)
- C. Overlay-Dispositions and Boundaries

RPA DISPOSITIONS ALONG HPZ BOUNDARY

SERIAL	HILL FEATURE	GRID REF	ESTD STR
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)

BUTARE ZONE - 157 BN

1	REBERO	5391	1 x SECT
2	NYAGATOVU	5293	1 x SECT
3	CYANWA	5396	1 x SECT
4	CYAHIDA	5498	1 x SECT
5		5598	1 x SECT
6		5500	1 x SECT
7		5407	1 x SECT
8	MIGINA	5309	1 x SECT
9	KINAZI	5210	1 x SECT
10	RAMBA	5414	1 x SECT
11		5416	1 x SECT
12	SHYINGA	5920	1 x SECT
13	NYAMYAGA	6021	1 x SECT
14	MPANDA	6122	1 x SECT
15		6023	1 x SECT
16	GISAYITA	6627	1 x SECT
17	RWANIRO	6629	1 x SECT
18		6730	1 x SECT
19	NYAGATOVU	6635	1 x SECT
20	RUGARAMA	6536	3 X SECT
21		6636	1 x SECT
22	RUNGA	6537	1 x SECT
23	NDAGO	6438	1 x SECT
24	RWAGAHAGO	6340	1 x SECT
25	NYABIHANGA	6241	1 x SECT
26	CYARWA	6241	1 x SECT
27	CYABAKAMYI	6142	1 x SECT
28	KIGAKAMA	6043	1 x SECT

GITARAMA ZONE - 101 BN

29	NYARUSANGE	5846	1 x SECT
30		5648	1 x SECT
31		5750	1 x SECT
32		5550	1 x SECT
33		4660	1 x SECT
34	NZARATSI	5064	1 x SECT

HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ZONE BOUNDARY

SERIAL	RIVERS	GRID REF		REMARKS
		FROM	TO	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	AKANYARU	5390	5293	
2	AKAVUGUTO	5293	5211	
3	RWAGISHAYA	5211	5313	
4	NYAGISASA	5313	5316	
5	KIYAMO	5316	5518	
6	RUKARAGATA	5518	5618	
7	NYAKAGESI-CYAHAFI	5618	5719	
8	GATARE	5719	5759	
9	RUNDAZI	5759	602222	
10	MWOGO	602222	6628	
			6635	
			5156	
11	NIL NAME	5156	4560	Dry Stream Bed

NOTE:
USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANNEX 'C' (OVERLAY)

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UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

12 July 1994

3000.10(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: ATTENDANCE AT FC'S MORNING AND EVENING BRIEFING

Reference:

A. Our letter No. 3000.10(Ops) dated 16 May 94.

1. With immediate effect, under listed appointment holders are requested to attend the briefings of the Force Commander as follows:

a. Morning Briefing (Everyday at 0800 Hrs).

- (1) DFC.
- (2) CAO.
- (3) CMO.
- (4) CHAO.
- (5) COO.
- (6) CLO.
- (7) CMPO.
- (8) C Plan O.
- (9) C Log O.
- (10) C MOVCON.
- (11) CO GHANBATT.
- (12) MIO (G-2)
- (13) Force Info Offr (Media Monitor).
- (14) SDO of Ops Br (Will work as the Secretary and ensure preparedness of the room for conference).

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b. Evening Briefing (Everyday at 1830 Hrs).


- (1) DFC.
- (2) Rep from SRSG.
- (3) CAO or Rep.
- (4) CMO.
- (5) CHAO.
- (6) COO.
- (7) CLO.
- (8) CMPO.
- (9) C Plan O.
- (10) C Log O.
- (11) French Chief LO.
- (12) DCOO.
- (13) Rep from HA Team.
- (14) CO GHANBATT.
- (15) MIO (G-2).
- (16) Force Info Offr (Media Monitor).
- (17) MA to FC.
- (18) MA to DFC.
- (19) UNAMIR Military Spokesman.
- (20) Camp Comdt.
- (21) SDO of Ops Br (Secretary).

2. In addition to the above mentioned officers, FC or DFC may invite any visitors or persons deemed necessary.

3. Person(s) not being able to attend any briefing due to unavoidable circumstances, will ensure attendance of the Deputy/Next in the chain.

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4. Reference 'A' is hereby cancelled.



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
For Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

CO GHANBATT

Internal:

Action:

CAO
CMO
CHAO
COO
CMPO
C Plan O
C Log O
French Chief LO
DCOO
C MOVCON
HA Team
SDO (Ops Branch)
MIO (G-2)
Force Info Offr (Media Monitor)
MA to FC
MA to DFC
UNAMIR Military Spokesman
Camp Comdt

Info:

SRSG
FC
DFC

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UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch
Kigali

3000/1/ops

// April 94

Subject: EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES FROM KIGALISITUATION

1. After the death of the President of the Republic, Mr. Juvenal HABİYARIMANA, the political situation deteriorated very fast. The prime minister and other ministers were abducted with their spouses and children from their houses and subsequently were killed. A pall of smoke hang over the city of KIGALI. Mass killings of civilian population in and around KIGALI created panic and fear among the habitants of KIGALI, specially TUTSIS. No government machineries are functioning and there is hardly any possibility of any leader to arrest the situation. UNAMIR is making all efforts for negotiations among the different factions but it is yet to achieve any significant result.

2. Analyzing the situation, most of the countries have decided to withdraw their repatriates.

3. Belgian and French Joint Command (B & F Jt Comd) have decided to conduct the withdrawal of expatriates. Due to the shortage of resources, they have requested UNAMIR to assist them by providing transports and armed escorts from Assembly Points (APs) to Kigali International Airport (KIA). FC, UNAMIR decided to provide necessary assistance for the evacuation of the expatriates.

RESPONSIBILITY

4. Responsibilities are as under:

- | | | |
|----|----------------------------------|------------------|
| a. | Securing of APs | : B & F Jt Comd. |
| b. | Assembling of expatriates to APs | : B & F Jt Comd. |
| c. | Route security from APs to KIA | : B & F Jt Comd. |
| d. | Mobile escorts for the convoy | : Kigali Sector. |

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e. Transports for expatriates : Kigali Sector, MILOB Gp
HQ, Log Coy and FHQ
Convoy (detail follows).

f. Airport and aircraft
management : B & F Jt Comd.

5. Kigali Sector

a. Provide no less than 4 X escorts of section strength each
for each convoy.

b. Arrange trucks for lifting expatriates as per
instructions.

c. Establish a control HQ at KIA for smooth movement of
convoys.

6. MILOB Gp HQ

a. Provide 16 X LOs to Kigali Sector. LOs to report to
Kigali sector HQ by 110800 Apr 94.

b. Provide 15 X 4 wheel drive vehicles with drivers
(observers) to Kigali Sector HQ.

c. Vehicles and LOs to report with wireless sets (WS).

7. Log Coy

a. Provide trucks as per instructions to Kigali Sector HQ.

b. Trucks to report to Kigali Sector HQ by 110800 Apr 94.

8. Rules of Engagement. Annex 'A'.

Coordinating Instructions

9. Timings

a. LOs and vehicles to reach Sector HQ by 110800 Apr 94.

b. Evacuation of expatriates to start with effect from 1000
hours.

c. Detail schedule to be worked out by Kigali Sector.

10. Coordination between UNAMIR and B & F Jt Comd will be
established by employing LOs.

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Administration

11. Food. Individuals to carry pack ration.
12. Water. Sufficient water to be carried by individuals.
13. Transports. Units will provide trucks to Kigali Sector HQ as under:


	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Truck</u>	<u>Bus</u>	<u>4 Runner</u>
a.	RUTBAT	02	01	0
b.	KIBAT	09	0	0
c.	MILOB	0	0	15
d.	Log Coy	09	01	0

e. FHQ Convoy: To be arranged by Maj Beardsley.

14. POL. Sector HQs and C Log O to arrange necessary POL for the vehicles.

Command and Signals

15. Convoy Management. Sector Comd, Kigali Sector.
16. Establish a control HQ for managing convoys at KIA.
17. Signals. Separate net to be established for this purpose.



R A DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Comd

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Distribution:

External:

Action:

Kigali Sector
MILOB Gp HQ
Log Coy

Information:

B & F Jt Comd
CAO
RUTBAT
KIBAT

Internal:

Action:

FC
DFC
COO
CMPO
C Log O

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ANX A TO
3000/1/OPS
DATED 11 APR 94

SPECIFIC FOR HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION ESCORT
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TO: ALL SECTORS

RULE NO 1: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.
STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

RULE NO 2: STATE OF WEAPONS.
STATE B: WEAPON CARRIED WITH MAGAZINE CHARGED.

RULE NO 3: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT
WITHOUT USE OF FIRE.

STATE D: OBSERVE AND REPORT, STAY IN PLACE, WARN
AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND
DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS.
DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF FIRE IS AUTHORIZED.

RULE NO 4: DISARM PARAMILITARY.
STATE B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED.
USE OF MINIMUM FORCE.
EVALUATE INTENT TO USE.

RULE NO 5: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS.
STATE B: INTERVENTION BY FIRE FOR EFFECT AGAINST
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND DESIGNATED TARGETS
ONLY AFTER WARNING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AS
PART OF THE WARNING PROCESS.

RULE NO 6: DESIGNATED AUTHORITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED BUT WILL BE
SPECIFIED BY:

MAN - MOVE - PREPARE - FIRE

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UNAMIR Force HQ

Kigali

January 94


3000/1/Ops

To : See Distribution

From : Ops Branch

Subject : State of Readiness/Alertness

1. Introduction. There is a tendency in UN missions for long periods of calm followed by sudden increase in tension. It calls for a requirement to retain operational flexibility to allow timely reaction to changes in operational tempo. This is best achieved by utilization of a graded readiness system.
2. Aim. The aim of this instruction is to lay down the state of readiness with a view to retain operational flexibility.
3. Readiness System
 - a. A properly organized readiness system allows for the gradual stepping-up of our reaction as the situation develops. The various levels of alert will be applied in response to increased threats in the area of op.
 - b. It is necessary to design an alert system to resist the temptation to introduce too many levels. Usually three should be sufficient, if properly utilized.
4. Levels of Readiness/Alert. Annexure 'A'.
5. Authority. Force Commander exercises the authority to alter the state of alert. However, he may delegate the authority to DFC/COS in case of need.
6. Conclusion. The implementation of the state of readiness calls for correct judgement of the current situation and rational appreciation of future threats, so as to prepare the Hqs and units to react to any situation with expected operational efficiency.


Asrarul Haque
Colonel
Chief of Staff

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Distribution :

External:

Action:

- Kigali Sector
- DMZ Sector
- MILOB Group HQ
- Force Engr Coy
- Force Log Group
- Force Med Platoon
- Move Control Unit

Information:

- SRSG
- CAO
- UNCIVPOL
- Chief Security Officer(UNDP)

Internal:

- C Log O
- CMPO
- Liaison Section
- Plans Section
- MP Section
- MA
- Camp Commandant

LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT

<u>SL</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>UNITS/HQ</u>	<u>MEANING/ACTION</u>
1.	Green	All	Normal everyday status.
2.	Yellow	HQ	a. Planning for next higher status commences. b. Liaison increased. c. VIP visits postponed. d. No leave granted except on compassionate ground.
		Units	a. Precautionary stage. b. Double duties of sentries. c. Night movements restricted. d. Test shelters. e. Stand to/Local alarm practice. f. No leave granted except on compassionate ground. g. Backup comm units/weapons. h. Reserves put on 3 hours notice to move.
3.	Red	HQ	a. General alert. b. VIP visits cancelled. c. No leave granted. d. Emergency movements only. e. Special sitreps to UN HQ. f. Civilian evacuation if situation warrents.
		Units	a. Troops in defensive position. b. Troops in stand to position. c. Reserves put on 1 hour notice. d. No leave granted. e. Troops on duty outside to be with flake jacket on.

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UNAMIR
Force HQ
Kigali
Feb 94

3000/1/ops

Subject: SECURITY MEASURE AT HQ, UNAMIR

1. Under the prevailing political stalemate, it has become necessary to enhance the existing security measures of HQ, UNAMIR. With this in view following measures/restrictions are to be adhered by all concerned:

- a. Visiting Day. All working days of the week except Wednesday.
- b. Visiting Hours. On all visiting days as follows:
 - (1) Morning Hour. 1000 to 1200 hours.
 - (2) Afternoon Hour. 1600 to 1700 hours.
- c. Dignitaries/VIPs. This timing will not be applicable in case of dignitaries/official delegations. However, SRSG, FC and Division Heads may receive any visitor at any time.
- d. Visitor Information Slip. Officers allowing the entry of visitors during visiting day are to furnish 2 copies of the information as per Annex 'A' to the front desk NCO, who in turn will inform the main gate:
- e. Temporary Entry Pass. At the entry of the lobby, the front desk NCO will issue a temporary entry pass and retain the ID Card of the visitor. The visitor will return the pass and collect the ID card while leaving the HQ.
- f. Parking of Vehicle. All visitors are to park their vehicles outside the main gate. However, visitors whose vehicle is requested to be brought in, should be mentioned in the Information Slip and duly vetted by the Camp Comdt.
- g. Impromptu Visitors. Impromptu visitors are not expected/encouraged. Should there be any such visitor, the front desk operator will verify from the concerned officer over telephone before issuing of the entry pass.
- h. UNAMIR Pers. All civil and military personnel working in HQ, UNAMIR must have their individual ID Card and car stickers displayed while entering the main gate and passing through the lobby. Pers not yet issued with ID card must have temporary entry pass issued by respective division.

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2. This is forwarded for information and necessary action by all.

ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Chief Operations Officer

Annexes: One

Distribution:

External:

Action:

SRSg's Office
CAO's Division
CIVPOL Division
Kigali Sector HQ
DMZ Sector HQ
MILOB Gp HQ
Force Engr Coy
Force Log Coy
Force Med Pl
Force MP Sec

Internal:

Action:

FC
DFC
COO
C Plans
CMPO
C Log O

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO		<i>[Signature]</i>	10/3
DCOO	X	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Sr Duty		<i>[Signature]</i>	
Duty Offr		<i>[Signature]</i>	
Engineer		<i>[Signature]</i>	
Info			
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			

x = Final destination

/ = No need to see

000
FMB

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

MILOB GP HQ

TO: See Distribution FILE: 6005/MILOB

FROM: MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 09 MAR 94

SUBJECT: URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RPF MILOB SECTOR

GENERAL

1. There has been numerous significant change on the overall distribution of MILOBs to the various sectors against the UNNY approved establishment for UNAMIR since inception.

2. These changes were influenced by the operational requirement to cater for different security situation UNAMIR encompasses almost on a fortnightly basis. These changes do not only affect MILOBs of UNAMIR but also of UNOMUR right from the start of the mission. These will continue to happen as long as the security situation continues to change, and on emphasis to operational effectiveness, there are no other alternatives but to rearrange to meet the change.

3. The Commanders at all levels are fully aware of the operational difficulties these changes do to operational effectiveness, as in most cases MILOB were just beginning to perfect their job description when change has to occur. It also appreciate the personal administrative and logistic difficulties an UNMO goes through especially in Rwanda. Needless to say one of the principles of war is co-operation and flexibility. This change does not affect MILOBs only, as just recently the force puts into operation, OPERATION BOOMERANG, which saw the

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movement of a huge Chunk of BYUBAT redeployed into Kigali. All UNAMIR ranks and files will have to undergo such change one way or the other as UNAMIR pursues its objective to bring peace and stability in Rwanda.

CURRENT SITUATION

4. As the political stalemate continues, finding no solution to the formation of the BBTG, simultaneously the security situation deteriorates especially in Kigali. Kigali being the nerve centre of Rwanda, maximum attention has to be focused in Kigali to keep Kigali secure as possible everyday.

5. RPF is one of the two major prominent players in the formation of the BBTG and the implementation of the Arusha Accord in which UNAMIR is here to assist in all way possible, for its success. RPF is also one of the two major organization that also on a major scale may violate the cease-fire for reasons of its own, especially if their element in Kigali is subjected to a high level of danger and risk or if they foresee that there is no more possibility existing to resolve the current political crisis.

6. On both situation above, a military commander has to prepare itself for the worse. UNAMIR has an instrument of peace in Rwanda must also make all necessary move, much far ahead of the two major conflicting parties to be able to contain and stops resumption of hostilities as it is mandated to do.

7. The Force Commander has decided to move 200 plus men from the BYUBAT down to Kigali and immediately order the CMO to send MILOBs teams to monitor each RPF Bn deployed immediately North of the DMZ and spread across east to west approximately 100 km with a depth reaching the Uganda border. At present RPA has deployed seven Infantry Battalions and one Infantry battalion in reserve the total of eight Battalions altogether.

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RPF/MILOB SECTOR DEPLOYMENT.

8. As the situation is urgent and warrants immediate and rapid deployment of MILOBs, the MILOBs were deployed in the RPF area on 03 Mar 94 on 24 hours notice. The deployment detail and equipments states are given at Annex A.

IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT

9. Manpower. At present all sectors are under manned and are currently operating with some in 3 men per team, some with five and few with six men per team. The only resource available to extract some MILOBs from, are from the MILOBs at Kigali Sector. The immediate manpower requirement is 13. It is requested that Kigali sector release 7 seven MILOBs and the additional six will be from those newly arrived UNMOs from Liberia.

10. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS. The sector has sufficient communication equipments to enable them to operate effectively. BUT many of these teams neither can communicate at each other nor to their HQ at Mulundi using channel 11. Very few locations can communicate using channel 10. This unit appreciate the receptive assistance the DMZ, CS D/ZERO accommodate to MILOB as relay stations from time to time. This unit also finds difficulty most time to enter channel 10 as users of this channel are DMZ Sector HQ, DMZ MILOBs, the whole BYUBAT Bn and the Engn unit at Byumba. The only solution it to install a REPEATER station immediately at MULINDI. The importance of this cannot be overemphasised. At present the RPF/MILOB HQ can only transmit message to all its team from MULINDI by requesting RPF authority for the use of their radio to relay message to their Bn Comds who will then send the message down to the deployed MILOB teams, and this is what is happening to date.

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11. VEHICLES. Without being able to communicate, coupled with only one vehicle per team, No repair kit existing in 90% of the vehicle, the difficult terrain and bad condition of roads & tracks, the wet season in Rwanda, the use of one vehicle for both operational and admin and log runs, etc, it is strongly recommended that the RPF Sector be issued with seven(7) more vehicles as soon as possible. This HQ is fully aware of the risks MILOBs or any soldiers for that matter, live with each day and he is trained for it, but it also at the same time must not entertain unnecessary risk which can be avoided.

12. At present to reduce this risk at a certain level, each neighbouring team will conduct joint patrol and monitoring on a Battalion one day and they will do the same to the other Bn on the next day, this reduces some risk but it certainly affect the overall affectiveness on the daily monitoring activity that has to be executed to all RPF units on the ground every day. Once again this HQ requests the FHQ to place some high priorities on the issue of these seven (7) additional vehicles to RPF MILOB Sector.

RECOMMENDATION


13. The following are strongly recommended to enable the RPF MILOB Sector execute its mission:

- a. Provision of seven UNMOS from Kigali Sector to be posted to RPF MILOB Sector.
- b. Provision of 7 x (4 x 4) vehs.
- c. An urgent immediate installation of a repeater anywhere in the North to provide maximum communication output with a separate channel.

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CONCLUSION

14. Force Headquarters is urgently requested to provide some high priorities to this request and would like to ensure, with or without support the MILOBs will continue to be deployed in whatever condition and will without question execute tasks allocated to them to the fullest.


I. D. TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

DFC, FHQ
COO, FHQ ✓
Sector Comd Kigali
KSMOC
CTO, FHQ
CCO, FHQ
CLOGO, FHQ

Information:

FC
CAO, FHQ

UN RESTRICTED

Annex A

a. RPF MILOB SECTOR OF TOTAL STR OF 29

S/NO	TEAM	STR	VEH	COMMS	DEPLY	REMARKS
(1)	RPF/MILOB SECTOR HQ	5	1 x L/C (1278)	1 x B/Station 3x H/Talkie	MULINDI (RPF HQ)	All veh radio mntd
(2)	Team-504	4	1 x Pickup	2x H/Talkie	MULINDI (RES Bn)	"
(3)	Team-501	5	1 x L/C (1235)	2 x H/Talkie	RUHENGI RI/BUTA RO C Mob Force	"
(4)	Team-502	6	1 x 4 runner (1047) 1 X pickup	1 xB/ Station 2 x H/Talkie	MUHAMBO 157 Bn	"
(5)	Team-503	6	1 x Pickup	1 x H/Talkie	BYUMBA B Mob FCE	"

b. Team G-603 from RGF/MILOB Sector Under Command RPF/MILOB Sector

(1)	G-603	3	1 x L/C (1260)		RUHENG I 59 Bn	"
-----	-------	---	-------------------	--	----------------------	---

c. Escort Team 101 from MILOB HQ

(1)	Team-101	3	1 x L/C (1294)		CYONDO 7 Bn	"
(2)	Team-101A	3	1 x Pickup (522)		CYONDO 21 Bn	"
TOTAL	8 x Teams	35	9	-	-	
Imme- diate Addi- tional Requi- rement	0 x teams	13x MILOB	7 X 4 x 4 veh	1 x repeater	-	-

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO			
Sr Duty	x	hy	
Duty Offr			
Engineer			
Info			
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination			
/ = No need to see			

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR

7189/DMZ/OPS

15 March 1994

To : RGF Sector Commander

Info: FC
DFC
COO ✓

Subject: FIRING INCIDENTS AT NGONDORE

1. Within the month of February 1994 a number of small arms firing incidents occurred in the area of NGONDORE. These are summarised as follows:-

a. Series of explosions with smoke approximately 600m SE of NGONDORE meeting place from RGF-held area at about 1600 hrs on 19 Feb 94. The cause was attributed to bush burning in the area.


b. Burst of small arms fire (8 - 10 rounds) heard from hilltop within RPF defended locality sited NW of NGONDORE at about 1430 hrs on 24 Feb 94 which was said to be a test firing of a weapon.

c. Single shot from RPF defensive area (described by RPF as an incidental discharge) at about 1400 hrs on 24 Feb 94.

2. I am to convey to you the Force Commander's grave concern about these incidents and the security implications of the occurrences.

3. I am further to request you to take positive steps to prevent recurrence of such incidents in future.

4. Submitted for your immediate attention please.


CB YAACHE
Col
Sector Comd

UN RESTRICTED

3000.1 (1000)
2-3

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO			
Sr Duty	x	h	
Duty Offr			
Ops Room			
Info		d	1413
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination			
/ = No need to see			

Reference 8

UN RESTRICTED

Kigali Sector HQ
Kigali
Telephone :84127

March 1994

7130.9/Ops

See Distribution

Subject : SOP ON RECOVERY OF WEAPONS IN KWSA

Reference :

- A. Kigali Sector HQ letter No. 7128.9/Ops dated 25 January 1994.
1. A fresh copy of the Annex B to reference A is attached herewith for your further necessary action please.
 2. Please return the copy of Annex B forwarded vide reference A.
 3. For UNCIVPOL Only. One copy of the subject SOP is forwarded herewith please.



MARCHAL L
Colonel BEM
Sector Commander

Encls : 01 Copy only.

Distribution:

External :

Action :

- COO, Force HQ ✓
KIBAT
RUTBAT
MILOB Co-ordinator, KSHQ

Information:
UNCIVPOL

2000.1(COO)
2-1

UN RESTRICTED

FORMAT ON RECOVERY ON WEAPON/AMMUNITION

1. Particulars of the Weapon recovered including name,type, body number and country of origin etc :
2. Details of ammunition recovered :
3. Date and time weapon/ammunition recovered :
4. Place of recovery with GR and Map sheet No :
5. Particulars of the person from whom weapon/ammunition is recovered :
6. Particulars of the person who recovered the weapon/ammunition :
7. Particulars of Gendarmerie representative present :
8. Particulars of persons arrested :
9. Disposal of the weapon/ammunition :

Signature:_____
Name:_____
Rank:_____
Unit:_____
Date:_____

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO	<i>[initials]</i>	<i>i / ></i>
DCOO	<i>[initials]</i>	
Sr Duty	<i>[initials]</i>	
Duty Offr		
Engineer		
Info		
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		

x = Final destination

/ = No need to see

OKs room Check please

25

UN RESTRICTED

①

UNAMIR

7189/DMZ/OPS

02 March 1994

See Distribution

Subject: VIOLATION OF DMZ BY RPF


Reference:

A. Letter No. 048/G3.3.1 dated 27 February 1994 (Not To All)

1. We acknowledge receipt of the letter on the above subject and wish to inform you that the violations mentioned are already known to UNAMIR and appropriate action is being taken by this HQ and UNAMIR HQ.

2. The outcome will be duly communicated to you please.

3. Best Regards.


CB YAACHE
Col
Sector Comd

Distribution:

Action:

Information:

External:


RGF Sector Comd - BYUMBA

FC - UNAMIR - Copy of Ref A Att ✓
A/COO - UNAMIR - Copy of Ref A Att

②
COO
These are our
own troops? confirmed?

UN RESTRICTED

3000.1(COO)
R-5


15-6/3
since 24/3
on final

UN CONFIDENTIAL

BYUMBA

No.048/G3.3.1

27 February 1994

From: Sectuer OPS BYUMBA

To : DMZ COMD BYUMBA

Info: Minister of Defence
KIGALI

Chief of AR

Chief of GENDAMARIE

OBJECT : VIOLATION OF DMZ BY RPF

Reference: ARUSHA ACCORD

MAP OF RWANDA - 1: 50,000

SERIAL 2721, SHEET BYUMBA

1ST EDITION

1. I have the honour to get you informed that the RPF have not stopped their violations of the DMZ by the detailing of combat Ptls or the occupation of certain positions in the zone. I would cite among others that the erection of a CHP at GR 0421 and the deployment of heavy arms on the summit of GR 2196 in the coordinates of 0321 on 23 Feb 94.

2. We equally know that the RPF have created a new combat posn at GR 0229. This posn is made of several firing trenches linked by comm trenches. They have even constructed a volley ball pitch. They are therefore permanently occupying crest of Kabingo GR 0226,9623 and 9324.

3. We respectfully ask you to carry out verifications of these issues and ask the RPF to leave these posns in accordance with the Arusha Agreement.

APP5 | INITIAL | DATE |

20

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch
Kigali
Feb 94

3000/1/ops


Kigali Sector HQ


Subject: SOP - ESCORT

Reference:

A. Your letter 713.9/ops dated 08 Feb 94.

1. The draft sent vide reference A on demand and detailing procedure of escort is returned herewith duly seen by FC.
2. Kindly note the observations/remarks, incorporate new details, restructure the concerned paragraphs and forward the same for the approval of the FC please.


ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Chief Operations Officer



UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

19


UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch
Kigali
Feb 94

3000/1/ops/2

Kigali Sector Comd

Subject: ENHANCEMENT OF SECURITY MEASURE AGAINST BRINGING IN WAR
LIKE MATERIAL AND STORES THROUGH KIGALI AIR PORT

1. Please find enclosed herewith a draft letter on the subject addressed to all concern for implementation.
2. FC desires the contents of the letter and procedures to be adopted be discussed with the airport authority, connected agencies i.e. customs etc and UNAMIR elements on duty at the airport before issuing the letter to all concerned from FHQ.
3. Kindly return the letter alongwith your comments by 20 Feb 94.


ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Chief Operations Officer

Enclosure: ~~one~~ Two

g/c

UN RESTRICTED

17

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO		
DCOO	SA	341740
Sr Duty		
Duty Offr		
Engineer		
Info		
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		
x = Final destination		
/ = No need to see		

KSHQ/Ops/3

FORCE HQ, UNAMIR (OPS

SECURE CORRIDOR KIGA

Reference :


- A. Force HQ, UNAMIR (OPS)
1. This HQ agrees with reference A.
 2. Regards.


Sector HQ

ne: 84127

r 1993

19 December 1993.


MARCHAL L
Colonel BEM
Sector Commander

Please line up
our letter & apprise,
COO

603
30/12

3000.1 (COO)
12-1

UN RESTRICTED

Office Copy

16

UN RESTRICTED

To: Kigali Sec HQ

File: 3000/1/ops

Info: FC
DFC

From: COO


Date: 12 Feb 94

Subject: SECURITY GUARD - SRSG's RESIDENCE

1. Security guards at the residence of SRSG is provided by KIBAT since one month. It was intimated two weeks ago that the guards be rotated on daily basis instead of living in as desired by SRSG. This instruction was intimated over telephone to Maj KESTELOOT, Operations Officer of Kigali Sec by Lt Col Balis, DCOO of this HQ. It was expected that the instruction would have been implemented. It may be noted that FC has agreed with SRSG about the arrangement.

2. It is unfortunate that despite clear order the instruction was not carried out nor the difficulties in carrying out were communicated to this HQ till yesterday. The matter was again raised by the undersigned with Maj KESTELOOT who requested to have it in writing. Such noncompliance has been an embarrassment for the FC.

3. In view of the foregoing, you are instructed to ensure the rotation of the guards on daily basis with immediate effect and confirm action by 1800 hours today. It may be noted that orders disseminated verbally from this HQ is to be carried out without any delay. Clarifications if any should however be sought but it must not cause any delay in the execution of the order.


ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Chief Operations Officer

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch

12 January 94


3000/1/Ops/G

See Distribution

Subject : NIGHT GUARDS AT FORCE HQ

1. The security of the Force HQ is ensured by night guards provided by RUTBAT. In view of the prevailing situation, vehicles moving out at night from the Force HQ is required to have 1 X armed guard. As such, please instruct RUTBAT to provide 2 X Armed soldiers with SMG for escort duty at Force HQ in addition to the normal strength of guards. Duty officer at Force HQ will exercise operational control over the night guards.

2. This is forwarded for necessary action please.



ASRARUL HAQUE
Colonel
Chief of Staff

Distribution:

External:

Action :

Kigali Sector HQ

Information :

RUTBAT

Internal :

Camp Commandant

Duty Officer

UN RESTRICTED

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO		
DCOO		On 1001 84
Sr Duty		
Duty Offr		
Engineer		
Info		
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		
x = Final destination		
/ = No need to see		

TO : F C UNAMIR

FROM: DMZ SECTOR CMD.

Date : 05 Jan 94.


OK the msg
OK J. Good


1. DMZ Sec HQ. Please be informed that DMZ sec HQ now fully operational for 24 Hrs, effective 05 Jan 94. Sector call sign is "D" and Tel No-64168. The grid ref of DMZ is 0750,2585.

2. Please accept for yours necessary action.

Note: The above message was passed over RADIO, and received by the Duty officer, Sqn Ldr MOTAEB.




A. MOTAEB
Sqn. Ldr
Duty Officer.



COS

6/1/94

3000.1 (COS)
R-3

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO	A	
bDCOO	D	08/12/92
Sr Duty		
Duty Offr	WV	SV
Engineer		
Info		
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		
x = Final destination		
/ = No need to see		

82

UNAMIR Force HQ
Ops Branch
Kigali
January 1994


3000/01/ops

See Distribution

Subject : Secure Corridor KATUNA - BYUMBA

1. A paper on the subject is attached herewith for your comments so as to reach this HQ by 11 January 1994.

2. Regards.



Asrarul Haque
Colonel
Chief of Staff

Distribution :

External :

Action :

Kigali Sector
MILOB Group HQ
DMZ Sector

Internal :

CAO

3000.1 (C50)
R-2

UN RESTRICTED

SECURE CORRIDOR KATUNA-BYUMBA

1. Introduction. With the activities and progress of UNAMIR ops aimed for phase-I of Mission's objective, there is a need to secure KATUNA-BYUMBA corridor for the passage of the following:

- a. UNAMIR personnel.
- b. UN Agencies involved in the peace process.
- c. Diplomats and embassy officials involved in the peace process.
- d. UNAMIR visitors and journalists.
- e. UN Convoys/Humanitarian Convoys.
- f. Commercial traffic.

2. Aim. To open the KATUNA-BYUMBA corridor through RPF, DMZ and RGF controlled areas to all traffic.

3. Meaning of Secure Corridor. The concept of a secure corridor should respond to the following definitions:

a. UNAMIR personnel or UNAMIR visitors travelling throughout Rwanda have free access at any time by day or night, provided they have:

- (1) UN ID card.
- (2) Is travelling in a "UN" marked vehicle.
- (3) Has UN flag on the vehicle.

b. UN Agency personnel should have freedom to travel during day hours without any UNAMIR escort provided;

- (1) They have UN ID card.
- (2) Is travelling on "UN" marked or UN insignia pasted/engraved/painted on the vehicle which is visible from outside.

c. Diplomats/Embassy personnel should be able to travel during day hours without UNAMIR escorts.

UN RESTRICTED

d. UNAMIR convoys/Humanitarian convoys should be able to travel during day time provided :

- (1) UNAMIR convoys are all "UN" marked vehicles or the escort vehicle is "UN" marked.
- (2) Drivers have UN ID cards.
- (3) Convoys have UN flag.
- (4) Humanitarian convoys has UN flag and is escorted by UN Agency vehicle with proper UN identity.

e. Commercial traffic to have passage once we have the road section in RPF zone and the bridge between Rwanda-Uganda border repaired and able to handle two way traffic securely.

4. Forces Present in the Corridor

a. UNAMIR forces.

- (1) UNAMIR has no armed troops along this axis as yet. Over the next month one infantry battalion is expected in the DMZ.
- (2) UNAMIR UNMOs occasionally patrol this road now. With the increase of more UNMO teams in DMZ and RPF Sector, more patrols activity will start.
- (3) UNAMIR will shortly have approximately two sections of TUNISIAN troops in NGONDORE (Joint meeting site).

b. Forces that must be reviewed before the Establishment of Safe Corridor.

- (1) RGF. Has 3 to 4 check points on road KIGALI-KATUNA upto BYUMBA. Each check point has half a section to one section of armed troops but no vehicle with them. They speak French and local language.
- (2) RPF. Has 2 check points on road KIGALI-KATUNA on BYUMBA-KATUNA portion of the road. In each check point they have approx half a section to one section of armed troops and no vehicles with them. They speak English and local language.
- (3) Mines. Check post of RGF at BYUMBA has land

UN RESTRICTED

mines on the road which. They remove it as the traffic approaches. No known mines on RPF side. Although there is no known mine on the road, however mines are likely to be on the sides of the road specially from BYUMBA to KATUNA.

(4) Checking System. No traffic is allowed to pass through check points without the vehicle being checked by soldiers. UN vehicles are stopped but not checked. At night the soldiers normally do not remain on the check points. They sleep in nearby areas.

5. Recommendations

a. Option 1

(1) Continue with the present status of deployment of forces of both RGF and RPF on the road.

(2) Give in writing to RGF and RPF that "UN" marked, UN flag hoisted vehicles and passengers wearing uniform with UN head gear should not be stopped at check points.

(3) Give in writing to UNAMIR military component that they should slow down their vehicle and waive their hands as a gesture of friendliness while passing through check points. At night they should stop at check points and give their identity.

(4) UN Agency vehicles and humanitarian aid convoys with UN insignia be allowed to pass through after checking. No UNAMIR escorts be given.

(5) Diplomatic corps cleared by HQ UNAMIR.

b. Option 2

(1) Ask RGF and RPF to withdraw all their checkpoints. They can have deployed forces on tactically important grounds, say 50 meters away from the road.

(2) No escorts of UNAMIR be provided to anyone who wants to go upto Mulindi or Katuna. But for visits inside RGF held territories or inside DMZ, the UNAMIR provides escorts or UNAMIR HQ is informed of such visits, so that we can monitor.

c. Option 3

(1) Agencies mentioned in option-1 may have passage

UN RESTRICTED

upto end of phase 2 of UNAMIR operation except commercial traffic.

(2) Commercial traffic may be allowed passage on commencement of phase 3 of UNAMIR operation.

d. Recommended Options. Considering overall operational situation the corridor may be secured in 2 phases :

(1) Phase 1. Option 1 by 10 January 1994.

(2) Phase 2. Sub para (2) of option 3 by 01 April 1994.

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO		
DCOO	X	051500
Sr Duty	5/11/99	5/11/99
Duty Offr		
Engineer		
Info		
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		
x = Final destination		
/ = No need to see		

OPS
UN RESTRICTED

5
UNAMIR Force HQ
Kigali
January 94


3000/1/Ops

To : See Distribution

From : Ops Branch

Subject : State of Readiness/Alertness

1. Introduction. There is a tendency in UN missions for long periods of calm followed by sudden increase in tension. It calls for a requirement to retain operational flexibility to allow timely reaction to changes in operational tempo. This is best achieved by utilization of a graded readiness system.
2. Aim. The aim of this instruction is to lay down the state of readiness with a view to retain operational flexibility.
3. Readiness System
 - a. A properly organized readiness system allows for the gradual stepping-up of our reaction as the situation develops. The various levels of alert will be applied in response to increased threats in the area of op.
 - b. It is necessary to design an alert system to resist the temptation to introduce too many levels. Usually three should be sufficient, if properly utilized.
4. Levels of Readiness/Alert . Annexure 'A'.
5. Authority. Force Commander exercises the authority to alter the state of alert. However, he may delegate the authority to DFC/COS in case of need.
6. Conclusion. The implementation of the state of readiness calls for correct judgement of the current situation and rational appreciation of future threats, so as to prepare the Hqs and units to react to any situation with expected operational efficiency.


Asrarul Haque
Colonel
Chief of Staff

UN RESTRICTED

Distribution :

External:

Action:

- Kigali Sector
- DMZ Sector
- MILOB Group HQ
- Force Engr Coy
- Force Log Group
- Force Med Platoon
- Move Control Unit

Information:

- SRSG
- CAO
- UNCIVPOL
- Chief Security Officer(UNDP)

Internal:

- C Log O
- CMPO
- Liaison Section
- Plans Section
- MP Section
- MA
- Camp Commandant

LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT

<u>SL</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>UNITS/HQ</u>	<u>MEANING/ACTION</u>
1.	Green	All	Normal everyday status.
2.	Yellow	HQ	a. Planning for next higher status commences. b. Liaison increased. c. VIP visits postponed. d. No leave granted except on compassionate ground.
		Units	a. Precautionary stage. b. Double duties of sentries. c. Night movements restricted. d. Test shelters. e. Stand to/Local alarm practice. f. No leave granted except on compassionate ground. g. Backup comm units/weapons. h. Reserves put on 3 hours notice to move.
3.	Red	HQ	a. General alert. b. VIP visits cancelled. c. No leave granted. d. Emergency movements only. e. Special sitreps to UN HQ. f. Civilian evacuation if situation warrents.
		Units	a. Troops in defensive position. b. Troops in stand to position. c. Reserves put on 1 hour notice. d. No leave granted. e. Troops on duty outside to be with flake jacket on.

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO		<i>[Signature]</i>	
DCOO	X	<i>[Signature]</i>	1250
Sr Duty			
Duty Offr		<i>[Signature]</i>	20/0000
Engineer			
Info	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	20/1750
Trg			
Air Ops		<i>[Signature]</i>	20/030
Signals			
Mov Con		<i>[Signature]</i>	20/030
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination			
/ = No need to see			

UN RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 2 OF 10
KIGALI SECTOR HQ
10 December 1993
PART 0 NR 02

KSHQ/3/XX

REFERENCE: A. UNAMIR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (R.O.E.)
B. OP O 01/93
C. OP O 01/93

TIME ZONE : BRAVO
MAPS : RWANDA 1:50000 NR 16, 17, 23, 24

TO : RUTBAT PARTY COMMANDER
FROM : KIGALI SECTOR HQ
INFO : FORCES HQ

PARTICULAR ORDER NR 02/93: PREPARATION PHASE TO OPERATION

"CLEAN CORRIDOR"

1. SITUATION

KIGALI SECTOR received as its mission the task of ensuring control and security of the movement of one Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) battalion from its present staying area to a quarter in Kigali.

2. MISSION


As part of this mission, RUTBAT shall be able to execute NO LATER THAN 20 December 1993:

- foot patrols
- check points
- road blocks
- defense of key points

in order to participate in the Kigali Sector assigned mission.

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- a. It is of utmost urgency that all RUTBAT personnel be familiarised and trained on the R.O.E.
- b. A written report on the execution of this particular order and about the level of preparedness shall be sent to the Kigali Sector HQ not later than 21 0800 Dec 93.


L. MARCHAL
Col. BEM
Sector Commander

UN RESTRICTED

3000.1/0932
R-1

Ops branch
②- COS
wated.
12/12

There is
late.