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REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
MINISTER

H.E. Thorvald Stoltenberg  
Co-Chairman of the International Conference  
on the Former Yugoslavia  
Geneve

2 November 1993

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to forward the Peace Initiative of 1 November 1993 by the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman.

President of the Republic of Croatia, deeply concerned about the stalemate of the Geneva Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the failure of all other efforts to stop the war and armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, wishes in this way to contribute to actions designed to stop the war and pave the way to the establishment of peace, mutual understanding and settlement of political and economic problems in the states created in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

You are kindly requested to forward the text of the Peace Initiative of the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman to the President of the Republic of Serbia Mr. Slobodan Milošević and the President of the Republic of Macedonia Mr. Kiro Gligorov.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dr. Mate Granić  
Minister



**PEACE INITIATIVE  
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN**

Deeply concerned by the impasse at the Geneva Conference on the former Yugoslavia, and by the failure of all other attempts made to stop the war and military conflicts in the area of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I consider it my statesman's duty to suggest to the international community, in particular to all the relevant global factors, a peace initiative which would stop the war and all the associated horrors, and open up the path to peace and understanding, and to a resolution of political and economic problems in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

**I. Proposal for the Implementation of the Peace Plan  
in United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAS) in Croatia**

In order to achieve the speediest implementation of Security Council Resolution 871 (and all other resolutions referred to in this Resolution), the Republic of Croatia proposes as follows:

1. The Croatian Government is prepared to conclude within 15 days an agreement on the cessation of all hostilities with the representatives of the local Serbs, guaranteeing their local and cultural autonomy.

2. To this end we propose at the same time the renewal of the work of the Joint Commissions in order to resolve all issues enumerated in the Vance Plan, and the implementation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 871, with the participation of the representatives of UNPROFOR and of the European Community.

3. We propose the immediate normalization of overall social and economic life in the UNPAS through the following:

3.1. The immediate opening of all road and rail communications throughout the Republic of Croatia, and particularly along the routes Zagreb-Knin-Split, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, Novska-Okučani-Pakrac-Daruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-Hungarian border, Osijek-Vukovar, Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, etc.;

3.2. The opening of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline and the repair and beginning of regular operation of facilities for oil transport, and power and water supply, throughout Croatia;

3.3. The immediate return, without further delay, of all displaced persons to their homes under the supervision and



with the efficient assistance of UNPROFOR and the authorities of the Republic of Croatia;

3.4. The initiation of all steps necessary for the restoration of normal life in the UNPAS, including the reopening of all communications, the supply of goods to the entire population, i.e., including the Serbian population (without any discrimination) in the forthcoming winter period, the reinstatement of welfare and medical care, normal operation of schools, supply of electric power and other energy sources, the payment of pensions, the employment of all civil servants, and the integration of all other activities into the overall economic and legal system of the Republic of Croatia;

3.5. The preparation of plans and the initiation of steps to achieve the equitable integration of the UNPAS into the economic reconstruction of Croatia.

4. For the sake of the political settlement of the conflict and normalization of overall social life Croatia is prepared, within the scope of its constitutional and legal order, to ensure in the UNPAS the implementation of its regulations, as well as of international conventions concerning the rights and freedoms of the Serbian ethnic community. To this end the following steps will be undertaken:

4.1. The provision of full local autonomy (self-government), within the framework of the Constitutional Law, in the Districts of Knin and Glina in which the Serbs account for the majority;

4.2. The assurance of the right to cultural autonomy of the Serbian ethnic community throughout Croatia, and especially the right to education in their language and script in accordance with special curricula, and the bilingual writing of toponyms in areas in which they are in the majority;

4.3. The scheduling of elections for local - district and municipal - self-governmental authorities under international supervision;

4.4. The establishment of special police administrations in the Districts of Knin and Glina, whereby the national composition of the police force should match the ethnic composition of the population according to the latest censuses.

5. In order to provide for full civil and political equality, and efficient safeguarding of the civil and ethnic rights of the Serbs in Croatia, Croatia is prepared to accept the establishment of a special international supervisory body, and of a special Human Rights Court, to which each citizen may apply after having exhausted the regular legal course. In order to safeguard their special rights, the Districts of Knin and Glina will be able to bring a constitutional action to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia should they



consider that human rights and liberties, or the rights of the ethnic community, have been violated in their areas.

6. In order to create full confidence, Croatia is prepared to propose the use of a special international CSCE supervisory mission for mediation between the minority and the majority population.

7. The Republic of Croatia is prepared to negotiate the political settlement of all outstanding issues except those that may affect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

## II. Proposal for the Cessation of War and Establishment of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this fateful moment when there appears to be no escape from the tragic sequence of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when the orientation to the convening of new, time-consuming international conferences is not likely to produce results, I propose that international factors revive the work of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the thus far achieved agreements concerning the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Union of Republics.

In order to make such a revived Conference as efficient as possible, I suggest the participation, along with the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY, of representatives of States which may have the most effective influence on the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the former Yugoslavia, i.e.: France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

1. Thus convened anew, the Geneva Peace Conference should prevail upon all the three parties in conflict, under threat of sanctions and within 14 days, to:

1.1. sign an agreement on the immediate cessation of hostilities and all military actions, should they fail to do so, the U.N. Security Council should be requested to pass a resolution ordering such cessation under the threat of armed enforcement,

1.2. sign a declaration on the acceptance of the Constitutional Arrangement and the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the annexed agreements.

2. I propose that the controversial issues of delimitation between the Republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina be resolved through bilateral negotiations and, if no agreement can be reached, to entrust the final decision to a special (arbitration) body to be nominated by the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY and other Conference participants.

3. I propose that all the parties in conflict should undertake to immediately:



3.1. assure and guarantee free and unhindered passage of humanitarian aid to all parties in all areas where it is required;

3.2. exchange all detainees and disband all detention centres, and bear full responsibility for their treatment of detainees in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law;

3.3. permit international supervision and freedom of movement to representatives of international agencies who will supervise the implementation of these steps.

4. The peace plan can be implemented by using NATO forces (in the role thus far played by UNPROFOR), with the authority to use force, air strikes included, against all those who violate the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or frustrate the delivery of humanitarian aid and international supervision of the implementation of the achieved agreements.

### III. Proposed Steps for the Permanent Consolidation of Peace

If the peace, once achieved, is to be sustained permanently and consolidated, I propose that all the states in the area of the former Yugoslavia should proceed - within the framework of the Peace Conference and under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General and Security Council - as follows:

1. sign a solemn declaration on the reciprocal recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all newly emerged states within their internationally recognized borders;

2. sign within 3 months an agreement on the succession to rights and obligations of all successor states of the former Yugoslavia pursuant to the decision of the Arbitration Commission;

3. start negotiating, within the scope of European integration processes, treaties between themselves and with other European states concerning the regulation and promotion of economic and traffic links and trade, and other matters of interest for relations among sovereign and independent states wishing to establish good neighbourly relations, and also of interest for the stability of the international order in this part of the world;

4. sign, within the framework of the Conference, a solemn declaration on the observance of the rights of national minorities and ethnic communities in accordance with international standards and conventions, with internationally controlled implementation of such an agreement;

5. immediately begin negotiating an agreement on the regional security of countries in the area of the former



Yugoslavia within the scope of the general CSCE conventional armaments limitation system;

6. I believe that the U.N. Security Council sanctions enforced in respect to certain states in the area of the former Yugoslavia should remain in force until all the results of the proposed peace process are achieved. As soon as the peace plan is achieved, the sanctions ought to be lifted forthwith.

I urge all international factors to consider these proposals and to take resolute measures to bring a halt to the conflict, and all steps required to bring peace and create the prerequisites for the establishment of a stable international order in the area, for the benefit of all the states in this part of Europe and in the world.

THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

DR. FRANJO TUDMAN

Zagreb, November 1, 1993



*Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia*

*Predsjednik / President*

**MIROVNA INICIJATIVA  
PREDSJEDNIKA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE  
DR. FRANJE TUĐMANA**

*Duboko zabrinut zastojem Ženevske konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji i neuspjehom svih drugih nastojanja za zaustavljanje rata i oružanih sukoba na području Republike Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine, smatram svojom državničkom dužnošću predložiti međunarodnoj zajednici, osobito svim relevantnim svjetskim čimbenicima, mirovnu inicijativu kojom bi se zaustavio rat i strahote koje on donosi i otvorio put prema miru i razumijevanju, te rješavanju političkih i gospodarskih problema na području bivše Jugoslavije.*

***I. Prijedlog provedbe mirovnog plana na području pod  
zaštitom Ujedinjenih naroda (UNPA) u Hrvatskoj***

*Radi što hitnije provedbe Rezolucije br. 871 Vijeća sigurnosti UN (i ostalih rezolucija na koje se ta rezolucija poziva), Republika Hrvatska predlaže kako slijedi:*

- 1. Hrvatska vlada spremna je u roku od 15 dana zaključiti sporazum o prekidu svih neprijateljstava s predstavnicima lokalnih Srba dajući im jamstva za lokalnu i kulturnu autonomiju.*
- 2. U tu svrhu predlažemo da se u istom roku obnovi rad zajedničkih komisija za rješavanje svih pitanja koja navodi Vanceov plan, te provedbu odredaba Rezolucije vijeća sigurnosti br. 871, uz sudjelovanje predstavnika UNPROFOR-a i Europske zajednice.*
- 3. Predlažemo da se odmah pristupi normalizaciji cijelog društvenog i gospodarskog života u UNPA i to:*
  - 3.1. Otvaranjem, bez odgode, svih cestovnih i željezničkih prometnica na cijelom području Republike Hrvatske, a napose na prometnicama Zagreb-Knin-Split, Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Županja, Novska-Okučani-Pakrac-Daruvar, Sisak-Glina-Bosanski Novi, Osijek-Beli Manastir-mađarska granica, Osijek-Vukovar i Osijek-Vinkovci-Ilok, itd.;*



- 3.2. *Otvaranjem Jadranskog naftovoda i popravkom, te puštanjem u redovni rad, postrojenja za prijenos nafte, električne energije i vodoopskrbe na cijelom području Hrvatske;*
  - 3.3. *Povratkom, bez odlaganja, svih prognanika na njihova obitavališta pod nadzorom i uz djelotvornu pomoć UNPROFOR-a i vlasti Republike Hrvatske;*
  - 3.4. *Poduzimanjem mjera za uspostavu normalnog života u UNPA, uključujući uspostavu svih komunikacija, opskrbu svega, tj. i srpskog stanovništva (bez diskriminacije) u predstojećem zimskom razdoblju, obnovu socijalne i zdravstvene zaštite, normalan rad školstva, opskrbu električnom energijom i ostalim energentima, isplate mirovina, primanje u službu svih državnih službenika, te uključenje svih ostalih djelatnosti u sveukupan gospodarski i pravni sustav Republike Hrvatske;*
  - 3.5. *Izradom planova i poduzimanjem mjera za ravnopravno uključenje područja UNPA u gospodarsku obnovu Hrvatske.*
4. *Radi političkog rješenja sukoba i normalizacije sveukupnog društvenog života Hrvatska je spremna, u okviru svog ustavnopravnog poretka, osigurati u UNPA primjenu svojih propisa ali i međunarodnih konvencija o zaštiti prava i sloboda srpske etničke zajednice. U tom cilju poduzet će se slijedeće:*
    - 4.1. *Davanje pune lokalne autonomije (samouprave) u okviru Ustavnog zakona u kotarevima Knin i Glina, u kojima Srbi čine natpolovičnu većinu stanovništva;*
    - 4.2. *Osiguranje prava na kulturnu autonomiju srpske etničke zajednice na cijelom području Hrvatske, a osobito pravo na odgoj i obrazovanje na njihovu jeziku i pismu prema posebnim nastavnim programima, te dvojezično ispisivanje toponima na području gdje imaju natpolovičnu većinu;*
    - 4.3. *Provedba izbora za lokalne - kotarske i općinske - samoupravne vlasti, pod međunarodnim nadzorom;*
    - 4.4. *Osnivanje posebnih policijskih uprava u kotarevima Knin i Glina s tim da nacionalni sastav službenika odgovara nacionalnom sastavu pučanstva prema posljednjim popisima.*
  5. *Radi osiguranja pune građanske i političke ravnopravnosti i djelotvorne zaštite građanskih i etničkih prava Srba u Hrvatskoj, Hrvatska je spremna prihvatiti osnivanje posebnog međunarodnog tijela za nadzor, te posebnog Suda za prava čovjeka, kojem će se moći obratiti svaki građanin nakon iscrpljivanja redovnog pravnog puta. Kotarevi Knin i Glina moći će se, radi zaštite*

posebnih prava, obratiti Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske ustavnom tužbom, ako smatraju da su povrijeđene slobode i prava čovjeka ili prava etničke zajednice na njihovu području.

6. Radi stvaranja punog povjerenja Hrvatska je spremna predložiti primjenu posebnog međunarodnog nadzora misije KESS-a za posredovanje između manjinskog i većinskog stanovništva.
7. Republika Hrvatska pripravna je pristupiti pregovorima o političkom rješenju svih otvorenih problema osim onih koji bi dovodili u pitanje njezin teritorijalni integritet i suverenitet

## *II. Prijedlog za okončanje rata i uspostavu mira u Bosni i Hercegovini*

*U sudbinskom trenutku kad se čini da nema izlaza iz tragičnog slijeda događanja u Bosni i Hercegovini i kad nije vjerojatno da bi orijentacija na sazivanje novih dugotrajnih međunarodnih konferencija donijela ploda, predlažem da međunarodni čimbenici obnove rad Ženevske konferencije, na dosada postignutim sporazumima o ustavnom uređenju Bosne i Hercegovine kao Unije republika.*

*Da bi obnovljena Konferencija bila što djelotvornija, predlažem da uz supredsjedatelje Upravljačkog odbora sudjeluju u daljnjem radu predstavnici onih država koje mogu najdjelotvornije utjecati na rješenje krize u BiH i na području bivše Jugoslavije: Francuske, Njemačke, Ruske federacije, Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Turske i Velike Britanije.*

1. *Novi saziv Ženevske mirovne konferencije trebao bi sve tri strane u sukobu privoljeti, pod prijetnjom sankcija, da u roku od 14 dana:*
  - 1.1. *Potpisu sporazum o bezuvjetnom prekidu neprijateljstava i svih oružanih akcija bez odgađanja, a ako to ne učine da se od Vijeća sigurnosti UN zatraži donošenje rezolucije kojom se taj prekid nalaže pod prijetnjom oružane prisile;*
  - 1.2. *Potpisu deklaraciju o prihvatanju Ustavnog sporazuma o Uniji republika Bosne i Hercegovine i sporazuma koji su mu dodani.*
2. *Predlažem da se sporna pitanja razgraničenja između republika Unije BiH riješe u bilateralnim pregovorima, a ako se ne postigne sporazum da se konačna odluka povjeri posebnom ( arbitražnom ) tijelu koje će odrediti supredsjedatelji Upravljačkog odbora i ostali sudionici Konferencije.*



3. *Predlažem da se sve sukobljene strane obvežu da će bez odlaganja:*
  - 3.1. *Osigurati, i jamčiti slobodan i nesmetan prolaz humanitarne pomoći svim stranama, na svim područjima gdje je to potrebno;*
  - 3.2. *Odmah pristupiti razmjeni svih zatočenika i raspustiti sve zatočeničke centre, te da snose punu odgovornost za postupak sa zatočenicima prema pravilima međunarodnog humanitarnog prava;*
  - 3.3. *Omogućiti međunarodni nadzor i slobodno kretanje predstavnicima međunarodnih organizacija koje će nadzirati provedbu gore navedenih mjera.*
4. *Provedba mirovnog plana može se osigurati upotrebom snaga NATO (u ulozi koju je do sada imao UNPROFOR), s ovlaštenjem upotrebe sile, uključujući zračne udare, prema svima koji prekrše prekid neprijateljstava, ili budu onemogućavali dostavljanje humanitarne pomoći i međunarodni nadzor nad provedbom postignutih sporazuma.*

### *III. Prijedlog mjera za trajno učvršćenje mira*


*Da bi se trajno održao i učvrstio jednom postignuti mir, predlažem da sve države s područja bivše Jugoslavije, u okviru Mirovne konferencije i pod pokroviteljstvom Glavnog tajnika i Vijeća sigurnosti UN:*

1. *Potpisu svečanu deklaraciju o međusobnom priznanju samostalnosti i suverenosti svih novonastalih država, u njihovim međunarodno priznatim granicama;*
2. *Da u roku od 3 mjeseca potpišu sporazum o sukcesiji prava i obveza svih država nasljednica bivše Jugoslavije na osnovi odluka Arbitražne komisije;*
3. *Da pristupe pregovorima o zaključenju, u okviru europskih integracijskih procesa, ugovora između sebe i s ostalim europskim državama, o uređenju i promicanju gospodarskih i prometnih veza i trgovine i drugih pitanja od interesa za odnose između suverenih i neovisnih država koje žele dobre susjedske odnose, a također od interesa za stabilnost međunarodnog poretka u ovom dijelu svijeta;*
4. *Da se u okviru konferencije potpiše svečana deklaracija o poštivanju prava nacionalnih manjina i etničkih zajednica, prema međunarodnim standardima i konvencijama, uz uspostavu međunarodne kontrole primjene tih sporazuma;*

5. *Da odmah počnu pregovori o zaključenju sporazuma o regionalnoj sigurnosti zemalja s područja bivše Jugoslavije, u okviru općeg sustava ograničenja konvencionalnog naoružanja unutar KESS-a;*
6. *Smatram da sankcije Vijeća sigurnosti UN koje su donesene u odnosu na određene države s područja bivše Jugoslavije, trebaju ostati na snazi sve dok se ne ostvare svi rezultati predloženog mirovnog procesa. Čim mirovni plan bude ostvaren, sankcije bi rebalo bez odlaganja ukinuti.*

*Pozivam sve međunarodne čimbenike da razmotre ove moje prijedloge i da poduzmu odlučne mjere za zaustavljanje sukoba i sve potrebne korake koji će donijeti mir i stvoriti pretpostavke za stvaranje stabilnog međunarodnog poretka u ovom području na dobrobit svih država u ovom dijelu Europe i svijeta.*

*Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske*



*Dr. Franjo Tuđman*

*U Zagrebu, 1. studenog 1993.*



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UNPROFOR		PAGE 1 OF 4	
OUTGOING FAX NO.: 431		DATE: 15 NOVEMBER 1993	
TO: UNPROFOR BELGRADE		FROM: OFFICE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER UNPROFOR ZAGREB	
FAX NO:		FAX NO:	
ATTN: GEN. KOUKSENKO		DRAFTER: COL. CORBERAND MA TO FC	
INFO: SECTOR EAST COMMANDER FAX NO.: CAC BELGRADE			
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG/DFC/COS; MA TO FC			
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS IN SECTOR EAST.			

Please find attached a fax from Gen. Peeters concerning negotiations in Sector East for your:

1. information,
2. comments, especially with regard to para. 5 of the paper.

Regards.

16/11-93

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ADD page 1 of 3 pages

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OUTGOING FAX NO: 422703	DATE : 12 November 1993
TO : HQ	FROM : SHQ-EAST
FAX NO:	FAX NO : 025-26674 BHTPO54-120012
ATTN : FC DFC	FILE NO: DRAFTER: P. PETERS TITLE : BGCO
INTERNAL : COS } CAC } <i>OK</i>	RELEASING OFFICER: P. PETERS TITLE : BROADCASTER-GENERAL SECTOR COMMANDER SIGNATURE: <i>[Signature]</i>
SUBJECT: Negotiations in Sector EAST	

MESSAGE

1. Until now, we were able in Sector EAST to conclude with both parties a CFA, which in general, holds quite well.
2. On 10 Nov 93, we also set up Joint Commissions: one at Sector level, two at Bn level and with the possibility to establish specific commissions dealing with particular issues.
3. These were the easy steps; the next ones: establishment of buffer zone(s) and withdrawal from hot spot(s) are going to be much more complicated, if possible at all.

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The major problem will reside with the Croatian side, rather than with the Serbs.

In both cases, my course of action will be to make proposals asking for concessions from both sides. I expect that I can convince the Serbs to cooperate if the other side is also ready for concessions: mainly withdrawal from where they are and UNPROFOR controlling both sides and the area between in the same way. If, however, the Croats refuse the idea of a buffer zone located partially on their "frec" territory, the Serbs will consider every proposal to be unbalanced and will not be willing to discuss further.

*Two 11/27*



ZAB-212

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In fact, we have two political problems: the first being the one of the equal sign (and equal partners), the second one being the political importance of the confrontation line and the political repercussions of extending a buffer zone beyond that line. I could avoid this problem when negotiating the CPA by not mentioning the CL and by replacing it by the forward lines of deployment. I will, however, have to face it starting the buffer zone talks.

4. A further problem is that our agreements have to be followed very soon by similar agreements either in other sectors or at the general level. If this is not the case, I expect, under pressure of one or both "governments" that further negotiations will stall and in fact that we might even return to a worse situation than before.
5. Other interesting point would be to know, what Belgrade is thinking about what we achieve here, and if we could eventually get some support from them through pressure on the local authorities, either directly or via KNIN.
6. With regard to KNIN, we should recognize that not everybody there is that happy with the developments here. They may fear that a separate solution here may also be the beginning of the disintegration of the "RSK" or that at least they might never be able to "get back" the territories which were "reconquered" by the Croats.
7. Finally, I have a feeling that the Serbs are more and more willing to cooperate because they believe that maybe they have a better chance to get something through UNPROFOR. So my question is, of course, if we are able to offer them anything else than all the SRK they don't like. If this is not the case, in the long or even in the medium run, this situation may reverse completely.
8. Other point, which troubles me, is the presence of ARKAN troops. I don't know what their attitude is towards what we try to achieve, but if they are opposed to it, we may expect troubles probably under a form of terrorist acts.
9. So, I definitely need your help and support; foremost to convince the Croats to accept buffer zones, partially on their side and controlled by UNPROFOR (not only by UNMO's). If they agree that a CPA is a necessity, as claimed by their President, they must accept that a valid CPA implies buffer zones and that the establishment is only possible on a basis of reciprocity.

They accepted now the notion of forward lines of deployment and they agreed on the line of 5 km from there to be the zone where tactical movements are frozen. So, we might further develop these ideas and turn the so defined zone gradually into buffer zones, without mentioning the CL; we must, however, convince them to allow more than UNMO's and ECOM.

It is obvious that this concept will only be accepted if approved by Zagreb.


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10. As I understand, the French - German proposal within the EC, to release a little bit the pressure on Serbia, should not only to be seen with regard to B-H, but also with regard to Serbian pressure on the "RSK". I wonder if this cannot be exploited in our case, where Belgrade should be pushed to advise the locals here, first of all to continue the negotiations and secondly to be ready to make concessions. It would be nice, if at the same time and in the same context, Belgrade would be asked to withdraw the Arkan troops on its own territory.
11. With regard to what we may promise to the local Serbs, I think that this, of course, is within the tasks of the SRSG, but it should be clear by now for everybody, that even the latest proposal of Tudjman is not acceptable for them. Whether they are right or wrong, becomes more and more an academic question, while avoiding a war and a valid reason for a further presence of UNPROFOR here are now the real issues.

Bien à vous

  
 P. Paubert  
 BS  
 JC

PS. I had a request from Mr. MIHANOVIC, "Assistant MCD". He would like to meet you again and he would probably talk about: the situation, the OKARA mass grave and he would ask you to give an interview to local and Serbian press.

Would that be possible during your visit at our Sector on 02 Dec 93?

If it is not possible, I may try to set it up at the time you want to meet MG DECAN, Cdr OZ OSIJEK.



010/4✓

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Date:

16/11-93

PSC:

UNPROFOR

Page 1 of 353:

Common use ONLY

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SNHQ: 325

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TVA: 18:20

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TVZ:

VBD: RTX

FAX

IMMEDIATE

UN UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 151755B NOV 93
TO: POLBAT, FREGAT 1, DANBAT AND UNMO/SEC N.	FROM: HQ SECTOR NORTH
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: OO/RTN OO/UNMO	FILE REF. NO. : 1002 - 057J DRAFTER : MAJ BILIER TITLE : HTO RELEASING OFFR: COL LANG/COS
INFO : HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE BETWEEN OZ KARLOVAC AND KORDUN CORPS.	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SC, DSC, COS, SOO	

MESSAGE

- REFERENCES: 1. MINUTES OF THE FACE TO FACE MEETING AT TURANJ ON THE 14 NOV 1993.  
2. MAP COVERING THE AREA CONCERNED.

1. IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OZ KARLOVAC AND KORDUN CORPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE 1 AND 2, POLBAT, FREGAT 1, DANBAT AND UNMO/SECTOR NORTH ARE REQUESTED TO EXECUTE THE FOLLOWINGS:

A: POLBAT AND FREGAT 1 will in order:

- FROM OP/CP OBSERVE ON A 24 HOURS BASIS EXTREMELY PRECIS CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS, AND REPORT THIS IMMEDIATELY.
- INCREASE PATROLLING IN THE AREA, IN ORDER TO GIVE THE JOINT COMMITTEE, REFERENCE 1, THE BEST RELIABLE PICTURE TO ACT ON.

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NFC  
COS  
HCA  
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700/0145  
- 111

T414

2/5

B: UNMO/SEC N:

- INCREASE PATROLING, ON BOTH SIDES, CLOSE TO THE CONFRONTATION LINE, ESPECIALLY ON THE CROATIAN SIDE. REPORTS TO BE GIVEN IMMEDIATELY TO SN.

C: DANBAT:

PROVIDE SN WITH A DOUBLE PREFAB, TO BE USED AS A CONFERENCE ROOM AT THE TURANJ CROSSING. PROJECT OFFICER, CAPT. L. CORDEAU, SECTOR NORTH IS TO BE CONTACTED BY DANBAT ASAP FOR DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.

2. ACKNOWLEDGE.

3. REGARDS.



14 NOV 1993

 $\frac{3}{5}$ 

1. The meeting started as planned at 1200 hrs. and lasted until 1420 hrs.

The meeting was held in a very positive atmosphere and with a show of very good will from both sides.
2. The three parties participating were represented as follows:
  - a. Croatian side:

Brigadier General, Pavao Miljavac.  
Senior Advisor, Krsto Kovačević.  
Chief of Police, Mr. D. Derk.
  - b. Serb side:

Colonel, Čedomir Bulat.  
Chief of Militia, Mr. Tošo Pajić.  
LO/KORDUN Corps, Lt.Col. S. Lazarević.
  - c. Sector North:

Deputy Sector Commander, Colonel C. Sarna.  
Chief of Staff, Colonel P. Lang.  
Senior Ops. Officer, Lt.Col. B. Sohnemann.
  - d. Observers:

CO FREBAT 1, Colonel B. Ratel
3. After the welcome from Sector North and the opening remarks from the two sides it was agreed that the meeting should lead to some gentlemen agreements and that the agenda should cover the following items:
  - A cease-fire covering the area common to the two Commanders.
  - A re-opening of TURANJ X-ing.
  - Humanitarian Aid Convoys.
  - The media and their way of covering events concerning "the other side".
4. At the meeting the following was agreed upon:
  - A cease-fire covering the area common to the two Commanders will start at 151200A NOV 1993.
  - A Joint Committee will be established and have their first meeting at 151300A NOV 1993.

T414 4/5

The Comity will consist of:

- Cpt. T. Brckan (TICA), Croatian side.
- Maj. D. Kovačić, Serb side.
- Cpt. Duverger, OC Coy/FREBAT 1.
- Lt.Col. B. Sohnemann, SOO/SN.


The first meeting will deal with the establishing of Hot-Lines.

- Establishing of Hot-Lines ASAP at:  
TURANJ  
PERJASICA  
BRODANI or REČICA or ? (to be defined)
- Re-opening of TURANJ X-ing starting at  
160700A NOV 1993.  
The X-ing will be open daily 0700 -1700.  
The opening and closing will be supervised  
by FREBAT 1.  
The X-ing will be open to traffic from:
  - UN.
  - ECHM.
  - Humanitarian Convoys.
  - AGROKOMERC.
- Media should, when possible, be influenced  
to cover "the other side" in an objective,  
neutral way in order to avoid insults and  
any increase of tension or hatred among the  
population on both sides.
- The Croatian side would make sure that no  
further infiltration or forward movement  
will take place in the area of BRŠLJENOVAC.
- When the cease-fire has functioned well for  
more than a week the political authorities  
on both sides will be notified that the Red  
Cross in KARLOVAC and KRNJAK assisted by UN  
can re-start their programmes concerning  
exchange of parcels, letters, medicine etc.  
and later on the family meetings at TURANJ  
X-ing.
- Sector North will take the initiative to  
start face-to-face meetings on Sector level  
concerning a cease-fire agreement covering  
whole Sector North.
- That information on this "gentlemen agree-  
ment" should be given to the media on both  
sides.

5. These minutes have been accepted by both sides.

C. SARNA  
ACTING SECTOR COMMANDER





# SECTOR NORTH

AREA

OGULIN

POLBAT

SLUNJ

BRINJE

RAKOVICA

PERUSICA

BIHAC

BOS. KRUPA

SAJSKI MOST

BANJA LUKA

KARLOVAC

FREBATA

OGULIN

SLUNJ

BRINJE

RAKOVICA

PERUSICA

BIHAC

BOS. KRUPA

SAJSKI MOST

PETRINJA

Glinje

Slunj

Brinje

Rakovica

Perusica

Bihać

Bos. Krupa

Sanski Most

Banja Luka

PETRINJA

Glinje

Slunj

Brinje

Rakovica

Perusica

Bihać

Bos. Krupa

Sanski Most

Banja Luka

PETRINJA

Glinje

Slunj

Brinje

Rakovica

Perusica

Bihać

Bos. Krupa

Sanski Most

Banja Luka

PETRINJA

Glinje

Slunj

Brinje

Rakovica

Perusica

Bihać

Bos. Krupa

Sanski Most

Banja Luka



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UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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OUTGOING MOST IMMEDIATE

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CZN-1142

TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

INFO: ANNAN, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

FROM: COT, ZAGREB

DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-1119

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GENERAL BOBETKO

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
93 SEP 12 16:51

1. Considering the deterioration of the situation and the unilateral cease fire announced by MR. TUDJMAN to MR. STOLTENBERG, the Force Commander requested a meeting with GEN. BOBETKO. This meeting took place on 12 September, at 1700 hours.

2. The Force Commander started to say that he was there to report on the step taken by the Croats in order to return to a normal situation on the ground. He asked him to make another step in regard to the villages taken by the Croats near GOSPIC in order to have the Serbs come back to the negotiating table.

3. GEN. BOBETKO replied that he had given order for a twenty-four hour cease fire starting at 1200 today. The Croat Army will comply with the cease fire and see if the Serbs are ready for a negotiation as propositions are quite clear - "First, we will respect the cease fire. Second, we agree on a discussion for a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. Third, we will study propositions in order to solve the problem for GOSPIC, ZADAR, LOVINAC AND KARLOVAC."

4. The Force Commander said that the answer was quite clear but he thought that the process will lead to an impasse because the Serbs will not accept the unilateral ceasefire alone without some thought of withdrawal from the villages taken.

5. At the end of the meeting, the Force Commander took the opportunity to discuss the problem of the Polish OP shelling this afternoon by the Croat Army and the future of the population of the villages surrounded. GEN. BOBETKO gave him his personal guarantee on these matters.

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- Summary of the telephone conversation of 10 Sept 1993 at 1245  
hrs between General Cot and General Bobetko

General Cot: Have you received the letter that was forwarded to me by General Novakovic?

General Bobetko: No.

General Cot: I'll summarize it then to you: General Novakovic says that if you do not withdraw from the villages of Divoselo and Citluk by 1300 hrs today, he is going to attack on all Croatia targets. Do you have a message for him?

General Bobetko: Yes, yes... Today is the market day in Karlovac and right at the moment the people started coming to town, the very centre was shelled by mortars. There have been 4 dead and 12 wounded civilians.

General Cot: I am speaking about your attack. Are you ready to withdraw from those two villages?

General Bobetko: I want General Novakovic to withdraw himself from Lovinac which is a Croatian town.

General Cot: I'll then tell to General Novakovic that you have no intention of withdrawing from those villages.

General Bobetko: When we are given guarantees, by General Novakovic and by you, General Cot, that the shelling of Gospic will cease, we will talk about it and we will reach... (noise) ... a positive decision.

General Cot: If the condition is fulfilled by the Serbs, are you going to withdraw from that territory?

General Bobetko: You are meeting with the Serb and Croat representatives this Sunday to discuss conditions of the signature of the cease-fire agreement which is a condition for putting an end to war.

General Cot: This meeting has been seriously compromised by your attack and I doubt that the Serbs are going to accept it.

General Bobetko: It's their problem!

General Cot: I'll tell General Novakovic that you are not accepting what they are asking from you.

General Bobetko: We want and we ask, and propose, signing of an agreement on a total cease-fire.

General Cot: I will have to declare that you have decided to perform this attack and that this decision is by no means favourable for the cease-fire process.

General Bobetko: This is your interpretation of what I have said.

General Cot: I will say, in a declaration, that I am obliged to conclude that an attack has been launched by the Croats in the area south of Gospic.

General Bobetko: I want to add that the aim of this attack was to protect the Croatian population in Gospic.

General Cot: I think that we have said to each other everything then.

General Bobetko: Are we going to see each other this afternoon?

General Cot: No, for this afternoon we had other things to discuss, the routine things, but following the events that took place in the meantime, I can only send my representative, my chief of staff to meet with your chief of staff.

General Bobetko: We had agreed upon this meeting in order to speak in a more constructive way, and not like his, over the phone.

General Cot: The events that took place yesterday have created a completely new situation. Do you want me to send my chief of staff to your HQ?

General Bobetko: I had made a decision and a proposal and I had asked the general to consider all the details, to explain everything ... (noise)... talks - I do not want them.

General Cot: I will be more useful at the Serb side trying to convince them to stop the escalation rather than to go to see you this afternoon.

General Bobetko: I have a clear understanding of the situation. But I first want to say that Croatia is not going to let itself be blackmailed. We are ready to negotiate but we will respond to all provocations energetically.

General Cot: Very well, you do not want me to send my representative to you.

General Bobetko: The nature of the problems is such that it is only with someone of your rank that I can talk.

General Cot: I am not coming this afternoon. I hope that we will be able both of us to maintain the crisis within acceptable limits.

General Bobetko: I agree to try to solve the situation in the best possible way.

General Cot: I will get in touch with you again.

General Bobetko: Je suis pret, mon general (said in French)



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Zagreb, 12 August 1993

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali  
Secretary General  
UNITED NATIONS  
New York

Your Excellency,

On behalf of my Government, I would like to state the position of the Republic of Croatia concerning unimpeded construction of Maslenica bridge and the undisturbed flow of traffic over it, which was provided in the Agreement of 15/16 July 1993 providing for the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces from the area of Maslenica, Zemunik and Peruca as soon as UNPROFOR takes effective control over these areas.

The signature of the Croatian Government resulted from a *bona fide* approach which includes participation of the local Serbs in the negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of all disputes within the political framework determined by the Security Council resolutions 802, 815 and 847. It was the understanding of the Croatian delegation that, in addition to the 15/16 July Agreement, an additional agreement would be signed on a comprehensive cease-fire affecting all the lines of confrontation. Yet, at the decisive moment, the delegation of local Serbs from Knin decided not to sign the text which had been preliminarily agreed upon, until the Croatian side had implemented the 15/16 July Agreement.

The pressure exerted in that way by the local Serbs from Knin was not acceptable to our delegation, which insisted that the signing of the cease-fire agreement - as called upon in para. 5 of the 15/16 July Agreement - is a prerequisite for any unilateral and temporary withdrawal of Croatian armed forces from any part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

After the attacks of the Serbian insurgents on the Maslenica bridge, the destruction of one part of the bridge and the continuing shelling that prevents the repair of this solely civilian object - my Government is compelled to consider the 15/16 July Agreement void, and to request the immediate and unconditional implementation of the measures that were proposed in the reports and their annexes of the Secretary General (S/23280, S/23592, S/23513, S/23353) and in the stipulations contained in Security Council resolutions 724 (1991), 740 (1992), 752 (1992), 762 (1992), 769 (1992), 779 (1992), 802 (1993), 815 (1993) and 847 (1993).



UNZ-681 CYZ-537 P4/4

The measures which are foreseen in the above-mentioned reports and resolutions include not only the taking control of heavy weapons but also the disbanding and demobilization of all paramilitary, irregular and volunteer units in the UNPAs, as well as the banning of the wearing of uniforms or carrying of weapons by the personnel from these units. Unfortunately, the present situation is in disturbing contrast to these provisions and attacks by local Serbs on Croatian civilian targets are continuing.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia is willing to continue its dialogue and promote confidence-building measure meant to demonstrate our desire to proceed with the reintegration of the UNPAs in a peaceful manner. However, it is difficult to do this as long as Serbian paramilitary forces continue to threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. In this context, I have to stress that the decision by the "government" of the "republic of Serbian Krajina", communicated to the diplomatic and consular missions in Belgrade, that they "will negotiate with the Republic of Croatia on an equal state-entity basis", is insulting and totally unacceptable to the Republic of Croatia. The UNPAs are an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia as emphasized in Security Council resolutions 815 (1993) and 847 (1993), and we consider that these negotiations have to be an entirely internal matter of the Republic of Croatia, in which UNPROFOR and the officials of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia are only unbiased mediators.

In our view, the reports of UNPROFOR regarding the situation in Croatia have become increasingly slanted in recent weeks, often disregarding information that would describe the hostile actions by the Serbian paramilitary units. While supporting the activities of peace-keeping forces on our territory until the expiration of the present mandate, we strongly believe that the members of the Security Council and the international community as a whole are entitled to have objective and unbiased information about the situation on the ground. We would like to see UNPROFOR finally acting in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially those that emphasize the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia over its entire internationally recognized territory.

We call once again upon the international community to exert pressure on the Serbian insurgents in the Republic of Croatia to obey its decisions which are stated in numerous resolutions, or face the necessary consequences. It is the firm belief of my Government that the relevant Security Council decisions contain all the provisions for restoration of a just peace in my country. My Government is committed to fulfill all its obligations, but we cannot agree with anything less than full implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

I would request your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest appreciation.

**Dr. Mate Granic**  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

P. 2/2

AUG 13 '93 11:22AM CROATIAN MISSION N Y

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3-08-13 20:14

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010/4

**FAX****TO: AMBASSADOR KNUT VOLLEBAEK****FROM: BRIG GEN BO PELLNÄS****DATE: 19993-08-09**

**PLEASE FIND TWO DRAFTS OF INVITATION ANNEXED.  
I WOULD APPRECIATE IF WE COULD HAVE YOUR  
COMMENTS MORE OR LESS IMMEDIATE.**

**THE CROAT MINISTER OF TRANSPORT JUST RANG AND  
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT UN AND SERB  
STANDPOINTS!!**

**I AM TRYING TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN EIDE  
AND SUSAK TO-DAY.**

**REGARDS****ENDALL**

**THIS FAX CONTAINS THREE PAGES, INCLUDING THIS  
PAGE.**

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

Zagreb 1993-08-09

The Republic of Croatia is herewith invited to send a delegation to Geneva to attend a conference with a Serb delegation from Knin.

The agenda would be to finalize and sign a ceasefire agreement and in connection with this to discuss and solve the necessary political questions related to such an agreement.

The political discussions will be chaired by Mr Stoltenberg's representative and the talks directly linked with the ceasefire agreement by General Cot's representative.

The Vienna document (The 11th draft on a ceasefire agreement) will form the base for the ceasefire talks.

It would be preferable if the Croatian delegation could be in Geneva not later than 2000 hours 10 August in order to allow for unofficial contacts during the evening. The conference will start at 1000 hours on 11 August at Palais de Nations.

Please convey your answer to this invitation as soon as possible to UNPROFOR including the names of the members of the Croatian delegation.

J MacInnis  
Major General  
Acting Force Commander UNPROFOR

Mr Degoricija  
Vice President of the State Committee  
for the Normalization of Relations with Serbs



UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

Zagreb 1993-08-09

Your authorities are herewith invited to send a delegation to Genève to attend a conference together with a delegation from the Republic of Croatia.

The agenda of this conference should be to solve the necessary political questions related to the possibilities to achieve a lasting ceasefire and to finalize and sign a ceasefire agreement.

The political discussions will be chaired by Mr Stoltenberg's representative and the talks directly linked to the ceasefire agreement by General Cot's representative.

It would be appreciated if your delegation could leave Knin in time to be in Geneva not later than 2000 hours on 10 August to allow unofficial talks to take place. The Conference will start at 1000 hours on 11 August.

Please convey to UNPROFOR as soon as possible your answer to this invitation including the names of the members of your delegation.

J MacInnis  
Major General  
Acting Force Commander UNPROFOR

Mr Bjegovic  
Knin

010/4



# РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА

The Republic of Serbian Krajina

Министарство за иностране послове

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

KNIN, KRALJA PETRA I OSLOBODIOCA 27

TEL: 011-235-16-72

0780-60-126 / 079-719-023

FAX: (011) 235-16-72

REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

OFFICE IN BELGRADE

TERAZIJE No 3/1

TEL: (011) 3221-325; 3226-778; 3227-346

FAX: (011) 3224-573

YUGOSLAVIA

1770\93

08 AUGUST 1993

HIS EXCELLENCY  
BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI  
SECRETARY GENERAL  
UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

Your Excellency,

I would like to remind you of the recent Peace Agreement signed between the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Government of the Republic of Croatia in Erdut\Zagreb on July 15\16, 1993.

You have been informed that the Government of the Republic of Croatia has refused to implement the stipulations of the said Agreement. My Government does not have any mandate in accepting this type of behaviour of the Government in Zagreb. In addition, it cannot find any reasons in the initiation of new negotiations, when the conclusions of the former (from Erdut\Zagreb), Croatia refuses to execute. Even more so when this rejection ensues after the caution by the Security Council at her behaviour, and the demands of the Co-Chairmen that the Erdut Agreement must be realized.

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina is prepared by means of negotiations to reach a peaceful conclusion, if you and the Security Council become a guarantor that Croatia will in the future respect and implement the stipulations of all accepted agreements. You have the right to demand the same from Croatia, since it is a member of the United Nations, and one which by means of state terror has alienated Croatia from the Serbian ethnic community, and in the process inducing the creation of two states - the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Croatia (this fact was divulged by you in your Report before the Security Council on May 15, 1993).

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If one adds to this the fact that in the former Croatia there lived a Serbian component which represented 30% of the population, and not 11% which Croatia (using its republic status in the former Yugoslavia) counterfeited, then one can deduce that the Serbian people have all the rights for a state entity of their own. Especially since so far, in the former mutual states with the Croatians, it was exposed to all forms of terror and genocide.

My Government recognizes the state frontier of the Republic of Serbian Krajina to be the line of demarcation as it existed on January 03, 1992, and one which the Croatian military violated during three armed offensives on Krajina - two in 1992 and one in 1993.


Your Excellency,

I would like to remind you that during the last offensive, Croatia occupied three important Krajina objects - the bridge at Maslenica, the airport at Zemunik, and the dam at Peruća. Even today, my Government is prepared to permit Croatia the mutual use of these objects, but only when it withdraws its military and police from the occupied territories, as foreseen by the Erdut Agreement of July 15\16 1993.

Pending the mentioned, we shall negotiate with Croatia all other points of inter - state contention.

The Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina avails its self of confirming the assurances of its highest esteem.

Yours sincerely,



Djordje Bjegovic  
Prime Minister



cc.

President of the Security Council, New York  
Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Geneva  
Diplomatic-Consular Missions accredited to Belgrade

## OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 2

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG/	DATE/TIME: 05 Aug 1993
TO: Stoltenberg - Geneva	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: Maj. Kanonen	FILE REF. NO.: 26. Dubrov DRAFTER : CAPT P DELANEY ADC TO THE SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: DEGRICITAS REPLY TO VOLLEBAEK	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE ADC/SRSG.	

MESSAGE:

1. Attached please find translated reply to Ambassador Vollebaek which was accidentally omitted from the earlier fax.

Regards.



**TRANSLATION FROM CROATIAN**

**REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**  
**Delegation of the Republic of Croatia**  
**to negotiations with local Serbian authorities**

Zagreb, 4 July 1993

**Mr. KNUT VOLLEBEAK**  
**Assistant to the Chairman of the ICFY**

Mr. Vollebeak visited me with his co-workers on 4 August 1993 and expressed a wish to continue with Vienna negotiations. In the same time, he informed me of the wish expressed by the Serbs from Knin to proceed with the negotiations.

During his visit, Mr. Vollebeak also informed me of the earlier talks in Knin and told me that the talks could proceed along the following three points:

1. The cease-fire agreement - based on the proposed draft agreement from Vienna;
2. The Erdut-Zagreb agreement would be discussed without timeframe;
3. If agreed upon, the cease-fire agreement would come into force six hours upon the implementation of the Erdut agreement.

The Croatian delegation accepts the proposal to continue with the cease-fire negotiations in the country and to have the draft cease-fire agreement from Vienna as a basis for the talks.

The Croatian delegation is ready, after the cease-fire agreement has been signed, to consider all the alternative separate agreements on specific activities in sectors implementing thereby all the relevant Security Council resolutions, and in particular the SCR 847.

Slavko Degoricija,  
Head of Delegation

(SIGNED UPON ORIGINAL)



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA  
FAX

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

PAGE 1 OF 1



010/4 ✓

TO: ANNAN Office of the Co-Chairmen FAX NO: 1-212-963 9222

TO: GOULDING FAX NO: 1-212-963 4879

GHAREKAN FAX NO: 1-212-963 2155

EIDE FAX NO: 38-41 170 199

COT FAX NO: 38-41 170 199

FROM: THORVALD STOLTENBERG *[Signature]* FAX NO: 41-22-917 0079  
-TEL NO: 41-22 917 1200

DATE: 2 AUGUST 1993

SUBJECT: MASLENICA BRIDGE

---

1. The Croatian Permanent Representative came to see me at 9.45pm this evening and handed over the attached letter. He stated that the political response to the sinking of a part of the pontoon bridge was very acute in Croatia and he felt that the situation could not remain as it is. It would either have to go forward or backward.

2. I replied that I was endeavouring to encourage all sides to implement the agreement of 15/16 July and emphasised the need for Croatia to withdraw from all areas mentioned in that agreement, including the Miljeveci Plateau. I stated further that all sides should contribute to defusing the situation.

Regards.



010/4✓

**Office of the  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia  
and the  
Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia**

OUTGOING FAX

Page 1 of 3

**To:** Stoltenberg, Geneva (NO DISTRIBUTION)

**From:** Stoltenberg, Zagreb

**Date:** 02 August 1993

**Subject:** Implementation of SCR 802

1. I had discussions with the FC, DFC and Vollebaek this afternoon regarding ongoing negotiations for withdrawal of Croatian forces from the SCR 802 and Miljevac Plateau areas. The latest position is that the FC met with Minister Susak this afternoon. Susak provided a written proposal (enclosed) which Pellnas and Thornberry have carried to Knin for discussion.

2. Vollebaek is of the view that this is enough common ground between the parties to reconvene discussions between them. The FC agrees that such discussions should be arranged as soon as possible but under ICFY chairmanship. (In this context, see also enclosed a fax sent to Knin at approximately 6:00 p.m.).

3. I detected some sensitivity from the FC in discussions today concerning the level of political direction over this matter and his unfulfilled request for an SRSG's Special Representative in Sarajevo. He appears to be of the opinion that the Maslenica negotiations fall within the ambit of the ICFY. The military should support political agreements not negotiate them. Mr. Eide has no doubt briefed you on such concerns but it does appear to me that they deserve your personal communication with the FC. The FC seems to have his hands full, as does everyone, and the DFC indicated a more permanent presence of a senior political officer would be appreciated. It was stressed that such comments were not a criticism of individuals on your staff here in Zagreb.

4. Incidentally, I assess relations are not good between the FC and the DCA. This may be the reason for some of the tension reported above.

1. Croatian military and police forces will hand over the area between Maslenica and Zemunik together with the Peruca dam to UNPROFOR control. UNPROFOR forces will start taking control over the stated areas on 2 August 1993. UNPROFOR will enable the functioning of the Croatian civil authorities in the same way it is being done in Sector West (e.g. Grubišno Polje and Daruvar) as well as the unobstructed construction of Maslenica bridge and Peruca dam.
2. The negotiations between the representatives of the Croatian Government and the local Serbs on the general cease-fire and the beginning of the implementation of SCR 847, based on the document prepared in Vienna, will continue from 3 August 1993.
3. The Miljevac plateau will be treated in the same way as the areas stated in Paragraph 1 after the Agreement mentioned in Paragraph 2 has been signed; until then, UNPROFOR will deploy its observers in the area.



r/3

**Office of the  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia  
and the  
Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia**

**OUTGOING FAX - MOST IMMEDIATE**

**To:** Sector South, Knin  
**From:** SRSG's Office, Zagreb  
**Date:** 02 August 1993  
**Subject:** Maslenica Negotiations

A handwritten signature, possibly "G. G. G.", is written over a horizontal line. To the right of the signature, the initials "cos" are written.

1. Please pass to Brig. Pellnaes ASAP.
2. Vollebaek called with the following information for your urgent attention:
  - a. General NOVAKOVIC's proposal of 2230 hrs 01 Aug 93 has been studied in New York and a formal reply will be sent this evening.
  - b. Vollebaek is returning to Zagreb tomorrow with full authority to sign on behalf of the UN any agreement reached by the parties.
3. Vollebaek wonders if there is any merit in proposing that the parties meet as early as tomorrow afternoon, possibly in Geneva, for further discussions. He would be prepared to chair such a meeting and the DFC supports such a proposal. (The FC is away from the HQ).
4. We know you have your hands full but thought the above would be useful. Any news on the possibility of further meetings of the parties would be appreciated.
5. Welcome back from leave.

CZV-567

P5/5

(C) 4

12. DCM noted in this respect that some of the moderate leaders surfacing at Knin evidently enjoyed the backing of Belgrade. The Joint Commission, set up under SCR 762 had not been successful for a number of reasons -- some procedural, some political. Nevertheless, it had been a promising idea. Its technical sub-commissions had had no difficulty in identifying what needed to be done, but the political will needed to bring projects to fruition had been missing. Now that there were more positive interlocutors on the Knin side, it should be insisted that the parties come together again, in Geneva, and start facing up to the political issues. Through this mechanism, which would focus on specific aspects of the problem, US-Russian support might also be drummed up. The Joint Commission, dealing with essentially operational matters, should also be looked at with a critical but constructive eye, and be re-established on the ground.

13. DCM stressed, however, that nothing constructive could be accomplished until the two sides first agreed to a cease-fire. In this connection, he regretted to have to inform the Vice President that the Czech UNPROFOR soldier killed that day had been the victim of Croatian Army shelling. This had been reported to New York.

14. The Vice President agreed that a cease-fire should be the first priority. However, Zadar and other towns were undergoing systematic attack by "RSK" forces. A mechanism was needed to convince them to stop shooting. It was unrealistic to expect the Croatian Army not to return enemy fire. While he deplored the death of the UNPROFOR soldier, in his view, the Czech soldiers who had been shot had probably been too close to the Serbian positions (although they had been warned about this) and had been hit by incoming fire. They had certainly not been targets of the Croatian Army.



23 February 1993

Tenth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement between the  
Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities in  
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and complete this return within further 5 days. No armed forces of the Serb local authorities shall move into any area from which the Government's armed forces thus withdraw.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. Subject to paragraph 4 below, UNPROFOR shall re-establish its presence in each area from which the Government of Croatia forces are to withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, before such area is vacated.

4. With respect to policing the areas from which the Government of Croatia forces and police are withdrawn, immediately after the implementation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above:

- (a) Police of the Serb local authorities may only be in those parts of the specified areas as are not included in (b) or (c) below.

- (b) In all such areas that are included within a Pink Zone, UNROFOR shall carry out the necessary police functions until the second sentence of paragraph 16(d) of the report of the Secretary-General set out in document S/24188 is implemented as required by Security Council resolution 762 (1992).
- (c) UNPROFOR shall also carry out the necessary police functions at the sites of the following facilities (whose exact perimeters are to be defined in further consultation with UNPROFOR): Maslenica Bridge; Zemunik airport; and Peruca Dam. These facilities are to be available for civilian use, under the control of UNPROFOR, by all inhabitants.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4 above.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).



SERB PROPOSAL

20 February 1993

Sixth Draft

Elements of an Agreement on the  
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)  
between the Croatian and Serb sides

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993.

2. No armed forces<sup>POLICE</sup> of the Serb authorities in UNPAs shall move into any area from which the Government of Croatia forces withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1.

Neither the armed forces nor the police of the Serb authorities in UNPAs shall move into the sites provided for joint civilian use under UNPROFOR control: the Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam.

3. UNPROFOR, including UNCIVPOL, shall take control of the sites specified in paragraph 2 and shall also re-establish its presence in the other areas from which the Government of Croatia forces withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1 as soon as each area is vacated pursuant to that paragraph.

4. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 5 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

20 February 1993

Sixth Draft

Elements of a ceasefire agreement between the  
Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities in  
implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993)

1. The armed forces and the police of the Republic of Croatia shall, within 5 days of the conclusion of this agreement, return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993.

2. In parallel to the withdrawal of Government of Croatia forces pursuant to paragraph 1 and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 5 days after the conclusion of this agreement, all heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan.

3. No armed forces or police of the Serb local authorities shall move into any areas from which the Government of Croatia forces withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1, to the extent such areas constitute part of a Pink Zone.

4. UNPROFOR, including UNCIVPOL, shall take control of the areas specified in paragraph 3 and shall also re-establish its presence in the other areas from which the Government of Croatia forces withdraw pursuant to paragraph 1 [as soon as each area is vacated pursuant to that paragraph/[after that paragraph has been implemented in accordance with the Vance Plan]].

5. The parties will request the United Nations to strengthen UNPROFOR to carry out its functions under the Vance Plan consequent on paragraphs 1-4.

6. The parties agree to begin, under the auspices as appropriate of UNPROFOR or the ICFY Co-Chairmen, to implement immediately the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).



725  
010/4

CZN - 567  
CZG - 410

CODE RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
(UNPROFOR)

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

Page 1 of 5

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK  
VANCE, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE : 26 APRIL 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-545-----

SUBJECT : Further Meeting with Vice-President Seks/DCM

... I attach copy of a note of meeting between Seks and DCM on 22 April. What was perhaps most interesting was (a) the major change in "atmospherics" with Milas' departure - though Seks is considered a hardliner and (b) Seks' evident desire to review all aspects of the situation.

DISTRIBUTION:
<i>JW PH</i>
<i>SC</i>

ENDALL  
93 APR 26 17:45  
UNOG Telecom Unit  
Palais des Nations

(C)

22 April 1992

NOTE TO FILE

1. A meeting took place this afternoon between DCM (accompanied by DDCA, Abdul-Aziz and Kearns) and Croatian Vice-President Seks (and one other official). The meeting had been arranged to continue earlier discussions (19 April) on the future mandate of UNPROFOR, and especially the Geneva Agreement on SCR 802, in light of developments at the "RSK Parliamentary Assembly" which was held on 20 April. The atmosphere throughout was excellent, a great improvement on what we have been experiencing in recent months with predecessor Milas, and Seks suggested, at the end, the possibility of himself and DCM doing a televised discussion together, in view of the changed tone of discussions.
2. Abdul-Aziz, who had visited the margins of the "Assembly", reported that while the Agreement on 802 had not been rejected, there was doubt that it would be ratified as it stood, following the adoption of SC resolutions 815 and 820, both of which were greatly resented by the "RSK" Serbs.
3. In the event, the matter would be decided only on 24 April, at a joint session of the "Parliaments" of the "RSK" and the "Republic of Serbia". Indications were that the Agreement might still be accepted, but with modifications or conditions which might not be acceptable to the Croatian side. DCM added however that he still felt that Milosevic wanted this ceasefire agreement implemented.
4. He noted that UNPROFOR, for its part, was ready to proceed with implementation of 802. With regard to a future mandate for UNPROFOR, he stressed that any proposals put forward must be realistic. They should focus on what could reasonably be achieved in the near future, not simply on what one party or the other would wish to see happen. The position of the "RSK" Serbs, as expressed in Knin on 7 April, was that SCRs 815 and 820 were incompatible with the Vance Plan, that they represented a fundamental change of attitude on the part of the UN, and that the Vance Plan was therefore dead. UNPROFOR had insisted, however, that SCRs were binding upon them and must be implemented. He also mentioned that he had consistently, over many months, in private, emphasised to what had become the new leadership of the Krajina that they had to negotiate their future with Zagreb, and that any other ideas were simply "fanciful". He believed that some know this in their "heart of hearts", but could not, at this time, publicly concur, because they would be destroyed politically by the hardliners who still remained the majority.



(C) 2

5. In any event, the UN could not afford another mandate that was unrealistic in terms of the resources and cooperation available to implement it. DCM's impression was that the Security Council was a bit fed up with the situation in the UNPAs. It had poured resources into an operation that had not in its view been successful, that was costing too much, and that had an unacceptable casualty count. On that very day, a Czech soldier had been killed and two others wounded. One country was withdrawing its troops. UNPROFOR's view remained that it did have a vital role to play in Croatia, but what that role should be needed thought and consultation. Possibly, it should even go beyond the Vance Plan - if that could be accepted. Autonomy had to be explored.

6. The Vice President agreed that the mandate needed to be redefined. It would be harmful for the UN, for Croatia and "even for the Serbs", simply to maintain the status quo. If the mandate were to be left unchanged, a dangerous situation would be allowed to continue, with military eruptions the extent of which it would be difficult to predict. Croatia would like to see a mandate in which all the UN resolutions and agreements relating to Croatia could be "brought to life". The Security Council should suggest mechanisms for their practical implementation.

7. The Vance Plan had been drawn up, he said, when Yugoslavia was still subject to international law. Now, Yugoslavia as such was no more, but Croatia was a State Member of the UN, and SCR 815 had been needed to give this fact of life articulation. Croatia had laws guaranteeing minority rights and must be given the opportunity to implement them. The Vance Plan should still be realized, somehow, or reviewed. It would not be an easy task for the Secretary-General or the Security Council, but by adopting SCR 815, the UN had accepted the fact that the mandate should be redefined and given expression within the framework of the Republic of Croatia. Crucial issues such as reintegration and the protection of minorities could be resolved if proper lines of communication existed with the Serb community. But, unfortunately, what little had been achieved had been achieved by force. Still, small steps to restore confidence might be considered, such as returning small groups of refugees, or restoring electric transmission facilities or gas pipelines serving Knin.

8. DCM agreed that, ideally, all of the relevant resolutions adopted by the UN should be implemented, but noted that a crucial issue needed to be addressed: that of getting Croatia's Serbs to accept UN activities on territory which they controlled. The UN had neither mandate nor resources to force or impose a solution. He was very familiar with majority/minority national situations and he believed that deep political problems had to have political solutions. Now, recent changes in the "RSK" had produced at least some leaders who thought in terms of rebuilding



the economy, the infrastructure, etc. -- who put practical issues before political mysticism. But their very approach made them highly vulnerable in the prevailing circumstances. A sharp drop in the tension in the UNPAs would need to be brought about as a prelude to forward movement and to developing conditions for the safe return of displaced persons. Many Serbs in the Krajina believed that the HCR's statistics on displaced persons in ex-Yugoslavia (copy of which we gave Seks) showed that it was impossible for them to live again in peace with the Croats. The original Vance Plan had perhaps set the target at too high a level, in the absence of the momentum that should have come from constructive political discussions mediated between the Croats and those in control in the UNPAs. This had been demonstrably true in the case of refugees. DCM said he would venture the view that in majority/minority relations the initiative lay, fundamentally, with the majority.

9. DCM went on to say that the mandate, to be effective, would have to have full international backing. Pressure might be needed to get it implemented. All the Permanent Members needed to be engaged. Russia, for example, could well be of assistance in facilitating this (depending, of course, on the outcome of the referendum on 26 April) on the reintegration of Croatia in a stable and prosperous manner. The Russian Ambassador in Zagreb had, DCM said and Seks agreed, a number of constructive ideas. Other neighbouring States could also be of help.

10. The approach, therefore, should be towards implementing agreements, perhaps even enlisting the support of Belgrade to persuade the "RSK" to accept integration. The approach would also need the full and continuing support of the Security Council, which should put a peacekeeping force on the ground with adequate strength to guarantee it a sufficient level of credibility.

11. The Vice President stressed that pressure from Belgrade was the key to the reintegration of Croatia. If Belgrade were to say, openly, that Croatia could guarantee the future of its Serb minorities, with UN backing and guarantees, the "RSK" hardliners would be isolated and then obliged to abandon their position. The UN and the Croatian Government could then jointly ensure that all conditions were met to safeguard the rights of those minorities, in compliance with international law. In areas where Serbs formed the majority, the most important positions would be held by Serbs. The UN could also assist in guaranteeing this. It was crucial, however, that Belgrade stop flirting with the Krajinian Serbs, and to let them know there was no marriage in the offing. The UN should put pressure on Belgrade to cooperate in this regard, e.g. through the application of "real" sanctions on the Danube. It was the only solution to the problem (he reiterated several times).



14 July 1993

Dear Mr. Sarinic,

I am replying to your letter of 13 July to General Cot on the events planned for Sunday, July 18th.

You and your authorities will, I am sure, appreciate the need for all concerned to act in such a manner as would be conducive to the maintenance of peace.

The Security Council in its resolutions 802 and 847 has specifically called for the Croatian armed forces to withdraw from the areas referred to in your letter. You will therefore understand that the event planned for the 18th of July is not in keeping with the resolutions of the Security Council.

As you are also aware, UNPROFOR is excluded by the Croatian authorities from entering the Maslenica area and, in such circumstances, is hardly in a position "to ensure that this event will pass without incident".

I trust that your authorities will keep the above considerations in mind.

Yours sincerely,

Thorvald Stoltenberg  
Co-Chairman  
International Conference  
on the Former Yugoslavia

14 July 1993

NOTE

The intention of the Croatian Government to re-open the Maslenica Bridge and the Zemunik Airport on 18 July has evoked concern in many quarters about the possibility of an escalation of hostilities.

The Serb local authorities and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have let it be known that the planned event is not in conformity with Security Council resolutions 802 and 847. They have indicated that they consider it provocative.

The Croatian authorities have written to the UNPROFOR Commander asking him "to ensure that this event will pass without incident". In reply to this letter the attached draft reply has been prepared.

In a meeting with a senior official of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the 14 July, the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia expressed the view that the President of the Security Council should issue a statement calling upon the Croatian authorities to comply with resolutions 802 and 847 and to desist from carrying out the planned event on July 18.



010/6 ✓

IMMEDIATE



REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA  
URED PREDSEDNIKA

F1 - 601

14 July 93  
BGA  
17

July 13, 1993

Dear General Got

I tried to get in touch with you tonight to inform you that the Serbs are shelling with heavy artillery the Zemunik airport and the area of the Maslenica bridge as we are preparing the construction of the pontoon bridge.

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 847, I would like to stress that we are going to open the Zemunik airport and the Maslenica bridge as planned on Sunday, July 18th.

The President of the Republic and other dignitaries will attend the opening ceremonies. Please take all necessary measures to ensure that this event will pass without incident. I will contact you tomorrow morning regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

*Lidvanka Burić*

for

Hrvoje Šarinić  
National Security Director

SRSG/FC/DCM/DFC/CCS/CMC  
CAO/ACOS OI/ACOS PL/COO/COPE  
FE/CCW POL/RIF

93 JUL 13 17:49

UNIT  
COMMUNICATIONS

## NOTE TO PRESS CORRESPONDENTS

16 JULY 1993

Attached is the text of an agreement relevant to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 that was signed yesterday (15 July) by Serb local authorities and today (16 July) by the Croatian Government. Paragraph 4 is of immediate interest in as much as it deals with the situation on the Maslenica Bridge which was the subject of a statement by the President of the Security Council earlier this week.

This agreement is the outcome of contacts the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia had with President Milosevic and President Tudjman. After consulting President Milosevic the Co-Chairmen had proposed a draft agreement to President Tudjman for consideration. Ambassadors Ahrens and Vollebaek then followed-up the matter with discussions in Zagreb and in Erdut. Those discussions led to some revisions in the text which are reflected in the signed document.

The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have issued the following comment:

"The Co-Chairmen welcome the signature of the agreement. They hope that this will facilitate further talks within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia which can improve confidence and lead to better relations between the two parties as well as the enhancement of economic conditions."





# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen

FAX

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: The Secretary General FAX NO: 1-212-963 2155  
COPY: Goulding FAX NO: 1-212-963 4879  
COPY: Annan FAX NO: 1-212-963 9222  
COPY: Sills FAX NO: 1-212-963 7055  
COPY: Eide, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FAX NO: 38-41 176 709  
FROM: Stoltenberg DATE: 16 July 1993

SUBJECT: SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CROATIAN  
GOVERNMENT AND THE SERB LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Attached is the text of an agreement relevant to the implementation of Resolution 802 that was signed yesterday by the Serb local authorities and today by the Croatian Government. Paragraph 4 is of immediate interest in as much as it deals with the situation on the Maslenica Bridge.

This agreement is the outcome of contacts the Co-Chairmen had with President Milosevic and President Tudjman. After consulting President Milosevic the Co-Chairmen had proposed a draft agreement to President Tudjman for consideration. Ambassadors Ahrens and Vollebaek then followed-up the matter with discussions in Zagreb and in Erdut. Those discussions led to some revisions in the text which are reflected in the signed document.

The signature of the agreement is being announced in Zagreb with a comment to the following effect:

"The Co-Chairmen welcome the signature of the agreement. They hope that this will facilitate further talks within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia which can improve confidence and lead to better relations between the two parties as well as the enhancement of economic conditions."

*Handwritten signature: Dava G. [unclear]*



Received 17.7  
in Geneva

## TRANSLATION

Secretary General of the UN  
His Excellency Boutros Boutros Ghali

President of the UN Security Council  
His Excellency Sir David Hannay

President of the Foreign Ministers'  
Council of the EEC  
His Excellency Willy Claes

Co-Chairmen of the International Conference  
on the Former Yugoslavia  
His Excellency Lord David Owen  
and His Excellency Thorvald Stoltenberg

Your Excellencies,

At its 16th session the Defense and National Security Council of the Republic of Croatia discussed the situation in connection with the opening of the Maslenica Bridge and Zadar Airport, and the pressures brought to bear against Croatia because of its intention to open these facilities, and because of its would-be responsibility for the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this regard the position of the Republic of Croatia is as follows:

- 1) Croatia is reinstating traffic across the Maslenica Bridge through the Zadar Airport in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the Vance Plan, because this is of vital importance, in economic terms, for Southern Croatia, as well as for the delivery of humanitarian aid not only to Dalmatia, but to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. After the destruction of the Maslenica Bridge all the traffic has been handled by ferries and across the Pag Bridge which according to experts' findings, its technical condition is such that it prevents all truck traffic. This is one more reason why traffic must be rerouted without delay across the new pontoon Maslenica Bridge.



*Let us point out that the reinstating of traffic is not a military provocation but a peaceful civilian emergency action, and that it is being taken after the failure of all attempts at direct and indirect negotiations with the local Serbs with the assistance of the representatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR. Indeed, this is an opportunity to demonstrate good intentions, and to discontinue the foot-dragging tactics practised in the negotiations by the Serbian side, which are contrary to the spirit and to the letter of the Vance Plan and of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.*

*In view of the foregoing, we urge the international community and the UNPROFOR Command to provide - on the basis of the general recognition of the legitimacy and justifiability of our requests (which has not been challenged either by the latest Report of the President of the UN Security Council) - all the required cooperation for the establishment of traffic, this being of vital importance for Croatia, and to bring pressure to bear upon the insurgent Serbs to refrain from all military actions against the Maslenica Bridge which is exclusively a civilian, economic and humanitarian facility.*

*We reject most vigorously that part of the letter of the UN Secretary General which might warrant the conclusion that agreement is expected not only of the local Serbs but also of another state (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) for any activity undertaken by the legitimate Croatian authorities within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia, including the establishment of traffic across the Maslenica Bridge.*

- 2) *The Council considers the pressures and threats against Croatia because of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be unfounded for the following reasons:*
  - a) *Croatia was the first to recognize the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and continues to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state.*
  - b) *There have been no agreements whatsoever on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia.*



- c) *In the quest for a solution, Croatia has always shown a high degree of cooperation with the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY. Croatia will support any solution accepted by all the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.*
  - d) *Croatia endorses the principle of independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We believe that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be brought to an end on the basis of an agreement on the arrangement of that state as a composite, federal tripartite state of the three constituent nations.*
  - e) *There are no regular units of the Croatian Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, except in borderland areas pursuant to Article 8 of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia signed on July 21, 1992. The HVO (Croatian Defence Council) units have been joined by individuals, former members of the Croatian Armed Forces natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had joined, as volunteers, the Croatian Armed Forces during the Serbian aggression against Croatia in order to defend the Republic of Croatia, and have now returned to defend their century-old homes.*
  - f) *The best proof of this position of the Republic of Croatia is to be found in the proposal previously made by Croatia and repeated on this occasion, that UNPROFOR should implement effective control of borders both between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the entire border and not only the border along the UNPAs.*
3. *Croatia supports all efforts conducive to an effective and immediate end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the agreement of the three constituent peoples in all matters, in the interest of maintaining Bosnia and Herzegovina and of peace in Europe.*

*Let us remind you that the Republic of Croatia has had to bear the bulk of the burden of the refugee crisis caused by the Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia and, subsequently, against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus far about 650,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority having been*



*Muslims, have crossed the Republic of Croatia en route to other European countries; at present, the Republic of Croatia is providing relief to more than 250,000 displaced persons from the occupied areas of Croatia, and for more than 280,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, about 196,000 of the latter (according to estimates) being Muslims.*

*As a result of Serbian aggression, more than 200,000 Croats have been expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina; 40,000 Croats have been expelled, an additional 100,000 still being in danger, as a result of Muslim aggression against the HVO in Central Bosnia.*

- 4. Croatia has always and consistently been prepared, and will continue to be prepared, within the scope of the ICFY and of the efforts made by the international community, for negotiations on a peaceful and political solution in the UNPAs, and for the normalization of relations with all states that have emerged in the area of the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia and Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).*

*Accept Your Excellencies, the assurances of my highest consideration.*

*President  
of the Republic of Croatia*

*Zagreb, July 16, 1993*

*Dr. Franjo Tuđman*

010/4✓

**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



page 1 of 4 pages

14 July 1993

FAX

To: General Eide

ORIGINAL TO:~~(copy)~~ to Wilson - FAX no. 41 - 22 - 917 - 0079)

FAX NO.: 00 - 38 - 41 - 176 - 709

From: Thorvald Stoltenberg

Subject: REPLY TO LETTER FROM SARINIC

DISTRIBUTION:	
MA	PS
DL	JK
BCR	AMC

Please advise General Cot that I have discussed the above letter with the Secretary-General and that we agreed that he should send the attached reply urgently. The Office of the Secretary-General is informing the President of the Security Council about these developments and the reply being sent.





**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



010/4 ✓

Office of the Co-Chairmen

**FAX**

**PAGE 1 OF 2**

**PLEASE PASS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE**

**TO: Minister for Foreign Affairs  
MFA, Stockholm**

**FAX NO: 46-8-7231176**

**FROM: *pp* Thorvald Stoltenberg**

**FAX NO: 41-22-9170079**

**DATE: 19 July 1993**

**SUBJECT: AGREEMENT BETWEEN CROATIANS AND SERB LOCAL  
AUTHORITIES**

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Attached is the text of the agreement relevant to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 that was signed by the Serb local authorities on 15 July and by the Croatian Government on 16 July.

Regards.



# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

UNPAs

## AGREEMENT

1. There will be no Croatian armed forces or police in the areas specified on the attached map after 31 July 1993.
2. UNPROFOR shall move into the areas specified on the attached map.
3. In the villages of Islam Grcki, Smokovic and Kasic, Serb police together with UNCIVPOL will be present, the number of Serb police shall be agreed with UNPROFOR.
4. With the withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces and police according to point one, Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam shall be under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR. The building of the pontoon bridge may proceed after the signature of this agreement by both sides.
5. Both sides agree to intensify their efforts to reach a negotiated solution to all problems existing between them, starting with a ceasefire agreement to be negotiated by UNPROFOR.

S. JARCEVIC 15.7.1993

Witnessed by:

TVO 1715 023



CNZ 614 CYZ 447 P1/1 ✓

010/4

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

**IMMEDIATE**

TO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 19 JULY 1993

NUMBER: MSC - 1413

SUBJECT: Maslenica Agreement

1993 JUL 19 P 10:23

UNITED NATIONS  
OFFICE OF  
COORDINATION

1. Re your Z-888, without any further background, it is difficult to determine whether UNPROFOR should provide travel assistance for the Knin delegation from Belgrade to Vienna. This should only be considered if there is absolutely no alternative means of transportation available to them. I leave it to your judgement to determine the possible Croat response were such assistance be provided by UNPROFOR.

2. As to covering the cost for the delegation's accomodation in Vienna, UNPROFOR does not have a budget line for such assistance. Moreover, it would appear odd to cover the accomodation for a delegation of an entity which is not recognized by the United Nations. You may wish to solicit the support of the Austrian Government in this regard which may be willing to offer hospitality for United Nation sponsored negotiations.

## DISTRIBUTION:

BR DC SC  
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JVD

93 JUL 20 - 2:58

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

10  
PAGE = 90:12 81-20-8661  
CZN-923  
CZG-737  
IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING (CODE OR CLEAR) CABLE  
(C)  
MOST IMMEDIATE

010/4✓  
UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

Page 1 of 1 TOR  
93 JUL 18 20:30

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB ✓

DATE : 18 July 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 888

SUBJECT : MASLENICA AGREEMENT

REF :

1. THE MASLENICA AGREEMENT SIGNED ON 16 JUL 93 REQUIRES THAT A CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT SHOULD NOW BE ARRANGED.

2. WE INTEND TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA STARTING 1330HRS TUES 20 JUL 93. THEY WILL BE CHAIRED BY THE CMO, BRIG GEN BO PELLNAS. BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO BRING 8 MEMBERS FOR SUB COMMITTEE WORK AS IT IS INTENDED TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON SOME DETIALED INPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES. LATEST UP DATE SUNDAY 1200HRS IS THAT THE SOUTH SECTOR HAS BEEN QUIET AND PREPARATIONS FOR OPENING OF BRIDGE CONTINUE UNHINDERED.

3. THE SERB DELEGATION WILL NEED UN FLIGHT FROM BELGRADE TO VIENNA AND RETURN. THEIR ACCOM COST WILL ALSO NEED TO BE MET.

4. DESPITE THE MASLENICA AGREEMENT SERBS RESUMED THEIR ARTILLERY ATTACKS IN THE VIC OF THE BRIDGE, NO DAMAGE WAS NOTICED BY UNMOS OBSERVING THE SITE. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF CROATIAN ARTILLERY RESPONSE. CMO HAS FLOWN URGENTLY TO KNIN AT THE REQUEST OF KNIN IN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE THIS APPARENT CONTRADICTION OF THE AGREEMENT.

DISTRIBUTION:		
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JW	JUD	PS
	JPH	SC

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS  
NYK  
93 JUL 18 20:57





INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen

FAX

PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: Fawzi FAX NO: 1-212 963 7055  
Office of the Secretary-General's Spokesman  
FROM: Ramcharan *Ramcharan*  
ICFY, Geneva  
DATE: 16 July 1993  
SUBJECT: PRESS RELEASE

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Please find attached, as discussed, the press release and the accompanying document.

Please note that the version I am sending is the one without the Croatian signature. We do not yet have the version with the Croatian signature. In issuing copies this may either be explained or the signature part may be cut off.

Regards.



# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



010/4 ✓

TO: Mr. Stoltenberg/Lord Owen

FM: Pasi Karonen

DATE: 1 Aug 1993

SUBJECT: Update on Erdut Agreement - Croatia

Gen Cot has sent yesterday evening the attached cable on the subject. He states that despite its clarity and the map attached the Erdut agreement is interpreted differently by the two parties.

At 1800 hours yesterday the Croatian side offered to withdraw from five small areas - but this is not the same thing as complete Erdut agreement. Being concerned about the safety of UNPROFOR troops Gen Cot could not place them last night anywhere.

Gen Cot summarizes that it is apparent to him that the Croatian side may have gone too far in their wrong interpretation of the agreement. The Serbs on the other hand may be able to allow some slippage of the deadline to give negotiations another chance.



Sont to  
général 010/4  
7u

TO: FC  
FROM: MAJ GEN MACINNIS/DFC  
INFO: ~~SSG~~, DCM, COS  
SUBJECT: RESULTATS DES NEGOCIATIONS AVEC LES AUTORITES  
MILITAIRES CROATES LE 1 AOUT 1993

1. NOUS VENONS DE TERMINER DEUX HEURES DE NEGOCIATIONS INTENSES ET AMICALES PENDANT LA DERNIERE HEURE LORSQUE LES CROATES ONT FAIT PREUVE D'UNE CERTAINE FLEXIBILITE ET IL PEUT Y AVOIR UNE PERCEE DANS L'IMPASSE.
2. ILS ONT ACCEPTE DE FORMER UN GROUPE DE TRAVAIL POUR ELABORER LA DYNAMIQUE ET LA FACON COMMENT LA FORPRONU ENTRERAIT LE PONT DE MASLENICA - ZONE ZEMUNIK, AINSI QUE LA ZONE DE LA REPRISE DE PERUCA, APRES LEUR RETRAITE.
3. CE QUI PRECEDE FAIT POSER LES QUESTIONS SUIVANTES:
  - A) SERA-CE ACCEPTABLE A TOUTES LES FACTIONS?
  - B) COMBIEN DE TEMPS AVONS NOUS POUR EFFECTUER L'OCCUPATION DES ZONES ET SURVEILLER LA RETRAITE DES FORCES CROATES?
  - C) EST QUE LES AUTORITES DE KNIN ACCEPTERONT LE FAIT QUE LE PLATEAU MILJEVICI N'Y EST PAS INCLUS?
  - D) EST QUE LES AUTORITES DE KNIN CONTINUERONT A AGIR AVEC RESTREINT?
4. LE DFC PARTIRA <sup>Pour</sup> DE PLESO A 1400 HEURES ET ESPERE ETRE DE RETOUR AU HQ VERS 1545 HEURES LE 1 AOUT 1993.

SIGNE

T.T. ITANI/SO/FC

1330, LE 1 AOUT 1993

CODE RESTRICTED

CZMUNOG 3711 Comm. Unit  
CZG 1790 UN Peacekeeping Nations

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

'93 JUL 31 20:33

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

'93 JUL 31 20:26

DISTRIBUTION:

LO	TS
DW	BR
MA	JPM
PK	MW
PS	JM
JUP	

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, ZAGREB

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 31 JULY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z 936

CODED CABLE

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON ERDUT AGREEMENT-CROATIA

I have just returned from a visit to Knin and the UNPROFOR troops in Sector South. There I had the opportunity of meeting with Gen Novakovic and I visited the reinforcements from other Sectors.

Two points come across clearly from this day's events: the first at the political level and the second on the military side.

Politically, it is apparent that the Erdut agreement despite its clarity and the map attached, is interpreted differently by the two parties. The Croatian side insists that they would be prepared to withdraw only from the five very narrow zones that you are familiar with, while the Serbs want the complete agreement implemented as per the map. The Secco presidential statement which was made 30 July was a counter-productive document that was not in keeping with the spirit of the Erdut agreement. In effect, it made my position vis-a-vis the Serbs even more difficult, almost condoning one side's refusal to implement fully a signed agreement. Periodic diplomatic incoherence is probably inevitable but it puts the troops on the ground in a difficult position.

Militarily, I told Novakovic that I was there to confirm UNPROFOR's readiness and capabilities in fulfilling its mission, and that as time was running out, I was concerned with the safety of my troops. I thanked him for the virtually unrestricted freedom of movement and co-operation he had



P2/2

accorded UNPROFOR. I advised him that the 31 July deadline should not be regarded as immovable and that because the ICFY had dispatched Ambassador Vollebaek to UNNY, there was still time to negotiate.

C2N-971  
C2G-790

My visit confirmed the fact that the Serb side had co-operated, but that no such co-operation had been forthcoming from the Croatian side. Only at 1800 hours on 31 July, did the Operation Zone Commander of the Croatian Split-Zadar area contact the Commander Sector South to offer to withdraw from the five small zones and finally constitute the joint liaison teams. Unfortunately, as Commander, I cannot place my troops in such a predicament and allow them virtually to become shields between now and midnight.

I assured Novakovic that I was staying in Sector South and still hoped he would show restraint. He stated he may not start shelling at midnight, but that Serbs were people of their word and that they would not be puppets.

In summary, it is apparent to me that the Croatian may have gone too far in their wrong interpretation of the agreement. The Serbs on the other hand may be able to allow some slippage of the deadline to give negotiations another chance.

ENDALL



# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



010/41

TO: Mr. Stoltenberg/Lord Owen

FM: Pasi Karonen

A handwritten signature in blue ink, likely belonging to Pasi Karonen.

DATE: 31.7.1993 at 2130 hours

SUBJECT: Croatian withdrawal

UNMO Headquarters in Zagreb has reported, that UNMOs have observed since 2000 hours this day a real Croatian Army withdrawal from Maslenica area.

For the moment no more details are available.



TO: Mr. Stoltenberg/Lord Owen  
FM: Pasi Karonen  
DATE: 31.7.1993  
SUBJECT: Croatian withdrawal

LtGen MacInnes called me at 0845:

Ref fax Elements for Statement to SC: para 6. is wrong. Knin side did not sign anything.

Ref Presidential Statement: second para limits the issue and lets the Croats off hook. Croats should withdraw from all areas taken by Croats in January.

LtGen MacInnes has cancelled his meeting with Bobetko this day. He suggests Amb Vollebaek to be contacted in NY asap. He will suggest Gen Eide to try to get the parties to extend the time limit.

010/4✓

## OFFICE OF THE SRSG Page 1 of 2

BY FAX

ROUTINE                      PRIORITY                      IMMEDIATE                      MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNCLASSIFIED      UN RESTRICTED      UN CONFIDENTIAL      UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG	DATE/TIME: 31 JULY 1993
TO: STOLTENBERG GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB <i>✓ J E Z</i>
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: STOLTENBERG	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : MAJ J HARJA SO TO MA/SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: LETTER TO FC/UNPROFOR FROM GEN BOBETKO	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE	

MESSAGE:

SIR,

ATTACHED COPY OF THE LETTER TO FC FROM GEN BOBETKO CLEARLY INDICATES THE CROATS INTERPRETATION OF THE SC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. HAVE RECOMMENDED FC REPLY THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT CLEARLY DEMANDS THAT THE CROATIAN FORCES WITHDRAW FORTHWITH IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ERDUT AGREEMENT.

RECOMMEND SUCH CLARIFICATION ALSO SENT FROM GENEVA TO CROATIAN POLITICAL AUTHORITIES.





REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA  
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE  
GLAVNI STOŽER HV

Ref: 804-01/93-03/01  
512-06-01-93-1

Zagreb, 31 July 1993

SRSO'S OFFICE

Date: 81/7-93

SRSG: \_\_\_\_\_

DSRSG: \_\_\_\_\_

SA: \_\_\_\_\_

DIR: \_\_\_\_\_

MA: \_\_\_\_\_

*pn*

General Jean Cot  
FORCE COMMANDER  
UNPROFOR

On the 31st of July 1993 at 12:30 hours I personally gave orders to Brigadier Ante Gotovina, the Split Military District Commander, to start arrangements for the withdrawal of the Croatian Army forces from the Maslenica Bridge area, as the initial step, and to make it possible for the UNPROFOR forces swiftly to be redeployed within the specified area in accordance with the UN Security Council Statement of the 30th of July 1993.

General Janko Bobetko  
CHIEF-OF- STAFF  
CROATIAN ARMY GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

1568

Palais des Nations

CNZ 649 CYZ 490 P 1/2

010/4

'93 JUL 31 -2 :48

OUTGOING CODE CABLETO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB  
for COT, UNPROFORIMMEDIATE

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 30 JULY 1993

NUMBER: 1476SUBJECT: Presidential StatementDISTRIBUTION:

LO	WS/TB
DL	BGR
Jpm	JUP
PS	JM
PK	VP

I attach for your information a Presidential Statement issued today demanding the withdrawal of Croatian forces in conformity with the agreement reached on 15th and 16th July 1993 at Erdut.

M 4 7 0 P 01

2/3



CNZ 649 CYZ 490 P 2/2

CZG 084

30 July 1993

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

The Security Council has heard with deep concern the report from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia on the situation in and around the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia and in particular in respect of the Maslenica crossing.

The Security Council reaffirms the presidential statement of 15 July 1993 (S/26084). Following this statement the parties reached an agreement on 15/16 July 1993 at Erdut which requires the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police from the area of the Maslenica Bridge by 31 July 1993 and the placing of the bridge under the exclusive control of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

The Security Council demands that the Croatian forces withdraw forthwith in conformity with the above-mentioned agreement, and that they permit the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR. The Council also demands that the Krajina Serb forces refrain from entering the area. The Council calls for maximum restraint from all the parties, including the observance of a cease-fire.

The Security Council warns of the serious consequences of any failure to implement the above-mentioned agreement.

The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



010/4

CZG 0081

MSC 7208

MOST IMMEDIATE  
CRYPTO FAX

prh

TO: Cot, Zagreb; att DFC  
INFO: Stoltenberg, Zagreb; att SA to SRSG  
FM: Stoltenberg, Geneva *[Signature]*  
DATE: 30.7.1993  
REF: Your fax no. 052 at 301635B July 93  
SUBJECT: Erdut agreement - Croatian Withdrawal

President Tudjman stated this day to me that UNMOs can move to all areas with no territorial limitations.

This contradicts what Gen Bobetko has said to you this afternoon, namely that "discussion of any other areas was impossible".

Tudzman suggested that CA would only withdraw from limited areas. I discussed this with Gen Cot, who declined the idea to deploy UNPROFOR troops in between the two parties with not enough space. I again put pressure to President Tudzman, who is now on his way back to Zagreb and hope that he will likewise do so with Gen Bobetko tonight.

Please follow up tomorrow morning with Bobetko.



UN-757

CODE RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION  
U N P R O F O R

'93 JUL 27 17:01

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

I M M E D I A T E

IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 2

TO: STOLTENBERG, SRSG, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 27 Jul 93

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z - 922

SUBJECT: CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS - CROATIA

TOT 27/649Z

*Handwritten signature*

93 JUL 27 16:33

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

CODED

We have received some valid comments from BGen Peeters, the Commander of Sector East regarding the 10th draft of the agreement on the cease-fire that we feel we must pass on to you in anticipation of the resumption of negotiations.

As a general comment, it is our understanding that the cease-fire should cover the complete area of Croatia, that is, all the UNPAs. If that is indeed the case, we feel the present text refers too specifically to Sector South, without stating which provisions apply to Sector South and which apply to all the UNPAs.

In particular, BGen Peeters correctly points out the particularities of his Sector and the difficulties which will accompany the search for an agreement on a buffer zone. Nevertheless, he has suggested a demarcation line which can be used as a start point for negotiations. This trace will be forwarded to you presently. He also states that we will need to develop a position on the soldiers remaining in the villages and barracks of the towns situated inside the buffer zones. In his

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case there are several, such as Osijek, Vinkovci, and Vukovar.

The issue of storage sites is not dealt with in the cease-fire agreement, but several Sectors will need to negotiate their use where the 10 and 20km lines do not fit the ground exactly.

Specific comments with respect to the agreement:

- para 3 should refer by name to Sector South.
- para 4 "freedom of movement" should also refer to helicopters.
- para 8, the attached list of crossings is not accurate. Existing crossings in Sector East include: Osijek - Bilje, Lipovac West, and Osijek - Sarvas (which you list).
- Para 9 mentions only towns in Sector South. Some other towns should also be mentioned in all other sectors.

In the same vein, the "Procedures for Implementation" could also be adjusted to reduce the focus on Sector South. Unless we are mistaken, the line of 3 Jan 92, for example, does not apply to all sectors.

We are attempting, along with Ambassador Vollebaek and General Eide to maintain the impetus toward a withdrawal before the 31 Jul 93 deadline, and hope that we can be successful so that the cease-fire negotiations can continue.

Endall

Agreed with TS and BR on 28 July,  
that let KV and FC handle this.

OK