




JOINT INSPECTION UNIT
of the United Nations System

CORPS COMMUN d'INSPECTION
du Système des Nations Unies

The Chairman
Le Président

Ref.: A319

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29 May 2008

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

As you are aware, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has included in its programme of work for 2007, a review of the role of Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSGs) and Resident Coordinators (RCs). The team responsible for the preparation under my coordination has performed extensive research, issued questionnaires and conducted more than one hundred interviews at headquarters and field level with United Nations officials across the system and Member States representatives. As a result, a blueprint of the report entitled "Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Resident Coordinators: A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence within the United Nations system" has been drafted, a copy is attached for your better understanding of the issues discussed.

With the support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the co-auspices of the United Nations Deputy-Secretary-General, we are organizing an enlarged brainstorming conference in Geneva on Monday, 30 June 2008 with the participation of approximately 40 participants with a wide range of knowledge and experience in the area to discuss the blueprint. The purpose of such event is to seek views and to assist all parties concerned to build up consensus among major actors in the coherence process.

You are cordially invited to designate a representative, versed in this matter, to participate in this event to share his/her views and comments on the blueprint.

Since our budget for this project is very tight we hope your office would be able to bear the relevant cost. The JIU would undertake to make a hotel booking, if required, at Best Western Chavannes-de-Bogis where the conference will take place. The hotel services include free transfer from/to airport. We will provide conference facilities and meals on 30 June and also dinner on the day of arrival, on 29 June.

Since this is high-season period in Geneva, we should confirm flights and hotel reservations promptly. We would highly appreciate receiving your confirmation at your earliest convenience but no later than Friday, 6 June 2008 addressed to Ms. Nemehjargal (bnemehjargal@unog.ch, tel. +41-22-917 3043). Passed this date we will consider you are not available to participate.

We are looking forward to your participation and valuable contribution.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Even Fontaine Ortiz

P.O. G. B. Brand

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JIU/REP/2008/XX

**SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL AND RESIDENT COORDINATORS:
A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence within the
United Nations system**

Prepared by

***Inspector Even Fontaine Ortiz
Inspector Juan Luis Larrabure***

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2008



United Nations

A.319 draft dd/mm/yy (should be changed for each section)

JIU/REP/2008/XX

Original: ENGLISH

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND RESIDENT COORDINATORS:

A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence within the United Nations system JIU/REP/2008/XX

[Introductory paragraph outlining the objective and scope of the report]

Main findings and conclusions

Subheading

- Text...
- Text...

Subheading

- Text...
- Text...

Recommendations for consideration by legislative organs

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the



➤ Text ...

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABC [insert full name of abbreviation here]

I. INTRODUCTION

1 As part of its programme of work for 2007, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a review of the role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs)¹ and Resident Coordinators (RCs) in the coherence and integration process of the United Nations system.

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2 Several JIU reports in the past have already discussed this issue from different angles². As early as 1995, the "Investigation of the Relationship between humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations" recommended that the SRSGs should provide overall leadership, coordinate and harmonize political, military and humanitarian operations and the United Nations Force Commander, the Humanitarian Coordinator and the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the ground should report to the SRSG without prejudice to their respective mandates and internal procedures vis-à-vis their United Nations headquarters. In 1999, the Unit conducted a "Review of the Administrative Committee on Coordination and its machinery" and make recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness and impact of inter-agency coordination. In 2005, another JIU report proposed "Some measures to improve overall performance of the United Nations at the country level". In 2006, the reports on "Evaluation of results-based budgeting in peace-keeping operations" and "Results based management in the United Nations in the context of the reform process" refer to the lack of integration, as an obstacle for effective delivery of programmes.

3 Likewise, the issue of coherence and integration has been at the heart of United Nations' reform agenda from its inception. In 1996, the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed in the Annual overview report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) "...A new system-wide culture must emerge, based on systematic policy consultations, effective decentralization, full respect of each other's mandates and competencies, and a common appreciation of the challenges ahead and of the respective strengths of the various organizations of the system in meeting them."³ The idea was further developed in his reports "Renewing the United Nations: a program for reform"⁴ of 1997 and "In Large Freedom: towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all" of 2005⁵.

4 Two panel reports mandated by the United Nations Secretary-General, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations⁶ of 2000 and the Report of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence "Delivering as One" of 2006, make concrete recommendations towards the United Nations system functioning in a more coherent manner respectively in the areas of peacekeeping, and of developmental, humanitarian assistance and the environment. The later report, notably, proposes a "framework for a unified and coherent UN structure at the country level"⁷ under the RC's authority and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lead.

¹ For the purpose of this report SRSGs also refers to Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General (ERSGs) and Representatives of the Secretary-General (RSGs)

² JIU/REP/95/6- Investigation of the Relationship between humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations; JIU/REP/1997/1- Strengthening the field representation of the UN system; JIU/REP/1999/1- Review of ACC and its machinery; JIU/REP/2005/2 - Some measures to improve overall performance of UN at the country level; JIU/REP/2006/1; Evaluation of RBB in peacekeeping operations; JIU/REP/2006/6 - RBM in UN in the context of reform process.

³ "Annual overview report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination for 1996", E/1997/54, page 5.

⁴ A/51/950, para.49.

⁵ A/59/2005, para.200.

⁶ A/55/305-S/2000/809. Most commonly known as the "Brahimi report"

⁷ A/61/583, page 5

5 Yet, the proposed framework does not apply to countries in conflict and post conflict situations nor addresses the role of SRSRs in these countries vis-a-vis the reinforced RCs⁸. In fact, at the time that we were writing this report, there were SRSRs in 25 per cent of the countries where RCs had been appointed (33 out of 134). In such instances, according to the 2000 Secretary-General's "Note of Guidance on the relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators", the SRSR is responsible for providing political guidance of the overall United Nations presence as well as providing the impetus for a coordinated and coherent approach by all the United Nations components in the country⁹. This Note of Guidance was revised in 2006 to lay out that in integrated missions, the SRSR has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations, represents the Secretary-General, speaks on behalf of the system, establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UNCT and ensures that all pursue a coordinated approach.¹⁰

6 Therefore, regardless of whether it is coherent or integrated, the "One UN" is de facto being built up within two similar and parallel processes: within the RC system in the 8 pilot projects (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam), and within the SRSR system in the eight integrated peace missions/offices (Afghanistan, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, East Timor, Haiti, Sudan, Sierra Leone), while there should be only one.

7 To a lesser extent, the Humanitarian Coordinator system present in 14 countries also represents a model of coherence/integration that associates non-governmental organizations.

8 Until now, no definition of coherence as such within the United Nations has been adopted. The High-level Panel's report on UN System-wide Coherence defines the process as the consolidation of most United Nations country activities under one strategic programme, one budget, one leader and one office. The validity and applicability of this definition have been questioned by some since the General Assembly has not pronounced on this issue. However, among the eight integrated peace missions/office, three were so mandated by Security Council resolution.

9 In general, coherence is a term applicable to countries in development or peaceful situation whereas integration is related to countries in transition or post conflict situation, transition being understood at the United Nations as the "period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning fragile cease-fires or peace process by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity. Peace building is the area where United Nations activities in a transition context intersect."¹¹

10 The Secretary-General has described integration as the "guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. An integrated

⁸ It nonetheless indicate that "Since the Brahimi Report on peacekeeping operations, integrated UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions have improved coordination by bringing the development arm of the UN under the direct leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Better development strategies for post-conflict are needed to guide such missions".

⁹ Paragraph 9

¹⁰ "Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions: Clarifying the Roles, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator"

¹¹ Report of the UNDGECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, February 2004.

mission is based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the United Nations seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and supportive manner”.¹²

11 The draft Capstone Doctrine - a concept paper developed by DPKO for United Nations peacekeepings- characterizes an integrated mission as “one in which there is a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at the country level”¹³. In a more restrictive manner, integration often refers to integration within the DPKO run-mission, which may be neither internally integrated (due to lack of coordination between the different pillars of the mission) nor integrated with the rest of the UN system in a “coherent and mutually supportive manner”¹⁴.

12 All the above-mentioned definitions of coherence and integration apply at the country level. The Inspectors believe however that it is impossible to achieve coherence/integration in the field without coherence/integration at headquarters and that coherence/integration to be effective should occur at all levels across the United Nations system and with/within its stakeholders/partners outside the United Nations system. Across the United Nations system, coherence should be realized within Member States at the legislative organs, within the Secretariat and between the Secretariat, the funds and programmes and the specialised agencies. As it has been correctly pointed out, the greatest challenge to integration and coherence is the United Nations structure itself, with a highly fragmented and complex bureaucracy, 17 departments and offices, 14 funds and programmes, 16 specialised agencies, all with different mandates, governing structures and procedures.

13 Furthermore, in the spirit of the Paris Declaration of March 2005 by Ministers of developed and developing countries on Aid Effectiveness, the coherence/integration process should involve other important actors such as the Breton Wood institutions, individual donor countries and groups of donors, regional organizations, the civil society and the private sector.

14 Last but not least, the coherence process is driven by Member States and should be even more driven by the “needs and wants” of each country, respect to agreed national priorities and strong Government commitment. Therefore, it is important to achieve coherence at level of local authorities of each country. Ultimately, achieving coherence and integration is a shared responsibility of Member States and the United Nations system organizations, both collectively and individually.

15 In view of the complexity of this subject, the Inspectors, who had initially envisaged the review of the relationship between SRSGs and RCs from a more restricted angle concerning: (1) The status of implementation of the various guidelines defining their respective responsibilities; (2) The headquarters arrangements in support to coherence and coordination at the field level; and (3) The selection, costing, conditions of services, terms of reference, accountability and oversight of SRSGs, have subsequently decided to expand the scope of the report to take into account other issues that influence the coherence and integration process,

¹² Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, December 2005, para. 4

¹³ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Capstone Doctrine Draft, 29 June 2007, page 33, para. 102

¹⁴ Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: trends and Challenges, Seminar in Addis Ababa, 26-27 April 2007, page

such as the mandates and concerns of the different actors involved and the funding constraints that hamper the implementation of the "One UN".

16 As a result, the report finally proposes a benchmarking framework for coherence at all levels across the United Nations system and with its stakeholders/partners and a model of field presence flexible enough to fit the diverse and changing needs of countries in peaceful, conflict and post conflict situations. Due to space limitations, it was decided to divide the report in two parts. Part I is dedicated to coherence and integration at headquarters and Part II is devoted to coherence and integration at the country level. Within each Part, the report discusses the various (sub) levels at which coherence and integration should be achieved and how. The Inspectors invite Member States to adopt this benchmarking framework as reference to guide the efforts towards a more efficient and effective Organization, better serving the needs of the countries.

17 In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary desk review, questionnaires, interviews and in-depth analysis. The Inspectors conducted more than 100 interviews with officials of various participating organizations in New York, Geneva and Rome, with SRSGs, RCs and members of the United Nations country teams (UNCTs), and with representatives of the host country Governments, donor's countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field. At headquarters New York, the interviews included the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Deputy-Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary Generals and the Assistant Secretary-Generals of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Administrator of UNDP, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the heads of the Executive Office on Peace and Security and of the Peacebuilding Support Office, among other officials. In Geneva and Rome, interviews were held with officials from FAO, ILO, OHCHR, WHO and WFP. In addition, confidential electronic questionnaires were sent to a total of 47 SRSGs and Deputies Special Representatives (DRSGs) who may or not combined this function with the RC and HC functions, with a response rate of 57 per cent. Further, the Inspectors visited a sample of United Nations peace operations in countries with different stages of post conflict situation: Haiti, Tajikistan, Somalia (based in Nairobi), Burundi and Nepal. The Inspectors also visited Viet Nam, among the eight pilot projects, and China, as an example of country in a peaceful development situation. Comments from participating organizations on the draft report were sought and taken into account in finalizing the report.

18 In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report was consulted among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

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19 To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex I contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies those recommendations relevant for each organization, specifying whether they require a decision by the organization's legislative or governing body or can be acted upon by the organization's executive head.

20 The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

II. COHERENCE AT HEADQUARTERS LEVEL

A. Towards greater coherence of intergovernmental mandates

The driving role of Member States

21 The United Nations system is composed of 30 organizations, each governed by legislative bodies composed of Member States, and of employers and employees in the case of at the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Membership varies from one organization to other in terms of State representatives and their expertise. Consequently, the mandates of these legislative bodies may differ or overlap.

22 In terms of peace and development, mandates generally come from the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC). A number of subsidiary and advisory bodies with more limited membership assist in dealing with these issues, such as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations¹⁵, the Peacebuilding Commission¹⁶ and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)¹⁷.

23 Other subsidiary and advisory bodies are involved in their financing and programming as the Fifth Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee on Programme Coordination (CPC). The two latter in particular have a normative role to bring homogeneity to decisions taken at a higher level and they perform this role with dissimilar effectiveness and impact.

24 Composed by 34 States Members, the role of the CPC is critical in bringing coherence to the system, assisting the ECOSOC in the performance of its coordination functions. It should consider on a sector-by-sector basis the activities and programmes of the agencies of the United Nations system...and ensure that the work programme of the United Nations and its agencies is compatible and mutually complementary, setting priorities to avoid overlapping and duplication.¹⁸ Several United Nations General Assembly resolutions have called since 2004 for the improvement of the Committee's working methods and procedures¹⁹ with slow progress, as attested by the report of its substantive session of June-July 2007²⁰ where the view was expressed that negotiations among delegations should be held within an atmosphere of "flexibility and compromise".

25 At its turn, the ACABQ should bring coherence to the system when examining the budget presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies and proposals for financial arrangements with such agencies; and

¹⁵ Established by General Assembly Resolution 2066(XIX) in February 1965, the Committee is mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping. It reports to the General Assembly, through the Fourth Committee on Special Political and Decolonisation, one of the six main committees of the General Assembly. Its members are 124 Member States, mostly contributors of peacekeeping personnel and 17 observers

¹⁶ Established in 2005 as an intergovernmental advisory subsidiary body of the General Assembly and the Security Council¹⁶, to fill a gap in this area by responding to the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. It brings together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and proposed integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; focusing attention on reconstruction and institutional building efforts

¹⁷ Established as a functional commission of the Economic and Social Council by Council decision 1993/207, its functions are set out in General Assembly resolution 47/191 of 22 December 1992. It is composed of 53 members and receives substantive and technical services from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Division for Sustainable Development. It reports through Economic and Social Council to the Second Committee of the General Assembly

¹⁸ ECOSOC resolutions 920 (XXXIV), 1171 (XLI) and 2008 (LX), General Assembly resolutions 31/93 and 58/269

¹⁹ A/RES/61/235; A/RES/60/257; A/RES/59/269

²⁰ A/62/16, pages 34-36

considering and reporting to the General Assembly on the auditors' reports on the accounts of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.²¹ Over the years however the Advisory Committee has increasingly focused on the work of the United Nations and its funds and programmes, departing from its oversight responsibilities over the specialised agencies, for reasons sometimes beyond its control.

26 In the view of the Inspectors, both CPC and ACABQ should reposition themselves with regard to their responsibilities in bringing coherence in programmatic and budgetary aspects across the system.

27 The Inspectors further notice that Member States have different stand on the coherence and integration process. The report of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence has been tabled for consideration by the General Assembly, but an agreement on its proposals looks remote presently. It is evident that the coherence and integration process at the United Nations is driven by Member States and would go as far as Member States are committed to lead it. The legislative bodies at each organization should send clear signals to their respective Secretariats about what it is expected from them in terms of coherence and integration.

28 The High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence has recommended the establishment of a Sustainable Development Board, through the merging of the existing joint meetings of the Boards of UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP, and composed of Member States representatives reporting to the ECOSOC, to provide oversight for the United Nations country programme, allocate funding, review performance, and drive coordination and joint planning. The Inspectors view this proposal as a positive step towards further coherence at legislative level. However, in order for this process to be inclusive, participation in the Board should be opened to all organizations of the United Nations system.

Benchmark 1

The integration and coherence process is effectively guided by Member States.

Through:

- (a) Providing clear guidance to the Secretariats of all organizations of the United Nations system about what is expected from them in terms of coherence and integration;
- (b) Enhancing the assisting coordinating role of the Committee on Programme and Coordination;
- (c) Broadening the scope of the budgetary review of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to all agencies of the system.

Making SMART Security Council mandates

29 In an attempt to address the failure of previous peace operations and the dynamics of post conflict situation, the Security Council mandates on peace operations have become in recent years more multidimensional, helping to laying out the foundations of a sustainable peace. A new concept of peacekeeping has emerged²² with implications for the work of other United

²¹ General Assembly resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 32/103 of 14 December 1977 and rules 155 to 157 of the rules of procedures of the General Assembly

²² DPKO Capstone Doctrine

Nations organizations which have different stakeholders, mandates and strategic priorities set up by their independent governing bodies over which the Security Council has in principle no authority.

30 Under Chapter VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the authority of the Security Council is restricted to peace. Chapter VI calls for the pacific settlement of disputes through “appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment”²³. Chapter VII calls for action (by air, sea or land forces) to “maintain or restore international peace and security”²⁴. Consequently, when the Security Council decides to mandate activities to lay out the foundations of sustainable peace (in specific areas of governance, rule of law, human rights, and child protection) may be intruding in an area where its legal ground is disputable by some, notably at the light of the frustration created by its failure to reform. When establishing mission components and hiring staff to deal with these issues it may parallel or duplicate the structures existing within the UNCT.

31 As a result, sometimes when the missions budgets are submitted for approval to the General Assembly, funding gaps to implement mandated activities occur. For instance, the peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Ethiopia were to provide stability while the boundary was being demarcated, but no funds were allocated to finance the boundary commission. Similarly, if a peace operation is to hand over its functions to a national authority who require training and equipment such as the police, the General Assembly normally decides that this activity should be financed by voluntary contributions that often do not materialize or materialize too late.²⁵

32 Following the Brahimi report, which called for realistic Security Council mandates and emphasized the need to enhance the support information-gathering and analysis capacity of the Secretariat to this purpose, the Security Council²⁶ itself resolved to give peacekeeping operations clear, credible and achievable mandates. Although some progress has been achieved since then, still the Security Council mandates lack clearness, are unrealistic or over ambitious, without adequate indicators to measures progress²⁷ and without exit strategies²⁸ to transfer responsibilities and end operations. The Inspectors therefore reiterate the need to achieve coherence in the United Nations’ response to conflict and post conflict situations through specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-bounded (SMART) Security Council mandates.

33 Further, in the view of the Inspectors, if a comprehensive approach is needed to address the root causes of conflicts that today affect the world’s poorest country and to prevent their recurrence, which risk is admittedly higher during the decade following the conflict, such a comprehensive approach should come from the coherent response of the system as a whole towards reducing poverty and achieving development. It is therefore key for the success of these operations to involve all United Nations organizations from the start up phase in assessment missions and in the preparation of Security Council reports from which mandates emanate. Until now, such reports are not broad-based and UNCTs on the ground are not regularly and actively involved in their drafting. At the best, when UNCTs are implicated, the

²³ Article 33, para. 1

²⁴ Article 42

²⁵ See S/2001/304, paras. 32.

²⁶ Security Council resolution 1327(2000)

²⁷ JIU/REP/2006/1, paras. 24-35

²⁸ 77 percent of the respondents said “no” to the question of whether the joint-mission planning document contained an exit strategy in the JIU questionnaire

feedback received has been qualified as poor. In the Inspectors' opinion, the Department of Peacekeeping should rather build up on the expertise of the UNCT to increase its information-gathering and analysis capacity for the Security Council to draw SMART mandates.

Benchmark 2

Security Council mandates are SMART with sufficient resources to match

Through:

- (a) Strengthening the information-gathering and analysis capacity of the Secretariat;
- (b) Involving the UNCT in assessment missions and in reporting to the Security Council;
- (c) Establishing indicators to measure progress towards meeting mandated activities; and
- (d) Agreeing on an exit strategy for the handover of military to development actors from the outset of operations.

Aligning complementary, duplicative and conflicting mandates

34 Widely recognized is the issue that the operational mandates of funds and programmes as UNDP, UNHCR, UNIFEM, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP, the normative role of specialised agencies and OHCHR, and the coordinating responsibility of OCHA can be complementary or duplicative, particularly in cross cutting issues such as protection, sustainable development, human rights and gender. In many instances, the comparative advantage of the United Nations system is not in its funding capacity but rather in its ability to provide reliable technical expertise, to develop norms and standards and help Governments to face increasingly complex challenges. The boundaries between development and normative mandates of organizations are increasingly disappearing.

35 Since no significant changes to redefine mandates and governing structures of these organizations can be expected in the short-run, adequate division of labour among them is necessary to ensure a coherent and effective engagement of each individual agency and of the United Nations system collectively.

36 However, currently, there is no binding institutional framework for the United Nations system that defines the operational doctrine, division of labour and rules of engagement of each agency. The Inspectors believe that such a binding institutional framework can only be set up at CEB level and should be ratified by the relevant legislative bodies. The Inspectors are conscious that such an agreement will take time and indeed the coherence and integration should progress in parallel without awaiting its conclusion.

37 In the meantime, the cluster approach by theme adopted by development and humanitarian organizations, under the led of the agency with more comparative advantage represents a remarkable improvement in terms of effectiveness. Several successful examples attested of the benefits of such approach in working together at headquarters and at the country level in the fight against HIV, Evian influenza, polio eradication, and reproductive health, among others. Nevertheless, the Inspectors believe that there is room for further improvement in terms of cost effectiveness. The increasing number of coordination meetings raises serious concerns about transaction costs and the lack of dissemination of best practices induces the repetition of learning processes and procedures.

38 In peacekeeping, a good example of agreed division of labour is the Policy Committee decision on rule of law whereby UNDP and OHCHR share responsibility for different aspects. Yet, at the operational level this decision is not always well known and implemented. Furthermore, the decision is apparently applicable exclusively to peacekeeping missions and not to political missions/offices since DPA is not a signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by DPKO with UNDP and OHCHR. Such a piecemeal approach is ineffective in the Inspectors' opinion and attempts against the principle of inclusiveness embedded in the cluster approach.

39 The High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence has recommended that the Secretary-General established an independent Task Force to further eliminate duplication within the United Nations system and to consolidate United Nations entities where necessary while related efficiency savings should be recycled to the "One" country programmes. The Inspectors fully support this recommendation and the idea that given the recurrent nature of these savings, they should be re-injected in the country programmes on a recurrent basis.

40 Further, the Inspector found that some "conflicting" mandates. The UNDP dual role as broker in operational activities and coordinator/advocate of the United Nations family has the potential for conflict of interests. The role of UNDP as overall coordinator of the United Nations system is perceived as biased by some UNCT members who feel that the coherence process is too much UNDP driven. Also, the UNDP newly established capacity building mandate on the areas of Democratic Governance, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Energy and Environment, HIV/AIDS and Women's empowerment meddle with other agencies long established mandates. In this regard, the High-level Panel on System-wide coherence recommended that UNDP withdraw by 2008 from its sector-focused policy and capacity work for which other agencies have competencies and focus in strengthening the coherence of the UNCT in delivering the One Country Programme. The Inspectors believe that, on the contrary, by meddling with others and playing the system coordinator, UNDP expertise in development and authority at country level is at risk; it should therefore return to its mandate of the 70's and focus on global macroeconomic and social issues.

41 The peacekeeping mandates by definition intrusive, with a short-vision, driven by milestones and by a sense of urgency conflict the development and normative mandates of agencies with more sense of ownership, a longer-term vision, and more incline to dialogue with Governments. These apparently "opposed" concepts have been as well source of disagreements, this time between the missions and the UNCTs.

42 Notably, the mandate of integrated missions with recourse to force under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter²⁹ is perceived differently by humanitarian agencies which defend the so-called "humanitarian space" for their interventions based on neutrality, impartiality, needs-based assistance free of discrimination and operational independence. Although peacekeepers and humanitarians are dependent to gather information about security conditions on the ground, escorts and logistics, infrastructure support or direct support in distributing relief assistance, and the implementation of QIPs under the "hearts and minds" activities of peacekeepers, these activities should be carefully planned and mutually consulted to avoid a negative impact on humanitarian operations as sometimes allegedly occurred.³⁰

²⁹ Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, IASC, June 2004, paras. 18, 21

³⁰ A/60/558 - Report of the Office of internal oversight services on the review of military involvement in civil assistance in peacekeeping operations, December 2005

43 In the Inspectors' opinion, within a coherent strategic vision of the United Nations system presence, they all reconcile. Until now, such reconciled and coherent vision is provided at country level by the leadership of SRSGs and/or DSRSGs/RCs. The Inspectors believe that beyond the charisma and voluntarism of leaders and individuals who come and go, the system should provide a binding and stable institutional framework to which all actors could easily refer to for guidance about their collective and respective responsibilities and roles.

Benchmark 3

A binding institutional framework for the United Nations system defines the operational doctrine, division of labour, rules of engagement, guidelines and procedures, agreed by CEB and approved by pertinent legislative organs.

Through:

- (a) Promoting a common understanding that coherence and integration is a process whereby every agency found its comparative advantage to achieve results within the One Plan/Programme through common objectives and operational independence.
- (b) Assigning clear institutional responsibility for each mandated activity.
- (c) Redefining the role of the United Nations Development Programme as a broker of development assistant and not as a coordinator of the system.
- (d) Defining a humanitarian space for OCHA action; and
- (e) Repositioning the specialised agencies in line with its equally important development role.

B. On the way to achieve system-wide coherence

44 With 17 departments and offices, 14 funds and programmes and 16 specialised agencies, the coherence and integration of the United Nations family represent a real challenge not only for Member States, as already discussed, but also for its managers and staff in transforming a culture of decades of fragmentation and competition into a culture of working together effectively and talking with one voice.

45 The fear to loose operational independence, visibility and ability to mobilize funds explains why not all organizations are equally supportive of the integration process. This is compounded with the fact that the Secretary-General's authority is limited to the United Nations' secretariat departments and to a certain extent to its funds and programmes (but not to the specialised agencies) and with the lack of an overarching body with authority to impulse integration and coherence across the system.

From ad hoc consultations to more effective Secretariat coordination

46 The two main Secretariat departments involved in policy and support to peace missions/offices are DPKO and DPA. The mandate of DPKO is to serve as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all United Nations peacekeeping operations and it is responsible for conducting, managing, directing and planning those operations.³¹ DPA is

³¹ ST/SGB/2000/9, sect. 2.1 (a)

responsible for managing and directing special political missions on behalf of the Secretary-General.³²

47 Regrettably, the relationship among them is less than effective. Ad hoc consultations prevail as well as some temporary assignments of desk officers from DPA to DPKO when a special mission is converted by a Security Council decision into a peacekeeping mission or its mandate is changed to include a military component, so as to ensure that institutional memory is not lost.³³

48 According to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in its report on the audit of special missions by DPA of September 2006, the two coordination and cooperation tools that the Secretary-General has established, namely, the physical co-location of the regional divisions of the two departments³⁴ and the interdepartmental task forces³⁵, have not actually worked out.

49 OIOS also reported³⁶ that the “lead policy department”³⁷ promulgated in 1999 by the Secretary-General lacks clear criteria and has not been consistently applied. This policy aimed at ensuring full support, minimizing duplication and assigning responsibility for coordination with other organizational entities to the lead department. DPA is to take the lead for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, whereas DPKO is to lead in peacekeeping. The policy was further refined in 2002³⁸. DPKO is the lead department for the planning and management of all peace and security operations in the field, including those with a majority of civilian personnel. In the practice, however, DPKO has been assigned responsibilities for leading field missions that do not clearly involve peacekeeping such as UNOTIL, UNIOSIL and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo, and others as UNAMA with a military component. Likewise, DPA has led the early negotiation phases of some peacekeeping and it is leading UNAMI, a peacekeeping mission, on exceptional basis. Apparently, in the above instances other elements, not defined in the policy, have been taken into consideration in deciding the lead department, such as whether they are integrated missions with a military component and DPKO is the only with logistical capacity to support them.

50 In another report issued also in 2006 on the comprehensive management audit of DPKO³⁹, OIOS pointed out that to achieve cooperation and cooperation, and to avoid duplication and overlap, some restructuring of the two departments was needed, including a full merger or a combination of the planning, and political and substantive direction, and a separation of the administrative and logistical support function. OIOS recalled a self-assessment report of DPA to the Deputy Secretary-General in 2002, which proposed a full merger of the departments.

51 Taking into account that the DPKO should benefit from the institutional knowledge of DPA about particular conflicts and countries and should rely on it for advice on the regional dimensions of conflicts and their potential impact on the ability of the missions to deliver, the idea of merging the two departments was not without certain logic. They both have political

³² ST/SGB/2000/10, sect. 3.2

³³ A/61/357, paras. 52 to 56

³⁴ A/55/977, paras. 234-236.

³⁵ A/55/502, paras. 49-60

³⁶ A/61/357, paras. 9-15

³⁷ A/53/854/Add.1

³⁸ A/57/387, para. 126

³⁹ A/60/717, paras. 66-67, 88-94

affairs officers and regional divisions; there is no sequential or continuum but an overlapping between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and 40 per cent of countries emerging from conflict slide back into conflict, figure that rises 60% in the case of African countries.

52 Instead, in February 2007, the Secretary-General proposed⁴⁰ and the General Assembly decided⁴¹ to strengthen the Secretariat's capacity to manage peace operations through the restructuring of the current DPKO into two departments and an increase in staff resources. The new Department of Field Support is responsible for the administration and management of field personnel, procurement, information and communication technology and finances for United Nations peace operations and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to focus on strategic and day-to-day direction and management of peacekeeping operations, new missions planning, implementation of policies and standards, and the fostering of partnerships. In a unique reporting authority, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support receives directions from the Under Secretary-General for Peace Operations.

53 Further, pursuant to recommendation 18 of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change⁴² of December 2004, the Secretary-General has planned a major overhaul of DPA within the 2008-2009 budget to "resolve conflicts earlier rather than later", with a US\$21 million budget increase to create 101 additional staff mainly at headquarters and for the travel of officials to areas of conflict or potential conflict.

54 With the strengthening of DPKO and DPA, the idea of a merging is no more up-to-date, but the need for effective coordination mechanisms between the two departments is more acute today than ever before so as to be able to coherently and effectively discharge their strengthened policy guidance role. In this regard it should be noted that DPA did not have until recently internal capability to promulgate substantive policies in implementing its mandate and providing guidance to missions within its Policy and Planning Unit, unlike DPKO where a Best Practices Section was established more than a decade ago.

55 Notwithstanding the importance of effective coordination mechanisms in policy guidance between these two departments, joint coordination structures of DPKO and DPA with other Secretariat's departments and offices such as the Department of Public Information (DPI), the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Division for the Advancement of Women, the DESA/DSD, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), OHCHR, UNHCR, and OCHA are also critical to cohesively carry out their functions, which may encompass a wide range of tasks. In this regard, the Inspectors noted that the relationship between DPKO/DPA and these departments/offices is uneven, eventually more structured in the case of DPKO, which has signed MoUs to regulate them, as with OHCHR. The terms of these agreements do not however apply to DPA led missions since DPA was not involved in the relevant negotiations, evidence of the sectorial approach described above.

56 Finally, a redefinition of the role of DPA in post-conflict peacebuilding, as described by ST/SGB/2000/10, section 2.1 (a), and a clarification of the working relationship between DPA and the newly created Peacebuilding Support Office⁴³ of the Peacebuilding Commission might be necessary, as requested by OIOS, which saw a risk of duplication between the two⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ A/61/749- Annex 1 –Strengthening the capacity of the Organization to manage and sustain peace operations, paras. 15,16, 22, 23, 24 & 25.

⁴¹ A/RES/61/279

⁴² A/59/565

⁴³ With resource requirements amounting to US\$5.5 million for 2006-2007, A/60/694 of 23 February 2006,

⁴⁴ A/61/357- para. 57

Benchmark 4

Effective DPKO/DPA concerted efforts and coordination mechanisms are in place

Through:

- (a) Reinforced day-to-day cooperation between DPKO and DPA;
- (b) Establishing joint coordination mechanisms with other Secretariat departments and offices;
- (b) Clarifying the role of DPA in post-conflict peacebuilding and the relationship with the new Peacebuilding Support Office; and
- (c) Providing DPA and the Peacebuilding Commission with sufficient think-tank-like information, strategic analysis and research capacity for making conflict prevention the backbone of all United Nations system operations.

Some positive steps

57 In an attempt to overcome the mentioned fragmentation of the system, the United Nations Secretary-General had established during the last decade within the framework of the United Nations reforms, several committees, management groups and task forces as instruments of policy development and decision-making to facilitate coherence across the system.

58 In January 1997, four executive committees were created in four of the five areas that comprise the core mission of the United Nations: peace and security, economic and social affairs, development cooperation and humanitarian affairs.

59 The Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS) deals with critical crosscutting issues of peace and security and delineates courses of action in situations of immediate security concern and potential conflict situations.⁴⁵ ECPS is not a standing body; it is convened twice a month and sometimes establishes task forces for issues requiring in-depth analysis over an extended period of time (eg. Sudan, Afghanistan, rule of law, terrorism, human rights, peace building and MDGs). At first sight, ECPS and its task forces have not however been brought up to the degree of operational effectiveness of the clusters system established by other Executive Committees, notably IASC/ECHA.

60 The Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA) facilitates more effective participation of developing countries in global processes and a better balance between the global and regional dimensions of development in terms of analysis, standard setting and technical assistance.⁴⁶ It meets??? and works through thematic clusters with leading agencies.

⁴⁵ The members of the Committee are: DPA (convenor), DPKO, OCHA, DDA, OLA, UNHCR, UNOHCHR, the Director of the United Nations office in Geneva, UNDP, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF and the United Nations Security Coordinator.

⁴⁶ Chaired by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and integrated by the five United Nations regional commissions, UNCTAD, UNEP, OHCHR, UNDP, UNODC, DPI, UNU, UNITAR, UNRISD, INTRAW, the UN-HABITAT and the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

61 The Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) considers humanitarian policy and operational matters.⁴⁷ It meets on a monthly basis and also works through thematic clusters with leading agencies at the global and field levels.

62 The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) was constituted in support to the development work of the United Nations at country level and has become the backbone of the RC system.⁴⁸ It has a standing office, the Development Group Office, with 40 staff from the leading funds and programmes members. It meets at least three times a year and has various working groups and task forces.⁴⁹

63 Later in the same year 1997, the Senior Management Group⁵⁰ was conceived as the Secretary-General's cabinet and a central policy planning unit, considering inputs for the legislative bodies, recommending policies dealing with complex cross cutting sector issues, monitoring the implementation of the reform, guiding the work of the four Executive Committees, and providing advice on issues regarding the medium-term plan, programme budget submissions and resource mobilization. It used to meet weekly⁵¹ but with the creation in 2005 of the Policy Committee and the Management Committee⁵², the Senior Management Group became a forum for exchange of information and experience among heads of departments, offices, funds and programmes of the United Nations.

64 The newly created Policy Committee deals with issues requiring strategic guidance and policy decisions on thematic and country-specific issues affecting the Organization, and emerging issues.⁵³ The also new Management Committee considers internal reform and management related issues requiring strategic direction and ensure that findings of the Board of Auditors, the JIU and OIOS are fed into management processes and accepted recommendations are followed up and implemented.⁵⁴ They both?? meet once a week.

65 The Inspectors noted that the members of these committees are basically the same executive managers of the United Nations and its funds and programmes whereas two specialised agencies, FAO and WHO, participate in ECHA and several in UNDG. The Inspectors believe that since these Committees have similar composition and agendas with different frequency of meetings they should be rationalized to reduce transaction costs of coordination; some of them could be merged and the Senior Management Group should be definitely discontinued.

⁴⁷ Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, it is composed of DPA, DPKO, DPI, FAO, OHCHR, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP and WHO.

⁴⁸ A/51/950, paras. 73, 74

⁴⁹ Chaired by UNDP, the four founding members of the major funds and programmes provide leadership: UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and UNDP. Its membership today has grown to 28 organizations, plus five observers with representation in different governance structures: the support group, the management group and the programme group.

⁵⁰ ST/SGB/1997/3 and ST/SGB/2005/16

⁵¹ Composed of the Deputy Secretary-General, the convenors of the four Executive Committees, the Under-Secretary-Generals for DPKO, for Management, for General Assembly and Conference Services and for Public Information, the Legal Counsel and the High Commissioners for Human Rights and for Refugees and the Directors General of Geneva and Vienna

⁵² ST/SGB/2005/16 and ST/SGB/2006/14

⁵³ It is chaired by the Secretary-General and composed of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet, the Chair of four Executive Committees, the Under-Secretary-Generals for Peacekeeping Operations and for Communications and Public Information, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Legal Counsel, and the Special Adviser on Africa.

⁵⁴ It is composed of the Deputy Secretary-General the Chief the Cabinet and the Under-Secretary-Generals for Management, for Economic and Social Affairs, for General Assembly and Conference Management and for Peacekeeping Operations.

66 In this connection, the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence has recommended that UNDG and ECESA are subsumed into a Development Policy and Operations Group to be established to bring together economic, social and environmental policies and activities into an integrated whole under the UNDP Administrator. The UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues has proposed the establishment of a mechanism comprising the secretariats of UNDG, ECHA and ECPS to ensure that headquarters support to UNCTs remains coherent and timely⁵⁵.

67 Another attempt to improve coordination at more operational level are the Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), born in 2001 pursuant to a recommendation of the Brahimi report⁵⁶ on the need for a single working-level focal point at headquarters that can address the concerns of missions quickly. In the practice, few successful experiences of IMTF have materialized. The IMTF concept has been further developed into the notion of integrated teams within the framework of the DPKO reform process "Peace Operations 2010" launched in February 2006. The integrated teams are expected to have a range of expertise in political affairs, military, police, civilian, logistics, financial and personnel, as well as on conduct and discipline, training, rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as necessary and a dedicated capacity to engage with external partners⁵⁷. In 2007, 26 additional posts were approved for the integrated operational teams⁵⁸; the concept will then be fully put to test.

Revamping the CEB

68 The only existing system-wide coordination mechanism is CEB (former ACC⁵⁹), which brings together the executive heads of all organizations under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. Supported by two high-level committees, one for substantive programme (HLCP) and the other for strategic management (HLCM), CEB discusses a broad range of substantive and policy issues and approves policy statements on behalf of the United Nations. However, it meets only twice a year in two-day sessions.

69 Among the guiding principles of the CEB functioning, the commitment to carry out the necessary consultations when launching on their own initiative any operation requiring contributions from other members and the undertaking to convey to their respective governing bodies major initiatives within the United Nations system of relevance to their organizations, provide the basis for effective coherence at the headquarter and field levels. Indeed, in the view of the Inspectors, the CEB framework has been insufficiently utilized to this purpose.

70 The High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence stressed that CEB potential had been underexploited and recommended that CEB should improve its decision-making role and effectively drive managerial reform to make it more results-oriented⁶⁰. The Secretary-General has requested the Directors of ILO and WTO to lead the CEB review process.

⁵⁵ Report of February 2004, page 7

⁵⁶ A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 201 & 202, rec. 15.

⁵⁷ A/60/696, paras. 16, 19 & 21

⁵⁸ A/RES/61/279

⁵⁹ Established pursuant to ECOSOC 13(III), Co-ordination Committee Resolution E/231 of 21 September 1946 which "Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish a standing committee of administrative officers consisting of himself, as chairman, and corresponding officers of the specialised agencies"

⁶⁰ A/61/583 of November 2006, paras. 63, 64, 65

71 The High-level Panel also recommended that the new Development Policy and Operations Group resulting from the merging of UNDG and ECESA be established within the CEB. Actually, the Inspectors believe that all four Executive Committees should be opened to membership by all interested United Nations agencies and should be reporting to CEB. The Policy Committee and the Management Committees should be subsumed into the HLCP and the HLCM.

72 The annual overview report of CEB for the period covering its fall 2006 and spring 2007 sessions submitted to the ECOSOC in July 2007⁶¹ indicated that the CEB endorsed the proposal for the integration of the UNDG within the CEB framework and requested the mapping of all inter-agency coordination mechanisms together with estimations on the level of funding required to appropriate funding the CEB machinery.

73 Apparently, there is no deadline or timetable to develop these proposals and conclude the review process. Neither the first 2007 CEB session held on 20 April nor the second session held in October 2007 made reference to the CEB reform process.⁶² If the reform and integration process are to work at the present pace of CEB meetings, then it will take years to achieve concrete progress.

Benchmark 5

Existing inter-agency coordination mechanisms are effectively promoting integration and coherence throughout the system

Through:

- (a) The Chief Executive Board and its High-level Committee on Programme and High-level Committee on Management are given the mandate and tools to become the supreme inter-agency mechanism for system-wide reform and integration process;
- (b) The frequency of CEB meetings is brought to at least once or twice a month;
- (c) All existing coordination mechanisms, such as the four executive committees, the Policy Committee and the Management Committee report to CEB, through the HLCP and the HLCM;
- (d) The four executive committees are opened to the membership of all United Nations organizations; and
- (e) The Senior Management Group is discontinued.

C. Coherence between the United Nations and its partners

74 The Inspectors believe that the coherence process within the United Nations to be successful and credible cannot be seen in isolation from other international players, with which the Organization interacts in different ways.

The United Nations and the civil society

⁶¹ CEB/2007/7, para.69, 71,72

⁶² CEB/2007/1

75 Civil society organizations not only complement but also many times carry out the job that the United Nations cannot do for various reasons. Recognizing their key role, particularly in crisis and post-conflict countries, in reconciliation and peacebuilding and in bringing forward the development agenda in support to the MDGs, the Secretary-General established⁶³ a panel of eminent persons that produced in September 2004 a report on United Nations-Civil Society Relations”.⁶⁴

76 Based on the Panel’s proposals, the Secretary-General made concrete suggestions to increase the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the work of the United Nations in general and its intergovernmental bodies in particular.⁶⁵

77 Among all the United Nations system organizations, the humanitarian agencies have been indeed the most successful in engaging with NGOs through concerted efforts. Back in 1992, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was created, as a unique interagency coordination forum with the Red Cross Movement and three NGO consortia⁶⁶. Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on the division of responsibility among various actors, identifies and addresses gaps in response to needs and advocates for the application of humanitarian principles, assuring a coherent interagency response to complex emergencies and natural and environmental disasters.

The United Nations and the Breton Wood institutions

78 Over the years, the United Nations and the Breton Wood institutions have gradually developed different mechanisms of working together. There is however a need for more complementarity, as discussed by the report of the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence, in order to strike a balance between “healthy competition and inefficient overlap and unfilled gaps”. In this connection, the report recommended that as a matter of urgency the Secretary-General, the President of the World Bank and the Executive Director of IMF should conclude an agreement on their respective roles and relations at country level.⁶⁷ Among other concrete actions, it was suggested a more substantive participation of these institutions at global level in the annual spring meetings of the ECOSOC and the biennial High-level Dialogue of the General Assembly and of the United Nations in the Development Committee.

79 In the same vein, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes had also recommended that the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the President of the World Bank be represented in the Peacebuilding Commission to “marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict building”.⁶⁸

80 A concrete example of effective cooperation towards achieving coherence among the United Nations and these institutions is the development by UNDG and the World Bank of the PCNA methodology, which was used in Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia and Darfur to assess needs, cost and prioritise results, and reviewed in common in 2006 to draw lessons and improve practices. Also in 2006, the UNDG and the World Bank established a Joint Programme agreement to facilitate donors financing through a more effective mechanism.⁶⁹

⁶³ A/57/387 and Corr.1, General Assembly resolution 75/30

⁶⁴ A/58/817 and Corr.1.

⁶⁵ A/59/354

⁶⁶ In response to UNGA Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance

⁶⁷ Page 36

⁶⁸ A/59/565, Recommendations 83 and 84 (f)

⁶⁹ Synthesis of Resident Coordinator Annual Reports 2006, pages 72 and 73

The United Nations and regional organizations

81 Regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been playing an increasingly important role in peace operations during the last decade. While cooperation between the United Nations and these organizations has been ad hoc, the need for a mutually agreed strategic framework is becoming urgent at the light of the hybrid African Union-United Nations Force for Darfur. The establishment of such framework will require flexibility from each party to understand differences, realign procedures and management cultures, develop common objectives and priorities and agree on a division of responsibilities in the ground. In this particular instance, the cooperation of the United Nations may even entail building the capacity of the regional organization to fulfil its role.⁷⁰

82 In connection with the need to formalize and better structure the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, the Inspectors see as a positive event the ongoing process of signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between DPKO and NATO. In the Inspectors' view, similar agreements should be negotiated with other regional organizations.

83 In the area of development, in addition to the existing Regional Commissions (ECA, ESCAP, ESCAW, ECE and ECLA), the various United Nations system organizations have set up over the years, their own networks of regional offices in locations scattered around the world according to different regional designs. These regional commissions/offices interact in different ways with the above-mentioned regional institutions, which are sources of potential funding and cross-fertilization. A coherent setting and approach is needed to avoid duplication also at this level.

The United Nations and the private sector

84 The interaction of the United Nations system with the private sector is critical in two sense: as an important source of transfer of money and technology for development and normative due to its responsibility in employment and in the management of natural resources and the environment. In this regard, ILO's constituency is unique in the sense that the private sectors is represented in its governance structures.

85 The last decade has witnessed the proliferation of individual partnerships and global mechanisms between the United Nations organizations and the private sector in all domains of activities. The JIU is currently reviewing the principles for the use of corporate sponsorships within the United Nations system, identifying best practices and areas which require adoption of policies and guidelines or practices that may cause conflicts of interest or may be detrimental to the United Nations.

Benchmark 6

The United Nations System interacts with its external partners from the civil society, Breton Wood institutions, regional organizations and private sector in a coherent manner

⁷⁰ Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges, Seminar Addis Ababa, April, 2007, page 25

Through:

- (a) Providing the necessary institutional framework for interaction that delineates each party role, division of responsibility and engagement procedures;
- (b) Action-oriented engagement of these partners in the ECOSOC, the General Assembly and legislative bodies of other United Nations system organizations;
- (c) Making effective the participation of the United Nations System in the governance structures of these partners;
- (d) Establishing a follow-up mechanism to oversight the commitments of each partner; and
- (e) An alignment of the mandates and location of the United Nations Regional Commissions and other United Nations regional offices.

II. COHERENCE AT THE FIELD LEVEL

A. The challenge of local ownership: what the country wants

86 In line with the United Nations Charter's principle of sovereignty of each State, country ownership should be at the heart of coherence and integration process in the United Nations system. The respect to the right of each Government to determine what is best for it and its citizens is not only crucial to legitimate the United Nations system presence in any given country, but also for each United Nations organization to find a niche in the design and implementation of the national recovery/development strategy of the country while advocating for international norms and standards.

87 The kind of involvement of the United Nations system in any given country at any given time will depend on the degree of consolidation of the Government's authority and other local powers, as appropriate, and on the specific and evolving country situation. In fragile post-conflict situations and in countries with low capacity to absorb the influx of resources, a higher involvement of the United Nations in helping the country to determine its needs and priorities may be required as opposed to stable countries, with solid governance structures.

88 Notwithstanding the above, there is a need to balance the strong authoritative presence of the United Nations System with the equally strong imperative need for local ownership, notably in integrated missions established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with authority to recourse to force. The United Nations System is not to patronize or to merchandise, it is to respond to the country needs and should be flexible enough to understand and provide what the country wants.

89 Consequently, in the Inspectors' opinion, governmental authorities should drive all stages of the "One United Nations" process at the country level: from the conception to the implementation and evaluation of the "One plan", in the approval and support to the "One leader", in the determination of the composition of the United Nations presence in the country, in the prioritisation of the use of resources from the "One fund" and in the selection of the "One house". Attempts to impose conditionality to the UN System support is probably the main obstacle to foster a genuine integration of the UN System and, therefore, the respect to the national priorities and wants should become the golden rule of the UN System support to recipient countries.

90 Conversely, coherence is also required at national level to determine the degree of the desire and actual involvement of the United Nations. The establishment of an entry point within the Vietnamese Government to facilitate dialogue with the Resident Coordinator,

enhance planning and coordination with local authorities and reduce transactions costs reveals as key to the success of the “One United Nations” process and a best practice to replicate.

Benchmark 7

The coherence process within the United Nations system upholds the sovereign role of each country in defining what it “needs and wants”.

Through:

- (a) Undertaking reliable, common need assessments of the country situation, led by the national authorities;
- (b) Respecting country leadership in developing and implementing national recovery/development strategies, and strengthening national capacity; and
- (c) Developing a consultative mechanism with the Government all throughout, involving the national authorities, the UN System, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the bilateral donors.

B. The “One” United Nations

91 As already mentioned, while there should be only one process, the “One” United Nations is currently being worked out within different parallel processes at country level: within the RC system in the eight pilot projects (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam), and within the SRSG system in the eight integrated peace missions/offices (Afghanistan, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, East Timor, Haiti, Sudan and Sierra Leone), three of which have been so designed by decision of the Security Council.

92 To a lesser extent, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system present in 14 countries, also represents a model of coherence/integration that associates non-governmental organizations.

93 The RC system encompasses all organizations of the United Nations system dealing with operational activities for development, regardless of their formal presence in the country. The Resident Coordinator is the designated representative of the Secretary-General and the leader of the United Nations system country team, which is composed of representatives of the United Nations funds and programmes, specialised agencies and other United Nations entities accredited in the country, and may include representatives of Breton Wood institutions. UNDP is the manager of the RC system⁷¹ and under its guidance UNDG has produced a number of policies and guidance material in support to the system.

94 Within the integrated mission/office system, the SRSG is “the senior United Nations Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations”⁷². Alone or supported by a deputy performing multihatted functions, the SRSG should devise effective coordination mechanisms among the various mission components (security, political, human rights, rule of law, humanitarian and development) taking into account the existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms and the expertise of the UNCT.

⁷¹ ACC Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System, paras. 6,9,11,17

⁷² Note on Integrated Missions was issued in December 2005 paras. 5,6,11

95 As for the HC system, the terms of reference approved by IASC in December 2003, indicates that Humanitarian Coordinators have overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field through needs assessments, contingency planning and the formulation of humanitarian programmes, providing response tools and advocacy and information services.⁷³ In April 2006, IASC approved an Action Plan and established a working group to strengthen the HC system⁷⁴.

96 Like UNDG, DPKO and IASC have also produced policies and guidance for peacekeepings and for humanitarian actions in the field, respectively. Regrettably, DPKO issued guidance is applicable only to DPKO led missions not to DPA led missions or is duplicated by other guidelines. For instance: DPKO produced in 2000 the “Civil-Military Coordination Policy” and in 2003 the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” whereas IASC published in 2004 the “Civil-Military relationship on Complex Emergencies”. Although in the Inspectors’ view, the issuance of these policies and guidelines represents positive attempts towards more effective coordination among the various United Nations field actors, coherence within the “One” United Nations will only be achieved when solely one set of policies and guidelines will be available and applicable to all.

97 In fact, regardless of these and other guidelines and policies whose system-wide applicability is sometimes doubtful or unknown to the different players at the field level, and in spite of the recognition of the need for a single coherent strategy for all United Nations system actors that create political and operational synergies, particularly in transition contexts, when it comes to actual implementation in the ground political, military, development and humanitarians have a different stand as to whether and to what extent integration is possible⁷⁵, and who is that will be integrated at what stage. Integration is feared by some on the understanding that it will bring all organizations of the family under a single flag, with no “individual” authority and visibility. The fact that Members States have not “legitimate” the “One UN” process also adversely contributes to the existing misgivings.

98 As already mentioned, humanitarians are more concerned about preserving their legitimate status of neutrality and impartiality, with one foot in and one foot out of the integrated mission. This position was endorsed by the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions and the concept was successfully implemented in MONUC and UNMIS where OCHA was situated outside the mission premises. Other UNCT members fear to loss operational independence, visibility and ability to mobilize funds, as confirmed by the results of the JIU questionnaire in 72 per cent of the responses. Actually, in the Inspectors’ view a lot have to do with the lack of understanding of each other role, with poor guidance, communication and dissemination of information about the coherence and integration process.

99 When it comes to actual implementation in the ground, there is no strategy, there are no terms of reference to guide the relationships within the UNCT and between the UNCT and the mission, there are no guidelines on how to integrate nor standard operating procedures and a clear division of responsibilities between the UNCT members, between the various mission components such as human rights, civil affairs, political affairs, DDR, etc and between the mission components and other system organizations that deal with gender, child protection, human rights, rule of law, etc.

⁷³ <http://ochaonline.un.org>

⁷⁴ OCHA in 2007, page 153

⁷⁵ Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, February 2004, page 6 and 7.

100 Some UNCT and missions/offices have developed their own terms of reference and guidelines, each time reproducing the same processes. The eight pilot projects are all experimenting, starting from zero and the eight integrated missions similarly, although the latter established could have enjoyed the benefit of learning from previous experience. There are positive attempts to regulate certain issues through Policy Committee's decisions, such as the division of responsibilities between UNDP and OHCHR on Rule of Law, which is apparently not always applied at the field level in MINUSTAH and UNPOS.

101 Since UNDG is leading the coherence process and producing a great deal of guidance, there is a feeling that the process is very much driven by UNDP and the EXCOM funding members whereas the role of specialised agencies is not well dimensioned. There is a similar perception that the integration process is too much determined by DPKO, and the views and wealth of expertise of the UNCT members, who were in the country "before" the establishment of the peace mission/office, are there "during" and will be there "after" are not always taken into account.

102 To summarize, there is no common mind setting, conceptualisation, shared vision, strategy and procedures to materialize the coherence and integration process at country level. Without them, the process lacks the ownership and support of its players.

Benchmark 8

A common mind setting, conceptualization, understanding, shared vision, approach and sense of ownership exist among the United Nations organizations represented in the country.

Through:

- (a) Inclusiveness;
- (b) Respect for the operational independence and visibility of each partner;
- (c) Incentives to encourage integration;
- (d) The development of a common strategic paper that provides the principles and basis for working together to which all formally adhere;
- (e) Agreed procedures and guidelines; and
- (f) Better communication strategy to disseminate information about the risks and opportunities of the coherence and integration process.

From various models to one flexible model of United Nations presence

103 The Inspectors noted that other than the mentioned development/humanitarian models of United Nations presence for countries in peaceful situation and the two models for integrated missions led by DPKO: (1) The SRSG and two Deputies, one of whom is political and the other one is also RC/HC/UNDP Resident Representative (as for example in Haiti and DRC); and 2) The SRSG is the RC/HC/UNDP Resident Representative (for example, in Burundi and Sierra Leone), there is no model for DPA led missions/offices and for non integrated missions/offices in countries in post conflict situation.

104 The Inspectors also observed that regardless of the model applied, the coherence/integration process in the countries visited by them has not yet gone beyond the planning stage even if there are some examples of integrated and joint programmes. Some teams still do not manage to work together but just to coexist, others have developed more or less

effective mechanisms of information sharing, coordination and decision-making and few has reached the stage of one strategic planning document focused and inclusive. In an ascendant scale of integration, the Inspectors list them as follows: China, Somalia, Nepal, Tajikistan, Haiti, Viet Nam, Burundi, and DRC.

105 It is clear that there is no “one size fits all” and no cookie cutter approach to design the perfect model of integration that will fit all countries in all situations. Nevertheless, some kind of universal model is necessary to ensure that one do not work across purposes in no situation.

106 In this connection, the Inspectors are of the opinion that in the same manner that the decision of UNDP to appoint country directors in some 40 countries to run its core activities⁷⁶ is helping to change the perception of bias in its favor within the UNCT, the SRSG function will benefit a de-linking from DPKO. Actually, it is the Secretary-General’s Office that should manage this function.

107 Furthermore, in the Inspectors’ view, if an SRSG or RCs is to become the highest or most senior representative of the United Nations system in a given country, he/she should be simply called “Representative of the United Nations system in (country)” and appointed by the CEB. The other members of the UNCT should be called “Representative of (organization) in (country)”. The UNCT may include a Representative from DPKO/DPA, as applicable.

108 Since he/she will perform functions tailored to specific needs and wants, the profile of the Representative of the United Nations system in the country and the United Nations presence should be determined and evolved in accordance with the country “needs and wants” in the specific circumstances, taking into account the comparative advantage of each agency based on its historical local presence, expertise and resources.

109 Further, building up on the core group of organizations that constitute the UNCT on the basis of their comparative advantages, and inserting the specific into the general, other “temporary” components could be added (and withdrawn) in a phasing-in phasing-out agreement with the sovereign Government in question, such as the peace component (whether peacekeeping or peacebuilding) or the humanitarian, human rights, refugees or crime prevention components, as appropriate to the situation.

Benchmark 9

A flexible integration model that responds to the specific and changing needs of each country as determined through a need assessment carried out by/or in full consultation with the UNCT and the host Government.

Through:

- (a) The appointment by the Chief Executive Board of “Representatives of the United Nations system” to lead the United Nations country team as the most senior representative of the system in the country, supported by “Representatives” by organization;
- (b) The profile of the Representative of the United Nations system in any country should be drawn in line with the specific and evolving needs of the country, in full consultation with the national Government;

⁷⁶ A/59/250, para. 60

- (c) The composition of the United Nations country team should respond to the country “needs and wants” in the specific circumstances and may vary in response to evolving circumstances, taking into account the comparative advantage of each agency based on its historical local presence, expertise and resources. It should be re-assessed periodically in accordance with the needs of the strategic programming cycle.
- (d) If new components were to be added to the established country team structure, such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, human rights or any other, it would be so do in full consultation with the UNCT and the Government by inserting the temporary structures into the permanent configuration.

Effective leadership

110 UNGA resolution 60/1 states the need for a United Nations country presence with a “strengthened role for the senior resident official, whether special representative, resident coordinator or humanitarian coordinator, including appropriate authority, resources and accountability...”

111 In the view of the Inspectors, for the United Nations to speak with one voice at the country level, it needs strong leadership. Strong leadership means visionary, competent and experienced managers, with the ability to exercise and entrusted with the necessary authority to negotiate on behalf of the United Nations system, to shape the “One” country programme and ensure its implementation by mobilizing, prioritizing and allocating resources while being accountable for his/her actions. Effective leaders cannot function without effective management teams and structures.

112 Visionary, competent and experienced managers could only be selected through well-structured competitive processes. Rather than training managers, it is better to identify those with managerial competencies and develop them.

113 In fact, the highest rated obstacle to achieve integration/coherence at the field level identified through the questionnaire prepared by the Inspectors was the issue of personalities, with 41 per cent of responses.

114 In his report of July 2006 “Investing on People”⁷⁷, the Secretary-General states that a more rigorous and systematic approach to selection of high level officials (at Director level and above), including for peace operations, will be established, with competency-based interviews and other assessment techniques to select them based on sound track records of successful managerial and leadership experience.

115 In this regard, the Inspectors noted that UNDP has a quite elaborate and long standing system for selecting Resident Coordinators but DPKO/DPA have no such system to choose SRSGs, as described below. As a result, the selection of leaders is too much personalized in multidimensional integrated missions where the role of individuals within teams is critical to ensure success. Hence, the importance of drawing and testing requirements for specific managerial competencies and do not rely on demonstrated professional competencies only.

116 It is clear that requirements for a type of leader may change in line with the evolving country situation and needs, even along the mission life cycle. Accordingly, profiling allows for the design and search of more specific requirements adapted to the specific circumstances.

⁷⁷ A/61/255, para.316

117 Diversification in terms of gender and culture is also crucial to the United Nations values⁷⁸. Regrettably, at present there is only one female SRSG recently appointed and so there was none for about three years, as compared to 29 percent of female Resident Coordinators⁷⁹. As for geographical representation, 50 per cent of SRSGs comes from Europe and ??? per cent of Resident Coordinators.

118 The participation of all UNCT members on equal foot in the selection system, with the same rights to propose, scrutinize, veto and nominate candidates for endorsement by CEB, is in the Inspectors' opinion key to the credibility of the integration and coherence process.

119 Last but not least, Member States should take responsibility for proposing valuable candidates, starting by identifying potential applicants at national level and exposing them to the United Nations environment.

Selection of Resident Coordinators

120 The ACC Guidelines of 1999 provide that the Secretary-General designates Resident Coordinators after consultation with ACC (CEB) members and upon the recommendation of the UNDP Administrator. Building up on the provisions of these guidelines, UNDG has further developed policies and procedures for their selection, job descriptions, competencies, profiles and work plans, all available in the relevant website.

121 The process is as follows: the UNDP Administrator invites United Nations agencies to present candidates for a competency assessment designed to help determining their suitability. An Inter-Agency Advisory Panel (IAAP) of eleven organizations reviews the assessment and recommends suitable candidates to the UNDP Administrator. The UNDP Administrator makes a selection for nomination to the Secretary-General, after consulting on the nominated candidate first with the executive heads of the UNDG Executive Committee and then with other UNDG members. Once the Secretary-General endorses the candidate, it is circulated to ACC members of the IAAP on a no-objection basis. Candidates that are found suitable by the IAAP but are not selected for a post, integrate a pool for future vacancies.

122 In 2006, 69 percent of the Resident Coordinators comes from UNDP, figure that represents a decrease from 74 percent in 2004⁸⁰. Although this constitutes a step forward, still impartiality is perceived as being compromised for various reasons. One of the main reasons is the fact that Resident Coordinators are selected by and are accountable to the UNDP Administrator. Indeed, the role of UNDP as manager of the Resident Coordinator system and of UNDG in support to this system have created the perception of conflict of interest.

123 Questioned about it, officials from some organizations interviewed by the Inspectors had indicated that they did not feel ownership of the selection process because the involvement occurred at the level of human resources departments, because the candidates proposed were finally not selected and because the procedures applied lacked transparency.

⁷⁸ A/RES/16/25

⁷⁹ Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2006, UNDG, page 66

⁸⁰ Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2006, UNDG, page 66

124 UNDP at its turn indicated that organizations did not submit sufficient valuable candidates and in this respect it was acknowledged that it represented a drain of their best managers.

Selection of SRSGs

125 Unlike the Resident Coordinators' selection process, the choice of SRSGs is not made through approved job descriptions, a roster of candidates, a short-list and competency based interviews conducted by an established panel

126 The Inspectors were informed during its visit to New York in March 2007 that a draft policy on Senior Leadership Appointments in the Field was in preparation by DPKO, which would address most of the above requirements. According to the information received, the draft policy refers to appointments by the Secretary-General at D-2 level and above of political nature concerning SRSGs and others as DSRSGs, Heads of Administration and Chief of Staff for DPKO missions. It was made clear that the policy did not describe what was happening but it was rather the way to go in the future.

127 Apparently, DPA was not involved in the preparation process and consequently the policy might not apply to high-ranking officials appointed to DPA led missions.

128 At the time of drafting this report in December 2007, the policy was still in draft form, waiting for the Secretary General's approval to begin implementation. In the Inspectors' view, it is not necessary to approve separate procedures for the appointment of these officials but rather to improve the existing process for the selection of Resident Coordinators and develop a unique system applicable to the nomination of all country leaders.

Multihatted SRSGs and DSRGs/RCs/HCs/UNDP Resident Representatives

129 The multihatted SRSGs and DSRGs/RCs/HCs/UNDP Resident Representatives is a relatively new function created in the system with the establishment of integrated missions. We refer therefore to no more than eight of such positions, although in perspective their number may increase.

130 At first sight, when looking at the diversity in nature of responsibilities entrusted to only one person and the potential for conflict of interests resulting from the multiplicity of reporting lines to the Secretary-General or the SRSGs for DSRGs, to UNDP, DPKO/DPA, and OCHA, one may tend to believe that the performance of this multihatted function could be ineffective. On the contrary, after certain hesitation, there is today a general agreement that it is not so, as confirmed by the answers to the JIU questionnaire. While about half of the respondents (54 percent) agree that the various functions may be conflicting at times, the majority (85 per cent) disagree to detach them. In this regard, the Inspectors learnt that one of the issues to be reviewed by the working group established by IASC on the strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator system were the circumstances that might lead to the separation of this function.

131 In the Inspector's view, it is clear that performing diverse and at times conflicting tasks require specific competencies as good judgement and bridging but it cannot otherwise expected from such a high level appointees. In terms of physical location, the Inspectors noted during their field visits that the incumbents hold offices either within the mission premises or at UNDP or at both sites on part time basis. The later arrangement appears to be the most effective.

132 Conversely, the Inspectors are in favour of detaching the function of UNDP Resident Representative. The firewall established with the creation of the post of UNDP Country Director may work as well for the UNDP Resident Representative function, adding independence and impartiality to the multithatted function.

133 As for the selection of multithatted SRSGs and DSRSGs/RCs/HCs/UNDP Resident Representatives, the Inspectors understand that currently they are either appointed by the Secretary-General or nominated by the UNDP Administrator through the Resident Coordinator system. A Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and UNDP that will deal with these specific appointments has already been signed by the United Nations Controller and is pending signature by the UNDP Administrator.

134 In the meantime, DPKO is trying to work more closely with UNDP in the selection of candidates for these positions while seating in interview panels. In the Inspector view, this is a better solution than creating new structures and requirements.

Benchmark 10

A unique selection process of mission leaders through the Chief Executive Board is in place to ensure the appointment of managers of high-calibre with full authority over representatives of all United Nations system organizations in the country.

Through:

- (a) Changing the current title of Resident Coordinator to United Nations System Representative (UNSR)
- (b) Refining the existing process for the selection of Resident Coordinators to develop a single system applicable to the appointment of all country leaders;
- (c) A selection process tailored to the country needs and specific situation;
- (d) Participation of all United Nations agencies present in the country on equal foot, with the same rights to propose, scrutinize, veto and nominate candidates;
- (e) The process is administered by the High Level Committee on Management and candidates are appointed by the Chief Executive Board;
- (f) Detaching the function of UNDP Resident Representative;
- (g) Member States are invited to propose valuable candidates;
- (h) Evaluating the managerial competencies of candidates; and
- (i) Achieving diversification in terms of geographical distribution, gender and culture in line with United Nations values.

Training, learning and development of leaders

135 The responses provided to the JIU questionnaire were equally divided at 40 percent between sufficient and no training/induction received in connection with the current position.

136 UNDP has developed several training programmes with support from the United Nations System Staff College (UNSCC) to strengthen the RC system, among them, some of general nature and others specific to the function as: Induction training for first time RCs, In-service briefings for RCs, Competency-based training for performance appraisal, Team building, the United Nations Reform and country programming processes and UNDAF Strategic Planning Retreats.

137 Instead, DPKO has just recently set up a Senior Leadership Induction Programme for SRSGs, which becomes mandatory during the first six months of appointment. Additionally, it arranges senior mission leader courses 3-4 times yearly, with the drawback the attendants do not often go further on mission assignment. The United Nations has also established a Leadership Development Programme for D-1 and D-2 managers and CEB endorsed the organization of an inter-agency Senior Management Network Leadership Development Programme by the United Nations System Staff College.⁸¹

138 OCHA has also recently facilitated a first Induction event with current and potential Humanitarian Coordinators and has established a pool of 22 Humanitarian Coordinators (including NGO representatives), which will undergo a four-phase briefing and learning system over one year.⁸²

139 Training of teams is imperative as well; quite impossible on appointment since all UNCT/mission leaders are not designated at the same time but feasible through mobiles training teams rotating by region. In this connection, OCHA set up in 2007 a Cluster/Sector Lead Training Programme for current cluster leads or individuals on cluster's rosters that could be interesting as experience to be replicated outside the humanitarian area.

Benchmark 11

Leaders receives the necessary training/induction to effectively perform their functions

Through:

- (a) An induction/training module for leaders is put in place in coordination with the United Nations System Staff College and tailored to the different country situations and needs;
- (b) Mobile training teams provides group training to UNCT and mission leaders by region; and
- (c) Clusters training by thematic subject are organized.

No authority without accountability

140 There should not authority without accountability and no accountability without authority. This principle has been set out by the UNGA and the CEB in approving the benchmarking framework proposed by the JIU (JIU/REP/2004/5). Currently, SRSGs lack both. Resident Coordinators lacks the necessary authority manage and oversee the UNCT but are held accountable to a certain degree since their performance is measured by the extent they are able to push forward the reform agenda.

141 Actually, neither the 1999 ACC guidelines nor the subsequent Secretary-General notes of guidance have resolved this issue.

⁸¹ A/61/255, paras 319 and 320

⁸² OCHA in 2007, page 153

142 The ACC Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System indicates that the Resident Coordinator is responsible for providing team leadership and members of the RC system are expected to provide full support to the functioning of the system.⁸³ The SRSG should consult and coordinate regularly with the RC and/or HC as well as the country team, drawing on their expertise, articulating an strategy, and exchanging information, particularly as they relate to peace building initiatives”.⁸⁴

143 The 2000 “Note of guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators” specifies that the SRSG is responsible for providing political guidance of the overall United Nations presence as well as giving the impetus for a coordinated and coherent approach by all the United Nations components in the country.

144 The revised Note of Guidance of 2006 provides that in integrated missions, the SRSG has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations, represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the United Nations, establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UNCT and ensures that all pursue a coordinated approach. The multihatted DRSGs/RCs/HCs is the principal interface between the mission and the UNCT and is responsible for the coordination of the UNCT, for the planning and coordination of development and humanitarian operations in his/her respective capacity of RC and HC, and maintains links with the Government, donors, and development and humanitarian partners to this purpose.

145 The Accountability Framework of the Resident Coordinator developed by the UNDG/Resident Coordinator Issues Group in March 2006, pursuant to a request of the General Assembly in the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review⁸⁵ does not add up much to the above provisions, except that it insert a reference to the Resident Coordinator responsibility to monitor and report on the implementation of UNDAF, and support relevant resource mobilization.

146 As it can be observed, the above formulations on the authority and responsibilities of SRSGs, RCs and multihatted DRSGs are quite general while any reference to accountability is almost inexistent. Many issues remained unclear concerning the authority of these leaders, particularly in non-integrated missions. Grey areas may generate tensions among them.

147 Further, neither SRSGs nor RCs can influence the appointment or removal of UNCT members, and do not participate in their evaluation as to their contribution to the “One” United Nations.⁸⁶

148 Finally, RCs are appraised in their performance but SRSGs are not. The performance appraisal system of RCs by inter-agency regional directors is quite cumbersome. In 2005 it was decided to evaluate RCs not only on results achieved against work plan goals but also to introduce a 180-degree assessment by the country team of the RC’s competencies.

149 During their field visits, the Inspectors confirmed that the challenges of authority and accountability of SRSGs and RCs were the same, valid and unresolved. The Inspectors

⁸³ paras. 21, 22

⁸⁴ Standard directives for the Special representative of the Secretary-general, 3 August 1998, paras. 3 & /

⁸⁵ A/RES/59/290

⁸⁶ JIU/REP/2005/02 and E/2004/4-DP/2004/12 para. 41;

observed that a step forward had been taken in Viet Nam where the Resident Coordinator would make ultimate decisions on fund allocation and be held accountable for it, according to the draft terms of reference of the “One Plan Fund Allocation Committee” developed in May 2007.

Benchmark 12

The “One Leader” at country level is empowered with the necessary authority and held accountable for successfully implementing the “One plan”

Through:

- (a) Determining the extent of authority delegated to the Representative of the United Nations system to ensure coherence/integration at country level, including over the United Nations country team;
- (b) The chain of command within the United Nations Country Team is clear and unambiguous;
- (c) Delegation of authority is clearly defined in administrative instruments and individual delegation orders, which are consistent and comprehensive, including all financial and human resources authority delegated;
- (d) The Representative of the United Nations system is appraised through performance oriented-systems of accountability and effectively held accountable for results delivered;
- (e) His/her managerial competencies are appraised;
- (f) He/she provides inputs to the performance appraisal of the United Nations country team members as to their contribution to the coherence/integration process and the implementation of the “One Plan”; and
- (g) Mechanisms are established to resolve discrepancies.

Conditions of service

150 Closely linked to the issue of selection are the level and contractual arrangements of SRSGs and RCs. Usually, SRSGs are appointed at the level of Under-Secretary-General since they deal with “large, politically complex” situations, requiring a “high degree of political authority, including dealing with problems at the highest national level, often the head of State or head of Government.”⁸⁷ Some missions require one or two deputies, who are appointed at Assistant Secretary-General level, as are the force commanders or chief military observers. Executive Representatives and Representatives of the Secretary-General are appointed at ASG and D-2 level. Resident Coordinators, country directors and local heads of agencies may be graded at D2/D1 level. Although the grade of the “One leader” is not necessarily linked to the issue of authority, it may have some influence in certain instances when UNCT members have the same level.

151 As per the conditions of service, the report of the Secretary-General “Investing in people” indicates that “...Significant differences exist between staff with 300-series appointments and those with 100-series appointments, between staff with 100-series appointments who are mission appointees and those who are assigned from Headquarters and between staff serving with peace operations and those serving with the United Nations funds and programmes. The

⁸⁷ A/C.S.48/26, paras. 3 to 12

differences relate to the designation of missions as family or non-family, the payment of compensation for maintaining a second household, the scope of the rest and recuperation scheme, the calculation of hazard pay and the lump-summing of travel entitlements”⁸⁸.

152 It is quite difficult to retain high-quality staff, with vacancy rates between 22 and 26 percent and a turnover rate of 30 percent of Professional posts⁸⁹, compared to a maximum of 8 percent for other system organizations represented in the field.

153 It is clear that without the support of qualified staff, leaders could not succeed in their strategic tasks. Hence, the Secretary-General proposed: 1) the introduction of one United Nations staff contract under one set of Staff Rules, with three types of appointments (temporary, fixed-term and continuing), and with conditions of service equivalent to the 100-series contract, varying according to the length of service and 2) the harmonization of conditions of service of secretariat staff in the field with those of other organizations by designating field missions in line with security phases, introducing the special operations approach for non-family duty stations, and revising the scheme for rest breaks including through lump-summing.⁹⁰

154 Given the annual recurrent cost of such proposals, estimated at US\$280 million, the General Assembly decided⁹¹ to request the ICSC to consider them and to report to it at the second part of its resumed sixty-first session. In its report for the year 2006⁹², ICSC concludes that the Secretary-General’s proposal on one type of contract should be revised to conform to the Commission’s contractual framework and recommends the phasing out of the appointment of limited durations in non-family duty stations in favor of fixed-term contracts with the same compensation package. The issue of uneven conditions of service then remains unresolved.

155 On top of the above described less attractive conditions of service, the current challenges for the implementation of the recently introduced “mandatory” staff mobility policy within the United Nations⁹³ and the challenges faced by staff to move across the system even voluntarily, reduce the possibility of finding qualified candidates to meet the increasing demand in human resources at the field level.

Support structures, coordination and decision-making mechanisms

156 Several information sharing, coordination, and decision-making mechanisms operate at field level under the authority of SRSGs, DSRSG/RC/HC and RCs.

147 Established pursuant to General Assembly resolution⁹⁴ as reflected in the ACC guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator system⁹⁵, the field-level committees, composed of all resident and non-resident United Nations representatives and chaired by the Resident Coordinator, review substantive activities, country programmes, sectoral

⁸⁸ A/61/255, para.272, 276

⁸⁹ A/61/255, para. 276

⁹⁰ Ibid. Proposal 4

⁹¹ A/RES/61/244 of 30 January 2007

⁹² A/61/30/Add.1

⁹³ JIU/REP/2006/7

⁹⁴ 47/199, para. 40 and 50/120, para. 41

⁹⁵ Para. 24

programmes and projects, coordinate joint activities and interact with other development partners and the national Government.

157 In integrated missions, the Senior Leadership Teams (SLT), comprised of the heads of major functional components of the mission, assist the SRSGs in planning and implementing the mission plans, supported by an integrated planning capacity that should bring the UNCT, financial institutions and NGOs into the planning and implementation process. Some integrated missions have created effective integrated mission-UNCT management teams, with agreed terms of reference and work plans, as in DRC.

158 Other field coordination mechanisms opened to the participation of all system organizations are the UNSMIT for security and the Operation Management Teams (OMTs) for the administration of joint services.

159 As for support structures, the Resident Coordinator function is back up by a coordination unit, financed by the Support to the Resident Coordinator Fund (SRC) and the United Nations Country Coordination Fund (UNCCF) from which US\$100,000 are allocated per year for the most basic capacity (one international/national staff and an administrative assistant). Additional funds may be mobilized from other agencies or local donors. In 2006, the staffing of such units varied from one or two to twelve individuals.⁹⁶

160 In peace operations, 67 percent of the missions/offices that responded to the JIU questionnaire have a unit and /or staff dedicated to integration with the UNCTs. These units coordinate activities (93 percent), share information (86 percent) and carry out joint planning (71 percent). However, unlike DPKO multidimensional operations, where integrated structures have been designed in support to senior mission leadership (a Joint Operations Centre, A joint mission analysis centre and an integrated support services), there is no structure for integrated peacebuilding missions.

161 According to the responses to the JIU questionnaire, the SRSGs offices are not provided with enough resources for integration, and are inadequately staff and financed. Similarly, the DRSG/RC position co-financed by the mission and UNDG pursuant to a recent General Assembly resolution⁹⁷, lacks adequate backstop to its multihatted functions, as confirmed by the two-third of the answers. The number of staff dedicated to support to this function does not exceed three in 79 percent and the funding is provided by DPKO only in 43 percent.

162 Representatives of the mission/office and the UNCT meet weekly in 41 percent of the cases, twice a month in 27 percent and monthly in 18 percent. Others meet irregularly or do not meet at all. The meetings are chaired by the SRSG, the DRSG/RC, the RC, co-chaired or rotated. The quality of the relationship with the UNCT has been qualified as excellent by 43 percent of the respondents, as very good and satisfactory by 19%, as simply good or poor by 14 % and 5 %, respectively.

Benchmark 13

The Representatives of the United Nations system are given the resources to effectively exercise the coordination responsibilities entrusted to them

⁹⁶ Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2006, UNDG, page 67

⁹⁷ A/RES/59/296

Through:

- (a) The Representatives of the United Nations System are graded at USG, ASG or D-2 level depending on the complexity of the country situation; but always one grade above of other members of the United Nations Country Team;
- (b) The harmonization of the conditions of service of staff serving in the field;
- (c) The adoption of a system-wide mobility policy;
- (d) Coordination/integration Units are established in all duty stations without exception, with direct reporting line to the Representatives of the United Nations system;
- (e) The Coordination Units support the Representatives of the United Nations system in their coordination functions within the UNCT, between the UNCT and the mission/office, the UNCT and the Government and the UNCT and other partners (donors, civil society and private sector).
- (f) The Coordination Units organize regular monthly meetings with the participation of all parties. In addition to information sharing and backstopping of meetings, the Coordination Units are responsible for joint planning, monitoring and evaluation and for resource mobilization.

Planning for effective coherence/integration

163 Integration/coherence is not possible without effective planning. Currently, several “integrated” strategic planning processes exist within the United Nations system: the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) for DPKO led missions; the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for OCHA and NGOs humanitarian activities; and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) of the UNCT led by UNDP for development, in addition to the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSP) of the Government and the World Bank or any other national strategy. There is no strategic planning process for DPA led missions and for non-integrated missions???

164 In principle, any such planning processes should be inclusive, focused, results-oriented and national-owned, based on the comparative advantages of each agency and of the United Nations as a whole. National Governments and partners from outside the United Nations system should be involved in the process, which should be normally initiated by an independent assessment that brings in and establishes a division of responsibilities among the various United Nations and non-United Nations actors (Breton Wood institutions, bilateral donors, NGOs) involved in addressing needs regardless of whether or not they are based in the country or are non-resident. It is imperative that such assessments draw on the UNCT long standing experience to identify the root causes of problem and in doing so, the regional dimension is mainstreamed into the country situation. A temptation to avoid is the abandonment of focus for the sake of inclusiveness.

165 UNDAF was the main strategic planning tool created in 1997 as part of the reform agenda of the Secretary-General of articulating a coherent vision for a unified approach towards common development goals at the country level.⁹⁸ The first UNDAF guidelines were adopted in April 1999 and have been subsequently revised. By the end of 2006, nearly all UNCT have engaged in the UNDAF process, with few exceptions of countries in crisis or post crisis situations or those with very limited United Nations presence. About 40 were finalized,

⁹⁸ A/51/950 of 14 July 1997, Renewing the United Nations: a Programme for Reform, para.73

mostly based on prior common country assessments, which could be but were not always highly participatory processes.⁹⁹

166 However, UNDAF is not an operational document, does not integrate results and resources nor link the programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluation process for accountability purposes. Although there are some good examples of UNDAF, in many instances it is just a sum of the activities in the country programme of each agency, grouped around some broad outcomes with few joint programmes to bring a multidisciplinary approach to interventions, avoiding duplications and increasing impact. In 2006, only 57 percent of UNCTs reported having developed or been in the process of implementing at least one joint programme, for a total of 345 joint programmes across the system. The three main areas of joint programming/implementation were HIV/AIDS, health, and governance/democracy. The agencies more currently involved were by large UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA, followed by WHO, WFP, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNIFEM and UNAIDS¹⁰⁰.

167 No planning document has been purposely devised for the eight pilot projects. The “One Plan” in Viet Nam is an extended UNDAF with outputs grouped around five major outcomes and indicative resources. Its preparation was strongly driven by the national Government and happened in two phases, a first phase initiated prior to the pilot project initiative, which brought in the six funds and programmes that were ready for the “One United Nations” (UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, UNAIDS, UNV and UNIFEM) and a second phase during which the other United Nations organizations resident in the country joined the plan. The main challenge face in this process was the dilemma between focus and inclusiveness.

168 The IMPP at its turn was adopted by the Policy Committee in October 2006 when most missions had been established and was found so complex that its revision was initiated right after. Indeed, IMPP has never been fully tested. At the time of writing this report, it was still at conceptual stage, although some elements of it were being applied. IMPP should lead to the establishment of a mission plans that focus on political, security, electoral and rule of law issues, with the involvement of all actors.

169 In responding to the JIU questionnaire, one third of the missions/offices indicated that they have not been involved in a joint planning exercise with the UNCT. Such joint planning exercises produced a joint planning document in 60 percent of the instances, and the document incorporated an exit strategy only in 24 percent. In elaborating this document, IMPP was partly or never used in 37 percent of the cases, respectively. The number of joint programmes included varied between 2-3 (22 percent), 5-10 (28 percent) and none (22 percent) and the main areas were HIV/AIDS, election, governance/democracy, rule of law and gender. Donors were involved in the planning process in 44 percent of instances.

170 Both mission plans and UNDAF may coexist, since they are not mutually exclusive and led by different actors. Yet, they can be duplicative. Therefore, it is necessary to create linkages among them to avoid overlapping and effectively articulate the shifting role of the United Nations system from peacekeeping to peacebuilding to development.

171 The Country Assistance Framework (CAF) for 2008-2010 in DRC and the revised and extended UNDAF in Burundi are good examples of transitional post conflict strategies. The

⁹⁹ Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2006, undg, page 14-17

¹⁰⁰ Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2006, undg, pages 54 and 56

CAF stands for the best practice so far in integrated planning since it involves the United Nations, the World Bank and 19 bilateral donors representing 95% of the ODA to the country. They build up on the PRSP, the existing UNDAF and the Governments strategies, defining a limited number of common strategic priorities under a shared vision for a sustainable peace. Individual agencies maintain other specific priorities in their country programmes as mandated by their governing bodies and financed under their results-based budgeting process. In DRC, the UNDAF cycle was coming to an end whereas in Burundi the UNDAF was revised before the end of the cycle to make them coincide with the timing of the mission. Both designated staff to seat in the planning cells. In Burundi, a representative of the Government sat in all meetings and one staff was full time dedicated to it, funded by DGO and trained in the UNSSC in Torino. They were long planning processes of several months of interaction, initiated at different stages and types of missions (DRC is a peacekeeping operation closed to phase down and Burundi a recently established peacebuilding office). At the time of the Inspectors' review, they were all still at the planning stage, and were moving to the implementation phase.

172 In the Inspectors view, regardless of the type planning instrument utilised, it should provide for the following to be an effective managerial tool: a vision of the United Nations comparative advantage and role in the country, a reduced number of goals and priorities and objectives in line with the country "needs and wants", cost estimates and indicators to measure results.

173 In implementing the "One Plan", the best practice so far is the theme/cluster approach. Among development agencies, the theme/cluster approach is based on the comparative advantage of agencies and started as a consultation mechanism for the preparation of the CCA and the UNDAF in cross cutting subjects to evolve into joint programming and implementation. The cluster approach developed by IASC for humanitarian agencies is more structured with higher predictability, timeliness and accountability than the theme group concept of UNDG. IASC has eleven pre-established clusters by sector/area of activity and leads at global and country level with the participation of NGOs, terms of reference for their functioning, authority to mobilize resources, mechanisms to assess their performance and training modules for leaders and members. Within peace operations, the theme/cluster approach is not applied although there are isolated examples of effective joint planning and implementation as the election process in DRC.

Monitoring, reporting and evaluation

174 Reporting on performance against plans through the RBB system was introduced at the United Nations during the biennium 2003/2004. It applies to all programmes including DPKO and DPA and is done through the IMIS and IMDIS.

175 Progress towards achieving the Security Council peace mandates is monitored through periodic reports by the Secretary-General, prepared by the mission/office, with increasing involvement of the UNCT and finalized at Headquarters. However, in the absence of success indicators to measure progress towards meeting established objectives and agreed reporting format, some of these reports lack clarity and in-depth analysis to ease the decision-making process.

176 Other than these reports, there is no evaluation mechanism to assess integrated missions and non-integrated missions. Evaluation has been traditionally a weak area in DPKO. Although the creation of Best Practices Section in 1995 represented a step forward, a decade

later it remains an internal policy development and lesson learnt mechanism without a structure to disseminate findings other than the Intranet for the exclusive benefit of DPKO staff. In recent years, the Section has “outposted” a number of Best Practices officers to selected missions with terms of reference that include ad hoc evaluations on request but in terms of structure and reporting lines, it is unclear whether these officers will fit within the monitoring and evaluation units in process of establishment within some missions/offices.

177 Resident Coordinators are required to prepare Annual reports based on detailed guidelines to assess progress towards meeting UNDAF outcomes/outputs and the United Nations contribution to the national development process and identifying good practices and lessons learnt in coordination and joint programming.

178 Individual reports are consolidated into annual synthesis reports that serve to feed information for the ECOSOC Annual Ministerial Review and Assessment Process and the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review of operational activities of the United Nations development segment’s report submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.

179 UNDAF monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework calls for annual, mid-term and final UNDAF reviews. In 2006, UNCTs reported conducting 18 of such reviews. It has been however reported that the monitoring and evaluation framework was too difficult to implement.

180 The pilot projects shall also develop their own M&E framework of the “One” Programme/Plan. At the time of the Inspectors visit to Viet Nam, M&E was in process of design.

181 The above are all processes of internal self-evaluation that are not independent by definition, although necessary and beneficial to ensure learning and feedback into the planning and programming process. Independent evaluation can only be exercised by external oversight and eventually by internal oversight, when adequately established, positioned and resourced.

182 In this connection, each organization of the system has developed at different extent its own oversight mechanisms that may or not include all the components of oversight (audit, evaluation, investigation and inspection), which do not all meet the criteria of independence, as defined in the JIU Report entitled “Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations system”¹⁰¹, and which work independently from one from another.

183 In terms of external oversight, other than the already mentioned policy review bodies such as ACABQ, CPC and ISCS, there are the Board of Auditors of the United Nations and its funds and programmes (except WFP) and the external auditors of the specialised agencies and IAEA as well as the JIU, the only existing system-wide oversight mechanism of the United Nations with mandate for inspections, evaluations and investigations.¹⁰² The Unit has successfully undergone¹⁰³ in recent years a process of internal reform to improve its efficiency and effectiveness but it is currently inadequately staffed to perform effectively this broad function.

¹⁰¹ JIU/REP/2006/2, paras. 38-48

¹⁰² The Panel of External Auditors comprising all external auditors of the United Nations family has a coordination, exchange of information and promotion of best accounting and auditing practices’ role.

¹⁰³ A/RES/60/258 and A/RES/62/226

184. The High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence recommended in 2006 that a United Nations system-wide evaluation mechanism should be set up by 2008 and a common evaluation methodology applied across the system by 2010. During its first regular session of 2007, CEB requested the network of heads of Evaluation Units of the United Nations system (UNEG) to revert to it with details on the scope, funding, and governance of a United Nations system-wide evaluation mechanism. UNEG prepared in August 2007 a draft paper entitled “Establishing a UN-wide evaluation system” which proposes the establishment of central unit under the auspices of and reporting to CEB with a standard setting role that could also conduct or lead programme evaluations commissioned by CEB. JIU has addressed a letter to UNEG taking exception from this latter proposal since it will overlap with the mandate of the Unit, and with recent General Assembly resolutions that reaffirmed its unique role as the only system wide external oversight body.¹⁰⁴

185 In April 2007, CEB commissioned UNEG with the establishment of substantive parameters and process for the evaluation of the pilot projects.¹⁰⁵ Subsequently, UNEG has produced a design of the evaluation that was endorsed by the HLCP in October 2007, has prepared terms of reference, hired evaluators and initiated the evaluation study and field missions to the pilot projects in November 2007 which will be completed with some delay by May 2008. The assessment of the evaluability of the Delivering as One initiative was due to the HLCP meeting in March 2008 but could not be fully finalized.

186 In December 2007, the General Assembly has called¹⁰⁶ for an independent evaluation of lessons learned from the voluntary efforts to improve coherence, coordination and harmonization in the United Nations development system (referring to the pilot projects), for consideration by Member States, without prejudice to a future intergovernmental decision.

187 The JIU can conduct such evaluation within existing resources, building up on the benchmarking framework proposed by this report.

188 The Inspectors recognize the need for “One” oversight mechanism for the audit, evaluation, inspection and investigation of the “One” Programme/plan and related joint programmes and projects in order to ensure a coherent approach and a rational use of existing oversight resources while avoiding oversight fatigue.

Benchmark 14

A results-based approach is applied to ensure a coherent and integrated planning, programming, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting process from the very outset of the preparation of the “One plan”.

Through:

- (a) Developing a single common country programme and strategy for all United Nations system organizations represented in the country with full participation of all actors;

¹⁰⁴ A/RES/60/258

¹⁰⁵ A/62/208

¹⁰⁶ A/62/208

- (b) Conducting prior needs/mission assessments to identify the root causes of problems with the involvement of the United Nations country team and others actors outside the United Nations family;
- (c) Translating country strategies into prioritised results-oriented and focused plans/programmes;
- (d) Focus on the simultaneous efforts of all United Nations components;
- (e) Setting progressive targets at country level for the set up and implementation of joint programmes;
- (f) Developing the cluster approach in the areas of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development based on the experience of the humanitarian clusters;
- (g) Establishing indicators to measure progress towards meeting objectives;
- (h) Setting up effective monitoring and (self-evaluation mechanisms;
- (i) Regularly feeding the results of evaluation into the planning process;
- (j) Improving the quality of the reporting process;
- (k) Resorting to existing oversight mechanisms to provide an independent assessment of progress achieved in the coherence/integration process.
- (l) Harmonizing the current Financial, Human Resources and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation Regulation and Rules.

One Fund

189 Early in this report, the Inspectors indicated that integration and coherence is not possible without Member States' political will; political will that translates into the financial commitment of donors to support the "One" United Nations process.

190 It is well known that the funding of field operations and programmes comes from different budget sources: a special scale of assessed contributions for peacekeeping, assessed contributions for political missions, and voluntary contributions for peacebuilding, development and humanitarian activities.

191 UNICEF, UNDP, UNFP and WFP are (almost) entirely funded by voluntary contributions and OCHA, OHCHR, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNDOC, UNRWA and UNEP increasingly so financed in at least two-thirds as well. The specialised agencies and IAEA rely heavily on extrabudgetary resources for technical cooperation programmes.

192 To mitigate the risks of their growing dependence on voluntary funding, the United Nations organizations have developed different initiatives with uneven success at headquarters and country level such as: multiyear funding framework (MYFF), multidonors trust funds (MTDF), the Central Emergency Response Funds (CERF), the Peacebuilding Trust Fund, voluntary indicative scale of contributions (VISC), thematic funds, pooled funding and strategic umbrella agreements with specific donors.

193 At country level, for development activities, the United Nations is not a major funding source, with only ??? percent of total Official Development Assistance (ODA), but rather a convenor, a normative and capacity building player. Core funds available at country level are spread out in small budgets by organization, with little resources left to implement individual programmes and even less for joint programmes. Considerable efforts are invested in fundraising and managing numerous donors/recipients with a variety of reporting requirements, cycles and procedures resulting in high transactions costs. Increased competition for funds results in even higher administrative and support costs.

194 On the other hand, voluntary funding for development is frequently tied up to specific donors interests that may differ from the country “needs and wants”. The conditionality and unpredictability of this funding undermine planning and distort the delivery of programmes and projects with under/over funding, as a result of donors priorities.

195 In humanitarian situations, where the United Nations may play a more decisive role, funding is more forthcoming, with less conditionality and better timing. Pooled funding has been quite successful in reducing transition costs for donors and recipients, and increasing transparency and focus, as for example in DRC.

196 In seeking greater harmonization, in 2006, through the CCA/UNDAF, 48 percent of joint programmes were financed in parallel and 22 percent pooled; whereas 22 country or region specific CAPs were launched with a 67% funding rate.¹⁰⁷

197 In multidimensional peacekeeping missions, a number of activities mandated by the Security Council lack funding, and Trust Funds are established to that purpose. However, contributions are scarce and SRSGs do not have resources at their disposal to meet certain operational needs, other than up to 1 million per mission for quick impact projects (QIPs) with a ceiling of US\$ 25, 000 ceiling per project during the first year of mission.

198 In this regard, the Peacebuilding Trust Fund established in August 2006¹⁰⁸ constitutes an important step to marshal resources for post-conflict recovery in areas for which no other funding mechanism is available. This includes activities in support to peace agreements in relation to national institutions, activities to enhance the capacity to promote coexistence and conflict resolution, activities related to the establishment of basic administrative services and critical interventions to respond to imminent threat to peace, as for example, the reintegration of excombatants under DDR. Two countries have been selected as pilot projects: Burundi and Sierra Leone, and each assigned US\$35 million.

199 The High-level Panel on System-wide coherence have recommended that sufficient core/assessed funding is secured for those organisations committed to the reform process, including to support the Resident Coordinator system and that all contributions be pooled at country level under one budgetary framework with donors refraining from funding interventions outside the “One” programme. This funding should be predictable and multiyear and organizations should align their funding cycles.

200 In this connection, UNDP has developed terms of reference for the operation of Multi-Donor Trusts Funds with a Steering Committee co-chaired by the Government and the RC or DSRG, composed by UN, Government and donors’ representatives and with UNDP as administrative agent, to decide on the allocation of funds based on established requirements and priorities and due reporting and auditing.

201 The Inspectors noted some good examples of working together with a wide range of donors to secure adequate funding for the “One” programme. At DRC, the funding of the CAF was secured through agreement with the World Bank and 19 bilateral donors present in the country. In Viet Nam, donors have committed to finance the activities of the first phase of the “One Plan” and a “One Plan Fund Allocation Committee” was established to prioritise

¹⁰⁷ Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2006, UNDG, pages 55 and 76

¹⁰⁸ A/60/984

activities for funding in close coordination with the Government. UNDP was to administer the “One Fund” on behalf of the UNCT and was responsible for fund mobilization.

202 The Inspectors agree with the funding principles outlined in the Report of the High-level Panel and see positively the efforts by UNDP to establish an **operational** framework for the “One” Fund through Steering Committees. While they recognise that UNDP is in a better position to act as financial administrator of the pooled funds, they believe that the UNCT Coordination Units are in a more “neutral” position to relate to donors and mobilise resources.

203 Likewise, donors should become increasingly conscious that it is a better investment to fight the root causes of conflicts and more rational to create the capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts before they escalate into costlier tragedies, as indicated recently by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

204 Actually, donors have become increasingly aware and concerned by the harmonization and effectiveness of aid, as illustrated by the Rome Declaration of February 2003 and the Paris Declaration of March 2005 whereby they commit to “link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from the national development strategy” and to “implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (e.g. joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows”, while setting indicators to measure progress that include aid predictability and untied aid.¹⁰⁹ Also, the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship adopted in Stockholm in 2003 recognize the need for a dynamic and flexible response.

205 Other than the mentioned limitations imposed by donors’ preference for tied and bilateral aid, it has been acknowledged that the United Nations financial rules and procedures remain a significant obstacle for the “One Fund”. The most frequently refer to are the differences in budget cycles, agency administrative costs, financial systems, cost recovery and cash transfer procedures. In this connection, some progress has been achieved with the new harmonized approach for cash transfer to implementing partners introduced in 2006 in a number of countries that have harmonized their programmes cycles. In Viet Nam, the harmonization of rules is of one of the pillars of the “One UN” and a working group has been set up to that purpose where both the Government and UNCT members are represented.

206 Finally, the challenge for UNCTs is not only to increase the amount and flexibility of funds received and to harmonize procedures to more effectively channel such resources but to be able to adapt to the capacity of the country to absorb such aid and meet donors’ expectations for rapid disbursement and delivery.

Benchmark 15

A funding mechanism that includes all United Nations system organizations present in the field, the Bretton Wood institutions, bilateral and multilateral donors, international and national NGOs and other members of the civil society exists to ensure coherence and correlation between the need assessments and available resources.

¹⁰⁹ Paras. 16, 32, 34

Through:

- (a) Linking the country programme and strategies to funding;
- (b) Involving Breton Woods institution and individual donors in the strategic planning process to increase ownerships and transparency;
- (c) Providing increased funds for QIPs and financing DDR activities under security programmes from assessed contributions;
- (d) Applying pooled funding for increased efficiency;
- (e) Establishing mechanisms to prioritise activities for funding;
- (f) Establishing effective inter-agency disbursement procedures; and
- (g) Revising financial and administrative rules to make them more compatible.

One house

207 Integration/coherence at administrative level means common premises and services in a “One United Nations House”. The rationale behind the one house is to reduce administrative costs, which absorb resources that instead could be dedicated to development, improving the ratio of programme to support costs.¹¹⁰ In this connection, the Secretary-General has recommended in its report of the 2007 TCPR¹¹¹ that related savings on transaction cost be better monitored and channelled into programme funding to be made available for operational activities for development in development countries. The Inspectors would like to see such savings reinvested in development on a recurrent basis and not as a one-time exercise.

208 Pushed forward through out the system and particularly within the 8 pilot projects, administrative integration lags far behind strategic and programmatic integration. The TCPR in 2005 has requested the creation of 20 joint offices by 2007. Only one has been so far established in Cape Verde and so for the four United Nations funds and programmes. Arrangements towards the establishment of other such offices are in process.

209 The set up of common services is progressing though slowly. In 2005, more than 60 out of 134 UNCT reported joint activities in the areas of security (by large the first one); procurement of fuel, paper and stationery; travel arrangements; IT and telecommunications¹¹².

210 As a first step, OMTs were set up, integrated by the most senior operation and administrative managers to make assessments and recommendations to the UNCT on activities requiring their approval for joint initiatives. OMTs are also called to plan and manage joint activities. UNDG has issued terms of reference and guidelines for their functioning.

211 In general, effective progress is hampered by lack of political will and commitment, by insufficient technical support and funding and by the differences in systems, rules and regulations among organizations.

212 Nevertheless, integration happens in spite of the rules and requires some degree of flexibility for “rule-breaking”, accommodating financial and budgetary processes to the overarching goal of achieving integration. In this connection, a lot of pressure is put today on

¹¹⁰ ECOSOC E/2005/CRP.1

¹¹¹ A/62/253, para. 50 and 51(i)

¹¹² Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Report 2005, UNDG, page 30

directors of administration and chief administrative officers to both comply with rules and at the same time to work around the rules to achieve prompt results.

213 On the other hand, whereas harmonizing rules and regulations is a process that requires policy decisions by the Controller, the ACABQ, the Fifth Committee and budget and finance committees at the funds and programmes and specialised agencies, these often go other way, micromanaging and adopting policies that undermine integration efforts, as for example, in the view of some, on the use of common assets.¹¹³

Benchmark 16

A One United Nations house is set up where United Nations system organizations in the country share common premises and services and related savings are reinvested in development activities within the country

C. The United Nations Country Team and others

214 The integration of partners from outside the United Nations system into the country team activities was first encouraged by the ACC Guidelines of 1999 which refer to the participation of representatives from Bretton Woods institutions and civil society in thematic groups and in the CCA/UNDAF process.¹¹⁴

215 Several initiatives followed with uneven success. In 2004, after the publication of the report of the panel of eminent persons on “United Nations-Civil Society Relations”¹¹⁵, which called for the United Nations to become a more “outward-looking organization” and to “connect the global with the local”, the Secretary-General proposed to strengthen the institutional capacity to engage with NGOs at country level through the establishment of focal points within UNDG and the UNCTs.¹¹⁶ In 2006, the High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence recommended that the United Nations and Bretton Wood institutions cooperate at country level in the development of needs assessments, PRSPs and MDG strategies, in data collection and evaluation mechanisms, in setting-up multi-donors trust funds and establishing a clear division of labour.¹¹⁷ UNDG has reported attempts to involve NGOs in the preparation of country assessments and UNDAF.

216 In the context of integrated missions, it is important to clearly establish the boundaries of integration and cooperation between the United Nations and NGOs and agree on common principles of intervention to preserve the quality of the relationship¹¹⁸.

Benchmark 17

Civil society representatives, Bretton Wood institutions, group donors and the private sector participates in the “One United Nations” process at country level

¹¹³ Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges, Seminar Addis Ababa, April, 2007, page 28

¹¹⁴ Paras. 11 and 19

¹¹⁵ A/58/817 and Corr.1.

¹¹⁶ A/59/354

¹¹⁷ page 36

¹¹⁸ Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges, Seminar Addis Ababa, April, 2007, page 23

Through:

- (a) Designation of focal points within the UNCT;
- (b) Participation in country needs assessment; and
- (c) Involvement in the design, implementation and evaluation of country strategies and plans.

Annex I

Annex title goes here

[INSERT "ACTION ON RECOMMENDATIONS" TABLE HERE]



Marvin Cardenas/NY/UNO
11/06/2008 12:13 PM

To SGCentral/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc Kaori Minami/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Josiane Ambiehl/NY/UNO@UNHQ
bcc
Subject Fw: A319, JIU review of the role of SRSGs and RCs: A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence within UN system. Invitation to a brainstorming session

Dear Central,

Grateful for your logging of the attached invitation -

Thanks,

Marvin

----- Forwarded by Marvin Cardenas/NY/UNO on 11/06/2008 12:13 PM -----



Byambaa
Nemehjargal/JIU/GVA/UNO@
UNGVA

11/06/2008 11:55 AM

To Marvin Cardenas/NY/UNO@UNHQ
cc Even Fontaine Ortiz/JIU/GVA/UNO@UNGVA, Maria GOMEZ TRONCOSO/JIU/GVA/UNO@UNGVA
Subject Fw: A319, JIU review of the role of SRSGs and RCs: A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence within UN system. Invitation to a brainstorming session

Dear Mr. Cardenas,

As per our telcon of this afternoon, I am resending you the invitation sent to the Secretary-General on 29 May 2008.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Nemehjargal

----- Forwarded by Byambaa Nemehjargal/JIU/GVA/UNO on 11/06/2008 17:54 -----



Byambaa
Nemehjargal/JIU/GVA/UNO

29/05/2008 15:06

To Ki-moon BAN/NY/UNO
cc Rajiv Ramlal/NY/UNO@UNHQ, Even Fontaine Ortiz/JIU/GVA/UNO@UNGVA, Maria GOMEZ TRONCOSO/JIU/GVA/UNO@UNGVA, Ludmila Kondrachova/JIU/GVA/UNO@UNGVA
Subject A319, JIU review of the role of SRSGs and RCs: A Benchmarking Framework for Coherence within UN system. Invitation to a brainstorming session

Dear Sir,

With reference to the above-mentioned subject, I am pleased to send you herewith attached on behalf of Mr. Fontaine Ortiz, Chairman, a letter of invitation to a brainstorming session to be organized in Geneva on Monday 30 June 2008.

We are looking forward to receiving your response.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Byambaa NEMEHJARGAL (Ms.)
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