



Trip Middle East (9/06)

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
CABINET DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL**

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

Date:	1 September 2006	Ref:	CDC/009/08/2006
To:	Ms. Corinne Momal-Vanian The Secretary-General's Party Doha	From:	Alicia Bárcena Chef de Cabinet New York <i>Alicia Bárcena</i>
Fax No.:		Fax No.:	212-963-2155
No. of pages (including this one) 31			
Subject:	Miscellaneous		

For the Secretary-General's attention/approval

1. Note dated 1 September from Mr. Mortimer concerning the SG's speech to High-level dialogue on Migration and Development. [26-11340]
2. Note dated 1 September from Mr. Michel on his upcoming trip to Beirut regarding the Lebanon Tribunal. [26-11350]
3. We are recommending that the Secretary-General writes to Heads of State/Government of key donors to raise funds for the Global Fund. Please find attached a note from Mr. Paolo Galli along with a draft letter and a list of recipients. We are seeking the SG's approval to have these letters signed at Headquarters. [26-11051]
4. Update Note from Mr. Lopes. [26-11324]
5. Note from Mr. Gambari dated 1 September entitled Background note and talking points for your visit to Ankara: Cyprus. [26-11361]

For the Secretary-General's information

6. Summary of today's Meeting of the Middle East Task Force. [26-11326]

cc: The Deputy Secretary-General

**Update Note for the Secretary-General
1 September 2006**

1. Iran

Gambari has sent you a note¹ providing an update on the nuclear issue. The strategy of the EU3 appears to still seek some form of dialogue with Iran through Solana, most likely next week. If such efforts do not lead to tangible progress, they are prepared to raise the stakes through the imposition of sanctions.

Iran's strategy seems to try to drive a wedge between Russia and China on one side and the EU3 and US on the other. While Iran reportedly snubbed Solana's overtures for consultations this week, officials sought talks with the "two". China's FM received Iranian Deputy FM in Beijing and the head of Iran's atomic energy organization will hold talks in Moscow next week.

Iran has continued its diplomatic drive to gain support from states with large muslim populations for its stance on the nuclear issue, including talks in Cairo, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India, Indonesia and Malaysia. At a press conference, Ahmadinejad maintained that the US and UK did not represent the international community but were just bullying the SC and others.

Larijani has clarified that Iran would be happy to buy fuel internationally, yet needed the know-how as a safety measure. He said engaging with Iran would be to Europe's advantage "because the issue of gas is a very important matter for Europe.

In another development, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has announced it will hold an international conference on the Holocaust 11-12 December that will allow historians to present "hidden aspects" of the holocaust. An Israeli newspaper announced that Holocaust survivors from Israel have asked to participate in the conference in Tehran.

2. Lebanon

Gambari has sent a note² indicating proposed contributions from Cyprus, comprising access to the installations of the Paphos Air Base, port facilities at Larnaca and Limassol ports, barracks for stationing approximately 1,400 troops, medical support and two military officers for the reinforcement of UNIFIL.

3. Sudan

UNMIS has sent an analysis on the resolution adopted by the SC. Although they refer to the text as "draft resolution" and although the cable was sent before

¹ (26-11319)

² (26-11286)

they knew the resolution had been adopted, the version they used to provide this analysis was identical to the final text. Gambari has also commented in previous notes that he will submit an analysis on the resolution. (attachment # 1).

4. Côte d'Ivoire

Stoudmann reports³ on his consultations in preparation for the forthcoming IWG and the NY meeting. In conversations with the IEC's President Mambé, he indicated that, once political and technical pre-conditions are fulfilled, the IEC would require approximately 11 months to complete the technical preparations for a credible election. Taking into account the experience of the last two months with the *audiences foraines*, the delays in the identification process, the delayed formation of regional IECs and the various objective and subjective obstacles in implementing these steps, the estimated timeline from early July has been reinforced. Stoudmann comments that the 11 months include 7-8 months for the identification process and 3-4 additional months to continue technical election preparations. He states that his consultations confirmed the need to adapt election procedures to the present situation of transition, even though this may lead to long legalistic debates and will face fierce opposition.

Stoudmann suggests that the only practical solution would be to establish an exhaustive list of all measures necessary to move the process forward, which he will prepare, and include these in a Security Council resolution for enforcement, thus bypassing interminable debates and delays.

Stoudmann further reports⁴ on his field visits to the north and west, by Licorne and UNOCI officer unanimously said that the disarmament of militias had been a farce. The fact that it was poorly implemented by a national authority (the PNDDR) in the context of a peace process overseen by the UN negatively affected the overall credibility of the UN.

He met in the course of the week with Sopuka, (Mbeki's representative). Sopuka was pessimistic about the possibility of moving forward in the next few months, and questioned the will of FN. General Mokoko, (Sassou-Nguessos representative), agreed that political will was lacking among the Ivorians, but stressed that political leverage appeared to be lacking among the international community. Mokobo stressed that the main problem was that the PM did not actually have the powers that he had been formally granted and, most importantly, he did not have control over security structures.

Schori reports⁵ on a meeting with the French Minister of Cooperation, Mme Girardin. She intimated that she had come with a message that there had been neither contact nor agreement with President Bongo on his surprise proposal on post-October governance arrangements (President Bongo suggested this week that Gbagbo should form a power-sharing government with his rebel and opposition

³ (CPY-052 of 30/8/06)

⁴ (CPY-051 of 25/8/06)

⁵ (CCN-319 of 01/09/06)

rivals, namely Outtara, Bédié and Soro, to end the political crisis), nor did France support them. Paris was also very concerned at the two recently speeches by Gbagbo where he rejected Chirac's call for updated electoral lists. The French would not accept preparations for "*des élections truquées*", nor would Paris be part of an automatic extension of present governance arrangements after October 31. This leads Paris to argue for "*un autre système de transition*". With French military engagements in Lebanon, Licorne's presence would be seriously questioned if the peace process continued to be sabotaged. Therefore, she ardently hoped that the AU would meet and take relevant decisions before the September 20th mini-summit.

Schori comments that the French government is now both very concerned and proactive in the face of the current impasse in Cote D'Ivoire. They realize that President Gbagbo cannot be excluded from any new arrangements but they will push for limits to his powers. The AU presidency seems to share the French and Schori's impatience, while the AU representative's reaction may reflect the mood of some African partners when it comes to tampering with the constitution.

5. Liberia

Doss has sent⁶ an analysis on the current political trends in the light of the recent security incidents. Senior government officials have suggested that the shooting incidents in the first week of August at the residence of the Special Security Service (SSS) Director were the result of an internal rivalry in the service, which raises concerns over the professionalism of the SSS personnel.

Recent reports of "secret" meetings between leadership of the former warring factions and Charles Taylor loyalists have further heightened security concerns. Of greater concerns are also the deactivated police and military personnel who find themselves unemployed and have limited access to alternative employment opportunities. The situation may be exacerbated with the return of IDPs and refugees.

Issues of former Liberian combatants being recruited to fight for the *Forces Nouvelles* in Cote D'Ivoire and for the militia of the President Gbagbo also constitute a security concern.

The legislature itself has within its rank former warlords and ex-combatants as well as individuals on the travel ban list, such as the Speaker of the House himself.

6. Reports approved on your behalf

EOSG has approved on your behalf the ninth quarterly Report to the SC on UNAMI. The observations are attached for your information. (attachment # 2)

EOSG has approved on your behalf your Report to the SC on UNMIK.

⁶ (MON 248 of 30/08/06)
26-11324

EOSG has approved on your behalf your report on Participation of volunteers *White Helmets* in the activities of the UN in the field of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and technical cooperation for development.


Also approved today, on your behalf was your report on International cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to recovery.

7. Security Council luncheon

DPA has proposed the following subjects for discussion at September's SC luncheon: Burundi, Darfur, DRC, Iran, Lebanon, Middle East, Timor-Leste (if the situation deteriorates). Your advice would be appreciated.

8. Update on several political issues

Gambari has sent you an update⁷ on political issues (attachment # 3)


Carlos Lopes
1 September 2006

cc: Mr. Malloch Brown
Ms. Bárcena
Mr. Nambiar

⁷ (26-11318)
26-11324