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TO: Mr. Wilfrid de Souza Executive Director UNAMIR, Kigali	FROM: Francis M. Ssekandi Deputy Director General Legal Division Office of Legal Affairs
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ATTN:	File:
Info:	Drafted by: FMS/zm
Date: 9 February 1996	Total no. of pages (including this page:

Please see attached.

Please copy to the SRSG
- Isel
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Cleared by:  Francis M. Ssekandi Deputy Director General Legal Division, OLA
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Reçu le 12 FEV. 1996

cc: Mr. I. Rivera

Given to Mr. O'neal

MINOR WORK ORDER REQUEST

REQUESTOR	
DATE OF REQUEST	19.10.95 ID NUMBER 021
NAME OF REQUESTOR	B. KIRU TEL/CALL SIGN 11004
SECTION/BRANCH	OSRSG
LOCATION OF WORK	<input type="checkbox"/> UNAMIR HQ AMANORO ROOM NUMBER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BELGIUM VILLAGE <input type="checkbox"/> CHELLANDO HOTEL <input type="checkbox"/> UNICEF BLDG
DESCRIPTION OF DISCREPANCY: TO FILL POTHOLES AT THE BELGIUM VILLAGE ROAD TO SRSG'S HOUSE AND TO EDS HOUSE	
CONTRACTOR	CONTRACTOR NUMBER
(LIST OF MATERIALS USED) (receipt = is available) WORK NUMBER	
REMARKS COMMENTS	
TOTAL OF LAB OF HOURS	
CERTIFICATION (When works comence)	
ACCEPTED THE WORK WAS COMPLETED SATISFACTORY	
SIGNATURE OF ACCEPTANCE	NAME
SIGNATURE OF CONTR RESF	NAME



*Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMIR, Kigali*

Tel.: (212) 963-9905 & (250) 84265 - Fax.: (212) 963-3090 & (250) 86877


DATE: 14 July 1995

Your Excellency,

I will be most grateful if you could grant an interview to the BBC as part of its documentary on the occasion of the visit to Rwanda of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

It may please you to see the BBC team next week either on Wednesday 19 July, Thursday 20 July or Friday 21 July. The BBC team's contact is Mr. Toby PORTER who stays at Mille Collines Hotel, Room 301.

I thank you Excellency for your cooperation and, please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.


Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

H.E. Major General Paul Kagame
Vice-President and Minister of Defence
Kigali
Rwanda

Isel, Special Assistant to SRSG:

Following your instructions, CIVPOL Commission met the resident Representative of UNDP on 29/6/95.

It has been decided, that a team of UNDP, CIVPOL and Gendarmerie will go to Ruhengeri Gendarmerie National Training School on Saturday, 1/7/95, 08.00 hrs to assess the situation of the school for contribution of UNDP.

You should be so kind to request for the helicopter on 1/7/95, 08.00 hrs,

6 Persons want to fly:

1 UNDP Representative (residential)


2 UNDP Officials

CIVPOL Commissioner

1 Officer from CIVPOL

1 Representative of Gendarmerie

29/6/95, 17.00 hrs

Capt. Ligi. 

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if possible.
re. Shreef

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. C. Ouziel
CAO

FROM : Isel Rivero
SA/SRSG *[Signature]*

DATE : 7 July 1995

The items that the SRSG had noted missing from the guest room at the Belgian Village are as follows:

- Curtains (including shower curtains)
- Kettle for the kitchen
- Coffee and/or tea
- Minimum cutlery and China
- Drinking water (one or two bottles).

Maintenance:

- telephones that work
- periodic housekeeping (he has been told that places are not kept clean).

In addition the guests should be given the name of a person and an extension number who would be on call in case of an emergency.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE

GOUVERNEMENT RWANDAIS EN EXIL

Very ex Geneve
2
Tfel

APPEL A LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE POUR
UNE SOLUTION DURABLE A LA TRAGEDIE RWANDAISE.
=====

En date du 14 octobre 1994, le peuple rwandais, par le biais du Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil, a adressé un mémorandum sur la situation politique du Rwanda, à la Communauté Internationale.

Ce mémorandum était motivé par l'évolution politique du Rwanda depuis le 06 avril 1994, la situation tragique dans laquelle se trouvaient les millions de Rwandais (réfugiés ou non), l'insécurité qui régnait sur tout le territoire contrôlé par le F.P.R., l'urgence d'une solution politique au conflit rwandais et la ferme volonté du même Gouvernement de contribuer à l'avènement d'une ère de paix et au retour pacifique de tous les réfugiés rwandais.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil lançait aussi un appel à tous les Rwandais pour qu'ils enterrent leurs hâches de guerre et leurs fusils. Il appelait à la fin de toutes les hostilités et à la fin de toutes les exactions. Il appelait tous les Rwandais à la réconciliation nationale et à la reconstruction de leur pauvre pays détruit par une guerre de quatre ans.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil demandait aussi à l'ONU, à l'OUA, à l'Union Européenne et à toutes les Organisations humanitaires qui ont tant apporté au peuple Rwandais de l'aider à restaurer la confiance et la sécurité des Rwandais, mais aussi à calmer les esprits.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil attirait l'attention de la Communauté Internationale sur le fait que l'absence de légitimité et de représentativité des institutions politiques mises en place au Rwanda par le FPR constituait une source importante d'instabilité.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil constatait que cela était d'autant plus vrai que sans un réel partage du pouvoir, sans constitutionnalité, sans l'instauration d'un Etat de droit et d'une Société civile active, tout effort pour résoudre le conflit rwandais serait vain, parce que d'autres conflits suivraient fatalement.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil faisait aussi remarquer que la Société rwandaise traînait depuis des décennies, voire des siècles, une multitude de pesanteurs et de rigidités qu'il faut absolument extirper, en vue de permettre l'éclosion d'une nouvelle Société.

Cette action nécessite une révolution des mentalités pour un renouvellement des modes de pensée et des modes d'action des Rwandais en général. Pour le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil, cela constitue le passage obligé si l'on veut vaincre les conservatismes et autres conformismes qu'on relève dans la Société Rwandaise.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil faisait aussi remarquer que, contrairement à une certaine propagande mensongère, la Société Rwandaise était prête à évoluer, à condition qu'elle se reconnaisse dans les objectifs qu'on lui propose, et que l'effort demandé à tous soit librement débattu et équitablement réparti.

La Communauté Internationale était interpellée pour qu'elle s'associe à un certain nombre d'objectifs, parmi lesquels:

1. Contribuer à sauver la Nation et l'Etat Rwandais;
2. Contribuer au règlement rapide de la question des réfugiés rwandais;
3. Contribuer à donner de l'espoir au peuple rwandais en montrant à ce dernier que la situation tragique qu'il vit actuellement n'est en aucun cas définitive, car rien n'était encore perdu d'une manière définitive pour le Rwanda; et,
4. Contribuer à la réinstauration d'une véritable démocratie et d'un Etat de droit au Rwanda.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil notait que la question du règlement du problème des réfugiés rwandais devrait être considérée comme une priorité absolue à laquelle tout devait être subordonné.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil concluait enfin qu'un dialogue politique responsable constituait le passage obligé pour l'avènement d'une telle solution à laquelle devrait adhérer une grande majorité de Rwandais. Ce dialogue devrait impliquer la Communauté Internationale du fait que la complexité du conflit rwandais découle aussi de l'existence d'interférences étrangères.

C'est ainsi que, parmi les causes profondes de ce conflit, on relève les velléités hégémoniques du Président Yoweri MUSEVENI d'Ouganda, des enjeux géostratégiques, économiques et linguistiques inavoués, et les velléités de reconquête du pouvoir perdu lors de la Révolution populaire de 1959 par d'anciens seigneurs féodaux réfugiés à l'étranger.

I. SITUATION ACTUELLE DES REFUGIES RWANDAIS DANS LEURS PAYS D'ACCUEIL.

1.1. Des conditions de vie de plus en plus précaires.

La fuite de Rwandais vers les pays voisins, au cours de la période d'avril-juillet 1994, répondait autant à la volonté de ne pas être tué sur place, qu'à celle de ne pas avoir à participer soi-même aux massacres.

La situation actuelle des réfugiés rwandais dans leurs pays d'accueil est dramatique. L'on compte environ quatre millions de réfugiés rwandais dans le monde, la plupart d'entre eux étant hébergé dans des camps de fortune installés principalement au Zaïre, en Tanzanie et au Burundi. 60 % de ces réfugiés sont des enfants de moins de 16 ans.

Depuis le mois de novembre 1994, les conditions de vie des réfugiés n'ont cessé de se détériorer sur tous les plans. L'aide alimentaire s'est vu réduite drastiquement de manière que, actuellement, le réfugié rwandais ne reçoit, en moyenne, que l'équivalent de 250 calories par jour, là où il en faudrait au moins 1.900. Cela a entraîné une faiblesse physique généralisée chez une grande majorité d'entre eux.

La Communauté Internationale a apparemment refusé de procéder à des contributions financières nécessaires pour assurer la survie de ces réfugiés. Il en a résulté que beaucoup d'Organisations non-gouvernementales (O.N.G.) ont cessé leurs activités relatives à l'assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés.

De même, l'encadrement-éducation des millions de jeunes qui se sont vus obligés d'abandonner leurs études (primaires, secondaires et supérieures) semble n'avoir pas attiré l'attention de la Communauté Internationale, et particulièrement du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (UNHCR). On n'est en droit de se demander ce qu'il adviendra de ces jeunes, continuellement désœuvrés, dont les parents sont dans l'incapacité d'assurer l'encadrement et pour lesquels il n'existe pas d'infrastructures scolaires. D'aucuns en sont arrivés à parler de génocide intellectuelle et culturelle opéré à l'endroit de cette jeunesse.

1.2. Une élite rwandaise menacée d'extermination.

Depuis le recouvrement de l'indépendance du Rwanda, l'Etat Rwandais a investi des sommes colossales dans la formation de cadres. Ces derniers sont aussi bien HUTU que TUTSI voire TWA. On retrouve l'essentiel de l'élite HUTU dans les camps de réfugiés. Ne voudrait-on pas par hasard "éliminer" cette élite HUTU en vue d'assurer la pérennité du pouvoir au Rwanda, au FPR!

La Communauté Internationale est-elle prête de financer la formation de nouveaux cadres rwandais, en recommençant à zéro, une fois que plus des deux-tiers de l'élite rwandaise aura disparue!

1.3. Des Rwandais HUTU (85 % de la population) diabolisés par la Communauté Internationale.

Les réfugiés rwandais souffrent énormément sur le plan psychologique. En effet, du fait de l'équation "HUTU=Tueur" qu'on a laissé s'installer dans les esprits dans le monde entier, la population HUTU est en plus sous le coup d'une suspicion et d'une culpabilisation qu'elle ne mérite pas.

C'est dans ce cadre que la Communauté Internationale a diabolisé toutes les autorités politiques d'ethnie HUTU, ainsi que la population HUTU en général, en le traitant de manière inhumaine (qualification de massacreurs, embargos sur les Visas, propagande mensongère de manière concertée, voire planifiée).

Il faudrait donc que la Communauté Internationale soit conscient du drame, non seulement physique, mais aussi psychologique et spirituel que vivent ces réfugiés.

1.4. La Communauté Internationale "complice" des atrocités commises par le FPR.

La Communauté Internationale se compromet en présentant les massacres systématiques commises par le F.P.R., à l'endroit des Rwandais d'ethnie HUTU, jusqu'aujourd'hui, comme des faits de guerre normaux, des bavures commises par des "éléments incontrôlés" de son Armée ou encore comme des actes de "justice immédiate".

Really

II. SITUATION QUI PREVAUT AU RWANDA SUR LES PLANS POLITIQUE ET DE LA SECURITE.

2.1. Mise en place progressive d'un pouvoir tyrannique.

Le FPR a foulé aux pieds l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha. Le pluralisme politique a disparu au Rwanda avec la prise du pouvoir par le F.P.R.. Les Partis politiques n'existent que sur papier, et l'on a parlé d'élections que d'une manière hypothétique, dans une perspective de cinq ans au moins. En réalité, le pouvoir FPR, monoéthnique, n'acceptera jamais la tenue de véritables élections.

Il apparaît actuellement, que, à la table des négociations d'Arusha (Tanzanie), les deux partenaires majeurs savaient très exactement que les dispositions prises ne seraient pas appliquées, mais il fallait faire de telle sorte qu'aux yeux de la galerie internationale, ce soit l'adversaire qui apparaisse comme le fautif. Ici, les pays et les organisations internationales qui ont joué le rôle d'observateurs à ces négociations ont une responsabilité capitale dans la suite des événements au Rwanda.

Le Gouvernement de facto, "dirigé" par Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU et à dominance TUTSI, est très contesté par les TUTSI eux-mêmes, qui, du fait notamment de leur volonté d'instaurer un pouvoir beaucoup plus monolithique que celui qui existe au Rwanda actuellement et de divers problèmes d'ordre socio-économique, ne ménagent pas leurs critiques.

Cette situation de marasme social, politique et économique, se caractérise aussi par l'existence de plusieurs désertions dans l'armée du FPR, voire des retours en Ouganda particulièrement de TUTSI anciens réfugiés et récemment rentrés au Rwanda.

Le FPR refuse tout dialogue avec toute personnalité HUTU qui ne serait pas à sa solde. Or, la situation intérieure, voire extérieure du Rwanda ne cesse d'empirer du fait de la présence de plusieurs millions de réfugiés rwandais dans les pays de la Sous-région.

Des rivalités importantes sont apparues entre les Chefs TUTSI avec formation de divisions lignagères comme dans l'ancien temps du moye-âge rwandais.

2.2. Violation systématique des droits de l'homme sur tout le territoire rwandais et volonté du FPR d'étendre le conflit rwandais aux autres pays de la Sous-région.

Les droits de l'homme restent bafoués au Rwanda. Des milliers de personnes sont arrêtées et emprisonnées de manière arbitraire. D'autres sont exécutées pour des raisons ethniques. Les conditions de vie dans les prisons rwandaises sont catastrophiques. Il existe au Rwanda des accusateurs sur demande.

Ce non-respect des droits de l'homme entraîne la permanence des camps de personnes déplacées qui abritent des centaines de milliers de personnes, certains ayant quitté leurs domiciles sur les collines et dans les villes, pour se réfugier dans ces camps de fortune.

Après avoir infiltré des centaines de ses soldats et milices "ABAKADA" dans les régions ayant accueilli les camps de réfugiés rwandais au Zaïre et au Burundi, le FPR vient de massacrer plusieurs dizaines de réfugiés dans le camp de BIRAVA au Zaïre, violant ainsi toutes les conventions internationales en la matière, ainsi que la souveraineté du Zaïre.

De même, à l'intérieur du Rwanda, cette même armée et les milices "ABAKADA" viennent de s'attaquer aux paisibles déplacés de guerre des camps de la Préfecture de Gikongoro. Ils ont ainsi massacré des femmes et des enfants particulièrement, sous les yeux de la MINUAR. Cette dernière s'était déjà rendue célèbre pour non-assistance à peuple rwandais en danger, en avril 1994.

2.3. Insécurité permanente et négation du droit de propriété.

L'insécurité est présente partout au Rwanda. Des listes de personnes à abattre circulent dans tout le pays (villes et campagnes), des personnalités HUTU sont froidement massacrées par familles entières puis enterrées dans des fosses communes, souvent creusées à l'intérieur même des maisons d'habitation des victimes. Des régions entières, particulièrement celles du Sud-ouest et du centre se sont vidées suite à ces massacres perpétrés par les soldats et les milices du FPR.

Le droit de propriété est complètement bafoué. Toute personne HUTU qui revendique sa propriété risque d'être assassinée illico. Le FPR a procédé à la distribution de biens meubles et immeubles (maisons, propriétés foncières...) à des personnalités TUTSI sans aucun respect du droit de propriété. L'on ne se tromperait pas si l'on disait que le Rwanda est spolié par ses prétendus dirigeants.

2.4. L'armée du FPR et ses milices "ABAKADA", constituant une terrible terreur pour le peuple rwandais.

L'armée et les milices du FPR appelés "ABAKADA" sont devenues l'instrument d'un pouvoir tyrannique. Elles organisent des vols, des massacres et des pillages et recourent à l'ethnocentrisme pour assouvir les grandes ambitions de leurs Chefs. L'enrichissement illicite est devenu une institution.

Les TUTSI récemment rapatriés, et particulièrement les hommes d'affaires, se livrent au pillage systématique du pays. C'est ainsi que, du fait du non-respect des règlements en vigueur au Rwanda, ils achètent notamment le café aux agriculteurs HUTU, à un prix dérisoire, avec l'appui des soldats et des miliciens, et l'exportent sans aucune déclaration et paiement de droits de sortie. Le produit de cette vente en devises n'est que très rarement rapatrié. L'on note une absence totale de l'Etat et un processus d'informellisation de l'économie rwandaise.

Les hommes d'affaires HUTU sont régulièrement lynchés, spoliés et dévalisés. Ils sont continuellement accusés de massacres et de génocide.

L'essentiel du "budget" de l'Etat rwandais est consacré à l'entretien d'une armée monoethnique dont les effectifs sont passés de 14.000 à environ 50.000 hommes (soldats et milices confondus) en moins de sept mois.

La situation sur les plans politiques et de sécurité ne cesse donc de se détériorer au Rwanda au fur et à mesure que le temps avance. Les Chefs militaires et politiques ne semblent pas s'en préoccuper. Ils semblent, au contraire, attiser des foyers de tensions en vue de permettre la gouvernance du pays par un petit nombre de personnes (genre d'AKAZU). Le FPR a aussi entrepris un programme de lavage de cerveau collectif, soi-disant pour "anéantir" l'ethnisme.

L'encouragement du FPR dans sa logique politique faite par certains pays étrangers n'est pas de nature à permettre un tel dialogue, pourtant indispensable si l'on veut résoudre la crise rwandaise et prévenir des conflits inutiles dans notre Sous-région.

3.2. La Communauté Internationale se trompe encore une fois, dans la recherche d'une solution à la tragédie rwandaise.

Il apparaît que dans certaines Chancelleries occidentales, des "esquisses de solutions" à la crise rwandaise sont en voie de discussion. Il apparaît aussi que ces "solutions" ne peuvent pas être de vrais solutions durables dans la mesure où elles s'écartent de la réalité profonde de cette crise et n'intègrent pas les principaux concernés, à savoir les réfugiés rwandais et leurs représentants.

C'est dans ce cadre que l'on parle, dans certaines de ces Chancelleries, d'initier des négociations avec les pays voisins du Rwanda (Zaire, Tanzanie et Ouganda) destinées à revenir aux frontières du Rwanda de 1895 (peu avant la Conférence de Berlin).

Cela veut dire que les trois pays concernés se verraient amputer, chacun, d'une partie de son territoire qui serait rétrocédée au Rwanda, et l'on voudrait faire croire que cela résoudrait la crise rwandaise.

D'une part, cela pourrait constituer un dangereux précédent dans la mesure où beaucoup de pays africains connaissant des problèmes similaires, la remise en question des frontières héritées de la colonisation risquerait de "faire éclater" l'Afrique entière. D'autre part, une telle solution ne résoudrait pas le problème crucial des propriétés des actuels réfugiés dont se sont partagés les anciens réfugiés TUTSI récemment rapatriés.

En ce qui concerne d'éventuels négociations entre le FPR et les réfugiés rwandais, on remarque toujours dans certaines Chancelleries occidentales, une esquisse de solutions selon laquelle, l'Union Européenne identifierait certaines personnalités "politiques" rwandaises actuellement réfugiés, en vue de les mettre face à face avec le FPR pour des négociations.

Le principe des négociations est accepté par les réfugiés rwandais, mais, il faut noter que pour ce qui concerne la représentation de ces derniers dans ces négociations, il faut qu'ils puissent être représentés par des personnalités politiques qui jouissent de leur confiance, qui ont fait preuve dans la passé de leur droiture et qui intègrent toutes les données de la problématique rwandaise.

Ce ne sont donc pas de "fausses solutions" élaborées dans certaines Chancelleries, sans le consentement des représentants des réfugiés, avec à la tête le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil, que le Rwanda pourra retrouver la paix et la tranquillité.

IV. URGENCE D'AGIR POUR UNE SOLUTION APPROPRIÉE.

Le gravité de la situation du Rwanda telle que développée ci-avant oblige à l'urgence d'une solution appropriée. Cette dernière doit être fondée sur le dialogue entre les parties en conflit.

4.1. Du point de vue politique.

Le 4 août 1993, a été signé à Arusha, en Tanzanie, un Accord de paix. Ce dernier n'a pas pu être mis en application du fait de l'assassinat des Présidents Juvénal HABYARIMANA du Rwanda et Cyprien NTARYAMIRA du Burundi et de la reprise de la guerre par le FPR en date du 6 avril 1994.

Pour sortir de l'impasse politique actuelle rwandaise, des négociations politiques devraient s'ouvrir rapidement, avec la garantie de la Communauté Internationale, de manière à dégager un Compromis politique sur les points ci-après:

1. La réconciliation ethnique et nationale;
2. Le partage du pouvoir politique au cours de la période de transition et l'organisation d'élections générales;
3. La sécurité des personnes et des biens;
4. La mise en place d'une armée, réellement au service de la Nation Rwandaise;
5. La justice et la primauté du droit;
6. La démocratie et les droits de l'homme; et,
7. La problématique de la population rwandophone dans la Sous-région.

4.2. En ce qui concerne le droit de propriété.

Tout le monde sait qu'il sera impossible aux réfugiés rwandais de recouvrer tous leurs biens, étant donné que certains de leurs biens ont été pillés ou détruits, une partie ayant été emportée dans les pays étrangers dont particulièrement l'Ouganda et le Burundi.

Toutefois, pour ce qui concerne les biens immobiliers, il ne peut pas y avoir d'Etat de droit au Rwanda, si ces biens ne sont pas rétrocédés à leurs propriétaires légitimes. Le droit de propriété n'est pas négociable.

Dans l'Accord de paix d'Arusha, il était prévu un plan de rapatriement des réfugiés rwandais d'alors. Avec la reprise de la guerre et la "victoire militaire" du FPR, ce dernier a organisé un rapatriement sauvage des anciens réfugiés TUTSI.


Par ailleurs, il était prévu des sites d'accueil de ces réfugiés sur tout le territoire rwandais. Il serait judicieux d'installer temporairement les anciens réfugiés nouvellement rentrés au Rwanda dans ces sites et éventuellement dans d'autres à identifier, de manière à permettre aux réfugiés actuels de réintégrer leurs biens en toute sécurité et de prévenir d'éventuels conflits entre les propriétaires qui rentrent et les squatters.

Le Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil lance un appel pressant à toute la Communauté Internationale pour s'investir dans la recherche d'une solution pacifique à la crise rwandaise. Il n'est plus nécessaire de rappeler que l'absence de cette solution constitue une bombe à retardement pour toute la Sous-région. Est-ce, ce que souhaite la Communauté Internationale!

De même, il lance un appel pour une mobilisation suffisante de l'aide humanitaire au profit des millions de réfugiés rwandais, et particulièrement de la jeunesse rwandaise réfugiée.

Fait à BUKAVU, le 20 avril 1995.

Jérôme C. BICAMUPAKA



Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération.

J.-L. Emmenegger
P.O. Box 110
CH-1009 Pully
Switzerland

Misc

25 Nov 94

long

I sel. (can you help this?)

500 - 1000 13.5

Dear Sir,

I found your name in a press release of the UN HQ in New York, issued recently. You were mentioned as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Rwanda.

For my historical collection of documents related to the UN role in the peace effort in Rwanda, I would appreciate getting from you (posted in Rwanda = would be better !!! or via UN-NY) one or two copies/envelopes (of MINUAR II ?) with your complete sender address on the front side (handwritten all). It would be fantastic if you would accept to help me a bit!

Good Luck for your peace efforts!

Looking forward to hearing from you, I remain

Sincerely yours J.-L. Emmenegger

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX

MIR NO:

MISC NO:

TO: Ms. Esperanza Durán World Gold Council Kings House 10 Haymarket London SW1Y 4BP	FROM: Shaharyar M. Khan SRSG UNAMIR, Kigali Rwanda <i>Shaharyar M. Khan</i>
FAX NO: 44-171-839-4314	DATE: 8 May 1995
AUTHORIZED	PHONE: 212-963-3582 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
SECTION: OSRSG UNAMIR, RWANDA	
SUBJECT:	

PAGE 1 OF 1

Dear Esperanza,

I was pleasantly surprised to receive your fax from Washington DC. Though you had indicated to me that your plans were taking you away from the World Bank, I was saddened to realize that we shall be losing your periodical presence in Kigali.

However, I can understand your reasons for feeling a sense of personal loss since you dedicated so much of your professional energy into resuscitating the Rwanda World Bank package. My staff as well as I will miss you and I certainly hope that our paths will cross again.

I took it upon myself to share your very impressive vitae with a colleague in New York just in case something comes up which could be of interest to you. I hope you have left forwarding instructions at your Washington address.

In the meantime I will not say goodbye, but au revoir.

My very best regards.

* * * *



UNAMIR - MINUAR

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In the meantime I will not say goodbye, but au revoir.

My very best regards.

* * *

Draft

VIA fax

Dear Esperanza,

I was pleasantly surprised to receive your fax from Washington DC.

Though you had indicated to me that your plans were ~~(most definitely)~~ taking you away from the World Bank, ^{I was seldom / I realize} ~~it is nevertheless a shame~~ that we shall be losing your periodical presence in Kigali.

However, I can understand your reasons for feeling a sense of personal loss since you dedicated so much of your professional energy into resuscitating the Rwanda World Bank package. My staff as well as I will miss you and I certainly hope that our paths will cross again.

I took it upon myself to share your very impressive vitae with a colleague in New York just in the ^{case} ~~event~~ that something ~~(might)~~ ^{come} up which could be of interest ~~(ing)~~ to you ~~(and the United Nations)~~. I hope you have left forwarding instructions at your Washington address./

In the meantime I will not say goodbye, but rather, ^{an revoir} ~~let's talk when I am in~~ ~~London again.~~

My very best regards,

Yer A

THE WORLD BANK GROUP
Headquarters: Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.
Tel. No. (202) 477-1234 • Fax (202) 477-6391 • Telex No. RCA 248423

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET AND MESSAGE

DATE: May 4, 1995

NO. OF PAGES: 1
(including cover sheet)

MESSAGE NO.: (#) 3657

TO: Ambassador S. Khan
Title: SRSG
Organization: UNAMIR
City/Country: Kigali, Rwanda

DESTINATION FAX NO.: 212-963-3090

FROM: Esperanza Durán
Title: Country Economist
Dept/Div: AF3C2
Room No.: (Room #)

DIVISIONAL FAX NO.: (202) 473-8564
Dept./Div. No.: (Div-#)
Telephone: (202) 458-4733

SUBJECT: Farewell

MESSAGE: Dear Ambassador Khan,

It is with much regret that I must inform you that I will be relinquishing shortly my responsibilities as Country Economist for Rwanda. It is a post I held to with great enthusiasm and conviction that the Bank could contribute to rehabilitation and reconstruction in the wake of the 1994 crisis. Though professionally most rewarding, I have realized that it is at the personal level that I now feel sense of loss. I was very fortunate that, through our discussions, I always found in you a sense of direction and commitment I greatly admired and guided my own perceptions. I shared many of your views and I feel that your being at the head of the UN operation in the country was a positive contribution in incredibly difficult and complex circumstances. Personally, I am most grateful for the unfaltering support and encouragement I always found in you. There were some rough times while in Rwanda, and I shall never forget the enormous contribution you made, not only at the institutional, but also at the personal level.

I do hope that our paths will cross again in the not too distant future.

My new address. World Gold Council
Kings House
10 Haymarket
London SW1Y 4BP

Tel: (44-171) 930-5171
Fax (44-171) 839-4314

As always,

Esperanza

Transmission authorized by: authorization

If you experience any problem in receiving this transmission, inform the sender at the telephone or fax no. listed above.

P1. sent by
a nice reply.
Sub.
6-5
tel

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MEMORANDUM

TO: Force Commander
CIVPOL Commissioner

FROM: Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative of
the Secretary General

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 08 May 1995

SUBJECT: Information Exchange

Now that the Spokesman's office is fully operational, all components of UNAMIR who have immediate access to information that has news value are requested to maintain a regular link with the Spokesman's office. This link should be a routine daily link, as also an ad-hoc link on news items of immediate importance.

Accordingly, Military Operations, Investigations Branch, G-2, CIVPOL, Humanitarian Assistance Liaison, Public Affairs, et cetera, are requested to establish direct contact with the Spokesman's Office.

Your assistance will be appreciated.

* * * * *

to FC

CIVPOL Commissioner

Information Exchange

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Your assistance will be appreciated.

draft *Agus*
Please update



Date: 6 May 1995

To: AFC
CIVPOL Commissioner

From: SRSG

Subject: Information Exchange

The Office of the Spokesman has brought to my attention the fact that up-to-date information is not being channelled to his attention in a timely manner. I think it would be a good idea if the different components of the mission would keep a daily link with his office either directly or through the military Public Affairs Officer's office.

Essentially these two services should act reciprocally in the way they receive and handle information, and while noting that the office of the Spokesman should take the initiative in corroborating certain facts, he should be contacted by the different services, Operations, G2, Investigations Branch, et cetera, in order to enable him to verify or deny different reports.

Your assistance will be appreciated.

Nat'l Hlth Spokesman's office is fully operational
all components of ORNSTEIN also have immediate access
to information that has news value are requested to
maintain a regular link with the Spokesman's office. This
link should be a routine daily link as also an
ad hoc link on news items of ~~an~~ immediate importance.
Accordingly Nat'l CPS, Capital, X - ~~is~~ ~~are~~ requested
to establish direct contact with Sp's office.

Please
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NOTE TO THE SRSG
5 MAY 1995

Subject: Enhancing efficiency for the Spokesman's Office

NOTE: *The following issues should not normally be brought to you. The questions raised below should have been taken care of and resolved easily and quickly in a professional manner to avoid a situation where every solution sought appears to be given as a favor.*

In the course of my duties as UNAMIR Spokesman, it has become quite clear that this Office is not sufficiently and promptly served with regard to receiving information that is required by the media. That is to say the information on events that affect the day-to-day life in Rwanda in the light of UNAMIR's mandate. Some recent examples here will illustrate this point.

Both these stories were false. See
On Monday, May 1, 1995 at 14:55, Voice of America called from Washington, D.C. asking me to confirm some information given by UNHCR on the death of 18 people at Huye, Butare Prefecture. On that same day at 20:18, another call came from REPORTERS SANS FRONTIERES in Paris, asking for confirmation of the arrest of Monsignor André Sibomana, Head of Kabwayi Diocese in Gitarama and Editor of KINYAMATEKA newspaper.

In both cases, I was learning the news from outsiders and my efforts to check their veracity took long to get a response: two hours in the first case and waiting overnight in the second case. I had to call UNHCR, where an officer explained in more detail what had happened at Huye.

These two cases are typical examples of every-day handicaps that hamper the carrying out of the Spokesman's duties. Without having to know each and everything, the Spokesman should be among the first officials to know what is happening, for purposes of public information. This is essential for the credibility of his office and effective image-building for UNAMIR.

I agree. Dep. human rights not informed Sp. Gen. enough. I sent a circular
It is in view of this that I respectfully request that the Chief of the Mission tells the relevant services about the need for the Spokesman to keep abreast of all events likely to interest the media. The services in question are: the Office of the SRSG, the Security Services Section, the Office of the Force Commander, the Military Police, the Military Observers, the Civilian Police, the Investigation Branch and the Operations Section.

The Spokesman's Office ought also to receive from the Military Operations Branch the latest and up-to-date information on what is happening across the country.

Needless to say that the Spokesman is always to ensure that the SRSG is in full agreement with what he can report to the media.

Your directives in the above matter will most certainly strengthen the collaboration between the Spokesman's Office and the other Services.

Photocopying ok.
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strength and rules
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In addition to the above, there are three problems that need your good offices for the much needed solution: lack of a full-time secretary, the reluctance by the Administration to maintain our driver and need for a photocopier.

Since early March, the Spokesman's Office has to depend on part-time secretaries who have priorities for other offices. One has practically to beg them to have some work done. And even then, it is almost impossible to get their services between 12:30 and 2.30 p.m. as well as after 5 p.m. Yet the urgency of such work cannot be over-stressed. A delay of some hours can turn fresh information into superfluous, stale news of no importance to our target groups. It can also make this office look ineffectual before you and in the eyes of colleagues in New York, who may resort to other channels for more fresh data. As an example, last Saturday afternoon I was instructed to make a report on my return from Kibeho but the draft, which has been ready since last Sunday is still waiting to be typed.

Another example, in the case of New York: while reporting over the phone yesterday to the Spokesman in New York about the opening of the Inquiry Commission on Kibeho, I was informed that a detailed report from UNAMIR had already been received and mine would serve no purpose.

In the light of these facts, your personal intervention will be vital for the rectification of this matter.

usual
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help?
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ED

The issue of a driver for this office is equally an urgent matter to resolve. The driver assigned to this office is about to be withdrawn by the Administration. The decision to assign that driver was taken by the Executive Director in early April, following earnest pleas by this office to facilitate the public relations work in our dealings with the media. The urgency entailed in making the necessary contacts is indeed self-explanatory. And so is the frequent need to work late in order to process and disseminate information while it is still fresh. Both factors necessitate the services of a driver. Again your intervention in this matter will be highly appreciated.

yes. This
is essential
Sub.
55

The last issue is the request for a photocopier. This office has often to try a number of other offices seeking help for photocopying documents that are urgently required for distribution. As in the above cases, the time factor is of essence and such a facility is, therefore, the long awaited solution.

It is our sincere hope that the SRSB will kindly consider the above facilities as essential inputs to enhance the efficiency of this Office.

Avec une haute considération./


Ismaël A. Diallo
Spokesman

cc: Mr. S.K. Buo
Acting Executive Director

* * * * *



Date: 9 May 1995

To: ED
CAO
Mr. Goeransson
MOVCON
Isel |

From: Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

Shaharyar M. Khan

Subject: Airport problem

There has been an appalling lack of sensitivity and inefficiency with regard to receiving the inquiry commission representatives.

a) Col Ashraf was "returned" to Nairobi because he did not have a visa. He was unable to plead his case with anyone who could have helped him. Though the main fault lies with an intransigent airport official, surely someone from UNAMIR could have assisted the distinguished visitor [Attached note may be seen].

b) Worse still was that Ambassador Ataul Karim was not received at all at Nairobi airport. He had to fend for himself carry his bags, pass through customs and find his own way to our aircraft. This is a disgraceful lapse for which I must have an explanation in writing within 48 hours. Why was Ambassador Karim not received? Was everyone concerned informed of his arrival? Were clear instructions sent?

I would like ED to hold the inquiry and report to me by Thursday noon.



From: Col K M Tutt
Commander BRITCON
HQ UNAMIR

Extn 11109

To: OIC Administration

Info: Office of SRSG, DFC through COS

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-21

Date: 8 May 95

Subject: RECEPTION DIFFICULTIES - LT COL ASHRAF KHAN
(UK REPRESENTATIVE - INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION INTO KUBEHO CAMP)

1. I had been advised by the UK Charge d'Affairs for RWANDA, Dr Lillian Wong, that a British Army Officer Lt Col Ashraf Khan had been assigned to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office as the UK representative on the International Commission into Kubeho Camp. He was due to arrive in Nairobi Airport at 0640 hours Sunday 7 May 1995. This memo records the events as seen from my perspective.
2. I agreed that I would check the UNAMIR travel arrangement from Nairobi and would extend the normal courtesy of ensuring that an incoming British officer was met by an in-theatre officer, in this case myself. On Saturday 6 May 1995 Air Ops HQ UNAMIR, Mr Smith, confirmed that all the necessary information would be passed to Mov Con Nairobi on Lt Col Ashraf Khan and other members of the International Commission and it was expected that Lt Col Ashraf Khan would be able to travel to Kigali on the UN flight Sunday 7 May 1995.
3. On Sunday 7 May 1995 at 1040 hours I met the UN flight. Lt Col Ashraf Khan did not pass through customs with the other UN passengers. Movement Control, the US civilian employed by Brown and Root, confirmed from the manifest that Lt Col Ashraf Khan had been booked on the flight and was shown to have travelled on it.
4. At 1130 hours the Movement Control representative went into immigration and informed me that Lt Col Ashraf Khan was not at immigration, he further advised me that with some VIPs they are processed through different channels and this could have happened.
5. I returned to HQ UNAMIR and first checked by telephone if Lt Col Ashraf Khan had been transported by other means to the UK Charge d'Affairs residence, this had not happened. I then checked with the Political Affairs Officer, Mrs K Scott, she had no additional information, but advised me to discuss the matter with Air Ops.

6. At about 1145 hours I then checked with the Air Ops officer Mr Smith. He investigated the movement of VIPs and confirmed that Lt Col Ashraf Khan had not moved from the airport through other channels.

7. Mr Smith then informed me, some ten minutes later, that the flight manifest had incorrectly shown Lt Col Ashraf Khan to have boarded the aircraft, but he had in fact not reported at Nairobi. There was a warm discussion over the radio between Mr Smith and the Mov Con representative at Kigali airport on the failure of Movcon Nairobi who, it now appeared, had in error shown him as being a passenger.

8. At 1200 hours I informed the UK Charge d' Affairs of the events, that Lt Col Ashraf Khan had not boarded the aircraft at Nairobi and she agreed to check with the High Commission in Nairobi.

9. Later that afternoon the UK Charge d' Affairs was informed by Lt Col Ashraf Khan from Nairobi that he had been on the UN flight, but because he had no appropriate visa had been refused entry, refused any right of contact with UNAMIR representatives and refused any right of use of the telephone. He was subsequently returned to Nairobi.

10. The incorrect statements at paragraphs 4 and 7, exacerbated by the intransigence of the Rwandese authorities, meant that three valuable hours within which the visa complication might have been resolved were lost. There appeared, within movement control, to be no positive information as to who was on the flight, no support for VIP passengers faced with immigration difficulties and no record of how they had disembarked. This sad series of errors had occurred despite the requirement to treat this passenger as a VIP.

087 Received Message

01:47 03/02/51

*Copied to
SASG
Bessan de.*

ZCZC KGMS2419 MCX0769
SS KGM
.NEWYORK (UNAMIR) 2342 GMT 05/04/95
BT
17258-5 FOR GOLO
FROM DA COSTA.

PLEASE BE ADVISED, MR. ATAUL KARIM, UN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY FOR EVENTS IN KIBEHO, IS SCHEDULED TO
ARRIVE NAIROBI ON 8 MAY 1995 AT 8:55 AM (0855 HRS) VIA FLIGHT
NUMBER BA 69. PLEASE MEET ON ARRIVAL AND ARRANGE ONWARD TRAVEL TO
KIGALI THE SAME DAY. PLEASE ALSO MAKE DSA PAYMENTS AS APPROPRIATE
AND CONFIRM TO SATO/FALD.

VM

MR. KARIM WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO NEW YORK VIA GENEVA ON
SWISSAIR. PLEASE MAKE ANY NECESSARY CHANGES TO HIS AIR TICKETS.
REGARDS,
(MEDILI/FALD)

COL CKD
M5661

PINTO 2286 ALL

=0504952344GMT

NNNN

(Circled signature)

*Mr. Revere
cc: Roucoal / travel
for in Nairobi
5-5-95*



UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX NO. 2792

PAGE 1 OF 2

MIR NO. ✓

MISC NO. 1572

TO: MR. N.I. GOERANSSON SAO UNAMIR NAIROBI (KENYA)	FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN SRSG UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA
	DATE: 4 MAY 1995
FAX NO: 254-2-622668 <u>41111LT</u>	PHONE: 212-963-9905 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
ORIGINATOR: I. RIVERO <u>✓</u>	SECTION: OSRSG
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION AGAINST UNAMIR	

PLEASE PASS THE ATTACHED INFORMATION TO MR. AJELLO WHICH WAS SENT YESTERDAY TO NEW YORK:

YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT ON 1 MAY 1995 THERE WAS A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST UNAMIR NEAR THE AUSMED FACILITIES IN KIGALI. WE HAVE IN THE MEANTIME OBTAINED THE ATTACHED PROFILE OF THE FOUR HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS WHICH STAGED THE DEMONSTRATION. BEST REGARDS.

SRSG

I RIVERO



AVP (Association des Volontaires de la Paix, Association of Peace Volunteers), ASRG (Association de Soutien pour les Rescapés du Genocide, Association for Support to the Survivors of Genocide), AVEGA (Association des Veuves de la Guerre d'Avril, Association of Widows of April War), and PAGE-Rwanda, are four Rwandese human rights associations which were created after the RPF victory, and are almost exclusively composed of ethnic Tutsis very close to the RPF. The members of the associations are people who lost most of their relatives during the genocide, most of their family only survivors being RPA soldiers who were on the battlefield. The chairman of ASRG is Mr. Joseph Nsengimana, the Minister for Higher Education, Culture and Scientific Research, a former university teacher, who lost almost all members of his family including his wife and children, and was saved by the RPA, the Chairman of AVP is Andre Katabarwa, a very rich Tutsi businessman, and former Minister under the Regime of President Habyarimana. The Chairman of AVEGA is Mrs Cyubahiro Nyiratamba, the wife of the late Cyubahiro Constantin, a former Minister under the regime of President Habyarimana. The associations which claim to be the voice of genocide survivors are politically influential and are thought to be responsible for the postponement of the trials of people accused of the crime of genocide, however wished by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Alphonse-Marie Nkubito. The associations claim that the trials should begin with the planners of genocide and the laws on judicial procedures, and penal laws, have to be amended and voted first by the Parliament. The associations have attracted many Tutsis who have recently returned from exile, mostly Tutsi extremists, and who hold a grudge against UNAMIR and the foreign community accused of failing to save their relatives, and France and the Catholic Church for alleged complicity in genocide, and MDR political party, for conducting a bloody social revolution in 1959 which overthrew the Tutsi rule and caused the massacre of thousands of Tutsis and forced many more to exile.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UN POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA, NAIROBI, KENYA

TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

OUTGOING FAX NO:	DATE: 26 APRIL 1995
TO: MR. ALLY GOLO CAO UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA	FROM: ABDUL HAMID KABIA UNPOS NAIROBI, KENYA <i>AKH</i>
FAX NO: (212) 963 3090	FAX NO: (254-2) 622697
TOTAL NO. OF PAGES: 1	REFERENCE:
SUBJECT: LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE	
CALL PHONE NO: (254-2) 622705 FOR ANY QUERIES	

ATTENTION: OUATTARA/DRIGGERS/JORSLING

1. MR. OMAR HALIM HAS BEEN ASKED TO UNDERTAKE A MISSION TO MOGADISHU, SOMALIA. IN FURTHERANCE OF THIS TASK, IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF YOU MAKE A UNAMIR PLANE AVAILABLE TO TAKE MR. HALIM AND A PARTY OF ABOUT 4 OR 5 TO SOMALIA ON SUNDAY APRIL 30 1995 ON A DAY RETURN. SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY, MR. HALIM MAY UNDERTAKE ANOTHER DAY RETURN TRIP TO SOMALIA ON MONDAY MAY 1 1995. UN HQ HAD SENT A CODE CABLE CNR 106 ON THIS MATTER TO UNAMIR SRSG ON 24 APRIL 1995.
2. FURTHER TO MY DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU THIS MORNING, PENDING THE FINALISATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR NEW OFFICE BY UN HQ, IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF YOU COULD MAKE TWO VEHICLES AVAILABLE TO THE UN POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA ON LOAN. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR AUTHORISATION TO UNAMIR NAIROBI OFFICE FOR THE RELEASE OF THESE VEHICLES.

VERY BEST REGARDS.

*Pl. agree
Sel
26-4**(DIR)**CAO**MCC**CITMM*



24 April 1995

Dear Mr. Ayres,

Thank you for your note of 18 April 1995 which I have read with interest.

In the course of the coming months we shall be examining our capabilities and future mandate and I hope that at that time we shall be able to find a more suitable place where your experience can be of service to UNAMIR.

I would suggest that you provide Mr. Golo with a copy of your curriculum vitae in order to make him aware of your capabilities.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Shaharyar M. Khan'.

Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Christopher J. Ayres, ESQ,
Legal Officer/Administration
UNAMIR



DRAFT

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I would suggest that you provide Mr. Golo with a copy of your curriculum vitae in order to make him aware of your capabilities.

Sincerely,

S. Khan

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1st. pr. J. S. 21 4 UNAMIR - MINUAR

18 April 1995

Dear Sir,

I am distressed over recurring problems arising between the various Sections of UNAMIR and the Rwandan Government. Following our meeting of 15 April 1995 (re: Brown & Root Satellite) it became evident to me that you share the same concerns.

There appears to be an inability on the part of UNAMIR officials to engage in constructive discourse with Rwandan officials when seemingly urgent objectives appear in conflict with Government procedures. I refer to this as "external friction".

Also, it seems to me that nearly all Sections have great difficulty understanding or appreciating the policies and position of the OSRSG. I refer to this as "internal misapprehension".

If the structures are in place to address both external friction and internal misapprehension, they have proved ineffective. Adding to the problem are the too frequent negotiations with Rwandan Authorities and private indigenous entities that are undertaken from an adversarial perspective. Adversaries wind up issuing ultimatums where reasonable discussions emphasizing common ground and mutual interests should prevail.

The result is increasing discord, tension and misunderstanding both internally, and in relation to our hosts, the Rwandan Government. UNAMIR's status, while never exemplary, is suffering blows that may have irreversible effects.

To counter these increasingly troubled relations, permit me to point out the following. I hold my Juris Doctorate from Harvard Law School ("HLS"). While at HLS, I achieved the highest mark in a negotiation project involving several hundred worthy HLS participants. I have passed the most prestigious and difficult bar examinations in the United States. While ordinarily I would refrain from making reference to my background, under the circumstances, the negotiation and communicative skills I have cultivated both during my several years at Harvard and in subsequent international practice should not be wasted in the current context.

To foster greater cooperation and understanding between all concerned parties, it seems to me that my capabilities should be more effectively deployed. While I have no particular objection to being in Administration, I was merely retained there randomly when I reported to the mission in November. Nevertheless being there has given me insight into the mechanics of the various Sections. Consequently, my appreciation of how conflicts over relatively uncomplicated matters result between the Sections in their dealings with Governmental Authorities is notable. Clearly, a far more productive allocation of human resources could be achieved by redefining my role here. I have proven able to mediate apparently conflicting objectives while promoting an ambience of conciliation between parties experiencing unnecessary discord.

The representatives of the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR officers are in such discord. UNAMIR officials have been unable to articulately express their concerns and have been dismissive of the concerns of our hosts. The fallout of external friction is increasing anti-UNAMIR animus, the consequences of internal misapprehension equally damaging.

A more adroit capacity to encourage mutual appreciation and understanding by means of well reasoned and well intentioned discourse is imperative.

Towards this end, I propose the establishment of a "Special Legal Liaison Officer" to report directly to your office. Liaison would proceed triangularly between the OSRSG, representatives of the Rwandan Government and the Sections (including, Communications Section, Building and Engineering Services Section, MOVCON/Air Ops, Logistics, Transport Section, Procurement Section, and such other sections as seen fit when the need arises).

The aforementioned Sections too frequently head down paths that are inimical to the interests of the OSRSG and perilous to the viability of the mission. Recent controversies involving Rwandan Customs are illustrative. Recurrent trouble spots could either be avoided entirely, or mediated intelligently. I am prepared to undertake this important and necessary role immediately. Kindly permit us to meet and discuss this matter. My sincere regards.



Christopher J. Ayres, ESQ.
Legal Officer/Administration

Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative of the Secretary General

carefully not
such 21-4
13-1

Post-It "routing request pad 7664
BRAND

ROUTING - REQUEST

Please

☐ READ

☐ HANDLE

☐ APPROVE

and

☐ FORWARD

☐ RETURN

☐ KEEP OR DISCARD

☐ REVIEW WITH ME

To SASG

I would suggest this
gentleman could be
designated as UNAMIR
Secretary to the
Presidential Commission
which he has to head
From ENTAIL the duties he
is outline for himself

Date 21/4/95 *[Signature]*



UNOSOM
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA

DRIVER'S HANDBOOK

PRODUCED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER

UNOSOM

1. RESPONSIBILITY OF DRIVERS

All members are reminded that as guests of the host countries in the mission area, they must drive with care and comply with traffic rules and regulations. They must show more than the usual care and courtesy.

- Insurance

The United Nations is insured against limited third party liability but is not insured against theft or damage to its own vehicle.

- Reporting

Drivers must report all traffic violations as well as accidents as soon as possible to UNOSOM HQ. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action (when these matters are referred to UNOSOM by the host country authorities, Contingents are reminded that their governments may be held responsible by the United Nations for damage to vehicles caused in accidents which go unreported).

2. TRAINING

Only drivers properly trained and qualified in their home countries may drive UNOSOM vehicles. New arrivals should be given these instructions to read and should be taken on familiarization trips through the area before being permitted to drive. In particular, they are to be briefed on personal discipline, local traffic code, speed limits, accident procedure, trip tickets and vehicle loads.

3. UNOSOM DRIVING PERMIT

No unauthorized person may drive a UNOSOM vehicle until he has obtained a UNOSOM's driver's permit from the Chief Transport Officer at HQ Mogadishu. A UNOSOM permit is only valid for operating UN vehicles.

4. AUTHORITY OF HOST COUNTRY POLICE

Staff members are obliged to obey the host country traffic regulations and the directions of host country police, except that they must not commit themselves nor the UN in any matter of liability, nor give statements to host country police except in the presence of a UNOSOM official.

5. PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL IN UNOSOM VEHICLES

- (a) Non-UN personnel must not be transported in UN vehicles, with the exception of:
 - i) United Nations recognized dependents;
 - ii) Personnel of other United Nations organs and missions;
 - iii) Personnel other than United Nations staff members travelling in connection with official United Nations business;
 - iv) Official guests of UNOSOM officials, serving in the Government of the countries of the mission area.
- (b) Other persons may not travel in United Nations vehicles without the approval of the Chief Administrative Officer, with the concurrence of the Chief Military Officer, in each case. Such approval shall be given only in exceptional or compelling circumstances.

6. AUTHORIZATION OF TRIPS

Routine orders will name those with authority (which cannot be delegated) to designate transport details. Transport authorizing tickets must be completed and signed by authorizing officer and operator:

- (a) Before using any vehicle;
- (b) At the beginning of each day;
- (c) Before each trip outside normal area of operation or made by any individual in a pool to which the vehicle is assigned.

Transport to specific recreational areas shall be governed by instructions issued by UNOSOM HQ:

- (a) Authorized by an officer;
- (b) Using the most direct route.

7. DAILY TRIP TICKET

This is the form of transport ticket used with all UNOSOM HQ and commercial pattern vehicles; a book of which is kept in each vehicle. Every driver must fill a ticket for each trip from point to point, recording in particular:

- (a) Place of departure and arrival;
- (b) Kilometers travelled;
- (c) Quantity of petrol and oil put into the vehicle and the station where it was obtained.

Trip tickets must be delivered weekly to Transport Section UNOSOM HQ.

8. DAILY CHECK

Everyday, the first driver of a vehicle must check on the following items and make out and sign corresponding entry in the daily trip ticket, as applicable. He must check that:

- (a) He has his ID card, driver's license, and trip ticket in order;
- (b) There is sufficient gasoline in the tank and that the jerrycan is full;
- (c) The radiator is filled with water;
- (d) The engine oil level is correct;
- (e) The tires have the required air pressure;
- (f) The battery has an adequate amount of distilled water;
- (g) The spare tire, tools and equipment assigned to the vehicle correspond to the list in the trip ticket folder and are in good order.

9. SERVICING AND MAINTENANCE

A maintenance record card and maintenance slip showing the speedometer reading at which the next maintenance is due is placed on the dashboard and in the trip ticket folder. It is the driver's responsibility to ensure that the vehicle is presented for maintenance in accordance with the schedule. When handing a vehicle in for maintenance, it is important that the driver give as detailed a description as possible of any shortcomings or defects in the vehicle, to ensure that these are checked and repaired by the Transport Personnel.

10. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AFTER AN ACCIDENT

All accidents and traffic violations must be reported to UNOSOM HQ as soon as possible. The following sequence of action will be taken by the driver in cases of serious accidents.

- (a) Do not move the vehicle; if, however, you are obliged to move it, mark its position on the road so that the investigating officer may make an accurate report when they arrive.
 - (b) Lock the vehicle against theft and if you are obliged to leave it unattended, take the contents with you if possible.
 - (c) Assist injured persons.
 - (d) Call the local host country police.
 - (e) Give the local host country police and the driver of the other vehicle involved your name, rank, ID card number, and address of the Un insurance agents in the country.
 - (f) In exchange, obtain the same information as in paragraph (e) from the other party involved and also the name, number and address of the police station whose officers are reporting the accident.
 - (g) Except for the information enumerated above, the driver shall not commit himself or UNOSOM in any matter of liability. Any statement required of the Un personnel involved shall only be made in the presence of a UNOSOM official.
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- (h) Remain at the scene of the accident until all action is completed. But, if the conduct of the local people indicates an imminent danger, the UN personnel shall immediately leave the scene of the accident. It sometimes happens in some countries that the local people become very hostile to, and take mob actions against, drivers who are involved in accidents which have caused injury to local people.
- (i) As soon as possible the same day:
 - i) Notify UNOSOM Transport Section;
 - ii) Prepare driver's accident report form found in the trip folder. Measurements of brake marks, position of the vehicles at the time of the accident, etc., even if approximated, should be taken and filed in the report. This report should be submitted in four copies and distributed to the Office of the CTO and Claims;
 - iii) Take the vehicle involved in the accident to UNOSOM HQ Transport workshops for inspection and assessment of damage caused by the accident. Any defect in the vehicle which might have caused the accident must be referred to the workshop for checking immediately.
- (j) After the investigations have been completed, the vehicle should be returned to its base. If it cannot be driven, the driver should endeavour to obtain further orders from his superior officer. The contents of the vehicle should be removed or made secure before leaving.

12. EMERGENCY AID CALL

You may send a message to the nearest UNOSOM post by telephone or radio, the police, or another passing vehicle. The message should include sufficient detail to enable the necessary assistance to be provided, including:

- (a) Time and exact location;
- (b) UNOSOM number of the vehicle, driver's name, rank and unit;
- (c) Nature of casualty, e.g. injury, recovery crew, or spare parts required, help required for towing, unditching.

Breakdown Service - In addition to the above information, specify:

- (a) Type and make of vehicle;
- (b) Type and load;
- (c) Detail of mechanical defects;
- (d) Whether the vehicle ditched, bogged or had mechanical failure;
- (e) Whether the vehicle can be towed or if it has to be suspended;
- (f) When being towed, distance between vehicles should be about 5 meters and speed no more than 30 km. per hour.

Theft and Loss

- (a) Do not move or touch the vehicle; allow the police to check for fingerprints;
- (b) The driver is responsible for the security of his vehicle and he must take the following precautions:
 - i) Always park in a public place where many people pass by and which is well lit at night;
 - ii) Lock all doors and windows, leaving no property whether Un or personal in the vehicle, which might tempt theft.

13. FIRE PRECAUTIONS

Fire extinguishers are provided in each vehicle. Travellers and passengers may not smoke within the vicinity of refueling. Vehicles are to be parked so that in case of fire they may be driven off quickly.

In the event of fire, turn off ignition switch and remove other vehicles to safety.

14. CROSSING FRONTIERS

Each passenger must ensure that the proper clearance has been obtained and that his documents are in order.

The driver is responsible for checking that all goods carried in his vehicle are authorized. Personnel are reminded that illegal crossing of frontiers with duty free items is a serious offense.

15. INSTRUCTIONS ON DRIVING TECHNIQUE AND RULES OF THE ROAD

Stay alert and concentrate on driving well. The following points are stressed:

- (a) Sit erect when driving;
- (b) Refrain from resting the arm on the window opening;
- (c) Do not smoke while driving;
- (d) Do not salute while driving;
- (e) It is forbidden to drink any intoxicating beverage or take any drugs while driving or to drive in an intoxicated state;
- (f) Concentrate on your driving and do not be distracted by conversation or by watching the scenery.

DEVELOP GOOD HABITS IN KEEPING WITH THE RULES OF THE ROAD

- (a) Always fasten safety belts.
- (b) Keep both hands firmly on the wheel.
- (c) Keep good distance behind vehicle in front, one vehicle length for every 15 km. per hour.
- (d) Keep your mind on your driving and your eyes on the move.
- (e) Always keep to the right side of the road.
- (f) Give proper (hand) signals well before you make your move when starting, slowing down, overtaking, before turning, before halting and when changing lanes. Always signal intentions.

- (g) Give "pass" signal to lighter vehicles.
- (h) Pay attention to road signs, e.g. hairpin bend ahead, unguarded railway crossing, schools, etc.
- (i) Pay attention to police traffic signals.
- (j) Observe speed limits laid down.
- (k) Give right of way to the vehicles approaching from your right (if in doubt, always give the right of way).
- (l) Stay in one lane except when passing or changing lane in preparation for a turn.
- (m) Give right of way to pedestrians and animals at all times. Remember that animals and children are unpredictable. Slow down, sound the horn and expect that they might run in front of your vehicle at any moment. Be especially careful and ready for children when passing parked vehicles and when driving through villages.
- (n) At night, dim your headlights for oncoming traffic.
- (o) When entering a crossroad or main road, slow down and stop, look to the left and right to see that no other vehicle is coming along the other road before moving on.
- (p) Approach curves and negotiate them at slow speed.
- (q) Use the horn when necessary. The locals are accustomed to it.
- (r) Check in your rear vision mirror constantly.
- (s) Be sure that your load is secured safely.
- (t) Use a guide when reversing.

DON'T'S

- (a) DON'T exceed speed limits.
- (b) DON'T monopolize the road - always keep well to the right.
- (c) DON'T "bully" the coming lighter vehicle by remaining in the middle of the road and forcing it to go off the road.

- (d) DON'T park on curves near the crest of a hill or in the middle of the road.
- (e) DON'T overtake unless signalled to do so by the driver of the preceding vehicle, or it is readily apparent that the road ahead is clear.
- (f) DON'T overtake except on the left of the preceding vehicle and then never on a curve or on a hill top.
- (g) DON'T fail to allow sufficient clearance when passing other vehicles or after having overtaken other vehicles, before pulling to the right.
- (h) DON'T reverse on main road without ascertaining that all is "clear" in the rear.
- (i) DON'T leave your vehicle unattended.
- (j) DON'T refuse to give particulars of identity when called upon to do so by civil/military police. Give only your name, number, rank, nationality and location before arrival of Police.
- (k) DON'T depend upon the horn to do the job of the brakes.
- (l) DON'T depend upon the brakes to do the job of the gears.
- (m) DON'T drive fast through streets, camps, near schools and other built up areas.
- (n) DON'T drive through a red traffic signal or other STOP sign.
- (o) DON'T drive under influence of drinks or drugs of any kind.
- (p) DON'T wear studded or loose boots or shoes when driving.
- (q) DON'T carry unauthorized passengers except in cases of emergency.
- (r) DON'T permit any unauthorized person to drive your vehicle if you are able.

HAND SIGNS

Observe carefully the conduct of local drivers and signs given by them. The commonest signs given by local drivers are as follows:

- (a) A hand stretched horizontally with the fingers pointing up usually indicates for you to stop. The sign is often accompanied by the words "Shewayaya", "Shewayaya" = "slowly", "slowly".
- (b) It often happens that when you are to overtake a vehicle, its driver waves his left hand forward, which means that you can overtake.
- (c) However, when overtaking, if you see or hear "shewayaya", "Shewayaya" sign, you shouldnot overtake at that moment.
- (d) Occasionally local drivers indicate their directions by the use of their left or right hand instead of turn signals.
- (e) DON'T mistake the signs given to you.
- (f) Trust more in your own observations.

16. OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

Parking

Turn the wheel into curb, pull on hand brake, place vehicle in first gear.

Starting the Engine

- (a) Before attempting to start your vehicle, you should ensure that the emergency brake is on and the the transmission shift lever is in the NEUTRAL position.
- (b) Disengage the clutch when using the starter. Avoid long and continued cranking of the engine with the starter motor.

Use the Clutch

- (a) Release the clutch gradually. Get the "feel" of the clutch, learn just where the clutch actually starts to engage and how far the pedal must move to become fully engaged.
- (b) Keep your foot OFF the clutch pedal except when starting, stopping or shifting gears.

Shifting Gears

- (a) Always anticipate the need for extra power and shift gears in advance. Do not allow the motor to labour or jerk before shifting into a lower gear ratio.
- (b) When you shift to a higher gear, engage the clutch smoothly and accelerate gradually.
- (c) When you shift to a lower gear: to obtain greater pulling power for travelling over bad roads or ascending hills, it is necessary to shift to a lower gear ratio. Use double clutching when necessary.

Descending Hill

Always drive in gear with the clutch engaged. If it is essential to use the brakes, even after shifting to low gear, apply brakes intermittently to prevent excessive wear and burning of the brakes. Care should be taken, however, that the engine is not damaged by being forced to run at excessive speed because of the steepness of the hill.

Use the same gear when descending as when climbing.

Stopping a Vehicle

Do not slow down the vehicle with the help of the clutch pedal; remove the foot from the accelerator and depress the brake pedal as required; use clutch pedal only when the vehicle reaches a full stop.

Engine Idling

Do not allow the engine to idle except in the following circumstances:

- (a) When halting in traffic;
- (b) For initial warm up when first starting.

17. DRIVING IN DIVERSE CONDITIONS

- (a) During hours of night driving vision is reduced, so reduce your speed accordingly to such an extent that you will be able to see clearly with the aid of your headlight.
- (b) Always dim your headlights in all built-up areas and when meeting approaching vehicles or following another vehicle.

Bad Weather Driving

Rain, sand or fog add to your driving problems.

- (a) Adjust the speed to existing conditions.
- (b) Keep windshield clean at all times.
- (c) Follow other vehicles at a safe distance.
- (d) Apply brakes with light pumping action to avoid skidding.
- (e) Signal your intention to stop or change direction well in advance.

Driving through Shallow Water

When you unavoidably have to drive through shallow water or large puddles on the road, reduce speed to avoid splashing of water in the brake drums, engine or ignition system.

Cross-Country Driving

Cross-country driving requires extra proficiency in use of gear, anticipation of ground conditions and vehicle maintenance.

- (a) Before entering patch of bad ground, change into 4-wheel drive.
- (b) Use suitable gear depending on driving conditions. It is easier to change into a lower gear ratio when the going gets tough than to come to a stop and change into 4-wheel drive.
- (c) Do not allow engine to labour under any circumstances.
- (d) Follow the speed limit regulations even if the country is flat and open.

- (e) Do not leave hard surface.
- (f) Do not drive through dust cloud raised by the preceding vehicle. Keep 30 yards clear vision to avoid collision in case the preceding vehicle stops suddenly.

Local Road Conditions

Roads are very deceptive. The civil war has caused them to fall into disrepair. Avoid a false sense of security and beware of unexpected turns, caved-in roads or shoulders, obstacles, etc.

Steering into a Skid

If the vehicle skids, always steer your vehicle in the direction of the skid to regain control of your vehicle. Sometimes it helps to speed up slightly. Do not disengage the clutch or apply the brakes.

Driving in a Convoy

When driving in a convoy, look out for the local drivers who try to move between the vehicles of the convoy. Keep the distance between the vehicles not less than 50 metres.

When STOPPING, keep the distance about 5 metres.

It is recommended, when driving in a convoy, to turn on your headlights and use low beam.

Resting during a Long Distance Drive

The maximum a driver should drive at a stretch should not be more than 270 kms. After this, the vehicle and the driver must rest for 10 mts. If in a convoy, an organised rest must follow after 270 kms. During the period of rest, the engine, oil and water gauge must be checked before commencement of journey.

18. SPEED LIMITS IN THE AREA

Stopping Distances

It takes a great deal more braking power and requires a much greater distance to slow or stop a vehicle from 50 to 40 miles per hour (80 to 64 kph) than it does from 30 to 20 miles per hour (48 to 32 kph). A careless driver failing to recognize or properly understand this fact may enter curves at too high a rate of speed or fail to maintain a proper interval between vehicles while travelling at high speeds. Vehicle brakes cannot be applied instantly. Your vehicles will travel a considerable distance from the time you take your foot off the accelerator and depress the brake pedal until the brakes actually take effect. The illustrations below indicate stopping distances which have been obtained from practical tests:

<u>SPEED</u>	<u>STOPPING DISTANCE</u>
25 kph or 15 mph	15 metres or 45 feet
32 kph or 20 mph	20 metres or 60 feet
48 kph or 30 mph	30 metres or 90 feet
64 kph or 40 mph	50 metres or 150 feet
80 kph or 50 mph	70 metres or 210 feet

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE BY DRIVER

6. To ensure maximum operational readiness it is necessary that the vehicle be systematically maintained and inspected every day it is operated, so that defects may be discovered and corrected before they result in serious damage or large repair costs. Any deficiencies discovered that cannot be repaired by the driver will be reported to the unit maintenance officer.

7. Daily Preventive Maintenance Service

a. Before operation service

The driver must check every day the following items and make the corresponding entry into the duty trip ticket which he will sign:

- That there is sufficient fuel in the tank;
- That the radiator is filled with water;
- That the engine oil level is correct;
- That the tyres have the required air pressure;
- That the battery has an adequate amount of distilled water;
- That the spare tyre, tools and equipment assigned to the vehicle are correct and are in good condition.

b. During operation service

While driving, the driver or crew should be alert to detect any unusual noises or odours, abnormal instrument readings, steering irregularities, or any other indications of malfunction of any parts of the vehicle.

c. After operation service

This is the daily service for UN vehicles. It consists of correcting, as far as possible any operating deficiencies; thus the vehicle is operationally ready at any time.

8. Four Days Preventive Maintenance

PERIODIC MAINTENANCE

9. The periodic maintenance for military pattern vehicles has to be carried out by the unit's own workshop (see Annex A).

DRIVER'S ACCIDENT REPORT

Date of Accident Time LT Vehicle UN/Private (No.).....
Location Open Road/Crossroads/Built up Area
Driver ID. No. Passenger(s)
On or Off duty..... Purpose of Trip
Weather Condition Road Condition
Other Vehicle (No.) Make Model
Driver Address
Insurance Company
Property (Other than Vehicle)
Injured Person(s) Name, Age, Address

Investigation

Name of Security Officer
Police Officer No. Station.....

DETAILED DESCRIPTION (State also Speed; Visibility; extent of Damage, Injury; name of Doctor, Hospital
Witness, Passenger; all Actions taken)

(It is the driver's responsibility to report the accident/incident to the nearest UN office/MP).

ADD SKETCH (if applicable)

DISTRIBUTION

CTO (1), Claims (1), MP Coy (1), Unit File (1).

..... 19

.....
(Signature)