

The situation in Laos:

The long-awaited report of the United Nations inquiry group was made public on November 6, and as anticipated the group found no clear proof to support charges by the Royal Government of Laos of "flagrant aggression" by North Vietnamese forces. However, the fact-finding team reported some evidence of communist support in the form of arms, supplies and other help to rebels in Laos. In view of the group's failure to substantiate the most serious of the charges, I do not expect that the Western powers will press for an early meeting of the Security Council. Meanwhile rumours were current since the publication of the report that the Secretary-General might visit Laos. I met the Secretary-General on November 5 and again on November 6 (at our delegation's lunch). Although he indicated to me that he would very much like to go to see the Laotian leaders in connection with the establishment of a United Nations "presence", he had not come to any decision. On the evening of Saturday November 7 the Secretary-General informed the members of the Security Council that he had decided to go.

On November 9 the Soviet Union complained to the Secretary-General about his decision to go to Laos. The Soviet Union's note of protest said that the Secretary-General's impending visit, as well as "any other action on the part of the United Nations could only further complicate" the situation in Laos. The Soviet letter concentrated its fire on the possibility that Mr. Hammarskjöld might decide to station a personal representative in Laos. The most significant paragraph of the Soviet note, in my view, is the following:

" All such steps (like stationing the Secretary-General's personal representative in Laos) cannot be considered otherwise than attempts to use the United Nations for covering the actions of certain powers, aimed at the complete liquidation of the Geneva agreements, which cannot but entail dangerous consequences for peace in South East Asia and in the whole world."

A spokesman for the Secretary-General announced on the same night that Mr. Hammarskjöld would not comment on the Soviet note. In any case his decision to go to Laos remained unchanged, and he left New York for Laos on the night of November 10. The United States Delegation did not take the Soviet protest too seriously. They felt, privately of course, that the Soviet Union believed it had made the complaint so that the People's Republic of China would be satisfied about Soviet support on the Laotian question. The communist delegates, on the other hand, attributed the Secretary-General's visit to Laos as one more attempt to get a new feather on his cap. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria Mr. Tarabanov confided to me that "Mr. Hammarskjöld is after the Nobel Peace Prize."

The bluntness of the Soviet criticism has produced some anxiety at United Nations headquarters that a breach may be opening up between the Soviet Union and the Secretary-General of the kind that once caused the resignation of Mr. Trygve Lie. My own impression is that Mr. Hammarskjöld considers the Soviet letter as just a theatrical thunder designed to impress Peking. My further impression is that he will advise the Laotian government to come to some kind of agreement with the outlawed Pathet Lao and to revert to a stricter observance of the neutral status enjoined upon Laos by the Geneva stipulations. I will not be surprised if he even goes to the extent of suggesting reactivation of the International Control Commission and the withdrawal of the United States military mission from Laos.

Today's newspapers (Monday, 16 November) carried reports that the Secretary-General has asked Mr. Sakari S. Tuomioja, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, to join him in Laos and to remain there for about a month. His task in Laos will be "to review the economic situation" but as Secretary-General's personal representative he will certainly have broader responsibilities.

General.

It is not often that Burma and Burma's policies feature in American periodicals. But the November 9 issue of The New Leader published in New York featured an article entitled "United Nations: Illusion and Reality" by one Arnold Beichman who obviously was in Burma recently. There is one paragraph devoted to Burma and it is reproduced below. It is apparent that he is unable to draw a distinction between the force of private statements at home countries and subtleties of policies enunciated at the world forum.

" One of the mysteries of the United Nations is the non-communication which seems to exist between UN delegates and their home governments. This observation follows from a trip I took last summer through Asia, where I heard the most anti-neutralist, anti-Communist statements from government officials. For example, there was Burma, where it couldn't be more obvious that Communist China was regarded as the enemy, where the Soviet Union's popularity was at a low for various reasons. My interviews with Government officials in Burma were frank and on-the-record; and the political opinions expressed were as far from neutralism as they are on Formosa. Yet here at the UN the Burmese Foreign Minister operates as if he never heard from Rangoon. On the Tibet resolution, mild as it was, Burma abstained. Yet it was the Tibet issue which had an enormous impact on opinion in Burma."

The following delegates and U.N. officials attended the lunch given by our Delegation at the United Nations on Friday, 6 November, 1959:

Argentina:	H.E. Dr. Mario Amadeo
Austria:	H.E. Dr. Franz Matsch (Chairman, 1st Committee)
Belgium:	Mme. Georgette Ciselet (Chairman, 3rd Committee)
Canada:	H.E. Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie
Ceylon:	H.E. Sir Claude Corea
Czechoslovakia:	H.E. Mr. Jiri Nosek (Chairman, 5th Committee)
	H.E. Mr. Karel Kurka
Ecuador:	H.E. Dr. Jose A. Correa
Finland:	H.E. Mr. Ralph Enckell
Guatemala:	H.E. Dr. Alberto Herrarte (Chairman, 6th Committee)
Haiti:	H.E. M. Max Dorsinville (President, Trusteeship Council)
India:	H.E. Mr. C.S. Jha
Indonesia:	H.E. Mr. L.N. Palar (Chairman, 4th Committee)
Italy:	H.E. Mr. Egidio Ortona
Liberia:	H.E. Mr. Charles T.O. King (Chairman, Special Political Comm.)

Mexico:	H.E. Mr. Luis Padilla Nervo (Chairman, Disarmament Commission)
Sudan:	H.E. Mr. Omar A.H. Adeel
United Kingdom:	H.E. Sir Pierson Dixon Mr. A.R. Moore
U.S.S.R.:	H.E. Mr. A.A. Sobolev
U.N. Secretariat:	Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld (Secretary-General) Mr. Andrew W. Cordier (Executive Assistant) Dr. Ralph J. Bunche (Under-Secretary) Mr. D. Protitch (Under-Secretary) Mr. W.A.B. Hamilton (Director of Personnel).



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U Thant
Chairman of the Delegation.

New York
16 November, 1959.

THIRD FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF HIS EXCELLENCY
U THANT - FOR THE PERIOD 16 OCTOBER to
31 OCTOBER, 1959

THE QUESTION OF TIBET:

The question of Tibet took up two full days of the General Assembly - October 20 and October 21. Mr. Frank Aiken, Foreign Minister of Ireland and one of the two sponsors of the Draft Resolution, in his introductory speech, advised the People's Republic of China to open negotiations with the Dalai Lama for a peaceful settlement. Such a settlement, he told the Assembly, should "recognize the right of the small Tibetan people to control their own destiny." The first day's debate revealed a three-way split in the Assembly.

Some nations backed the Western viewpoint. Pakistan, New Zealand and several Latin American countries announced their support of the Irish-Malayan resolution urging respect for the human rights of the Tibetan people. Representatives of the Soviet bloc stuck closely to the line they introduced when the General Committee was debating a recommendation for placing this item on the Assembly's agenda. Mr. Kuznetsov, head of the Soviet delegation, called Ireland and Malaya "tools" of those in the West who opposed the relaxation of tensions foreshadowed by the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks. Nepal, Finland, Belgium and Cuba expressed doubts over the Tibetan resolution, though all expressed sympathy with Tibet. The Nepali representative held that the resolution could only imperil the improvement in international relations. The Cuban representative asserted that both sides should be heard before the United Nations came to a judgment.

On the second day of the debate, the Assembly, by 45 to 9, with 26 abstentions, approved the draft resolution. As instructed by the Honourable Foreign Minister, Burma abstained and took no part in the debate. The surprise of the vote was that Britain abstained after Sir Pierson Dixon had explained to the Assembly that his Government had doubts on the legal aspects of Tibet's status as an independent nation and the authority of the United Nations to intervene. He suggested that the United Nations might find itself unable to take direct measures that would help the Tibetan people. A "consensus of speeches" expressing the opinion of the world organization might be more effective than a resolution, he said. Actually, Sir Pierson Dixon attempted in the lobbies to persuade several delegations to postpone the vote indefinitely. Mr. Cabot Lodge, head of the United States Delegation, told me before voting that his delegation would oppose "tooth and nail" any attempt to postpone the decision.

Mr. Krishna Menon of India expressed the "distress" of his Government and people at events in Tibet. But, he added, a "warming up of issues" could not lead to relaxation of international tensions. India, therefore, found herself unable to support the move of Ireland and Malaya, he declared. As expected, the strongest denunciation of Chinese activities in Tibet came from Dr. Tsiang of Nationalist China. He asserted also that Tibet was rapidly being developed as a base for possible future aggression. As in the earlier stages of the debate, Communist speakers presented three main arguments against the resolution: (1) the resolution was a move backed by those who desire to continue the cold war, (2) Tibetan nobles and "outside imperialists" instigated the Tibetan revolt, and (3) no evidence existed of oppression in Tibet. Latin-American delegations, as on the previous day, generally favoured the resolution.

Voting took place while the representatives of Costa Rica and Guinea were not in the Assembly Hall. If they were present Costa Rica would have voted for the resolution and Guinea abstained, resulting in 46 votes to 9, with 27 abstentions.

Security Council Election.

As reported in my second Fortnightly Report, Poland and Turkey deadlocked for the Security Council seat when voting took place on October 12. When voting was resumed on October 19 Turkey took a slight lead over Poland. With the support of the United States and other supporters, Turkey went into the lead on the 29th ballot with 41 votes. Poland, which had led on 28 consecutive ballots, received 39. There were two abstentions. The General Assembly suspended voting for two weeks after the 31st ballot, which raised Turkey's vote to 42 to 39 for Poland and one abstention. It is generally believed that Turkey's lead may strengthen the hand of the United States and other supporters in behind-the-scenes negotiations before the voting is resumed.

Some Western delegates feel that only two ways out of the deadlock exist:

- (1) Split the term, with Poland and Turkey each serving one year in the Security Council, as was done in 1956 and 1957;
- (2) Bring forward a compromise candidate who will get more votes from the Asian and African members than Turkey has received. Yugoslavia, which had been prominently mentioned as a compromise candidate, has removed herself from consideration.

Otherwise, it is felt, the deadlock may last through the Session. This is based on the expectation that there will be no major changes in the present alignment when the voting is resumed on November 2.

The United States, which was responsible for putting up Turkey's candidature, is understood to be doing most of its electioneering in the home capitals rather than in contacts with Assembly delegates, and the charge of "arm-twisting" here is not raised.

General and Complete Disarmament.

In the First Committee the debate on this item is still going on at the time of writing this report. It is expected that the question will be disposed of on Monday, November 2.

Since October 20 rumours were afloat that the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiating on a joint draft resolution on disarmament. It was also understood that France and Britain had been called in to share in the talks. On October 22 I understood that various tentative drafts were in circulation here among the NATO, CENTO and SEATO representatives who were being asked to express their opinions. My enquiries from the United States and the Soviet Union delegates merely elicited the fact that they were approaching an agreement on a joint resolution.

On October 27 the Soviet Union and the Western Powers agreed to introduce a joint resolution. On the same day Mr. Cabot Lodge, head of the United States' Delegation, asked me if Burma would cosponsor the same. At our delegation meeting on the next day, I explained the significance of the draft and it was decided that

Burma should cosponsor it. When I conveyed to Mr. Lodge the decision of our delegation I was informed that 34 delegations had already agreed to cosponsor it. When the draft resolution was tabled on the evening of October 28 I discovered that all 82 members had cosponsored it. (A/C.1/L.234).

The resolution is based on a Soviet draft after a week of preliminary talks. I understand that the original Soviet draft sought to endorse the principle of Premier Krushchev's proposal. The Western group rejected the idea of acceptance, even in principle, but agreed to retain the Soviet phrases "general and complete disarmament." These words occur three times in the draft resolution. The Western delegations think of "general and complete disarmament" as equivalent to "comprehensive disarmament", the official description of the programme submitted to the Assembly by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, on September 17.

I made a brief intervention on September 30. Copies of my speech have already been submitted to the Foreign Office. Fourteen delegates spoke on that day, and the New York Times of October 31 covered only three speeches including mine. A large majority of delegates extended a very warm welcome to the principle of "general and complete disarmament", and some Western delegates fear that the Soviet Union will exploit this welcome when the ten-nation group, which was established by the Big Four foreign ministers last August, meets in Geneva early next year. The unanimous adoption of the resolution by the Assembly is a certainty.

The situation in Laos.

In my first fortnightly report, I mentioned that the Secretary-General expected to receive the report of the United Nations Fact-Collecting Sub-Committee on Laos in mid-October. But the report is not yet received by him for transmission to the Security Council. According to reliable sources (Japan and Tunisia) the sub-committee did not find proof in Laos that any North Vietnamese had been involved in the fighting, although they found some evidence that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) had supplied a certain amount of small arms and uniforms to the Pathet Laos Rebels. Spokesmen for the Laotian Government have recently intimated that Communist intervention ceased with the arrival of the sub-committee. Laos obviously wants the United Nations to maintain observers there permanently. But the United States, Britain and France want to avoid the bitter Security Council debate such a proposal would produce. Instead they hope the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld will establish a United Nations "presence" in Laos on his own authority. Such a "presence" would be modelled on the mission he sent to Jordan in September, 1958, in response to Jordan's charges of indirect aggression by the United Arab Republic. Mr. Hammarskjöld is reported to have informed the Western powers that he would agree to establish a similar "presence" in Laos only if the Soviet Union gave its consent. This position is based on the Secretary-General's belief that he must have the authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly for such action, unless the great powers are in agreement.

On October 30, the Soviet delegation issued a statement saying that it would vigorously oppose any effort to set up an U.N. "presence" to help maintain the stability of Laos. The statement went on, "There can be no question of the Soviet Union supporting or even tacitly agreeing to using the name of the United Nations to cover up such unlawful actions." There is no immediate Western reaction to this statement. My own surmise is that the Western powers will refrain from introducing any proposal to extend the life of the present sub-committee or

to establish permanent observers in Laos. This anticipated shift in Western strategy is based on the following factors:

First, the short supply of evidence on the alleged intervention by North Vietnam.

Second, the belief of many delegates that a bitter debate on Laos should be avoided at a time when international tensions are beginning to be relaxed.

General

At the invitation of Cornell University, I took part in the Conference on Far Eastern Studies at that University by addressing a gathering of about four hundred delegates from four universities: Cornell, Colgate, Syracuse and Rochester, on Friday evening, October 23. Copies of my speech have already been submitted to the Foreign Office on October 23 (Pouch No.47). The speech received a very enthusiastic reception, and Professor Harold Shadick, Chairman, Department of Far Eastern Studies and one of the sponsors of the Conference wrote to me on October 26, "I am sure I express the sentiments of President Malott and all my colleagues when I say that your lecture last Friday was most stimulating and led us to a fresh self-examination of our understanding of and attitude to the countries of Asia. We thank you."

The following delegates attended the lunch given by our Delegation at the United Nations on Monday, 26 October, 1959:

H.E. Dr. Victor A. Belaunde, President of the General Assembly.	
Afghanistan:	H.E. Mr. A.R. Pazhwak
Albania:	H.E. Mr. Halim Budo, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.
	H.E. Mr. Reis Malile
Australia:	H.E. Mr. J. Plimsoll
	Mr. Kevin T. Kelly
Bulgaria:	H.E. Mr. Milko Tarabanov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.
	H.E. Dr. Peter Voutov
Byelorussian SSR:	H.E. Mr. K.V. Kiselev, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
	Mr. F.N. Gryaznov
Cambodia:	H.E. M. Nong Kimny
Ceylon:	H.E. Dr. G.P. Malalasekera
Malaya:	H.E. Dato' Nik Ahmed Kamil
Ghana:	H.E. Mr. A. Quaison-Sackey
Greece:	H.E. Mr. Christian X. Palamas
India:	Mr. Harishwar Dayal
Iraq:	Dr. Adnan Pachachi
Italy:	Mr. Girolamo Vitelli
Nepal:	H.E. Mr. Rishikesh Shaha
New Zealand:	H.E. Mr. Foss Shanahan
Norway:	H.E. Mr. Sivert A. Nielson
Philippines:	H.E. Mr. Francisco A. Delgado
Poland:	H.E. Mr. Jerzy Michalowski
Romania:	H.E. Mr. Silviu Brucan
Sweden:	H.E. Mrs. Agda Rossel

Union of South Africa:	Mr. B.G. Pourie
United Kingdom:	Mr. Harold Beeley Sir Andrew Cohen
U.S.A.:	Mr. Walter S. Robertson
Yugoslavia:	H.E. Mr. Dobrivoje Vidic
U.N. Secretariat:	Mr. Jehan de Noue (Chief of Protocol)


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U Thant
Chairman of the Delegation.

SECOND FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF H.E. U THANT
FOR THE PERIOD 1 OCTOBER TO 15 OCTOBER 1959

The General Assembly ended its over-all debate on Tuesday, 6 October, and began to tackle specific world problems. As reported earlier, the Assembly's Steering (General) Committee met on Friday, 9 October, and took up three items:

1. International Encouragement and Scientific Research into the Control of Cancerous Diseases, proposed by Byelorussian S.S.R. (A/4233).
2. The United Nations Library, proposed by the Secretary-General. (A/4231) and (A/4232).
3. The question of Tibet, proposed by Malaya and Ireland. (A/4234).

The Question of Tibet.

The first two items were unanimously adopted for inscription on the agenda, without discussion. But the question of Tibet, as expected, generated a very heated debate. The United States delegate, Mr. James W. Barco gave a very strong backing for the debate on this item. He said, "It is entirely clear that large-scale violation of fundamental human rights had taken place in Tibet. To disregard the issue would be inconsistent with the purposes and principles of this Organization and would expose the United Nations to charges of indifference." Mr. Barco's statement drew an immediate and hotly-worded reply from Mr. Vasily V. Kuznetsov, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. The Tibetan question, Mr. Kuznetsov said, "is a dead question which has already begun to stink". Mr. Kuznetsov named Mr. Walter S. Robertson, former Assistant Secretary of State and now a member of the United States delegation, as one of those who had indulged in what he called "arm-twisting" in the lobbies.

After a three-hour debate, the General Committee recommended inscription of the item by 11 to 5 votes, with 4 abstentions. Burma, along with Morocco, France and Union of South Africa abstained. France expressed doubts regarding the competency of the United Nations to interfere in what is generally regarded as the internal affairs of the People's Republic of China. Union of South Africa also took the same stand, having in mind the problem of race relations in its own country. Indonesia and Liberia sided with the three Soviet bloc members in opposing inscription. Britain's representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, while endorsing inscription, said that his Government could not commit itself to any resolution on Tibet that might be introduced later before the Assembly.

The matter was taken up in the General Assembly on October 12, and the vote for inscription was carried by 43 against 11, with 25 abstentions. The nine-nation Soviet bloc with Yugoslavia and Indonesia opposed the inscription. Liberia which had opposed inscription in the General Committee shifted its stand in the General Assembly by abstaining. Ambassador King of Liberia told me later that if a country like Burma could abstain there is no reason why Liberia should take a stronger stand. Burma's vote also influenced several other countries. Nepal, Afghanistan and Guinea, which earlier threatened opposition to inscription, abstained in the General Assembly. India was the only country which "refused to participate" in the voting. Mr. Krishna Menon told me that his non-participation was tantamount to his country's disapproval of the discussion of that item, and therefore it was the same as opposition.

While the General Committee was seized of this item, attempts were made by Mr. Gyalpo Thondup, a brother of the Dalai Lama, to plead the cause of Tibet in the United Nations. However, he was advised by the representatives of Malaya and Ireland, sponsors of the item on Tibet, to abandon the idea as it would touch off a storm and make it still more difficult for them to obtain approval of their proposed resolution calling for respect of the fundamental human rights. The view of most Delegates is that it would be unfair if one party to the dispute addressed the Assembly while the other did not.

Space Data Exchange:

Another development which warrants a reference in this report is the announcement by the Soviet Union on Tuesday, 6 October, that it would ask the General Assembly to call an international scientific conference "on the exchange of experience in exploring outer space." The announcement was made by Mr. Kuznetsov in the course of his statement to the General Assembly. Soviet circles said later that the Soviet Union would propose that the conference meet next year and that it be modelled on the scientific conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy that were held in Geneva in 1955 and 1958.

The United States and British delegations declined to comment immediately, but on the next day they indicated they would be willing to take part in an international conference to exchange data on outer space. On behalf of the United States, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said, "We welcome this new departure in Soviet policy and hope that it means co-operation in the future work of the United Nations in the field of outer space." Soviet sources have indicated that they want the conference to be held as soon as possible and that all countries should be represented, including the People's Republic of China.

Arabs and Refugee Report:

Ten Arab Delegations made public on Thursday, 8 October, a report sent to the United Nations Secretary-General, assailing the latter for his report on Arab refugees published in June last. Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld has urged continued United Nations aid to the refugees until they could be absorbed into the Middle East economy. He sketched out a large-scale programme for strengthening the regional economy by foreign aid. The Arabs asked that Israel be compelled to hand over the abandoned properties of Arab refugees who fled during the 1948 Palestine war, together with income accumulated in the last eleven years. They urged that foreign aid going to Israel be diverted instead to an international body for the benefit of the refugees. Insisting also that Jewish immigration to Israel posed an increasing danger, they said they would consider any assistance from outside to promote immigration as an unfriendly act. Israel's position, as is well-known, has been that it would be impossible for a million hostile Arabs to be taken into Israel's territory and that the refugees logically should be absorbed into the Arab world.

Meanwhile, on October 8, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of United Arab Republic declared in Cairo that he is ready to accept a United Nations Commission that would implement all United Nations resolutions relating to Israel and the Arabs. This would include the 1951 Security Council Resolution calling for freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal and the United Nations plan to give Palestine Arab refugees the right to return to their former homes in Israel or accept compensation, and the 1947 plan for partition of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem, both of which Israel has rejected. President Nasser emphasized that resolutions applying to Israel must be carried out along with those affecting the United Arab Republic.

According to a Jerusalem despatch of the same date, President Nasser's offer was dismissed by Israel as "deliberate propaganda". The fact that an official Israeli reaction was made immediately indicated that President Nasser's offer was not being taken seriously.

First Committee:

The Political (First) Committee met on 6 October and as usual, took up the question of priorities of items allocated to it by the General Assembly. The Russians sought to have their item "General and Complete Disarmament" given top priority. The Western powers wanted to have their plan discussed simultaneously. The Committee voted to discuss the Russian plan first and separately. Strangely enough, no opposition was voiced by any Delegation. Most observers viewed this as a Soviet victory, because the vote implied that the Russian disarmament plan has a special and over-riding importance.

The Committee also decided on the following priorities after the Soviet item:

2. Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara (Morocco)
3. Prevention of Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons (Ireland)
4. Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (India)
5. Question of Disarmament: Report of the Disarmament Commission.

The debate began on the next day, October 9, when Mr. Vasily V. Kuznetsov set out the Russian plan. One striking thing about Mr. Kuznetsov's speech was that it was remarkably moderate in tone, omitting familiar Soviet attacks. He did not ask for an endorsement of the Krushchev proposal, but urged its acceptance in principle. In an obvious reply to Western critics, he denied that the Soviet programme would not provide adequate inspection and control measures. He insisted that the extent of controls would correspond to each of the stages envisaged in the plan.

Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States, in the course of his intervention on October 11, emphasised that the United States has made many concrete proposals for both comprehensive and partial disarmament, and challenged the Soviet Union to demonstrate whether the latter's plan for total disarmament within four years is a serious proposal or whether it is merely propaganda. The challenge, however, was couched in very diplomatic terms. Mr. Lodge called upon the Soviets to produce "sounder, clearer and more unambiguous" plans for inspection and control than they have displayed thus far.

At the time of writing this report, the general debate on this item still continues.

Council Elections:

Elections to the Security Council and Economic and Social Council took place on October 12. Ecuador, the Latin American Candidate, and Ceylon, the Commonwealth candidate, were elected without opposition. Ecuador received 77 votes and Ceylon 72. Poland and Turkey deadlocked for the third seat, and the voting was suspended after Poland had led on thirteen ballots.

For the Economic and Social Council, Poland was elected on the first ballot, receiving 66 votes. Others elected, and the votes each received, were: Brazil 73, United Kingdom 73, Soviet Union 70, Denmark 72. Japan and India deadlocked, but the latter withdrew from the race after Japan had led, 48 to 33, on the sixth ballot.

The surprise of the elections was Poland's lead over Turkey, the United States' candidate, in the race for the seat on the Security Council that Japan will give up at the end of the year. After Poland had led on thirteen ballots the General Assembly suspended the voting until the next day, October 13. On that day again twelve more ballots failed to break the deadlock. The contest will be resumed on Monday, October 19. Although the vote was secret at least eight Latin-American countries including Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Panama and Cuba had voted for Poland on every ballot. Poland also had the support of the nine members of the Soviet bloc, the Scandinavian countries, most of the Asian-African countries and six members of the ten-member British Commonwealth: Canada, Ceylon, India, Malaya, New Zealand and Ghana.

Most of the countries which had supported Poland did so on the ground that Eastern Europe, which was allocated a seat on the Security Council under a "gentleman's agreement" in January, 1946, was entitled to get it back. Besides, Turkey, the nominee of the United States, did not enter the race until September 24, and a number of votes had been pledged to Poland before the United States and other Turkish supporters went into action. The delay arose from the fact that Greece which had been expected to make the race against Poland, hesitated for two weeks before deciding not to be a candidate.

Surprisingly enough, both the London Times and Washington Post supported Poland's candidacy. The third round of elections will take place on Monday, October 19.

General:

The Honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Chan Tun Aung, left New York for London on the night of October 5. Earlier that day he recorded a broadcast message of 6 minutes in Burmese for the Voice of America.

In my first fortnightly report, a typing mistake occurred in the first page. Turkey was stated to have polled 77 voted in the Vice-Presidential election. The correct figure was 67.

New York,
16 October 1959.


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U Thant
Permanent Representative
of Burma to the United Nations

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FIRST FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF HIS EXCELLENCY
U THANT FOR THE PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER TO
30 SEPTEMBER 1959

The Fourteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly opened at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, September 15. Business on the first day was limited to the election of the President, thirteen Vice-Presidents and seven Chairmen of the main committees. Dr. Victor A. Belaunde of Peru was unanimously elected President. As reported earlier, Burma was among the thirteen Vice-Presidents elected. Countries elected and the number of votes polled are shown below:

Burma	79
Morocco	79
Philippines	78
Turkey	77
Romania	73
Brazil	73
Sweden	71
Union of South Africa	60
United Kingdom	79
United States of America	79
France	78
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	76
China	61.

Iraq, one of the candidates, withdrew her candidature on the eve of the election, and informed the Asian-African group that she proposed to seek the chairmanship of the Fourth Committee at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly.

The Main Committees then met for the purpose of electing Chairmen. The results of the elections are as follows:

First Committee:	Mr. Franz Matsch (Austria)
Special Political Committee:	Mr. Charles T.O. King (Liberia)
Second Committee:	Professor Marcial Tamayo (Bolivia)
Third Committee:	Mrs. Georgette Ciselet (Belgium)
Fourth Committee:	Mr. Lambertus N. Palar (Indonesia)
Fifth Committee:	Mr. Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia)
Sixth Committee:	Mr. Alberto Herrarte (Guatemala).

In the above elections, I had the privilege of seconding the nomination of Ambassador Palar of Indonesia for the Chairmanship of the Fourth Committee.

The first meeting of the General Committee, of which Burma is a member by virtue of her office as a Vice-President, met on September 16. Highlights of the meeting were (1) the United States' proposal to reject the request of India for inscription of item on the seating of the Central People's Republic of China in the United Nations, and (2) the attempt by Brazil to group items 59, 65 and 68 under the general heading "Question of Disarmament." In line with the Foreign Office brief Burma voted against the United States resolution which was, however, adopted by 12 votes to 7 with one abstention. The countries which voted against the resolution were: Burma, Indonesia, Sweden, U.S.S.R., Romania, Czechoslovakia and Morocco. Austria abstained. The proposal to group together three separate items was also adopted despite the opposition of six members including Burma. Actually eight members opposed, but Morocco and Liberia, through a misunderstanding of the President's call, abstained in the voting. Their protests, after the declaration of votes, were rejected by the President, as out of order.

However, the General Assembly at its 803rd meeting, decided to reverse the recommendation of the General Committee by renumbering all items separately. On the question of representation of China in the United Nations, the General Assembly rejected Nepal's amendment to the United States' resolution, and the General Committee's report was adopted. In this connection, it is significant that India, which in previous sessions attempted to reverse the United States' resolution by tabling an amendment, asked Nepal to do the job. Mr. Krishna Menon confided to me that recent Chinese "incursions" into Indian territory had created such an uproar in India that he felt India should not be the first to champion Peking's admission to the United Nations. However, his intervention in the debate was, as usual, full of sound common sense. The vote against Communist China's membership was 44 to 29 with 9 abstentions. It was the ninth successive year the Assembly had rejected proposals that it take up the question of Chinese representation. There is a consensus of opinion among the

delegates that if only the Chinese Communists had not been "foolish" in her relations with India, she would have three or four more supporters this year.

The highlight of the General Debate in the present session was Premier Krushchev's address on September 18. At once the reaction was sharp and varied. The New York Times dubbed it as a "propaganda mountain and a disarmament mouse". Mr. Kiselev, leader of the Byelorussian Delegation told me that it was the best piece of news for the peace-loving people of the world since World War II. On the second day of the speech, reactions were more sober and cautious. Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter said that he believed that no disarmament plan, however remote from reality it appears to be, should be summarily rejected. Most delegates agree that the long-deadlocked arms issue is too important and too complex to be handled in any casual manner. I personally believe that a close examination of Premier Krushchev's proposals may yield some formula that would serve at least a basis for negotiation.

In the course of his speech in the General Debate, the Honourable U Chan Tun Aung, Leader of our Delegation, made a brief reference to Premier Krushchev's proposals. But a major attention, both by the press and public, was focussed on our leader's observations on the desirability of stationing the Secretary-General's special representatives in all potentially explosive areas. The New York Post of September 30 observed, "A Burmese proposal that any East-West accommodation be supplemented by U.N. action was being closely studied at the U.N. today. Burmese Foreign Minister U Chan Tun Aung welcomed the 'current negotiations between the two superpowers'. But he cautioned the General Assembly that 'agreements and settlements at the summit can ... be upset by occurrences elsewhere in the world, quite unprovoked by the great powers'. 'A new flare-up in the Middle East or Far East could easily destroy a limited accommodation at the summit,' he said.

"It was here U Chan thought the U.N. could be helpful. A U.N. presence in the turbulent areas could exert 'a pacifying influence', he said. 'My Delegation feels that very close attention should be given by this Assembly to the possibility of stationing the Secretary-General's special representatives in those areas, with their functions clearly defined,' he added.

"U Chan's recommendation for Assembly action went further than a somewhat similar proposal last week by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange of Norway. Dr. Lange urged full use of the possibilities offered by the U.N. in bringing about a gradual improvement in East-West relations, but addressed his recommendation to the U.S. and U.S.S.R."

Mr. R.G. Casey, Foreign Minister of Australia, in the course of his speech in the General Debate, on September 30, echoed similar sentiments.

At the time of writing this report attention is focussed on a new item inscribed on the agenda by Malaya and Ireland. It concerns Tibet and the sponsors propose to call for the restoration of "civil and religious liberties" there. The United States Delegation, which is rumoured to be behind this move, made a press statement "welcoming the prospect of the inscription of the item so that the United Nations will have a chance to search out the facts of the situation". Many Delegations, however, are unhappy over the proposed inscription, since they believe among others that there is a chance that the present Assembly might participate in a significant relaxation of East-West tensions and thus go down as "the Assembly of Peace". They regard the Tibetan question as a cold war issue and think that it would intensify tensions, and hinder progress towards peace.

The question of inscription will be taken up by the General Committee at its meeting on October 9. The question was first scheduled for Friday, October 2. For unknown reasons it was postponed to Monday, October 5. The Secretary-General informed me on Saturday, October 3, that "at the request of the sponsors", the

General Committee will meet on Friday, October 9. Apparently, the sponsors themselves are not too happy over their own action. Several delegations including Indonesia, Nepal and Afghanistan declared informally that they would oppose inscription. The Indian delegation is awaiting instructions from New Delhi and my own surmise is that it will abstain. Ceylon, I understand, will also abstain. At our Delegation meeting held on 30 September presided over by the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister, it was decided that Burma should abstain. Cambodia, I understand, will take the same stand with Burma.

On the question of Algeria, President DeGaulle's proposals and the Algerian Nationalist reaction are receiving the closest attention of our Delegation. So far there has been no official response from Paris to the Algerian statement. I doubt whether Paris will make any formal reply since it does not recognize the F.L.N. However, the French evidently are considering it carefully. According to reports from Paris, they recognize that it represents a concession on the part of the Nationalists, who have previously insisted that they would lay down their arms only if they got immediate independence.

Presumably, the French and the Algerians are in contact and are exploring the meaning of each other's declarations through the good offices of the Tunisians and Moroccans. My own view is that the prospects of a settlement are better than ever before. But in view of the difficulties, it may be weeks or even months before France and the Algerian Nationalists can get down to fruitful discussions. The Hon'ble. Foreign Minister (Burma) in his speech in the General Debate merely expressed the hope that President De Gaulle's new approach "will inevitably lead to negotiations of a political nature which obviously have been the essence of the United Nations resolutions in previous sessions."

The Israeli Delegation exerted considerable pressure on our Delegation to make appropriate references in the General Debate to the freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal, but we refused to comply

with their wish, although the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister made an appeal both to "our Arab and Israeli friends to intensify their efforts to find ways and means to solve their differences". In this connection a reference is invited to the Foreign Office cable BUN.217/ dated 21st September and our office cable UNB.344/ dated 23rd September, 1959.

GENERAL.

At the request of the Secretary-General I saw him on Friday, September 11, and discussed the situation in Laos. I reported verbally to the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister as soon as he arrived in New York on Saturday, September 12. The Secretary-General had in mind the stationing of a special representative of his in Laos to function in the same way as his special representative functioned in the Middle East during the period of crisis. His surmise is that the U.N. Fact-Collecting Group in Laos will submit its report to the Security Council in Mid-October. The Security Council shall have to pass a substantive resolution based on this report, and the Soviet Union will no doubt veto it. The matter shall have to be taken up in the General Assembly where ways and means will be sought to break the impasse. Here, the Secretary-General considers that the Middle Eastern precedent should be followed.

At his own request again, the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister and I saw the Secretary-General on Wednesday, September 23, and he reiterated his own proposal. He hinted that the matter shall have to be taken up either late in November or early in December this year. From the discussions, the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister and I got the impression that the Secretary-General was thinking in terms of a "neutral" diplomat who is to function as his special representative, and that he had in mind a Burmese with the rank of an Ambassador.

Another relevant matter which should be mentioned in this report is the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister's interview with the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Christian A. Herter, on Tuesday, September 22, at the latter's suite in Waldorf Towers. I

was also present at the interview. Mr. Herter asked the Hon'ble. Foreign Minister what he thought of Premier Krushchev's speech in the General Assembly. He did not pursue the matter further when Hon'ble. Foreign Minister replied, "Very interesting". Then Mr. Herter asked Hon'ble. Foreign Minister how the recent United States aid programme was progressing.


The Hon'ble Foreign Minister had also occasion to discuss with Mr. A. Fujiyama, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, on Friday, September 18, the question of Japanese reparations to Burma. Hon'ble. Foreign Minister stressed the fact that there is a very strong feeling in Burma that Japan should enhance her reparations commitments. Mr. Fujiyama assured Hon'ble. Foreign Minister that he would consider the matter carefully and sympathetically, but cautioned that it is a very delicate matter in the context of current Japanese domestic politics. He assured Hon'ble. Foreign Minister that he would obtain the views of his Finance Minister who is directly concerned with any question of enhancement.

Before I conclude, I hope it will be proper for me to invite a reference to the following cables:

BUN.203/Da	dated September 14
BUN.204/Da	dated September 14
UNB.616/	dated September 14
UNB.690/	dated September 28.

Uniburma, London, reports to Hon'ble. Foreign Minister, "Enquiry reveals source of information on Sino-Burmese question from two members of your Delegation while in London Mr. Pendsay of Agence France Press interviewed them. Pendsay refused to give names. Fuller report will be sent on return from Scotland." But the Delegates deny having spoken to any news correspondent in London.

New York
5 October 1959.


.....
(U Thant)
Permanent Representative of
Burma to the United Nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

FINAL REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF BURMA TO THE
THIRTEENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The composition of the Delegation and its distribution among the various Committees is shown below:

Representatives:

U Thant (Chairman)	First Committee
U Aung Tha Gyaw (Alternate Chairman)	Sixth Committee
U On Sein	Fourth Committee
U Tun Shein	Special Political Committee
U Tin Maung	Fifth Committee

Alternate Representatives:

U Kyaw Thoun	Sixth Committee
U Thet Tun	Second Committee
U Kyaw Win	Third Committee
U Ba Chit	

Advisers and Secretaries to Delegation:

U Kyaw Min
U Aung Thant
U Kyawt Maung

Justice U Aung Tha Gyaw left New York for Rangoon on 1 November 1958 to assume duties as Chairman of an Enquiry Commission set up by the Union Government, and U Kyaw Thoun arrived here on 15 November 1958 to take up delegation duties in the Sixth Committee. U Thet Tun left New York on 22 October 1958 vide Foreign Office cable BCY 204/Hta dated 2 October, 1958 and returned to New York on 15 November 1958 to resume his duties.

Periodic cable reports were submitted to the Foreign Office from time to time, on important issues raised both in Committees and in the Plenary session, and full reports on the work of the individual Committees, except the First Committee, have been submitted. In the circumstances, I propose to deal mainly with the work of the First Committee in this Final Report.

Trusteeship Council Elections

Before dealing with the actual items considered by the First Committee and directly by the Plenary, I think it will be appropriate to begin this report with an event of direct interest to Burma, i.e. her re-election to the Trusteeship Council. Burma made a wise move in giving up her proposed candidature to the Economic and Social Council in favour of the Trusteeship Council. Three vacancies when the terms of Guatemala,

United Arab Republic and Burma expire at the end of 1958 were hotly contested. No problem was posed for Guatemala's successor as the Latin-American group met before the date of election and unanimously decided to put up Paraguay as their candidate. For the two Asian-African seats, the following six countries had announced their candidature: United Arab Republic (for re-election), Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Indonesia and Burma (for re-election). I made several attempts to put up just two candidates to avoid unnecessary and unpleasant canvassing among the Asian-African as well as other delegations, but to no avail. However, before the voting took place, Ghana withdrew in favour of the United Arab Republic; Ethiopia withdrew in favour of Liberia and Indonesia withdrew in favour of Burma. Thus only three countries seriously contested for the two Asian-African seats.

The African group, in one of its closed door meetings, heard the pleas of the Liberian delegate for support, but the Permanent Representatives of the United Arab Republic, Tunisia and Morocco privately assured me that they would vote for Burma, and not for Liberia. Burma was also assured of support both by the Western and Eastern big Powers for totally different reasons. The United States, Britain, France and all white Commonwealth countries, for obvious reasons, prefer Burma to the United Arab Republic. Soviet Russia and all Eastern European countries, for equally obvious reasons prefer Burma to Liberia. It is certainly a matter for gratification that just on the eve of voting, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge of the United States, Sir Pierson Dixon of the United Kingdom and Mr. A. Sobolev of the Soviet Union personally expressed their concern to me over Burma's chances. When the voting took place Burma and Paraguay (official Latin American candidate) received the needed two-thirds majority vote on the first ballot. The United Arab Republic was elected only after the third ballot when Liberia withdrew from the race.

In this connexion I want to take this opportunity of mentioning the nature of handicap under which Burma has been labouring in the discharge of her functions as a member of the Trusteeship Council. When India was a member of that Council, she had on her permanent staff three Officers who were mainly concerned with Trusteeship affairs. The United Arab Delegation had two officers who discharged similar functions. I understand that even China (Formosa) maintained three Officers - one with the rank of Minister - who concentrate on the Trusteeship Council.

Our delegation is no doubt strengthened by the arrival of U Tin Maung who has had vast experience of Trusteeship Council affairs, but this additional strength is greatly mitigated by the withdrawal of the Second Secretary's post currently held by U Kyaw Min. U Tin Maung can be hardly expected to devote his sole attention to Trusteeship Council affairs since his attention will necessarily be diverted to administrative and public relations duties, besides helping me in general United Nations activities. To achieve more effective participation in Trusteeship affairs, I would submit that the post of the Second Secretary in this office should be revived. Incidentally, U Tin Maung will be away on the Visiting Mission to the Pacific Islands from the first week of February till the end of April 1959 while the twenty-third session of the Trusteeship Council will be in session.

Elections to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council which took place at the same time with the elections to the Trusteeship Council are of course only of academic interest to Burma.

Italy, Tunisia and Argentina were elected to Security Council membership and they fill the vacancies that occur when the terms of Sweden, Iraq and Colombia expire at the end of 1958. The voting by secret ballot was a formality since the three nations were unchallenged candidates. At first Iran intended to compete with Tunisia for the usual Middle Eastern seat currently occupied by Iraq, but just before the election day she withdrew, giving way to Tunisia.

The Assembly also elected six new members to fill vacancies on the Economic and Social Council. Five countries received the needed two-thirds majority vote on the first ballot. They are Venezuela, New Zealand, the United States, Spain and Bulgaria. The remaining vacancy was filled, after a series of five ballots, when Thailand withdrew from the race and Afghanistan was elected. Ceylon, which was one of the original candidates, withdrew about a week ahead of the election date in favour of Afghanistan. The Philippines which also contested for the single Asian seat trailed far behind Afghanistan and Thailand in the first two ballots.

DISARMAMENT:

No perceptible progress was made in the field of disarmament in the thirteenth session, except the passage of a resolution to place all 81 Members (now 82 with the admission of Guinea) of the United Nations on the Disarmament Commission. This is one of several examples of the increased support that the Soviet Union is now receiving from the neutralist countries of Asia and Africa in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union, it will be recalled, proposed the same thing in the previous session but it was turned down by the West. Since the overwhelming majority felt that it was essential to end the year-long Soviet boycott of the Disarmament Commission, the United States did not oppose it this time.

Similarly, the United States did not protest when the Special Political Committee shelved action at this session on planning for a United Nations Peace Force. Although President Eisenhower has urged immediate action, the United States found that opposition not only by the Soviet bloc, but also by several uncommitted countries like India, United Arab Republic and some Latin Americans was too strong.

However, the Western Powers defeated an Asian-African resolution (co-sponsored by Burma) supporting the Soviet view that nuclear test explosions should be stopped immediately. Instead, The Assembly endorsed the United States and British position on the necessity of controls first before a test ban is imposed. The United States resolution called for the suspension of nuclear tests during the Geneva negotiations on the establishment of an international control system. The acceptance of this resolution followed a long series of attempts to reach a compromise recommendation on nuclear testing. On 1 November a final attempt to find a formula was made in a resolution sponsored by India and Yugoslavia. But the First Committee turned it down by 36 to 26 (Burma included) with 19 abstentions, the key paragraph of which would have had the Assembly call for a discontinuance of atomic arms tests pending the establishment of a control system. A second resolution, tabled by the Soviet Union, on the cessation of tests was withdrawn by Mr. Valerin A. Zorin, head of the Soviet Delegation, after the defeat of the Indo-Yugoslavian resolution for the cessation of tests.

Nevertheless, the thirteenth session of the Assembly has emphasized the increased voting strength of the Soviet Union which, on some issues, is supported by the majority of Asian-African members. Together with the ten Communist members and the European neutralists like Austria, Sweden and Finland, they almost balance the United States and its allies in Europe, Latin America and the British Commonwealth. One illustration was provided by the vote on the Asian-African nuclear test resolution (co-sponsored by Burma) which was defeated by 41 to 27. The United States, 19 Latin American countries and 11 Western European countries constituted the basic Western strength. Ten additional votes were provided by seven Asian countries and three Commonwealth countries. In contrast, 16 members of the Asian-African group and Finland, along with 10 Communist countries voted for the resolution. Thirteen members refused to take sides and abstained: seven Asian-African countries (including Japan and Iran); three traditional allies of the United States, Mexico, New Zealand and Iceland; and Austria, Ireland and Sweden.

On the basic disarmament issue, the situation remains as tangled as ever. Unfortunately the mutual suspicion that has wrecked all East-West negotiations since the war has applied as strongly as ever in the discussion of disarmament problems. The roots of the suspicion have been these:

The West does not believe that Russia will keep agreements she has signed, and therefore Western policy is to insist on effective controls before putting agreements into effect.

Russia believes that American nuclear bases overseas will be used for attack on the Soviet Union, and therefore demands their dismantling before any inspection of Russian territory or effective international control system, is put into effect.

In other words both sides believe that if they relax their guard for a moment the other will attack.

PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE:

Even before the first man-made satellite was hurled into orbit in October 1957, the United States had taken the initiative for international control of space. A Commission was proposed to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union responded to this initiative by linking the space question with the issue of United States' foreign military bases, on the ground that these were or would be armed with missiles aimed at Russia.

The item proposed by the USSR for the consideration of the General Assembly was entitled "The banning of the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other countries and international co-operation in the study of cosmic space." The same item proposed by the United States was entitled "Programme for international co-operation in the field of outer space."

The item was subsequently allocated to the Political Committee and the question was taken up on 8 November when the Soviet Union moved formally for a United Nations ban on the use of outer space for military purposes. The Soviet Delegation laid before the Political Committee a draft resolution coupling the proposal with a recommendation for the elimination of military bases on foreign territory. On 17 November, however, the Soviet Delegation withdrew this condition.

When the Soviet proposal originally was made on 15 March, 1958 (outside the United Nations) for discussion at a meeting of the heads of governments, the United States at that time called it "wholly unacceptable" because it linked the control of outer space with that of American "defence installations" abroad. The United States, as is well known, would have the questions of outer space and disarmament considered separately.

The United States and 19 other countries tabled a draft resolution on 13 November, under which the Assembly would appoint a Committee of 9 Member Governments. The Committee would report to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly on the following among others:

- (a) The activities and resources of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and of other international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;
- (b) The area of international co-operation and programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space;
- (c) The future United Nations organizational arrangements to facilitate international co-operation in this field;
- (d) The nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore outer space.

On 22 November, the United States and 19 co-sponsors tabled a revised draft resolution, eliminating most of the features unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The general consensus of opinion was that only one fundamental difference remained between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. This was the composition of a preparatory group to be named by the Assembly to consider the programme and rules for "a permanent international Committee on cosmic space."

The Soviet Union had moved for an eleven-nation body including the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. The revised Western draft accepted the idea of a preparatory group, but called for a membership of eighteen, eliminating Rumania and adding some Western and friendly neutral States. It will be redundant, for the purpose of this report, to relist the two bodies here, but my own line-up of the two respective compositions is as follows:

Soviet Proposal (Eleven Nations)

Four Communist plus four pro-Western plus three neutrals (Sweden, United Arab Republic and India).

United States Proposal (Eighteen Nations)

Three Communist plus twelve pro-Western plus three neutrals (Sweden, United Arab Republic and India).

The Soviet proposal basically insists on parity between Communist and non-Communist representation in the proposed Committee, while the United States proposed composition is based more or less on mathematical proportion of the whole United Nations structure. Mr. Sobolev of the USSR Delegation also hinted to me privately that his Government objected to the inclusion of Australia and Brazil since the Soviet Union has no diplomatic relations with them. Mr. Zorin publicly threatened to boycott the Committee if it were constituted under the United States' resolution.

The debate in the Political Committee followed the usual pattern. All the familiar cold war themes were revived, and the problems involved in the control of outer space were obscured by a sea of rhetoric.

Before the voting on the two draft resolutions took place I made a brief intervention, appealing both to the United States and the Soviet Union not to rush through with their respective proposals which were not acceptable to the other side, but to continue to exhaust all possible avenues of negotiation and conciliation. I also mentioned the fact that only one fundamental difference remained between the United States and the Soviet Union, i.e. the composition of the preparatory group.

Mr. Krishna Menon of India who seemed to be impressed with my appeal offered to co-sponsor with me a resolution requesting both the United States and the USSR to consider this matter and report to the Political Committee on an urgent basis "on an agreed and practical approach to this problem." I promptly complied with his request, and the two sponsors were joined by the United Arab Republic. It fell to my lot to introduce the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.224/Rev.1). However, the resolution was rejected by 25 to 14 votes with 42 abstentions. Since the United States objected to the resolution, Mr. Menon (whose roll-call vote preceded Burma) took the extraordinary step of abstaining on his own resolution. The United Arab Republic and Burma had to follow suit with much distress. The more appropriate course, once the United States attitude was known, should have been to withdraw our resolution, but the developments in the Committee took place so fast that there was no chance of determining our joint attitude before the voting. In any case, among the 42 countries which abstained were many Latin Americans who normally voted with the United States. It is equally significant that Colombia, Ghana, Iceland and Indonesia joined the 9 members of the Soviet bloc in voting for our resolution.

When the United States draft resolution was put to the vote it was adopted by 54 to 9 with 18 abstentions. Burma of course was among those which abstained.

Mr. Zorin at once took the floor and declared that as a result of the rejection of the Soviet proposal last year on the composition of the Disarmament Commission, it had accomplished nothing for a year and that the same thing would happen to the new study Committee on outer space. I am also convinced that there is no point in setting up a Committee which will not function, especially when that Committee is to be concerned with the problems of outer space in which the Soviet Union is generally recognized as ahead of the United States.

CYPRUS

I think it will be appropriate to offer a brief explanation in this report on why I consider that the Cyprus question has assumed a new character in the thirteenth session, vide our cipher telegram FO.639, dated 25 November, 1958. In my humble opinion, the introduction of the original Greek draft resolution and the statement of the Greek Foreign Minister in introducing this resolution reflect a basic change in the Greek attitude towards the Cyprus question. The Greek Government has clearly abandoned its original demand for the annexation of Cyprus and it made a straightforward appeal for Cypriot independence. The Greek Foreign Minister even stated that his Government is willing to guarantee that Cyprus would not unite with Greece unless the United Nations General Assembly gave its approval.

However, Archbishop Makarios said before the debate began (of course outside the United Nations) that an independent Cyprus should be united with Greece, and this has kept alive the suspicion in London and Ankara that the Greek change of position was merely for tactical purposes. But several delegations which were traditionally opposed to the idea of Eunoia welcomed the official Greek attitude, and among them are India, Ceylon, Nepal, Guatemala, Panama and Ireland.

I would submit that while both partition and independence have their drawbacks, almost anything would be better than a continuation of the present situation. The Mexican resolution adopted by the General Assembly merely expressed the "confidence" that the nations concerned would strive for a "peaceful, democratic and just solution" of the problem of Cyprus. The Mexican text followed almost exactly that of a resolution sponsored by India in February 1957.

ALGERIA:

The Asian-African group very nearly put together a two-thirds majority on the political issue it regards as most significant: Algeria. In the closing hours of the General Assembly on 13 December the group obtained a 35 to 18 vote in favour of its resolution "recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence" and calling upon France to negotiate with the un-named Provisional Algerian Government. Twenty eight countries, including the United States, abstained from voting. Had anyone of them supported the resolution, it would have had the necessary two-thirds majority. Success was just a hair's breadth away. Last year, the Asian-African group offered the Assembly a much milder document, but even so, was unable to prevent its further dilution with pro-French amendments. Thus the increase in group influence during the past year was strikingly demonstrated. The Asian-African steering Committee on Algeria, of which I have the privilege to be Chairman, met twice during the period of the Assembly session.

On this particular issue, one Asian-African asset was the fact that France continued to boycott the Assembly debate, thus antagonising some delegations. Much more important, however, was the fact that the United States stood aloof, declining to lobby for France.

The American abstention on the final vote was heartily welcomed by the Algerians and their supporters, since it marked a break with the United States' traditional attitude towards the French Algerian policy. The French Delegation was unhappy with the stand, but by no means so unhappy as it would have been had the resolution passed.

While on this subject I want to take this opportunity of offering a brief explanation on why the Delegation decided that the reference to the Provisional Algerian Government in the original draft resolution (co-sponsored by Burma) does not imply recognition, vide this office's cipher cable FO.693, dated 13 December, 1958.

The last paragraph of the preamble takes note of "the willingness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with the Government of France."

Representatives of some Member States including Argentina and Japan raised the question whether, by voting for this paragraph in conjunction with the operative paragraph urging "negotiations between the two parties concerned," they may not be giving implied recognition to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Some other delegations including the delegations of Pakistan and Iran which are traditionally sympathetic to the official French stand and which now support our draft resolution, believe otherwise.

This belief is based on several precedents set in the United Nations and its subsidiary organs. For instance, on the question of Indonesia, the Security Council adopted, as early as August 1947, a resolution which noted, "with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed Forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia," and called upon the parties concerned to cease hostilities. This resolution specifically mentioned "the Republic of Indonesia" and no member of the then Security Council appeared to be conscious of any implication of recognition.

There is still another decision of the Security Council on the question of Indonesia that has a bearing on the present question of recognition. At its 181st meeting on 12 August, 1947, the Security Council decided to invite Indonesia to participate in the discussions. At that time the representative of Belgium called attention to the fact that the invitation of a community under Article 32 might be interpreted as "indirect recognition." However, the President of the Security Council ruled as follows:

"I should like to add that an invitation to the representative of the Indonesian Republic to participate in this discussion would not bind any State to recognize the independence or sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic. The invitation would be extended simply in connexion with the work of the Security Council."

That, I submit, is identical with the case of Algeria discussed in the thirteenth session of the Assembly. If an invitation to the Republic of Indonesia to participate in the discussions of the Security Council and a call by the Security Council for negotiations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands did not imply recognition of the Republic, then the reference to "the willingness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into negotiations with the Government of France" and urging negotiations between "the two parties concerned" cannot imply recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

In another resolution of the General Assembly -- resolution 498(V) on the intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea, one of the operative paragraphs "Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China." In adopting that resolution, no one stated that this reference implies recognition of the People's Republic of China.

The same holds true in regard to the Warsaw negotiations between the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. There is no inference of recognition at all, on the basis of these negotiations. In fact, this has been made abundantly clear by the United States Government.

I fully appreciate the concern of the Union Government conveyed to me vide your BOY.278/Da, dated 13 December, 1958 and I regret that no detailed explanation could be offered to the Foreign Office in time as co-sponsorship of the draft resolution was requested within 24 hours of the Asian-African group meeting which considered the draft.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS:

Although I have said earlier that the thirteenth session of the General Assembly has emphasized the increased voting strength of the Soviet Union and its supporters on several issues, it opened with a happy augury for the United States and the West. At its start the United States won two successes. Dr. Charles Malik, the then Foreign Minister of Lebanon, was strenuously opposed by both the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic (and of course all Arab States except Lebanon), and his election as President of the General Assembly was a clear-cut victory for the United States and the other Western Powers. A victory for Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, the then Sudanese Foreign Minister, would have been interpreted by many delegations as a rebuke to the United States for its "intervention" in Lebanon.

Dr. Malik did not attain the post without a struggle. Until the recent crisis in the Middle East, he had been considered certain to win the Assembly Presidency without serious challenge, because he stepped aside last year for Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand. But his pro-Western stand in the Lebanon crisis displeased many, and therefore the Arab League of ten States, with the exception of Lebanon, made Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub its candidate for the high United Nations post. The United States and most of the Western Powers backed Dr. Malik. In the Assembly's secret ballot Dr. Malik won by 45 to 31 votes. Burma of course, as per instructions, voted for Mahgoub.

The second success for the United States came when the Steering Committee recommended by 12 votes to 7 that the Assembly not place on its agenda the question of the representation of China in the United Nations, and it turned out, as expected, that formal consideration of the issue was postponed, as desired by the United States, for another year, despite objections from several delegations including Burma. Many Western delegations privately felt that it is time for the Assembly to consider whether the Chinese Nationalist Government still represents China, taking into account the fact that it left the mainland nine years ago. However, they felt that under the present circumstances, the inclusion of this question on the Assembly agenda would certainly be interpreted as disapproval of the assistance that the United States Navy was giving the Nationalist garrisons on the Quemoy and Matsu islands at that time.

In fact the Far Eastern crisis dominated the general debate during this session. At certain stages there was widespread fear in the United Nations that the crisis might explode into a major war. The United States at first took a very tough stand. Secretary of State Dulles, in a statement issued at Newport, Rhode Island with President Eisenhower's approval, said that Quemoy was "increasingly related" to the defence of Formosa. The statement strongly implied that the President might invoke the Formosa resolution of 1955 which authorized him to use United States forces to defend such "related positions" as he deemed essential to the defence of Formosa. In a press conference at Newport, Mr. Dulles even went further. The United States, he said, might bomb the

Chinese mainland if the Communists attacked Quemoy. President Eisenhower followed it up in a television and radio address, with a warning that the nation must fight if necessary to prevent the Communist conquest of Quemoy and Matsu. In that situation direct talks opened in Warsaw between the United States and the People's Republic of China. But the strong and unyielding positions taken by the two sides failed to achieve any positive results.

The United States' tough stand on the issue of the off-shore islands had aroused considerable opposition both in the United States and abroad. Many Democrats charged that the Administration had given Chiang Kai Shek an option on whether the United States was to be dragged into World War III. Former Senator Herbert Lehman, among others, said that Quemoy "was not worth the life of one American boy." The allies, deeply alarmed, refused to accept the United States' view that Quemoy was "another Berlin" and a test of the West's determination to resist Communist aggression. Instead, they saw it as a barren piece of territory that was traditionally part of the Chinese mainland and had become important only because Chiang, unnecessarily and unwisely, had committed a large force there.

Several delegations including Burma devoted substantial portions of their speeches in the general debate to the explosive Far Eastern crisis. Our delegation's references to that crisis and our deep concern over the fearful developments, expressed in the course of the general debate on 24 September, were widely quoted in the American press. The New York Times (The News of the Week in Review) of 28 September observed, "Several nations also used the Assembly forum last week to echo the warning of Burma's U Thant that the world is on the brink of a major war."

The first hint of the United States' policy shift was on 29 September when Under Secretary of State Christian Herter, in apparent contradiction of previous Administration statements said that the off-shore islands were not "strategically defensible" and he described the Nationalist preoccupation with them as "almost pathological." At his press conference on the next day, Mr. Dulles expanded and developed the theme with the startling remark that it had been "rather foolish" of Chiang Kai Shek to put so many of his troops on Quemoy. In the course of the same speech he observed, "In any case, the United States had no commitment to help Chiang back to the mainland and it regarded a re-conquest as highly hypothetical."

This statement coupled with President Eisenhower's statement at his press conference the following day were widely interpreted as a major change in the United States' Far Eastern policy. Although on Quemoy itself the military picture remained more or less unchanged up till the time of writing this report, I consider that the United States' policy shift was prompted by several factors including certain pressure groups in the United Nations which are considered friendly to the United States. The fundamental reason which prompted these delegations to plead for the softening of the United States' attitude is the fact that the Soviet Union threatened to come to the aid of the People's Republic of China if the mainland were attacked.

I should like to conclude this report with a warm tribute to the general work of our delegation. As in the case of the delegation to the twelfth session, all members attended to their duties with full consciousness of their responsibilities. I am

not sure whether I should give my personal impressions in this report on the work of the individual members of the delegation, but the temptation to comment is so great that I crave the indulgence of the Foreign Office for this seemingly off-the-track soliloquy.

Justice U Aung Tha Gyaw was of very great help to the delegation not only in the work of the Sixth Committee to which he was assigned, but also in other Committees whenever issues of a legal and juridical nature were involved. U On Sein's work in the Fourth Committee was outstanding, and Ambassador Boland of Ireland (Chairman of the Fourth Committee) personally expressed to me his admiration for U On Sein's positive contribution in that Committee. U Tun Shain, with his rich experience in the Foreign Office, was also of very great help to the delegation with his capacity to analyze knotty problems. U Thet Tun ably represented Burma in the Second Committee, but his long absence from New York considerably mitigated his good work. U Kyaw Thoun, despite his background and qualifications, could not show up his talents well. U Ba Chit is thorough and meticulous in his work, but I have a feeling that there is still room in his make-up for tact and public relations. U Kyaw Win is the least equipped of the delegates to contribute effectively to the work of the delegation.

In any case, their sense of duty and spirit of co-operation rendered the work of the delegation not only co-ordinated but also very pleasant.

H
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(U Thant)
Chairman
Delegation of Burma
Thirteenth Regular Session
United Nations General Assembly

New York
26 January, 1959

(13th Session Gen Assembly)
- U Nu Speaks, 7 Nov. 1958 -

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT

The Burman, in its issue of November 1, 1958, carried an AFP report to the effect that the Israeli Government has asked the Burmese Government for an explanation of the statement made by a Burmese delegate on the sending of the United Nations troops to Israel. A few days earlier, the Guardian wrongly attributed this statement to Ambassador U Thant. As the person responsible for touching on this issue in the statement made in the Special Political Committee on October 29, when the report of the Secretary-General on the UNEF was being discussed, I think it is necessary for me to give this further clarification in addition to that already mentioned in my report for the period ending October 31, 1958. The report to which was attached my statement was despatched under covering letter No. FO.576/13-07UN/58 dated 4 November 1958 by diplomatic bag No.65 of 4 November 1958.

The statement, which was based on documents, is self-explanatory. ^{when I said} I was merely expressing an honest opinion that conditions more conducive to peaceful and just settlement of the outstanding problems would be created if the Force could operate also on the Israel side.

By our support of the various resolutions relating to the Force, particularly resolution 1125(XI) of 2 February 1957, it would be safe to assume that Government considers it important that for the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, the Force was deployed on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line, viz. on both sides of the line, subject to consent of the host countries. Egypt agreed to accept the Force but not so Israel with the result that this resolution could not be implemented fully as reported by the Secretary-General in paragraph 61 of document A/3943. If the resolution was not fully implemented it meant that there was no certainty that the Armistice Agreement would be maintained. Peace in the region might again be disturbed.

It was with a view to prevent any disturbance of the peace and a desire to see the early settlement of the Arab - Israeli problems that a reference to the operation of the Force on the Israeli side was made.

Since other speakers did not touch on this particular aspect of the Force's operation during the course of the debate the fact that I did so perhaps appeared a little odd. But as stated earlier, I was simply expressing an honest opinion with the best of intentions.

I regret if I had given cause for embarrassment to the Government.

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sd- (Tun Shein)

7 November 1958

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CONFIDENTIAL

FINAL REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF BURMA TO THE
THIRD EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
8TH TO 21ST AUGUST 1958

To present a fairly comprehensive background to the Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, it will be necessary to go back to the fighting in Lebanon which flared up in the third week of June 1958. At the heart of the situation was an insurrectionist movement against the strongly pro-Western Government of President Camille Chamoun. President Chamoun, a Christian in a country that is half Christian and half Moslem, indicated plans in May 1958 to amend the Constitution so that he could serve a second term when his present term expires on September 23, 1958. The plan precipitated a violent reaction among Moslem leaders, opposed for various reasons to the Chamoun Government. There were sporadic bombings and street clashes in Beirut and other Lebanese cities and the rebels seized large sections of the 150-mile Syrian border. They even occupied a substantial part of Beirut town itself and set up rebel headquarters there.

One peculiar feature of the rebellion is that the Government forces all along seemed to be taking only half-hearted measures against the rebels rather than launching a campaign of concerted military action. Another feature which confused Western observers is the fact that the rebel leaders held almost daily press conferences, unmolested, at their Beirut headquarters. The rebel leaders, at their press conferences, claimed, among other things, to have an understanding with the Government Military Commander, General Fouad Chehab.

The Chamoun Government claimed that the rebellion was inspired, and to a great extent supported with arms and recruits, by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic. From all accounts it is clear that the Chamoun Government has

been a target of strong Nasser propaganda as a step towards his goal of a United Arab World in the Middle East. The Chamoun Government embodied its charges against the Nasser regime in a formal protest to the Security Council, as a result of which a 100-man United Nations Observation Group arrived in Lebanon to survey the situation. Burma contributed five military officers to this Group, at the request of the Secretary-General, acting on the Security Council resolution.

In that situation, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold journeyed to the Middle East to confer with President Chamoun, with the United Nations Observers and with President Nasser in Cairo. Mr. Hammarskjold, reporting on his first-hand survey of Lebanon, said, "The phrase massive infiltration is not warranted at present." The United Nations Observation Group, in its first report to the Security Council stated that the United Nations Observers had not been able to gain access to many of the rebel-held border areas, but like Mr. Hammarskjold, the Observation Group was clearly sceptical about the claims of "massive infiltration" made by President Chamoun. The report, inter-alia, said, "It has not been possible to establish from where the rebel arms were acquired. Nor was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside." Beirut was dismayed by the United Nations findings and the Chamoun Government repeated its earlier charges that 3,000 Egyptians, Syrians and Palestinian Arabs, armed by Nasser, had infiltrated Lebanon and joined the rebels. At the United Nations the Lebanese delegation issued a statement sharply criticising the Observers' report.

However, Mr. Hammarskjold's views coupled with the Observers' report produced in the United Nations a pronounced change of atmosphere surrounding the Lebanon situation. The possibility of further action by the United Nations virtually disappeared. The feeling grew that it was up to the Lebanese themselves to end the turmoil in their country.

In the middle of July, fateful events took place in the Middle East. On the 14th July the pro-Western Government of Iraq was overthrown by those who professed sympathy for the pan-Arabic movement of President Nasser. On that very night the United States sent a military force into Lebanon to prevent a similar coup there. Two days later, Britain sent by air a military force into Jordan. In a gesture of United States support, fifty U.S. Navy jet fighters flew over Jordan. Moscow warned it could not remain "indifferent" to the events close to its borders. Russia vetoed a United States move in the Security Council to have the United Nations take over the job of policing the Middle East. Nasser made a surprise and secret trip to Moscow for consultations with Premier Khrushchev who called for a summit meeting at Geneva on July 22 to "avoid the world's greatest catastrophe."

Out of these critical events, four major conclusions emerged:

First, while the Middle East situation was loaded with danger, it was unlikely to trigger a major war.

Second, the Western show of strength had taken Nasser and the Soviet Union by surprise.

Third, one result was going to be a Soviet war of nerves that threatened to keep the international situation at fever pitch.

Fourth, the United Nations was faced with the gravest crisis of its career.

The Security Council was called a few hours after the landing of United States marines in Lebanon, and Ambassador Cabot Lodge declared that the American forces would remain in Lebanon "only until the United Nations itself is able to assume the necessary responsibilities." Mr. Lodge introduced a resolution whose key clause provided for "a request to the Secretary-General to consult with Lebanon and other States on additional arrangements, including the contribution and use of contingents for the defence of Lebanon's

integrity and independence." Ambassador Arkady Sobolev of Russia said the United States had committed an "act of aggression against the Arab world." While the Security Council was in session, the general opinion in Lebanon itself appeared to be resentful over this country's possible involvement in a collision of the vast forces of East and West. The Speaker of the Lebanese parliament reported to the United Nations that half of the members of parliament protested the American landing.

These developments provided a decisive propaganda advantage to the Russians who promptly mounted a heavy propaganda offensive. The reaction of many "neutrals" including India, Indonesia and Ceylon was bitterly critical of the United States' action in marine landings, which although legal in the strict sense of the term, was considered a dangerous precedent in view of the fact that the Security Council was already seized with the Lebanese complaint when the United States took that independent action. Burma's official stand, which has been made clear in cable instructions to this office by the Foreign Office, was shared by countries like Afghanistan, Nepal, Malaya and Ethiopia. Pro-Western members of the Asian-African group like Liberia, Tunisia, Turkey, the Philippines and Thailand were found to be far from vocal. Certain Latin-American States like Venezuela, Mexico and El-Salvador seemed to be critical of United States' landings since they dread the prospect of foreign troop intervention in Latin-American States at the request of unpopular dictators.

In this political climate the Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was convened. President Eisenhower, in a dramatic appearance at the opening session, outlined for the first time a comprehensive programme for the area. He outlined a six point programme for the Middle East:

- (1) United Nations measures to preserve the independence of Lebanon.
- (2) United Nations measures to preserve peace in Jordan.
- (3) An end to the fomenting from without of civil strife in the Middle East through "inflammatory propaganda."


resolution presented to the Security Council and vetoed by Soviet Russia. The United States and Britain supported the resolution while the Russian bloc plus Yugoslavia opposed it. Among the Asian-African group, India, Ceylon and Indonesia came out openly against the Norwegian draft. The group met five times during the period of the Special Session, and the Sub-Committee of ten, including Burma, met twice to frame a commonly acceptable formula. The Sub-Committee submitted to the Group a tentative draft resolution and an amendment to the Norwegian draft, for consideration. I promptly submitted these texts to the Foreign Office for instructions vide this office's cables FO.372 and FO.374 dated 19th August 1958. While most Asian-African delegations were awaiting similar instructions from their respective governments, the ten Arab delegations conferred among themselves and produced a draft resolution, the two main clauses of which are:

- (1) "Calls on members of the Arab League to observe the pledge of non-interference in one another's internal affairs, and
- (2) "Requests the United Nations Secretary-General to "uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan so as to make possible the early withdrawal of foreign troops from the two countries."

Agreement was reached among the ten Arab States at 11 p.m. on Wednesday, 20th August 1958, and I received a copy of the draft resolution at 11.30 p.m. the same day. On the next morning I met both Ambassador Lodge and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and asked for their reaction. Lodge told me that his delegation would support the Arab draft, but Gromyko said he was not very happy over it as it was "very mild." He took particular exception to the phrase in one of the operative paragraphs "so as to make possible" (underlined above), which, he said, was the same used in the original

Japanese draft resolution presented to the Security Council and vetoed by the Soviet Union. He said that it would be difficult for his delegation to support a draft resolution identical with the Japanese draft which had already been vetoed by Soviet Russia in the Security Council. He suggested that the phrase "so as to make possible" should be replaced by a more definitive expression like "facilitate." I at once contacted the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fawzi and informed him of the Soviet reaction. The Arab States met again at 2.30 p.m. on Thursday, 21st August, and changed the wording accordingly. The draft resolution was tabled on the same day at 3.30 p.m., and when the vote was taken at 6.40 p.m. on that day all the 80 nations (except Dominican Republic which was absent) voted for it. Thus ended the Assembly consideration of the explosive Middle East crisis.

As for what the resolution meant for the Middle East, no one at this stage can say with certainty. Heavy reliance had been placed on President Nasser to cease voluntarily his pressure against the other Arab governments. In theory, the Arab League would police the guarantees of non-interference. Much, however, depends on how Mr. Hammarskjold interprets his mission and the authorization for a United Nations "presence" in Lebanon and Jordan as a substitute for the Anglo-American forces. At the time of writing this report, the Secretary-General is already on the spot.


.....
(U Thant)
Chairman

Third Emergency Special Session
United Nations General Assembly

New York
26 August 1958

Copy for H.E.

FINAL REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF BURMA TO THE
TWELFTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The composition of the Delegation and its distribution among the various Committees is shown below:

Representatives:

U Thant (Chairman)	First Committee
U Aung Soe (Alternate Chairman)	Second Committee
Justice Thung Sein	Sixth Committee
U Hla Kyaing	Special Political Committee
U Sein Win	Fourth Committee

Alternate Representatives:

U Ko Ko Gyi	Third Committee
U Thet Tin	Fifth Committee
U Than Hla	

Advisers and Secretaries to Delegation:

U Paw Htin
U Kyaw Min

U Aung Soe returned to London on 13 October 1957 to attend the Tenth Anniversary celebration commemorating the signing of the Nu-Atlee Agreement, and returned to New York on 10 November, 1957, vide Foreign Office cable No. BCY 217/ZA dated 14 October, 1957. He again left for London on 11 December, 1957 to meet the Hon'ble Deputy Prime Minister for National Economy.

U Thant Hla's inclusion in the Delegation proved to be only on paper as he had not been able to attend to his duties here for any considerable stretch of time due partly to his poor health and partly to his regular duties in Washington. U Paw Htin and U Kyaw Min invariably filled up the gaps thus caused by the absence of these two delegates.

When the Delegation decided on 30 October 1957 to assign U Sein Win to the First Committee to help me, U Paw Htin took full responsibilities in respect of the Fourth Committee work with effect from 30 October till the termination of the General Assembly.

Periodic cable reports were submitted to the Foreign Office from time to time, on important issues raised both in Committees and in the Plenary session, and full reports on the work of the individual Committees, except the First Committee, have been submitted. In the circumstances, I propose to deal only with the work of the First Committee in this Final Report.

Before dealing with the actual items considered by the First Committee and directly by the Plenary, I think it will be in order to begin this report with a statement on the structure of the United Nations for 1957-58.

The following office-bearers were elected for the twelfth regular session of the United Nations General Assembly:

President: Sir Leslie Murre of New Zealand

Vice-Presidents: Mr. R.S.S. Gunewardene (Ceylon)
Mr. George K.C. Yeh (China)
Mr. Christian Pineau (France)
Mr. Raul Sapena Pastor (Paraguay)
Mr. Mongi Slim (Tunisia)
Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko (U.S.S.R.)
Mr. Selwin Lloyd (United Kingdom)
Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge (U.S.A.)

Committees: The General (Steering) Committee is composed of the President of the General Assembly, the eight Vice-Presidents and the Committee Chairmen listed below:

1. First (Political and Security): Dr. Djalal Abdol (Iran)
2. Special Political: Mr. Emilio Arenales Catalan (Guatemala)
3. Second (Economic and Financial): Mr. Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia)
4. Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural): Mme. Aase Lionaes (Norway)
5. Fourth (Trusteeship): Mr. Thanat Khoman (Thailand)
6. Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary): Mr. W.H.J. van Asch van Wijck (Netherlands)
7. Sixth (Legal): Mr. Santiago Perez Perez (Venezuela)

Burma did not seek election to any office during the session. Canada, however, proposed the name of the Hon'ble Justice Myint Thein as a candidate for the International Court of Justice. The nomination was brought to the notice of our delegation only 24 hours before the time set for the election. Reference to the Government was hardly possible, and the Delegation, after due consideration, decided to request the Canadian Delegation to withdraw its nomination. The request was made, and the President of the General Assembly announced the withdrawal on the eve of the elections. However, it was found that one vote was actually cast for Justice Myint Thein at the election. It was of course very difficult to ascertain which delegation had cast that solitary vote.

During the session Burma was appointed to the Credentials Committee. Both in the Committee meeting and in the Plenary session when the report of the Credentials Committee was discussed, the Delegation supported the move by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. to oust the KMT representative and seat the representative of the People's Republic of China, but the move was not successful. The Delegation abstained when the United States Delegation raised, in the Credentials Committee, the question of validity of the credentials of the Hungarian Delegation.

Items at Plenary Meetings:

Among the items which came up for consideration at the Plenary meetings, the following deserve special mention:

1. Appointment and Report of the Credentials Committee
(Already reported above).

2. Election of the President:

(The Delegation voted for Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand. Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon, whose Delegation secretly canvassed for his nomination, withdrew at the last minute at the open request of the Delegation of Mexico).

3. Election of Vice-Presidents.

(The Delegation voted for Ceylon, France, Liberia, Paraguay, Tunisia, the U.S.S.R. the United Kingdom and the United States.)

4. Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council

(The Delegation voted for Panama, Canada and Japan, all of which were elected on the first ballot to fill vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1957, of the terms of office of Cuba, Australia and the Philippines).

5. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council:

(The Delegation voted for France, The Netherlands, Chile and Haiti. The Philippines withdrew, on the eve of the election. On the first ballot, Chile, Costa Rica, the Sudan the Netherlands, France and China were elected, having obtained the required two-thirds majority).

6. Election of five members of the International Court of Justice

(The Delegation voted for Sir Percy Spender of Australia, Phya Ladpli Thamapra Khan of Thailand, Professor Zourek of Czechoslovakia, Jean Spiropoulos of Greece and Dr. Henri Rolin of Belgium, but only two of them: Sir Percy Spender of Australia and Jean Spiropoulos of Greece got elected. Three other candidates elected did not receive Burma's vote).

7. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

(The Security Council unanimously recommended the re-appointment of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General for a new five year term of office. The Assembly, by secret ballot, unanimously elected Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld for a further five-year term).

8. Admission of Malaya to membership in the United Nations:

(Burma voted for her admission. Voting was unanimous).

9. Report of the Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter:

(The Delegation voted for the resolution requesting the Committee to report, with recommendations, to the General Assembly not later than at its fourteenth session, and requesting the Secretary-General to continue the work envisaged in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 992(X) of 21st November 1955).

FIRST COMMITTEE ITEMS

Disarmament: The issue of Disarmament and allied matters focussed the greatest attention among the items discussed by the First Committee. The deliberations on this item took place under the shadow of spectacular Russian successes in launching their first two sputniks, and most delegations, despite President Eisenhower's optimism, were convinced that the Soviet Union has a

Disarmament (Cont'd)

considerable lead in the race to build a rocket that could span the polar regions and explode a nuclear war head on any country. That being the case, the Soviet desire to expand the Disarmament Commission with increased representation of neutralist and communist countries to strike a more-or-less even balance with the West was viewed favourably even by those countries with pronounced Western sympathies. Canada, India, Japan, Sweden, Paraguay and Yugoslavia, therefore, attempted to satisfy Russian desires by tabling a resolution on 18 November 1957 (A/L.231/Rev.1) effecting the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission by the addition of fourteen Member States, including Burma, to the existing eleven. I learned from very reliable sources that the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. originally approved of that step but reversed its stand at the eleventh hour when fresh instructions were reportedly received from Moscow. On the next day, Albania tabled an amendment to the above resolution, seeking to add seven more countries to the list. The Soviet Union also warned that she would boycott the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its sub-committee if the Albanian amendment were not passed or if her original proposal to transfer the Disarmament question to the entire membership of the United Nations were rejected. Burma, along with other uncommitted countries, voted both for the six-Power resolution and the Albanian amendment. The six-Power resolution was passed by 60 votes to 9, with 11 abstentions, but the Albanian amendment was rejected as it did not obtain the required majority. The Soviet Union's proposal to transfer the Disarmament question to the entire membership of the United Nations was also rejected. Burma abstained on that resolution, as the Delegation considered that in spite of its equitable and just representation, the proposed Commission would not only be unwieldy, but it would amount to the indefinite perpetuation of the First Committee. This explains Burma's presence in the still-born expanded Disarmament Commission.

Mr. Kuznetsov, leader of the Soviet Delegation told me, immediately after the voting, that the Soviet boycott of the Disarmament Commission was in no way in protest against the fourteen new members, which are about evenly divided between Western supporters on one hand and neutralists and Soviet supporters on the other. Obviously, his country's rejection of the proposal was due to the fact that the eleven countries already on the Commission (the members of the Security Council for 1958) would still have been able to muster a pro-Western majority out of the total of twenty five. With the Soviet boycott, the question of Disarmament and allied issues such as the suspension of nuclear tests have slipped out of the United Nations for the time being, and they have become issues for the not-so-certain Summit Conference.

The present position may be summed up as follows: The United States wants meetings of both the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Security Council to discuss the Disarmament question before the Summit. This would have the advantage of dramatizing the fact that it was the Russians, not anybody else, who broke off the Disarmament negotiations. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, is insistent on holding the Summit Conference which alone can, in her view, deal with several other outstanding and urgent problems besides Disarmament. Whether or not the American programme goes through, it would seem that there will be a preliminary meeting of foreign ministers to determine the agenda and the other participants at the Summit.

Disarmament: (Cont'd)

/sometimes If the Summit Conference takes place, although other subjects, notably Germany and the Middle East, have been proposed by the one side or the other, Disarmament will obviously be the dominant issue. But the Disarmament problem has now grown so complex that it includes most of the important subjects in dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is/ forgotten that the two great Powers are not far from agreement on such aspects of Disarmament as the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. The deadlock has continued because each side has made its acceptance conditional upon the fate of other categories on which there is no agreement.

It is the view of many uncommitted countries in the United Nations that the only hope of getting anywhere is to break up the respective "packages." Then it can be determined whether the United States and the other Western Powers can reach agreement with the Soviet Union on one or two specific issues.

Regarding nuclear armaments and nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has insisted on stopping nuclear tests without waiting for agreement on anything else. The Soviet Union has offered a quite comprehensive system of control, but the United States has rejected the proposal unless there is an accompanying ban on the production of nuclear materials for weapons. The Soviet Union refuses to accept the United States proposal for a prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons unless there is an accompanying ban on their use.

The United States refuses the proposal for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons because it is argued no system of inspection could be relied upon to detect all the bombs now in the possession of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. That being the case, it is further argued, the side that complied with the agreement would have to depend upon the good faith of the others or its fear of reprisals.

Another matter which is closely linked with the general problem of Disarmament is the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. For obvious reasons the United States has suggested that the study of this problem be given priority and should proceed without waiting for a comprehensive Disarmament agreement. However, the Soviet Union makes control of outer space conditional upon acceptance of its demands on two issues: prohibition of the use of all nuclear weapons, and the abandonment of American bases abroad, including those from which the United States could launch missiles against the Soviet Union.

Still another matter which is closely related to the general problem of Disarmament is the limitation of ceilings on conventional armed forces. The Western Powers and the Soviet Union are quite close on both inspection arrangements and the ultimate size of the forces. The Soviet Union wants ceilings of 1,500,000 for itself, the United States and the People's Republic of China, while the Western Powers propose 1,700,000. However, the Western Powers propose a ceiling at the first stage of 2,500,000 and would come down to 1,700,000 only if progress had been made meanwhile on the settlement of "political issues," meaning primarily the German question.

Disarmament: (Cont'd)

Aerial inspection against surprise attack is another issue which still remains a bone of contention between the two power blocs. The original proposal by General Eisenhower in 1955 that the entire territory of the United States would be open for aerial inspection by the Soviet Union, and vice versa, is barely recognizable now as a result of changes during subsequent negotiations. There is evidently a growing consensus of opinion among the uncommitted countries, closer to the Soviet viewpoint, that a really effective system of inspection and control of all aspects of arms reduction would have to await the growth of more trust between the East and West than now exists. There seems to be a growing realization here of why the Soviet Union is not prepared to open all its doors and its "secret places" to outsiders or anyone except the very closest friends. I personally feel that in the absence of trust and confidence between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, the Western proposals for elaborate methods of supervision and inspection over the carrying out of Disarmament pledges are not practical propositions. The Soviet Union is prepared to accept limited forms of supervision and inspection as outlined in various Soviet statements, and as trust among nations grows, the Soviet Union has promised to "accept other measures of control." This issue brings into sharp focus the cleavage that has existed between Moscow and the Western Powers regarding the entire Disarmament question. The Western Powers have been insisting on a really effective system of inspection that would guarantee that Disarmament commitments would be fulfilled. The Soviet stand, on the other hand, is to start on a more modest level, and if possible to get agreement on Disarmament with no more assurance of fulfilment than the pledged words of the countries involved. As trust developed, it is argued, elaborate measures for mutual inspection could be taken.

Soviet Russia would like to start out by setting up a limited number of control points at major airfields, rail junctions and on highways. It would also accept aerial reconnaissance over a 1,000 mile-wide strip in Europe centered on the line that divides Eastern and Western armies there, and over the Soviet Far East and Western United States. The official American attitude towards this proposal seems to be less stiff than hitherto.

Another aspect of the Disarmament question which is closely linked with inspection and control is concerned with the Polish proposal, generally known as The Rapaci Plan after the name of the Polish Foreign Minister, to establish a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. This proposal was made after the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee had concluded its work in October last. The Rapaci Plan provides that no nuclear weapons be manufactured or stored on the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, or West Germany. The Western Powers, especially the United States, oppose it because, among other reasons, it would deny nuclear weapons to American troops in West Germany. Most representatives of the uncommitted countries with whom I happened to discuss informally, express the view that the Rapaci Plan is in line with the declaration of the Bandung Conference. Although it has been rejected by the West, the Soviet Union is insisting that this be taken up at the proposed Summit meeting.

These, in brief, deal with the various aspects of Disarmament which have from time to time engaged the attention of this Delegation.

Algeria: The proceedings of the First Committee in the course of the debate on Algeria demonstrate how much ground the French have lost in the last two years. In 1955, when the General Assembly put the question of Algeria on its agenda for the first time, the records show that some of the Asian-African delegates, themselves, were surprised and a little apprehensive over United Nations intervention in a region that is legally a part of Metropolitan France. The French Delegation angrily walked out, and the Assembly took the issue off the agenda.

At the 1956 session the Assembly went ahead with the debate on Algeria, but limited itself to expressing its hope for a peaceful, just and democratic solution.

This time the Asian-African group has demanded a specific endorsement of negotiations in accordance with the principle of self-determination, which in this context is virtually the same thing as a demand for independence. The tie vote in the First Committee on the 17-Power draft resolution, as amended, was considered as the triumph of the Algerian independence movement, by most Asian-African countries. When the issue was to be decided by the Assembly itself, supporters of the French succeeded in watering down the Asian-African resolution, and a compromise resolution less unpalatable to France was put to the vote (A/RES/1184(XII)) and adopted unanimously. France, however, did not participate in the voting.

The unanimity of voting on a resolution expressing the wish that "pourparlers" (negotiations) will be entered into by France and Algeria is itself a victory for the Algerian independence fighters. The mood of the Assembly was such that even the most devoted supporters of France conceded that it would be almost impossible to limit the Assembly's action, as before, to the expression of a pious hope. To some extent this change is due to the increased size and self-confidence of the Asian-African group. Another reason, I think, is the middle-of-the-road position that has been taken by the United States.

It is interesting to recollect that two years ago the United States gave its full endorsement to the French insistence that Algeria is a domestic matter and that intervention by the United Nations would, therefore, be a violation of the Charter. However, times have changed, as witness the decision of the United States and Britain, only a few days before the debate opened, to supply arms to Tunisia over French protests. Both the United States and Britain have apparently reached the conclusion that the situation in what used to be French North Africa is so serious that the decisions can no longer be left to France exclusively. This in itself is a great moral victory for the Algerian independence movement.

The failure on the part of France to implement the terms of the unanimous resolution and the general deterioration of the Algerian situation prompted the Asian-African group to take a keener interest in developments in Algeria. The group's Steering Committee on Algeria, over which I have the honour to preside, met four times in the past three months, and at its last meeting drafted the explanatory memorandum for communication to the Secretary-General to accompany our request for the inscription of the item "The Question of Algeria" in the agenda of the * thirteenth session of the General Assembly. So far, eighteen Asian-African delegations, including Burma, have agreed to request the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

* On 16 July 1958 twenty-four delegations actually endorsed the request for inscription.

France's efforts to settle the Algerian conflict have been plagued by the built-in instability of the French political system. The assumption of power by General Charles De Gaulle and his plan to "integrate" the Moslems and Europeans in Algeria and to establish loose Federal ties between Algeria and France are understandably viewed with disfavour by the Algerian Nationalists. The future is uncertain, and if no satisfactory solution is forthcoming in the next three months, the question of Algeria will be a dominant issue in the thirteenth session of the General Assembly.

Other Items:

Other items of the First Committee will be dealt with very briefly.

On the question of Korea, the Assembly called for reunification of Korea under a representative government and as an independent and democratic nation, and asked the Communist authorities concerned to accept the United Nations objectives set forth by the United Nations Political Conference in Geneva in 1954. The Assembly also voted to bring the work of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency to an end by June 30, 1958.

Regarding the item "Effects of Atomic Radiation", the Assembly unanimously called for a broadened study of the effects of atomic radiation and approved a working agreement between the United Nations and the newly formed International Atomic Energy Agency.

On the question of Cyprus, a Greek resolution calling for the people of Cyprus to be given the right to determine their own political future was rejected by the Assembly.

Regarding West Irian, a proposal inviting the Netherlands and Indonesia to resume negotiations was rejected by the General Assembly when it failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.

A three-Power resolution calling upon all States to make every effort to strengthen international peace, develop friendly and co-operative relations and settle disputes by peaceful means was approved by the Assembly by a vote of 77 to 0 with Nationalist China abstaining.

ITEMS AT OTHER COMMITTEES

Special Political Committee:

South Africa: The Assembly considered a report on racial problems in the Union of South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid. A resolution passed by a vote of 59 to 6 with 14 abstentions, deplored the fact that the South Africa Government had not responded to an Assembly resolution passed at the last session. It called upon South Africa to revise its policy in the light of the principles and purposes of the Charter and to inform the Secretary-General of its response. A second resolution passed by a vote of 64 to 0 with 15 abstentions, appealed to South Africa to negotiate with the Governments of India and Pakistan on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Composition of the General Committee: One of the most significant resolutions approved by the General Assembly relates to the composition of the General Committee of the General Assembly. The voting was 49 in favour, 1 against, with 27 abstentions. The resolution in effect amends rules 31 and 38 of its Rules of Procedure. Henceforth thirteen Vice-Presidents are to be elected, as provided in the annex to that resolution. What is of considerable interest to Burma is the increased representation of Asian-African States from two to four for the posts of Vice-Presidents. In fact several Asian-African representatives have very kindly suggested that Burma should be interested in one of these posts. But, in view of the fact that the Republic of Indonesia has withdrawn its candidature from the Trusteeship Council in favour of Burma and that the Republic of Indonesia is interested in seeking election to one of the Vice-President's posts, I would recommend that Burma support Indonesia's candidacy to it.

Second Committee:

Among the important resolutions relating to Second Committee items approved by the General Assembly is the one recommending the Economic and Social Council to give "prompt and favourable consideration" to the establishment of an Economic Commission for Africa, to give effective aid to the countries and territories of Africa. The general stipulation is that Ethiopia will be asked to provide the Headquarters of the Commission. Another important resolution which is endorsed by Burma urges the Assembly members to reduce existing barriers to international trade and urges Member States to approve the agreement on the Organization for Trade Co-operation as soon as possible. Another resolution which was adopted unanimously requests the Economic and Social Council to study the desirability of promoting increased use of regional and national training facilities as may be made available under the United Nations programmes of Technical Assistance. Another unanimous resolution relates to the establishment of a separate Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. The matter has been dealt with rather comprehensively by the representative concerned in his report on the Second Committee.

Third Committee:

Among the more important resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in respect of items relating to the Third Committee are (1) Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-determination, (2) Freedom of Information, and (3) Development of International Co-operation in the field of Science, Culture and Education. Burma voted in favour of all the resolutions under these subject items. The item "Draft International Covenants on Human Rights," which I consider to be the most important item before the Third Committee, was discussed at length, and the Assembly approved the recommendation of the Third Committee that consideration of this item should be continued at the thirteenth session.

Fourth Committee:

The Fourth Committee, as usual, is burdened with a multitude of items most of which are not only of unusual interest to countries like Burma but are highly technical in character. In view of the fact that Burma is seeking re-election to the Trusteeship Council and in view of the very good prospects for re-election, it is considered imperative that Burma should be strongly represented in the Fourth Committee.

Fourth Committee (Cont'd)

Two particular items with which Burma is directly involved relate to the grant of scholarships for students from Trust Territories under General Assembly resolutions 557(VI) and 753(VIII) and for students from Non-Self-Governing Territories under General Assembly resolution 845(IX).

The resolution adopted in regard to scholarships for students from Trust Territories -- 1209(XII) endorsed by Burma, notes that the major part of the scholarships offered by Member States remains unutilized; and requests the Secretary-General to include, in his future reports to the Trusteeship Council, detailed information concerning the actual use of scholarships and training facilities offered by Member States for the education of inhabitants of the Trust Territories.

The resolution adopted in regard to scholarships for students from Non-Self-Governing Territories -- 1154(XII) endorsed by Burma, noted with satisfaction the further response to resolution 845(IX) of 22 November 1954, inviting Member States to extend offers of facilities for study and training to inhabitants from Non-Self-Governing Territories, and requests the Secretary-General to include in his annual report to the General Assembly information on the action taken as a result of the present resolution.

Burma, so far, has unfortunately failed to extend any facility for study and training to the inhabitants from either the Trust or the Non-Self-Governing Territories, and when the matter came up for consideration at the current session of the Trusteeship Council, I attempted to present what I consider to be plausible reasons for Burma's failure so far to comply with the provisions of the Assembly resolution, vide my speech on 20 June 1958, submitted to the Foreign Office (FO.282/80UN/58 dated 24 June, 1958). I would recommend that prompt and effective steps should be taken with the Ministry of Education and the University of Rangoon to implement the provisions of these resolutions.

Fifth Committee:

Among the more important resolutions adopted by the General Assembly relating to Fifth Committee items, is that concerned with the Scale of Assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations. A new Scale of Assessment for Member States was approved, and under this scale, the majority were granted reductions as a result of the admission of new Members. The largest reduction was given to the United States by the provision that in principle, the maximum contribution of any one Member State to the ordinary expenses of the United Nations shall not exceed 30 per cent of the total. The United States' existing contribution is 33.33 per cent of the total and under the new scale of assessment, its contribution is reduced to 32.51 per cent. Burma is in no way affected by the resolution, since it clearly stipulates that the percentage contribution of Member States shall not in any case be increased as a consequence of the present resolution.

Two other resolutions which are of general interest relate to the Public Information activities of the United Nations and the question of geographical distribution of the Staff of the United Nations. Regarding the first, the Secretary-General has been requested to appoint an expert committee of six individuals

Fifth Committee (Cont'd)

to be nominated by the Governments of Egypt (United Arab Republic), India, U.S.S.R., Britain, U.S.A. and Uruguay respectively to review the work, methods used, and effectiveness of the results achieved by the Public Information services of the United Nations. The second resolution is concerned with the future appointments to the Staff of the United Nations Secretariat, giving appropriate preference to nationalities which form a disproportionately small part of the Secretariat. Burma voted for both resolutions.

Sixth Committee:

As in previous sessions, the major portion of the Sixth Committee work was occupied with the sterile discussion on the question of defining aggression. All that the General Assembly could do was to request the Secretary-General to place the question of defining aggression on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly not earlier than its fourteenth session. Similarly, the discussion of the question of international criminal jurisdiction was deferred until such time as the General Assembly takes up again the question of defining aggression and the question of a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS

The period of the twelfth session of the General Assembly confronts the Western Powers, and above all the United States, with the most disturbing problems that they have faced since the end of World War II. It is not simply a matter of catching up with the Soviet lead in missiles and other precursors of the space age. Western delegates at the United Nations, at least in private, are generally pessimistic about the capacity of the Western Powers to solve the complex problems involved in direct negotiations with the Communist Powers, while the latter are believed to have gained more adherents.

Few expect the United Nations to play a leading role in the climactic events ahead. There is a general feeling that the most urgent problems facing the world at present can be solved only by direct negotiations between the leaders of the two Power blocs. One tragic aspect of the problem is that, at the time when men's minds are dominated by missiles and hydrogen bombs, the United Nations Disarmament Commission gives no sign that it will even meet before the start of the next General Assembly. Some Western delegates feel that the delay will be useful in helping to bring out the fact that it is the Soviet boycott after all, which halted the Commission's work. But most believe that the United States and its allies must negotiate somewhere, somehow.

Then there is the general problem of Asian-African Nations, who are pressing their drive against Colonialism all the more vigorously now that the British, French and Dutch empires are on the way out. Anti-colonialism blends with most other problems and that partly explains why most of the Asian-African countries are closer to the Soviet position on Disarmament than they are to the Western position. The Soviet boycott of the Disarmament Commission means that, unless the Western Powers agree to add more neutralists and Communist satellites to the Commission, there will be no negotiations in the United Nations.

General Reflections (Cont'd)

In that event, the negotiations would be conducted either by the United States and the Soviet Union, or by a group specially selected by them.

One fact clearly emerges out of the debates and discussions in the United Nations: it can take action only if the United States and the Soviet Union are in agreement. In the past eleven years, as far as I can recollect, Korea has been the only exception to this rule. In any case, the debates in the General Assembly will continue to provide useful information on what the world thinks, and there is an unmistakable trend in evidence that only a spirit of trust and understanding by both sides can meet the challenge of our times.

I should like to conclude this report with a warm tribute to the general work of our Delegation. All the members of the Delegation, without exception, attended to their duties with full consciousness of their responsibilities. Their devotion to their work and their sense of co-operation rendered the work of the Delegation not only effective and co-ordinated, but extremely pleasant.

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(U Thant)
Chairman
Delegation of Burma
Twelfth Regular Session
United Nations General Assembly

New York
18 July, 1958

FINAL REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF BURMA
TO THE SPECIAL (ELEVENTH) SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

10 TO 14 SEPTEMBER 1957

The Special (Eleventh) Session of the General Assembly met on Tuesday, 10 September 1957, to debate the Hungarian crisis. In the absence of any overall report by this Delegation on the eleventh Regular Session of the General Assembly which was mainly seized with the Hungarian crisis, I think it will be appropriate to recount briefly the extraordinary developments in Hungary which had focussed world-wide attention.

On 23 October, 1956, a group of Hungarian students and intellectuals held a public meeting in Budapest and called for, among other things, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The following night another meeting took place and, it was reported, the Soviet troops fired upon the gathering. That touched off a bloody rebellion. From all accounts it was obvious that men, women and children rallied in cities and towns to the cry "Out with the Russians." They fought pitched battles in defence of homes and factories, pitting small arms and home-made bombs against Soviet tanks. Thousands of Hungarians were killed and wounded. Others were allegedly deported to the Soviet Union or fled across the border into Austria. The Soviet Government denied the allegation that any Hungarian had ever been deported to the Soviet Union. Anyhow, the rebellion was crushed in two weeks.

The tragedy of Hungary shocked most of the non-Communist world. When the matter was brought up at the eleventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, a series of resolutions were passed, calling on the Soviet Union to cease its intervention, and on the Soviet-backed Hungarian regime of Prime Minister Janos Kadar to admit United Nations observers. Neither country complied, and as its final act in the debate,

the General Assembly adopted a resolution creating a five-nation Committee -- Ceylon, Tunisia, Denmark, Australia and Uruguay -- to investigate the situation.

In June 1957 the Committee released a unanimous report which charged the Soviet Union with "ruthless suppression of a popular uprising." The main purpose of the Special Session was just to act on this report.

Before the session was a resolution drafted by the United States, with 36 other nations as co-sponsors. Burma was also requested by the United States Delegation to be one of the co-sponsors, but we declined, on specific instructions from the Government. The resolution endorsed the Committee report, asked new condemnation of Soviet interference in Hungary's internal affairs and provided for the appointment of a Special United Nations representative to seek compliance with the Assembly's resolutions passed in the eleventh Regular Session. These resolutions called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and for free elections in that country.

The principal concern of the resolution's sponsors was that the Asian-African nations would refuse to go along with a condemnation of Russia and would thus spoil its moral effect. Burma took the lead in the fight to water down the resolution by three amendments, but due to lack of substantial support, our endeavours failed to materialize. In this connexion, I think it will be relevant to mention that Iraq, represented by Mr. Hashim Jawad, consistently supported all our three amendments.

In the course of the debate, strong statements against the original resolution were made by the representatives of India and Indonesia, who, however, abstained on Burma's amendments. They argued that the world organization would not be able to "improve the situation" by either "condemning" or "deploring" the Russian action.


When the resolution was put to the vote, it was approved by 60 to 10, with 10 abstentions. Yugoslavia voted against it

with the nine Soviet bloc members, and Finland joined nine Asian-African nations in abstaining. The abstention of Ceylon, despite the fact that its representative had signed the Special Committee's indictment, was the biggest surprise of the session. But most Western nations sighed with relief when Ceylon's unexpected volte-face was balanced by our vote in favour despite the rejection of our attempt to soften the language.

The overwhelming vote of 60 to 10, with only 10 abstentions was an impressive demonstration of the world's indignation of Soviet suppression of Hungarian revolt. Beyond this exhibition of universal indignation, of course, the United Nations accomplishes nothing else. The plain truth is that neither the United Nations nor any of its members - including the United States - dared to take action regarding Hungary. This reluctance resulted from the general belief that any action would produce a third world war, and the consensus of opinion was that the Assembly should limit itself to protests.

The resolution provides for two different approaches: the condemnation of Soviet actions, and the appointment of Prince Wan Waithayakon as a Special Representative to try to persuade the Russians to get out. Even among the delegations which voted against or abstained on Burma's amendments, there are some which are afraid that the two things are incompatible. Some of these delegates, in private conversation, said that if the Assembly really thinks that Prince Wan can accomplish anything either in Hungary or in Moscow, it is not helping his chances by making the Russians even angrier than they were before. They admitted that Burma's attempt was to help in creating the correct atmosphere congenial to fruitful negotiations. It is significant that Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, leader of the United States Delegation, realized this incongruity and attempted to cover it with a mildly worded speech in which he insisted that the Assembly would be condemning not the "doer" but the "deed."

Looking at the resolution realistically, no result satisfactory to the majority members of the United Nations is expected from it. At the time of this report, the chances of Prince Wan, as Special Representative of the United Nations, to persuade the Russians to get out of Hungary, are as remote as at the close of the Special Session of the General Assembly.



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(U Thant)

Chairman

Delegation of Burma

Special (Eleventh) Session of the
General Assembly

New York
27 July 1958

For six consecutive years, Burma as an elected member of the Trusteeship Council has participated in its deliberations and contributed unceasingly and actively to the work of this principal organ of the United Nations. As is well known, Burma will cease to be a member at the end of this year and as the day of her retirement approaches, my delegation feels gratified that Burma's efforts to make the international trusteeship system operate satisfactorily in accordance with the provisions of the Charter have not been made in vain. Despite inherent weaknesses, the system has functioned quite satisfactorily. The international trusteeship system has helped the peoples in the trust territories to achieve their independence peacefully and happily, although we all must admit the problems which will beset the newly independent countries will long continue to engage the undivided attention of their leaders who in cooperation with the international community must seek to solve them for we know that independence always creates as many problems as it solves, and sometimes more.

Before the end of this year, two Trust Territories the Cameroons and Tanganyika under United Kingdom administration will achieve their independence. For the British Cameroons, the General Assembly at the resumed fifteenth session recommended the termination of trusteeship, in the northern part on 1 June and in the southern part on 1 October 1961. Tanganyika under United Kingdom administration which is the largest trust territory has marched towards its goal of independence so smoothly and peacefully that the Trusteeship Council at its twenty-seventh session by acclamation took note with satisfaction of the advancement of the date of independence for Tanganyika from 28 December 1961 to 9 December 1961 and decided to draw this auspicious date to the attention of the General Assembly at its sixteenth session for appropriate action. Mr. Julius Nyerere, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, appearing before the Trusteeship Council in July this year explained why his country's transition to independence had been so smooth in that turbulent part of Africa. He said three things were

needed to make sure that the objectives of the Trusteeship System would be obtained smoothly: "first, a Trusteeship Council which took its responsibilities seriously and honestly; secondly, an Administering Authority which was sensitive to world opinion; and thirdly, a people united and determined to achieve its independence." Tanganyika is, of course, fortunate in having at her helm of affairs such an outstanding statesman of proved ability, moral courage and vision, a leader who could shake off the crushing humiliation of foreign domination without rancour much less hatred and thus was able to unify all elements of progress and direct them to his well balanced way of thinking. On behalf of my delegation, I wish to congratulate the Prime Minister, his government and the people of Tanganyika on their spectacular achievements and look forward with pleasure to warmly welcoming her accredited representatives who I am sure will be seated very soon in the United Nations.

We also feel particularly gratified to know that Western Samoa, under New Zealand administration will attain its independence on 1 January 1962. In the plebiscite held in the island territory on 9 May this year under United Nations supervision, the "overwhelming majority" of the 100,000 (one hundred thousand) Polynesians chose independence. We wish to extend our felicitations to the Government and people of Western Samoa on their impending independence.

The future of the Belgian administered trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi remains as yet undecided and undetermined. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi which was set up by the General Assembly and entrusted with the mandate of helping the people and the trust administration solve the problems of the future of this trust territory is, I believe, wisely engaged, among other things, in the task of supervising the legislative elections in Ruanda-Urundi. In Urundi, the legislative elections were held on 18 September. In Ruanda the legislative elections are scheduled to be held on 25 September. Although the situation in Urundi gives no cause for concern, the news about the unfortunate incidents prior to the elections in Ruanda have indeed been disquieting. We have not the least doubt however, that the Commission,

whose main task it was to keep a close watch over political developments and to see that legislative elections are held in an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity and in conditions of complete freedom and that General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV) is implemented fully and effectively will discharge its task with complete impartiality and objectivity. We must patiently watch with unabated interest ~~the~~ political developments in that Trust Territory and await the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi. If we feel satisfied that General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV) and other relevant resolutions have been implemented fully in the spirit of the Charter, the date for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement in respect of Ruanda-Urundi can be fixed during the current session so that the people of Ruanda-Urundi who in the recent past have suffered untold misery are assured of their complete and genuine independence in the earliest part of 1962.