

[14 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-1002</u>
BOX	<u>124</u>
FILE	<u>5</u>
ACC.	<u>PPB/293</u>

3000.5

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125/Pt1/A


28 November 1994

From : INDBATT

To : DCOS Ops
UNAMIR HQ

Subject : RECCE PATROL REPORT (VICTORY) : FORWARDING OF

Report on recce patrol 'VICTORY' is forwarded herewith for your information please.


(PC Roy)
Major
Adjutant
for CO INDBATT

Enclosures. As above.

② G3 Ops

1. Liaise with Ops Indbatt and G3 Engr (if reqr) to ensure that ammo at Appendix A is disposed of properly.
2. Pass to DTC/COS for info.

③

Roger Sir.
Done.
G3 OPS2
Thumt


DCOS Ops
29.11

RESTRICTED

OPS Offr Indbatt
to revert to me
after assessment
of explosives required
for the ex.

Thumt
G3 OPS2
30/11

RESTRICTED

RECCE PATROL REPORT (VICTORY)

Map Ref :- Op Lance (UNAMIR - II) Kigali
 Topographic map of Rwanda at 1:50,000
Appces : Appx 'A' - Details of Amn found at
 vill Kabeza (743792)
 Appx 'P' - Sketch of the route

1. AIM. The aim of ptl Victory was to familiarise pers with terrain in AOR.
2. TASK. The tasks assigned to the ptl were :-
 - (a) Ascertain condition of the roads/trs.
 - (b) Habitation in villages enroute, their occupancy and their state of mind after war.
 - (c) To show the presence of UN forces.
 - (d) Familiarise with the terrain.
3. STRENGTH. The ptl party consisted of 1 Offr, 1 JCO, and 12 OR.
4. VEH. 1 Gypsy and 1x3 Ton.
5. COMMUNICATION.
 - (a) 2xYaesu walkie talkie within the ptl.
 - (b) 1xANPRC-25 set for comm with Bn HQ.
6. ROUTE. The route taken by the ptl is shown in the sketch att (Appx P).
7. TERRAIN. The terrain is generally hilly with heights upto 1775 mtrs with gentle slopes.
8. ROADS/TRACKS. The roads are not black top. All hills and villages are well connected with small trs. All roads are in satisfactory condition other than if it rains heavily.
9. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS :-
 - (a) The villages enroute were sparsely populated. Population ranging from 30 to 100 only.
 - (b) The people could not understand neither English nor French.

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- (c) Some biscuits were carried by the ptl for distribution to the children. At villages between Kabeza and Rushubi junction, though the villages were sparsely populated but the inhabitants were very happy to see the UN vehicles.
- (d) It was observed that no vehicles had moved between Kabeza and Rushubi since very long time.
- (e) It was observed that people were scared of coming near the vehicles. They responded when called for two or three times. Small children rushed towards vehicles for biscuits and eatables.
- (f) Presence of RPA soldiers was seen at Kagarama (a small tent with 4 soldiers), at Nyanza (one soldier in uniform), and one boy in uniform at Burema village.
- (g) The static barriers manned by RPA are shown in the sketch.
- (h) Between village Kabeza and Burema, it was observed that heavy fighting took place between the tribes. Empty amn boxes were seen stocked in the houses which were constructed or modified into fighting bunkers.
- (j) Fired cases of all types of small arms amn were seen in front of the houses between Kabeza and Burema.
- (k) Most of the houses were vacant, some of them completely collapsed and some were fit for living.
- (l) No shops or vendors were seen between village Nyanza, Kabeza and Nunga.
- (m) The area shown as 'Domaine Militaire' was abandoned. Three long barracks were there which were in bad state with bullet marks every where.
- (n) Road Gasharu - Nyanza - Kagasa to Kanazi is two way unmetalled road.
- (o) Road Nyanza Jn - Kabeza - Gahombo - Rushubi Jn - Nunga Jn is one way with small nallas unmetalled road which is not in use.
- (p) No untoward activity was observed by the ptl.
- (q) Amn found at village Kabeza (GR 743792) details att at Appx 'A'.

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10. HALTS.

(a) Five minutes halt at village Kabeza for comn with Bn HQ. Comn was through from village Kabeza.

(b) Five minutes halt at Rushubi Jn for checking the comn with Bn HQ on ANPRC-25 set. It did not get through.

(c) Two minutes halt at Nunga Jn for comn but did not get through. Additional HF sets coming with main body from India should overcome this problem.

11. CONCLUSION. Generally it was observed that inhabitants are coming back to their houses. But people have got the fear of war in their minds specially among female folk and children. The ptl was successfully completed and was in at 1300 h at Bn HQ.



(JS Tanwar)
Major
Patrol Leader

Nov 94

COUNTERSIGNED



(NK Singh)
Colonel
CO INDBATT

27 Nov 94

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Appx 'A'

DETAILS OF AMMUNITION



<u>Ser No</u>	<u>Type of Amn</u>	<u>Lot No</u>	<u>No of rds (qty)</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	Carts 7.62 mm MMG	RIM - 2 and FNB - 87	1175 rds	
2.	Blank rds .30 mm	FN - 63	2500 rds	
3.	Carts Tracer MMG	LV .1 91-23	136 rds	
4.	Carts .57 mm AK Rif	87 - 23	1245 rds	
5.	Carts MMG	FN - 66 X WCC - 79 X FN - 79 X SMI - 72 X FNM - 80-67 X SF - 84 X	1865 rds	
6.	Blank rds 7.62 mm	FNB - 90	7 rds	
7.	Carts rif	51 - 79	15 rds	
8.	Cart sten	STE- 859 X HXP- 0 X	4 rds	
Total			<u>6947 rds</u>	Wooden Packages - 4

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Appx - 'P'


ROUTE CHART



LEGEND

↑ ROUTE TAKEN BY THE PTL

— RPA RD BLOCK / BARRIERS



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MILOB GP HQ

cc
Put on file
Thunt
h30ps2
25/11

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 27 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : Plans 50/94

SUBJECT : WEEKLY SRSG RETURN ON ACTIVITIES IN SECTORS

1. MILOBs in all Sectors are now required to work on statistics and produce the exact picture of their daily activities.
2. This document serve as a guideline for the return to be submitted weekly on Tuesdays for further transmission to the SRSG's office. Sector Comds are required to make this return a priority.
3. The return shall be outlined as follows:
 - a. Issues Related to Returnees and Original Inhabitants. Under this paragraph the report shall cover:
 - (1) The percentage of the original inhabitants who have come back into your sector.
 - (2) The number of the new comers who have settled in your sector.
 - (3) Whether there are any indications that property is being invaded. You are to produce statistics.
 - (4) Whether agricultural activities have resumed and outline the harvest and the new planting by percentage.
 - (5) The percentage of children attending school and their attendance and non attendance bracket. Outline the number of schools in your sector. Indicate whether Government or private and level of education offered.

0000 110810Z NOV 94

CDHS RAS1

FM: 1 CDHSR RWANDA

TO: NDOC OTTAWA//J3 OPS (INTL)//

INFO: LFCHQ ST HUBERT//G3//
1 CDN DIV HQ KINGSTON//COMD//
1 CDN DIV SIG KINGSTON//CO/OPS//
3 CSG MONTREAL//OPS//
NDHQ INT OTTAWA//DIPCD/DDI 4/DIE//
NDHQ OTTAWA//DMOV 2-3-3//

[Handwritten signature]
12.11.94

Seen
12/11/94

CONFIDENTIAL 1 CDHSR 251

SUBJ: 1 CDHSR SITREP 115 10 NOV 94

1. GENERAL SITUATION -NO CHANGE.
2. DOMESTIC FORCES ACTIVITIES - THE UNREO REP STATED THAT THE RPA ARE CROSSING INTO NORTHERN BURUNDI AND GOING INTO REFUGEE CAMPS TO GET PERS WHOSE NAMES ARE ON PREPARED LISTS. THE FOREST IN SECTOR 4C EXTENDS FROM RWANDA INTO BURUNDI AND IS BEING USED FOR A STAGING CAMP FOR HUTUS.
3. UNAMIR OPS - MILOBS IN SECTOR 1 HAVE IDENTIFIED A MINE FIELD AT MUGAMBAZI (GR 0502), APPROXIMATELY 20 KM NORTH OF KIGALI. SIZE AND DENSITY NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME.
4. OP HOMEWARD: A TOTAL OF 737 DP WERE MOVED ON THE 10 NOV.
5. 1 CDHSR OPS - ALL SYSTEMS IN ALL SECTORS ARE OP. LINEMEN INSTALLED V-SAT EARTH STN DISH AND LAID NECESSARY CABLES AT SECTOR 4A(GIKONGORO). AWAITING ELECTRONIC EQPT TO ARRIVE BEFORE IT IS TESTED. TECHS RE-PROGRAMMED 3 BASE STNS, 8 MOBILES AND 14 HANDHELD MOTOROLAS FOR MILOBS IN SECTOR 5.
6. CDN 16 X PAX MINIBUS DRIVEN BY LOCAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE WAS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT WITH RPA VEH AT THE CONVENT

TURNOFF (3 KM FROM STADIUM). TWO RPA PERS INJURED, EXTENT OF INJURIES NOT KNOWN BUT SUSPECT ONE MAY BE SERIOUSLY INJURED. MINIBUS HAS BEEN RECOVERED TO 3 CSG, 1 CDHSR OFFERED TO ASSIST RPA TO RECOVER THEIR VEH WAS REFUSED. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT NO 6 HAS BEEN SUBMITTED.

7. FUTURE OPS - NSTR

8. PERS - CURRENT STRENGTH IS 374, PLUS 5 ON TD-IN. 22 UNMO & STAFF. CCIR TOTAL IS 396 PLUS 5 ON TD-IN.

9. AIR OPS - NTR

10. LOG - NTR

11. CO S COMMENTS - 1 CDHSR IS HOSTING REMEMBRANCE DAY CEREMONIES AT THE STADIUM ON 11 NOV. FC IS TO PRESIDE PARADE.

M.J. SPRINGER MAJ R OPS O


M.E. HANRAHAN LCOL CO

INTERNAL DISTR

→ DCOS OPS

3 CSG

SP SQN

①

1390/15

HQ BRITCON
KIGALI
BFPO 615

DCOS Ops
HQ UNAMIR

4 Nov 94

ALLEGED INCIDENT AT GATUNA BORDER CROSSING

1. Please find enclosed a report on the above incident. Although it would appear that an incident of some sort did occur, no formal complaint was forthcoming from the Ugandan Police. We believe that they have passed a report along their chain of command.
2. Asst Insp Karaki of the Ugandan Police witnessed the incident, he was unable to provide details of the alleged victim nor could he offer any description of the assailant. An internal investigation has failed to identify any suspects or witnesses. It is therefore unlikely that any further details of the alleged incident will be forthcoming.
3. The Officer in charge of the Party has been disciplined by COMBRITCON for failing to provide adequate leadership. COMBRITCON feels that the incident should now be closed.

D Roberts

D W ROBERTS
Capt
for COMBRITCON

② COMBRITCON

1. Concur. Incident closed.
2. Hopefully there will be no long term effects/restrictions as a consequence.

Col
DCOS Ops
5.11
11186

ce
Actioned
as directed
sh

300,37 (ops)

NOT FOR DISCLOSURE
RESTRICTED - INVESTIGATIONS

RWANDA DET
5 AB BDE PRO UNIT
OP GABRIEL
BFPO 615

WHITEHALL MIL

OC RWANDA DET
5 AB PRO UNIT

2 NOV 94

ALLEGED INCIDENT AT GATUNA BORDER CROSSING ON 31 OCT 94 ABOUT 1615HRS

1. On WED 2 NOV 94 RMP were requested by the OC A COY 2 PWRR to establish the facts surrounding an alleged incident involving members of BRITCON, OP GABRIEL on 31 OCT 94 at White Horse Hotel, kabale, and the Gatuna border crossing point, Uganda.
2. RMP liaised with Assistant Inspector Police Nathan Karaki, officer in charge, Gatuna Police, Uganda, who stated that he was on duty on 31 OCT 94. He said he was aware that two vehicles with British soldiers on board had been refused entry into Uganda for R and R purposes and that a Sgt Williams of the Ugandan Army had escorted them to Kabale to establish the reason why.
3. About 1615hrs the two vehicles carrying the British soldiers returned to the checkpoint and immediately, several of them disembarked from the vehicles and began urinating in the open, upon fences and buildings. He saw one soldier hold out what looked like a bank note to a child and when the child attempted to take it from his hand, the soldier punched him in the face with his fist. Asst Insp Karaki approached the child and saw that he had a bloody nose. He spoke to the British officer who appeared to be in charge of the group. The British officer began arguing with him and he appeared to be drunk. Asst Insp Karaki later conveyed the child to a local medical dispensary in Uganda where he was treated for his injuries.
4. The soldiers who had remained on the vehicles were throwing empty bottles at civilian passers by but he could not say if anybody was struck. Stones were thrown at the metal Ugandan Police sign and at their office buildings situated within the 'no mans land' at the checkpoint.
5. He stated that Sgt Williams asked him to arrest the soldiers concerned but using his discretion decided that this would only inflame the situation and felt it wiser to get the vehicles away from the checkpoint and into Rwanda as soon as possible and report the incident through his chain of command the following day.

NOT FOR DISCLOSURE
RESTRICTED - INVESTIGATIONS

6. Asst Insp Karaki also stated that he has heard of a complaint from the manager of the White Horse Hotel with regard to a number of smashed glasses and complaints from civilians, using the Kabale to Gatuna road, of empty bottles being thrown at them. Both accusations are aimed at the party of British soldiers whilst in Uganda. He said that there are Ugandan Police Reports on these matters and can be produced if necessary.

7. No evidence could be provided of the identity of the alleged victim of the assault or of any assailant. Nor have any specific complainants of the bottle throwing incident been identified. In light of this, no further RMP action is envisaged and the matter is to be dealt with by the unit concerned

I. Wright

I WRIGHT
CPL
AGC (RMP)

①

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To : FHQ (Ops)
From : MILOB GP HQ
Date : 04 Nov 94.

Sub : INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE INCIDENT AT GATUNA BORDER BY
BRITCON PERS ON 31 OCT 94.

1. Please find attach a copy on the above mentioned subject for your information and necessary action.


M NAIM HASSAN
Sqn Ldr
For CMO


② G3 Ops

1. For your info.
2. Pls pass copy to Co Briton.


DCOS ops
5-11

③

cc

Pse make a
copy to Co Briton

G3 ops.

④

cc
copy sent to
Co Briton

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INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE INCIDENT AT GATUNA

BORDER BY BRITCON PERS ON 31 OCT 94

1. On 31 Oct 94, a convoy of 03 vehicles with 33 British un soldiers crossed the Gatuna border for Kabale. The aim was to visit the QUEEN ELIZABETH national park in Uganda. Since any movement of defence personnel with uniform and service vehicle need prior clearance for such visit, so the Brig Comd granted permission for the convoy upto Kabale. However, the Brig Comd advised the soldiers to seek permission from local district authority for the said visit. The civil admin officer of Kabale district did not give permission to the soldiers to visit the national park as they could not produce any paper regarding their visit. It was reported by the Brig Comd that some soldiers went for verbal argument with civil officials and threatened the people. Thereafter, the soldiers proceeded to the WHITE HORSE INN hotel in Kabale where they consumed a large quantity of alcohol and misbehaved and insulted other customers of the hotel. While returning they threw some bottles on the roads at Gatuna border and urinated publicly. One soldier hit an Ugandan civilian who later had to be admitted to hospital. According to the Brig Comd the injured boy was released from the hospital after treatment. However, his family would claim financial compensation for the treatment of the boy. just after the incident the border was closed for all UNAMIR personnel immediately.

2. After the incident MILOB team contacted the Brig Comd and discussed to withdraw the decision of closing of the border. On elaborate discussion the Brig Comd was convinced to open the border under the following conditions:

- a. All personnel have to be in civil cloth while crossing the border for uganda.
- b. UNAMIR personnel will continue to report to the NRA officer in charge of the border during crossing.
- c. The immigration will stamp entry in the passport for each entry if the person goes beyond Kabale.

Investigation Officer
MILOB Sector 1

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

MILOB GP HQ

Sam
2/11

TO : FHQ

Date : 02 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ *2.11*

Ref : PLANS36/94

SUBJECT : INCIDENT REPORT NIGHT 31 OCT 94

1. It was on the night of 31 Oct 94, at about 2000hrs when a panicking male adult approached my hired residence in KICUKIRU low density suburb crying. He had a car. He claimed that RPA elements were causing havoc at his place. They were assaulting him and his family. He indicated that his residence was close to the Roman Catholic Church in KICUKIRU.
2. I told him to wait while I communicated the incident to MILOB GP HQ. During this interlude, the man drove away. My assessment was that the man was alone in his car so there was the possibility that he drove back to try and rescue his family.
3. After communicating the issue to MILOB GP HQ, the same was relayed to Force HQ and a rapid reaction team was despatched. I was supposed to marry up with the team in KICUKIRU. However, this failed due to delays caused by RPA check points. After realizing that we had been delayed, I decided to drive to the scene of incident.
4. On my way to the church area, I discovered that there was more than a company of RPA soldiers along the road. The area was very dark. For orientation, this is the area close to the old Belgian Camp. No civilian movement was noticed and the only movement observed was RPA vehicles.
5. On arrival at the church, I discovered that more than a battalion of RPA troops had

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occupied the complex. I stopped and spoke to some trying to find out about their activities. I noticed that they were not prepared to divulge any information. I then decided to patrol the area until 2300hrs and retired home.

6. This is all that happened during the said night. It was noticed that it might be dangerous to introduce night patrols at this stage but night patrols by armed troops are a priority. There is a likelihood of too many things happening during hours of darkness.

WMA 347 W 11 N
M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
S PLANS & TRG O

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(1)

To: Force Headquarters

Info: MILOB HQ

From: MILOB Sector 5

SPECIAL REPORT ON MASSACRE ON 31 OCT 94 OF VILLAGERS
IN RWERERE AND RUBAVU COMMUNES IN SECTOR 5

GENERAL

1. During the night of 30/31 October 1994, unidentified persons armed with grenades and fire arms infiltrated from across the Rwandan border with Zaire and killed the members of three families in three separate attacks in dwellings close to the border.

2. First news of the incidents was received from the RPA LO attached to MILOB Sector 5 at about 1030hrs 31 Oct 94. A visit was made to the scenes by Sector Comd accompanied by Sector Ops Offr, RPA LO, Info Offr and OC of the RPA Coy deployed in the area.

FINDINGS

3. Details about the places of the incidents and casualty states are given below.

4. RUTAGARA 189204. This is located in Secteur KINYANZOVU in Commune RWERERE. 19 bodies were found in one out of a group of four huts. The victims were made up of 2 men, 4 women and 13 children. They must have been rounded-up into one hut and sprayed with bullets. Grenades also seem to have been used. The head of the family was a community leader by name ALPHONSE KYANGANZARA.

5. RUTAGARA 186201. The place is located in Secteur BYAHI in Commune RUBAVU. 10 dead bodies were found in an isolated house close to the inter-commune boundary. These were made up of 1 man, 1 woman and 8 children. Grenades and fire arms appeared to have been used in the massacre. Head of family was KINYOGOTE.

6. RUTAGARA 183191. 7 dead bodies were found in an isolated house close to the Zairean border. These were also made up of 1 man, 1 woman and 5 children. It appeared that only fire arms were used in this attack. Head of family was NTAKAZARUMARA J.

7. The attacks all took place at about 0300hrs on 31 October 1994.

8. All three places were isolated and surrounded by banana

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(2) FC

1. Special report as req.
2. HRFO is continuing to investigate.

DCO 5000
2.11

3000.37/ops)

CC

copy sent FC
date.

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plantations. They were all within 100-150m of the Zairean Border.

9. RPA units in the area heard the noise of the attacks and moved in, but in each case it was too late, as the assailants acted rather swiftly. In the case of the incident at RUTAGARA 186201 noise of the withdrawing assailants shuffling through the near-by banana groves was heard towards the Zairean frontier.

GENERAL COMMENTS

10. The attacks appear to have been a well planned operation by one source with three well known objectives to hit or reach simultaneously. This can be inferred from the time of attack in each location and the efficiency and speed with which the mission was accomplished.

11. The victims were ordinary farmers who may not have had any other place to live to feel secure. The choice of targets therefore seems to have been dictated by their easy accessibility. It is also possible that the hamlets were already known to some members of the murder squads who perhaps lived in the area before the April-July 1994 war.

12. The attacks are the first of their kind in Sector 5 or at least known to MILOB Sector 5. They could be a prelude to what is yet to come unless appropriate measures are adopted to ensure these isolated hamlets are well protected.



M AUSTDAL
LT COL
SECTOR COMD

UN CONFIDENTIAL

①

FROM : SECTOR 3 HQ

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)✓
FORCE HQ (HAC)✓

INFO : MILOB GP HQ
: TAC HQ
: MILOB TEAM BUTARE

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MONITORING OF LIVING CONDITION OF RETURNEES.

1. Attached herewith is a report on an ongoing MILOB monitoring operation in the commune of BUTARE.
2. Specific information will very soon be provided to enable you initiate action on road bridges repairs.
3. Rest of issues are respectfully repered to you for appropriate action please.
4. Many thanks.

Dated: 28 Oct 74

Actuated

Thanks & PA.

Ask
3.11

2/11

S HAIDER
MAJ

For Sector Comd

② G3 Plans 3

1. Monitoring exercise seems like a worthwhile venture for Milobs in coop with UNHCR and HAC. this has implications for Op R and perhaps an Op O/Frag O/Instr to CMO.

Dec 8 1974
21.10

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INTERIM REPORT ON MILOB MONITORING EXERCISE OF CONDITION OF
RETURNEES - MUYIRA COMMUNE

Introduction

1. In fulfillment of part of MILOB tasks, to assist displaced persons in returning to and settling down in their homes, the team in Butare embarked on an exercise to monitor conditions of returnees in their homes. The exercise started on 12 October 1994 in cooperation with the UNHCR who however withdrew after the first day. The exercise started with the Muyira Commune in Butare Prefecture and is intended to cover all the communes. The MILOB Team is also using the exercise to confirm ^{whether} ~~shelter~~ for returnees are actually going back to the DPC, and if so, at what rate.

2. The monitoring exercise in Muyira Commune lasted four days during which the MILOBs interviewed the locals. The interview took the form of asking the people how the security situation in their homes was, what their most serious problems were ie. health, food, clothing, housing, farming etc. At the end of the first phase of the exercise, many things were brought to the fore.

Aim

3. The aim of this report is to give a brief account of the MILOB monitoring exercise of returnees in Muyira Commune and make recommendations.

Conduct of Exercise

4. The exercise started 12 October 1994 with MILOB using the list of returnees as registered by UNHCR in the DPC during Op Homeward. The team visited the homes of returnees, checking their living conditions and also cross-checking the returnees families against the lists. At the end of the first day out of 17 families registered for Muyira Secteur, 14 families were located. Three families that could not be located were said to be generally around. The exercise thereafter continued in Mukoma, Nyamiyaga and Munyinya Secteurs. Due to the large area to be covered and limitation in time, the exercise had to be reviewed after the first day. Random sampling is now done, rather than check family by family. The last Secteur, Munyinya was checked 20 October 1994, after which the exercise will continue in other communes.

5. Many problems were reported by the locals, the most acute which is common in all the Secteurs, being that of lack of hoes. As many as 4000 families require hoes to enable them to cultivate the land. Those that have hoes now are people who did not leave their

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homes and those who returned early enough to loot from other homes. The fear now is that if these hoes are not distributed in time people would be forced to eat the seeds given them. During the exercise, it was also discovered that the local staff of the NGOs responsible for distribution of cooking oil sold them to the locals rather than give them freely. A few people confessed to buying the cartons at 2000 FRW per carton of six gallons. A computation carried out by the MILOB Team and the Bourgemestre, showed that about 109 cartons of cooking oil, out of the stock brought for distribution could not be accounted for. Other problems identified include lack of medicines, food and building materials since many homes were destroyed.

6. It was also observed during the course of the exercise that contrary to general reports and impressions held, not very many people have returned to the DPCs or the refugee camps. Most of those who returned to the DPC are the early returnees, ie those who returned to their homes in late July and early August. In Munyina Secteur, the people reported that many of the early returnees were harassed by the Tutsis while some were killed. These prompted some to run back to the DPC and refugee camps thereby spreading the story of reprisals. This has generally stopped as many neighbours now live in peace.

Findings

7. The following findings were made:

- a. Local NGOs staff sell cooking oil instead of distributing it free;
- b. The people are hardly cultivating the land due to lack of hoes;
- c. About 4000 hoes will be required for the commune;
- d. Many people have no shelter and are therefore living in overcrowded homes where they are sheltered by friends and relatives;
- e. MSF and ICRC, during their food distribution refused to give to the new returnees who were not registered during the registration exercise conducted in September;
- f. Medical centres located at Nyamiyaga (SQ8490) and Busoro (SQ) are not adequate;

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- g. Some families still have relatives in the DPCs and refugees camps and would therefore want them brought back. Many families have been displaced and do not therefore know the whereabouts of their kin;
- h. Contrary to general belief, not very many returnees have fled back to the DPCs. Those that have fled are people who were caught up in the reprisals of July and August by the Tutsis. This has generally stopped; and
- i. The condition of most earth roads are bad. Many will be rendered impassable in the near future. Many wooden bridges also require repairs.

Conclusion


8. The monitoring exercise has enabled the team to identify many problems of the locals which were hitherto unknown. Cooking-oil meant to be given out to the locals free is now being sold by the local staff of the NGOs. Many locals can not cultivate the land due to lack of hoes, thereby negating the objective of bringing people home to cultivate the land. Rural roads and bridges if not repaired will soon cut off many rural areas from the urban centres, thereby encouraging rural - urban migration.

Recommendation

9. It is recommended that:
- a. Monitoring exercise be encouraged in other areas with large numbers of returnees;
 - b. The allegation of sale of cooking oil be investigated by the NGOs concerned and those found responsible dismissed;
 - c. The present system of distribution of relief materials be reviewed. That is, hoes and seeds be issued out together so that people with seeds but without hoes are not tempted to eat the seeds;
 - d. Appropriate NGOs and UN agencies be encouraged to assist locals with building materials to enable them to rebuild their destroyed homes; and

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- e. Government be advised to encourage locals to repair their roads/bridges in view of lack of resources by the Government, otherwise, many rural areas will be cut-off from urban centres.



E. Essten
Major
Senior Team Leader
Butare

21 October 1994

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Colonel J Arp
Deputy Chief Staff (Ops)

UNAMIR Force Headquarters
Kigali
Rwanda

3000.37(OPS)

20 Oct 94


UNHRFO
KIGALI

REPORT - MURDER OF FATHER CLAUDE SIMARD

Please find attached a report from TAC HQ regarding the murder of Father SIMARD a Catholic priest, at RUYENZI GR 8132 in Sector 3 for your information and necessary investigation.

Information:

MA TO FC


J ARP
Col
DCOS OPS

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PAACZYUW UCCVVDB00005 2921729-CQCC--UCCVVDA UCCVVDD

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P 191729Z OCT 94

FM UCCVVDB//UNAMIR TAC HQ BUTARE//

TO UCCVVDA/UN HQ KIKALI//OPS//G2//

UCCVVDD/MILOB HQ GITARAMA/

BT

C O N F I D E N T I E L OPS 129

SUBJ: MURDER OF CATHOLIC PRIEST CLAUDE SIMARD

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 19 OCT 94.

REFERENCE: REPORT DATED 18 OCT 94.

1. A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE RATED B-2 REPORTED TO MILOB STAFF OFFICER AT TAC HQ WITH THE FOLLOWING INFO.

2. FATHER SIMARD HAD SPOKEN WITH THE SOURCE ON 10 OCT AND RELATED THAT SIMARD WAS UNSURE OF HIS PERSONAL SAFETY. APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS PREVIOUS, AN ARCHBISHOP REMOVED FATHER FRANCOIS MAANA (TUTSI) THIS PERISH AT THE REQUEST OF FATHER SIMARD. THE LOCATION OF THIS PARISH IS UNKNOWN. MAANA IS NOW AT PARISH MYAMIYA' AT MUYIRA (GR NAME (8639) SIMARD STATED THAT MAAMA HAS BEEN SPREADING RUMOURS TO RPA AND OFFICIALS THAT SIMARD WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ATROCITIES DURING THE WAR IN APRIL/ MAY OF THIS YEAR. SIMARD EMPHATICALLY DENIED THIS.

③ G3 Ops

1. Inform Tac HQ that as a result of this confd ops 129 msg that Sect 3 should be tasked to increase mounted/dismtd patrols in the areas of Muyira (GR 8639), Save (GR 7419) and Ntanyazo (GR 8631) through Malawi Coy and Milobos.
2. Pass copy of this report to UNHRFO for their investigation, copy to MA to FC and myself for further staff action.

[Signature]
G3 Ops
20.10

② CC

Pse forward to
DCOS off for his
comments.

[Signature]
20/10

PAGE 2 UCCVVD0005 C O N F I D E N T I E L

3. ABBOT EMMANUEL TWAGIRAYEZU (TUTSI), WJ CUREE AT SAVE (NAME GR 7419), WAS AWARE THAT MAANA HAD CAUSED A FILE TO BE HELD ON SIMARD AT THE PREFECTURE'S OFFICE. AND THAT THE RPA WAS LOOKING INTO THE MATTER. THE ABBOT INFORMED SIMARD OF THIS ON 27 SEP 94 FOR HIS OWN KNOWLEDGE AND SECURITY. THE ABBOT ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD TOLD OFFICIAL (UNKNOWN WHO AT THIS REPORT DATE) THAT HE FELT THESE ALLEGATIONS BY MAANA WERE UNTRUE. IT WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THIS DISCUSSION THAT SIMARD HAD GONE TO THE SOURCE OF THIS REPORT TO INFORM AND KEEP ADVISED.

4. SIMARD WAS ADVISED TO REPORT THIS MATTER TO UNAMIR TAC HQ IN BUTBRE, AND SINCE HE WAS A CANADIAN CITIZEN, TO SPECIFICALLY REPORT THE MATTER TO A CANADIAN OFFICIER. HE REFUSED AND ASKED THE SOURCE TO DO IT FOR HIM. THE SOURCE COMPLIED AND REPORTED THIS SAME REPORT ON OR SHORTLY AFTER 10 OCTOBER.

5. ON LEARNING OF THE DEATH OF SIMARD, THE SOURCE RETURNED TO TAC HQ TO INQUIRE AND REITERATE THE REPORT. THE SOURCE REFUSED TO COORD THIS INFO WITH MILOBS DUE TO A PERSONAL OPINION OF UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF MILOBS IN BUTARE. AN OPINION BASED ON

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PAGE 4 UCCVVDB0005 C O N F I D E N T I E L

PROVIDING ANY MORE INFORMATION AS TO A MOTIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY. AN INTERVIEW WITH ABBOT TWAGIRAYEZU AT SAVE COULD ALSO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING THE BACKGROUND AND CONFIRM ALL DETAILS INITIALLY REPORTED BY FATHER SIMARD. IN A CASUAL DISCUSSION WITH THE RPA LO IN BUTARE, LT CHARLES, IT IS KNOWN THAT HE AND LOCAL GENDARME OFFICIALS PLAN TO CONTINUE THEIR INTERVIEWS TODAY IN THESE COMMUNES FATHER MAANA AND THE ABBOT WILL BE INTERVIEWED BY RPA BEFORE BEING INTERVIEWED BY UNAMIR MILOBS OR CIVPOL.

8. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THIS INCIDENT AND POSSIBLE RPA INVOLVEMENT, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT A FOLLOW UP INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATIVES IN CONCERT WITH THEIR INVESTIGATIONS ALREADY INITIATED IN THE NTYAZO AND MUYIRA AREAS. FOR SECURITY AND INFORMATION GATHERING PURPOSES, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE POSITIONING OR A REGULAR PATROL OF UNAMIR TROOPS THROUGHOUT THIS GENERAL AREA INCREASED.

BT

May be incomplete, No ETX indicator received.

0AACZYUW UCCVVDB0002 2911322-CCCC--UCCVVDA UCCVVDD.

ZNY CCCCC

O 181322 OCT 94

FM UCCVVDB/TACHQ BUTARE

TO UCCVVDA/UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS//

UCCVVDA/MILOB HQ KIGALI

UCCVVDD/SECTOR 3 MILOB HQ GITARAMA

SECTOR 3 MILOB BUTARE//ZEN

BT

U N C O N F I D E N T I A L OPS 117

SUBJ: ALLEDGED MURDER - EX PATRIATE

1. (C) STAFF FROM IMC VISITING RUYENZI (8132) WERE TOLD THAT FATHER CLAUDE, THE LOCAL CATHOLIC PRIEST, HAD BEEN MURDERED IN HIS HOME ON THE NIGHT OF 17/18 OCT 94. ALLEDGEDLY A CAR CAME TO THE FATHERS HOME AFTER DARK AND STAYED ABOUT AN HOUR. BODY FOUND BY LOCALS WHEN FATHER FAILED TO APPEAR FOR 0600 MASS 18 OCT 94. REPORTEDLY FATHER HAD HANDS TIED BEHIND BACK AND HAD BEEN BEATEN TO DEATH WITH A HAMMER. MISSING FROM FATHERS HOME, MEDICINES, MONEY AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS BUT CAR WAS NOT TAKEN.

2. (C) APPARENTLY RPA HAVE SEALED OFF THE AREA AND BURGOMEISTER HAS BEEN INFORMED DO NOT KNOW IF

PAGE2 UCCVVDB0002 U N C O N F I D E N T I A L

BUTARE GENDARMES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED/COMMENCED INVESTIGATION.

3. (C) MILOB BUTARE TEAM HAS BEEN DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE. MORE TO FOLLOW WHEN THEY RETURN. RADIO SILENCE ON THIS MATTER HAS BEEN IMPOSED.

4. (C) FATHER CLAUDE WAS 60 YEARS OLD FRENCH CANADIAN WHO REMAINED IN COMMUNE DURING THE WAR.

5. (C) INCIDENT REPORTED TO TACHQ AT 181245 OCT 94. NAMES OF PERSONS REPORTING ARE HELD ON FILE.

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OAACZYUW UCCVVDB0002 2911322-CCCC--UCCVVDA UCCVVDD.

ZNY CCCCC

O 181322 OCT 94

FM UCCVVDB/TACHQ BUTARE
TO UCCVVDA/UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS//
UCCVVDA/MILOB HQ KIGALI
UCCVVDD/SECTOR 3 MILOB HQ GITARAMA
SECTOR 3 MILOB BUTARE//ZEN

BT

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PAGE2 UCCVVDB0002 U N C O N F I D E N T I A L

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See Distribution

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR FIXED INSTALLATION SECURITY IN KIGALI - SECTOR 6

Reference:

A. HQ UNAMIR 0000.12 (Ops) dated 30 Aug 94.

1. I intend to issue planning guidance for the security requirements of fixed installations in Kigali (Sector 6), in the near future. The purpose of this guidance is to ensure conformity between units and with Security Alert Measures (SAMs) (to be issued). This guidance is likely to include:

- a. A description of the fixed installations in Kigali.
- b. A summary of the security measures required at each location, to include:
 - (1). Sentry manning.
 - (2). Entry/exit procedures.
 - (3). Mobile/roving patrols.
 - (4). Communications requirements.
- c. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) planning guidance - RRF details already issued as Reference A.
- d. Command and Control.
- e. Wider applicability of procedures to other fixed installations.

2. In order to facilitate the planning process, action addressees are asked to submit their current orders for the security of installations in Kigali to G3 Plans by **Thu 20 Oct 94**.

18 Oct 94

See
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See
JRP
20/10

J ARP
Col
DCOS Ops

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Distribution:

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GHANBATT - B Coy

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Information:

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DCOS Ops
G3 Plans

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UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G

HQ NICOY
UNAMIR HQ
BYUMBA CAMP SECTOR 1
BYUMBA

See Distribution

14 Oct 94

PRELIMINARY RECCE REPORT OF SECTOR 2

Reference:

A. FRAGO 06/94 dated 12 Oct 94.

1. Preliminary Recce of Sector 2B was carried out on 13 Oct 94, by a team from NICOY. The team Recce the CANCON location at KIBUNGO and it's environ.

2. On arrival, the team was received and briefed using OP Map of the Sector by the CANCON Commander. The brief was preceeded by a recce tour of KIBUNGO and sorounding towns. While on recce, the team noted a good number of returnee in the area. These facts, is proofed by the following:

- a. Good turn out of the returned Refugee.
- b. Impresive commercial activities.
- c. The usual road blocks and search conducted by RPA.

3. However the immediate deployment of NICOY Platoon to this area may not be possible due to lack of some important and obvious facilities by UNAMIR in the Sector. At the moment the NICOY is still building up in strength and materials, thus could not readily provide the lacking items in this loc. These lacked facilities and items are as follows:

- a. Communication Requirement. The issue of communication for NICOY platoon in the Sector has been made known to the UNAMIR Force Signal Officer. The communication requirement for this platoon is listed in the Annex A to this report.
- b. Accommodation of the Troops. The present location has no provision for accommodation of the troops. The alternative choice is the use of tent shelters in the open. The sanitation of the area will be neglected if field toilets are not constructed to serve the troops. Likewise the need for electric generator and deep freezer for storage of fresh food for the troops. For detailed accommodation requirement See annex B.
- c. Field Engineer tools for the platoon. As the troops are to be located in the open, there is need for some measures of field defences, to cordon off unauthorized persons to the area. The requirement for this are listed in Annex C.

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
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d. The vehicle/POL requirement. For effective operation, the platoon needs to be highly mobile to cover the Sector 2. In the absence of the Armoured personnel carriers, the soft skin vehicles are suggested. Each vehicle is expected to cover a distance of two thousand kms per week during active patrols, thus the need to provide the platoon with enough POL. See Annex D to the report for Veh/POL requirement.

CONCLUSION

4. The NICOY Recce report on the requirement necessary for the deployment of its platoon in Sector 2 is a continuous one but for now we hope the accommodation, logistic, Engineer and Veh/POL requirements highlighted in this brief will make it possible to deploy with minimum waste of time. NICOY is coy ever ready to deploy as directed but the back up required is what may be causing the delay once this is met, the platoon will be in place.



G. LAWAL
Maj
for Cont Comd.

Annexes:

- A. Communication Requirements for NIG Pl GP Deployment in Sector 2B KIBONGO.
- B. Accommodation store Requirement.
- C. Engineer Requirement.
- D. Vehicle/POL Requirement.

Distribution:

External:

Action:

DCOS OPs ←

Information:

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ANNEX A TO
UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G
DATED 14 OCT 94

COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR NIG
PL GP DEPLOYMENT IN SECTOR 2B KIBONGO

1. Based on the discussion between the NICOY Signal Officer and the UNAMIR Force Signal Officer, the following comm requirements are hereby made:

a. Setting up of a motorollar Repeater Station and the provision of:-

- (1) 10 x Handheld motorollar Radio Sets.
- (2) 20 x motorollar Radio Set Batteries.
- (3) 10 x motorollar Battery chargers.
- (4) Any assessories needed for the motorollar comm system not mentioned in sub- paragraphs a(1) - (3) above.

b. Establishment of effective communication links between BYUMBA - KIGALI - KIBONGO and vice versa to enable the NICOY Commander exercise direct Command and control on the NIG platoon GP in KIBONGO.

2. It is however very necessary to meet the above communication requirements before the deployment of the NIG platoon on 17 Oct 94.

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ANNEX B TO
UNAMIR/NICoy/7404.9/G
DATED 11 OCT 94

ACCOMMODATION STORE REQUIREMENT

Serial	Items	Quantity	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Teulages	10 ✓	Ten - Man Tent
2.	Generator Set (25kv)	2 ✓	2.5 KVA
3.	Hurricane lamps	4 x	
4.	20 Ltrs jerricans	20 ✓ 30	
5.	Buckets (10 Litres)	20 x 5. PLASTIC BASINS w/HANDLE	
6.	Cooking Pots large	4 x 5	
7.	Cooking Pots medium	4 x 5	
8.	Deep freezer	1 x	
9.	Field kitchen/Gas Cooker	1 ✓ 3 BURNER LPG	
10.	Spoon Scoop large	3 x	

FIELD TOILET AND SANITATION

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Corrigated Iron Sheet	5 Bundles ✓	
2.	Timber (Lumbers)		
	2"x6"x8'	40 pcs ✓	
	4"x6"x8'	40 " ✓	
	2"x6"x8'	40 " ✓	
3.	Plywood	25 pcs ✓	
4.	Roofing Nails	2 Pkts x	
5.	Nails		
	Sizes: 2"	25 kg x 1 kg	
	3"	25 kg ✓ 1 kg	
	4"	25 kg 1 kg	
	5"	25 kg x	
6.	Cement	500 kg ✓	
7.	Jerry cans (20 ltrs)	25 x	
8.	Surface tanks (1000 ltrs)	2 x 1000 l	
9.	Water pumping set	2 x	

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ANNEX C TO
UNAMIR/NICCOY/7404.9/G
DATED 14 OCT 94

ENGINEER REQUIREMENT

1. FIELD DEFENCE STORES

Serial	Items	Qty Required	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Concertina Wire	6 Reels ✓	
2.	Barbed Wire	6 Reels ✓	
3.	Binding Wire	1 Reel ✓	
4.	Pick axes	20 Pcs x	
5.	Shovels	20 " x	
6.	Sand Bags	3 Sets (1,500) ✓	
7.	Hammer (big)	3 x	
8.	Wire Hand gloves	5 Pairs x	
9.	Matchet	30 x	

120 6' STAKE PICKET

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ANNEX D TO
UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G
DATED 14 OCT 94

VEHICLE/POL REQUIREMENT

Serial	Designation	Quantity	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	5 ton truck	6 3 (2 next week)	
2.	AGO (Diesel)	500L/Wk 1,000 LT	
3.	Kerosine (DPK)	100L/Wk x	
4.	LPG	41kg bottle/month	✓

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O 261530B SEPT 94

FM UN HQ BUTARE/G3/MAJ LIDSTONE//

TO UN HQ KIGALI//SIG OPS.CDN CONTINGENT COMD/COL ARP//

BT

C O N F I N T I A L OPS 012

SUBJ: SHOOTING INCIDENT BUTARE 26/SEPT/94

1. AT APPROX 1145 HRS ON MON, 26 SEP 94. I WAS AT THE RPA CHECK POINT WHERE THE CYANGUGU ROAD INTERSECTS THE BUTARE/GITARAMA ROAD. I WAS IN CONVERSATION WITH THE RPA LO, THE HAC OFFR AND UNREO REPS CONCERNING AN OP HOMEWARD PACKET OF FOUR VEHS WHICH WAS BEING DETAINED AND SEARCHED AGAIN. A CROWD HAD GATHERED AND THE AREA WAS HEAVILY CONGESTED WITH BOTH PERS AND VEHS.

2. I WAS SUDDENLY AWARE OF A COMMOTION UPHILL OF ME AT THE ROAD JUNCTION PROPER. LOOKING UP I SAW A CIVILIAN LOW-BED MAKING A RIGHT TURN ONTO THE GIKONGORO ROAD. AT A GLANCE I SAW THAT THE VEH WAS IN THE PROCESS OF STRIKING THE HAC OFFR'S VEH. THAT THE RPA AT THE ROADBLOCK WERE SIGNALLING HIME TO STOP AND THAT THE DRIVER LOOKED VERY AGITATED, PERHAPS EVEN PANIC STRICKEN HAVING STRUCK THE VEH HE THEN RAN THE RPA ROADBLOCK AND APPEARED TO BE DELIBERATELY ACCELERATING.

PAGE 2 UCCVVDB0003 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. I GLANCED DOWN THE ROAD AND SAW THAT MANY PERS WERE IN HIS PATH. I STEPPED INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD AND MOTIONED HIM TO STOP. HE CONTINUED ON AND APPEARED TO BE CHANGING GEARS AND ACCELERATING. I HAD THE DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS DELIBERATELY RUNNING THE ROADBLOCK. I STAYED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF HIM. ARMS OUTSTRETCHED, PALMS FACING (ALTHOUGH I WAS GIP.HG GROUND) UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR I WOULD BE RUN DOWN IF I DIDN'T MOVE. I BELIEVE MY HAND CONTACTED THE FRONT OF THE VEHICLE BUT AM NOT CERTAIN. AT THAT POINT I SIDESTEPED AND ATTEMPTED TO MOUNT THE RUNNING BOARD BUT FAILED. AT THIS POINT I WAS RUNNING ALONGSIDE THE VEH AND HAD TWO IMPRESSIONS OF MY SURROUNDINGS: THAT THE ROAD IN FRONT WAS STILL CONGESTED AND THAT THE RPA AROUND ME WERE UNSLINGING THEIR WEAPONS. I RECALL THONKNG THAT EITHER SOMEONE WOULD BE STRUCK BY THE VEH OF THAT THE DRIVER WOULD BE SHOT BY THE RPA, OR BOTH.

4. AT THAT POINT (PERHAPS 5-6 SECONDS ELAPSED) I DREW AND CHARGED MY PISTOL AND FIRED THREE ROUNDS INTO THE RIGHT FRONT TIRE (RANGE OF ONE FOOT OR SO) TO STOP OR SLOW THE VEH. I WAS AWARE OF AT LEAST TWO OTHER SHOTS BNG FIRED. I FIRED WITH THE MUZZLE OF MY PISTOL AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE TIRE TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCE OF A MISS AND THE SUBSEQUENT POSSIBILITY OF A

PAGE 3 UCCVVDB0003 C O N F I D E N T I A L

STRAY ROUND STRIKING A BYSTANDER. THE VEH SLOWED AND THE ROAD CLEARED. THE VEH CAME TO A HALT SOME DISTANCE LATER. THERE WERE NO INJURIES.

5. I WAS LATER APPRISED BY MAJ F MHUNDA, GITARAMA MILOBS. THAT HE HAD BEEN ESCORTING THE VEHICLE TO GIKONGORO AND THAT THE DRIVER HAD ALSO, INEXPLICABLY, RUN A PREVIOUS RPA CHECKPOINT AND THAT THE DRIVER, IN MAJ MHUNDA'S WORDS, SEEMED TO PANIC OR SOMETHING...

6. AT THE MOMENT OF DRAWING AND FIRING THERE WERE THREE THOUGHTS IN MY MIND. FIRST THAT THE VEHICLE WAS GOING TO RUN SOMEONE DOWN. SECOND THAT THE DRIVER HAD RUN THE ROADBLOCK DELIBERATELY AND THE RPA WERE GOING TO SHOOT. THIRD THAT DUE TO MY PROXIMITY TO THE VEH I COULD SUCCESSFULLY STOP IT BY SAFELY

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SHOOTING OUT THE TIRE THUS. HOPEFULLY, AVOIDING THE TWO AFOREMENTIONED CONSEQUENCES. I BELIEVED THEN, AS I DO NOW, THAT A FAILURE TO ACT WOULD HAVE HAD UNFORTUNATE AND PERHAPS FATAL CONSEQUENCES.

7. WHILE WRITING THIS NOTE I HAVE BEEN VISITED BY MAJ MHUNDA WHO ADVISES THAT THE DRIVER HAS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGED HIS TIRE AND EXPLAINS.

PAGE 4 UCCVVDB003 C O N F I D E N T I A L

THAT HIS BRAKES FAILED. HOWEVER, THE DRIVER NOW CLAIMS THAT HIS BRAKES ARE SERVICEABLE AND WILL CONTINUE TO GIKONGORO WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE ASSISTANCE OR ADVICE OF A MECHANIC. MAJ MHUNDA WILL MAKE A SEPARATE REPORT BUT STATED TO ME THAT HE BELIEVED THE DRIVER HAD PANICKED FOR AN UNKNOWN

my be incomplete, No ETX indicator received