



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AU  
DPRO

24 December 2008


Excellency,

I would like to inform you that the African Union – United Nations Panel established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1809 (2008) concluded its deliberations and submitted its report to me on 11 December 2008.

I am pleased to share with you a copy of the report, which I am sending to the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

I would like to thank the African Union for its excellent cooperation in supporting the work of the Panel. I look forward to our continued close collaboration on this matter.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
BAN Ki-moon

His Excellency  
Mr. Jean Ping  
Chairperson of the  
African Union Commission  
Addis Ababa

28-14670



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

24 December 2008


Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to refer to Security Council Resolution 1809 (2008), adopted on 16 April 2008, concerning the cooperation of the United Nations with regional organizations, by which the Council welcomed my proposal to establish an African Union – United Nations panel to consider the modalities of how to support African Union peacekeeping operations established under a United Nations mandate.

I wish to inform you that the Panel, established on 12 September 2008, concluded its work and submitted to me its report, which I am pleased to transmit herewith to you. I am also sending a copy of the report to the President of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the report of the Panel to the members of the General Assembly.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
BAN Ki-moon

His Excellency  
Mr. Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann  
President of the General Assembly  
New York

28-14670



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

24 December 2008


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I wish to inform you that the Panel, established on 12 September 2008, concluded its work and submitted to me its report, which I am pleased to transmit herewith to you. I am also sending a copy of the report to the President of the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the report of the Panel to the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
BAN Ki-moon

His Excellency  
Mr. Neven Jurica  
President of the Security Council  
New York

## Letters for SG's signature


### Report of the AU-UN Panel establishment pursuant to SCR (2008)

1. H.E. Mr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission
2. H.E. Mr. Neven Jurica, President of SC
3. H.E. Mr. Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, President GA

Drafter: DPKO

Proofread by: JL/MZ

Approved by:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'B. Aime', with a checkmark at the end.

Date: 22 December 2008



Report of the AU-UN Panel established pursuant to  
SCR 1809 (2008)

To: Mr. Nambiar,

① Please find attached, for **your approval** and SG's signature: two letters addressed to the President of the SC and the President of the GA, transmitting the Prodi report (received on 11 December by the DSG); and one letter addressed to AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping transmitting the report to him.

② DPKO also recommends that the SG call Mr. Ping to thank him for the AU's support to the Panel. Talking points are attached (also given to Scheduling).

③ Finally, a copy of the report itself is attached for your review. The report makes two recommendations on funding: 1) the use of UN assessed contributions to support Security Council mandated AU peacekeeping operations for their initial 6 months under agreement that the mission will then transition to a UN operation; 2) a multi-donor trust fund to address longer term AU capacity building for conflict prevention and resolution. The panel suggests a joint UN-AU team be constituted to examine implementation modalities.

Nicholas Haysom  
23 December 2008

Cc: KWS

28-14670

ACTION N H

DEC 22 2008  
128-14670 Unclassified

Note to Mr. Nambiar

Report of the AU-UN Panel established pursuant to SCR 1809 (2008)

1. Please find attached the report of the AU-UN Panel, which was submitted to the Deputy Secretary-General by the Panel's Chairman, Romano Prodi, on 11 December. 28-14515  
Please also find attached for your consideration draft letters addressed by the Secretary-General forwarding the report to the Presidents of the Security Council and General Assembly, as well as a letter addressed by the Secretary-General to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, forwarding the report to him. We would suggest that the Secretary-General may wish to consider calling Mr. Ping to thank him for the African Union's support to the Panel and to discuss with him the Panel's main recommendations and next steps. Please find attached talking points in this regard.

2. The report reviews the challenges facing the African Union in establishing and sustaining peacekeeping operations, drawing on lessons learned from United Nations, African Union and sub-regional organizations in Africa. It underlines the need to strengthen the African Union's institutional capacity, and to enhance the political and strategic relationship between the United Nations and the African Union.

3. In terms of funding, the Panel proposes the use of United Nations assessed contributions, under certain caveats, to meet the immediate operational requirements of African Union peacekeeping operations. These caveats include the use of assessed contributions on a case by case basis, for a maximum period of six months and on the premise that the African Union operation would transition to a United Nations operation. The Panel also recommended the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to address more efficiently the long term requirements of African Union capacity building for conflict prevention and resolution.

4. The use of United Nations assessed contributions for African Union peacekeeping is likely to be the more sensitive for Member States of the Panel's recommendations. We assume that before approving either recommendation, the Security Council and the General Assembly may request the Secretary-General to submit a more detailed report on how such mechanisms could be established and their potential implications. The preparation of such a report would require in-depth consultation by specialized personnel with key partners.

5. In the meantime, we will continue to work closely with key Member States, in consultation with the African Union, how they intend to review and respond to the report. We will keep you informed of developments in this regard.

A. L. J.  
Alain Le Roy  
18 December 2008

cc: Ms. Malcorra  
Mr. Pascoe

Talking Points for the Secretary-General's phone conversation with  
H.E. Jean Ping, Chairman of the African Union Commission

**UN-AU Panel established pursuant to SCR 1809 (2008)**

*[The Panel submitted its report on 11 December. While we understand that Mr. Prodi briefed the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Mr. Lamamra, on the gist of the report, the African Union has not yet received a copy.]*

- **Comme vous le savez, le Panel a conclu ses travaux la semaine dernière. En mon absence, M. Prodi a remis le rapport du Panel au Vice-Secrétaire général. Je vous ai en envoyé une copie que nous avons aussi partagée avec le Commissaire Lamamra pendant sa visite à New York cette semaine.**
- **J'ai envoyé le rapport aux Présidents du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale. Nous restons en contact étroits avec la présidence du Conseil sur les suites que le Conseil entend donner au rapport et à ses recommandations, et vous tiendrons bien entendu informé de ses décisions en la matière.**
- **With regard to funding, the Panel has recommended two mechanisms:**
  - (i) UN assessed funding to support specific UNSC mandated AU peacekeeping operations, on a case by case basis for an initial six months; (ii) a voluntary multi-donor trust fund to assist, coordinate, and focus international support for longer-term AU capacity building for conflict prevention and resolution.**

- The panel also underlined the importance of a stronger UN/AU strategic relationship, which is essential to achieve common goals and objectives, on the basis of clear and shared understanding of the issues at stake.
- I look forward to continued close collaboration with you on this matter.



## Foreword

1. There is still no peace in many parts of Africa. From the Horn to the Great Lakes to West Africa conflict is endemic. New threats continue to undermine political stability, even though in the past years there has been progress both in achieving peace and economic growth.
2. The cost of conflict manifests itself in the deaths of millions. In addition general insecurity inhibits economic development as well as creating an enormous financial burden for the international community. Associated problems of destruction of infrastructure, environmental threats, displacement, disease and injury mean that the aftermath of conflict is more damaging and long lasting than the conflict itself.
3. While this is not exclusively an African problem, it is in Africa that it is felt most acutely. It is also in Africa that the number and scale of the issues mean that they do not necessarily attract the attention that they deserve. As a result many attempts by the international community to alleviate poverty in Africa often fail to achieve their goals, a problem that is exacerbated by other issues such as lack of good governance, corruption, patronage, poor education, and inadequate health and social services which perpetuate a vicious circle of poverty and violence.
4. While military capability may be part of any potential solution, peace on the African continent cannot be achieved through the deployment of military forces alone. We need to look for long term strategies at the continental, national and, above all, local levels that support the efforts of political leaders to develop effective governance and the capacities to produce the stability that is essential. Only then can they meet the aspirations of the people and break out of the cycle of violence.

5. The international community in general, and African member states in particular, should not wait for events to unfold before acting. Deploying a peacekeeping mission may be a response, but effective conflict prevention that obviates the need for that deployment is a much better option. However, the latter needs to be backed by a credible capability to deploy or there is a risk of raising expectations that cannot be met. Hence the need for Africa to develop the capacity for a comprehensive approach that contains the ability to respond.

6. UN peacekeeping has undergone an exponential increase since the early 1990s. It has had its successes and its failures but few would argue that it has not made a positive difference. At the same time the African Union has recognised the need to develop its own capacity to respond to crises on the continent. There is a significant synergy to be achieved in drawing on the respective capacities of both organisations and exercising the comparative advantage that each can offer. However, this requires that the strategic relationship be clearly defined within the overall context of the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It also requires the resources needed to implement the range of conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities envisaged within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The Security Council adopted Resolution 1809 (2008) in which it "recognized the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations when they undertake peacekeeping under a United Nations mandate". Indeed, the full deployment of AU missions has been often limited by a lack of equipment, inadequate transport capacities, and other operational weaknesses.

7. The consequences of unpredictable support have been all too evident both in AU missions and those mounted by sub-regions. Contributions from donors have played a crucially positive role, but they have often fallen short of what was needed. To this end the Secretary General, after close consultation with the African Union,

asked me to chair a Panel whose members were Ms. Monica Juma (Kenya), Mr. James Dobbins (United States), Mr. Jean-Pierre Halbwachs (Mauritius), Mr. Toshiyuki Niwa (Japan) and Mr. Behrooz Sadry (Iran).

8. The content of the report reflects our consensus, which has been reached after intense debate within the Panel and after a variety of consultations with the UN offices involved in peace operations and meetings with African Union institutions and African Union member states, members of the United Nations, UN Secretariat, the European Union, and existing and potential donors.

9. The Panel's report explores how the UN and the AU can enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of UN mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union, with a particular focus on the expeditious and effective deployment of well equipped troops and effective mission support arrangements.

10. The Panel recommends the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund for the purposes of supporting African Union peacekeeping capacity which should be premised on African ownership. The objective, in creating this fund, is both to consolidate the various current sources of support for the African Union and to secure additional resources from current and new donors building on the current EU African Peace Facility. Among its main purposes would be to build capacity within the AU to conduct the range of activities associated with early warning, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

11. In addition, the Panel recommends the use of UN assessed funding to support UN authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. To qualify for such support, the panel believes that the following two conditions should be met: 1) a case by case approval by the Security

Council and General Assembly; 2) an agreement between the AU and UN that the mission would transition to UN management within six months.

12. Although the Panel is aware that these two recommendations will not completely address the problems of peace in Africa, I believe that they constitute a significant progress in a longer process which is aimed to profit from the comparative advantages of the AU:

Signed Romano Prodi  
Chairman of the Panel

**Report of the African Union - United Nations Panel on modalities  
for support to AU peacekeeping operations**

**Executive summary**

In its resolution 1809 (2008) of 16 April 2008, the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal to establish an African Union-United Nations panel to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment, logistics, and to consider in-depth lessons from past and current African Union peacekeeping efforts.

The present report provides a broad review of the main issues discussed with a wide range of interlocutors on the increasing engagement of the African Union in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction. These issues included peace and stability in Africa; lessons learned from African peacekeeping; UN/AU strategic relations; African institutional capacity; development of the African Standby Force; resources and logistic requirements; financing for peacekeeping and long term capacity building, as well as coordination of support.

In addition to addressing the strategic relationship between the UN and the AU, the Panel makes a number of recommendations to strengthen the mutual relationship and develop a more effective partnership when addressing issues on the joint agendas.

Concerning the enhancement of the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of UN mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union, the Panel recommends the establishment of two new financial mechanisms. The first based on UN assessed funding and designed to support specific peacekeeping operations. This should be on a case by case basis to support UN Security Council authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period up to 6 months. Initially, at least, this support should be provided mainly in kind. The second, a voluntary funded multi-donor trust fund, should focus on comprehensive capacity building for conflict prevention and resolution as well as institution building, and should be designed to attract new as well as existing donors, while fostering African ownership.

The Panel recommends that the AU considers developing its logistics capacity and explore innovative options including commercial multi-function contracts.

Finally, the Panel recommends the establishment of a joint UN/AU team to examine the detailed modalities to implement the above mentioned recommendations.

## I. Introduction

1. At its high-level meeting held on 16 April 2008, the Security Council adopted resolution 1809(2008), recognizing "the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping under a United Nations mandate<sup>1</sup>". This led to the establishment of a panel, whose members are listed in annex I, and whose mandate was "to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment, logistics, and to consider in-depth lessons from past and current African Union peacekeeping efforts<sup>2</sup>."

2. The Panel's Terms of Reference, attached at Annex II, state that the objective is to make "concrete recommendations on how the UN and AU could explore the possibility of enhancing the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of UN mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union, with a focus on the expeditious and effective deployment of well equipped troops and effective mission support arrangements." Therefore the Panel's priority was to examine the difficulties created by the lack of assured funding and to give advice as to how they might be addressed to support the development of long term peacekeeping capacity.

3. While the Terms of Reference were framed in technical terms, the Panel's task is inherently political in that it encompasses the nature and structure of partnerships between the United Nations and African Union, and regional organisations. The Report of the Secretary General S/2008/186 highlighted the need for the Security Council to define the "role of regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security" and to clarify "the nature of the partnership" with emphasis on how to develop mechanisms to promote common understanding and effective coordination across the range of conflict prevention and conflict resolution activities. We stress the necessity for the African Union Member States to develop a coherent response to crises on the continent and the implications of their operating under a Security Council mandate.

4. The Panel consulted as widely as possible with the United Nations, the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, the

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<sup>1</sup> Security Council Resolution 1809 (2008)

<sup>2</sup> Security Council Resolution 1809 (2008)



European Union and member states within the limited time available. The report will present a broad analysis of the main issues that came out from the various discussions and examine possible ways of enhancing long term capacity, including sustainable mechanisms for funding for consideration by the United Nations, the African Union and other bodies, as appropriate. As such this report should be seen as a step in a longer process that will require further consultation and work for the development of its recommendations to improve the funding of AU peacekeeping operations.

5. The Panel's recommendations have been guided by the need to build up the African Union's capacity for peacekeeping, consistent with the objectives of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the African Union's Constitutive Act, both of which emphasize the need to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. In examining the needs, it is impossible to divorce the requirement for improved support for African Union peacekeeping capacity from the context of collective security and the broader underlying political and strategic issues.

6. In this context, specific emphasis was placed upon:

- i. Recognition of the primacy of the United Nations Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security;
- ii. The need to enhance the strategic relationship between the United Nations and the African Union, specifically between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the UN Secretariat and the African Union Commission, as the basis for a more effective partnership when addressing issues of mutual interest;
- iii. The African Union's objective to develop a comprehensive peace and security policy;
- iv. The necessity to provide resources for peacekeeping in a sustainable, predictable manner without undermining the value of flexibility associated with the ability of regional organisations to respond quickly to a crisis; quick
- v. The African Union's need to develop the institutional capacities that will enable it to implement that policy, in particular the need for integral capacities to plan, manage and support both conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities;
- vi. The need to identify mechanisms for financial and logistic support that focus on the African Union's



requirements at the continental level, while acknowledging the implications at the sub-regional and national levels as the building blocks of African peacekeeping capacity;

- vii. The importance of close coordination between all international partners supporting AU capacity building;
- viii. The need for capacity building initiatives to be supported by effective and appropriately funded training programmes.

7. Notwithstanding the requirement to propose possible technical solutions to this problem it was clear that the issue at hand was more political than technical. Financing options are not difficult to identify and are generally well known, particularly in the case of mounting regional peacekeeping missions in Africa. The challenge lies in a question that when the Security Council authorises a peacekeeping mission to be undertaken by the African Union whether it should be funded from UN Assessed Contributions or not. The constraint imposed by this divergence led the Panel to focus on options that are possible within the existing financing framework, or adaptations of it; more far reaching and revolutionary alternatives would require a fundamental change of approach from all stakeholders, including the reform of the main structures of multilateral politics.

8. It is also important to acknowledge the impact of other ongoing events that will influence the ability of the international community to generate the funding that is needed both to support the deployment of AU peacekeeping missions and long term capacity building. The UN peacekeeping budget has risen from \$1.5bn in 1999-2000 to \$7.1bn for 2008-9. The international community remains committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Demands for support continue unabated. In addition there is considerable uncertainty generated by the current worldwide financial crisis.

9. The Panel notes that much good work has been undertaken by the African Union and its partners, including the UN, to ensure support for AU peace operations and the development of long term capacity. However, the Panel also notes that much of this work has tended to be *ad hoc* and driven by either a need to respond to a specific crisis, often beyond the capacity of the AU, or by other interests. While such support may provide a solution to short term requirements it does little to build long term capacity of the African Union.

## II. The Maintenance of Peace and Security - The Global Challenge

10. The complexity of modern peacekeeping means that no single organization is capable of tackling the challenge on its own. More than ever security threats require a collective approach premised on a range of partnerships which should seek to establish coordination both at the strategic and programmatic levels. They should also take maximum advantage of the strengths that respective organizations, especially regional organizations, can contribute.

11. There is a need to reaffirm collective responsibility for global peace and security in order to reflect the changes that have taken place in recent years. Peacekeeping operations initiated by the AU and African sub-regional organizations have proved useful precursors to larger UN led efforts leading to lasting peace for the countries concerned, Sierra Leone and Burundi being good examples. However, there is a growing anomalous and undesirable trend in which organizations lacking the necessary capabilities have been left to bear the brunt in terms of providing the international community's initial response, while others more capable have not engaged. This inversion of responsibility is generating a trend of benign neglect in which interests rather than capabilities prevail.

12. In examining the past operations it is clear the AU faces particular challenges. Recent and ongoing conflicts in Africa such as Somalia, Darfur, the DRC and those in West Africa illustrate the challenge. The complexity, in terms of the range of responses from mediation to intervention, creates demands out of all proportion to the availability of resources to address them. In this respect any recommendations made to address this dilemma should focus on meeting the needs of the African Union and should not necessarily set a precedent for other regions.

13. Weaker organisations have been drawn into complex and volatile missions without the necessary capacities to succeed, or have been so constrained that their objectives have been impossible to achieve fully. The recent examples of Darfur and Somalia clearly demonstrate this point: two of the most challenging of all operations with the least well supported deployments. Further evidence of this problem lies in the pressure experienced by the AU to deploy in both cases. While lack of resources put the operations at serious risk of failure, the dependency on external support for deployment and sustainment put the AU in the position of having potential responsibility for missions over which it has little

institutional or managerial capacity or control. The accomplishments of these missions is testament to the AU's willingness to difficult challenges, but it has not been without some cost, as evidenced by recent incidents such as Haskanita in Darfur. Deployment under these conditions should be assessed carefully. While donors should be encouraged to provide financial support to regional peacekeeping efforts, they should not be under any illusion that this is a substitute for more direct international participation.

14. It is probably unrealistic to expect to see a quantum leap in the deployment of troops from the countries outside Africa to support peacekeeping missions on the continent. While many countries have commitments to peace and security in other parts of the world, an increased engagement of the international community in Africa remains an important objective. The development of the African Peace and Security Architecture should not be seen as a signal for the need for less international involvement, but an opportunity to develop a range of appropriate responses.

15. The circumstances of many UN member states have changed as their economies have developed. In addition, many of these countries have interests in the African continent beyond a general desire for stability. All countries, both those who have been engaged traditionally and emerging economies, with resources and / or interests in Africa should be much more actively encouraged to support the building of an African peacekeeping capacity. In the final analysis the AU will only be able to respond to crises effectively if there is sufficient political and financial commitment of its own member states and, more generally, of the international community.

16. As new threats to peace and security emerge, and the complexity of the environment in which peacekeepers are expected to operate continues to increase, the importance of deploying capable and credible peacekeeping missions increases proportionately. New demands require fresh thinking. Complexity demands greater responsiveness. Both require greater capability. It is simply undesirable to expect peacekeeping missions to deploy into uncertain situations without the necessary means. It is a recipe for failure. We are deluding ourselves if we believe that having something on the ground is better than doing nothing. In the absence of the necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising expectations of the people that cannot be

fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peacekeeping and weakens the organisation that is responsible.

17. Developing the necessary capability depends on a combination of political will and availability of resources. Lack of political will undermines credibility, while lack of resources compounds the problem by limiting the ability of a mission to implement its mandate. In either case hard decisions will have to be taken as resources are finite and their availability for building peacekeeping capacity will affect other potential priorities within the 10 Year Capacity Building Plan approved by the 2005 World Summit Outcomes,

18. The demand for resources is likely to become increasingly competitive as mandates become more complex and expectations are raised. This underlines the need for those involved in the maintenance of peace and security to work together in effective partnership if they are to achieve their objectives. Progress has been made in this respect, and increasingly those organisations and member states have developed a much better understanding of how to work together, but many of the arrangements are still evolving and remain ad hoc. They are not necessarily the product of a shared strategic vision.

19. It is unlikely that demand for peacekeeping capacity will decrease in the near future. This makes it even more important to ensure that peacekeeping is not seen as a panacea. Not only should every effort be made to develop a shared strategic vision, but it must also be viewed in the wider context of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction activities. Peacekeeping missions should not be the default answer. They must be used appropriately and should only be deployed where there is an unambiguous understanding of the objectives that need to be achieved, how their activities relate to the longer term political and reconstruction process and how they will be resourced. Unless these issues are clear there is a risk of missions losing direction and becoming part of the problem rather than the solution.

20. Security is a prerequisite for long term sustainable development and nowhere is this more evident than in Africa where conflict continues to undermine the aspirations of the people. The need to address this challenge is not only an African issue; in an increasingly globalised world it has implications for the international community as a whole.

### **III. Peace and Stability in Africa**



21. There have been sixty three UN Peacekeeping Missions since 1948, almost half of them in Africa. African troops have been involved in all but ten of these. Currently peacekeepers in Africa make up nearly 75% of UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide, and of these 40% are drawn from African troop contributors. The 2008 budget for UN operations deployed on the African continent amounts to \$5.162bn.

22. Recent years have seen increasing cooperation and understanding between international and regional organisations. In the African context the Africa - EU Strategic Partnership and the UN-AU Joint Declaration of November 2006 are two key milestones, but the ideals that they represent need to be developed, and there remains a need for more detailed and functional mechanisms to be put in place; this also applies to the evolving relationship between the AU and the African sub-regional organisations. Critical to this relationship is the notion that the RECs form the building blocks for the AU Peace and Security Architecture. Therefore engagement in Africa should be with all its constitutive elements. It must be built upon solid foundations that can ensure a response that is appropriate to the circumstances. This may be the deployment of an AU mission, or it may require capabilities beyond those that are likely to be available in Africa, either in the form of a UN mission or a multi-national coalition. The development of an increased African capability does not lessen the need for other forms of international engagement, but rather it expands the range of available options and draws upon the strengths that the AU and sub-regional organisations can contribute.

23. To play its part the African Union has developed the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which encompasses a range of conflict prevention activities supported by the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System, the five sub-regional response elements that form the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace and Security Council as the primary decision making body. Funding represents one of the major challenges but it is far from being the only one. The APSA structure is still evolving but despite various efforts the AU Commission has some difficulty in keeping pace with the increasing demands being created, particularly in light of the expectation of the capacity to respond rapidly, and credibly, to a situation such as occurred in Rwanda.

#### **IV. Lessons from Peacekeeping Missions in Africa**

24. Since 1989 there have been eight African Union or sub-regional peacekeeping operations; in Liberia (1990-1993), Sierra Leone (1997-1999), Guinea Bissau (1999), Côte d'Ivoire (2003-2004), Burundi (2003-2004 & 2007 to date), Darfur (2004-2007) Comoros (2008), Somalia (2007 to date). Of these eight operations, four have been succeeded by UN led missions and one is currently being conducted as a hybrid UN/AU mission. Of these eight societies, six are now at peace, though peacekeeping or subsequent post conflict reconstruction, missions remain in all of them.

25. There are lessons to be learned from these missions and, among these is the crucial need to develop the capacity to support operations. These include many of the same capacity issues that challenge the UN and the African Union, particularly the need to generate and deploy missions with appropriate capabilities in a timeframe that meets the requirement. It is important to ensure that missions deploy with what they need or they risk being given a mandate that they cannot achieve and the result is an incremental deployment that is more costly in the long run, not only in resource terms but also in its impact upon the civilian population of the country concerned. The examples of Darfur and the DRC provide ample illustration of the consequences of that lack of capacity.

26. The UN has faced the same challenges to enhance effectiveness and has taken steps to address them; in this respect it has developed guidelines for peacekeeping; changed its structures and procedures to enhance its institutional capacity; established Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) and Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority (PMCA) to provide the initial finance for mission start up.

27. African missions have demonstrated the value of a quick response to provide the initial stability needed for a longer term solution, but their scope and ability to implement their respective mandates has often been constrained. Lack of resources is clearly one factor but difficulties in establishing the foundations for long term post-conflict resolution, not entirely linked to resources, have been another. Hitherto the emphasis has tended to be on the military deployment with little capacity to address wider post conflict issues, or coordinate with other agencies deployed in the country, leading to implementation of the mandate in a sequential rather than a concurrent process. It is essential that it has both the capacity to plug into the wider long term framework and

coordinate its planning with other actors from the very start of the process

28. Capacity can be less of an issue where there are clear and limited objectives as can be seen in the successful deployment of the mission to the Comoros. The clear objective to restore the authority of the Union of the Comoros in the Island of Anjouan, a short duration and the availability of sufficient resources demonstrated the ability of the AU to deploy successfully. It would be wrong to suggest that the AU should confine itself to smaller scale operations but it does underline the importance of capacity being matched to the objectives.

29. While African missions have been able to stabilise certain situations and provide a first response, their capacity to sustain a long term commitment has been limited. Notwithstanding difficulties faced in establishing a long term framework, in cases where they have acted as precursors to larger and more robust UN operations, they succeeded in initiating the process towards lasting stability, albeit not without some other significant problems as illustrated in the following examples.

30. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployments in West Africa demonstrate many of the problems facing a regional deployment; these were the subject of a lessons learned study<sup>3</sup> held in 2005 which concluded that in its earlier deployments ECOWAS had underestimated the implications of deploying peacekeeping missions and lacked the necessary capabilities to support a sustained operation, particularly in terms of critical assets such as aviation, medical, engineering and communications. The situation was exacerbated by a lack of capacity within individual troop contributors that quickly affected missions as a whole and hence the effectiveness of the regional response. While these shortcomings were known from the early 1990s, they persisted in more recent deployments in Côte d'Ivoire in December 2002 and Liberia in August 2003 when, in both cases, the success of the deployment depended on considerable assistance from external partners.

31. The deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) also provides a useful example of cooperation between ECOWAS and the UN in so much as the resources of the latter were authorised by Security Council Resolution 1497 (S/RES/1497 (2003)) to be used to support the deployment of the first Nigerian battalion,

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<sup>3</sup> Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990 -2004, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre, 1 March 2005.

which had just completed its tour of duty in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone. While this battalion provided the vanguard of the ECOMIL deployment, at the mission level it was still significantly under resourced in terms of transport, communications, medical support and overall logistic capacity. Consequently it was severely constrained; for example the Accra agreement required government, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) forces to stay in their ceasefire positions and allow unhindered humanitarian access to the territory they controlled, and for ECOMIL to verify compliance with the Accra Agreement. Yet the mission lacked the capacity to deploy beyond the area immediately surrounding Monrovia and some key corridors. This is no criticism of ECOMIL's contribution to stabilizing Liberia, indeed similar problems face UN missions, but it is indicative of the problems facing missions that are deployed with inadequate resources. Indeed it took a considerable time, even after transition to UNMIL, for the capabilities to be built up to the required level during which the mission was not fully able to implement its mandate.

32. The AMIS deployment to Darfur presented many similar problems that were compounded by the faltering political process though it is recognised that the deployment itself was able to provide some stability which was essential to establishing the conditions to initiate a longer term approach. A study aimed at identifying lessons for the ASF held in late 2006<sup>4</sup> concluded that:

- i. There was a lack of planning in the initial stages of the mission and insufficient remedial action taken to develop planning capacity in the course of the mission;
- ii. There was a lack of clarity in the mission structure at the field level, and the inadequacy of that structure for the purpose of managing the interaction between the military, police and civilian components of what quickly became a multidimensional mission;
- iii. There were weaknesses in strategic management capacity, encompassing both the AU Commission and member states' advisory bodies;
- iv. There was an absence of effective mechanisms for operational level management;

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<sup>4</sup> The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force, International Peace Academy, October 2006.



- v. There was a lack of tools and know-how to handle the relations of the mission with a variety of external actors, including local communities, the Government of Sudan (GoS), external partners and agencies;
- vi. There was insufficient logistic support and ability to manage logistics;
- vii. There was insufficient capacity in the key area of communication and information systems, compounded by unclear reporting lines from the field to the AU Commission;
- viii. There were problems in force generation and personnel management;
- ix. And there was a quasi-total dependence on external partners to finance the mission, and over-dependence on partners' technical advice, with attendant constraints, delays, and political ambiguities.

33. It is recognised that many of the problems were exacerbated by political and geographical factors beyond the mission's control a considerable amount of subsequent development work has been done,. However, notwithstanding that pressure on the African Union to manage the mission has been removed by the deployment of UNAMID the fact remains that the African Union's institutional capacity to manage the above issues is still inadequate.

34. A significant outstanding problem relates to the lack of an adequate system for reimbursement of troops and equipment. This has led to a decline in countries' capabilities as they are unable to replenish their defence equipment. In turn this has resulted in a growing reluctance to use their military assets for deployment on AU peacekeeping missions.

#### **V. The need for clarity in the UN /AU strategic relationship**

35. The Charter of the United Nations acknowledges the role of regional arrangements in dealing with matters of international peace and security. This is the starting point for designing a stronger partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. In their communiqué at Annex II to the Report of the Security Council of 11 July 2007 (S/2007/421), the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed their commitment to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship between their respective institutions. They also agreed to bear in mind that in taking initiatives for the promotion of peace and security in Africa, the African Union is also acting on behalf of the UN and the

international community consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Although this relationship is evolving positively, it has yet to achieve the necessary level of strategic engagement to support a unified approach. In this regard there is a need to clarify the relationship between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council

36. The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. While regional and sub-regional organizations act on its behalf in resolving conflict, it is necessary to ensure that they are able to exercise their comparative advantage in initiating an operation before a situation becomes protracted.

37. A timely and effective response to crises is needed, especially in cases of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and major humanitarian situations. Achieving this requires a clearer division of labour in which the comparative advantage of the respective organisations can be exploited.

38. While the United Nations Security Council clearly supports stronger cooperation between the United Nations and regional organisations, it has not considered this issue in a systematic way. Instead, it has focused on individual cases and, as a result, has not yet developed a clear framework for cooperation. While this is in line with the Security Council's primacy in addressing peace and security issues, it has resulted in a lack of clarity in the strategic relationship between the United Nations Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

39. In developing a more effective relationship between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council, the objective should be to establish a division of responsibility based on the African Union's comparative advantages. The partnership should aim both to influence member states within the region either directly or through sub-regional organisations and to develop mechanisms that support a more responsive and regular coordination when addressing issues of common interest. In defining the division of responsibility it is important not to create the perception that the UN is subcontracting peacekeeping to the AU. The objective should be to maximise the AU's strengths in terms of its contribution to conflict prevention, mediation, its ability to address smaller scale requirements such as mediation and restoration of constitutional order in the Union of the Comoros, and, finally, its capacity to act as the first response to larger scale UN missions.

40. An enhanced strategic relationship will lead to better mutual understanding, development of joint approaches to issues and much improved continuity, particularly when it is envisaged that an AU mission will transition to the UN, an issue that has both political and potential financial implications. However, to agree on a common position is only the initial phase of the process as it still has to be planned and implemented.

41. A closer relationship between UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council may help to establish the strategic vision, but it has to be underpinned by equally strong relationship between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission. Over the past five years much progress has been made in this respect and regular coordination takes place at a variety of levels. Much of this is in the context of specific issues but it might be helpful to both organisations if a more routine mechanism existed, possibly using the UN/EU Steering Committee as a model. However, fully effective coordination is dependent on the respective organisations having an appropriate capacity.

42. The 2005 World Summit and the Peace and Security Cluster of the 10 Year Capacity Building Plan provides the framework for much of the assistance provided by the UN to the African Union. Led by the UN's Department of Political Affairs, the Peace and Security Cluster covers a range of conflict prevention and peacekeeping capacity building programmes. Through its AU Peacekeeping Support Team, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to address the development of peacekeeping capacity, particularly the development of the African Standby Force (ASF). Additional assistance has been provided to support more immediate planning requirements such as AMISOM because the AU's own structures remain insufficient for the task. While helpful, this does not produce real AU long term capacity to plan, deploy and manage missions at the continental and sub-regional level.

43. Much has been said about the principle of African ownership over the development of the APSA. Yet it is difficult to achieve ownership by augmenting the AU Commission with external support. Ownership will only be achieved through the development of home-grown structures and procedures supported by effective mechanisms for funding.

44. The modalities on which a strengthened relationship between the between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and

Security Council can be developed must work to the mutual benefit of both; this will require a **significant** effort both in terms of establishing a clear understanding of the issues that underpin the relationship and identifying practical answers as to how they can work together more closely; this is at the heart of building a more effective partnership when addressing issues on the joint agendas.

## **VI. Requirements of institutional capacity**

45. There is broad recognition that the ability of the AU and its sub regions to react quickly has, in most instances, been positive. They could have achieved much more if they had the necessary support. Development of a more comprehensive response to issues of peace and security is not just a question of focussing on hardware or finance, and it must recognise that military capabilities can never substitute for long term political solutions to crises. This requires the development of a range of complementary capabilities, including more effective conflict prevention mechanisms, such as early warning and mediation, as well as reconstruction and development.

46. The AU has to cope with the double challenge of building its institutions and responding to crises. In doing so it is important that the latter does not undermine the achievement of the former. It is impressive that the AU has been able to do so much with an as yet incomplete institutional structure. However, this is not something that can continue in the long term: sooner or later it will result in a major setback.

47. Much of the AU's institutional weakness stems from the fact that it is an organisation in transition. Structures and procedures that were conceived in the days of the OAU are at odds with, and inadequate to support, the AU's increasingly proactive approach. Even those agreed in Maputo in 2003 "suffered from the lack of clear expectation of what the Commission's programmes should be or what they should deliver"<sup>5</sup> and from the "failure to meet the approved staff complement was due to an inefficient recruitment process, encumbered by the application of the quota system." Lack of flexibility in Human Resources management and AU conditions of service have often resulted in the failure to attract and retain appropriately qualified personnel, thereby creating difficulties in developing capacity and an ongoing need for external assistance. Developing

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<sup>5</sup> Independent High Level Panel of the Audit of the African Union by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union



the institutional capacity to rectify this human resources problem is a major challenge and needs to be accorded the appropriate priority.

48. In the case of the AU Peace and Security Department, the 2003 AU Summit approved 53 posts of which only a small percentage have been filled. This creates a challenge for peacekeeping, in particular for the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) which has only 12 approved posts. While ad hoc arrangements have been made for support to specific operations there has been no continuity that could have contributed to long term capacity.

49. If the AUC aims to properly embrace wider peacekeeping and an integrated approach to tackling conflict, a step change is required in terms of doctrinal understanding and approach. This will entail cross department working and cross discipline working as well as building the necessary expertise, required to mount and manage peacekeeping operations.

50. The Panel understands that a study of the PSOD's structural requirements was conducted in early 2008 which confirms that the current structures and staffing are inadequate. This report is still being considered by the AU Commission in the context of its overall staffing requirements. It is crucial that any restructuring enables the AU to develop a fully integrated structure for peacekeeping.

## **VII. Development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**

51. In spite of the structural shortcomings, progress has been made in the development of the APSA, although some aspects are more advanced than others. Significant disparities exist in the degree to which AU member states are able to support the implementation of its goals. While the APSA has the potential to radically change the approach to peace and security in Africa, questions arise on the sequencing of some of its objectives and the effectiveness of the evolving institutions to manage the process. Without the appropriate APSA structures there is a risk that the AU Commission could be overwhelmed by the combination of immediate demands and long term interests, to the detriment of the overall process.

52. With regard to the immediate demands the focus is on building peacekeeping capacity in the form of the ASF. The first

phase of development was endorsed by the meetings of African Ministers and Chiefs of Defence and Security in March 2008 and it is now moving into the next stage of ASF development with the implementation of 'Road Map 2', which maps out the plan for the next stage of ASF development culminating in a major assessment of progress in 2010 supported by the European Union and other capacity building partners.

53. Developing the ASF is a major undertaking and it would be easy for it to lose direction; in this respect it is important that the African Union drives the process in terms of setting the objectives, but it is equally important that clarity and realism underpin its efforts. Key aspects, such as the logistic concept, ability to achieve the stated readiness requirements, issues of command and control, structural capacity and civilian capabilities remain unclear and while work is in hand to address many of the issues the clarity needs to be achieved as soon as possible. Equally it is also essential that donors do not attempt to drive the process at a pace that the AU Commission cannot handle.

54. Key to the development of the APSA is the need to take cognisance of the role of women participation at all levels, in conflict prevention, peace keeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction.

#### **VIII. Resource requirements**

55. The requirement for funding and resources should be viewed in the wider context of the APSA. A significant proportion of funding will be allocated for the support of the ASF concept, which is based upon five distinct regional, and integrated, standby capacities within a common continental framework.

56. In examining the financial and resource requirements needed to develop the ASF, it is clear that they fall into three separate layers. First, the implementation of the ASF institutions at the continental level. Second, those of the five sub-regions and, finally, those at the level of individual troop contributors. They also have to support short term operational requirements without undermining the ability to build long term capacity. Given the scale of the requirement, it would be unrealistic to envisage a single mechanism with the capacity to address all three. It would neither be the most efficient approach, nor would it necessarily be consistent with the ASF concept. Therefore, it is important that the long term emphasis

is placed on developing a strong capacity to sustain the AU's ability to implement the APSA.

57. As capacity is developed, it is important to ensure that improved mechanisms for funding and logistic support should promote more effective, complementary and concerted efforts. The emphasis must be on a coordinated approach of the international community, and not merely on enabling the AU to deploy missions. African led peacekeeping should be developed, but at the same time the international community should continue to be encouraged to participate more actively in demanding situations.

## **IX. Financing**

58. Hitherto AU missions have been mounted using voluntary contributions from donors, both financial and in kind. This approach tends to be ad hoc and, in addition to inhibiting long term planning, is complicated by the individual requirements of donors for accounting, reporting and auditing. Currently there are more than 130 different contributions channelled to the AU - each with its own reporting and monitoring requirements. This places a huge burden on the weak structures of the African Union. The AUC mechanisms were not designed to cope with the present scale and range of demands. Any new mechanism should be kept as simple as possible and include a standardized format for reporting.

59. While donor support may have facilitated the successful deployment of missions, it has not been able to ensure that they have had all of the necessary resources. Reliance on unpredictable sources of funding means that there is no guarantee that essential capabilities will be available which, in turn, may invalidate planning assumptions. This acts as a disincentive to potential troop contributors who are understandably reluctant to commit to missions that they see as under-resourced, especially when this is accompanied by a lack of any guarantee of sustained reimbursement. Donor support, both financial and practical, provided for specific operations may be able to facilitate an operation but it does not contribute to building up long term capacity. Once the requirement is over the donor support generally ceases.

60. Concerning the importance of long-term engagement, we note the experience of the African Peace facility established by the EU, to provide the AU and the other regional organisations with resources to mount effective peace making and peacekeeping operations structures.

## **X. Financing for peacekeeping missions under a United Nations Mandate**

61. The Panel considered a number of options for improved funding but emphasises the point common to all, that it is necessary to develop the AU's institutional structures for financial management concurrently with any improved funding mechanisms.

62. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches; one based on voluntary funding and one based on assessed funding. Within these there are a number of variations and there are also a number of aspects related more directly to logistic support than to specific mechanisms for providing finance. In general terms, the former are likely to be more suited to long term capacity building, while the latter are likely to be more appropriate in the case of supporting operational mission requirements.

63. In looking at the options for supporting peacekeeping the first and most obvious one is full access to UN assessed contributions for AU missions authorised by the Security Council. This would provide predictability which is sustainable over whatever period is necessary. The primacy of the Security Council remains paramount. The key is to reinforce its primacy while encouraging maximum flexibility at the regional level. Any proposal for the use of assessed contributions must be accompanied by appropriate accountability mechanisms.

64. The Panel recommends the use of UN assessed contributions on a case by case basis to support UN Security Council authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period up to 6 months. Initially, at least, this support should mainly be provided in kind. This could include troop transport, troop reimbursement, communications and various forms of logistic support. The panel believes such an arrangement could benefit both the UN and the AU, where the AU, exercising its ability to respond quickly, would be providing an initial response to a longer term UN commitment. This would require an agreement between the AU and the Security Council for the mission to transition to the UN. Such an arrangement should aim to establish an AU mission to UN standards as far as possible and would clearly facilitate the transition process that would ultimately take place.



65. Such an arrangement could provide the answer to a more predictable funding arrangement when it is clear that there will be a transition to the UN but it does not when it is either unclear, or the Security Council is undecided. In this case the AU is likely to be faced with the prospect of relying on donor contributions as it has in the past.

66. The Panel underscores the value of African ownership and emphasises the importance of AU member states increasing their own financial contribution to peacekeeping operations. The concept of an AU assessment has been discussed on a number of occasions. The Panel believes that this goal should be achieved gradually given the competing demands for resources, the ability of member states to contribute and the current economic situation. A first step in this direction could be to augment the AU Peace Fund.

## **XI. Financing for capacity building**

67. The Panel also recommends that the African Union develop a Comprehensive Plan for long term capacity building. The plan, which should contain timelines and benchmarks, should be aimed at developing the planning, management and administrative capacity of the AU to support peacekeeping operations and conduct the range of activities associated with conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. The panel recommends that the plan be financed by a multi-donor trust fund which should be established for that purpose. The various existing sources of support to the African Union would be consolidated under that Fund and a standardized format for reporting to all donors will be developed. The Fund would also seek additional resources from current and new donors.

68. A Board would be created to provide policy guidance for the development of the Plan prepared by the African Union, to recommend funding proposals for activities within the Plan and to oversee the utilization of resources of the Fund. The Board would consist of eleven members - five representatives appointed by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, one representative appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and one representative from each of the five largest contributors to the Fund. The Secretariat of the Board should be located in Addis Ababa.

69. The Panel recommends that the Fund should be administered by an agency with experience in managing multi-donor trust funds, such as UNDP, appointed by the Board. In addition the Board would need to appoint an implementing agency. Full responsibility for both administration and implementation of the Fund would be transferred to the AU as soon as the necessary financial management and other administrative capacity needed to execute these tasks is put in place at the AU. In order to transfer this responsibility, consistent with the principle of African ownership, the development of that capacity would be a priority of the Plan. A first review of ongoing progress should be undertaken after 2 years, from the establishment of the fund.

70. Additionally, the possibility of closer cooperation between private sector development initiatives and peacekeeping should be examined with a view to identifying areas of complementarity.

## **XII. Logistic requirements**

71. The most obvious manifestation of the difficulties created by lack of predictable and sustainable funding emerge from the problems facing AU and sub-regional peacekeeping missions in the provision of logistic support at all levels. This has a direct impact on the ability of the AU to support and sustain a mission in the theatre of operations. While the AU is willing and has demonstrated ability to mobilise troops, lack of logistics is a major constraint to AU Peacekeeping operations.

72. Dependence on donor support remains a major challenge that will continue to undermine the AU's capacity to mount peacekeeping missions. In response to this problem African Ministers of Defence and Security, at a meeting convened by the AU Commission in March 2008, approved a basic logistic framework. However, questions related to its final shape and funding remain unresolved.

73. The AU in developing its long term logistic capacity has two main options. The first consists of a traditional approach relying on significant stockpiles of equipment. The second, more innovative, which could take advantage of new business practices such as Logistics Civil Augmentation Programmes (LOGCAP) where the actual delivery would be provided by a commercial contractor. At the same time LOGCAPS offers greater flexibility and reliability.

74. The management of logistics is dependent on a range of institutional capacities that require to be included within the overall capacity building effort. Inadequate structures, lack of personnel and a lack of systems designed to provide support, procure equipment, let contracts, and generally support deployment such as exist in the UN framework, make it very difficult for the AU to provide the necessary support. The problem is exacerbated by the number of bilateral arrangements between AU member states and donors. Given the nature of such agreements, the AU does not necessarily have control over them, leading to logistic structures that can be very unbalanced.

75. The AU, supported by international partners, needs to examine how logistics support can be achieved, avoiding the establishment of large stockpiles of equipment that may, or may not, be used, and which exact a high price for maintenance. While the UN has experience in this field which can benefit the AU, it does not follow that it provides the perfect model for future AU logistic operations. In this respect consideration should be given to whether the AU's requirements could be better served either through commercial multi-function contract such as LOGCAPs, either in entirety or in combination with limited infrastructure and equipment stockpiles.

76. While it may not be desirable for the AU to replicate the UN's logistic arrangements, the latter has considerable experience in managing large scale logistic support. It follows that there are numerous lessons that can be passed on. In this respect consideration should be given to identifying how the AU can benefit from the experience of the UN Logistic Base in Brindisi (Italy). Much could be achieved through a close relationship between UN and AU logistic planners, particularly in transferring procedural experience either by co-locating an AU element with the UN Logistic Base or staff exchanges. Consideration should also be given to a possible role for the UN logistic hub in Entebbe (Uganda).

77. The scale of the logistic requirement needed to support the APSA is huge. It can be achieved only if it is both realistic and planned as a long term project. This process needs to be taken step by step and must be linked to a series of benchmarks established in order to support the implementation of logistic capacity commensurate to the development of the APSA concept. Ideally, this should be developed jointly between the UN and the AU which would assist in establishing a nucleus of experienced AU staff, and would also facilitate the transfer of best practice. It is also important that this process is accompanied

by comprehensive training programmes for AU and sub-regional staff.

78. The emphasis is mainly on developing the AU's capacity. However, we must develop a clear understanding of the division of responsibility for logistics between the AU and the RECs, and between the RECs and the member states. Member States are ready to provide troops, but they often lack the necessary equipment for them to operate effectively. This includes the resources needed to equip, deploy and sustain them which can result in delays to deployment but, more importantly, it may result in a mission lacking credibility, and therefore bringing greater risks.

### **XIII. Coordination of capacity building support**

79. Notwithstanding the proposals for improved financial and logistic support, it is likely that members of the international community will continue to provide funding and support for a number of the AU's capacity building programmes and operations pending the establishment of the two channels that we have recommended. The need for effective coordination among supporters extends to the whole range of partner activities, as duplication of effort needs to be avoided as well as the possibility of potentially competing initiatives. The interests of capacity building are best served if they are demand driven and in response to the AU's identified requirements rather than externally motivated.

80. A number of mechanisms exist to promote coordination between capacity building partners and the African Union and these will remain an important part of the process. However, it is clear to the Panel that in following up this report subsequent stages will be increasingly technical. They encompass issues that require expert knowledge over a range of different interests of a number of different partners. Consequently we recommend that appropriate arrangements are implemented to ensure that the Panel's recommendations can be followed up, and that they should be representative of the UN, AU and capacity building partners.

### **XIV. Recommendations**

81. The Panel's recommendations have been guided by the need to build up the African Union's capacity for peacekeeping, both in its ability to respond to crises and in its need for a capacity that is capable of promoting long term stability on the



Continent. At all times the Panel recognizes the primacy of the UN Security Council for matters of peace and security, and its recommendations are designed to reinforce that principle through developing a sustainable AU capacity that can complement the Council's work.

82. Before addressing the requirements to support peacekeeping capacity, the Panel emphasizes the need to establish a more effective strategic relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council and between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission is fundamental to long term success. A shared strategic vision is essential if the UN and the AU are to exercise their respective advantages; the AU's ability to provide a rapid response and the UN's capacity for sustained operations. It will also reduce the likelihood of duplication of effort and organisations working at cross purposes. In this respect it is recommended that a joint strategic assessment be established in order to identify the issues that underpin this mutual relationship and develop a more effective partnership when addressing issues on the joint agendas.

83. In addition to the need to define the strategic relationship between the UN and the AU the Panel also places emphasis on the need for a clearly understood relationship between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission. It is recognised that a good relationship already exists in many areas but these often relate to specific issues. Therefore it is recommended that a more formalised process be established to cover the range of issues of mutual interest. In this respect it is recommended that the model offered by the UN/EU Steering Committee would be helpful. It is also recommended that the idea of staff exchanges between the respective organisations, which has been floated in the past, be pursued with more vigour, particularly in the financial and logistic areas.

84. Africa has the greatest need for peacekeeping yet faces the biggest challenge in matching its willingness to act with the resources needed to be successful. The panel concluded, therefore that it makes sense for the international community to establish arrangements to support peacekeeping in Africa without necessarily envisaging a more general regime, or setting precedents for other regions

85. The engagement of the international community must be seen in the context of current circumstances. There is now a wider range of countries with an interest in Africa and a capacity to

contribute to its development and security. In light of these interests the Panel consulted widely and encourages those member states, as well as those already engaged, to increase their support for peacekeeping in Africa and contribute to the proposed capacity building fund. It is also important to encourage member states from outside Africa to participate in peacekeeping on the continent to complement the development of African peacekeeping capacity and ensure the availability of the most appropriate response

86. The need to develop institutional capacity commensurate with the demands placed upon the AU is crucial to the ability to implement the APSA. Lack of institutional capacity within the AU Commission remains a significant constraint to the development of a sustainable continental peacekeeping capability. The Panel commends ongoing efforts and encourages the AU to move forward with identifying and implementing appropriate structures and procedures; capacity building partners are encouraged to make this a priority for their support.

87. Developing structural and procedural capacity represents only one part of an equation. The other is the need for appropriate training. A good deal of work is in hand in the context of training to support the development of the ASF as a whole but more is required at the level of individual personnel. In this respect the Panel recommends that the AU should identify its priorities for personnel training, particularly in those areas dealing with financial, logistic and administrative issues.

88. With regard to financing it is recommended that funding mechanisms to support capacity building in the AU should be focussed at the continental level, and that the requirements of the sub-regions and member states be met through bilateral or multilateral arrangements as at present.

89. It is recommended that two new financial mechanisms be established; the first based on voluntary funding and focused on capacity building, the second based on UN assessed funding and designed to support specific peacekeeping operations. The Panel emphasises the importance of African ownership and recommends that the AU should consider the establishment of its own system for financial contributions for peacekeeping operations through assessed contributions to gradually augment the AU Peace Fund.

90. The Panel recommends the use of UN assessed contributions on a case by case basis to support UN Security Council

authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period up to 6 months. As indicated previously, initially at least, this support should mainly be provided in kind. This could include troop transport, troop reimbursement, communications and various forms of logistic support. The panel believes such an arrangement could benefit both the UN and the AU, where the AU, exercising its ability to respond quickly, would be providing an initial response to a longer term UN commitment. This would require an agreement between the AU and the Security Council for the mission to transition to the UN. Such an arrangement should aim to establish an AU mission to UN standards as far as possible and would clearly facilitate the transition process that would ultimately take place.

91. The Panel also recommends that the African Union develop a Comprehensive Plan for long term capacity building to be financed by a multi-donor trust fund. The Fund will be governed by a Board representing the AU, UN, and donors. The full administration and implementation of the Fund's activities will be transferred from the initial agencies to the AU at an appropriate stage. The Secretariat of the Board should be located in Addis Ababa (Refer to paragraph 66-69).

92. Additionally, the possibility of closer cooperation between private sector development initiatives and peacekeeping should be examined.

93. Regarding logistics, the Panel recommends that the AU considers developing its logistics capacity without necessarily replicating the current UN arrangements and explore alternatives such as commercial multi-function contracts, or LOGCAPS, in order to avoid the necessity of stockpiling large quantities of equipment and the costs of maintenance.

94. The Panel recommends a stronger and more consistent coordination between the AU and the UN that would ensure the appropriate division of labour between the regional authorities and the broader international community.

95. It is the panel's view that all the above recommendations are only an initial phase in a long term process of developing and supporting AU capacity. A joint UN/AU team should be established to examine the detailed modalities to support the recommendations made by the report.

Annex I

Composition of the Panel

Mr. Romano Prodi (Italy), Chair

Mr. James Dobbins (United States)

Mr. Jean-Pierre Halbwachs (Mauritius)

Ms. Monica Juma (Kenya)

Mr. Toshi Niwa (Japan)

Mr. Behrooz Sadry (Iran)



Annex II

**Terms of reference for the African Union - United Nations panel  
of distinguished persons established pursuant to  
Security Council Resolution 1809**

**Introduction**

1. At its high-level meeting held on 16 April 2008, the Security Council adopted resolution 1809(2008) by which, among other things, it welcomed the "Secretary General's proposal to set up within three months an African Union - United Nations panel consisting of distinguished persons to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support such peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment and logistics and to consider in-depth lessons from past and current African Union peacekeeping efforts."

2. In furtherance of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the Council's decision was based on paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security (S/2008/186 dated 24 March 2008). It is however important to note that while the focus is on the African Union, due consideration should be given to the role of sub-regional organizations in Africa as the building blocks of African peacekeeping capacity.

3. A significant amount of work has been undertaken by the African Union and its partners, including the UN, to ensure support for AU peace operations. Solutions have tended to be *ad hoc* and major limitations include the lack of assured and flexible funding arrangements and limited institutional capacity.

**Objective**

4. Concrete recommendations on how UN and AU could explore the possibility of enhancing the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of UN mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union, with a focus on the expeditious and effective deployment of well equipped troops and effective mission support arrangements.

**Key Output: Modalities for Predictable and Sustainable Funding -  
(S/RES/1809 /2008 - Op Para 16)**

5. The panel should examine all possible options for the funding of African Union peace operations mandated by the Security Council, and recommend possible mechanisms needed to support them, in particular:

- a. Reliable sources of funding for AU peace operations mandated by the UN Security Council;
- b. Funding for developing the AU's capacity to plan, deploy, manage and sustain peace operations;
- c. Funding to support the further development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the long term objective to see a sustainable African peacekeeping capacity.

6. The Panel's recommendations should be considered by the Security Council upon whose direction technical level work would follow to develop proposed mechanisms.

**Wider Context**

7. In identifying modalities for funding, the panel should take into account existing capacity-building initiatives, including those addressing specific shortfalls in capability as well as the capacity needed by the AU to implement the panel's recommendations.

8. Recommendations for improved modalities for funding should take into account the need for closer cooperation both between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, as well as between respective Secretariats.

**Documentation**

9. The following documents should inform the work of the panel:

- a. The letter from the Chairperson of the African Union to the UN Secretary General dated 10 December 2005 which outlines key areas of capacity shortfall,
- b. The UN-AU Joint Declaration for enhancing capacity building dated 16 November 2006 (A/61/630).
- c. The Joint Communiqué agreed by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council dated 16 June 2007 (Annex II of S/2007/421).

- d. The document adopted following the 98<sup>th</sup> meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council held on 23 November 2007 which provided input to the above mentioned report of the Secretary General.
- e. The Joint Communiqué agreed by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council dated 17 April 2008.
- f. Security Council Resolution 1809 (2008).

**Panel Composition and Modalities.**

- 10. The panel will incorporate a range of expertise and backgrounds of selected experts; the members (six) will be appointed by the UN Secretary General in consultation with the AU.
- 11. A number of resource persons (advisory / research / reference group) with specific expertise will be identified and made available to the panel.
- 12. The panel will be provided with a dedicated secretariat consisting of 1 professional and 1 clerical staff.

**Reporting**

- 13. The panel's recommendation should be submitted for review by the Secretary-General prior to submission, as appropriate, to the Security Council.