



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

16 September 2013

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2088 (2013) requesting me, inter alia, to provide an assessment on how the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) could further implement its mandate following the signature of the Libreville Agreements of 11 January 2013. A United Nations Strategic Assessment Mission visited the Central African Republic in February 2013 and provided recommendations on the strengthening of BINUCA, under the assumption that the Libreville Agreements had paved the way for a transitional period which would lead the country back to constitutional order. Further to a rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground, the fall of the regime of former President Bozizé on 24 March 2013 and the Séléka coalition taking control of the country, a further review of the mandate and structure of BINUCA was conducted by a multidisciplinary team from Headquarters from 21 to 26 August 2013. I am pleased to relay, for the attention of the Council, the findings and recommendations of the multidisciplinary team in the attached report.

The team found that the political and security situation has deteriorated dramatically since the last assessment and remains highly volatile and unpredictable. Outside Bangui, State administration, already weak before the unconstitutional change of Government in March, is now largely absent while, in the capital itself, the transitional authorities have not been able to fully control all Séléka commanders and their respective troops. Across the country, local Séléka commanders and their armed elements continue to systematically commit gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law with total impunity. In this connection, transitional Government authority and control over national territory is rapidly weakening and the humanitarian crisis has developed into a large-scale complex emergency, with half of the country's population in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, and enduring a protection crisis.

His Excellency
Mr. Gary Francis Quinlan
President of the Security Council
New York

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The Central African Republic is a failing State, with no cohesive national authority capable of guaranteeing the security of the State and its people in an accountable manner. State authority is in the hands of local warlords loosely federated under the Séléka umbrella. These forces are not under the unified command and control of the transitional authorities. The population lives in fear and has begun to mobilize against the Séléka forces, already resulting in sporadic clashes. There is a significant risk of multiplication of local self-defence and counter-rebellion forces, which would result in the further weakening of the State with parallel administrations across the country, widespread violence with religious undertones and a possible spillover to neighbouring countries. The Libreville Agreements, the N'Djaména Declaration and the Transitional Charter, which form the basis of the transition, are being systematically ignored, and the Head of State of the Transition is accumulating executive powers to the detriment of the authority of the Prime Minister. Relations between the Head of State of the Transition and his Prime Minister remain tense.

The population is desperate and has huge expectations that the United Nations is going to contribute decisively to improving the situation, which remains fluid and unpredictable. The United Nations must pursue several urgent priorities in parallel: (i) help stabilize the security situation; (ii) help create momentum for, and provide support to, an inclusive political transition; (iii) help protect people from grave human rights violations; (iv) respond to urgent and ever-growing humanitarian needs; (v) assist in the reconstruction of key State institutions and the extension of State authority to the entire national territory; and (vi) wherever possible, promote longer-term solutions to the underlying causes of the crisis, instability, vulnerability and poverty, through recovery and development activities.


To achieve these priorities, it is imperative that the United Nations adjust its strategy to the demands of the situation; strengthen its political and human rights capacities; increase its presence throughout the country; enhance its ability for socio-economic, political and security analysis of the dynamics within the country and in the sub-region and enhance its capacity to ensure the safety and security of staff. The United Nations should also gradually expand its presence on the ground, beyond Bangui, by prioritizing the areas where the needs are the greatest in terms of humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring and reporting, and the restoration of State authority.

At the same time, the improvement of the security situation is a critical prerequisite to progress in all other spheres, including the political, humanitarian, human rights and early recovery and development areas. This will require significant support to and close cooperation with the African-Led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR). The United Nations should therefore make it a priority to provide planning and logistical support to ensure a swift and effective deployment of AFISM-CAR.

In light of the increased security risks for United Nations personnel, the limited capacity of both the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic and AFISM-CAR, once fully operational, and the absence of reliable national security forces and law enforcement agencies, it is also recommended that urgent measures be taken to enhance the safety and security of United Nations personnel and installations across the country. This should include the deployment of United Nations guard units. Such deployment was identified as an important element in the overall security risk mitigation efforts, which are critically needed to enable the implementation of activities such as human rights monitoring and reporting, support to the re-establishment of State authority in the rural areas and other tasks.

I would be grateful if you could bring this letter and its attachment to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



BAN Ki-moon

**Findings and Recommendations: United Nations Multidisciplinary Mission to the
Central African Republic, 21 to 26 August 2013**

1. On 24 January 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/2088 (2013) extending the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2014 and requesting the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to provide an assessment on how BINUCA could further implement its priorities in light of the new political dispensation following the signature of the Libreville Agreements of 11 January 2013.
2. Consequently, a Strategic Assessment Mission (SAM) was deployed to the Central African Republic from 18 to 26 February 2013, which provided recommendations on the strengthening of BINUCA, under the assumption that the Libreville Agreements had paved the way for a transitional period which would lead the country back to constitutional order.
3. However, three weeks after the return of the SAM, the situation on the ground rapidly deteriorated and culminated in the fall of the Bozizé regime when the Séléka coalition invaded and took over Bangui on 24 March 2013. A further review of the mandate and structure of BINUCA was deemed necessary to adjust the mission to the demands of the evolving situation.
4. Thus, a United Nations Multidisciplinary Mission was deployed from Headquarters to the Central African Republic (CAR) from 21 to 26 August 2013, led by DPA and with representatives from DPKO, UNDP, OHCHR, and UN Humanitarian Agencies. The purpose of the mission was to formulate recommendations for the Secretary-General's consideration and transmission to the Security Council regarding adjustments in the mandate, composition and structure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office for the Central African Republic (BINUCA), taking into account the joint briefing presented to the Security Council on 14 August 2013 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in the Central African Republic, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC), Ms. Valerie Amos, and the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Human Rights, Mr. Ivan Šimonović.
5. The mission received briefings from BINUCA and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). It also met with national stakeholders, including the Prime Minister, the National Transitional Council, the Minister of Justice, and representatives of the Ministry of Territorial Administration; civil society; the diplomatic and humanitarian communities; as well as the Commander of the Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX). Furthermore, the mission consulted members of the African Union Technical Assessment Mission (AU-TAM) to the CAR and visited Bouar, in the Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, in western CAR, where it met with local authorities, including the recently appointed Prefect and members of his administration; the Deputy Séléka Commander in charge; representatives of civil society; and United Nations staff and humanitarian actors deployed in the prefecture. This report presents the team's findings and recommendations.

Findings

6. The current crisis in the CAR began long before the Séléka rebellion seized power on 24 March. It stems from long-standing socio-political, structural and governance deficiencies such as weak State institutions; fragile social cohesion; and deep-seated feelings of marginalization among some communities, in particular the Muslim community in the

northern part of the country who felt discriminated against by the central Government. These conditions were exacerbated by corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, internal strife and the deteriorating capacity of the national army. The political landscape is fractured, with 53 political parties, while civil society is, at best, extremely weak.

7. The findings of the mission confirm the assessments presented to the Security Council on 14 August by SRSB Gaye, USG/ERC Amos and ASG Šimonović. The political and security situation has deteriorated dramatically since December 2012 and remains highly volatile and unpredictable. Outside Bangui, State administration is largely absent while, in the capital itself, the highest authorities in the country have not yet been able to fully control different Séléka commanders and their respective troops. Across the country, the power vacuum left by the collapse of the State has been filled by local Séléka commanders and their armed groups who continue to systematically commit gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law with total impunity. In this connection, the CAR is undergoing a rapid process of state collapse and the humanitarian crisis has developed into a large scale complex emergency, with 50% of the population in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, and in a protection crisis.

8. Additional findings, reflecting the views of the mission's interlocutors, include:

- a. On the political front: An 18-month transition formally started on 18 August with the swearing-in ceremony of Mr. Djotodia as the Head of State of the Transition. Several interlocutors questioned his willingness and ability to ensure that the transition stays on track. They also noted that, contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Libreville Agreements, the N'Djaména Declaration and the Transitional Charter, which envisaged a transition led by the Prime Minister, Mr. Djotodia has a far greater say in the management of the transition than the Prime Minister. In this regard, most interlocutors commented that Mr. Djotodia has been accumulating increasing powers thanks to his close relationship with Séléka commanders. This relationship is complex and fundamentally characterized by a significant degree of interdependence between Mr. Djotodia and the Séléka commanders, rather than by a clear-cut subordination of the commanders to Mr. Djotodia as their political leader.
- b. The difficult and, at times, tense, relationship between the Head of State of the Transition and the Prime Minister constitute another serious challenge to the successful conduct of the transition. Furthermore, the National Transitional Council is widely perceived as being totally aligned with Mr. Djotodia. The mission's interlocutors unanimously pointed out that the real power lies with the Séléka commanders, who have divided the country and the capital in zones where they exercise full control.
- c. On the security front: The State is not only too weak to guarantee the security of its citizens, it is largely dominated by (the Séléka) forces that are largely perceived as being responsible for the bulk of the insecurity experienced by communities. Rather than being a cohesive, disciplined armed organization, the Séléka projects the image of a heterogeneous collection of disparate armed groups lacking discipline, adequate training and unity of command, under the control of war lords.

- d. The situation is compounded by the emergence of various local armed self-defence groups that fight against the Séléka, which is widely perceived as an occupation force. Such confrontations in Bohong (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture), Paoua (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture) and in some neighborhoods in Bangui viewed as strongholds of former President Bozizé have resulted in heavy casualties, especially among the civilian population. The volatile security situation in the CAR poses a risk to the stability of an already fragile sub-region. Neighboring states already host large numbers of refugees from CAR
 - e. Over the horizon, the current crisis is showing a religious hue which spoilers could exploit. As of now, no related rhetoric has come out but the mistrust between the major and minor religious groups, a basic ingredient for sectarian violence and extremism, is there.
 - f. On the human rights front: The mission received information about serious human rights violations such as extra-judicial killings, summary executions, torture, arbitrary arrests, lootings and destruction of private and public properties, including public records and archives, the recruitment and use of children and widespread sexual violence, mostly committed by Séléka combatants. Targeted attacks against the Christian community are creating a widespread perception that Séléka is anti-Christian, which, in turn, is undermining the climate of religious tolerance and relative harmony that prevailed before Séléka seized power. A deepening religious and ethnic division is thus becoming one of the most challenging consequences of the crisis in the CAR.
 - g. On the humanitarian front: In addition to the extensive and urgent needs described by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the mission noted that the already stretched public services are barely functional, including in Bangui. The risk of major epidemics is real due to the lack of access to clean water, interrupted routine vaccination and malnutrition. Food insecurity is expected to grow in the months ahead as a result of a missed planting season. Mobile humanitarian teams who commence returning to the interior of the country are reporting alarming child morbidity levels due to malaria and anemia, and suspected cases of measles. Access remains a challenge due to the prevailing insecurity and the targeting of humanitarian workers by armed elements.
9. In conclusion, the CAR is a failing state, with no cohesive national authority capable of guaranteeing the security of the State and its people in an accountable manner. State authority is in the hands of local warlords loosely federated under the Séléka umbrella. These forces are not under the unified command and control of the transitional authorities and act with total impunity. The population lives in fear and is beginning to mobilize against the Séléka forces. This entails a significant risk of multiplication of local self-defense and counter-rebellion forces, the further atomization of the State with parallel administrations proliferating across the country, widespread violence with religious underpinnings and a possible spillover to neighboring countries. The principles stipulated in the documents that frame the current transition, such as the Libreville Agreements, the N'Djaména Declaration and the Transitional Charter are not always respected, and the Head of State of the Transition is accumulating executive powers to the detriment of the Prime Minister.

10. Central Africans are desperate and have huge expectations that the United Nations is going to contribute decisively to improve the situation, which remains fluid and unpredictable. To meet these expectations, the United Nations must pursue several priorities in parallel: (i) help stabilize the security situation; (ii) help create momentum for, and provide support to, an inclusive political transition; (iii) help protect people from grave violations of their rights; (iv) respond to urgent and ever-growing humanitarian needs; (v) assist in the reconstruction of key state institutions and the extension of state authority to the entire national territory; and (vi) wherever possible, promote longer-term solutions to the underlying causes of the crisis, instability, vulnerability and poverty through recovery and development activities.

11. As mentioned earlier, the improvement of the security situation is the critical prerequisite to progress in all other spheres, including the political, humanitarian, human rights and early recovery and development areas. To that end, it is important to conduct ongoing joint (BINUCA/UNCT) analysis, including profiling of combatants and regional movements of armed groups, and develop a carefully considered strategy to identify entry points to support the political transition, promote security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of soldiers and armed rebels, enhance the respect for the rule of law and help rebuild other key state functions. This will require close cooperation between BINUCA and the African-Led International Support Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR), as discussed later in this report.

12. It is also important to strengthen humanitarian coordination and advocacy for full funding of humanitarian priorities, as well as to establish a more coherent interaction of BINUCA with the UNCT. Overall, it was found that current levels of engagement and support of the international community in the CAR are by no means commensurate with the challenges and complexity of the situation on the ground. The country needs to be given much greater priority by the international community.

13. In the light of the above considerations, the mission has reviewed the four proposals made by SRSB Gaye to the Security Council on 14 August, as well as the priorities outlined in the recent report of the Secretary-General on BINUCA (S/2013/470), and developed the specific recommendations below. These recommendations are designed to cover the 18-month transition period, on the assumption that the current transition arrangements will hold. Should the situation change, a further review will be necessary. Also, the recommendations do not cover eventual requirements for UN support to the deployment and operationalisation of AFISM-CAR.

Recommendations

A. Political role of BINUCA

14. To achieve the priorities outlined above, it is imperative that the United Nations adjust its strategy to the demands of the situation; strengthen its political and human rights capacities; increase its presence throughout the country; enhance its ability to collect and treat information to produce high-grade socio-economic, political and security analysis of the dynamics within the CAR and in the sub-region, including profiling of armed groups; and enhance its capacity to ensure the safety and security of staff.

15. The collapse of State administration in the CAR, the lack of a common vision amongst the transitional authorities on the way out of the crisis, and the absence of Government counterparts with effective authority seriously undermine BINUCA's ability to implement its mandate. To address this challenge, BINUCA, through SRSB Gaye's good office, needs to continue to advise the transitional authorities and to help improve the relationship between the Head of State of the Transition and the Prime Minister. In addition, BINUCA needs to promote the internal political negotiations that are required to help Central African leaders bridge their differences, build the necessary trust and agree on mutually acceptable arrangements to move the process forward.

16. The mission endorses SRSB Gaye's proposal to establish a two-pillar structure and the creation of a new Deputy SRSB (Political) position in order to strengthen the political pillar of BINUCA. The political pillar will need additional capacity and expertise regarding the designing, facilitating and managing of multi-stakeholder dialogue processes, political mediations, and grassroots peacebuilding. It is envisaged that additional professional posts would be necessary to accomplish these tasks. At a later stage, specialized support may also have to be deployed for key political milestones of the transition, including the planned elections and the new constitutional process, in close cooperation with the UNCT.

17. BINUCA will also play an important operational and advisory role in supporting the implementation in the CAR of the *United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the Lord's Resistance Army* (S/2012/421). This should be done in close coordination with the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), which is mandated to coordinate the work with United Nations entities, the AU and other partners to address the problems caused by the LRA. BINUCA's efforts in this regard should include information gathering, tracking and monitoring of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the CAR, as well as sensitisation to and assistance with the reintegration of LRA escapees. Ultimately, the extension of State authority and law and order into areas where the LRA is currently active will be a key requirement for the success of the strategy.

B. Analytical capacity

18. Given the complex and rapidly evolving situation outlined above, it will be essential for BINUCA to strengthen its ability to monitor and anticipate developments, through the establishment of a dedicated Unit to maintain situational awareness and produce high-grade analysis. The mission recommends that this Unit be established within BINUCA as an integrated structure, based on the concept of the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) present in peacekeeping operations. The Unit should include military and police personnel who would also ensure liaison with AFISM-CAR. It should report to the SRSB, through the Chief of Staff. While substantive sections and agencies are expected to second personnel to the Unit, dedicated positions should also be created on BINUCA's staffing table.

19. The Unit should also work closely with relevant partners and stakeholders to undertake the analysis of the root causes of conflict, including its socio-economic aspects, the political economy of the crisis, the role of natural resources in perpetuating conditions of insecurity and conflict, as well as the role of regional actors and power relationships (including within Séléka). This analysis should help the Mission develop strategies, scenario

planning and contingency arrangements, as well as design advocacy, advisory and programmatic interventions to address the challenges at hand.

C. Support to AFISM-CAR

20. AFISM-CAR is expected to play the role of an effective and impartial force to protect civilians, deter human rights violations and abuses, and help restore security and the observance of the rule of law. This will be particularly challenging given the absence of a formal national security apparatus and the extreme fragility of the Central African State. On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, the security and rule of law apparatus in the CAR appears to be dominated by a coalition of warlords who rule over poorly-trained and undisciplined armed elements largely considered as responsible for the bulk of human rights violations in the first place. Failure to address and resolve this fundamental challenge will hamper any meaningful progress in restoring security and rule of law, extending State authority and advancing security sector reform. Rivalry and infighting, as well as the increasing occurrence of multiple forms of counter-rebellion or self-defence groups, could lead to a further deterioration of the security situation and possibly widespread violence.

21. The United Nations should therefore make it its priority to provide planning and logistical support to ensure a swift and effective deployment of AFISM-CAR. To that end, BINUCA and the United Nations Secretariat will need to establish appropriate cooperation mechanisms with AFISM-CAR and the AU Commission, to ensure close collaboration and mutual support, especially since the envisaged mandate of AFISM-CAR's civilian component seems to coincide with many of BINUCA's tasks. BINUCA and the United Nations Secretariat should play particular attention to assisting AFISM-CAR get the adequate capacities and capabilities to effectively implement its mandated tasks.

22. AFISM-CAR's estimated 3,500 military and police personnel will not be sufficient to effectively implement the envisaged mandate across the country. At the same time, divergent views between the AU and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on the conception of AFISM-CAR have delayed the process. In this regard, the recommendations from the meeting between the Secretary-General of ECCAS and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, which took place in Addis Ababa on 2 and 3 September, should be implemented as soon as possible.

23. Of particular concern is the implementation of the civilian protection function by AFISM-CAR. In practical terms, a Chapter VII mandate would mean that AFISM-CAR would have to protect the citizens of the CAR against those groups and individuals responsible for the grave human rights violations and abuses committed in the country, including members of Séléka. The alleged presence of a number of foreign commanders and combatants among the Séléka forces further complicates the situation. At the same time, a number of national and international interlocutors perceive Chad as part of the problem in the CAR, while at the same time recognizing that any durable solution has to take into account Chad's national interests. Consequently, the planning assumptions for the deployment of AFISM-CAR should be carefully examined.

24. As the United Nations engages in providing technical and planning support to AFISM-CAR, it may be useful to draw the lessons from our recent experience of collaboration in the transformation of the African-led International Stabilization Mission in

Mali (AFISMA) into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

D. Deployment of additional United Nations presence in country

25. It is urgent that BINUCA and the UNCT increase their presence outside Bangui. The limited progress made by humanitarian agencies, notably through the mobile teams approach, is having an impact in terms of both the delivery of assistance and in building confidence and collecting information. In light of the rampant human rights abuses and the climate of fear and impunity, the populations are calling for the urgent deployment of United Nations staff, including a strong component of human right monitors. Enhanced field presence will also contribute to enhancing BINUCA's situational awareness and analysis.

26. The United Nations should expand its presence on the ground, beyond Bangui, by prioritizing the areas where the needs are the greatest in terms of humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring and reporting, and/or the restoration of state authority. This should entail both the immediate increase of outreach mobile teams, and the progressive deployment of new field offices. To that effect, BINUCA has suggested priority locations for field offices, and the UNCT has developed a deployment plan with lead entities/agencies for each location. The mission recommends that the criteria for selection of locations for field offices take into account risk assessments, the local context, and the sequencing of the deployment of State authority, as well as programmatic opportunities for the UNCT to support extension of State authority, local governance and rule of law and, in parallel, humanitarian needs. The configuration and composition of the United Nations presence in each field location should be tailored to the context and needs.

27. BINUCA is an integrated mission and its field presence should also help implement a shared United Nations vision for the CAR and the Organization's integrated strategy. This, however, should not be interpreted as a requirement to co-locate or deploy all components of the United Nations presence to the same locations. Co-location has its benefits in terms of cost reduction but, in the context of the CAR, the preservation of a distinct identity for humanitarian operations also needs to be taken into consideration.

E. Safety and Security of Staff

28. BINUCA and UNCT personnel expressed serious concerns about the security situation in the country. In this regard, the mission recommends the immediate strengthening the security capacity in the country from the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) with augmentation from the Department of Field Support (DFS), the urgent review of the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and enhanced security measures. The United Nations safety and security system in the country needs to be urgently upgraded, including through the strengthening of the DSS capacity in Bangui and at field level.

29. One of SRSG Gaye's recommendations to the Security Council was the deployment of a United Nations guard force to provide security to United Nations personnel, installations and property throughout the country. This need is determined by the increased security risks for United Staff staff, the limited capacity of both MICOPAX and AFISMA-CAR when it becomes fully operational, and the absence of reliable national security forces and law enforcement agencies. The mission discussed this proposal at length with BINUCA, the UNCT and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). While BINUCA and the UNCT endorse

the idea, the HCT expressed concerns about the impact such a force could potentially have on perceptions of their presence and operations' neutrality. They highlighted that humanitarian personnel continue to operate in some areas without such protection. Some expressed concern that an enhanced militarized protection of the non-humanitarian United Nations personnel may result in increasing security risks for the humanitarian actors. Based on the programme criticality assessment undertaken by BINUCA and the UNCT, level 1 criticality life-saving programmes are continuing or resuming across the country, even while additional security risk mitigation measures are necessary and should be pursued.

30. However, the guard force was deemed to be an important element in the overall security risk mitigation efforts which are critically needed to enable the implementation of activities such as human rights monitoring and reporting, support to the re-establishment of State authority in the rural areas and other lower-level criticality actions. A detailed concept of such a guard force therefore needs to be developed, taking into account the review of the current Security Risk Assessment and agency presence. The force should focus initially on Bangui, where national staff have been subjected to attacks, and expand progressively as field offices are re-opened or established in new areas, particularly those in the north-east and south-east of the country where State authority has been historically limited. Deployment of the guard force to these areas should be based on local threat and risk assessments, including appraisal of possible effects on ongoing humanitarian operations. The guard force should not be mandatory for humanitarians, either for compound protection or convoys in accordance with the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) policy on the use of armed escorts.

31. Another critical issue raised insistently by BINUCA and the UNCT relates to medical facilities. They were vastly inadequate before the fall of the elected government and became almost entirely absent thereafter. The United Nations only has a dispensary and no medical facilities, "putting our lives at risk" as one UNCT staff member noted. Given the severe insecurity reported at local health facilities, it is urgent to establish a level 1 United Nations medical clinic in Bangui. BINUCA has already initiated discussions with the United Nations Medical Services Division in this regard.

F. Human rights promotion and protection

32. At its current staffing levels, BINUCA is unable to adequately perform its human rights function. It therefore needs to be strengthened to be able to more effectively promote human rights protection throughout the country and adequately monitor, investigate and report on the serious violations of human rights that are taking place in the CAR. This work needs to be supplemented by efforts to create space for dialogue on human rights, humanitarian and protection issues within governmental and non-governmental institutions, and to support the creation and extension of national human rights and protection systems, including through building capacity of civil society to undertake monitoring and reporting. Activities need to be closely coordinated with those of the UNCT in this respect, in order to ensure a robust and coherent United Nations system-wide response to the current human rights and protection challenges in the country, with a particular attention to grave violations against women and children.

33. To that end, it is envisaged to create additional professional posts to effectively accomplish these tasks. Given the complex environment, gathering and analysis of information about the incidence and scale of various violations should be integrated so as to ensure a full picture of patterns of violations and protection concerns. The human rights

component should therefore also include specialized child protection and woman protection capacities. Mechanisms for close coordination on protection of civilians between AFISM-CAR, BINUCA, the UNCT and the Protection Cluster should be put in place. In the current security environment, ensuring security of victims and safe management of information about violations will be critical.

G. Security sector reform and rule of law

34. —The reform of the security sector in the CAR will be key to stabilization and the return of State authority in the medium and longer-term, as the formal security services (army, police, *gendarmerie*) are currently unable to fulfil their roles as security providers. Although the estimated 6,000 to 8,000 members of the *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA) continue to receive their salaries while being cantoned in Bangui, there is reportedly no support from the Government to reconstitute the FACA. Any attempts at reform are, however, severely hampered by the lack of a clear Government vision for this, and there are several competing ideas as to how this process should proceed (i.e. whether the 30,000 Séléka elements should be integrated into the FACA or vice versa). The international community's support will be required to enable the development and implementation of such a vision. Although much of the military training and reform assistance will be bilateral or multilateral (AFISM-CAR), BINUCA must work with the Government and other partners to advise them on the development of a holistic plan for SSR that includes civilian oversight mechanisms, and to assist with the coordination of international support.

35. With regard to the reform of the police and *gendarmerie*, BINUCA could provide police reform and development advice, including by deploying human resources and recruitment expertise and specialized trainers. At the same time, assistance will be required to analyse the conditions for a DDR process to start as well as the start of interim security measures, in preparation of the possible start of a national programme to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate or repatriate (DDRRR) Séléka elements when the context allows, who will not be integrated into the army, residual elements of other armed groups such as the *Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix* (CPJP), as well as elements of the security services which may be let go. Agreement with the authorities on arrangements for vetting and screening will be essential in these processes. This will also require close collaboration with partners for disarmament and demobilization (AFISMA-CAR and bilaterals), reintegration (UNDP and others) as well as funding from donors. These tasks will require the Mission to strengthen its capacity in the areas of security sector reform (defence and police sector reform) and DDR (particularly in terms of analysis, planning, demobilisation and reinsertion). Technical support will be required, in the immediate to address the risk caused by large quantities of explosives stored in unsafe conditions and eventually for the destruction of weapons and ammunition, clearance of unexploded ordnance and to assist in building of armories and ammunition storage facilities according to international standards. This can be provided on an as needed basis by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

36. Both the *CPJP Fondamentale* and the *Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR), which are members of the Séléka coalition, have re-recruited children formerly associated with armed groups, failed to implement commitments to end recruitment, and instead have in some cases opposed the release of children or conducted more recruitment. As a consequence, vetting and the application of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) will be critical steps in the process of DDRR. The specific

requirements for the reintegration of children associated with armed groups, in accordance with the Paris Principles, will also have to be observed.

37. The rule of law has almost completely collapsed in the CAR. Most courts and prisons have been looted and damaged, with the latter often emptied as the Séléka moved across the country. Judicial records, prison registries and prosecutor files are reported to have been destroyed, although the extent of this destruction is still unclear. Justice personnel have not resumed their work for fear and lack of security. It was reported that, even when police and gendarmes are deployed and arrest people, they are freed by Séléka with the State security institutions unable to oppose this. This state of affairs precludes the restoration of the rule of law rendering it impossible to re-open judicial and prisons institutions which will be vital in terms of accountability and combating impunity. Such efforts must also go hand in hand with the expansion of UNCT programmes to support decentralized community protection and access to justice across the country. BINUCA's support to the restructuring of the security forces, associated DDR processes as well as the restoration of the rule of law will require a strengthening of the Mission's capacity in these fields.

H. Humanitarian response

38. Humanitarian needs have been defined in the revised Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). While response is partially under way, gaps still persist, in large part due to funding constraints and low donor response to the CAP. The current approach, focused on extending programme delivery into the interior, should be accelerated, based on identified needs and the results of the programme criticality assessment. Proposed measures on safety and security are pre-requisites for this to go to scale. Humanitarian coordination and leadership should be strengthened through the already decided expansion of the OCHA Office, with a focus on civil-military coordination, information management and inter-cluster coordination (see specific recommendations in paragraph 38). As funding levels remain very low (34% of needs in the CAP are currently funded), it will be important to switch the public discourse about humanitarian assistance in CAR from one that focuses on access constraints to demonstrating what can be done. The existing humanitarian strategy can be strengthened by the adoption of a humanitarian code of conduct, a strategy to deal with the specific needs of internally displaced persons, and a protection strategy.

39. Given the growing complexity of the humanitarian situation and the rapid growth in humanitarian needs as well as daunting access challenges, it is urgent that the humanitarian country team receive additional support to ensure the right humanitarian coordination mechanisms supporting strong leadership to ensure an immediate scale-up of provision of assistance, including protection. The ERC, with humanitarian agencies and members of the HCT, will urgently consider specific means to achieve this.

I. BINUCA and the United Nations Country Team

40. The review of the BINUCA mandate and structure provides an important opportunity to further strengthen interaction and coordination with the UNCT. This will ensure greater coherence in terms of priorities and strategy, leading to more joined-up technical and advisory support as well as programmatic delivery. The UNCT has specifically expressed a need for greater sharing and integration of political and security information and analysis and better integration of the significant information being gleaned from the UNCT presence on

the ground. The proposed analytical unit referenced in paragraphs 18 and 19 will constitute the ideal instrument to achieve these goals.

41. The introduction of two pillars in BINUCA's structure provides a key opportunity to enable maximum cohesion and complementarity with the broader United Nations presence, positioning similar functions together within the management structure, particularly where those components have a programmatic or capacity development focus. Whereas the current Human Rights and Justice section covers both the clearly political functions of human rights monitoring and reporting, and more programmatic elements related to justice and corrections, these functions should be realigned so that the human rights monitoring and reporting function reports directly to the SRSG, with the more programmatic elements of rule of law (judiciary and corrections) aligning under the integrated DSRSG/RC/HC. Such an arrangement, which has been applied in other mission settings, would ensure optimal integration between the activities of the Mission and those of the UNCT, notably that of UNDP, enable BINUCA capacities to directly complement the presence, experience and results to date of the UNCT, and provide clear demonstration at country-level of the Global Focal Point arrangement on Rule of Law. As is the case with humanitarian programmes, the UNCT is facing inadequate levels of donor engagement, and the Organization needs to aggressively engage in advocacy with donors to increase funding levels to UNCT programmes in country. We should also encourage the re-engagement of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in the CAR in this respect.

42. In other areas where there is intersection of BINUCA's mandate and the UNCT priorities, such as SSR, DDR/DDRRR, human rights, gender, and child protection, joint strategies for a unified approach should be prepared, and ideally joint work plans as well, reflecting agreed SMART objectives and the comparative advantage and contributions of all UN entities. Coordination mechanisms should be reviewed and reinforced to ensure their effective functioning. In addition, a Strategic Planning Cell should be established under the DSRSG/RC/HC. BINUCA sections should be encouraged to participate in the existing UN Programme Management Team (PMT) more actively and consistently.



To: CDC (through DSG),

PRIORITY

Please find for approval a draft SG letter to the President of the Council transmitting the findings of the UN Multidisciplinary Mission deployed to CAR from 21 to 26 August to make recommendations on necessary adjustments in the mandate, composition and structure of BINUCA (the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Mission for the CAR)

The letter informs that CAR is a "failing state" and that the political and security situation has deteriorated significantly since March. It is therefore urgent, it concludes, that the UN pursues several urgent priorities in parallel. The SG proposed to strengthen its political and human rights capacities (through a two-pillar structure and the creation of a new Deputy SRSG (Political)) as well as analytical capacity, increase its presence outside Bangui, and enhance security for staff (through a UN Guard force). It notes the importance of strong consultation and coordination with AFISM-CAR (once deployed) and that the "UN should make it a priority to provide planning and logistical support to ensure a swift and effective deployment of AFISM-CAR".

It is expected that the Council will pass a resolution on the letter and enclosed Mission report before the start of the high level segment of the GA. As the AU is yet to finalize its Concept of Operations for AFISM-CAR, it is not likely to decide on UN logistical support at this point in time, but rather focus on endorsing the request to strengthen BINUCA. The report therefore does not provide details on what kind of logistical support the UN



may be providing. It briefly notes that as the UN “engages in providing technical and planning support to AFISM-CAR, it may be useful to draw the lessons from our recent experience of collaboration in the transformation of [AFISMA] into [MINUSMA]”.

Political Unit
16 September 2013


received in ODSG

16 September 2013

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Note to the Deputy Secretary-General

**LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

1. I attach, for the Secretary-General's consideration and signature, a draft letter from him to the President of the Security Council. The Secretary-General requests the President of the Security Council to bring to the attention of the members of the Council, the report of a Technical Assessment Mission deployed to the Central African Republic, from 21 to 26 August. The letter summarizes the key findings of the report, and related recommendations.
2. I should be grateful if you could bring the draft letter to the attention of the Secretary-General for his approval and signature.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jeff Feltman".

Jeffrey Feltman
12 September 2013

POL/66/001; POL/04/001