

ICFY

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2 JAN - 8 APR 1993

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UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS ZAGREB OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CZN-480
CZG-348

P1/4

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: OWEN, ICFY, UNATIONS, GENEVA
FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 8 April 1993

Wahlgren

MOST IMMEDIATE

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-2-458

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

The attached fax from BH Command, Kiseljak, is forwarded for information. I fully agree with the assessment made by Al-Alfi that this incident will cause trouble and complications in the future, not only for UNHCR, especially, but also for UNPROFOR.

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HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK


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ROUTINE/~~PRIORITY~~/IMMEDIATE/~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~/
UNCLASSIFIED/~~RESTRICTED~~/~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 08 1710 B APRIL 1993
TO: SHANNON BOYD CHIEF PRESS AND INFORMATION ZAGREB	FROM: HUSSEIN AL-ALFI CHIEF PRESS AND INFORMATION BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO.: 041-170-099	FAX: 873-130-1526
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : TITLE : RELEASING OFF. : SIGNATURE : 
INFO :	
FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT:	SITUATION IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

MESSAGE

- 1- A convoy of 14 trucks loaded with people left SREBRENICA. They are now being checked at BRATUNAC by the serbs. 4 more empty trucks are also there to ease the load of the 14 trucks. The convoy then will continue its journey to TUZLA, hopefully without any further problems.
- 2- Gen Morillon is on his way to TUZLA now, and he intends to spend the night over there. How he was saved from the crowd is unknown. Earlier, Gen MILOVANOVIC expressed his readiness to go and "save" Gen Morillon

Public INFO

TEL: 8731301526

8.Apr.93 16:13 No.

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- 2 -

from the crowd. Gen Morillon intends to come back to the Residency - FWD HQ tomorrow morning.

3 - A serious incident took place this morning when a UNHCR truck was stopped by the serbs, checked, and a large quantity of ammunition was found. Enclosed herewith is a typed report containing full details of the incident. I believe this incident will cause serious troubles and more complications for UNHCR, and probably for UNPROFOR too due to the fact that the truck was escorted by UNPROFOR's APC.

Best regards,



CZM-480
CZG-348 P4/4

At 0925 hours today a UNHCR truck with two containers of 13 MT of flour was moving under escort from the airport to BUTMIR. This was a normal internal aid run. At 0940 hours at the Serb checkpoint between ILIDZA and BUTMIR the truck was stopped for inspection.

During the inspection the Serb soldiers saw what appeared to be wooden boxes jammed between the containers and their flatbed. The truck and his escorting APC were ordered off the road into a Serb Garrison area for a fuller inspection. It proved impossible to move the containers without a crane. It took some hours for a crane to appear.

The containers were eventually taken off the flatbed and the following boxes were found:

24 boxes of 7.9 mm ammunition. This is used as sniper and machine gun ammunition.

24 boxes of 12.7 mm ammunition. This is used for heavy machine guns. It was all tracer. There were 160 rounds in each box. The boxes were old and the ammunition was packed in old clothes.

UNPROFOR and UNHCR authorities were present at the discovery and a full investigation will be made.

The Serb soldiers involved became very emotional after the discovery and threats to the security of UNHCR in the area were made. The UNHCR representative has now left the area but we understand that the CO of FRBAT 2 is still there.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen

FAX

PAGE 1 of 2

TO: Mr Vance
FROM: Herb Okun
DATE: 6 April 1993
SUBJECT: Izetbegovic/Boban Agreement

1. As discussed, I spoke with Susak at 3:00 pm local today (6 April) and asked that he call you regarding Izetbegovic's discussions in Zagreb after the signing ceremony in New York on March 25. Gojko said he would be happy to do so and would call you later today.
2. Meanwhile, we have just received here the Croatian Announcement of the joint statement issued by Boban and Izetbegovic regarding the implementation of the V/O Plan. Text is attached.

Faithfully,

HSO

BEGIN TEXT

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL CONSIDERS VANCE-OWEN PLAN

MOSTAR, Apr 3 (Hina) - The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia held a session on Saturday to consider the documents of the Vance-Owen peace plan, signed by the

delegations of the Croatian and Moslem nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The session was also attended by the president of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Mate Boban.

The meeting supported the Vance-Owen plan and stressed the importance of organizing the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of equality of the three constituent nations. HVO fully supported the delegation of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the peace conference.

HVO said that the system of interim executive power, established in the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, was in conformity with powers granted to provincial authorities under the Fundamental Document and the Agreement on Transitional Organization, adding that that system would be consistently applied in provinces 3, 8 and 10.

The establishment of the armed forces and the full demilitarization will be organized according to relevant documents of the Vance-Owen plan as well as according to the joint statement pursuant to the agreement between Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic. Here it is in full:

"After signing the Vance-Owen peace plan, Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban agree that:

1. all misunderstandings between the Croatian and Moslem nations concerning the boundaries of the provinces and transitional authority in them and in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are avoided;

2. all armed formations of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and police of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, as well as of the armed and police forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be identified and must withdraw from those provinces within three days' time.

3. until the full demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina envisaged in the peace plan and for the sake of efficient defence from aggression, domicile armed formations of the HVO and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in provinces 1, 5 and 9 shall be placed under command of the Bosnian Army Headquarters and in provinces 3, 8 and 10 under command of the HVO Headquarters.

The forces reluctant to accept this decision will also be allowed to leave those provinces.

4. The HVO Headquarters and the Bosnian Army Headquarters shall set up a joint command by 15 April 1993 at the latest.

5. Conflicts between the HVO and Bosnian Army must cease at once and must never resume.

6. The free passage of people and goods shall be established on all roads in free parts of the above-mentioned provinces."

The HVO hopes that Izetbegovic, aware of the significance of the Statement, will sign the document and thus confirm his wishes for peace, said a statement released from the session.

(Hina - The End)

END TEXT

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C2G=282

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

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CRYPTO CABLE

20 MAR 1993

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO : VANCE, UNATIONS NEW YORK
VANCE, ICFY GENEVA
FROM : WAHLGREN, ZAGREB
DATE : 20 MARCH 1993
SUBJECT: NOTE ON BH INTERNAL POLITICS

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UNPROFOR 357

I attach a note which I found interesting, for your information.

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HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/
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OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE:
TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM, DCA UNPROFOR HQ, ZAGREB	FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : EDMA SHITAKHA TITLE : CA OFFICER RELEASING OFF : VICTOR ANDREEV SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : CIVIL AFFAIRS/PTT AND FORWARD HQ FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE BH PARLIAMENT	

OCM/R/R

MESSAGE

FURTHER TO OUR EARLIER REPORTS ON THE ABOVE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION ALREADY HELD IN SARAJEVO AND ZENICA, AND A FOLLOW ON MEETING TO BE HELD IN TUZLA AT A LATER DATE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE WAS A MEETING OF BOSNIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF BH FORCES, SAFER HALILOVIC, ON SATURDAY 13 MARCH 93 IN SARAJEVO. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THE CONTENT OF THE MEETING, IT HAS BEEN SPECULATED THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN TO SOUND OUT THE MILITARY'S VIEWS ON THE VIABILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN ON THE GROUND. IT COULD ALSO, PERHAPS, HAVE SOUGHT THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY FOR A POLITICAL DECISION TAKEN ON THE SAME, IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENCE AND STRENGTH OF THE OBSTINAS VERSUS THAT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. HERE, IT IS WORTH NOTING THE CONTINUED INTEREST OF ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING STRONGER POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OVER THE ARMY AND OF ITS REORGANIZATION.

THERE APPEAR TO BE CONFLICTING REPORTS ON THE NUMBER OF DEPUTIES ATTENDING THE SARAJEVO SESSION OF THE BH PARLIAMENT OF 13 MARCH:- WITH GANIC REPORTING A TOTAL OF 50 IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM AND PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC A TOTAL OF 20-30 TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE ECOMM (OUT OF A GRAND TOTAL OF 164). HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT NO QUORUM WAS EXPECTED OR NECESSARILY DESIRED AS THE SESSION WAS MORE A REFERENDUM OR MECHANISM FOR PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS THAN A FORMAL PARLIAMENTARY SESSION. THE

C2N 379

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SARAJEVO MEETING ENDED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE BH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK TO PROCEED WITH THE PEACE PACKAGE. EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON THE POINTS CONCERNING STATE CONTROL OVER THE BORDERS, INTEGRITY OF THE STATE, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MILITARY AGREEMENT, JUSTICE FOR WAR CRIMINALS AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SARAJEVO. THE ISSUES OF THE STATUS OF SARAJEVO AND CONTROL OVER THE BORDERS APPEAR TO BE THE MOST SENSITIVE AND THE ONES ON WHICH THE LEAST LEEWAY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE DELEGATION TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS ON. THIS WAS INDEED CONFIRMED TODAY BY PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH CAC AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT ALSO INDICATED THAT WHILE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE WERE FOR PEACE, SOME OPPOSITION STILL REMAINED WITHIN THE MILITARY RANKS.

BASICALLY, THE SARAJEVO PARLIAMENTARY SESSION APPEARS TO HAVE MADE A GESTURE OF COMPROMISE TO THE HARDLINERS AS WELL AS TO PRESENT THE EVENTUAL SIGNING OF THE PEACE PACKAGE AS A POLITICAL VICTORY RATHER THAN A MILITARY CAPITULATION. A CONSIDERABLY STRONGER PRAGMATIC APPROACH HAS BEEN ADOPTED WHICH HAS RALLIED BEHIND IT DIFFERENT FACTIONS FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. AS INDICATED IN OUR EARLIER COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS ISSUE, THE 'WESTERNERS' GROUP, LED BY GANIC, APPEAR TO HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND IN THE SARAJEVO SESSION AND SEE MORE TO GAIN IN A VIABLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITH STRONG INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE THAN IN CONTINUED FIGHTING. THEY HAVE BEGAN TO FOCUS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD OF THE PLAN, THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND EXPECTED INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL PUSH FOR A SHORTER INTERIM PERIOD AND SEEK ELECTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CLEARLY, THIS POSITION IS IN LINE WITH THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT/STRATEGIC AIM TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO AS THE BOTTOM LINE TO ANY AGREEMENT, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS HAVE THE MOST TO LOSE AND THE LEAST TO GAIN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SEEMS THAT THE 'FUNDAMENTALISTS' HAVE ACCEPTED, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THE REALITY OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY VICTORY AND THE IMPROBABILITY OF DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A MEANS TO ENHANCE OR PROTECT THEIR POSITION. HOWEVER, AS CAN BE SEEN IN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC'S STATEMENT TO THE ZENICA SESSION, THE 'FUNDAMENTALISTS' STILL OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF SDS SERBS IN THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT AND THE GRANTING OF THREE PROVINCES TO THE SERBS IN THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN. THEY MAY WELL INDEED STILL DECIDE TO 'GO FOR BROKE' BY PROVOKING INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTION, PARTICULARLY IF THEY FEEL THE PRESSURE OF A 'WESTERNERS' VICTORY OVERWHELMING THEM. IN THIS REGARD, AND FOR DIFFERENT REASONS THAN THE 'WESTERNERS', THE 'FUNDAMENTALISTS' WOULD BE INCLINED TO OPT FOR OPEN CONFLICT IN THE REGIONS OF SANJAK, KOSOVO AND WESTERN MACEDONIA.

WHILE ONLY 15 DEPUTIES ATTENDED THE ZENICA SESSION OF THE BH PARLIAMENT, ALSO ATTENDED BY MARC, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ITS LACK OF A CLEAR OR COMMON POSITION OF SUPPORT OR NON-SUPPORT FOR THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING FOR THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE HDZ (HVO) PARTY PRESENT BUT ONLY DEPUTIES FROM THE SDA (MUSLIM), SOME OF WHOM FELT IT IMPORTANT THAT SOLDIERS CONTINUE FIGHTING FOR TERRITORY UNTIL THE

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VANCE/OWEN PLAN WAS AGREED UPON. CONSIDERING THE COMMENTS OF PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC AND THE SUGGESTIONS OF SOME OF THE DEPUTIES PRESENT, IT COULD BE SURMISED THAT THE FUNDAMENTALISTS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO 'FIGHT BACK' AND THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN TUZLA, AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT CENTER OF POWER, THUS ASSUMES EVEN MORE IMPORTANCE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN THE IZETBEGOVIC AND GANIC FACTIONS.

WE SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.



UNOG Telecomm Unit

Palais des Nations

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C2N=378 UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
C2G=281 UNPROFOR

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IMMEDIATE

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, UNATIONS NEW YORK
VANCE, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, ZAGREB

DATE : March 20, 1993

SUBJECT: CURRENT SARAJEVO/BH POLITICAL SITUATION

UNPROFOR-356

I attach copy of Andreev's latest report to DCM for your background information.

DISTRIBUTION:

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~~ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/~~
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OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 20 MARCH 1993
TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM UNPROFOR HQ, ZAGREB	FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO1	FAX:
ATTN:	FILE REF NO : DRAFTER : E T SHITAKHA TITLE : C A OFFICER RELEASING OFF : V ANDREEV SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : GENERAL MORILLON, FORWARD HQ, SARAJEVO CIVIL AFFAIRS, PTT & FORWARD HQ, SARAJEVO SLOCA BELGRADE, BH LO ZAGREB	
FAX NO :	
SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT 10	

MESSAGE

POLITICAL

1. THE FORCE COMMANDER MET WITH BH VICE PRESIDENT GANIC AT THE PRESIDENCY ON 18 MARCH 93. DURING THE MEETING THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE RAISED BY THE BH DELEGATION:-

THE CURRENT MAJOR OFFENSIVES THROUGHOUT BH, PARTICULARLY IN SARAJEVO AND SREBRENICA WERE PREMEDITATED AND AIMED AT DESTABILIZING THE TALKS IN NEW YORK BY MAKING IT MORALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BOSNIAN DELEGATION TO REMAIN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

-THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED TO SEEK A COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY OF BH AS A BASIS AND PRECONDITION FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACE TALKS.

-UNPROFOR SEEMED UNWILLING TO ADMIT THAT ITS MANDATE AND STRENGTH WERE INSUFFICIENT TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION IN BH.

-UNMO'S SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY DEPLOYED ON THE BORDERS WITH SERBIA-MONTENEGRO.

2. THE MEETING SCHEDULED FOR THE FORCE COMMANDER WITH 'PRIME MINISTER' LUKIC AND C.O.S. OF THE SERB ARMY, GENERAL MILOVANOVIC, FOR 18 MARCH WAS CANCELLED BY THE SERB SIDE DUE TO THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THE MEETING ALSO BE ATTENDED BY GENERAL MORILLON AND BE HELD

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IN PALE RATHER THAN LUCAVICA.

3. SITUATION IN SARAJEVO: AS EXPECTED, THE BEGINNING OF THE PEACE TALKS IN NEW YORK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A RAPID DETERIORATION IN THE GENERAL SITUATION IN AND AROUND SARAJEVO. A BOSNIAN ATTACK IN THE AREA OF DONJI KOTORAC LED TO A STRONG RETALIATION FROM THE SERBS WITH EXTREMELY HEAVY SHELLING OF THE CITY AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS. INFANTRY ATTACKS WERE ALSO REPORTEDLY LAUNCHED FROM THE NORTHWEST AND IN THE HRASNO AREA OF THE CITY. THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND RELATED TO THE ON-GOING SITUATION IN SREBRENICA AND THE LARGER ISSUE OF THE PEACE TALKS. UNDER GROWING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, THE SERBS HAVE NOT MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SUPERIOR FIRE POWER AND THAT THEY ARE A POWERFUL FACTOR TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER, THEIR ACTIONS APPEAR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BOTH IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND IN GIVING THE BOSNIAN DELEGATION TO NEW YORK A BARGAINING HAND, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO FOR BOSNIA.

INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS: AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IS THE ONGOING TENDENCY OF DISENGAGEMENT OF THE CROAT AND SERB MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM ITS ACTIVITIES. M. SIMOVIC, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (A SERB), HAS ALSO TAKEN A DECISION TO DESIST FOR THE TIME BEING FROM ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT'S WORK. IN ADDITION, THE CURRENT ABSENCE OF LAGUMDZIJA FROM SARAJEVO, STRENGTHENS THE POSITION OF GANIC AS THE MAN ACTUALLY IN CHARGE HERE. A NEW DEVELOPMENT WHICH WILL FURTHER ENHANCE THE MUSLIM COMPONENT IN THE GOVERNMENT IS THE DECISION TO BRING THE STRONG MAN FROM GORAZDE, HADZO EFENDIC, TO FILL THE POSITION OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER VACATED AFTER THE MURDER OF TURAJLIC IN JANUARY. HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH GANIC AND THE TIMING OF HIS ARRIVAL IN SARAJEVO ARE STILL TO BE CLARIFIED.

4. TWO SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE BH PARLIAMENT HAVE BEEN HELD IN SARAJEVO AND ZENICA RESPECTIVELY ON 14 AND 15 MARCH 93 TO GARNER SUPPORT FOR THE BH DELEGATION AT THE PEACE TALKS IN NEW YORK. THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE SESSIONS (ANOTHER IS STILL TO BE HELD FOR DEPUTIES IN THE TUZLA AREA) WERE:-

-THE DIVISION OF SARAJEVO ON AN ETHNICAL BASIS IS UNACCEPTABLE AS IS THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITY ACCORDING TO THE TRIPARTITE PRINCIPLE.

-SPECIAL BORDER GUARD UNITS, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, SHOULD BE CREATED TO MONITOR THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS OF BH.

-THE TRANSITION PERIOD SHOULD BE LIMITED TO TWELVE, OR, AT MAXIMUM, EIGHTEEN MONTHS.

-THE BH GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY AND COORDINATION OF PROVINCIAL POLICE.

HUMANITARIAN.

A MEETING BETWEEN MARC AND THE NGO EQUILIBRE IN ZENICA CONFIRMED SOME DISSATISFACTION WITH UNPROFOR'S REACTION DURING THE TRAGIC ACCIDENT OF THE CONVOY ENTERING SARAJEVO TWO WEEKS AGO.

C2N 378

P4/4

EQUILIBRE WAS INVITED TO COME TO BH COMMAND, KISELJAK, ON 20 MARCH IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THEM WITH CLEAR ANSWER REGARDING UNPROFOR'S SECURITY MEASURES FOR GOING IN AND OUT OF SARAJEVO.

THE RECCE MISSION OF TWO CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS TO EASTERN BOSNIA WAS AGAIN CANCELLED BY PALE AUTHORITIES. WE DO NOT INTEND TO INSIST ON RESCHEDULING IT AT THE MOMENT, GIVEN THE CURRENT TENSE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA.

A RECENT REPORT FROM ICRC DATED 10 MARCH 93 INDICATED THAT THERE ARE 2704 PRISONERS IN BH:- 1311 DETAINED BY SERBS, 997 DETAINED BY BOSNIANS AND 396 BY CROATS. SINCE OCTOBER 92, THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY.

HQ's OPERATING IN SARAJEVO HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEIR NATIONAL AND EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL BE INCLUDED IN THE UN SECURITY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION PLAN. THE ISSUE IS BEING FOLLOWED UP IN THE WEEKLY INTERNATIONAL AGENCY MEETINGS HELD AT FWD HQ, SARAJEVO.

Best regards
V. Auf

UNPROFOR, Zagreb
Palisade

CNZ-219 CYZ-107 P1/2

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 MAR 17 20:55

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, NEW YORK
VANCE, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 18 MARCH 1993

NUMBER: MSC 366

SUBJECT: Situation in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina

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1. With regard to the three planes bombing Gladovici and Osatica, we have informed the Security Council in form of a letter from the Secretary-General. As we can expect further questions in this regard, we would appreciate any additional information or assessment you may have on the incident.

2. The press release in this regard was issued in Zagreb before we could formally inform the Security Council. I would appreciate that matters requiring the attention of the Security Council be cleared with this office before any information is given to the media.

3. We are perturbed as to the time the bombing incident happened. The MCCC report puts it at 16:15 hrs, the special report received yesterday mentions 16:40 hrs, and the press release has it at 17:15 hrs. Members of the Security Council already picked up on this inconsistency. For the sake of consistency, we have decided to use 16:15 hrs in our official communications.

4. With regard to the situation in Srebrenica, the spokesman of the Secretary-General at today's noon briefing said that the

CNZ-219 CYZ-107 P2/2

Secretary-General was supporting General Morillon's presence in that town and his brave efforts. His presence was explained to be part of UNPROFOR's mandate to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. The Security Council is watching the developments in Srebrenica with great interest and expects this office to provide accurate and up-to-date information. I would, therefore, appreciate to be kept informed on all the relevant details, including the number and names of UNPROFOR and other United Nations personnel presently in Srebrenica, the status of the convoy tasked to bring supplies to the area, as well as any negotiations or contacts with the parties.

COMMUNICATIONS
ZAGREB

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14 93 MR 18 462 UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
(U N P R O F O R)

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO : VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK
VANCE, ICFY GENEVA
FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Wahlgren*
DATE : 14 MARCH 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z 322
SUBJECT : Attached note on BH Parliament Session

Attached is copy of a note from Victor Andreev in regard to
the calling of today's parliamentary session.

ENDALL

Total Number of Pages: 3

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HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/
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OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 12.10.25.A.MAR.93
TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM ZAGREB	FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO:	FAX:
ATTN:	FILE REF NO : DRAFTER : TITLE : RELEASING OFF : SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : GEN. MORILLON, FWD HQ FAX NO : CIVIL AFFAIRS, FWD HQ AND PTT SANTANA, SLOCA BELGRADE	
SUBJECT: SESSION OF BH PARLIAMENT	

MESSAGE

BH GOVERNMENT INFORMED US THAT EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF BH PARLIAMENT WILL TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY, 14 MARCH. THE REASON FOR THE MEETING IS TO DISCUSS NEW YORK PEACE PACKAGE AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR, PUCINA EMPHASISED THAT THE SESSION IS NEEDED TO RALLY WIDER POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE BH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK. HE EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT THE PEACE PACKAGE WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY OF PARLIAMENT.

FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THE MEETING CAN BE SEEN FIRST OF ALL AS PART OF A STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN IZETBEGOVIC AND GANIC AND THE TWO MAIN FACTIONS OF THE BH GOVERNMENT. THE FACTIONS CAN BE DESCRIBED AS THE 'FUNDAMENTALISTS' HEADED BY IZETBEGOVIC AND THE 'WESTERNERS' - LEAD BY GANIC, WITH ABDIC, HALILOVIC, LASIC, AND LAGUMBZIA ALSO IN THIS CAMP.

IN TAKING THE INITIATIVE OF CALLING THIS MEETING, GANIC TOOK A BOLD STEP IN THE POWER STRUGGLE, WHICH IS BY ITSELF A KIND OF VICTORY FOR HIM - WHATEVER DECISION THE PARLIAMENT TAKES, HE AND NOT IZETBEGOVIC HAS SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE A MAIN PLAYER WHO REPRESENTS AND CARES ABOUT THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT.

Dcm
 R
 F

TUO 2104
 VLS

FC-DFC-CMO-COS

Santana Senayda, Ptitov

UNPROFOR MACEDONIA

5612

1993-03-14 19:09

CZN-344
CZG-248

7/3



2

THE 'WESTERNERS' GROUP IS MADE UP SOMEWHAT, OF SANJAK MUSLIMS (i.e. GANIC AND HALILOVIC) WHO WOULD FIND IT BENEFICIAL IF THE CONFLICT WERE TO BE RE-DIRECTED AWAY FROM THE REGIONS OF MIXED MUSLIM AND CROAT POPULATION - TOWARDS SERBIA (SANJAK, KOSOVO), AND WESTERN MACEDONIA WHERE MUCH OF THE POPULATION IS MUSLIM AND ALBANIAN.

THIS POSITION OF THE 'WESTERNERS' HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE CROATS - AS I SEE IT THE CROATS HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN KEEPING CONFLICT ALIVE, BUT OUT OF THESE MIXED AREAS IN BH. THIS OBVIOUSLY WILL PREVENT ANY MAJOR BH SERB MILITARY MOVEMENT TOWARDS KRAJINA - WHICH IS OF COURSE THE CROATS PRIMARY AREA OF INTEREST.

WILL KEEP YOU POSTED ON ALL DEVELOPMENTS. BEST REGARDS.

200/93

++ CYCY ++

1993-03-13 02:57 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS. NEW YORK

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 205 CYZ 099 P1/1

'93 MAR 13 -5 :06

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CODED CABLE

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓

VANCE, NEW YORK

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 12 MARCH 1993

NUMBER: MSC-347

SUBJECT: Transportation of Supplies for Coal Mines
in Central Bosnia

K. Kline

1993 MAR 12 P 9 49

1. Reyour UNPROFOR Z-318, we agree that the proposed transportation of explosives and detonators for coal mines in Central Bosnia would not fall within UNPROFOR's current mandate and capabilities, nor would we advise UNPROFOR to be associated with the transport of such supplies.

2. As to the possibility of this operation being undertaken by the European Community Task Force or others (which would also require Sanctions Committee clearance), we are referring your cable to the Department for Humanitarian Affairs for appropriate action.

DISTRIBUTION:

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C2N-340
C2G RESTRICTED
CODE R244

OUTGOING CRYPTOFAX

399/93 1/7 010/9
UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
ZAGREB 1 of 7

12 53 MR 19 202

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS NEW YORK
VANCE, ICFY GENEVA
FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB
DATE: 12 MARCH 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-318
SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES FOR
COAL MINES IN CENTRAL BOSNIA

DISTRIBUTION:	
JW	mw
WV	Hse

93 MAR 12 20:14

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE ACTING SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
.... (COPY ATTACHED) REQUESTING THAT UNPROFOR TRANSPORT FROM CROATIA INTO CENTRAL BOSNIA CERTAIN ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF TWO MINES WHICH, IN THEIR TURN, PROVIDE THE NECESSARY COAL FOR THE OPERATION OF THE KARANJ AND TUZLA POWER PLANTS. A MEMORANDUM ON THE MATTER WAS ALSO RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM GENERAL MORILLON (COPY
.... ATTACHED). THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THESE PLANTS FOR NORTHERN BOSNIA IS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF THIS MEMORANDUM.

2. THE SUPPLIES AT ISSUE, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GENERAL MORILLON AND MEMBERS OF THE (BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S) OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (ODA), ARE ABOUT 140 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES AND 100,000 DETONATORS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY BEING HELD BY THE CROATIAN CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES.

(C)²

3. FROM THE UNHCR LETTER IT APPEARS THAT, SINCE THIS COULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS DIRECT HUMANITARIAN AID, UNHCR HAS DECIDED NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE TRANSPORT OF THESE SUPPLIES. SINCE UNPROFOR'S MANDATE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNHCR OPERATION, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE REQUEST FROM THE ACTING SPECIAL ENVOY WOULD NOT BE COVERED BY OUR CURRENT MANDATE. IN ADDITION, AS INDICATED BY GENERAL MORILLON, THE TRANSPORT OF THESE SUPPLIES WOULD BE BEYOND UNPROFOR'S CAPABILITIES. THE MATTER IS ALSO PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE SUPPLIES IN QUESTION. WOULD THESE SUPPLIES BE REGARDED AS FALLING UNDER THE ARMS EMBARGO UNLESS DETERMINATION WAS MADE AS TO THEIR NON-MILITARY USE AND WOULD VERIFICATION OF THIS BE REQUIRED?

4. GENERAL MORILLON HAS SUGGESTED THAT THIS OPERATION BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TASK FORCE AND WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH HIS SUGGESTION. ALTERNATIVELY, THE ODA ITSELF MIGHT WISH TO ACT AS IMPLEMENTING (AND SUPERVISING - IF NECESSARY) AGENCY.

5. WE SHOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER. ENDALL.

NATIONS UNIES
HAUT COMMISSARIAT
POUR LES REFUGIES

2-318
CODE RESTRICTED



3/2
UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES

Bureau de l'Envoyé Spécial
pour l'ex-Yugoslavie

VISOKI KOMESARIJAT
UJEDINJENIH NARODA
ZA IZBJEGLICE

Office of the Special Envoy
for former Yugoslavia

UNHCR Zagreb, Croatia
Telephone: 041 613 266
Telefax: 041 530 101/390

Kupska 2
41000 ZAGREB
CROATIA

11 March 1993

Dear Major General

As noted during Tuesday's meeting between members of your staff and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the continued production of electrical power in central Bosnia is being jeopardized by a dwindling supply of coal. I request your assistance in the form of UNPROFOR transporting essential coal mining supplies from Croatia into central Bosnia so that the Tuzla and Kakanj power plants can continue to produce power. Without these supplies, large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina face total loss of power within a few weeks. As these mining supplies cannot be classified as direct humanitarian aid, it would be unwise for us to use UNHCR assets to transport them or for our organization to become directly involved in the issue. However, we do not fail to recognize the importance of this matter to the living conditions of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

If you agree, ODA, as the implementing agency of the British government's bilateral mining restoration project, will act as the point of contact. I truly appreciate any assistance you can render.

With my very best regards,

Yours sincerely,

Klaus Von Helldorff
Klaus Von Helldorff

Acting Special Envoy
of the
High Commissioner

Major General R. Gaudreau
Deputy Force Commander
UNPROFOR Headquarters
Zagreb

cc: Messrs. C. Coyle & D. Houston, ODA
Ms. Y. Auger, UNPROFOR
Mr. J. Adlam, ECTF



UNITED NATIONS



PROTECTION FORCE

COMMANDER BH COMD

Kiseljak, 05 March 1993

G3/3208

Force Commander
UNPROFOR Headquarters
Zagreb

SUBJECT: POWER PRODUCTION IN NORTHERN BH

1. The situation of electricity in BH has become a major concern. It is now a risk that it may deteriorate very quickly, and increase the tension between Northern Bosnia and Southern Bosnia. The key issue is the restoration of power production in BH, an issue that is beyond our capacity in terms of humanitarian aid. Negotiations will be required at the highest governmental levels. It is recommended that the European Community Task Force assumes responsibility for the restoration of power production in BH.

2. Our Area Field Engineer (South) attended a meeting in MOSTAR recently with the Director of the HZ Electricity Company. They were shown a letter prepared by the government of Herzeg Bosnia (but could not have a copy). This letter was signed and ready to be sent to different authorities, including UNPROFOR. Basically their statements were that:

- a. HZ BOSNIA has been providing electricity to BOSNIA without compensation.
- b. Most of HZ BOSNIA power plants are hydraulic power plants and the water level in the different storage sites serving such locations, as well as in the rivers, is low this year.
- c. The MOSTAR power plant is destroyed, money is needed to repair or replace what has been destroyed by the war.
- d. BOSNIA has at least two major power plants, that are not destroyed and should produce power.
- e. For all the reasons above, HZ BOSNIA will switch off power to BOSNIA unless they receive money.

C:\WP51\A008\POWER.NE

(C)

3. Technically, this is true. Most of the power plants in southern Bosnia are hydro electric power plants. Mostar thermal power plant is destroyed. The water level in the storage sites and in the streams are very low. There has been major destruction such as the Mostar thermal power plant or Mostar main transformer station. HZ BOSNIA have been providing power to Northern Bosnia and they have the capability to switch power off. The consequences could be very far reaching.

* 4. It is also true that ~~power plants in Northern Bosnia are dependent upon coal. Both are thermal power plants and their power production capability is dependent upon coal. Both power plants have coal mines in their vicinity. These mines need explosives and diesel fuel to produce coal. The situation of the KAKANJ power plant is not yet clearly known, however TUZLA power plant has a 20 day coal supply available (low power production rate). They need 140 tons of explosives for the mine to begin operations again and 900 tons of diesel fuel per month for the mine plant. These figures clearly show that the issue is beyond our capability in terms of humanitarian aid.~~ Both are thermal power plants and their power production capability is dependent upon coal. Both power plants have coal mines in their vicinity. These mines need explosives and diesel fuel to produce coal. The situation of the KAKANJ power plant is not yet clearly known, however TUZLA power plant has a 20 day coal supply available (low power production rate). They need 140 tons of explosives for the mine to begin operations again and 900 tons of diesel fuel per month for the mine plant. These figures clearly show that the issue is beyond our capability in terms of humanitarian aid.

5. Northern Bosnia has no hydraulic power plants and relies completely on these major thermal power plants and on electricity supplied by Southern Bosnia. If the latter decide to cut the supply, it is vital for BH to increase coal production and diesel fuel delivery in order to increase the power production in TUZLA and KAKANJ to offset this.

6. The current situation in the Serbian held area west of TRAVNIK has not yet been analysed, but the first studies show that JACE II power plant (destroyed) had a capacity of 2x10MW only, and was one of the oldest and smallest power plants of the country. This power source is hydro electric and hence inherently limited in output compared with fossil fuel types, yet BH Command were let to believe from many sources that the restoration of this plant was vital to the overall plan. This is clearly not the case, therefore, in this area, the solution could be (if the first information is confirmed) to reconnect the lines crossing the confrontation line. This can only happen if thermal production is enhanced, and southern lines are not switched off. Again, the key is power production.

7. From a more general point of view, the major concern and therefore the highest priority is production of electricity. The high voltage distribution grid must be considered a lower priority.

* 8. ~~Restoration of the power plants in the Serbian held area west of TRAVNIK is a high priority. The JACE II power plant (destroyed) had a capacity of 2x10MW only, and was one of the oldest and smallest power plants of the country. This power source is hydro electric and hence inherently limited in output compared with fossil fuel types, yet BH Command were let to believe from many sources that the restoration of this plant was vital to the overall plan. This is clearly not the case, therefore, in this area, the solution could be (if the first information is confirmed) to reconnect the lines crossing the confrontation line. This can only happen if thermal production is enhanced, and southern lines are not switched off. Again, the key is power production.~~

* See clarification of poor copy on last page.

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9. I would therefore request that you forward this through the appropriate authorities to initiate action on an urgent basis.

P Morillon
Lt Gen
Commander

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* Clarification of poor copy:

4. It is also true that two major power plants exist in Northern Bosnia . . . Kakanj and Tuzla.

. . . .

5. Negotiations need to be undertaken at the highest level in order to deter HZ Bosnia from denying power to Northern Bosnia. At the same time, the production of the Tuzla and Kakanj power plants needs to be restored to meet the demand level. This is beyond UNPROFOR and UNHCR capabilities and handover to ECTF is therefore recommended.

CZN 310

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COMMUNICATIONS

ZAGREB

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

10 MAR 1993

-6 93 MR 20/ 357 OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

CODE RESTRICTED MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 3

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY NEW YORK
VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : WAHLGREN, ZAGREB

DATE : 6 MARCH 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 288

SUBJECT: RECCE TO EASTERN BOSNIA

I herewith attach Andreev's report, just received, for your attention.

Endall

inc 2306
JW

CZN 310
X 224 + 6.0 10.4 16.0 *CZG 219*
2/3
11114445102 9:55
111144460102 10:55
111144470102 11:00

HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK

Page 1 of 2

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 6-19-40 A 1110 93
TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM/DCA ZAGREB	FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO:	FAX:
ATTN:	FILE REF NO : DRAFTER : TITLE : RELEASING OFF : SIGNATURE : <i>Beig-</i>
INFO : GENERAL MORILLON, FORWARD HQ FAX NO : CIVIL AFFAIRS, FORWARD HQ AND SARAJEVO (PTT)	
SUBJECT: RECCE TO EASTERN BOSNIA	

MESSAGE

A GROUP HEADED BY GENERAL MORILLON CONSISTING OF MYSELF, UNHCR, WHO AND ICRK REPS - FOR THE FIRST TIME VISITED THE TOWNS OF KONJEVICI-POLJE AND CERSKA IN EASTERN BOSNIA.

MOST OF THE DISPLACED FROM CERSKA ARE REPORTED TO NOW BE IN KONJEVICI-POLJE. ACCORDING TO BH ARMY LOCAL COMMANDER IN THAT TOWN, THOUGH PEOPLE ON THE STREETS OF KONJEVICI-POLJE LOOK UNDER-
FED THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE STARVING. AIRDROPS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY
SUCCESSFUL THERE WITH UP TO 17 PARCELS RETRIEVED. HOWEVER, PEOPLE
COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THE PARCELS STRESSING THE NEED FOR
BASIC NECESSITIES SUCH AS FLOUR, SUGAR AND BUTTER RATHER THAN THE
CHOCOLATE THE PARCELS CONTAINED. ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL COMMANDER,
COL. NASSER, APPROXIMATELY 2,000 ARE WOUNDED AND THERE ARE AN
ADDITIONAL 4-5,000 WHO ARE SUFFERING FROM ILLNESS AND MALNUTRITION.
THEY COULD NOT IDENTIFY HOW MANY OUT OF THIS NUMBER ARE SERIOUSLY
WOUNDED.

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A list
Boyd
Santana
Belgrade
Shepp



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2/

ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL POPULATION AND A GERMAN DOCTOR WHO HAS BEEN THERE FOR SOME MONTHS, THE MOST DRASTIC SITUATION EXISTS IN SREBENICA. THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF WOUNDED THERE AND THEY ARE WITHOUT MEDICINE OR ANAESTHESIA. IT IS REPORTED TO BE OVERCROWDED AND HAS NOT RECEIVED AS MANY AIRDROPS AS KONJEVICI-POLJE. WHO, DOCTOR SIMON MARDEL VOLUNTARILY LEFT THE GROUP AND TRAVELED TO SREBENICA TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND PROVIDE IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE.

STARTING THE MORNING OF THE 6/3, ICRC AND UNHCR TEAM MADE A HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SURVEY TO ASSESS THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE REDEVAC. BY 12:00 HOURS 75 CASES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED.

TOGETHER WITH GENERAL MORILLON, WENT TO CERSKA THE SAME MORNING AND FINALLY GOT THROUGH AFTER LONG NEGOTIATIONS WITH LOCAL SERB COMMANDERS - WHO AT FIRST WERE CATEGORICALLY REFUSING US ACCESS. WE SPENT ABOUT AN HOUR IN CERSKA - THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS LEFT IN THE TOWN AND MOST HOUSES HAVE BEEN BURNED. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF ANY MASSACRE - THERE WERE NO BODIES AROUND. HOWEVER, PLEASE NOTE, THAT THE TOWN IS FAIRLY SPREAD OUT AND SOME AREAS COULD NOT BE VISITED BECAUSE OF LACK OF SECURITY. (I.E. SNIPER ACTIVITY)

LOCAL COMMANDER INFORMED US THAT IN VLASINICA HOSPITAL THERE IS ONE WOUNDED MUSLIM SOLDIER AND ONE WOMAN WHO HAD JUST GIVEN BIRTH. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO ICRC REPRESENTATIVE.

IN CONCLUSION IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE FIRST ACCESS TO EASTERN BOSNIA WAS SUCCESSFUL AND ALLOWED US TO ASSESS THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE AREA. THIS MOMENTUM SHOULD AND WILL BE CONTINUED BY US WITH THE NEXT AIM BEING SREBENICA. SOME USEFUL CONTACTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH LOCAL COMMANDERS WHICH SHOULD MAKE FUTURE ACCESS EASIER.

AT THE SAME TIME ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF PEOPLE DID NOT MATERIALIZE DUE TO SERB AUTHORITIES IN ZVORNIK INSISTANCE THAT MEDICAL EVACUATION OF MUSLIMS FROM THE AREA SHOULD BE COUPLED WITH EVACUATION OF SERBS FROM TUZLA - WHICH IS POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

AFTER GROUP'S RETURN TO HQ OUR INTENTION IS TO ASSESS THE RESULTS OF RECCE AND PLAN AND COORDINATE FUTURE ACTIONS AND START NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING EVACUATIONS.

Best regards

V. [Signature]

YUGOSLAVIA
MOST IMMEDIATE

CZN=262

CZG=~~183~~
184

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

310/93⁸⁰
P1/3
010/9
CODE RESTRICTED
UNCLASSIFIED
ZAGREB

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 24 February 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR=241

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN BH -
AS ON 23 FEBRUARY 1993.

Most Immediate 24 93 FEB 16 142

Clawhill
M. Gen

Morillon's subject cable, attached, is forwarded for information.

DISTRIBUTION:

P.H.

DR

UNOG Palace for
Palais des Nations
93 FEB 24 16:27

CZNE 262

P2/S

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UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCEHEADQUARTERS
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB ATTN: Force Commander

Info: BH COMMAND KISELJAK ATTN: COS, CAC

FROM: BH COMMAND SARAJEVO ATTN: G. G. Morrison

Date: 23 Feb 93

File No: BHCS/8607

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION - 23 FEB 93

1. Introduction. The last week has been marked by a series of small advances in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Eastern Bosnia Herzegovina, the establishment of a fragile pause in hostilities in SARAJEVO, the grudging acceptance that the mission given to UNHCR and UNPROFOR by the Security Council is useful and finally and most importantly the confirmation of a change of attitude by President Izetbegovic. I am however most concerned about the possible effects on Serb behaviour of the overly hasty decision taken by the United States of America to air-drop humanitarian aid.

2. Humanitarian Convoy Routes. After the long awaited success of the convoy to ZEPA, I hope that we today may even get a convoy to GORAZDE. A reconnaissance of the route from ZEPA to CERSKA is due to start tomorrow. This could however develop into a difficult expedition in view of the prevailing weather conditions. We will from now on have to face increasing difficulties due to continued heavy snowfall. Despite FRENGBAT's remarkable achievements the principle route to KISELJAK from MOSTAR, via TARCIN and KRESKO, is becoming virtually impassable. I have therefore instructed Sector SARAJEVO to recommence negotiations to try and remove the demolitions, minefields and obstacles on the main road between TARCIN and HADZICI. The recent success in mediating the release of some of the TARCIN prisoners should make this easier to achieve.

3. Lifting of Blockade of SARAJEVO. The guns have now been silent in SARAJEVO for the last 48 hours. I have ordered UNMOs to deploy to and patrol along both sides of the Confrontation Line in the most sensitive areas. I have also not yet lost hope that the Sector Commander will still manage to get a Joint Commission to monitor

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the cease-fire started within the next day or so. I am also trying to take advantage of the present calm to restart the project to lift the blockade of SARAJEVO by convening a Top Level Military Meeting between Generals Halilovic (Bosnian), Mladic (Serb) and Petkovic (Croat) under my chairmanship. The Presidency however remains very reluctant to participate.

4. Mrs Ogata's Cancellation of Convoys. Mrs Ogata's thunderbolt had the beneficial effect of clarifying the conditions under which our mission is being performed and forcing recognition of its achievements. It is to be hoped that at least a temporary halt has been brought to some of the blackmail to which we were being exposed.

5. US Decision to Airdrop. At the very moment at which the Presidency appeared to be showing a genuine desire to negotiate and when a fragile calm seemed to be setting in across the whole country, the American initiative to commence air-drops is in danger of lighting the powder keg. I have said as much to Brigadier General Jones (UECOM - US European Command) during his visit here last week. I have repeated my extreme reservations to him by telephone and will again pursue the point during his second visit here tomorrow.

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CZG-165

273/93

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
ZAGREB

16 93 FEB 13 08 39Z

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA

FROM: *for* NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Li f*

DATE: 16 February 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-211

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN BH - 15 FEBRUARY 1993.

IMMEDIATE

Morillon's report on the subject is faxed herewith, for your information.

DISTRIBUTION:

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93 FEB 16 19:01

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COMMITTEE
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HQ BH COMMAND SARAJEVO
16-93 FEB 08 312

Page 1 of 3

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OUTGOING SERIAL NO:	DATE: 160915A FEB 93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB BH COMMAND KISELJAK	FROM: BH COMD SARAJEVO
FAX NO:	FAX: 871 111 2475
ATTN:	FILE REF.NO : BHCS/8607
ZAGREB: FORCE COMMANDER	DRAFTER : MAJ TUCKER
KISELJAK: COS, CAC	TITLE : CHEF DE CABINET
	RELEASING OFF.: MAJ TUCKER
	SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION - 15 FEB 93

Sir,

Please find attached an assessment of the situation as at 15 Feb 93, from General Morillon.

[Handwritten signature]
R
F

UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCEHEADQUARTERS
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

To: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB Attn: Force Commander
 Info: BH COMMAND KISELJAK Attn: COS, CAC
 From: BH COMMAND SARAJEVO Lt Gen Morillon
 Date: 15 Feb 93
 File No: BHCS/8607

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION - 15 FEB 93

1. Fighting around SARAJEVO. SARAJEVO is suffering yet more convulsions and hostilities continue in Eastern Bosnia. The cease fire around SARAJEVO agreed last week did not last 48 hours. It was broken by the BH Army however the situation is turning in the Serb's favour after five days of heavy fighting. President Izetbegovic has just asked for UNPROFOR mediation.

2. President's Image. After the bombardment of FBRSAT 2's HQ and the prompt declaration that the attack had been carried out by the BH Army, President Izetbegovic may have come to realise that it is important for his cause and for his image that he be more conciliatory in his negotiations and more firm with his troops. The foolish decision to refuse humanitarian aid has placed him in a difficult situation from which he needs our help to escape. This he has in fact just asked for.

3. Change of Stance. It is probably for all these reasons that he yesterday gave a long interview on local television in which:

a. Army Restructuring. He stated that the BH Army was in urgent need of restructuring in order to improve its discipline and coordination. (Battalion strength Military Police units will be placed under the control of the Minister of the Interior; the number of Brigades will be drastically reduced in order to achieve a tighter chain of command; numerous commanders are being relieved of their responsibilities).

b. Acceptance of Vance-Owen Plan. He stated that with US support an appropriately amended Vance-Owen Plan could be acceptable and that there was no other solution than to negotiate its details.

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c. Attitude towards UN. He stood up for UNPROFOR whose good will and usefulness was self evident. UNPROFOR could not be held responsible for not having the right mandate.

This is an significant change in the "official line" and I did not hesitate to show my approval - but hell is paved with good intentions and I am cautious and am not letting any hopes be raised too rapidly.

4. Meeting with Dr Karadzic. As a result of this newly discovered apparent goodwill I have agreed to meet Dr Karadzic at PALE tomorrow, who has just returned from New York. I intend broaching a series of important points with him: breaking the deadlock facing humanitarian convoys in Eastern Bosnia, the deployment of CANBAT 2 in the region of SARAJEVO and the reconvening of the Mixed Military Working Group.

5. Mixed Military Working Group. On this last issue President Izetbegovic this afternoon informed me that he was ready to reexamine without delay the conditions under which peace might be brought to SARAJEVO (demilitarisation of the airport, opening of humanitarian corridors, lifting of the siege).

6. Amendments to Vance-Owen Map. The President's final request was for me to explore what new concessions concerning the provincial boundaries Dr Karadzic might be prepared to make.

7. Prisoner Exchange. The French Minister for Humanitarian Aid today left SARAJEVO after having prepared agreement for the exchange of 108 Serb prisoners for 50 Croat prisoners and 54 Presidency Prisoners (from TARCIN). The exchange is intended to take place on Wed 17 Feb 93 with UNPROFOR providing the escorts. It is hoped this will help reduce tension in the BLAZUJ region and ensure our movement between KISELJAK and SARAJEVO is not hindered.

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C2G-121

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

93 JAN 31 15:50

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 31 January 1993

NUMBER: **UNPROFOR 3-133**

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC AT ZAGREB
ON 31 JANUARY 1993

MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

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	MW
	FE

1. Pursuant to a telephone call from Secretary Vance on 30 January 1993, I had a meeting with President Izetbegovic at Zagreb today, to provide him with some clarifications he was seeking with regard to the ICFY agreements.

2. The President told me that he had declined to sign the ICFY military paper yesterday at Geneva because he needed clarification on aspects pertaining to withdrawal of heavy weapons, i.e. where the paper says, "all such withdrawals will be supervised by UNPROFOR and subsequently monitored at designated locations by UNPROFOR in order to prevent their use" (this reference is mentioned under the item, "Essential Elements" in Annexure 1 to the military paper). He said that his side had reservations on this aspect due to the current situation in Sarajevo, where the Serbs keep using their weapons in spite of UNPROFOR monitoring. He also alluded to the situation in the UNPAs in Croatia, saying that the Serbs were able to take back their weapons.

3. I responded that whatever we do to monitor the heavy weapons will be based on agreement with the respective parties, and added that we envisaged a mechanism whereby artillery and other heavy weapons will be withdrawn to areas out of range from the present confrontation lines and put either under monitoring of the UNMOs or physical control by our troops, depending on several factors. On the reference to the situation in Croatia, I told him that no

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Mr Gen

comparison could be made to what has occurred in Croatia, because the mechanism there envisaged joint control by the UN and local authorities.

3. President Izetbegovic wanted information on who exactly would control the weapons and I replied that we would be getting additional troops to meet this requirement among others. He asked for clarification on the actual mechanics of implementing the cease-fire agreement. When I explained what we had envisaged, he replied that he had a proposal in this regard which he would convey to me in a letter, after consulting with members of his Government and military leadership at Sarajevo. He desires a written clarification to all their "doubts and dilemmas" which he also intended to convey. I shall await his letter and respond appropriately, in consultation with you if necessary.

4. Before I departed, he mentioned that he may not be going to New York since he has been away from Sarajevo for quite some time and intended to start addressing the problems that had surfaced during his absence. On the HVO-Moslem fighting in Central Bosnia, he opined that the fighting had occurred due to misinterpretation of the ICFY political agreement by the Croats. On the aspect of the maps, he said that there were major differences in the Serb and the BH Presidency positions because "the Serbs have tried to retain the benefits of their aggression, especially in areas where they conducted ethnic cleansing". Endall.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

THE UNDERSIGNED

Welcoming the invitation of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to participate in talks for the restoration of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Taking account of the constructive atmosphere of the peace talks held in Geneva from 2 to 5 January and the assistance of the UNPROFOR Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar,

Keeping in mind the Principles of the International Conference and the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, in particular resolutions 752 and 787 pertaining to withdrawal of all outside forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Wishing to bring the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end without any further delay and to re-establish peace throughout the country,

Desiring to work out arrangements for bringing about compliance with a cessation of hostilities, and for monitoring it so as to ensure that it is effective and lasting,

Hereby agree on the following:

1. Measures for the achievement of an unconditional cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set out in Annex I;
2. Measures for the restoration of infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set out in Annex II;
3. Measures on the opening of routes, as set out in Annex III;
4. Arrangements on the separation of forces, as set out in Annex IV;
5. Measures for the demilitarization of Sarajevo, as set out in Annex V;

6. Measures for the monitoring of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set out in Annex VI;
7. Return of forces to designated provinces, as set out in Annex VII.

A. IZETBEGOVIC

Rado Karadzic

R. KARADZIC

M. Boban

M. BOBAN

Witnessed by:

C. Vance

C. VANCE

D. Owen

D. OWEN

Geneva, *Jan 30* day of January, 1993

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

BROAD PRINCIPLES

All parties agree to support the broad principles required to support a cessation of hostilities. These broad principles will be translated into concrete action through additional discussion within the MMWG. Several of the principles will be dealt with on a stand-alone basis, although they remain an integral part of the overall framework of the cessation of hostilities.

The broad principles are:

A ceasefire must be put in place and remain effective. This is to be implemented 72 hours from midnight (New York time - EST) of the day on which the Security Council endorses this plan.

Monitoring and Control measures are to be put in place to ensure compliance and should include as a minimum:

- Links between Commanders in conflict areas (Hot lines)
- Provision of UNPROFOR/ECMM liaison and monitors

- Establishment of joint crisis management teams
- Opening of Confrontation Line crossing points. For use by UNPROFOR and monitoring agencies

The separation of forces is to be achieved.

Routes supporting the general freedom of movement of people, commerce and humanitarian aid are to be opened.

The restoration of infrastructure will proceed as a priority. Restoration will not be linked to any negotiations.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

- Security Council endorses the plan - initiates all follow on action (D-3).
The 72 hours permit passage of information
- Cessation of hostilities effective (D-Day)
- Declaration of Forces - this is to take place on D-1 and should include:
 - Numbers and locations of all heavy weapons,
 - Detailed documentation of minefields,
 - Location of front lines (traces),

- Defensive works and positions.
- Establish Demarcation Line (joint activity)
- Move in UNPROFOR forces to establish security (commencing D+1)
 - Monitor lines of conflict,
 - Monitor heavy weapons,
 - Reporting System (all parties).
- Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons
 - of calibre 12.7 mm and above; five days for Sarajevo and fifteen days for remaining areas.
 - locations to be determined based on effective ranges of weapon systems.
 - all such withdrawals will be supervised by UNPROFOR and subsequently monitored at the designated locations by UNPROFOR in order to prevent their use.
- Separation of Forces
 - abandon defensive works on confrontation line,
 - area of separation to be agreed,
 - distance in which no forces, except police, allowed,
 - distance within which no defensive works will be manned.

Separation of forces and withdrawal of heavy weapons are linked.

Mixed Military Commission is established to deal with any clarifications and breaches of the cessation of hostilities.

RESTORATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE

All parties agree that denial or use of civil utilities as a weapon of war is unacceptable, and all affirm their commitment to the full restoration of the civil infrastructure across BH, and in particular, Sarajevo.

The provision of humanitarian aid cannot be linked in any way with the military steps of the process of demilitarisation or cessation of hostilities. Being humanitarian in nature its priority is strictly governed by the ability of all three parties to support its implementation.

Restoration will be the first priority. Therefore, immediate efforts must be placed on the restoration of infrastructure. This is equally applicable to the city of Sarajevo as well as the rest of BH. It includes where applicable:-

Powergrids,

Power stations,

Bridges,

Gas

Telecommunications,

Railway lines,

Routes,

Water supply.

Guarantees of security will be requested and must be provided as well as the restoration of power/water/heat will be fully supported by the warring parties.

A joint committee is already in place in Sarajevo; the work of this committee is to be facilitated with immediate effect to enable early restoration of utilities in Sarajevo.

Assistance will be provided through all the appropriate agencies including UN and civilian expertise. However, within BH, a joint commission composed of representatives of all sides is to identify the priorities, define the needs and execute the work in conjunction with civil authorities. To this end, vital installations will be identified in conjunction with BH joint commission:

- access will be guaranteed after local arrangements are made.
- forces will be withdrawn from sites consistent with security.
- warring parties will provide, when necessary, liaison for the repair teams.
- civil agencies/workers will be assisted.

Parties will work to re-establish infrastructure including railways/power grids/water supplies, across borders with neighbouring republics.

Respect for infrastructure facilities must be developed and they must remain free from attack or use as, defensive positions.

All parties agree to develop a common instruction for passage down chains of command to demonstrate an equal endorsement of support.

OPENING OF ROUTES

The opening of routes is directly related to the political issue which concerns the freedom of movement of all people in the context of constitutional principles. It is equally applicable to Sarajevo as well as all other areas of BH.

It is to be achieved through:-

Security guarantees by all parties to ensure non interference and protection of personnel and material using the routes.

Non interference on the route.

Check points, patrols, and monitoring by UNPROFOR/ECMM, as appropriate.

Supervised inspection at entry points.

Freedom of passage of humanitarian aid.

Absolute freedom of movement of UN forces.

The concept of Blue Routes for Sarajevo is attached as appendix one. This format is applicable for the establishment of all other similar types of routes within BH. Additional routes can be negotiated under the aegis of the MMWG.

SARAJEVO BLUE ROUTE CONCEPT

The parties have decided to establish three free passage routes with mutually agreed measures to guarantee and ensure safe passage for freedom of movement of civilians, commercial goods and humanitarian aid to and from SARAJEVO.

These routes are:

- SARAJEVO-ZENICA-SARAJEVO
- SARAJEVO-MOSTAR-SARAJEVO
- SARAJEVO-ZVORNIK-SARAJEVO

OUTLINE PLAN FOR BLUE ROUTES

1. EXECUTION

1.1 Prerequisites.

The following prerequisites are to be required:

- 1.1.1 Cessation of hostilities.
- 1.1.2 Complete freedom of movement for UNPROFOR forces on the three Blue Routes.

1.2 Use of the Blue Routes.

1.2.1 Timings.

Routes will be open during daylight hours for convoys.

UNPROFOR forces will use the routes 24 hours each day.

1.2.2 Access for Civilians.

All civilians, regardless of sex, age, or ethnic origin, and without weapons or ammunition, will be allowed to use the routes. Private and commercial vehicles will also be permitted on each route subject to inspection outlined in para 1.5.1.

1.2.3 Access for Humanitarian Aid.

All International and local humanitarian aid agencies will be allowed to use the routes. Humanitarian aid includes, but is not limited to, food, water, medical supplies and fuel.

1.2.4 Access for Commercial Goods.

Normal commerce will be progressively restored to and from SARAJEVO.

1.3 Establishment of Routes

1.3.1 SARAJEVO-ZENICA-SARAJEVO

This route incorporates SARAJEVO-RAJLOVAC-ILIJAS-VISOKO-ZENICA.

1.3.2 SARAJEVO-MOSTAR-SARAJEVO

This route incorporates SARAJEVO-ILIDZA-HADZICI-TARCIN-JABLANICA-MOSTAR.

1.3.3 SARAJEVO-ZVORNIK-SARAJEVO

This route incorporates SARAJEVO-BENTBASA-MOKRO-SOKOLAC-VLASENICA-ZVORNIK.

1.4 Checkpoints

Checkpoints will be established and manned by UNPROFOR forces at the entrance and exit of each route and when crossing a line of confrontation. Each UNPROFOR checkpoint will be located near or with the checkpoint of the force controlling the territory involved consistent with the security requirements of the factions. No side will be permitted to erect a new checkpoint.

1.5 Control Measures

1.5.1 Inspection Procedures

a. Inspections will be conducted by UNPROFOR forces.

Each side is permitted to monitor the events in close coordination with UNPROFOR.

b. War related material, weapons or ammunition are forbidden. If found, the items will be confiscated and subsequently destroyed under control of UNPROFOR and the parties.

c. Humanitarian Aid convoys may be subjected to inspections.

d. Checkpoints will be activated only during daylight hours as a safety measure for civilians and convoys.

1.5.2 Escorts

- a. Each convoy will be escorted with the appropriate UNPROFOR vehicles.
- b. Convoys and escorts will take priority over military activities.
- c. The Army controlling the territory involved may provide civilian police as an additional means of security.

1.5.3 Patrols

- a. UNPROFOR forces will patrol the blue routes as necessary.
- b. Patrols will consist of at least two vehicles suitably equipped and will contain an appropriate communications net.
- c. All UNPROFOR Patrols will be permitted to cross all checkpoints.

1.6 Implementation

1.6.1 Suggested Timeframe

D-3 - Security Council endorses the Plan

D+1 - Erecting checkpoints

- Inspection procedures agreed
- Routes cleared of all obstacles
- Repairs carried out as required
- Recce by UNPROFOR

D+5 - Opening of Blue Routes for civilians and humanitarian aid.

SEPARATION OF FORCES

The parties agree that the separation of forces is an element of the overall cessation of hostilities. An agreement will be based on the steps and control measures and sequence of events outlined below:

STEPS

The concrete steps envisaged in the process include:-

- An absolute ceasefire.
- Temporary freezing of the military situation, pending agreement on return of forces to designated provinces.
- No forward deployments or offensive action.
- No move of additional forces, explosives and weapons forward will be permitted. Rotation on an individual basis is acceptable.
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons (direct and indirect fire) of all parties from areas of confrontation to areas out of range, decided upon by the parties in conjunction with UNPROFOR.
- Physical separation of forces in contact.
- Security and monitoring of the demilitarized zone.

CONTROL MEASURES

The control measures required include:-

- Declaration of forces in being, including location of minefields.
- Monitoring of front lines.
- Declaration of heavy weapons in separation areas.
- Establishing agreed lines on which forces may be located.
- Staged withdrawal of forces culminating in their relocation to designated provinces.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- Ceasefire under aegis of the overall cessation of hostilities.
- Establishment and patrol of the demarcation line by UNPROFOR personnel.
- Withdrawal of designated weapons systems of all parties.
- Search and clearance of the affected area by joint patrols.
- Conduct of joint and UN only patrols within the area. Composition of the patrols to be negotiated at the MMWG.

UNPROFOR CONCEPT FOR HEAVY WEAPONS CONTROL

- all heavy weapons 12.7 mm calibre and above are included
- these weapons will be withdrawn out of effective range to areas decided between UNPROFOR and the parties
- the withdrawal will be monitored by UNPROFOR

- once in location the weapons will be monitored to ensure that they are not used
- UNPROFOR will not physically take over the weapons
- where terrain such as towns preclude moving weapons out of range, they will be gathered in agreed locations under UNPROFOR control to ensure that they are not used.

DEMILITARIZATION OF SARAJEVO

The demilitarization of Sarajevo is based on one requirement: an effective cessation of hostilities.

The other elements are;

- Establishment of control on a designated line
- Restoration of Civil Utilities
- Land Routes and Freedom of movement
- Separation of Forces along lines of confrontation

Control measures include:

- Patrol and monitoring of the demarcation line
- Checkpoints at major crossings until confidence is restored
- Mixed patrols in the demilitarized zone

A military/civil joint commission as previously proposed should oversee the implementation of the accord.

Attached as Appendix 1 is a draft agreement covering first stage of a potential agreement on the demilitarization of Sarajevo. This stage covers the airport area as already discussed at the MMWG.

PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST STAGE OF DEMILITARIZATION OF

SARAJEVO

The authorised representatives of all three conflicting sides with the presence of the UNPROFOR representative agree on the implementation of an area of separation in the western and southern districts of SARAJEVO.

Cessation of Hostilities

The cessation of hostilities will be implemented as follows:

- a. The freezing of the military situation on the existing lines.
- b. No offensive action allowed.
- c. No forward redeployments.
- d. All heavy weapons will be withdrawn from positions from which they can engage.
- e. No movement of any additional forces although rotation of personnel on a one for one basis shall be permitted.
- f. No movement or resupply of ammunition, explosives or incendiary devices.

Freedom of movement for all civilians

The agreement on Blue Routes will re-establish the freedom of movement of all civilians in support of this plan.

Restoration of Civil Utilities

A Joint Commission composed of representatives from each side will identify priorities, define needs and execute the implementation of civil utilities. Details can be found in Annex II, Restoration of Infrastructure.

Removal of Heavy Weapons

- a. Area. All heavy weapons will be withdrawn to designated locations from the following-

MOJMILO, DOBRINJA, LUKAVICA, GORNJI, KOTORAC,
VOJKOVICI, HRASNICA, SOKOLOVICI, BUTMIR, ILIDZA, OTES,
STUP, NEDARICI.
- b. Joint Commission. A Joint Commission will be created.
 - (1) The mission of this Joint Commission will be to execute and implement details of this plan and subsequent phases.
 - (2) This Joint Commission will be composed of:
 - (a) UNPROFOR command and support element.
 - (b) A team of each side commanded by an officer senior enough to make decision and designated as the authorised commander for the troops in the area affected.
 - (c) A joint communications system which includes a command net and the necessary guaranteed communications link to each individual headquarters.

c. Timeframe. From each district the withdrawal of heavy weapons out of the designated area will be carried out in two stages within a period of five days:-

- (1) Stage 1 - Withdrawal of all direct fire weapons of 12.7 mm calibre and above (tanks, APCs, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and heavy machine guns)
- (2) Stage 2 - Withdrawal of all heavy indirect fire weapons (mortars, field artillery).

d. Control Measures. The following implementation and control measures will be used:

- (1) UNPROFOR forces will patrol the area of separation between the conflicting sides.
- (2) UNPROFOR forces will be deployed on the confrontation lines and on agreed mixed checkpoints proposed by the Joint Commission.
- (3) All parties are to identify weapons by type and locations and will provide UNPROFOR with detailed maps of areas considered to be under their respective control.
- (4) Complete freedom of movement for all UNPROFOR personnel and vehicles within the affected areas.
- (5) The Joint Commission will establish mixed patrols as appropriate.

MONITORING OF BORDERS

Pursuant to UN resolution 787, article 5, to prevent interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, UNPROFOR/ECMM will monitor borders with neighbouring republics.

Principles

UNPROFOR/ECMM forces will monitor crossings to prevent weapons, munitions, military personnel or irregular forces from entering the country.

Borders with adjoining republics will be monitored.

UNPROFOR actions to observe, search and report will be facilitated by the authorities of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

RETURN OF FORCES TO DESIGNATED PROVINCES

To enable the process of return to normalcy, and as a direct follow-on from the cessation of hostilities and the separation of forces, a return of forces to designated provinces will be conducted. This can start as part of the withdrawal of heavy weapons but, given the winter weather conditions, it is hard to fix a definite date for the completion of this process. We should however aim to achieve the return of forces within 45 days.

This stage will be coordinated with an agreed demobilization of forces in being.

UNPROFOR/ECMM will monitor the withdrawal of these forces in conjunction with national and provincial authorities.

The MMWG would be the technical negotiating agency.

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
ZAGREB

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TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *28-1640* 28 93 JAN 15 1207
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 28 January 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR-2-107 *Nambiar*
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF BH POLITICAL SITUATION - 27 JANUARY-1993

MOST IMMEDIATE

Subject cable from Kiseljak is attached for information.

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PROTECTION FORCE

HQ BH COMD

To: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB
BH COMMAND KISELJAK

Attn: Force Commander
Attn: COS

From: BH COMMAND SARAJEVO

Maj Gen Morillon

Date: 27 Jan 93

File No: BHCS/8060

Subject: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION - 27 JAN 93.

1. The very tough line taken last week by Prime Minister Akmadzic has predictably led to the conflict between Croats and Muslims developing into our major current concern. I regret to say I have little faith that the agreements and ceasefire announced today will lead to a calmer and more stable situation in Central Bosnia.

2. The message to President Izetbegovic could not be clearer: "Unless you accept the opportunity for peace now on offer at GENEVA, you will be faced not by one, but by two adversaries in this war which you appear bent on pursuing at all costs."

a. I firstly however doubt that the President and his more radical advisors will have the sense to recognize this appeal.

b. This sideshow upon which these two parties have embarked is in grave danger of having serious consequences for the delicate balance between their two communities.

3. Ceasefires have nonetheless been agreed and in some areas they have held after a series of difficult and tough negotiations at GORNJI-VAKUF, BUSOVACA and ZENICA, as well as here at KISELJAK. A Joint Commission co-chaired by UNPROFOR and the ECMM will start tomorrow, 28 Jan 93, in BUSOVACA. Its aim is to arrange and supervise the separation and eventual withdrawal of forces and the reopening of all routes through the area, the latter being the most urgent and pressing objective in order to allow us to continue with our humanitarian task.

4. I will be staying in KISELJAK for my Battalion Commanders Seminar which has already been postponed once, until AM Fri 29 Jan 93. We will be discussing the details of contingency plans and the various options open to us.

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The Delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Geneve, 27th Jan. 1993

CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE

The delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is faced with the following facts:

1.- Today, from 6.00 am. Sarajevo suffers the heaviest attack in the last four months. The agressor uses all available heavy weapons to destroy civilian targets causing heavy casualties.

2.- All Muslim citizens from Trebinje and Bileca were ordered to leave the Province number 6 immediately as of 26th of January 1993.

3.- On the 25th of January a column of 10 tanks and 150 trucks carrying 2000 troops entered Rudo from Priboj in Serbia.

4.- A large number of military vehicles accompanied by heavy artillery entered the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina over the bridge of Karakaj near Zvornik.

5.- During this session of the Conference the agressor forces have been launching artillery attacks on the Srebrenica region from Ljubovija and Bajina Basta in Serbia. These attacks resulted in 80 civilian casualties. In this region 648 people died of starvation due to the Serbian siege of the region.

6.- On the 25th of January a tank batallion was transferred from Banja Luka to the region of Sanski Most.

All these actions are directly linked with the proceedings of this conference and form a direct pressure through the threat of genocide.

The delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests immediate action to create normal negotiating conditions, to remove the threat of genocide and effectively prevent attacks on civilians through the implementation of the relevant U.N. Security Concil Resolution.

If these attacks continue the delegation will have to consider leaving the Geneva conference.

The Delegation of the Republic of BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen



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FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: Feissel

FAX NO.: OO-1-212-963 5964

PAGE 1 OF 3

FROM: *Ramcharan*
Ramcharan

FAX NOS.:
(41-22) 917 00 78

TE: 27 January 1993

Attached, as requested, is a draft reply from the Secretary-General to Mayor Koch. Ambassador Okun has seen it and made comments, which have been incorporated

Dear Mr. Koch,

I appreciate the sentiments that moved you to write your letters of 13 January and 17 November. I share fully your concern for the innocent people of Bosnia and Herzegovina caught up in this tragic conflict.

Our approach to dealing with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been based on the following assessments which we have come to after examining all the evidence available:

- A shortage of arms is not the issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the arms embargo, arms are still reaching all three sides. This may be seen in the fact that the armed forces of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina are now much better armed and have launched offensives in some areas that have put the Bosnian Serbs on the defensive.
- Lifting the arms embargo would result in all three sides obtaining much deadlier weapons and the resulting loss of life and destruction would mount greatly. The conflict would thus be intensified within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- The introduction of a free-for-all in arms supplies would inevitably lead to deadly weapons going into the region and could well ignite new conflicts in places such as Macedonia and the Serbian province of Kosovo. If this were to happen the dangers of regional powers getting involved would be very high and there would be serious risk of a Balkan conflagration. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the former republics of the USSR, it is not hard to see what would ensue if any party were to obtain and to use nuclear weapons.

Mr. E.I. Koch,
Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman,
1290 Avenue of the Americas,
New York,
New York 10104

I hope you will thus understand how crucial it is that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina be contained and stopped through negotiations. The peace package advanced by the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference is balanced and fair. It has built into it provisions for:

- (a) rolling back the acquisition of territory by force;
- (b) the reversal of ethnic cleansing; and
- (c) extensive arrangements for guaranteeing respect for human and minority rights.

All three sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina have accepted the Constitutional Principles put forward by the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The Bosnian Croat side has also accepted the map. The Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb sides have indicated their willingness to cease hostilities while negotiations take place to iron out the provincial boundaries. The Bosnian Government side has so far not indicated a willingness to end hostilities.

What is important at this time is that all sides should participate in negotiations in good faith and should cease fighting. That - rather than the lifting of the arms embargo - is the real issue.

Yours sincerely,

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

010/9
HBO

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Vance and Ambassador Okun
From: Peter Beshar
Re: Press Conference by President Izetbegovic
Date: January 25, 1993

I am attaching a copy of the opening remarks by President Izetbegovic as well as a map that was circulated. The press conference lasted roughly forty minutes. Though Izetbegovic initially gave the impression that he was going to announce the withdrawal of his delegation from the talks, he backed off in the end.

When asked whether there had been any progress at the talks, Izetbegovic said "no." The Government delegation will not, and cannot accept a map which legalizes ethnic cleansing. Izetbegovic stated that he would remain in Geneva as long as he felt that progress was possible. He reiterated: "if there are signs of progress, then I will not leave." When asked whether that progress would have to be seen in hours, days or weeks, Izetbegovic responded: "days."

A reporter asked: "isn't acceptance of the constitutional principles a sign of progress? If not, why did you agree to the principles?" Izetbegovic responded that he no longer felt that the constitutional principles represented progress because of the subsequent comments by the aggressors.

On the positive side, Izetbegovic said that the decision by Boban and the HVO to withdraw their earlier order

that Presidency forces submit to their command had eased tensions in the area.

When asked whether he had any meetings planned later today or tomorrow, the President responded: "no, but I expect to receive an invitation."

25 January 1993

- Statement for the Press

The Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina is recognised as a sovereign and independent state and member of the United Nations.

Serbia and Montenegro committed a brutal aggression the consequences of which have been 200,000 killed civilians, tens of thousands of raped women and girls and a country destroyed.

A million and a half people were forced to leave their homes simply trying to save their lives. These facts are well known and have been stated by the resolutions of the Security Council, by the CSCE, by London Conference decisions, by the European Council and by Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

All those documents had as their main aims halting aggression, halting further killing, stopping the violation of human rights, and punishing the aggressors and bringing those who committed war crimes before the International Court.

This was the foundation for the Geneva Conference, which itself arose from the decisions of the London Conference, the resolutions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the CSCE.

Therefore, the State Delegation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has agreed to participate in the Geneva Peace Talks despite the fact that the aggression is continuing, that the suffering of civilians continues to increase and the aggressor has been allowed to participate in the negotiations.

At the insistence of the Co-Chairmen, the delegation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted the direct participation in the talks of individuals considered as war criminals.

On the basis of the mandate of the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the State Delegation aims to preserve sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic order. It also has the obligation to preserve the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of the Bosnian society left to us by the milenium long history of the Bosnian state.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is not an artificial creation of any external factor but it has from its origins preserved the state and territorial identity which it also had inside former Yugoslavia as a sovereign state.

Just because the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation is trying to maintain the the cultural and democratic order when facing brutal aggression, it has found itself in the present phase of the Geneva talks in an isolated and unfair position. This inequality is expressed in the fact that Serbia and Montenegro, which are still not recognised and which are still the source of the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, are participating in the talks.

On the other hand, the conditions created by the use of force have been taken as the basis and as the criteria for resolving the most essential issues of the future constitutional order of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Now the ethnic criteria is being imposed on the Conference and on the basis of it, the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being done, allowing the genocide already committed to be legalised. In this way the conditions created by force and the fait accompli have been introduced as the basis and the criteria for the creation of the state relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The state delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed to participate in the negotiations under the supposition that the Conference will in no way legalise and validate effects gained by force.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

plan of occupied territory



occupied territory

liberation activity

