

UNITED NATIONS  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



NATIONS UNIES  
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Vijay Nambiar  
A: Chef de Cabinet  
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

DATE: 11 January 2007

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM: Horst Heitmann, Director  
DE: Security Council Affairs Division, DPA

SUBJECT: Security Council: Report on activities  
OBJET:

Attached please find, for the information of the Secretary-General, a note on the proceedings of the Security Council on Wednesday, 10 January 2007 (a.m.).

cc: Mr. Gambari



SG OFFICE

# 43  
15 January 2007

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Wednesday, 10 January 2007 (a.m.)

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

**Chad/CAR/Sudan**

The Council heard a briefing by Mr. Hédi Annabi, ASG for Peacekeeping Operations, having before it the Secretary-General's report (S/2006/1019). ASG Annabi noted with concern that the spill-over of the Darfur conflict into both Chad and the CAR had become a major threat to regional stability and that the conflicts in the region had become increasingly inter-linked. To address these worsening situations, two options for a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR, which would stand separately from UNMIS, had been developed: 1) a Monitoring Mission (option A); and a Monitoring and Protection Mission (option B). Should the Council decide to authorize such a presence, the Secretary-General had recommended that the Council should adopt option B. The report also suggested that the Council consider sending an "advance team" to Chad and the CAR, with a view to collecting more requisite information, conducting relevant planning and beginning logistical preparation for further operations.

On recent developments since DPKO's last briefing, ASG Annabi reported that the security and humanitarian situation had deteriorated. In mid-December, the Chadian Army had fought two rebel forces (UFDD & RaFD) and entered the Sudan to pursue them. Meanwhile, CAR Government troops, supported by French and FOMUC forces, had retaken towns seized by the rebels. As a result, some non-essential humanitarian workers had been relocated. In a positive development, ASG Annabi said, President Deby had signed a peace accord with Mahamat Nour, the leader of the rebel group FUC. However, other rebel forces had dismissed this move as a "propaganda event".

Turning to Darfur, ASG Annabi stated that the security situation had continued to worsen while humanitarian access to the needy population had decreased to its lowest level since April 2004. At the same time, some encouraging developments on the political front had taken place. Notably, a number of rebel groups (including the SLA-Abdul-Wahid, G19, SLA-Abdul Shafi and the JEM) had agreed to commit themselves to the N'djamena Agreement. In that regard, ASG Annabi expressed the hope that with these new commitments, the deadlocked political process could be reenergized. Finally, ASG Annabi said that Mr. Jan Eliasson, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Darfur, had been consulting with senior AU officials in the past days and would soon hold meetings with the Sudanese leadership, including President Bashir, to discuss the steps forward in order to reach a lasting peace in Darfur.



While Council members shared their concern at the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Chad and CAR, and expressed support for the dispatch of an advance team, they remained divided over the wisdom of deploying a full-fledged UN mission in the absence of a political process and the consent of the parties. In this context, some delegations explicitly criticized the way the Secretariat had handled the issue.

France called for the urgent deployment of a UN multidimensional presence both in Chad and CAR. Ambassador Lacroix argued that such a UN presence should deal with a multiple of tasks, including protection of civilians. He believed that the UN mission would enhance the peacekeeping operations in Darfur as it would help stabilize the situations in the two adjacent countries. Together with the United Kingdom, he called for the dispatch of the advance team without any further delay. Ambassador Lacroix supported the proposal by High Commissioner Guterres that the advance team's mandate should be expanded so as to seek the "understanding of all parties to enable the deployment of a force; to seek clarification on the role of national defence and security forces in both countries and hold discussions on the nature, strength and composition of the possible force". Italy, Belgium, Slovakia and South Africa agreed on the need to deploy a robust mission to protect civilians and facilitate political dialogue. The United States argued that the fact that the technical mission had not completed its assessment due to security conditions should not hamper the ultimate deployment of a UN mission, which should be provided with sufficient capacity and authority to protect civilians.

Frustrated with the lack of action, the United Kingdom criticized the report of being "inadequate" both in terms of timing and substance. On the timing, Ambassador Jones Parry pointed out that the issue was first raised by the Council last June, followed by the adoption of resolution 1706 last August. On the substance, he believed that the recommendations of the report should have been "directly proportionate" to the emergency situation on the ground. Ambassador Jones Parry insisted that, at a minimum, the UN should immediately provide substantial assistance in policing the UN-run refugee camps as well as possible border monitoring. Noting that those camps had been without extra protection for four months, he urged the Secretariat to speedily re-send a technical assessment team to find out what was needed there. "We need a mission and a precise proposal", he maintained. Congo and Ghana were also critical of the Secretariat. Congo stated that the report did not reflect the situation on the ground, which urgently required the UN deployment. Ghana called for the immediate dispatch of the advance mission, urging the Secretariat to "get its act together" and "stop prevaricating". Belgium concurred with Ghana, and held that the UN should not remain passive. ✓



However, other delegations questioned the wisdom of deploying a robust UN presence in the absence of both a ceasefire and the consent of the parties. Qatar, China and Indonesia shared the view that for an effective UN presence, there must be a ceasefire and the consent of the parties. Indonesia opined that the UN should avoid creating the impression that it was intervening in internal conflicts. The Russian Federation and Qatar stressed the need to ensure the availability of enough troops and police forces.

Turning to Darfur, delegations expressed concern about the slow implementation of Phase I and II and the lingering ambiguity as to the intentions of the Sudanese government.

Delegations noted with concern the latest comments attributed to President Bashir, in which he repudiated the need for the deployment of UN forces alongside AMIS. The United Kingdom called on the Council to test Khartoum's sincerity as to the acceptance of the proposed UN/AU hybrid force. Cautioning against the possibility of "drifting" by losing the momentum, Ambassador Jones Parry stressed the urgent need to clarify the fundamental issues, including size, mandate and command and control of the force. He hoped that those issues would be clarified at the forthcoming AU summit in Addis Ababa. Similarly, Congo expected the AU summit to clarify those key issues once and for all. "We do not want to be told again what AU is deciding is ambiguous", Ambassador Ikouebe declared, adding that AU had already accepted the package and that the Sudan could not pick and choose elements therein as it wished. He hoped that following the AU summit, the Council would be ready to take action on the deployment of the hybrid force in early February. At this juncture, he warned anew that the UN should not use AMIS as an alibi and, if it failed to deploy the hybrid force by June, AU troops would withdraw.

Concerned about Khartoum's "procrastination", Belgium called on the Council to show firmness on the issue. Ghana complained that the Council itself had been delaying action. Along with Panama, he urged the Council to send a clear message instead of merely waiting for AU to make a decision. South Africa suggested that the Secretariat should create a roadmap for the implementation of the package in order to break the "road blocks". While agreeing on the need to ensure clarity, the Russian Federation stated that he trusted that the Sudanese government would abide by its own commitments.

Slovakia and others welcomed the appointment of Mr. Jan Eliasson as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Darfur. The United Kingdom held that the attainment of a ceasefire and the reinvigoration of the political process should be the "two essential planks" of the UN efforts. The United States urged the Secretariat to quickly conclude contracts for personnel needed for the implementation of Phase I and II.



Referring to the UK and other criticism, ASG Annabi stated that the Secretariat had traditionally been playing the role of an "institutional punching ball", adding that it was always considered to be "wrong". However, in this case, he found it difficult to accept such a role. It was therefore compelling to make a point-by-point counterargument to the criticism voiced. He urged members to look at a few facts behind the recent developments.

First of all, ASG Annabi reiterated that the technical assessment mission was unable to complete its task due to intensified fighting both in Chad and CAR. Recalling the UK argument that a ceasefire and political process should be the "two essential planks" for the UN efforts in Darfur, he wondered if the same criteria should be applied to Chad and CAR. "Do we need a ceasefire and political process? Or should we deploy the mission in the middle of fighting?", he asked. If the latter was the case, he continued, what would be the concept of operations of such a mission and who would provide troops? (On this point, Ambassador Jones Parry responded by recalling that the deployment of a UN presence in Darfur was not contingent upon a ceasefire.) ASG Annabi noted in this context that while the President of CAR had already given his consent to a UN mission, it was only on 2 December 2006 when President Déby of Chad gave his agreement "in principle" to the deployment of a mission during his meeting with ASG Annabi. At the same time, he reminded the Council that, as of 2 December, "quite a lot of work" had remained to be done for the deployment of a UN mission in Chad, not least in view of President Déby's notion that UN blue helmets should be co-deployed with the Chadian army. ASG Annabi also emphasized the need for a political process, which was absent in Chad, explaining that according to UN experience, no PKO could substitute for the lack of a political process. He reminded Council members that all PKOs which had been deployed without such a process had failed.

On the availability of troops, ASG Annabi said that although DPKO had "cast a wide net" in search of contributions, it had not received any offer to date. He noted in this context that in the recent TCC meeting on Darfur, states had raised the issue of the government's consent for deployment, and queried whether and when the UN had obtained such consent from the Sudan.

ASG Annabi rejected the UK argument that the Council should focus on the UN-run refugee camps, which had not been protected for some time. Rather, he argued that the main problem was the IDP population, which was now estimated at more than 100,000 and had been scattered in a wide area. He reported that the UN was operating 12 camps for a total of 232,000 Sudanese refugees, and that no single attack had been reported on those camps at least until the technical assessment mission left the region. Moreover, he implicitly corrected Ambassador



Jones Parry by explaining that those camps had actually been policed by personnel locally hired by UNHCR. He believed that this "creative formula" should continue in order to minimize the UN's reliance on international police forces, which were in short supply.

ASG Annabi concluded his explanation by recalling a phrase from the "Brahimi Report": The Secretariat should tell the Council "what it needs to know, rather than what it wants to hear".

On the difference between a technical assessment mission and an advance team, ASG Annabi said that the former was an "in and out" practice in search for new information, while the latter had been a UN device to set up a permanent presence, previously used in places like southern Sudan and Cambodia. The team, which should rather be called an "advance mission", would help prepare the ground for the possible deployment of a full mission, including logistics arrangements.

ASG Annabi shared his concern with President Bashir's latest remarks on the need for UN troops in Darfur, which appeared to represent a "regression" from the Sudan's earlier commitment. However, he cited the subsequent comments by the President's spokesperson, in which the Presidency reconfirmed its agreement to the envisaged UN presence "in its technical, material and logistical capacity". Still, he agreed with the United Kingdom that Khartoum's intentions should be tested continuously.

ASG Annabi clarified that while the technical assessment mission needed no further authorization to revisit the region, it was necessary for the proposed advance team to receive proper authorization, based on which the Secretariat would seek the necessary budgetary arrangements from the GA. At the same time, given the various hurdles to cope with, ASG Annabi warned ("Let's not kid ourselves") that it would take months for a mission to be deployed. ASG Annabi also stated that it would take some time for the UN to assume the funding for AMIS. In the meantime, traditional partners should continue to support the AU mission.

ASG Kalomoh briefly informed the Council of his recent visit to CAR and other countries in the region. In CAR, he said he had encouraged the government and the parties concerned to engage in dialogue aimed at attaining a lasting political solution. He said that President Bozizé appeared eager to embark on such dialogue and had already asked a group of wise men, led by a highly respected clergyman, to make preparations for it. At the same time, ASG Kalomoh noted the shared perception among opposition groups as well as civil society representatives that the UN would deploy in support of the respective governments. In view of this, he stressed the need for a sustained political process and the strict impartiality of a UN operation in the region.

Urged by the United Kingdom, the President summed up that the Council was unanimous in calling for the dispatch of the advance team, and agreed on the urgent need for the technical assessment mission to return to the region, security conditions permitting. France proposed that his delegation would draft a "document" to authorize the advance team, with a view to quickly adopting it by the Council.

#### FORMAL MEETING

#### The situation in Côte d'Ivoire

At its 5617<sup>th</sup> meeting, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 1739 (2007), by which it, *inter alia*, decided to extend until 30 June 2007 the mandates of UNOCI and the French forces to support it (Attachment).

Kiyotaka Kawabata/Xiaoning Huang/SCSB/SCAD/  
10 January 2007