

UNAMIR

CODE CABLES - OUTGOING

8 MAY - 8 JUNE 1994

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CRN 202

HR 1130

(4 pages)

TO: AMMAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FOR: RIZA, DPKO

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 8 JUNE 1994

SUBJECT: DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR UNAMIR

REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE 1839 OF 7 JUNE 1994

1. The document attached at reference is first class. The tone and content reflect very positively the orientation of this Mission.

2. There are however three comments that we wish to offer:

a. Para 1. The Phases 1 and 2 deployment in "close synchronisation" is very good. We hope that this means we can deploy Phase 2 at the same time as Phase 1, for that is an absolute must due to the far over delays that we are already have to deal with. Secondly, there is no mention of Phase 3. Whether this is deliberate or not, we feel that a statement must be added that specifies the time frame or process that must be used by UNAMIR to be able to come back to the Security Council with its Phase 3 implementation plan. We would prefer

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that Phase 3 implementation simply be ready to execute at the end of the Phases 1 and 2 operational deployment but we can accept a procedure that tells us to report back during Phases 1 and 2 (in a timely fashion) in order to get Phase 3 mobile with a minimum delay.

b. Para 9. Again we feel that the cease-fire subject has been relegated much too much to a secondary position. The cease-fire will permit us to get into the far west and north-west heartland (Cyngago, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi) much sooner than if we had no cease-fire. The planned Phase 1 and Phase 2 assets do not provide us with the force levels needed to permit us to go so far into RGF territory without a cease-fire. Some UNMOs and a few formed troops could conduct very limited monitoring and humanitarian security tasks in these outer reaches with a cease-fire because it would at least provide a reasonable feeling of confidence that the shooting and aggression were being controlled through the agreement between the three of us (RGF/RPF/UNAMIR). This would be an important start and even encourage the rapid deployment of Phase 3. We thus recommend that:

(1) Para. 9 be moved up to at least para. 6 in order that it would support para 5. The paragraph should indicate clearly that it is expected that UNAMIR forces will be so deployed as to be able to monitor effectively

a cease-fire agreement and that forces, both UNMOs and formed troops, be even accelerated in their deployment in order to be able to respond to both the tasks in para. 4 and the cease-fire monitoring.

(2) Possibly a rider can be added to either para. 1 or para. 9, specifically stating that should a cease-fire agreement be signed, then Phase 3 assets will be accelerated into the theatre in order to provide the levels of troops and UNMOs that will be essential for both major tasks: the humanitarian security and support contribution and the cease-fire monitoring.

c. There is no mention of UNOMUR. It is our recommendation that UNOMUR be maintained for another 2 months as an element of political stability and then be reduced by more than half (mobile patrols and HQ staff), and then be eliminated. The delay of 2 months to keep UNOMUR at current strength is necessary due to the fact that the RGF continue to argue that the embargo is against them but does not disrupt the unorthodox rebel forces arms acquisition methods. We are now able to respond that if that is so, the only border now under surveillance is the Uganda/Rwanda border that they accuse the RPF of using for supplies. This has been a very effective argument and we wish to maximise it for as long as we can during the cease-fire negotiations over the next while.

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3. We can work with this modified resolution and look forward to the Security Council's continued support in getting men and material into Rwanda ASAP.

4. Best regards.

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UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUN -8 08 54

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY

FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE

DATE: 08 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: MIR1128

SUBJECT: PHASE ONE AND TWO TROOP DEPLOYMENT FOR NEW MANDATE 918
(1994)

1. THE ENCLOSED IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION.
2. REGARDS.

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UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
KIGALI

8 JUNE 1994

3000.15 (OPS)

SUBJECT: PHASE ONE AND TWO TROOP DEPLOYMENT FOR NEW MANDATE 918 (1994)

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXECUTION OF UNAMIR'S NEW MANDATE 918 (1994) ARE UNDERWAY. FOR A RAPID AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS, THERE IS THE NEED FOR US TO HAVE AN IDEA OF HOW SOON DEPLOYMENT WILL START FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT YOU FEED US WITH THIS INFORMATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OUR PRIORITY OF DEPLOYMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PHASE ONE

(1) GHANBAT. ITS PRESENT STRENGTH TO BE BROUGHT UP TO FULL STRENGTH OF 800 PEOPLE TO ENABLE IT CARRY OUT SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TASKS IN KIGALI.

(2) MILOBS. THEIR STRENGTH TO BE BROUGHT UP TO 320 IN ORDER TO INTEGRATE THEIR FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT INTO THE OVERALL MONITORING/SECURITY TASKS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

(3) CIVPOL. THEIR STRENGTH TO BE INCREASED TO 90 FOR THEIR EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES IN VARIOUS SECTORS THEY WILL BE DEPLOYED.

(4) MEDICAL COMPANY. A SURGICAL TEAM COMPLETE WITH EQUIPMENT AND DRUGS TO OPERATE AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE A FIELD HOSPITAL.

(5) TUNISIA PLATOON. ITS STRENGTH TO BE BROUGHT UP TO 60 TO ENABLE IT TO PERFORM ITS DUTIES AS DEFENCE COMPANY. THIS WILL ENABLE CONCENTRATED USE OF GHANBAT RESOURCES FOR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY TASKS. CURRENT STRENGTH IS 40.

(6) FORCE SIGNALS SQUADRON. REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH FORCE COMMUNICATION BEFORE MAJOR DEPLOYMENT PHASES.

B. PHASE TWO

(1) ONE MECH INF BN. TO ESTABLISH PRESENCE IN GITARAMA SECTOR.

(2) ONE MOTORIZED BN. TO BE DEPLOYED IN BUTARE.

(3) FORCE ENGR COY. TO ASSIST AND PROVIDE ENGR EFFORT AND WILL DEPLOY IN BYUMBA.

(4) LOG COY. CONDUCT FINAL COORDINATION BEFORE EXECUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE III.

(5) MAINT COY. Q TO ESTABLISH AND COORDINATE MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT INTO PHASE III.

(6) FORCE SUPPORT BN HQ. TO ESTABLISH COMMAND STRUCTURE.

(7) MILITARY POLICE COMPANY. TO BE DEPLOYED TO ASSIST IN MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PEOPLE AND CARRY OUT INVESTIGATIONS ON ANY ACTS OF VIOLATIONS.

(8) ONE HELI SON. FOR MEDEVAC, RECCE, COMMAND VISITS AND CARRYING EMERGENCY FOOD ITEMS.

2. WE FURTHER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THIS MISSION AND ALSO LIKELY TIME FRAME OF TROOP'S ARRIVAL AND EQUIPMENTS. THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF OUR OPERATIONS.

3. REGARDS.

CRN 221
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UNAMIR

94 JUN 26 11 51

TO: ANNAN UNATIONS
INFO: BARTL
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 25 JUNE 1994
FAX NO: 212-963-4879

MIR 1232

SUBJECT: VISIT OF RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS TO UNAMIR - AUSTRALIA AND CANADA

REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE 2055 OF 24 JUNE 1994.

1. RECEIPT IS ACK OF ABOVE REFERENCE.
2. THE RECCE ITENARIES OF BOTH GROUPS ARE ACCEPTABLE TO US.
3. THE CANADIANS HAVE MADE CONTACTS WITH US AND WE ARE SENDING A RECEPTION PARTY TO NAIROBI TOMORROW 26 JUN 94 TO MEET THEM.
4. FOR THE AUSTRALIANS, I WOULD LIKE TO FOREWARN THEM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A FIELD HOSPITAL INSTEAD OF USING EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE SINCE WE ARE HAVING PROBLEMS ACQUIRING, SUITABLE INFRASTRUCTURE.
5. REGARDS.

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(4 PAGES)

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 5 JUNE 1994
NUMBER: MIR 1112

SUBJECT: THE USE OF KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA) AND
ATTITUDE OF BOTH BELLIGERENTS

1. This morning, one 106 mm artillery shell fell behind the control tower near the tarmac of the KIA right at the time when the C-130 Hercules aircraft was commencing off-loading procedures. The aircraft (AC) immediately ceased off-landing procedures and moved to the runway. Seconds after the AC was on the runway for this emergency departure, the second round fell on the access tarmac to the runway and a few minutes later a third round fell again behind the tower.

2. If you recall, FC suspended the operations of exchange of displaced persons between the lines for yesterday because of the deliberate firing on the UNAMIR convoy by an RPF fire position at a main/contested intersection, even with a truce on. The firing went on even if the vehicles were either full or empty of displaced persons. The DFC was deployed to the spot in an APC in order to deter the belligerent (RPF), but with no effect.

3. Yesterday late afternoon, Radio Rwanda announced the RGF counter-offensive from the south along the Butare/Gitarama

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road and even around Gitarama. Also yesterday, FC met with COS of RGF and the COS of the Gendarmerie and discussed a variety of subjects. They expressed concern on the delays in the cease-fire negotiations, the continuing war and the security of the drop off point for the displaced persons being transferred from RPF lines.

4. KIA. Due to this morning's incident, the FC has halted all airlift operations through the KIA until this incident is fully investigated and appropriate guarantees are obtained. The crater analysis is on-going and the results are due this afternoon. We had received some rounds at the KIA in the evenings over the last four days or so, but never this close to the off-loading point and the terminal/tower. The crater analysis team could not investigate these previous craters as the impact points were not found. However, some days back, a formal protest was sent to the COS of the RGF as a result of our crater analysis of the firing on UNAMIR HQ. So far today our preliminary findings indicate that the rounds on the KIA may be coming from the same general area as those against UNAMIR HQ.

5. The fact that both sides have recent incidents of direct/deliberate fire on UNAMIR forces in the process of doing humanitarian activities, even though the senior Commanders of both sides have stated that such actions are not condoned, leaves the FC to believe that both sides are either not taking our presence and work seriously (which FC doubts), or that they are both having command and control problems with certain units.

a. RPF. The success and the effect of the massacres on their soldiers and their leadership may be such that, as can easily happen in a rebel force, the forward units may have their own ideas on the tactical situation, i.e. on at who and when to shoot.

b. RGF. The units remaining in Kigali are, and have been, relatively cut off and isolated for some time. We have heard of but not seen some heavy ammunition has been delivered to them. These units probably still have some heavy weapons in their defensive positions/camps. These units may be either acting out of despair/disenchantment, or possibly out of encouragement with the fact that the RGF counter-offensive in the south has commenced. This does open the door to the theory that this action may have been coordinated and even deliberate. Lastly, the loss of the KIA and camp Kanombe, the recent publication of the Secretary-General report of the Riza/Baril visit, may have infuriated some hard core RGF elements and politicians.

6. The slow-moving cease-fire deliberations, the evolving tactical situation on the battlefield, the deliberate actions against UNAMIR in the accomplishment of its humanitarian tasks, do not augur particularly well for the near future.

a. Cease-fire. The next meeting is planned for Tuesday 07 June and most certainly pressure will be brought to bear on the RPF by the RGF (and possibly by the chairman also) to get to the heart of the matter. We should start on the cease-fire document this time around.

b. Displaced persons evacuation. The RPF Commander has today responded to the FC's protest letter stating that severe disciplinary action has been taken and that such incidents will not happen again. On the other hand, the RGF must find, with our help, a more secure drop off point in their area as the RPF are swarming all around the current location. It makes little sense to move people out of one RPF zone into another even though it is out of the city/combat area. Options, including the setting up of a UNAMIR operated/secured camp out of the

city are being discussed with RGF authorities today and tomorrow.

c. KIA. All flights are now suspended at the KIA until we can, as much as humanly possible, clarify who fired deliberately against our AC this morning and why they did it. FC, as Acting Mission Head, has ordered that preparations be made to move the airhead to Entebbe and then use the overland route. RPF, UNOMUR, UNAMIR in Nairobi and UNDP Resident Representative in Kampala are being alerted. This may be the situation for the next 2 or 4 days at least.

7. Fuel/food. The Mission now has only three days of rations and fuel left. We must suspend our movement of displaced persons until we get the fuel. Actions are being taken to move what we need from Tanzania to Nairobi/Entebbe. We must move these consumables from Entebbe by road to Kigali. We have 41 days of bottled water.

8. Conclusion. The changing tactical scenario between the belligerents, including the resurgence (counter-offensive) of the RGF, and a yet unexplained setting of the UNICEF building (200 meters from our HQ and reced for use by out humanitarian people) for deliberate demolition by unknown persons/group, added to the actions described above, require a serious reassessment of the situation. FC is reviewing his next move on all fronts.

9. Best regards.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIRKYF 927
MIR 1101

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DPCMr. Muter
you in your letter
and return please.

TO : ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, SRSG, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: AFRICA'S POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
APPEAL FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF UNAMIR'S FORCE

DATE : 3 JUNE 1994

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1. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S VISITS TO VARIOUS AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN AFRICA HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF APPROPRIATE REPORTS. ON 2 JUNE IN ADDIS-ABABA, HE HELD ADDITIONALLY VERY FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS LASTING ABOUT TWO HOURS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY DEALING WITH JOINT ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE OAU AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE TO MAKE A SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 918 (1994).

2. DURING THEIR CONVERSATIONS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU MENTIONED THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 5 MAY AS WELL AS THE MEETING HELD IN JOHANNESBURG CONCERNING THE MANDATE OF THE UNAMIR-2 FORCE AND THE CRUCIAL ROLE THAT AFRICAN STATES MUST PLAY IN ITS MOBILIZATION. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU ALSO REVIEWED HIS MEETINGS WITH SEVERAL AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE INCLUDING THOSE OF GHANA, SENEGAL, NIGERIA, ZAMBIA, NAMIBIA, AND ZIMBABWE IN PARTICULAR.

3. FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATIONS HELD BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU, IT APPEARS THAT THE AFRICAN STATES CONSULTED ARE READY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE APPEAL MADE BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SEND CONTINGENTS TO RWANDA IN KEEPING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 918 (1994).

FC EDIT

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SENEGAL, GHANA, ETHIOPIA, ZIMBABWE, NIGERIA, CONGO, NAMIBIA, AND TANZANIA ARE NOW READY AND WILLING TO MAKE CONTINGENTS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. SUCH WILLINGNESS SHOULD BE PUT TO USE NOW BY INITIATING THE SENDING OF TROOPS TO RWANDA WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE FULL FORCE OF 5,500 TO BE READY.

4. IT SHOULD HOWEVER BE EMPHASIZED THAT ALL AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONSULTED INSIST AND SET AS A PRE-CONDITION THAT THE NECESSARY FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM BEFORE THEY UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION WHATSOEVER. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE QUICKEST RESULTS, THE UNITED NATIONS MUST THEREFORE DIRECT ITS INITIATIVES TO THE COUNTRIES READY TO SUPPLY SUCH RESOURCES.

5. THE HEADS OF STATE CONTACTED SHOWED NEVERTHELESS GREAT SCEPTICISM CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE RWANDESE CRISIS ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. THEY BASE THIS PESSIMISM ON THE DEEP SPLIT AND UNPRECEDENTED TRAGEDY INFLICTED BY WAR ON THE COUNTRY'S NATIONAL UNITY AND THE MILITARY REALITIES ON THE GROUND. THE KENYAN PRESIDENT HAS CONVENED A MEETING FOR 6 JUNE TO WHICH HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM UGANDA, ZAIRE, AND TANZANIA ARE INVITED. HE HAS HOWEVER EXPRESSED UNEQUIVOCALLY HIS SCEPTICISM WITH RESPECT TO THE RESULTS OF THIS SUMMIT. THIS SCEPTICISM IS SHARED TO A LARGE EXTENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU WHO BELIEVES THAT THE NEW REALITY IN RWANDA NO LONGER MAKES POSSIBLE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT UNLESS MODIFIED AT THE INITIATIVE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. IN ITS SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE RWANDESE CRISIS THE UNITED NATIONS MUST TAKE THIS NEW REALITY INTO CONSIDERATION. IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY AND PARTICULARLY ITS UNITY THAT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ON THE GROUND, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE SUB-REGION PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO FOSTER DIALOGUE AND REACH A POLITICAL SOLUTION SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA.

6. BEST REGARDS.

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government?*



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

CRN 196
MIR 1094

94 JUN -3 12 03

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 3 JUNE 1994
NUMBER: _____
SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF NEW PHASE II NEIGHBOURING
REFERENCE: MY CODE CABLE CRN 192 (MIR 1073) DATED 31 MAY 1993

1. In my above code cable, three references were mentioned. In response to yesterday's telephone queries from your office, please find below the explanation concerning references A. and C:
 - A. Reference A: MY ASSESSMENT DATED 21 MAY 94. Please find a copy attached.
 - B. Reference C. YOUR UNAMIR 1778 DATED 26 MAY 94. Please note that this reference should read: "YOUR UNAMIR 1738 DATED 26 MAY 94". Its subject was: "Meeting with US officials".
2. We apologize for the incomplete/incorrect references provided in my previous code cable CRN 192 and hope the present information clarifies the situation.
3. Best regards.

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY

FROM: MAI GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR

DATE: 21 MAY 1994

NUMBER:

NUMBER OF PAGES: SEVEN ONLY

SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A RE-ASSESSMENT PAPER ON THE MENTIONED SUBJECT.

2. REGARDS.

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SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

GENERAL

1. Fighting in Kigali City area has intensified significantly. RPF troops are closing in and launching offensive operations in Kigali city. They seem all out to capture Kigali International Airport (KIA) and Camp Kanombe barracks. UNAMIR has been protecting KIA physically since the outbreak of hostilities. Of late the terminal site has become dangerous for UN troops as both factions are engaged in heavy fighting in and around the area.

2. The proposal of turning the Kigali International Airport into a UN Neutral Territory has not been agreed upon. The RPF had initially agreed on the proposal but now they wish the RGF to withdraw their forces from KIA and from Camp Kanombe and have them relocate at a safe distance from these sites. The Government/RGF have had serious reservations as to UNAMIR's ability to defend the airfield against RPF attack since the beginning and then be able to keep the airfield neutral even under pressure. FC received this morning the RGF proposal for the establishment of the airport as a neutral territory but they have included some restrictions/conditions that are yet to be resolved between us, RPF and of course the RGF. It is not at all expected that the RGF will accept moving from Kanombe area. This stumbling block was finally discussed in detail with the RPF today. They stated, through the LO, that the airport and Camp Kanombe are part of the package. This could be the show stopper of this exercise. FC has written formal comments/concerns to Maj Gen Kagame and has asked him for a prompt reply. If FC does not see any solution by tomorrow, then he will initiate the withdrawal from the airport, to the Amahoro complex.

3. Presently the northern part of the KIA is under heavy artillery/mortar and small arms fire due to the RPF firing at RGF forces around and within the inner perimeter of the airfield, particularly around the main terminal buildings. Scheduled flights on 19, 20 and 21 May 94 were cancelled. KIA has turned into an important military target as the RPF continue their pressure on the RGF resulting in RGF soldiers filtering into the airfield complex. The damage to the infrastructure is increasing significantly as the tarmac and the landing strip are receiving more and more hits from mortar/artillery fire. The tower is now inoperative as RGF put a MG post there and it was neutralised. Based on the latest situation, a re-assessment of the deployment plan and tasks of Phase-1 UNAMIR II was conducted.

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OPTIONS FOR CONTROL OF KIA

4. The various options of control/availability of the KIA are as under:

a. KIA becomes neutral territory in four days. This is acceptable as we do not expect Phase I of UNAMIR II build up to commence before then and we have enough resources to take care of ourselves till then. State of the airfield by then will be a concern if fighting continues. Such an eventuality requires at least staffing of an alternate airhead option.

b. RGF refuses to make KIA neutral territory but agrees to secure it with UNAMIR II. This would be workable as it has in the past for UNAMIR but RPF will never accept this. The KIA will most certainly become a military target. Such eventuality requires an alternate airhead to be identified now.

c. The KIA becomes a neutral territory with RGF and RPF doing monitoring of UNAMIR II for transparency. This is acceptable to us and we know it is to RPF as they had proposed it at one time. RGF have been approached on it and no response received as yet. If we get the answers today/tomorrow that will be fine, but staffing of an alternate site is needed to cater for the unexpected.

d. RPF gain control of the airfield. This is a possibility. How long it will take them to do that ? Will it include Camp Kanombe ? Will the airfield be damaged in the fighting or deliberately by the withdrawing RGF ? These concerns require us to look at and prepare an alternate airhead now.

e. The possibility on a stalemate at and around the airfield is possible and in such a case an alternate airhead is essential now.

f. The stalemate happens but a truce/cease fire is signed. This requires an alternate airhead be reconnoitred for possible use if there are serious violations.

AIRFIELD NEEDS FOR UNAMIR II OPERATIONS

5. Requirement of airfield for UNAMIR II can be divided into two; Present and Future.

a. Present Requirement.

(1) Essential Support. To maintain forces during Phase 1 essential supplies like food, water and fuel

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will be needed. Presently UNAMIR II has a stock of 14 days of food, water and fuel. We can sustain at least 10 days without essential supplies. If KIA is closed for 10 days, it will not be a problem to continue our tasks.

(2) Medical Evacuation. For medical evacuation, UNAMIR II needs to keep the airport under its security control.

(3) Essential Stores. UNAMIR II with its present strength can sustain with its essential stores for the time being. No essential stores are required until the re-enforcements arrive.

(4) For In/Out Passengers. It is not critical to bring in or take out UNAMIR II personnel from Kigali at this time. However, if flights arrive, passengers can avail the facility for increasing the staff available and for welfare opportunities.

(5) Humanitarian Material. Indeed Rwanda needs a lot of help in terms of food, water and medicine. These needs can be brought in by air for at least Kigali. But this bridge still has not been maximized. The effort to utilize the C-130 already flying from Nairobi to Kigali, plus the two (2) German aircrafts about to come in can do more but there does not seem to be enough stocks available at Nairobi.

From the above assessment, it is derived that even if the KIA is not held by the Force, UNAMIR II could sustain and continue its operations for another 10 days or so. However the greatest concern we have is the evacuation of casualties. The alternate plan to use the helicopters from UNOMUR is still possible but as yet has not been used nor exercised. It would be most advisable that a secondary airfield, capable of handling C-130 type aircraft be reced for possible use as soon as possible.

b. Future Needs.

(1) GHANBAT Re-enforcement. To bring the strength of GHANBATT to 800 personnel and mechanizing it, an airhead is an absolute necessity. The airfield will be required for bringing troops, weapon systems, main combat vehicles (APCs) and ammunition.

(2) Advance Parties. Advance and reconnaissance parties of Engineers, Signals, Fd Medical Hospital and Log Coy will also be arriving during Phase 1 in order to prepare for Phase II.

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(3) Build-up of Supplies. Food, water, fuel, medical stores, defence stores and spares will be needed to support the augmented force.

A secure airhead is a fundamental need for the deployment of troops and equipments in Phase 1. Phase 1 deployment is supposed to commence between D+7 to D+14 (24-31 May 94) and probably finish between D+21 to D+28 (7-14 June 94). With the little time available, the state of the KIA infrastructure, the stagnation in the cease fire implementation, all these elements mitigate against the KIA being our main airhead. An alternate principal airfield is required in the shortest of time possible in order not to stop/slow down the deployment of Phase I assets.

TASKS IN KIGALI WITHIN MANDATE-PHASE I

6. UNAMIR II is presently and will continue to perform following tasks in Kigali Sector:

- a. Protection/support people in danger.
- b. Transfer of people in danger.
- c. Escort Duties.
- d. Patrolling in city area.
- e. Units in the supply of food to refugees and distressed people.
- f. Protection of UN installations.
- g. Liaison with both the parties for possible cease fire.
- h. Monitoring of truce/cease fire.
- i. Evacuation of casualties by air.
- j. Providing escorts, liaison and monitoring by UNMOs.
- k. Protection of KIA.

One infantry battalion (-) is needed full time to provide the protection and security of the KIA. If we don't need to protect the KIA as a neutral territory, then the above mentioned tasks (less sub-para k of course) could under very difficult conditions be carried out without the re-enforcement of GHANBATT during Phase-1. Again such an eventuality could be considered only if the proper equipment, materiel, personnel rotation/welfare and

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increased medical and logistic support are made available now.

7. GHANBATT. In Phase I, it was planned to bring Ghanbatt up to its full strength. Present strength is 321 and 479 personnel are supposed to join the battalion starting D+7 to D+14. The use of an alternate airport in a neighboring country - (BUJUMBURA or GOMA) and local smaller airports within Rwanda (CYANGUGU/GISENYI/RUHENGIERI) are essentials for the reasons stated above. Under these circumstances we see the need to divide the battalion and deploy one maybe two coys for securing the new airport (outside Rwanda), Logistics base (in Rwanda) near these airports (Butare or Gisenyi) and for convoy protection duties along the Mission's life line and the support/security of local humanitarian activities. Thus any addition to the present level of forces deployed, or redeployed in Kigali, without the task of the KIA, the following additional tasks may have to be under taken:

- a. Secure the alternative airhead (BUGUMBURA or GOMA).
- b. Secure the new logistics base behind to the airhead (BUTARE or GISENYI).
- c. Provide convoy escorts from alternate airhead to Kigali.
- d. Secure a local smaller airfield in Rwanda in order to establish the humanitarian air bridge that has been closed for the last three (3) days (CYANGUGU, RUHENGIERI, GISENYI, BUTARE).

8. Alternate Airhead. The KIA looks less and less as our principal entry point for UNAMIR II. It is therefore pertinent to consider the implementation of an alternative airhead now in order to permit Phase I to commence. Our first recommendation is BUJUMBURA airfield (BURUNDI) and the second one being GOMA (ZAIRE). Both airfields could also be used simultaneously if the volume of airlift required it. If we use BUJUMBURA, we need to establish a secure log base at Butare, for Goma it would be in Gisenyi. These main alternate airfields should be able to accommodate our build-up needs before the Phase I deployment is commenced. The secondary airfields could be functional within days of closing or leaving the KIA. That can accommodate C-130 and Trausall (C-160) type aircraft.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

9. It is then recommended that all the forces and material planned for deployment in Phase I should continued to move to Rwanda according to the current milestone. However, the use of

9/8

©
UN RESTRICTED

alternate airhead with its closeby logistics base and the use of the secondary airfields should be implemented soonest if the results of the negotiations between RPF, RGF and UNAMIR II do not conclude over the next day or so. The troops to task allocation proposed in this paper, without the KIA task will permit early deployment in the RGF areas and as such accelerate the securing of conditions for humanitarian relief in this particularly difficult area.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

7
UN RESTRICTED

CRYPTO ROOM. PLS PASS TO SITCEN N.Y.

CRN 195 MIR 1093



UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 94 JUN -3 11 32

1/5

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR KIGALI

INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, NEW YORK

DATE: 03 JUNE 1994

SUBJECT: A REPORT ON UN TECHNICAL TEAM VISIT
TO BURUNDI FROM 18 TO 20 MAY 1994

1. A COPY OF THE REPORT ON THE UN TECHNICAL TEAM'S VISIT TO BURUNDI FROM 18 TO 20 MAY 1994 IS FORWARDED FOR ACTION AND INFORMATION.

2. I FULLY SUPPORT THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE REPORT.

3. BEST REGARDS.

mir 1093

ESIR

UN ~~RESTRICTED~~

UNAMIR
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

2/5

To: FC 1000.7/(DFC)/G/7

From: DFC

Info: Executive Director, CAO

Date: 25 May, 1994

Subject: A REPORT ON UN TECHNICAL TEAM
VISIT TO BURUNDI FROM 18 TO 20 MAY 1994

Reference:

A. Outgoing Fax No. KMF 976 of 16 May 94.

1. I am submitting the following report on the visit of the United Nations Technical Team to Burundi from 18 to 20 May 1994.

GENERAL

2. A UN Technical Team as composed below left Kigali, Rwanda on Tuesday 17 May 1994 for Bujumbura, Burundi via Nairobi vide reference A.

- a. Brig Gen HK Anyidoho - DFC UNAMIR, Team Leader
- b. Col ID Tikoca - CMO UNAMIR, Member
- c. Maj ND Babacar - MILOB, Member/Secretary

3. Whiles in Bujumbura the team had discussions with the SRSG of Burundi, the military commander of the OAU Mission and officials (both military and civilians) of Burundi. The Team also had a rare opportunity to participate in a seminar on Burundi organised by the SRSG and the Scandinavian African Institute. The team left Bujumbura on 20 May to Nairobi and arrived in Kigali on 23 May 1994.

AIM

4. The aim of this report is to present an overview of the visit and make recommendations.

MISSION

5. The Technical Team left for Bujumbura without a mission or clear directive but with the anticipation that guidance will be provided by the SRSG of Burundi on arrival in Bujumbura.

A DIALOGUE ON BURUNDI

6. Upon arrival, we were invited by the SRSG to a Seminar that was organised by him and Scandinavian African Institute. It was a clever move on the part of the SRSG to expose us to the Burundese authorities to avoid suspicion. We, therefore, participated fully in the last debate and the closing ceremony which was performed by the Interim President of Burundi. The objectives of the seminar are as follows:

- a. Restoration of confidence, stability and democracy.
- b. National and sub-regional concerns on security matters.
- c. Reconciliation and co-existence.
- d. Protection of human rights of minorities and national unity.

MEETING WITH MR OULD-ABDALLAH, SRSG - BURUNDI

7. On Thursday 19th May 1994, we held our first meeting with the SRSG. Despite lack of information to him on our arrival he received us very well and invited us to a lunch also. During our discussions he showed us a number of documents he sent to UN New York clearly advising against the Technical Team's visit to Burundi in view of the delicate nature of the political situation in that country. He stated clearly that there was no need for such a team at this stage of the political crisis in Burundi. He was perfectly in charge and was using very tactful methods, diplomacy, broadcast, joint meetings with all sections of the community and transparent neutrality in handling the situation and he is succeeding. We noticed during our short stay that he is very much respected and he is in charge of his mission in Burundi. Our sudden appearance, therefore, embarrassed him and the Burundese started speculating. The Burundese really want no UN Force in their country especially one related to Rwanda. Indeed the Burundese refer to the situation in Rwanda as a lesson for them. The last organisation they want to deal with is any form of outside military force. I specifically asked the SRSG on using Bujumbura airport as a staging ground for UNAMIR II and he told us that he has been educating the authorities on the advantages they stand to get if they allow it but they told him they will only accept such UN flights if there is ceasefire in Rwanda.

OAU MISSION IN BURUNDI

8. We met the military commander of the OAU Mission in Burundi who is a Colonel from Tunisia. He briefed us thoroughly on what he and his team have been going through since December 17th 1993. The day they arrived in Burundi, they were detained at the airport under some sort of arrest/restriction for five hours before reluctantly allowing them to enter the city of Bujumbura. Since their arrival, they have been allowed to put on military uniform only twice. Their movement is very much restricted and they are miserable from all indications. Their mission ends on 17th of June 1994 and he personally sounded like he would prefer a non-renewal if the same conditions under which they have been operating persist.

INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH BURUNDESE OFFICIALS
(MILITARY AND CIVILIANS)

9. All the Government officials that the team had discussions with expressed their concern that the Burundi issue is a political affair that has to be solved politically and therefore there is no need for a regional or international military presence in Burundi. Dr Mpawenayo Prosper, a professor of the University of Burundi, stated during the meeting that Burundi is not involved in a civil war but is a victim of socio-political terrorism.

DEPARTURE FROM BURUNDI

10. We left Bujumbura on Friday 20th May 1994 for Nairobi on our way back to Rwanda.

OBSERVATIONS

11. The following observations were made in the capital Bujumbura during the team's visit:

- a. The city is not heavily populated in spite of the dense population of Burundi. The inhabitants are predominately Tutsis.
- b. Military personnel are visibly deployed at strategic points such as the airport, major crossroads in the town and around the President's residence.
- c. The army and gendarmes officers move about with armed guards.
- d. Social activities in the night are somehow limited possibly due to insecurity.


CONCLUSION

12. The Technical Team was in Bujumbura, Burundi from 18 to 20 May 1994. On arrival it became clear that the SRSG of Burundi did not really think there was the need for such a visit. It was also realised that the problem in Burundi is political and the Burundese obviously resent any form of international force in solving their problem as they think such a force does not seem to be working well in Rwanda. The OAU Military Team already in Burundi is not gainfully employed and its presence is resented. The SRSG indicated that the presence of the Technical Team in Burundi raised suspicion and queries from the Government officials.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The team recommends the following:

- a. The United Nations should not send any military personnel to Burundi now unless the SRSG specifically requests for it.
- b. Any team to be sent to Burundi in the future may not necessarily have to come from UNAMIR.
- c. Any team in Burundi should be in constant communications with UNAMIR.
- d. All future proposals or discussions involving Burundi should be coordinated with all relevant authorities.
- e. If the expanded UNAMIR force has to use Bujumbura airport as a staging ground, then UN New York has to take the case up with the Burundese authorities.



HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen
Team Leader



UNAMIR MINUAR

CRN 193 MR 1084

UNAMIR
194 JUN -2 15 1994

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 2 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: PAPAL REQUEST/KABGUYI

REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE 1786 DATED 1 JUNE 1994

1. After listening to the reports from the UNAMIR officers that I sent to KABGUYI, I share your concern for the safety of the people there. I find the fact that I do not have sufficient troops to carry out such a mission extremely frustrating. I will continue to send UNMOs to visit KABGUYI as often as I can spare them, but can do no more until I get more troops.

2. Best regards.

(FC) EDIR

CRN 194
MIR 1087

UNAMIR

NY. Please Pass
TO UNOMUR UGANDA
Thanks
B.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO: COL ASRAR, UNOMUR, KABALE

FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR

DATE: 02 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: FAX (256) 486-23816

NO OF PAGES: TWO

SUBJECT: UNOMUR REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. ATTACHED IS A SELF EXPLANATORY FAX FROM UNHQ NEW YORK FOR YOUR ACTION.
2. PLEASE SUBMIT A DRAFT FOR FC'S PERUSAL BY 05 JUNE 1994.
3. REGARDS.

③ F.C.
J'ai parlé le matin
3 juin au Colonel ASRAR
qui m'a fait de nos
en vye la contribution
au exploit de nos 4 min au
plus tard. Pierre 7 Me'h
3/6/94

② M. Michel
J'ai besoin de
support de vous et
M. Desmarche pour
mettre ceci en marche
des nouvelles, quand elles
apparaissent, pour paraître
pour paraître 3 adresses. C'est la
nécessité de qui il faut
voir.

FC EDIR

④
Pier
3/6



2NR 284 11/1

2/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1994 JUN -2 05:55

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 1 June 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1784
SUBJECT: UNOMUR: Report to the Security Council

②
JRC
COO
8/46
Please get draft from UNOMUR ASAP. He demands I could do something please.
RC
2/6

1. As you are aware, in accordance with resolutions 846 (1993) and 891 (1993), the mandate of UNOMUR will expire on 22 June and the Secretary-General will have to submit a report to the Security Council before that date. In order to allow sufficient time for the concerned Departments at Headquarters to review the report and ensure its timely submission to the Secretary-General's office, it would be very much appreciated if you could send us a draft by Wednesday, 8 June.

2. The draft should cover developments which have occurred since the last report, with particular emphasis on the efforts made by UNOMUR to extend its monitoring activities to the whole border following the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda.

3. We are inclined to think that, in view of the embargo on arms deliveries to Rwanda decided under resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, UNOMUR has perhaps lost its "raison d'être", since there is no reason for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. Moreover, the assets of UNOMUR could, in the present circumstances, be better used to reinforce UNAMIR. We therefore feel that the Secretary-General should perhaps recommend that UNOMUR be shut down and its assets transferred to UNAMIR. If you agree with this approach, please include an appropriate narrative to this effect in the draft report. Thanks and best regards.

FC EDIR



KyF 916
MIR 1085

1/2 UNAMIR
194 JUN -2 18 08

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *1/1* DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI *R. G. J.*

DATE: 2 JUNE 1994 *34879*

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Second round of ceasefire talks between RGF and RPA

Please find attached press release for your information.

Best regards.



(FC) EDIR

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

BIEP
PRESS RELEASE NO.44/94

2/2
P. H. L.

RWANDA: SECOND ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) AND RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA), AT UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS, KIGALI, RWANDA, THURSDAY, 2 JUNE 1994

Kigali, (BIEP) 2 June 1994

A second round of talks on the modality of a ceasefire between the Rwandese Government Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army took place today at UNAMIR Headquarters in Kigali under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Commander, Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho from Ghana. The first round of talks was held on Monday 30 May 1994. The two delegations which were headed by Colonel Frank Mugambage for the RPA and Brigadier General Marcel Gatsinzi for the RGF committed themselves to take all measures necessary to facilitate the continued evacuation of all displaced persons. They agreed on the concept of a ceasefire.

On the question of the massacres and the inflammatory broadcast consultations are ongoing to bring the situation under control in RGF Sector.

The two delegations decided to meet again under UNAMIR auspices at a later date.

Kigali, Rwanda - Tel: (via New York) 212 963 3093/3092
Fax: 212 963 3090

CRN 194
MIR 1087

UNAMIR

NY: Please Pass
TO UNOMUR UGANDA
Thanks

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO: COL ASRAR, UNOMUR, KABALE
FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR
DATE: 02 JUNE 1994
NUMBER: FAX (256) 486-23816
NO OF PAGES: TWO

SUBJECT: UNOMUR REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. ATTACHED IS A SELF EXPLANATORY FAX FROM UNHQ NEW YORK FOR YOUR ACTION.
2. PLEASE SUBMIT A DRAFT FOR FC'S PERUSAL BY 05 JUNE 1994.
3. REGARDS.

C

②
M. H. H. H.
J'ai besoin de
support de main et
M. Dallaire pour
mettre ceci en marche
des nouvelles, quand elles
apparaissent, quand elles
arrivent, de Kabale. Ceci
pour paraître 3 articles. C'est la
signature et qui il faudra
voir.

11
D
3/6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 1 June 1994
 NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1784
 SUBJECT: UNOMUR: Report to the Security Council

UNAMIR

194 JUN -2

05:55

②
 DRC
 COO
 Please get draft from UNOMUR ASAP. He should do document please.
 RC
 2/6

1. As you are aware, in accordance with resolutions 846 (1993) and 891 (1993), the mandate of UNOMUR will expire on 22 June and the Secretary-General will have to submit a report to the Security Council before that date. In order to allow sufficient time for the concerned Departments at Headquarters to review the report and ensure its timely submission to the Secretary-General's office, it would be very much appreciated if you could send us a draft by Wednesday, 8 June.
2. The draft should cover developments which have occurred since the last report, with particular emphasis on the efforts made by UNOMUR to extend its monitoring activities to the whole border following the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda.
3. We are inclined to think that, in view of the embargo on arms deliveries to Rwanda decided under resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, UNOMUR has perhaps lost its "raison d'être", since there is no reason for monitoring one of Rwanda's borders and not the others. Moreover, the assets of UNOMUR could, in the present circumstances, be better used to reinforce UNAMIR. We therefore feel that the Secretary-General should perhaps recommend that UNOMUR be shut down and its assets transferred to UNAMIR. If you agree with this approach, please include an appropriate narrative to this effect in the draft report. Thanks and best regards.





UNAMIR - MINUAR

CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM:  DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI 

DATE: 31 MAY 1994

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Ceasefire talks between the RGF and RPF in Rwanda

1. Please find attached a brief note on the ceasefire talks. Dr. Kabia has dictated its contents to the Spokesman of the Secretary-General who happened to have called for a briefing when the note was being prepared.

2. Best regards.

A handwritten signature, likely of J. Dallaire, consisting of a stylized 'J' and 'D'.

Ceasefire talks between the RGF and RPF in Rwanda

1. On 30 May, the warring parties in the civil conflict in Rwanda met for ceasefire talks at UNAMIR Headquarters, under the auspices of UNAMIR. The RPF delegation was led by Colonel Mugambagye and the RGF by Brig. General Gatsinzi. The talks were chaired by UNAMIR Deputy Force Commander Brig. General Anyidoho of Ghana.
2. The parties accepted the necessity for an immediate cessation of hostilities so as to allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance and create the necessary environment for the resumption of peace process. They also reaffirmed their commitment and support for UNAMIR's evacuation operation which involved the simultaneous cross-over transfer of displaced persons trapped behind enemy lines.
3. The evacuation operation which was commenced on 27 and continued on 28 and 30 has resulted in the evacuation of 1,500 persons from Hotel Mills Collins and Amahoro Stadium in Kigali to safe areas of their choice. This operation was however briefly interrupted on 31 May when an officer with the Senegalese contingent of UNAMIR was killed by a mortar shell which hit the UN vehicle he was driving from Hotel Mills Collins to UNAMIR headquarters. It is pertinent to note that the point of incident was a check-point manned by RGF.

The talks between the warring parties ended following a six hours exchange between the parties during which RPF demanded firm commitments from the RGF that they would stop the massacres and inflammatory broadcasts. They stressed these preconditions had to be met before the discussions on the ceasefire could be undertaken. The RGF delegation agreed to refer these preconditions to its High Command for reaction, although they reflected blanket condemnations of all members of the government forces for the atrocities committed by some elements of the forces. Finally, both parties agreed to resume the ceasefire talks on Thursday 2 June at UNAMIR Headquarters, under the auspices of UNAMIR.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN/190
MIR/1062

CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1994 MAY 31

09 39

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *Booh-Booh* BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI (on mission - dictated on phone)

DATE: 31 MAY 1994 *OKB*

NO. OF PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: Contacts with African Governments

1. I am leaving Dakar today for Nairobi following a very successful meeting with President Diouf of Senegal. During our meeting which was also attended by the Foreign and Defence ministers, the President reaffirmed his decision to commit an infantry battalion to UNAMIR in Rwanda. He however expressed his concern about the failure or reluctance of developed countries to provide equipment and other logistic support for the African troops including the Senegalese contingent.

2. The President stressed the serious limitation of African countries to fully participate in peace-keeping operations due to a lack of financial resources. He recalled that expenditures of this nature are usually unanticipated and thus are not included in the national budget. He indicated that he would send a high ranking official to New York to hold discussions with Mr. Kofi Annan on the matter. The President called on the warring parties in Rwanda to agree to a ceasefire so that Humanitarian Assistance could be delivered to the displaced people in the country.

3. He expressed appreciation for the visit of the SRSG and wished him and the UN Secretary-General success in their efforts to end the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and the current conflicts in the country.

BDIR only



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 MAY 29 20 44

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI (ON MISSION)

DATE: 29 MAY 1994

In keeping with the Secretary General's instructions, the Special Representative has initiated his contacts with various African heads of state with a view to bringing the UNAMIR force up to strength. On 25 May he travelled to Libreville where he was to meet the President of Gabon. Delays related to the UN aircraft made available kept him from arriving on time in Libreville where the Gabonese head of state was expecting him in the late morning. Thus only on 26 May could the Special Representative meet the Secretary-General of the Presidency who excused the President who was detained by the Malian Prime Minister's visit and preparations for the council of Minister's meeting the same afternoon.

Discussion with the Secretary General of the Presidency dealt with the situation in Rwanda and particularly diplomatic initiatives taken by the heads of state of the sub-region and the most recent decisions by the Security Council to strengthen the United Nations Mission in Rwanda.

Regarding the first point, the Secretary General of the Presidency informed us of his meeting with a Rwanda Government delegation led by the Minister of Planning. He emphasized his disappointment with the military information provided by the Rwandese Government which proved a misrepresentation of the real situation in the field. He added that, throughout their discussions in Libreville, the Rwanda Government never expressed any desire for humanitarian assistance from the Gabonese Government.

With respect to diplomatic initiatives at the sub-region level, the Secretary General of the President informed us of a meeting to be held very soon between heads of state aimed at finding lasting solution to the Rwanda and Burundi crisis and enhancing economic cooperation between their countries.

Concerning the Security Council's latest resolution and the Secretary General's subsequent appeal for troop contributions, the Secretary General of the Presidency assured us he would submit these matters to the President of Gabon and the Council of ministers to be held the same day.

The Special Representative was then welcomed on 27 May for a hearing by the President of Ghana to whom he conveyed the concerns of the international community and the United Nations in particular. The Ghanain president emphasized during these discussions his disappointment with the Security Council's hesitation and the little interest in Rwanda's plight shown by it and by certain major powers. The Ghanain head of state inquired about the precise

1/2 2/2

Force in Rwanda, his government would have difficulties in committing troops to an ill-defined military operations. He added that without the logistic support of certain major powers, in particular the United States, the United Nations force in Rwanda could end in failure and loss of life both in the UN force and in what remains of the Rwandese population. He stated his belief that, though the Rwanda crisis is a challenge to Africa and the international community, its solution requires faultless cooperation between the major powers of the security council and the African states who are asked to make a special commitment. He also expressed his fears concerning the security of the UNAMIR force upon its arrival in Kigali if the Airport's neutrality is not ensured under United Nations supervision.

The Ghanain Head of State did not reject in principle an increase in his country's contribution to the United Nations force, but would like clarification of the above-mentioned points which seem to worry the Ghanaian Government and people. To show his special interest in the Rwanda crisis, the President has decided to make the political commitment of sending a delegation led by a special political adviser to Zaire and Uganda. His aim apparently is to test the good will of the two countries bordering Rwanda whose influence on the belligerent parties is greatest.

Following his discussions with the Gabonese and Ghanain authorities, the SRSG met with the President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire on 28 May. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also attended. He first conveyed to the President the Secretary General's concerns regarding the situation still prevailing in Rwanda. He then underscored the international community's responsibility in this matter and the primary role to be played by African heads of states in response to the requirements of the Security Council's most recent resolution on Rwanda. The SRSG then expressed to the President the wishes for success sent by the Secretary General to him and to the Ivorian people.

The President of Cote d'Ivoire thanked the Secretary General for his confidence and asked the SRSG to express to the Secretary General congratulations for his tireless efforts to promote peace in the world and particularly in Rwanda. He expressed his view that the catastrophe in Rwanda is cause for legitimate concern for the UN and Africa in particular. He said that Cote d'Ivoire would not ignore its responsibilities and duty with respect to all peace-keeping operations including the one in Rwanda. He asked however for time for reflection and to submit the issue to his government for its opinion. We also expressed to the SRSG his country's concerns over the crisis still affecting Liberia and the measures his government was compelled to take to prevent the spread of the crisis to neighbouring countries and to his own. He added that the Ivorian armed forces are consequently mobilized on the Ivorian-Liberian border in order to contain the conflict and assist the people living on both sides of the border. He also pointed out the Ivorian forces' limited experience with peace-keeping operations and, given the current social and economic climate, the need to keep them to the extent possible in Cote d'Ivoire to ensure peace and security in the region. He wondered about the possibility and effectiveness of a UN force in Rwanda without the cooperation of the two parties to the Arusha Peace Agreement. He promised to pay special attention to this problem which, he said, is a tragedy for which an urgent and lasting solution must be found. Otherwise, he added, the damage could spread to the entire sub-region.

The SRSG is scheduled to meet the President of Senegal on 30 May and thereafter will meet the Secretary General of the OAU and the President of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa.

Best Regards

P11/1

ZMF 943

TO: Mr. Tedla Teshome
UNDP Resident Representative
Kampala, Uganda

FAX NO: 256 41 244 801

FROM: Dr. Abdul H. Kabia
Executive Director
UNAMIR, Kigali

FAX NO: 212 963 3090
212 963 3097

DATE: 27 May 1994

SUBJECT: Entebbe Airport as an alternate airhead for UNAMIR

UNAMIR
27 MAY 1994
42

Misc - 729

1. Please be advised that UNAMIR has initiated discussions with the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandese Government Forces in Rwanda for a ceasefire and unimpeded use of the Kigali International Airport by UNAMIR for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and support services. While these discussions are continuing, we wish to explore the possibility of using alternate airheads in the neighbouring countries for the purposes stated above. In this connection, we would appreciate your finding out from the authorities in Uganda what their reaction would be to a possible request for the use of Entebbe Airport by UNAMIR for the transportation of humanitarian relief supplies and support services.

2. Best regards.

Handwritten notes:
This is a copy
of the letter to
the UNDP Resident
Representative in
Kampala, Uganda
for his information
and for his use
in his report to
the UNDP
Executive Director
in Kigali
27/5

Handwritten notes:
-> ③
see / H. 04/6
cool
info.
29/5

UNAMIR
27 MAY 1994
48

Handwritten note:
E/D/16

UNAMIR

94 MAY 26 08 54

UNAMIR

CRN-188 1/3

OUT-GOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY.
FROM : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR.
DATE : 26 MAY 94.

NUMBER : MIR-1036

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES : 3 (THREE).

SUBJECT : THE REQUIREMENT FOR M 113 TYPE ARMoured PERSONNEL
CARRIERS FOR UNAMIR II MECHANIZED BATTALIONS

1. Please find attached a paper on mentioned subject for your necessary action.

2. Regards.

}

UNAMIR
94 MAY 26 09 09

THE REQUIREMENT FOR M113 TYPE ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS FOR UNAMIR II MECHANIZED BATTALIONS

GENERAL

1. IT HAS BEEN PROPOSED THAT TWO OF THE BATTALIONS TO BE DEPLOYED IN RWANDA WITH UNAMIR II BE MECHANIZED AND EQUIPPED WITH M113 TYPE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APCs). WITH THE APCs, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE TROOPS OPERATING THEM WILL HAVE THE MUCH NEEDED PROTECTION, MOBILITY, FLEXIBILITY AND MINIMUM FIREPOWER REQUIRED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ENORMOUS HUMANITARIAN TASKS THAT UNAMIR II IS EXPECTED TO PERFORM. THE TRACKED M113 TYPE APCs ARE DEEMED ESSENTIAL AND MORE OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE THAN THE WHEELED APCs FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. SHOCK ACTION. THE M113 HAS A BUILD QUITE DIFFICULT TO SCARE WOULD BE TROUBLE MAKERS. THE NOISE THAT THE VEHICLE MAKES ON THE MOVE IS ENOUGH TO SCARE THE LOCALS, MORE ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY HAVE NOT SEEN SUCH TANK-LIKE VEHICLES BEFORE.

B. FIREPOWER. THE M113 IS MOUNTED WITH A .50 HMG WHICH WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FIRE POWER TO DETER TROUBLE MAKERS.

C. PROTECTION. LIKE ANY OTHER APC THE ARMOR PLATING OF THE M113 WILL PROVIDE THE CREW PROTECTION AGAINST SMALL ARMS FIRE AND GRENADE ATTACKS WHICH ARE COMMON SIGHT IN RWANDA.

D. MANEUVERABILITY. THE TRACKS ON THE M113 GIVES IT BETTER MANEUVERABILITY ON AND OFF THE MAIN ROADS THAN THE WHEELED APC. IT HAS THE ABILITY TO MANEUVER AROUND ROAD BLOCKS OR GO OVER THE STONES, SAND, LOGS OR METAL OBJECTS THAT ARE USED FOR ROAD BLOCKS IN THIS COUNTRY. THE TRACKS ALSO MAKE IT LESS VULNERABLE TO NAILS, BROKEN BOTTLES/GLASS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE.

E. TERRAIN. THE TERRAIN IN RWANDA IS HILLY AND RUGGED. IN ADDITION TO THIS ONLY FOUR MAIN HIGHWAYS ARE PAVED. MOVEMENT OFF THESE MAIN ROADS IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE DEEP GULLIES ESPECIALLY WITH WHEELED VEHICLES DURING THE RAINY SEASON. OFF THE PAVED ROADS, THE M113 CAN FORD THE MANY SMALL STREAMS AND ALSO TRAVERSE THE PUGGED TRACKS THAT BECOME SLIPPERY DURING THE RAINY SEASON. SINCE MOST OF THE TROOPS WILL BE OPERATING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE A TRACKED APC WILL BE A PREFERRED CHOICE OVER THE WHEELED APC. THE TRACKS ALSO PROVIDE BETTER PROTECTION OFF THE PAVED ROADS THAN THE WHEELED APCs WHEN IT COMES TO CLIMBING THE HILLS ACROSS COUNTRY.

CONCLUSION

THE M113 IS A PREFERRED APC TO ANY WHEELED APC FOR UNAMIR II TROOPS IN VIEW OF ITS ROBUSTNESS, PROTECTION, BETTER MANEUVERABILITY ESPECIALLY OFF PAVED ROADS WHERE MOST TROOPS OF UNAMIR II WILL BE OPERATING. IT'S TRACKS WILL ALSO PROVIDE BETTER TRACTION ON THE DIRT TRACKS WHICH ARE COMMON IN THE RWANDAN COUNTRYSIDE.

RECOMMENDATION

3. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE MECHANIZED BATTALIONS OF UNAMIR II BE EQUIPPED WITH THE M113 TYPE APCs IN VIEW OF ITS OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES OVER OTHER WHEELED TYPE APCs.

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IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY

FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR

DATE: 21 MAY 1994

NUMBER:

NUMBER OF PAGES: SEVEN ONLY

SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A RE-ASSESSMENT PAPER ON THE MENTIONED SUBJECT.

2. REGARDS.

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SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKSGENERAL

1. Fighting in Kigali City area has intensified significantly. RPF troops are closing in and launching offensive operations in Kigali city. They seem all out to capture Kigali International Airport (KIA) and Camp Kanombe barracks. UNAMIR has been protecting KIA physically since the outbreak of hostilities. Of late the terminal site has become dangerous for UN troops as both factions are engaged in heavy fighting in and around the area.

2. The proposal of turning the Kigali International Airport into a UN Neutral Territory has not been agreed upon. The RPF had initially agreed on the proposal but now they wish the RGF to withdraw their forces from KIA and from Camp Kanombe and have them relocate at a safe distance from these sites. The Government/RGF have had serious reservations as to UNAMIR's ability to defend the airfield against RPF attack since the beginning and then be able to keep the airfield neutral even under pressure. FC received this morning the RGF proposal for the establishment of the airport as a neutral territory but they have included some restrictions/conditions that are yet to be resolved between us, RPF and of course the RGF. It is not at all expected that the RGF will accept moving from Kanombe area. This stumbling block was finally discussed in detail with the RPF today. They stated, through the LO, that the airport and Camp Kanombe are part of the package. This could be the show stopper of this exercise. FC has written formal comments/concerns to Maj Gen Kagame and has asked him for a prompt reply. If FC does not see any solution by tomorrow, then he will initiate the withdrawal from the airport, to the Amahoro complex.

3. Presently the northern part of the KIA is under heavy artillery/mortar and small arms fire due to the RPF firing at RGF forces around and within the inner perimeter of the airfield, particularly around the main terminal buildings. Scheduled flights on 19, 20 and 21 May 94 were cancelled. KIA has turned into an important military target as the RPF continue their pressure on the RGF resulting in RGF soldiers filtering into the airfield complex. The damage to the infrastructure is increasing significantly as the tarmac and the landing strip are receiving more and more hits from mortar/artillery fire. The tower is now inoperative as RGF put a MG post there and it was neutralised. Based on the latest situation, a re-assessment of the deployment plan and tasks of Phase-1 UNAMIR II was conducted.

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OPTIONS FOR CONTROL OF KIA

4. The various options of control/availability of the KIA are as under:

a. KIA becomes neutral territory in four days. This is acceptable as we do not expect Phase I of UNAMIR II build up to commence before then and we have enough resources to take care of ourselves till then. State of the airfield by then will be a concern if fighting continues. Such an eventuality requires at least staffing of an alternate airhead option.

b. RGF refuses to make KIA neutral territory but agrees to secure it with UNAMIR II. This would be workable as it has in the past for UNAMIR but RPF will never accept this. The KIA will most certainly become a military target. Such eventuality requires an alternate airhead to be identified now.

c. The KIA becomes a neutral territory with RGF and RPF doing monitoring of UNAMIR II for transparency. This is acceptable to us and we know it is to RPF as they had proposed it at one time. RGF have been approached on it and no response received as yet. If we get the answers today/tomorrow that will be fine, but staffing of an alternate site is needed to cater for the unexpected.

d. RPF gain control of the airfield. This is a possibility. How long it will take them to do that ? Will it include Camp Kanombe ? Will the airfield be damaged in the fighting or deliberately by the withdrawing RGF ? These concerns require us to look at and prepare an alternate airhead now.

e. The possibility on a stalemate at and around the airfield is possible and in such a case an alternate airhead is essential now.

f. The stalemate happens but a truce/cease fire is signed. This requires an alternate airhead be reconnoitred for possible use if there are serious violations.

AIRFIELD NEEDS FOR UNAMIR II OPERATIONS

5. Requirement of airfield for UNAMIR II can be divided into two; Present and Future.

a. Present Requirement.

(1) Essential Support. To maintain forces during Phase 1 essential supplies like food, water and fuel

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will be needed. Presently UNAMIR II has a stock of 14 days of food, water and fuel. We can sustain at least 10 days without essential supplies. If KIA is closed for 10 days, it will not be a problem to continue our tasks.

(2) Medical Evacuation. For medical evacuation, UNAMIR II needs to keep the airport under its security control.

(3) Essential Stores. UNAMIR II with its present strength can sustain with its essential stores for the time being. No essential stores are required until the re-enforcements arrive.

(4) For In/Out Passengers. It is not critical to bring in or take out UNAMIR II personnel from Kigali at this time. However, if flights arrive, passengers can avail the facility for increasing the staff available and for welfare opportunities.

(5) Humanitarian Material. Indeed Rwanda needs a lot of help in terms of food, water and medicine. These needs can be brought in by air for at least Kigali. But this bridge still has not been maximized. The effort to utilize the C-130 already flying from Nairobi to Kigali, plus the two (2) German aircrafts about to come in can do more but there does not seem to be enough stocks available at Nairobi.

From the above assessment, it is derived that even if the KIA is not held by the Force, UNAMIR II could sustain and continue its operations for another 10 days or so. However the greatest concern we have is the evacuation of casualties. The alternate plan to use the helicopters from UNOMUR is still possible but as yet has not been used nor exercised. It would be most advisable that a secondary airfield, capable of handling C-130 type aircraft be reced for possible use as soon as possible.

b. Future Needs.

(1) GHANBAT Re-enforcement. To bring the strength of GHANBATT to 800 personnel and mechanizing it, an airhead is an absolute necessity. The airfield will be required for bringing troops, weapon systems, main combat vehicles (APCs) and ammunition.

(2) Advance Parties. Advance and reconnaissance parties of Engineers, Signals, Fd Medical Hospital and Log Coy will also be arriving during Phase 1 in order to prepare for Phase II.

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(3) Build-up of Supplies. Food, water, fuel, medical stores, defence stores and spares will be needed to support the augmented force.

A secure airhead is a fundamental need for the deployment of troops and equipments in Phase 1. Phase 1 deployment is supposed to commence between D+7 to D+14 (24-31 May 94) and probably finish between D+21 to D+28 (7-14 June 94). With the little time available, the state of the KIA infrastructure, the stagnation in the cease fire implementation, all these elements mitigate against the KIA being our main airhead. An alternate principal airfield is required in the shortest of time possible in order not to stop/slow down the deployment of Phase I assets.

TASKS IN KIGALI WITHIN MANDATE-PHASE I

6. UNAMIR II is presently and will continue to perform following tasks in Kigali Sector:

- a. Protection/support people in danger.
- b. Transfer of people in danger.
- c. Escort Duties.
- d. Patrolling in city area.
- e. Units in the supply of food to refugees and distressed people.
- f. Protection of UN installations.
- g. Liaison with both the parties for possible cease fire.
- h. Monitoring of truce/cease fire.
- i. Evacuation of casualties by air.
- j. Providing escorts, liaison and monitoring by UNMOs.
- k. Protection of KIA.

One infantry battalion (-) is needed full time to provide the protection and security of the KIA. If we don't need to protect the KIA as a neutral territory, then the above mentioned tasks (less sub-para k of course) could under very difficult conditions be carried out without the re-enforcement of GHANBATT during Phase-1. Again such an eventuality could be considered only if the proper equipment, materiel, personnel rotation/welfare and

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increased medical and logistic support are made available now.

7. GHANBATT. In Phase I, it was planned to bring Ghanbatt up to its full strength. Present strength is 321 and 479 personnel are supposed to join the battalion starting D+7 to D+14. The use of an alternate airport in a neighboring country - (BUJUMBURA or GOMA) and local smaller airports within Rwanda (CYANGUGU/GISENYI/RUHENGIERI) are essentials for the reasons stated above. Under these circumstances we see the need to divide the battalion and deploy one maybe two coys for securing the new airport (outside Rwanda), Logistics base (in Rwanda) near these airports (Butare or Gisenyi) and for convoy protection duties along the Mission's life line and the support/security of local humanitarian activities. Thus any addition to the present level of forces deployed, or redeployed in Kigali, without the task of the KIA, the following additional tasks may have to be under taken:

- a. Secure the alternative airhead(BUGUMBURA or GOMA).
- b. Secure the new logistics base behind to the airhead (BUTARE or GESENYI).
- c. Provide convoy escorts from alternate airhead to Kigali.
- d. Secure a local smaller airfield in Rwanda in order to establish the humanitarian air bridge that has been closed for the last three (3) days (CYANGUGU, RUHENGIERI, GISENYI, BUTARE).


8. Alternate Airhead. The KIA looks less and less as our principal entry point for UNAMIR II. It is therefore pertinent to consider the implementation of an alternative airhead now in order to permit Phase I to commence. Our first recommendation is BUJUMBURA airfield (BURUNDI) and the second one being GOMA (ZAIRE). Both airfields could also be used simultaneously if the volume of airlift required it. If we use BUJUMBURA, we need to establish a secure log base at Butare, for Goma it would be in Gisenyi. These main alternate airfields should be able to accommodate our build-up needs before the Phase I deployment is commenced. The secondary airfields could be functional within days of closing or leaving the KIA. That can accommodate C-130 and Trausall (C-160) type aircraft.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

9. It is then recommended that all the forces and material planned for deployment in Phase I should continued to move to Rwanda according to the current milestone. However, the use of

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alternate airhead with its closeby logistics base and the use of the secondary airfields should be implemented soonest if the results of the negotiations between RPF, RGF and UNAMIR II do not conclude over the next day or so. The troops to task allocation proposed in this paper, without the KIA task will permit early deployment in the RGF areas and as such accelerate the securing of conditions for humanitarian relief in this particularly difficult area.


R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

UNAMIR

P1/8

94 MAY 22 20 22

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN 185

94 MAY 22 19 52

MOST IMMEDIATE

MIR 1018

TO: ASHAF FOR RIZA AND BARIL, UNOMUR, KABALE
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 22 MAY 1994
NUMBER:
SUBJECT: NEUTRALITY OF THE KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT


1. The RGF provided us with their proposal yesterday (attached) for making the airfield neutral territory. We raised some concerns on their conditions at Annex A. They were to give us the results of our concerns late yesterday; we did not get such answer until late today due to various reasons on both sides but *due to our insistence we got some answers finally*.
2. Also attached is a press conference/interview between the COS of RGF and Radio France International this afternoon in which he states he withdrew from the airfield and Kanombe in order to give it to us as a neutral territory.
3. We were surprised this morning to find the RGF had completely withdrawn from both sites as we knew from observing them that they were thinning out. The RPF followed on their heels and took over both sites without prejudicing any of the UN controlled points on the airfield.
4. This evening, the RPF LO stated that the RPF would not agree to a neutral territory as they have won the sites and they see no need to make it neutral anymore. This precludes our full guaranty of the site for our sole use and in fact will create increased tensions/difficulties with the RGF (which they expect I'm sure as they really did this withdrawal to ensure they could pull out the two battalions in and around the sites with minimum risks).
5. As much as we tried to convince the RPF that they still could state their victory on the airfield, if they agreed to make the site neutral territory, they would demonstrate magnanimity, support for the UN humanitarian mandate, and a sense of security for our force, they still refused.
6. Your advice is requested and your intervention with the RPF tomorrow is essential on this critical matter.
7. The RPF are insisting that if I am to go to Gatuna to meet you, then I must get the road held by the RGF opened for my passage at Kadhafi bridge/crossing. This has been attempted for the last 10 days without any success at all.

8. Your trip to Kigali along a safe RPF route should the RGF route not be cleared at our request again tonight has not been approved by RPF. The LO stated that the RGF must open the route for your visit. I am pretty sure it can not be made available because of the type of road block and the work that would have to be done to clear it, and also the fact that it was put there by the militias and not by the RGF forces. I strongly recommend you raise this point with the RPF leaders in Mulindi.

9. There were more reports from my G2 today in town, on the barricades and on the radios that I, the FC am a wanted man, as I am the reason for all these problems the RGF are having and that I am a RPF sympathizer and supporter. This situation prevented a meeting with the COS RGF today and may make it difficult to get through RGF lines tomorrow morning. We will be phoning you at 0800 hours your time at UNOMUR HQ to clarify these and other points should I not make it through. Should I not be able to attend, my senior UNMO LO of the RPF zone will be at the border in the morning. If MGen Baril wishes to call me tonight we will be late anyway.

10. Tomorrow afternoon, upon your arrival at our HQ, we plan some meetings with Dr Kabia, Mr Golo (CAO) and myself, then a briefing (Ops and Humanitarian) at 1500 hours with most of the staff there. A supper on compo with the senior military/civilian officers in the evening. Meeting with Government PM and hopefully the COS Gendarmerie and Army at Giterama at 1000 hours on 24 May. We will have to leave Kigali at 0800 hours. Both sides have agreed to a truce from 0800 hours 23 May to about 1800 hours 25 May.

11. Regards.



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ARMEE RWANDAISE
ETAT - MAJOR

G3

KIGALI, le 20 MAI 1994

N° 0713 /G3.3.3

Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR

O B J E T : Statut de l'Aéroport
International de KIGALI.

REFERENCE : Votre lettre du 21 Avr 1994.

Monsieur le Commandant,

Je vous transmets en annexe mes observations quant aux conditions nécessaires pour assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de l'Aéroport telles que reprises dans votre lettre en référence.

- a. En effet, comme il a été constaté à plusieurs reprises, le FPR utilise la MINUAR pour la protection de ses positions de combat en prétextant la présence des membres de la MINUAR sur ses positions pour empêcher les FAR de riposter aux tirs ennemis en provenance des positions FPR(CND, MERIDIEN, STADE AMAHORO, QG MINUAR etc...).

Il serait alors inacceptable que cette situation se reproduise à l'Aéroport international de KIGALI. C'est pourquoi je vous propose les conditions reprises en annexe de la présente qui sont de nature à assurer une neutralité positive de l'Aéroport.

- b. Je prends bonne note également de l'engagement du FPR par écrit à respecter le nouveau statut de l'Aéroport de KIGALI. Cet engagement par écrit devra ressortir expressément la bonne foi du FPR, pour ne pas tenter de s'emparer de l'Aéroport.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Copie pour information :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre
- Monsieur le Ministre des Transports et de Communication
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense
- Chef EM Gd W

BIZIMUNGU Augustin
Général-Major
Chef EM AR

Les conditions nécessaires pour assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de l'Aéroport.

- Pas acceptable. RCF to reviewing at least. The road is the problem. But these are impacts, as they should not also. The question of the road should be addressed specifically.*
- a. Les FAR et la Gendarmerie doivent se retirer de l'Aéroport et de ses environs immédiats sauf les militaires de l'aviation et la Gendarmerie aéroportuaire.
 - b. L'établissement d'une zone de sécurité, autour de l'aéroport d'au moins 300 mètres pour les tirs d'armes lourdes et les installations de ces armes lourdes au moins à 1000 mètres (1 kilomètre).
 - c. Tous les tirs des FAR et FPR doivent être évités par les mortiers et autres systèmes d'armes dans la zone neutre dite de sécurité dont les limites sont définies ci-dessus. *This is from the letter to the FAR, in their control.*
 - d. La défense éloignée de l'Aéroport est assurée par les FAR.
 - e. Les FAR et le FPR ne doivent pas utiliser la force pour pénétrer dans la zone de sécurité.
 - f. L'Aéroport est ouvert pour des raisons strictement humanitaires jusqu'à la conclusion d'un accord de cessez le feu. Après cet Accord les conditions qui prévalaient avant la reprise des hostilités (avant le 07 Avr 94) seront d'application. *There must be part of the cease-fire negotiations not now.*
 - g. Le personnel civil qui travaille à l'Aéroport doit avoir des facilités pour venir travailler. Ces facilités doivent être garanties par la MINUAR. *we can prepare special access cards.*
 - h. La MINUAR s'engage à assurer la Neutralité de l'Aéroport par tous les moyens en vue de NE PAS laisser l'Aéroport tomber sous le contrôle du FPR.

INTERVIEW OF MAJOR GENERAL BIZIMUNGU BY RFI AT 1400 HRS 22 MAY

1. Preliminary statement of MGen BIZIMUNGU "UNAMIR has requested that the airport be handed over to the Force for humanitarian actions and we have accepted the neutrality of the airport".

Q1. But it seems that heavy fighting was going on before the RPF controlled the airport?

A1. I don't know if the airport was occupied by the RPF but the withdrawal of our troops was a precondition to deal with UNAMIR to neutralize it so the airport should be in the hands of UNAMIR.

Q2. You have withdrawn all your troops from the airport on purpose?

A2. Yes.

Q3. Tonight?

A3. Yes, last night.

Q4. Where did you relocate your troops?

A4. In the center of the city.

Q5. There was heavy fighting this night or not?

A5. For the time being, there is no fighting because the KIA is supposed to be in the hands of UNAMIR.

Q6. So you are saying that you have withdrawn your troops to give up the airport to UNAMIR and the airport was not taken by the RPF from you?

A6. I don't know actually if the RPF has taken over, you must ask UNAMIR if they are still in charge of it the RPF which was 500 meters away has taken it.

Q7. What about the nearby camp Kanombe?

A7. The camp was next to the airport and to control the camp one must hold the airport.

Q8. So you have evacuated the camp?

A8. Yes we have evacuated the camp.

Q9. The troops were also relocated in Kigali?

A9. Yes, we are taking a defensive posture by giving up the part of the city and we have organized a new tactical posture.

Q10. Did you suffer lot of losts in the camp?

A10. I told you that the fighting were going on for three days and in this case one cannot avoid casualties.

Q11. Now, what is next?

A11. We will reorganize for combat.

Q12. This will be the battle of Kigali now?

A12. I don't know but if one defends a position, one must fight when attacked. Now I don't know if RPF will continue to attack. If it does, the fight will continue.

Q13. So you are still in the defence?

A13. In the city yes. But in the North the RGF has the upper hand and we are planning offensive operations in this sector. In the south around Bugesera, our troops have stepped back two weeks ago and now we are undertaking a reorganization to start offensive operations.

Q14. Your global assessment of the situation, do you feel defeated?

A14. We are not yet defeated but the situation is complicated at the moment. Nevertheless we are not desperate. One loses a battle on this side and wins a battle on the other side. We can say that we are not desperate.

Q15. What about negotiations with RPF, do you wish it?

A15. We have always called for a truce and we are still convinced that the problem is Rwanda will not be solved by weapons.

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

3000.9 (IO)
22 April 94
TAY.

FROM : MIO *[Signature]*

TO : FC

SUBJECT: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. KANOMBE CAMP

UNDER RPF CONTROL. TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL OF PARA CODO AND ARTILLERY BATTALIONS THROUGH RPF LINES LAST NIGHT.

PRESENTLY THEY ARE CONSOLIDATING IN DOWN TOWN AREA.

ALL CIVILIANS WHO WERE LIVING IN AND AROUND KANOMBE CAMP HAVE MOVED OUT AND ARE HEADING TO THE AIRPORT (ABOUT 500 DISPLACED); THE OTHERS FOUND SHELTER IN DOWN TOWN.

DURING THAT ACTION, THEY HAVE LEFT BEHIND IN KANOMBE CAMP:

- 08 37mm ARTI GUNS
- 04 23mm QUADRI-TUBES.
- . 50 MG BROWNING.
- 03 60 mm MORTARS.

2. AIRPORT

UNDER TOTAL RPF CONTROL. DEPLOYMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF RPF TROOPS ARE GOING ON. EVEN FROM UNAMIR HQ TO THE KIA IS UNDER RPF CONTROL. ALL CIVILIANS HAVE MOVED OUT.

02 TO 03 RPF BATTALIONS ARE DEFENDING THE AIRPORT.
HOWEVER, RPF TROOPS ARE STILL PRESENT ON THE HIGHGROUNDS DOMINATING THE AIRPORT (NDERA- MUNINI-GASOKI ETC)

3. REMERA

UNDER TOTAL RPF CONTROL.

4. KICYCURU

FIGHTINGS ARE STILL GOING ON.

5. GIKONDO

DEEP RPF INFILTRATION FROM REBERO HILL. HOWEVER, THE INTERAHAMWES MILITIA IS TAKING OUT LOT OF PRIVATE VEHICLES AND GOODS FROM MAGERWA (RWANDA GENERAL STORES).

6. KIMIHURURA

STILL UNDER RGF CONTROL. MP'S BATTALION WHICH WITHDREW FROM REMERA IS REINFORCING PG AND GENDARMERIE IN KIMIHURURA. HOWEVER NO CHEKPOINTS ARE ESTABLISHED ON THE ROAD.

7. KIGALI CITY.

LOT OF RGF TROOPS AND CIVILIANS (AMONG THEM LOT OF WOUNDED) MOVEMENTS WITHOUT DISCIPLINE. HOWEVER FRIENDLY ATTITUDE IS BEEING SHOWED TOWARDS UNAMIR (SO FAR).

A MEETING BETWEEN THE RGF CHIEF OF STAFF AND AND THE COMMANDERS TOOK PLACE THIS MORNING AT THE ARMY HQ (RESULT OF THE MEETING UNKNOWN YET, OTHERWISE A PAINFUL DECISION COULD COME UP FROM THIS MEETING...EITHER AN ATTEMPT FOR COUNTER OFFENSIVE OR A WITHDRAWAL FROM KIGALI)

BY THE WAY, GENERAL GATSINZI PROPOSED ON THE 13th OF MAY A WITHDRAWAL OF RGF DOWNSOUTH. HIS OWN TROOPS THREATENED HIM TO DEATH.

BASED ON OUR OWN ASSESSMENT, RGF TROOPS WON'T BE ABLE TO LAUNCH ANY COUNTER OFFENSIVE OPERATION BECAUSE OF SERIOUS LACK OF AMMUNITIONS (ARTI AND SMALL WEAPONS) AND SUPPLIES.

THE MORALE OF RGF HAS BEEN AFFECTED BUT ANY PANIC HAS BEEN NOTICED AMONG THE LEADERSHIP.

8. ASSESSMENTS

a- COUNTER OFFENSIVE OPERATION MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE AIRPORT, KANOMBE AND REMERA.

b- CONSOLIDATION OF RPF IN KANOMBE AND IN THE KIA.


c- NEXT RPF PRIORITY IS PG CAMP.

d- UNAMIR TROOPS COULD BE TARGETTED (BY BOTH PARTIES, MOSTLY BY RGF).

FM: LO RPF.





TO: FC.

IF THE RPF ALLOWS THE SPECIAL
ENVOY TO THE S.G TO USE THE
GHABATI CROSSING JUNCTION FM. GASTATA
THE RPF WILL ENSURE HIS SAFE
PASSAGE UP TO THERE.



22.05.94

KAMANZI M. F.
MAJOR.
L.O RPF.



UNAMIR
94 MAY 21 21 23

UNAMIR
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UNAMIR FORCE HQ
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KMF 890
MISC 695



21 MAY 1994

TO: COL ASRAR ACMO KABALE, UNOMUR	FROM: MAJ GEN R A DALLIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI RWANDA
FAX: (256) 486 23816	FAX: 001 (212) 963 3090
SUBJECT:	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: SIXTEEN	

REFERENCES:

- A. DEFENCE MINISTRY OF RWANDA LETTER NO. 0731/G3.3.3 DATED 20 MAY 1994.
 - B. UNAMIR FORCE HQ FAX MESSAGE NO NIL DATED 20 MAY 1994.
 - C. UNAMIR FORCE HQ LETTER NO. 3000.15 (OPS) DATED 21 MAY 1994.
-
- 1. ENCLOSED HERewith PLEASE FIND THE LETTERS AND FAX MESSAGES UNDER REFERENCES A, B AND C.
 - 2. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO HANDOVER THESE LETTERS AND FAX MESSAGES TO MAJ GEN BARIL AS SOON AS HE ARRIVES AT YOUR LOCATION.
 - 3. REGARDS.

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IMMEDIATE

TO: *[Signature]* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY

FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR

DATE: 21 MAY 1994

NUMBER:

NUMBER OF PAGES: SEVEN ONLY

SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A RE-ASSESSMENT PAPER ON THE MENTIONED SUBJECT.

2. REGARDS.

*Sent with
code cable
CRN 196
of 3/6/94*

*CRN 185
MIR 1018*

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SUBJECT: RE-ASSESSMENT OF PHASE-1 DEPLOYMENT AND TASKS

GENERAL

1. Fighting in Kigali City area has intensified significantly. RPF troops are closing in and launching offensive operations in Kigali city. They seem all out to capture Kigali International Airport (KIA) and Camp Kanombe barracks. UNAMIR has been protecting KIA physically since the outbreak of hostilities. Of late the terminal site has become dangerous for UN troops as both factions are engaged in heavy fighting in and around the area.

2. The proposal of turning the Kigali International Airport into a UN Neutral Territory has not been agreed upon. The RPF had initially agreed on the proposal but now they wish the RGF to withdraw their forces from KIA and from Camp Kanombe and have them relocate at a safe distance from these sites. The Government/RGF have had serious reservations as to UNAMIR's ability to defend the airfield against RPF attack since the beginning and then be able to keep the airfield neutral even under pressure. FC received this morning the RGF proposal for the establishment of the airport as a neutral territory but they have included some restrictions/conditions that are yet to be resolved between us, RPF and of course the RGF. It is not at all expected that the RGF will accept moving from Kanombe area. This stumbling block was finally discussed in detail with the RPF today. They stated, through the LO, that the airport and Camp Kanombe are part of the package. This could be the show stopper of this exercise. FC has written formal comments/concerns to Maj Gen Kagame and has asked him for a prompt reply. If FC does not see any solution by tomorrow, then he will initiate the withdrawal from the airport, to the Amahoro complex.

3. Presently the northern part of the KIA is under heavy artillery/mortar and small arms fire due to the RPF firing at RGF forces around and within the inner perimeter of the airfield, particularly around the main terminal buildings. Scheduled flights on 19, 20 and 21 May 94 were cancelled. KIA has turned into an important military target as the RPF continue their pressure on the RGF resulting in RGF soldiers filtering into the airfield complex. The damage to the infrastructure is increasing significantly as the tarmac and the landing strip are receiving more and more hits from mortar/artillery fire. The tower is now inoperative as RGF put a MG post there and it was neutralised. Based on the latest situation, a re-assessment of the deployment plan and tasks of Phase-1 UNAMIR II was conducted.

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OPTIONS FOR CONTROL OF KIA

4. The various options of control/availability of the KIA are as under:

a. KIA becomes neutral territory in four days. This is acceptable as we do not expect Phase I of UNAMIR II build up to commence before then and we have enough resources to take care of ourselves till then. State of the airfield by then will be a concern if fighting continues. Such an eventuality requires at least staffing of an alternate airhead option.

b. RGF refuses to make KIA neutral territory but agrees to secure it with UNAMIR II. This would be workable as it has in the past for UNAMIR but RPF will never accept this. The KIA will most certainly become a military target. Such eventuality requires an alternate airhead to be identified now.

c. The KIA becomes a neutral territory with RGF and RPF doing monitoring of UNAMIR II for transparency. This is acceptable to us and we know it is to RPF as they had proposed it at one time. RGF have been approached on it and no response received as yet. If we get the answers today/tomorrow that will be fine, but staffing of an alternate site is needed to cater for the unexpected.

d. RPF gain control of the airfield. This is a possibility. How long it will take them to do that ? Will it include Camp Kanombe ? Will the airfield be damaged in the fighting or deliberately by the withdrawing RGF ? These concerns require us to look at and prepare an alternate airhead now.

e. The possibility on a stalemate at and around the airfield is possible and in such a case an alternate airhead is essential now.

f. The stalemate happens but a truce/cease fire is signed. This requires an alternate airhead be reconnoitred for possible use if there are serious violations.

AIRFIELD NEEDS FOR UNAMIR II OPERATIONS

5. Requirement of airfield for UNAMIR II can be divided into two; Present and Future.

a. Present Requirement.

(1) Essential Support. To maintain forces during Phase 1 essential supplies like food, water and fuel

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will be needed. Presently UNAMIR II has a stock of 14 days of food, water and fuel. We can sustain at least 10 days without essential supplies. If KIA is closed for 10 days, it will not be a problem to continue our tasks.

(2) Medical Evacuation. For medical evacuation, UNAMIR II needs to keep the airport under its security control.

(3) Essential Stores. UNAMIR II with its present strength can sustain with its essential stores for the time being. No essential stores are required until the re-enforcements arrive.

(4) For In/Out Passengers. It is not critical to bring in or take out UNAMIR II personnel from Kigali at this time. However, if flights arrive, passengers can avail the facility for increasing the staff available and for welfare opportunities.

(5) Humanitarian Material. Indeed Rwanda needs a lot of help in terms of food, water and medicine. These needs can be brought in by air for at least Kigali. But this bridge still has not been maximized. The effort to utilize the C-130 already flying from Nairobi to Kigali, plus the two (2) German aircrafts about to come in can do more but there does not seem to be enough stocks available at Nairobi.

From the above assessment, it is derived that even if the KIA is not held by the Force, UNAMIR II could sustain and continue its operations for another 10 days or so. However the greatest concern we have is the evacuation of casualties. The alternate plan to use the helicopters from UNOMUR is still possible but as yet has not been used nor exercised. It would be most advisable that a secondary airfield, capable of handling C-130 type aircraft be reced for possible use as soon as possible.

b. Future Needs.

(1) GHANBAT Re-enforcement. To bring the strength of GHANBATT to 800 personnel and mechanizing it, an airhead is an absolute necessity. The airfield will be required for bringing troops, weapon systems, main combat vehicles (APCs) and ammunition.

(2) Advance Parties. Advance and reconnaissance parties of Engineers, Signals, Fd Medical Hospital and Log Coy will also be arriving during Phase I in order to prepare for Phase II.

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(3) Build-up of Supplies. Food, water, fuel, medical stores, defence stores and spares will be needed to support the augmented force.

A secure airhead is a fundamental need for the deployment of troops and equipments in Phase 1. Phase 1 deployment is supposed to commence between D+7 to D+14 (24-31 May 94) and probably finish between D+21 to D+28 (7-14 June 94). With the little time available, the state of the KIA infrastructure, the stagnation in the cease fire implementation, all these elements mitigate against the KIA being our main airhead. An alternate principal airfield is required in the shortest of time possible in order not to stop/slow down the deployment of Phase I assets.

TASKS IN KIGALI WITHIN MANDATE-PHASE I

6. UNAMIR II is presently and will continue to perform following tasks in Kigali Sector:

- a. Protection/support people in danger.
- b. Transfer of people in danger.
- c. Escort Duties.
- d. Patrolling in city area.
- e. Units in the supply of food to refugees and distressed people.
- f. Protection of UN installations.
- g. Liaison with both the parties for possible cease fire.
- h. Monitoring of truce/cease fire.
- i. Evacuation of casualties by air.
- j. Providing escorts, liaison and monitoring by UNMOs.
- k. Protection of KIA.

One infantry battalion (-) is needed full time to provide the protection and security of the KIA. If we don't need to protect the KIA as a neutral territory, then the above mentioned tasks (less sub-para k of course) could under very difficult conditions be carried out without the re-enforcement of GHANBATT during Phase-1. Again such an eventuality could be considered only if the proper equipment, materiel, personnel rotation/welfare and

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increased medical and logistic support are made available now.

7. GHANBATT. In Phase I, it was planned to bring Ghanbatt up to its full strength. Present strength is 321 and 479 personnel are supposed to join the battalion starting D+7 to D+14. The use of an alternate airport in a neighboring country - (BUJUMBURA or GOMA) and local smaller airports within Rwanda (CYANGUGU/GISENYI/RUHENGERI) are essentials for the reasons stated above. Under these circumstances we see the need to divide the battalion and deploy one maybe two coys for securing the new airport (outside Rwanda), Logistics base (in Rwanda) near these airports (Butare or Gisenyi) and for convoy protection duties along the Mission's life line and the support/security of local humanitarian activities. Thus any addition to the present level of forces deployed, or redeployed in Kigali, without the task of the KIA, the following additional tasks may have to be under taken:

- a. Secure the alternative airhead (BUGUMBURA or GOMA).
- b. Secure the new logistics base behind to the airhead (BUTARE or GISENYI).
- c. Provide convoy escorts from alternate airhead to Kigali.
- d. Secure a local smaller airfield in Rwanda in order to establish the humanitarian air bridge that has been closed for the last three (3) days (CYANGUGU, RUHENGERI, GISENYI, BUTARE).

8. Alternate Airhead. The KIA looks less and less as our principal entry point for UNAMIR II. It is therefore pertinent to consider the implementation of an alternative airhead now in order to permit Phase I to commence. Our first recommendation is BUJUMBURA airfield (BURUNDI) and the second one being GOMA (ZAIRE). Both airfields could also be used simultaneously if the volume of airlift required it. If we use BUJUMBURA, we need to establish a secure log base at Butare, for Goma it would be in Gisenyi. These main alternate airfields should be able to accommodate our build-up needs before the Phase I deployment is commenced. The secondary airfields could be functional within days of closing or leaving the KIA. That can accommodate C-130 and Tausall (C-160) type aircraft.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

9. It is then recommended that all the forces and material planned for deployment in Phase I should continued to move to Rwanda according to the current milestone. However, the use of

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alternate airhead with its closeby logistics base and the use of the secondary airfields should be implemented soonest if the results of the negotiations between RPF, RGF and UNAMIR II do not conclude over the next day or so. The troops to task allocation proposed in this paper, without the KIA task will permit early deployment in the RGF areas and as such accelerate the securing of conditions for humanitarian relief in this particularly difficult area.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

P 2/16

Passed

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

IMMEDIATE

20 MAY 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK INFO: BARIL	FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: 001 (212) 963 3090
SUBJECT: ALTERNATIVE AIRHEAD FOR UNAMIR II	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: THREE	

REFERENCE:

A. RPF PRESS RELEASE DATED 17 MAY 94.

1. THE PROPOSAL OF TURNING THE KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA) INTO NEUTRAL ZONE HAS NOT BEEN CONCLUDED AS YET. THE RPF HAD INITIALLY AGREED ON THE PROPOSAL BUT NOW (REF A) THEY WISH THE RGF TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM KIA AND FROM CAMP KANOMBE MILITARY BARRACKS (THE MAJOR RGF CAMP IN KIGALI) AND HAVE THEM RELOCATE AT A SAFE DISTANCE FROM THESE SITES. RGF HAVE HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS AS TO UNAMIR'S ABILITY TO DEFEND THE AIRFIELD AGAINST RPF ATTACK SINCE THE BEGINNING. FC DOES NOT EXPECT RGF TO ACCEPT MOVING FROM CAMP KANOMBE AS IT IS THE HINGE ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE CITY AS THEY ARE BEING MORE AND MORE HEMMED IN BY THE RPF. RGF HAVE NO OBJECTION OF UNAMIR'S PRESENCE IN THE AIRPORT AND IN FACT WOULD PREFER A JOINT SECURITY PLAN WITH US. FC EXPECTING FINAL ANSWER FROM RGF/GOVERNMENT THIS MORNING. AN OPTION OF UNAMIR DEFENDING AND RGF AND RPF MONITORING WITH US THE NEUTRAL TERRITORY WAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH RGF BUT NO ANSWER AS YET.

2. THE VARIOUS OPTIONS OF CONTROL/AVAILABILITY OF KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA) HAVE BEEN REVIEWED.

A. KIA BECOMES NEUTRAL TERRITORY IN FOUR DAYS. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE AS WE DO NOT EXPECT PHASE I OF UNAMIR II BUILD UP TO COMMENCE BEFORE THEN AND WE HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO TAKE CARE OF OURSELVES TILL THEN. STATE OF THE AIRFIELD BY THEN WILL BE A CONCERN IF FIGHTING CONTINUES. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY REQUIRES AT LEAST STAFFING OF AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD OPTION.

B. RGF REFUSES TO MAKE KIA NEUTRAL TERRITORY BUT AGREES TO SECURE IT WITH UNAMIR II. THIS WOULD BE WORKABLE AS IT HAS IN THE PAST FOR UNAMIR BUT FC IS CONVINCED RPF WILL

NEVER ACCEPT THIS. THE KIA WILL MOST CERTAINLY BECOME A MILITARY TARGET. SUCH EVENTUALITY REQUIRES AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD TO BE IDENTIFIED NOW.

C. THE KIA BECOMES A NEUTRAL TERRITORY WITH RGF AND RPF DOING "MONITORING OF UNAMIR II FOR TRANSPARENCY. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO US AND WE KNOW IT IS TO RPF AS THEY HAD PROPOSED IT AT ONE TIME. RGF HAVE BEEN APPROACHED ON IT AND NO RESPONSE RECEIVED AS YET. IF WE GET THE ANSWERS TODAY/TOMORROW THAT WILL BE FINE, BUT STAFFING OF AN ALTERNATE SITE IS NEEDED TO CATER FOR THE UNEXPECTED.

D. RPF GAIN CONTROL OF THE AIRFIELD. THIS IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY. HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE THEM TO DO THAT ? WILL IT INCLUDE CAMP KANOMBE ? WILL THE AIRFIELD BE DAMAGED IN THE FIGHTING OR DELIBERATELY BY THE WITHDRAWING RGF ? THESE CONCERNS REQUIRE US TO LOOK AT AND PREPARE AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD NOW.

E. THE POSSIBILITY ON A STALEMATE AT AND AROUND THE AIRFIELD IS REASONABLE AND IN SUCH A CASE AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD IS ESSENTIAL NOW.

F. THE STALEMATE HAPPENS BUT A TRUCE/CEASE FIRE IS SIGNED. THIS REQUIRES AN ALTERNATE AIRHEAD BE RECONNOITRED FOR POSSIBLE USE IF THERE ARE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS.

3. PRESENTLY KIA IS UNDER HEAVY ARTILLERY/MORTAR AND SMALL ARMS FIRE DUE TO RPF FIRING AT RGF FORCES NEAR AND ON PARTS OF AIRFIELD (AIR DEFENCE GUNS). BOTH SCHEDULED FLIGHTS YESTERDAY WERE CANCELLED AS ONE THIS MORNING. RPF CONTINUE THEIR PRESSURE ON RGF AND RGF SOLDIERS ARE FILTERING BACK ONTO THE AIRFIELD COMPLEX. THE TERMINAL SITE HAS BECOME DANGEROUS FOR UN TROOPS.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF ABOVE, FC WILL BE DECIDING TODAY AS TO WHETHER WE MAINTAIN A PRESENCE OR NOT ON THE AIRFIELD. IF WE WITHDRAW, THE 206 PERSONNEL WOULD THEN BE MOVED TO THE AMAHORO COMPLEX. THINNING OUT WILL BE ATTEMPTED BEFORE HAND.

5. THE KIA LOOKS LESS AND LESS AS OUR PRINCIPAL ENTRY POINT FOR UNAMIR II. WE WOULD THEREFORE REQUEST YOU TO CARRY OUT IMMEDIATE STAFF CHECKS AS TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF USING AIRPORTS OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AS PRINCIPAL POINT OF ENTRY. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE AIRHEADS ARE GIVEN BELOW IN PRIORITY:

A. BUJUMBURA - BURUNDI. IF POLITICAL SITUATION WILL PERMIT. IT MAY POSSIBLY HELP THE SITUATION THERE. THE LOGISTICS BASE WOULD BE SET UP IN BUTARE. THE GHANABATT INCREASE WOULD BE DEPLOYED FOR BASE PROTECTION, CONVOY PROTECTION AND LOCAL HUMANITARIAN TASKS. THE FORCES PRESENTLY IN KIGALI COULD MEET THE PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN TASKS IF WE DID NOT HAVE THE KIA TO PROTECT.

- B. GOMA - ZAIRE. THE LOGISTICS BASE WOULD BE IN GISENY. SIMILAR SCENARIO AS BUTARE FOR ALL CONCERED.
 - C. ENTEBBE - UGANDA
 - D. DAR-ES-SALAM - TANZANIA
5. REGARDS.



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*2 copies of
sent to HQ
then to HQ
for info / Colabe.*

KIGALI, le 20 MAI 1994

N° 0713 /G3.3.3

Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR

O B J E T : Statut de l'Aéroport
International de KIGALI.

REFERENCE : Votre lettre du 21 Avr 1994.

Monsieur le Commandant,

Je vous transmets en annexe mes observations quant aux conditions nécessaires pour assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de l'Aéroport telles que reprises dans votre lettre en référence.

a. En effet, comme il a été constaté à plusieurs reprises, le FPR utilise la MINUAR pour la protection de ses positions de combat en prétextant la présence des membres de la MINUAR sur ses positions pour empêcher les FAR de riposter aux tirs ennemis en provenance des positions FPR(CND, MERIDIEN, STADE AMAHORO, QG MINUAR etc...).

Il serait alors inacceptable que cette situation se reproduise à l'Aéroport international de KIGALI. C'est pourquoi je vous propose les conditions reprises en annexe de la présente qui sont de nature à assurer une neutralité positive de l'Aéroport.

b. Je prends bonne note également de l'engagement du FPR par écrit à respecter le nouveau statut de l'Aéroport de KIGALI. Cet engagement par écrit devra ressortir expressément la bonne foi du FPR, pour ne pas tenter de s'emparer de l'Aéroport

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Copie pour information :

- Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre
- Monsieur le Ministre des Transports et de Communication
- Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense
- Chef EM Cd W

BIZIMUNGU Augustin
Général-Major
Chef EM AR

ANNEXE A MA LETTRE N° 0713 / G3.3.3 DU 20 MAI 1994

Les conditions nécessaires pour assurer la neutralité et la sécurité de l'Aéroport.

- a. Les FAR et la Gendarmerie doivent se retirer de l'Aéroport et de ses environs immédiats sauf les militaires de l'aviation et la Gendarmerie aéroportuaire.
- b. L'établissement d'une zone de sécurité, autour de l'aéroport d'au moins 300 mètres pour les tirs d'armes lourdes et les installations de ces armes lourdes au moins à 1000 mètres (1 kilomètre).
- c. Tous les tirs des FAR et FPR doivent être évités par les mortiers et autres systèmes d'armes dans la zone neutre dite de sécurité dont les limites sont définies ci-dessus.
- d. La défense éloignée de l'Aéroport est assurée par les FAR.
- e. Les FAR et le FPR ne doivent pas utiliser la force pour pénétrer dans la zone de sécurité.
- f. L'Aéroport est ouvert pour des raisons strictement humanitaires jusqu'à la conclusion d'un accord de cessez le feu. Après cet Accord les conditions qui prévalaient avant la reprise des hostilités (avant le 07 Avr 94) seront d'application.
- g. Le personnel civil qui travaille à l'Aéroport doit avoir des facilités pour venir travailler. Ces facilités doivent être garanties par la MINUAR.
- h. La MINUAR s'engage à assurer la Neutralité de l'Aéroport par tous les moyens en vue de NE PAS laisser l'Aéroport tomber sous le contrôle du FPR.

ACCORD DE FACILITATION D'AIDE HUMANITAIRE

1. Les deux parties reconnaissent que la situation humanitaire à KIGALI se détériore rapidement suite aux nombreux accrochages. Il y a un manque de nourriture, d'eau potable et de médicaments. La situation est plus spécialement critique dans les Camps de réfugiés et dans les hôpitaux. Il y a toujours plusieurs corps qui jonchent les rues, créant un danger d'épidémie. L'hostilité des troupes combattantes et militaires ne permet pas l'apport d'aide humanitaire au peuple qui souffre.
2. Afin de prévenir une détérioration plus accrue de la situation humanitaire à KIGALI, les deux parties sont prêtes à établir une entente pour la livraison d'aide humanitaire internationale sous la surveillance de la MINUAR.
3. Les parties contrôlant les secteurs devant chaque Camp de réfugiés, et hôpital, vont établir un poste de garde qui sera responsable pour la sécurité du Camp/Hôpital. Des endroits de distribution d'aide humanitaire seront établis par chaque partie dans leur secteur respectif.
4. Les deux parties en cause vont s'informer par l'entremise de la MINUAR de l'existence et de la création de nouveaux Camps/Hôpitaux ainsi que des points de distribution afin d'éviter l'échange accidentel de coups de feu dans ces secteurs.
5. Les deux parties s'entendent pour donner le libre accès et les escortes pour les convois d'aide humanitaire aux observateurs militaires de la MINUAR voyageant vers ou retournant des Camp/Hôpitaux. La zone neutre ne sera traversée qu'avec des escortes de la MINUAR.
6. Chacun des Camps/Hôpitaux, points de distribution et convois d'aide humanitaire doit être clairement identifié par un drapeau blanc avec une croix rouge.
7. Les deux parties s'engagent à respecter une zone de sécurité de 1000 mètres (1 Km) autour de chaque Camp ou hôpital où les combats ne peuvent avoir lieu.
8. Dans le cadre de la salubrité et hygiène publique, les 2 parties conviennent de faciliter l'accès aux techniciens d'ELECROGAZ devant assurer l'entretien de ses installations (zone de captage d'eau-station de pompage et de distribution d'eau-Usine d'épuration-postes de transformation).
9. Chacune des parties devra fournir à la MINUAR un officier de liaison pour l'aide humanitaire. Cet Officier devra avoir ses propres moyens de communication.

TRANSLATION OF RGF DOCUMENTS DATED 20 MAY 1994 CONCERNING
NEUTRALITY OF KIA

You are receiving as an annex my observations about the necessary conditions to ensure the security and the neutrality of the airport as discussed at the references.

a. As identified many times the RPF use UNAMIR to protect their combat positions on the pretext that members of UNAMIR are in location thereby making it difficult for the RGF to return to fire on the RPF positions located at CND, Meridien, Amahoro Stadium, and UNAMIR HQ etc.

It is unacceptable for this situation to occur again at KIA. This is why I am proposing the conditions outlined in the annex which will assure neutrality at the airport.

b. I would expect written confirmation from the RPF, confirming that they will respect the new Kigali Airport status. This confirmation should express the real desire of the RPF to not use the airport as an military objective.

Annex A To His Letter No. 0713/G3.3.3 DU 20 May 1994

The necessary conditions to assure the neutrality and the security of KIA:

a. The RGF and the Gendarmarie should leave the airport and its immediate area except for the military aviation personnel and the Gendarmarie airport personnel.

b. The establishment of a security zone around the airport for a minimum of 300 hundred meters for heavy direct fire weapons and a minimum of 1000 meters for all indirect fire weapons.

c. All fire from RGF and RPF mortars or other systems should be prohibited within the zone of neutrality as described above.

d. The defence of the airport outside the neutral zone will be assured by the RGF.

e. The RGF and the RPF may not use force in order to penetrate the neutral zone.

f. The airport will only be open for humanitarian reasons until a cease fire accord is reached. After this accord is reached the conditions that prevailed prior to 07 April, 1994 will be in effect.

g. The civilian personnel who work at the airport must be allowed to come to work. This ability will be provided by UNAMIR.

h. UNAMIR will ensure the neutrality of the airport, ensuring that it does not fall into the the control of the RPF.

AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE HUMANITARIAN AIDE

1. Both parties agree that the humanitarian situation in Kigali is deteriorating rapidly as a result of many disagreements. There is a lack of food, water, and medication. The situation in the refugee camps and hospitals are critical. There are still dead bodies in the street, thereby creating a danger of epidemics. The fighting of the two sides do not permit the delivery of humanitarian aide to the people who are suffering.

2. In order to prevent the situation from getting worse in Kigali, both parties should be ready to establish an agreement allowing the delivery international humanitarian aide under the protection of UNAMIR.

3. The parties controlling the sectors in which there are refugee camps or hospitals must establish a security force responsible for the security of that camp/hospital. The distribution areas will be identified for the distribution of aide by each party for each sector.

4. Both parties must be informed through UNAMIR about the existence or the establishment of new hospital/camps in order to avoid the accidental exchange of fire in those sectors.

5. Both parties must give free access and provide escorts to UNAMIR observers and humanitarian convoys going to and from the camps or hospitals. The neutral zone may only be crossed with escorts from UNAMIR.

6. Each camp, hospital, humanitarian convoy, distribution point must be clearly identified by a white flag with a red cross.

7. Both parties agree to respect the one thousand meter exclusion zone around each camp/hospital where no fighting will take place.

8. In the interest of health and public hygiene, both sides should allow access by the technicians to ELECROGAZ in order to maintain those installations. (water purification, pumping and distribution stations).

9. Both parties must give a liaison officer to UNAMIR for humanitarian aide. This officer should have his own means of communications.

Translation by:
Austdal / Nelson
21/5/94
Austdal
LGP
C Plans.

UNAMIR

194 MAY 19 20 01

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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194 MAY 19 20 16

CRN 184

MIR 1001

PRIORITY

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY

THROUGH MAJ GEN BARI

FROM: MAJ GEN DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

NUMBER:

DATE: 20 MAY 1994

SUBJECT: TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN PHASE 1 (UNAMIR II)

1. IN ADDITION TO THE 489 TROOPS FROM GHANA ARRIVING TO COMPLETE GHANBATT ON THE GROUND ALREADY, IT IS ALSO REQUIRED THAT THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS ARRIVE IN PHASE 1 FOR CRITICAL PREPARATION, HANDLING AND STAFFING FOR SUBSEQUENT PHASE II DEPLOYMENTS BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY INITIATE THE IMMEDIATE AND CRITICAL LAUNCHING OF OUR NEW FORCE STRUCTURE :

A. FORCE MEDICAL COY. A SURGICAL TEAM COMPLETE WITH EQUIPMENT AND DRUGS TO OPERATE AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE A FD HOSPITAL. THE CONCERNS OF CASUALTIES DUE TO THE CONTINUOUS FIRING AND THE DANGEROUS ALTERCATIONS WITH THE LOCALS ON THE BARRIERS REQUIRE THIS ESSENTIAL ASSET RIGHT UP FRONT. WE CURRENTLY ONLY HAVE ONE DOCTOR WITH THE FORCE. THERE IS AN EXISTING ACCOMMODATION FACILITY AT THE KING FAISAL HOSPITAL THAT CAN BE USED.

B. FORCE LOG COY. ADVANCE PLANNING ELEMENTS OF THE GENERAL TRANSPORT PLATOON, THE SUPPLY PLATOON, SECOND/THIRD WORKSHOP AND THE BULK LIFT FUEL/WATER PLATOON IN ORDER TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS AND CONDUCT THE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF BOTH ANTICIPATED TASKS AND UNIT NEEDS FOR THE EXPANDED FORCE. THIS ESSENTIALLY MEANS A LOGISTICS PLANNING CELL SUPPLEMENTED BY AT MOST A TRANSPORT PLATOON AND A MATERIAL HANDLING ELEMENT FOR AIRPORT SUPPLY FLOOR.

C. FORCE SUPPORT BN HQ. THE COMMAND ELEMENTS AND PLANNING CELL WILL BE REQUIRED TO START THE STAFFING EARLY FOR THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THIS COMPOSITE BATTALION WHICH WILL BE THE LIFE LINE OF THE EXPANDED FORCE.

TUNISIAN COY (-). THE FORCE HQ DEFENCE COY MUST BE MANNED TO ESTABLISHMENT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE ROUTINE AND MAXIMUM CONCENTRATED USE OF GHANBATT RESOURCES FOR SECURITY TASKS. TWENTY TROOPS FROM TUNISIA WILL BE REQUIRED IN PHASE 1 TO INCREASE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN THE DETACHMENT FROM THE CURRENT 40 TO 60 PERSONNEL.

3. THE CURRENT UNMO ESTABLISHMENT ON THE GROUND MUST BE AUGMENTED WITH THE LEAST DELAY POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO INTEGRATE THEIR FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT INTO THE OVERALL MONITORING/SECURITY TASKS OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE; BUT ALSO HAVE THEM AVAILABLE WITH NO POSSIBLE DELAY FOR THE IMMEDIATE MONITORING OF THE CEASE FIRE PROTOCOL.

4. FOR YOUR CONCILIATION AND ACTION.

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CRN 182

MIR 992

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: PARIL FOR ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 18 MAY 1994

NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF ORPHANS FROM RWANDA

1. FIND ATTACHED TWO REPORTS OF MEETINGS HELD ON 16 AND 17 MAY THAT WERE DEALING WITH THE EVACUATION OF ORPHANS.
2. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THESE REPORTS, WE ARE FACING SOME SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WHEN COMES TIME TO DISCUSS EVACUATION OF NOT ONLY ORPHANS, BUT OF RWANDESE IN GENERAL. THIS SHOULD REEMPHASIZE THE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE NEW RESOLUTION.
3. REGARDS.

FC E/DIR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: FC

From: CHO

Date: 16 May 1994

Subject: MEETING BETWEEN HAC- OPERATIONS OFFICER OF THE GENDARMERIE-G2 OF THE RGF AND SOME THIRTY MEMBERS OF THE INTERAHAMWE AND VARIOUS SELF DEFENCE FORCES.

1. The above mentioned meeting was held between 1230 hrs and 1445 hrs 16 May, 1994 at the Diplomat Hotel in Kigali. In attendance were the following persons:

- a. Colonel Yaache, CHO;
- b. Lt Col Paul Rwarakabiji, Gendarmerie Operations Officer;
- c. Col Aloys Ntiwiragabo, G2 RGF ;
- d. Some leaders of the INTERAHAMWE and the various self defence forces,
- e. Major Pajik, and
- f. Major MacNeil.

AIM

2. The aim of the meeting was to confirm the detailed planning for the evacuation of some two hundred and sixty orphans from the Gisimba and Gitega orphanages in Kigali for evacuation to Kampala and thence overseas.

DISCUSSION

3. Colonel Yaache welcomed all the participants to the meeting indicating to them that he was the Chief Humanitarian Officer for UNAMIR and that one of the main tasks of the Humanitarian Assistance Cell and indeed that of UNAMIR was to see that the many displaced persons in fear for their lives should be allowed to return to areas of the country that they wished to return to. He indicated to all present that preliminary discussions had been held previously with the Chef du Cabinet of Rwanda, the G3 of the Gendarmerie and some of the leaders of the INTERAHAMWE and militia groups and it was agreed in principle that as a humanitarian gesture and to show the outside world that the government of Rwanda could count on its citizens to follow direction given by the government.

4. Colonel Yaache went on to say that the specific aim of this meeting was the detailed planning for the initial transfer of displaced persons which centred on the evacuation of the orphans. He further stated that UNAMIR's intent was to conduct the operation in three stages:

- a. the evacuation of the orphanages;
- b. the evacuation of the displaced persons camps; and
- c. the evacuation of the displaced in hiding.

5. The floor was then given to Lt Col Paul Rwarakabiji, the Operations Officer of the Gendarmerie, who confirmed to all present that with preliminary talks complete on this topic he was ready to determine from those present the manner in which they would participate in this operation. He went on then to outline the participation of the Gendarmerie and indicated that during previous meetings he had convinced UNAMIR that their participation should consist of the vehicles to transport the orphans and some armed escorts in jeeps or pickups to augment the Gendarmerie and to show the cooperation of UNAMIR. He indicated that he had suggested to UNAMIR that the use of armour assets would be inappropriate for this operation. At this point all leaders present agreed that this would be most inappropriate. He went on to confirm that the evacuation was set to commence at 0900 hours the next day. ||X

6. At this point in the meeting it appeared that the majority of the leaders of the INTERAHAMWE and local militias were in agreement with the plan. However it appeared that some present who had not attended previous meetings were somewhat puzzled and remained silent with but a blank stare and perhaps a smile as to the magnitude of the operation that was about to be launched within 24 hours.

7. Colonel Yaache interjected at this point indicating that he could not confirm that the operation could in fact take place the following morning as UNAMIR had not as yet received a final response from the RPF. He indicated that for that reason a sequence of events and details on participation could be worked out and put in place once the cooperation of the RPF was assured.

8. The G3 of the Gendarmerie and the G2 of the RGF at this point gave an impression that something very important was lacking in convincing all those present that there was in fact a requirement at this time for a meeting. Nonetheless, the President of the INERAHAMWE indicated that his intention was to put 10 of his members along the route to warn of the operation and that his organization had decided to employ 20 members to announce on radio where displaced persons in hiding could report and where they would be met by his people and a representative of UNAMIR for evacuation to a location they wished to go. || hmw

9. At this point in time the G2 of the RGF raised the point that the timetable for the operation must be such that all government forces including the self defence forces be aware of the exact itinerary of the convoy and how long it would take to return. Colonel Yaache indicated that the convoy would only take 100 orphans as that was all the Hercules aircraft could hold. If this operation was successful, then it would be repeated at a later date for other orphans based on the availability of aircraft.

10. Talks now shifted to specifics of where the escort would drop the convoy in the area of the RPF lines. After some discussion the point was identified as the RGF position near the Kigali English School.

11. The G2 then raised the point that there must be a ceasefire during the operation and a guarantee from the RPF that they would not use the occasion to launch an offensive. Colonel Yaache explained that this concern would be addressed before the launch of the operation and was a major reason why in all likelihood the operation would not be able to take place the next day.

12. The floor was opened then to concerns of the leaders and things really went downhill. One leader indicated that he would have to be able to traverse RPF lines to reach the RGF lines near the airport so that he could personally verify that the orphans had arrived at the airport. The G2 of the RGF agreed that this was a real necessity. Colonel Yaache explained that this would definitely pose a problem with the RPF and would undoubtedly be a major difficulty for the completion of the operation.

13. Another leader indicated that he was not convinced that there was a requirement to evacuate the orphans as they had not been endangered since the commencement of hostilities. He asked HAC as to who in fact had suddenly decided to evacuate those particular orphanages while there were others just as deserving and more in need. Colonel Yaache explained that the decision was in consultation with the Rwandese Government and the RGF based on certain compelling reasons and that other orphanages would be looked at later.

14. This particular leader went on to indicate that he felt there was a lack of fair play in UNAMIR as this was a second attempt to evacuate Tutsis from Kigali, the Milles Collines being the first. He felt that someone was making a concerted effort to empty the RGF side of Kigali of Tutsis so that the RPF could lay siege to it.

15. The meeting ended with the HAC team indicating that they would raise the concerns raised during the meeting with the FC. In summary these include:

- a. There must be a ceasefire and guarantee from the RPF that they will not take advantage of the situation if this operation proceeds.

- b. A means must be worked out so that representatives of certain militias can make contact with their comrades in the area of the airport with permission to cross through RPF territory.
- c. Certain leaders are skeptical about outside interests being suddenly concerned about an area and forcing the hand of UNAMIR to favour the Tutsi versus the Hutu (a feeling that led one leader to express the view that he felt that the FC was not neutral in this conflict).*
- d. They are concerned that there is a concerted effort to empty the RGF area of Kigali of Tutsis so that an RPF siege can take place.


18. The INTERAHAMWE representatives and militia leaders left the meeting certainly unimpressed in this authors view. The G3 of the Gendarmerie was most perplexed as was the G2 of the RGF.

19. It was evident from the proceedings of the meeting that the RGF lacks control of the militia groups and the will to marshal these groups in any positive way.*

20. It is felt that there will likely be some bad press towards UNAMIR from Radio Rwanda concerning this operation particularly in view of the presence of the G3 of the Gendarmerie and the G2 of the RGF.

21. The issue of evacuation of displaced persons in Kigali remains a very sensitive one that needs to be handled with extreme tact and caution.

for


D.J. MacNeil
Maj
CHO

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: FC 

From: CHO

Date: 17 May 1994

Subject: MEETING BETWEEN HAC- OPERATIONS OFFICER OF THE RGF -
CHEF DU CABINET WITH PRESENCE OF RWANDAN MEDIA.

1. The above mentioned impromptu meeting was held between 1030 hrs and 1200 hrs 17 May, 1994 at the Diplomat Hotel in Kigali. In attendance were the following persons:

- a. Colonel Yaache, CHO;
- b. Colonel Bagosora, le Chef du Cabinet;
- c. Colonel Gasake , Acting G3 RGF ;
- d. Media representatives of Radio Rwanda and the Ministry of Defence;
- e. Major Pajik, and
- f. Major MacNeil.

AIM

2. The aim of the meeting was to explain to the Chef du Cabinet why the planned evacuation of the orphans of Gisimba and Gitega did not take place as planned at 0900 hrs 17 May, 1994.

DISCUSSION

3. Colonel Yaache introduced himself to the Chef du Cabinet and to the acting G3 of the RGF and reviewed action on the operation to date. He explained that there had been three meetings and he emphasized that at the last meeting with the youth leaders of the INTERAHAMWE and the militia, it was evident from the concerns they had raised that the evacuation had to be postponed for the safety of the children.

4. It was necessary for Colonel Yaache to explain the concerns of the leadership elements present during the meeting the previous day, as it was evident that the Chef du Cabinet was not aware of them.

5. Colonel Yaache explained that the concerns raised by the INTERAHAMWE and the youth leaders of the militia included the following:

- a. They insisted that there was a necessity for them to move through RPF lines and make physical contact with their elements in the area of the airport to ensure the safe passage of the orphans.

- b. They were concerned that the RPF would take advantage of the occasion to launch an offensive.
- c. They were skeptical about the reasons for the selection of these two orphanages when there were others that were overlooked.
- d. They felt that there was a concerted effort to empty the RGF controlled area of Kigali of Tutsis thereby allowing the RPF to lay siege on the city.

6. With these concerns raised by the leadership elements during the previous meeting, Colonel Yaache explained that there was more than enough controversy over the operation to conclude that it could be successfully executed and consequently it was agreed to keep the plan "on the shelf" until negotiations could be completed with the RPF. He stressed that getting the RPF to agree to allow INTERAHAMWE leadership elements into areas under their control would not be negotiation that could easily be concluded.

7. The Chef du Cabinet was in agreement with Colonel Yaache on the reasons as to why the decision to cancel the operation was taken but stressed that in his opinion, he could not understand why the two parties could not agree on the conduct of the exercise. He went on to add that race had nothing to do with this operation as these children were orphans.

8. The Chef du Cabinet agreed with the point raised by the youth leaders concerning the requirement for them to make physical contact with elements near the airport. He indicated that safety would not be possible without this requirement being met. As to the concern of the choice of these two orphanages, he indicated that the government chose them as they were the only two in the Kigali area. He went on to say that the issue of displaced persons in Rwanda was a priority and that this evacuation was the first phase in preparation for the transfer of the displaced from places of hiding and from larger displaced camps in areas under the control of both opposing forces.

9. The Chef du Cabinet went on to stress the point that the Rwandan Government wished for this evacuation to take place and that if it didn't it would be the fault of the RPF and not the Rwandese Government.

10. Colonel Yaache asked whether the demand of the youth leadership for a ceasefire was still binding. The Chef du Cabinet replied that a ceasefire was an obvious requirement as they could not move orphans through a firefight.

11. The Chef du Cabinet offered some suggestions to facilitate the passage of the youth leaders. He indicated that the leaders of the RPF were known to them and that before the hostilities they had dined together. He therefore suggested that the RPF be invited to participate in the movement through the RPF held area at the same time as the leadership of the militias and UNAMIR so as to represent a joint effort for the operation. He went on to


add that there would only be three or four representatives of the youth groups to move through the RPF held areas.

12. The Chef du Cabinet ended his portion of the discussion indicating that the Rwandese Government was committed to allowing freedom of movement to its citizens. He indicated that he understood that negotiation was necessary with the RPF and that it was UNAMIR's responsibility to do this. He also indicated that the media should be present during the operation. He closed by saying that they were ready to conduct the operation and that should agreement be reached then a notice of 24 hours would be all that would be required.

13. Colonel Yaache agreed to pursue discussions with the FC and with the RPF and indicated that once agreement was reached then a further meeting with the leadership elements of the INTERAHAMWE and militia would be required. The Chef du Cabinet replied that there was no need for any further meetings.

14. The Rwandese media as well as the media of the Ministry of Defence then put forward a question to Colonel Yaache as to why the Rwandese media should not be invited to cover this type of event. Colonel Yaache indicated that in his view he saw no problem with the media being present but it was not within his authority to grant such a request.

15. Upon leaving the Rwandese media asked if it was possible for them to interview Dr Kabia. HAC told them their request would be passed on to UNAMIR HQ.



D.J. MacNeil
Maj
CHO

for



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1994 MAY 18 19

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UNAMIR

94 MAY 18 20 13

CRN 183

MIA 994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 18 May 1994

NUMBER:

SUBJECT: WEEKLY PROGRESS REPORT ON UNAMIR OPERATIONS TO EVACUATE PERSONS FROM RWANDA

REFERENCE: CODE CABLE UNAMIR/DPKO THE SAME SUBJECT FROM 12 MAY 1994.

1. SINCE THE LAST REPORT UNAMIR HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN EVACUATING SIX BURUNDESE NATIONALS FROM THE MILLES COLLINES HOTEL AND ONE UGANDAN FROM KIGALI. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATION WITH LOCAL MILITIA GROUPS WAS NECESSARY FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE BURUNDESE NATIONALS BECAUSE OF THEIR TUTSI ORIGINS.

2. SINCE THE LAST REPORT 251 NEW REQUESTS FOR EVACUATION HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BRINGING THE TOTAL UP TO 971. ALL NEW REQUESTS INVOLVE RWANDAN NATIONALS WHO ARE MOSTLY TUTSIS.

3. UNAMIR IS STILL OF THE OPINION THAT DESPITE GOVERNMENT OVERTONES TO THE CONTRARY, THERE REMAIN MANY ELEMENTS IN KIGALI THAT WILL EXECUTE ON SIGHT ANY TUTSIS FOUND TRAVELLING IN UNAMIR VEHICLES OR SEEN IN PUBLIC.

4. UNAMIR EFFORTS TO INVESTIGATE REQUESTS DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD HAVE BEEN HAMPERED DUE TO INCREASED FIGHTING IN THE AREA AND THE RISK OF DISCLOSING THE HIDEOUTS OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED. MILITIA GROUPS FEEL THAT THE RPF IS USING UNAMIR VEHICLES TO INFILTRATE RPF FIGHTERS THROUGH RGF AND MILITIA LINES AND THIS HAS MADE THE TRANSPORT OF RWANDESE IN UNAMIR VEHICLES EXTREMELY DANGEROUS FOR BOTH RWANDESE AND UNMOS.

5. AS AN ONGOING ROUTINE ALL REQUESTS FOR EVACUATION ARE FORWARDED TO THE UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS CELL (HAC) AND PUT INTO A DATA BASE SO THEY MAY BE COMPLETED ONCE THE SECURITY

CFC eldie

SITUATION PERMITS. UNAMIR WILL CONTINUE TO RECORD REQUESTS AS THEY ARE RECEIVED AND WILL ENTER THEM INTO TASKING PLANS FOR UNMO TEAMS WHO WILL INVESTIGATE THEM AS SOON AS THE SECURITY SITUATION PERMITS.

6. A MAJOR EFFORT WAS TAKEN TO ARRANGE THE SAFE PASSAGE OF ABOUT 260 ORPHANS FROM THE GISIMBA AND GITEGA ORPHANAGES IN KIGALI TO THE KIGALI AIRPORT FOR EVACUATION TO NAIROBI AND OVERSEAS ON THE JOINT INITIATIVE OF UNAMIR AND MR KOUCHNER REPRESENTING THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. A SERIES OF MEETINGS WERE HELD WITH THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND YOUTH LEADERS OF THE INTERAHAMWE AND MILITIAS. AS A RESULT OF NUMEROUS CONCERNS AND DIFFERENCES OF OPINION EXPRESSED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF INTERAHAMWE AND OTHER MILITIA GROUPS THE EVENT WAS POSTPONED FOR THE TIME BEING.

7. MEETINGS HELD WITH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD INDICATE THAT THEY ARE COMMITTED TO ALLOWING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AT THIS TIME BUT ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE LEADERSHIP AND ACTIONS OF THE VARIOUS MILITIAS AND SELF DEFENCE GROUPS.

8. WE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO FOUR DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS UNDER OUR CONTROL AS WELL AS MOBILE PATROLS TO CONFIRM THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER CAMPS WITHIN THE KIGALI AREA. OTHER PATROLS ARE INVOLVED WITH ESCORTING HUMANITARIAN AID AGENCIES IN DELIVERIES TO DISPLACED CAMPS.

9. THE ISSUE OF THE SECURITY OF THE PERSONS WHOSE LIVES ARE IN DANGER AS A RESULT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION CONTINUES TO ENGAGE PRIORITY ATTENTION OF UNAMIR. PLANS ARE ACCORDINGLY BEING EVOLVED TO EVACUATE DISPLACED PERSONS IN RWANDA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KIGALI AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

10. REGARDS.

UNAMIR

194 MAY 15 21 24

CRN 179
MIR 970

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN GOULDING, UNATIONS, NY.
FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR KIGALI
INFO: KITTANI
DATE: 15 MAY 1994
NUMBER:

UNAMIR
194 MAY 15 22 43

SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS

1. YOUR CODE CABLE NO 1614 OF 13 MAY 1994 IS ACKNOWLEDGED AND NOTE IS TAKEN OF THE FACT THAT THE COUNCIL REQUESTS FOR A BRIEF ON THE LATEST SITUATION IN RWANDA.

2. THE POINTS RAISED IN THE SAID CABLE WILL BE TREATED IN THE SEQUENCE IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN LISTED. FIRSTLY PARA 3

A. THE LATEST SITUATION ON THE GROUND. FIGHTING BETWEEN THE WARRING FACTIONS IS CONTINUING WITH THE MILITIAS BECOMING MORE DESPERATE AND AGGRESSIVE. ON THE PART OF THE RGF THEY ARE CONTINUING WITH THE RECRUITMENT EXERCISE AND TRAINING OF YOUNG MEN TO STRENGTHEN THEIR FORCES. WE HAVE SEEN A SIMILAR EXERCISE IS TAKING PLACE IN THE RPF SECTOR BUT SEEMINGLY AT A SMALLER SCALE. AS REGARDS THE FIGHTING, THE SHELLING OF VARIOUS PLACES IN THE CITY INCLUDING REFUGEE CONCENTRATIONS IS ON THE INCREASE AND FIGHTING CAN BE HEARD IN ALL DIRECTIONS OF THE CITY DAILY WITH NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF BOTH PARTIES. ONE DANGEROUS ELEMENT THAT HAS BECOME EVIDENT IS THAT WHILST THE RGF LOCATES ITS MORTAR BASE PLATE POSITION CLOSE TO REFUGEE CAMPS, RPF ALSO HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY MOVED AWAY FROM THE AMAHORO STADIUM, KING FAISAL HOSPITAL AND THE UNAMIR HQ EVEN AFTER REPEATED FORMAL AND PERSONAL PROTEST. THIS SITUATION KEEPS ON DRAWING FIRE TO UNAMIR TROOPS AND THE DISPLACED PERSONS. IT IS NEEDLESS TO STATE, THAT CASUALTIES ARE OCCURRING IN THESE PLACES DAILY. AS REGARDS CAPTURED GROUND, THE RPF STILL HAVE THE INITIATIVE. RPF HAVE CONSOLIDATED THE NORTH AND EAST OF THE COUNTRY AND CONTINUE THEIR MOVEMENT WESTERLY ALONG THE BURUNDI BORDER AND SOUTH OF KIGALI. THE RGF HAS THE SOUTH WEST AND WEST OF THE COUNTRY. IN THE CITY THE POSITIONS HAVE REMAINED THE SAME WITH RPF COVERING ABOUT 40% ON THREE SIDES BUT NOT THE CITY CENTRE ALTHOUGH IT IS BEING SHELLLED REGULARLY.

B. THE SRSG AND REGIONAL EFFORTS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE THE SRSG WAS ABLE TO MEET PRESIDENT MUSEVENI OF UGANDA FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE CRISIS. A REPORT ON THAT MEETING WAS FORWARDED TO YOU ON 4 MAY 1994.

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C. AN ADEQUATE UPDATE ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION INCLUDING NEEDY AND ONGOING ACTIVITIES. UNAMIR TOGETHER WITH NGOS CONTINUE MAKING ATTEMPTS AT REACHING THE NEEDY POPULATION WITH LIMITED SUCCESS OWING TO THE CONTINUED FIGHTING AND THE ATTITUDE/ACTIONS OF THESE PERSONS ON THE LOCATIONS. EVERYDAY FRESH ATTEMPTS ARE MADE AND SOME DISPLACED PERSONS AND ORPHANAGES ARE REACHED WHILST SOME PLACES ARE JUST IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCESS UNLESS DIRECT OVERPOWERING FORCE IS PRESENTED. WATER AND MEDICINE ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY TO PERSONS IN DESPERATE NEED HIDING IN AREAS HELD BY RGF ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT IN MOST PLACES. THERE IS ALSO A GROUP OF RWANDESE WHO ARE STILL HIDING IN THEIR HOMES UNDER THE FEAR OF BEING KILLED BEHIND THE LINES OF BOTH SIDES. AFTER SIX WEEKS THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SOME OF THEM WILL SIMPLY DIE OF STARVATION AND LACK OF WATER. AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE IS CRUCIAL TO THE SOLUTION OF THESE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS PARTICULARLY IN KIGALI AND OTHER FIGHTING AREAS.

(1) BENEFICIARY NUMBERS

(A) DISPLACED PERSONS. WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF RWANDA, AN ESTIMATED 900,000 PERSONS HAVE BEEN DISPLACED BY WAR WITH MAJORITY OF THEM HAVING SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE 91 DISPLACED CAMPS THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY BOTH THE RWANDA GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) AND THE RWANDA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AND VERIFIED IN MANY CASES BY UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVER TEAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS AND THE UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE HUMANITARIAN TEAM. AS THE RPF ADVANCE CONTINUE TOWARDS THE WEST, AND DUE TO THE VERY LIMITED/DIFFICULT ACCESS TO REST OF THE RGF ZONE, WE CANNOT ESTIMATE HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE FLEEING THE ONSLAUGHT. THE POPULATION IN THE AREA IS WELL ABOUT 1 MILLION.

(B) REFUGEES. THERE ARE STILL AN ESTIMATED 80,000 BURUNDI REFUGEES LIVING IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA WHOSE DEPENDENCE ON ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES WAS COMPLETE. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 300,000 RWANDAN REFUGEES IN TANZANIA (250,000) BURUNDI AND ZAIRE. THERE ARE ALSO THE RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM THE PREVIOUS WARS THAT HAVE ALSO TO BE SOLVED. THEIR NUMBERS ARE WELL DOCUMENTED BY HCR.

(C) DROUGHT AND WAR AFFECTED FARMERS. PRIOR TO THE WAR, 800,000 DAILY RATIONS (400,000 FULL PLUS 800,000 HALF) WERE PRESCRIBED AS A TEMPORARY REMEDY FOR PERSONS IDENTIFIED AS VICTIMS OF A SERIOUS DROUGHT THAT SEVERELY REDUCED LOCAL PRODUCTION, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTH. THOSE PERSONS NEVER RECEIVED THE ASSISTANCE THEY

REQUIRED AND THEIR CONDITION CAN ONLY BE EXPECTED TO HAVE DETERIORATED DRAMATICALLY DURING THIS PAST FIVE WEEKS OF FIGHTING. PRODUCTIVE AGRICULTURAL AREAS HAVE BECOME WAR ZONES AND PRODUCTION IN MANY OF THEM HAS BEEN COMPLETELY DISRUPTED. NO LESS THAN 200,000 PERSONS ARE NOW THE VICTIMS OF THIS MAN-MADE DISASTER.

(2) AGREEMENT TO ALLOW FOR THE SAFE PASSAGE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. WHILE IN PRINCIPLE AND IN DISCUSSION BOTH OF THE WARRING PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BE DELIVERED, NUMEROUS INCIDENTS INDICATE THE CONTRARY.

(A) THE RED CROSS HAS LOST AN UNPRECEDENTED 52 LOCAL STAFF MEMBERS DURING THE FIVE WEEKS OF FIGHTING IN RWANDA OFTEN BECAUSE OF EXERCISING THEIR DUTY OF PROTECTING THOSE WHO WERE IN DANGER.

(B) INCIDENTS OF WOUNDED PERSONS BEING EVACUATED TO HOSPITALS BY RED CROSS STAFF HAVE BEEN RECORDED WHERE MILITIA HAVE STOPPED AMBULANCES, REMOVED THE PATIENTS AND KILLED THEM ON THE SPOT IN THE PAST.

(C) AS RECENTLY AS THREE DAYS AGO, MILITIA ENTERED THE SAFE-HAVEN COMPOUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN KABGAYE JUST ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S HEADQUARTERS AND MURDERED SEVEN PERSONS IN FRONT OF THE ICRC DOCTOR AND STAFF.

(D) ICRC STAFF ATTEMPTING TO EXTRACT FOOD FROM THEIR WAREHOUSES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WERE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO AFTER RECEIVING DIRECT FIRE FROM UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES.

(E) UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE HUMANITARIAN TEAM STAFF HAVE BEEN FIRED UPON WITH ROCKETS GOING TO AND COMING FROM THE DELIVERY OF RELIEF ITEMS TO THE SOUTH AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THEY HAVE BEEN BOTH THE TARGET OF DIRECT AND PERIPHERAL FIRE THAT JEOPARDIZED THEIR LIVES.

(F) FOLLOWING THE DELIVERY OF RELIEF ITEMS TO A DISPLACED COMMUNITY JUST WEST OF KIGALI ON ROUTE TOWARDS GITARAMA, THE SITE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THE UNAHT, JOURNALISTS AND UNAMIR DRIVERS WERE THREATENED AND NEARLY KILLED BY THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE ASSISTANCE DELIVERED.

(3) ASSISTANCE BEING RENDERED. BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES BEING FACED IN REACHING WAREHOUSES AND AFFECTED POPULATIONS IN WEST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY AROUND KIGALI AND IN THE GOVERNMENT AREAS RELIEF ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY LIMITED.

(A) ICRC HAS DELIVERED AND DISTRIBUTED THROUGH DISPLACED COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY FOOD AND SHELTER ASSISTANCE TO A PORTION REPRESENTING LESS THAN HALF OF THE POPULATION IN NEED OF THAT AREA.

(B) WFP HAS DELIVERED JUST MORE THAN 500 METRIC TONS OF FOOD TO THE NORTH (RATIONS FOR ONE MONTH FOR LESS THAN 30,000 PERSONS).

(C) MEDICINS DU MONDE AND MSF ARE PROVIDING MEDICAL CARE TO A SMALL NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTH, INCLUDING RUHENGERI WHICH IS STILL IN RGF HANDS.

(D) ICRC IS THE ONLY AGENCY WITH A TRUE PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH, WORKING WITH AN ESTIMATED 38,000 DISPLACED PERSONS IN KABGAYE WITH RELIEF ITEMS THAT HAVE BEEN FLOWN INTO BUJUMBURA AND TRACKED NORTH INTO RWANDA. (THE BURUNDI CONNECTION SEEMS TO BE A DIFFICULT ONE TO ACCESS BECAUSE OF BURUNDI'S OWN ESTIMATED 900,000 BENEFICIARIES OF FOOD ASSISTANCE.)

(E) THE UNAHT HAS MANAGED ONLY ONE DISTRIBUTION SOUTH OF KIGALI WITH SHELTER MATERIALS, WATER CONTAINERS AND BISCUITS FAR SHORT OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE CAMP WHERE THEY WERE DELIVERED.

(F) ICRC HAS ENTERED THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY FROM NGARA IN TANZANIA WITH RELIEF FOOD AND ITEMS THAT IT HAD PRE-POSITIONED PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

(G) THE UNITED NATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE JOINED A UNITED FRONT TO PREPARE A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN RWANDA BUT ACTIVITIES --- BECAUSE OF THE CONCERNS FOR SECURITY --- HAVE BEEN FEW.

D. THE SITUATION REGARDING REPORTED RADIO BROADCASTS INCITING THE POPULATION TO VIOLENCE. THIS IS AN ONGOING ROUTINE. THE RADIO RTLM (MOSTLY) TELLS THE POPULATION EVERYDAY TO GET UP WITH ARMS AND BE READY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND THEIR HOMELAND. THE GOVERNMENT STATION HOWEVER IS PASSING THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND MOST POLITICAL PARTIES. THE CONTENT IS ON THE ONE HAND RECONCILIATORY FOR PACIFICATION YET, THEY ALSO EXPRESS THE NEED TO BE VIGILANT TO INFILTRATORS, TO GET ARMS TO THE CIVILIANS AND TO SUPPORT/PARTICIPATE WITH THE ARMY IN ITS FIGHT. THIS SEEMS TO HAVE OVERTONES OF CIVIL WAR. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE POPULATION PAYS ATTENTION TO THESE RADIOS. THE RECRUITMENT OF THE YOUNG MEN AND THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF SOME MILITIAS WHO APPEAR UNDER NO COERCION TO JOIN THE ARMY TO FIGHT IS CLEAR INDICATION OF HOW EFFECTIVE THE RADIO BROADCASTS ARE ON THE POPULATION.

15,000 IN ZAIRE AND AN ADDITIONAL 80,000 IN BURUNDI, A TOTAL OF 345,000 OR ONE-SIXTH OF THE POPULATION IN NEED INSIDE RWANDA. (THE REFUGEES FROM THE PRE-APRIL 1994 WAR ERA IN UGANDA, TANZANIA AND ZAIRE ARE NOT CONTEMPLATED IN THIS CALCULATION BUT CANNOT BE IGNORED AS THEY WERE THE ESSENCE OF ALL THE PREVIOUS WARS. THE NUMBERS INVOLVED ARE WELL KNOWN TO UNHCR. GIVEN THE EXAMPLES OF INSECURITY MENTIONED ABOVE, THE ONLY CHANCE BENEFICIARIES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WILL RECEIVE RELIEF SUPPLIES, THE ONLY WAY THREATENED PERSONS CAN BE PROTECTED FROM THE WEAPONS OF HATRED, THE ONLY ASSURANCE RELIEF WORKERS CAN HAVE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE HARMED IS IF THE UNITED NATIONS EXERCISES A MANDATE FOR UNAMIR THAT PROVIDES IT WITH THE AUTHORITY TO GUARANTEE THE SAFE PASSAGE OF PERSONS AND SUPPLIES AND THE FORCE IT REQUIRES TO BACK IT UP WHEREVER THESE SECURITY NEEDS MAY BE IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT RWANDA. OFCOURSE NOT RELEGATING THE ISSUE OF CEASE-FIRE.

4. THE REASONABLY DETAILED INITIAL DEPLOYMENT PLAN OF THE UNAMIR II FORCE IS PROVIDED IN A SEPARATE CODE CABLE SENT TODAY.

UNAMIR

P 1/8

94 MAY 15 21 30

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

CRN 180

DATE: 15 MAY 1994

MIR 971

NUMBER:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION - CHANGE OF
PRIMARY MISSION AND STAGING BASE.

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A PAPER ON MENTIONED SUBJECT FOR YOUR
STUDY AND NECESSARY ACTION.

2. REGARDS.

FC E/DIR

CRN 181

MIR 991

UNAMIR
94 MAY 15 22 29

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION - CHANGE OF
PRIMARY MISSION AND STAGING BASE.

1. The work on reaching a cease fire implementation SOP is now at the stage that a draft document is now distributed to both sides with a working session planned/chaired by DFC on Monday 16 May 94 with the active involvement of Dr Bernard Kouchner former French Minister of Health. Taking advantage of the former French Minister, we are also planning the evacuation by Hercules of about 105 orphans out of very difficult area of Kigali with the support of the Government Army, Gendarmerie and Militia. The detailed staffing is advancing well. There is a desire by both sides to work/keep UNAMIR involved in the Rwandan problem and there seems to be a will to see these refugees/displaced persons evacuated to secure areas of their choice.

2. As it stands now, the Force is finding it more and more difficult to implement any useful Humanitarian tasks in Kigali and outside the city. The RGF state good intentions (now both in writing or verbally) but their influence on the local population is questionable at best, particularly when we speak of subjects such as ethnic matters. Furthermore the political parties and the government leaders are not stating the same policy as the military seems to be. The fact that they are in a separate city and that they rarely venture near Kigali where the military leaders are is a serious hinderance. We are hearing more and more calls by these leaders upon the general population to be vigilant of RPF infiltrations, to arrest/stop suspects, to distribute arms and to be prepared to fight all enemies of the nation. This has more and more the overtones of general mobilization of the population and thus reflections of a civil war scenario should the people wish to participate. The RPF side is showing growing signs of impatience with UNAMIR's inability to get at least the minimum humanitarian actions in motion. This has resulted in the infrequent, if at all, accessibility to their HQ at Mulindi. We still have LOs but we must now deal through an RPF LO. The CND Complex, and the use of a free/secure route in their zone are more complicated then before.

3. All the above are causing severe restrictions on our movements and our ability to conduct our tasks as per the 21 April 1994 mandate, including the cease fire discussions. This difficult situation has also significant ramifications on our ability to sustain ourselves in the country. The vulnerability of the Kigali airfield, the complexity and uncertainty of passage along even the main national road network on the government side, and the lessening goodwill of the RPF all seem to mitigate against any near term solutions. The obvious question is how are we to pursue, and even in some cases, initiate our current task? Secondly how do we launch our future force and ensure its sustainment under these hopefully temporary or short term

restrictions.

4. There have been several meetings with both sides separately on the subject of our current and future mandate, on the eventuality of rendering the airport a UN Neutral Territory, on reducing the need for the road blocks and such impediments to the accomplishment of even our mundane of daily logistic tasks like fetching water. But without a cease fire, our daily activities are always at risk of being peppered with mortar, guns and small arms peripheral and directed fire with of course the attendant risks and casualties (one soldier killed and seven seriously wounded so far).

5. The draft Security Council resolution on Rwanda to make the cease fire the first demand is most comforting and encouraging. Kigali is really not workable with the constant live firing and ground battles, the regions of Ruhengeri and Bugesera leading to Gitarama are active battle zones with front lines changing hourly. It is difficult to enter if not impossible to bring any relief there. The militias and civilians are armed with small arms and grenades that create serious impediments to any local movement in the RGF zone and the increased intransigence of the RPF, all reduce our access to the populations in need.

6. Future Force Deployment. The concept of deployment of UNAMIR II has three phases. Phase I is the reinforcing of the Ghana Battalion at the airport and stadium Complex. Phase II is the build up of 2 Mechanized Bns plus some support capabilities. Phase III is the deployment of the rest of the force to its full complement. All this is to be accomplished in the period of one month after the Security Council decision.

7. Deployment of Formed Troops. In order to accomplish the tasks being reflected in the mandate of UNAMIR II, there are some axioms that must be respected for reasonable chances of success:

a. Any attempts of imposing our will on either side will fail unless it is done with the full consent of those who are recognized as being in legitimate authority.

b. The country has no spare land and the culture of the people is such that they have an unrelenting wish/desire to return to their home or little plot of land. Being displaced is an evil that they wish to be rid of. Being forced to live or migrate to a specified area is counter productive to improving the situation.

c. The country is small (200 x 200 km) but the terrain is very mountainous and criss-crossed with paths and small roads that render area control, just like area defence, impossible unless one has a lot of troops.

d. The density of the population is such that in seconds, one can be overwhelmed by very large bodies of curious/inquisitive people who often react to moment by

moment changing moods.

e. There are displaced persons in all sizes of camps (some more developed than others) throughout the country. Consolidation/standardization for security and logistic support will be essential.

f. The 345,000 refugees of this current war have joined the already large number of refugees in surrounding countries from the previous wars. Returning these people into Rwanda in camps that are protected according to the threat analysis is absolutely necessary.

8. Methodology. Localized or punctual overwhelming force must be in evidence for any operation where there are risks. Constant and determined self defence capabilities must be demonstrated at all sites under security of UNAMIR. Ubiquitous presence of UN elements through the judicious allocation of troops to tasks must be the norm. We have to pervade the whole country.

9. In some/most areas, the unscheduled passage of monitoring UNMO patrols and meetings with the local authorities will provide the sense of security required. In other areas, where large concentrations of displaced persons or refugees are placed in camps and the like, a permanent presence in the form of UNMO to formed troops will be needed dependant on the nature of the people involved and the ambient threat assessment. This same analysis is required for convoy escorts and humanitarian aid distribution centers. Consolidation of these groups as well as establishing fixed security points and routes are anticipated of course. Lastly the pockets of minority groups or individuals who require physical/close protection because their lives are directly threatened by other groups must be catered for. In these cases, identification, possible regrouping, establishing a secure site and deployment of sufficient forces will be SOP. The volume of such tasks is not fully quantified at this time as many of these people are behind RGF and militia lines and have so far, under our current mandate, not been identified. These people are behind both opposing forces lines and will require movement to their places of choice once the situation, and our capabilities permit it.

10. Secure Base. In order to launch this new expanded force in the most secure fashion possible, there is the critical need to have a firm base well secured and defensible, and a capability to sustain ourselves at minimum risk. Under the current and seemingly near term security and mobility limitations, and until at least we have enough local overpowering effective force on the ground, it is deduced that Kigali and its airport may not fully meet the requirement of a secure staging base without aggressive initial deployment to reduce the risks.

11. Kigali. The preferred site for the mission staging and sustainment base is Kigali and its airport. This central location in the country permits access to all corners by an excellent road

system. There is reasonable infrastructure available and of course the airfield is capable for landing large aircraft. In order to render it accessible, usable, and secure, a number of actions must come to fruition in the very near term such as:

- a. Confirmation of the airfield being a UN Neutral Territory.
- b. Agreement on ensuring free/secure access by UN related aircraft only by at least a local cease fire in Kigali Sector.

12. The operational concept that the Force has maintained from the start of the war, is to invest by overwhelming force of up to two battalions in and around the airfield and the main routes to and out of town. It is felt that this concept must be maintained by reinforcing immediately the Ghana Bn and giving it the firepower and protection of a mechanized capability on M-113 family APCs. An equally strong/equipped second battalion is then required to secure the access route between the airport and the other major UN and humanitarian aid centers of work in the Kigali zone. This significant rapidly deployed force will set the tone far all of the rest of the operation as it will be taking on the whole gaunt of tasks, in Rwanda the microcosm that Kigali represents.

13. These initial resources must be rapidly re-enforced by a firm commitment to get out of Kigali and gain notoriety and effect principally but not exclusively in the countryside where the isolated pockets of individuals are surrounded and where major displaced persons camps exist. This third battalion coming in through Kigali airport must be deployed in company strong locations with as much autonomy/self sufficiency as possible, to include strong firepower and protection capabilities. The actual final coy sites will be chosen according to the most urgent humanitarian security needs as accessed over the next few days. There is more and more firm data coming available for the presence of formed troops in the Gitarama and Butare Prefecture, with outposts in the town of Cyangugu, Kibuye, Ruhengeri, Kibungo and Byumba.

14. As the other bns become available, and/the UNMO teams get more effective on the ground, they will be deployed with the same sense of urgency in appropriate sites and sectors according to the threat assessment and the needs of security monitoring. The support units, be they engineers, helicopters or logistic bases will be spread out in such a fashion as to maximize the UN presence and also delegate as many specific operational tasks to all components of the force.

15. Alternate Ports of Entry. There is a real requirement to acknowledge that all our essential deployment parameters for the secure use of Kigali and its airport either will not be met, or may be altered before or during the cease fire. The military cease fire negotiations are now in motion and with an agreement,

we hope to see the active pursuit of a Peace accord. Due to the nature of the protagonists, the search for an accord may be a long and difficult road with cease fire violations being part of the negotiation tactics (it happened before in Feb 93). This plausible scenario necessitates an analysis of possible alternate bases of entry, supply and sustainment.

16. Gabiro/Entebbe. The alternate solution to Kigali airport is for the initial complement of the current force security bn (Ghana Bn) and Force HQ to remain in Kigali, but the main reinforcement effort and our general logistic/support deployment to be through Gabiro with Entebbe as its primary airhead.

a. Advantages.

- (1) Gabiro is far behind RPF lines and not near any local population to speak of.
- (2) It has a limited Military RGF camp infrastructure to build on.
- (3) It is along the best Main Supply Route (MSR) in the country from a secure border through UNOMUR which must remain in Uganda.
- (4) The Entebbe airhead is modern and substantial and in a friendly/cooperative country even though the RGF claims it is supporting the RPF cause. Our increased presence in this country may possibly eliminate this concern.
- (5) There is lots of open space which is reasonably flat to meet all our space needs.
- (6) This North/South MSR connects into the national road grid and there are lateral routes west (though more difficult) in order to cover the country reasonably well.
- (7) Will show a significant military presence behind RPF lines.

b. Disadvantages.

- (1) It may be perceived that we are favoring the RPF on a security perception.
- (2) The distance from Entebbe to Gabiro is 275 km or two days for convoys to cover. This means heavy transport for armored vehicles.
- (3) There is little to no electricity capability.
- (4) The infrastructure/hard standing is limited and

could be a problem in rainy season (till end of June).

(5) Small local airhead may not be able to handle numerous landings of transport aircraft such as C-130 Hercules.

(6) Total dependance on good will of RPF for the continuation, sustainment and security of the mission.

(7) Situated in the north east corner of the country, supply lines will be rather far (150 km for the outer deployed units).

17. Gabiro could be used as the main staging and logistics base as it could house the bulk of our support elements (phases 2&3) with some self protection elements. The forces currently in Kigali (Force HQ and Ghana Battalion full strength) will remain and would deploy capabilities at the airport for humanitarian, medical evacuation and/or secondary resupply needs. The principal task of the Ghana Bn would be Humanitarian security tasks and protection of UN entities in the Kigali secure zone. The phase 2 Bns (two Bns) could if need be stage through Gabiro and deploy according to the general plan stated above. These units would establish protected sites, firm coy level bases of operations, from which convoy escorts, displaced persons camps, distribution points could be protected within a reasonable radius. These firm bases would be chosen dependant on the security needs of the prefecture or the commune and on the main supply/relief corridor required by the NGOs, etc. Certain new protected sites may be established at or near these coy firm bases by consolidating the displaced persons, or by creating a secure environment that will induce the refugees from outside the country to return, such as the 250,000 persons currently in West Tanzania.

18. Gisenyi/Goma Site. This area has immediate access to an international airfield that could meet an logistics buildup needs if the Zaire government demonstrates a cooperative attitude to the mission and to the turn of events in Rwanda (Zaire has in past been rather inclined to support the elements of the Rwanda government side that are currently in the interim government). The general area of Gisenyi is very pro-Hutu/MRND and this may prove to be a difficultly dependant on future events in the country. The infrastructure, electrical power, space available have good/reasonable potential to meet our needs. The road network is limited to the one MSR that goes through Ruhengeri which is a rather hot area now, and may remain a contested area for a while. The alternate route south toward Kibuye and then east to Kigali is in very poor shape, not tarred, very windy and long. The potential of the Gisenyi/Goma site is not to be neglected but has its inherent limitations.

19. Kibungo/Rusomo Site. This area has reasonably open spaces but it is hilly in most locations. It is located behind the RPF lines. The road system has a very good paved surface from the

Tanzania border to Kigali and of course all the rest of the national grid. The distances to our outer limits is no worse than the other sites. There is no airhead at all in the general area but there may be some infrastructure that could be made available. Electricity will still remain a problem as in other areas. The significant drawback of this site is the lack of relatively close airhead and the access route to it. The road network in Tanzania is very poor and the distances very long. The sea port at Dar-Es-Alam is over 1000 km away (equivalent to that of Mombasa but the Kenya/Uganda road is in very good shape). There is an airport at Mwanza in Tanzania (south end of Lake Victoria). It is an international airport with the capacity of handling all types of aircraft. This means the next airhead would be Dar-Es-Alam and that means 10 days to 2 weeks for convoys to reach our staging base. The potential of this site is considered marginal.

20. Conclusion. The current and anticipated near term general security situation reflects risks in Kigali and its airport. A difficult state of impeded movement within and without the general city area is also a concern. This set of circumstances is not conducive to our solely implementing a massive force deployment through or based on Kigali. The options presented by three alternate sites, all within Rwanda, but all requiring airheads in other countries must be seriously considered and made available for contingencies. Unless a commitment by both sides that the Kigali airport can and will be recognized as a UN Neutral Territory, and that we have a cease fire within which the control of the local militias and self defence groups are contested, and that this is reasonably secured before we commence the troop/logistics deployments, then an alternate secure staging base must be readied for possible use.

21. Recommendation. In the light of the above, the following recommendations are offered:

- a. Both sides agree to Kigali airport Neutral Territory Accord by 19 May 94 or upon approval of UNAMIR II's new mandate, whichever is sooner.
- b. Should no agreement be reached, then actions be taken immediately to prepare a possible alternate site. The site most suitable to meet our needs and has the necessary international clearances of involved countries should be finalized over the next four days. The choice of site is to be done in consultation with all pertinent authorities.
- c. The option of using Kigali airport as a main base, or at least as a large base of operations and logistics, and in parallel, deploy/use two alternate sites (one behind RPF and one behind RGF lines) to ensure the most flexible continuity of operations throughout should be formally established.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEWYORK

INFO: UNAMIR ASRAR, A/CMO, UNOMUR

FROM: MAJ GEN R.A. DALLAIRE, UNAMIR

DATE: 13 MAY 1994

NUMBER: MIR 958

UNAMIR

94 MAY 14 07 07

SUBJECT: UNOMUR MONITORING ACTIVITIES

1. UNOMUR has been operating quite effectively from Kabale and was monitoring the border activities along Uganda and Rwanda border. After the outbreak of current hostilities between RPF and RGF since 07 April 1994, UNOMUR has been facing difficulty in performing their tasks beyond its originally mandated area of operations. The interpretation and guidance given to UNOMUR from Resolution 846 was that the mission was to monitor the border area when the RPF controlled the Rwandan sides, as the RPF expanded that border area during the war to its success on the battlefield. UNOMUR under direction from the FC expanded in synchronizng its area of surveillance on the Ugandan side. Some of the facts and incidents are stated below:

a. Before the outbreak of current hostilities UNOMUR used to restrict its monitoring activities between Laborious (SQ-2263) on the east and Nkurunguro (6551) on the west.

b. With the deployment of RPF along the border from Laborious to Merama Hills (SQ-5183) and from Lugendabare (SQ-7648) to mount Sabino at the Zairian border, the necessity for UNOMUR to monitor the extended portion was felt.

c. UNOMUR planned to send their patrol to Merama Hill on 26 April 1994 and accordingly the chief liaison officer NRA was informed.

d. CLO NRA informed that he needed clearance from defence minister before we start monitoring the extended areas. and accordingly asked permission from defence minister.

e. UNOMUR patrol on 28 April 1994 was stopped by NRA 5km short (SQ-4787) of Merama Hills and refused access further to the south.

f. Interestingly, NRA did not restrict the movement northeast of Laborious along the border in areas west of Nkurunguro.

g. Kakitumba crossing point at Merama Hills is linked up by a good metal road to Mbarara and Ntungamo on the north

Uganda.

h. It may be noted that RPF used this axis Mbarara - Kakitumba - Rwanda during October 1990 invasion.

i. A/CMO UNOMUR met the NRA Div Commander at Mbarara on 06 May and raised the subject to him.

j. With the induction of helicopters our enhancement of patrolling activities in last one month has been significant.

2. In light of above following assessments may be derived:

a. RPF has been fighting a war with RGF and definitely there is a requirement of having resupplied of arms and ammo. May have gained considerable equipment and ammo left behind by RGF withdrawing.

b. The areas that UNOMUR is monitoring along Rwanda - Uganda border are relatively calm and there is no evidence of any suspicious activities.

c. NRA's reluctance/"Dilly Dallying" in giving a clearance to monitor the road Mbarara/Ntungamo - Merama Hills has obviously caused suspicion.

d. It can be assumed that NRA is buying time with the pretext of getting clearance from the Minister of Defence.

3. A/CMO UNOMUR held a meeting with NRA Army Commander at Kampala on 02 May 94. He raised the point of NRA's refusal to allow UNOMUR patrol to monitor borderline from Laborious upto Mirama Hills. The necessity to monitor the area due to current deployment of RPF has been clearly explained. The army commander assured A/CMO to get a decision from the ministry within 2/3 days.

4. On 12 May 94 A/CMO and NRA Army Commander met second time regarding the issue. The Army Commander finally confirmed the clearance of the Uganda government about monitoring Mirama Hills/Kagitumba area. This will be effective from Saturday 14 May 94. In the light of above UNOMUR will establish temporary OP at Kakitumba on 24 hours rotation for monitoring the border.

CRN177

UNAMIR

94 MAY 13 21 09

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BARIL FOR ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 13 MAY 1994
NUMBER: MIR 957
SUBJECT: BOARD OF INQUIRY (BOI) - MURDER OF THE BELGIAN
SOLDIERS ON 7 APRIL 1994
REFERENCE: YOUR FAX YKF 821 10 MAY 1994

1. I HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WITH THE REPORT OF THE BOI DEALING WITH THE KILLING OF THE 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS ON 7 APRIL 1994. I DO NOT FEEL THE BOI IS COMPLETE AND WILL HAVE TO DO SOME MORE WORK ON IT BEFORE IT CAN BE FORWARDED.

2. THE EVIDENCE SO FAR OBTAINED INDICATES EXTREME VIOLENCE ON THE PART OF THE RGF TROOPS INVOLVED. THE IDENTITY OF THE CULPRITS CAN NOT BE CONFIRMED AT THIS TIME AND I SUSPECT IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM THEIR IDENTIFY.

3. THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT HAS ALSO INITIATED ITS OWN BOI AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE BELGIAN MISSION COULD BE CONTACTED AND ASKED THAT A COPY OF THAT BOARD BE SENT HERE FOR REVIEW AND POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN OUR OWN BOI.

4. I WILL DO MY BEST TO GET THIS COMPLETED HOWEVER YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF THE CONTRAINTS I FACE AND I CAN NOT GIVE YOU A COMPLETION DATE AT THIS TIME.

REGARDS.

UNAMIR

194 MAY 13 21

CRN 176
MIR 955

- 1 -

1/2


UNAMIR

194 MAY 13 13 35

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO:  ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 13 MAY 1994
NUMBER: _____
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE
SITUATION IN RWANDA
REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE CRN 247 OF 12 MAY 94

1. I HAVE REVIEWED THE REFERENCE AND OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS. THESE COMMENTS ARE FOR THE PARAGRAPHS INDICATED.

- A. PARA 4. ADD AT LAST LINE, AFTER ...CEASE FIRE IS ACHIEVED "DUE TO THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION".
- B. PARA 9. THE RPF HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO THESE PRINCIPLES.
- C. PARA 12. RECOMMEND PARA TO READ AS FOLLOWS, WITH CHANGES UNDERLINED. UNAMIR II WILL PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN THEIR PROGRAMS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. UNAMIR II WOULD ESTABLISH ACCESS AREAS WHERE DISPLACED AND OTHER AFFECTED PERSONS ARE CONCENTRATED AND ASSURE THEIR PROTECTION. SUCH PROTECTED SITES MAY INCLUDE AREAS INSIDE RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER WITH NEIGHBORING STATES WHERE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS ARE ALREADY OR WHERE THEY COULD BE CONCENTRATED. ALL PROTECTED SITES ...
- D. PARA 14. IN THE SECOND TO LAST LINE, CHANGE THE LAST WORD TO READ "SITES" VICE "ZONES".
- E. PARA 15. IN THE SECOND TO LAST LINE, CHANGE ...THREATEN THE PROTECTED SITES...
- F. PARA 21. ...THE TWO INFANTRY BATTALIONS WOULD BE DEPLOYED PRINCIPALLY TO INITIATE AND REINFORCE OPERATIONS NOT YET FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN CERTAIN SPECIFIC SECTIONS DUE TO LACK OF TROOPS.
- G. ...WHILE LOGISTIC SUPPORT IS PUT IN PLACE BY THE UNITED NATIONS. SHOULD THIS INHERENT SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE

UNITS NOT BE POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY THE INFANTRY UNITS. THEIR SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE CONTRIBUTING NATION AND IMMEDIATE ACQUISITION MUST BE DONE THROUGH A GENEROUS THIRD PARTY. THE CONCEPT...

- H. PARA 24. ...IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT MEMBER STATES AGREE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO PROVIDE NOT ONLY THE TROOPS, BUT JUST AS CRITICALLY, THE ESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT, VEHICLES, WEAPONS, RADIOS AND LOGISTIC ASSETS FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY. A FORMAL COMMITMENT BY A DONOR NATION TO MEET THESE CRITICAL STORES SHOULD THEY NOT BE AVAILABLE BY A TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY BE IMPLEMENTED/IDENTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT REQUIRED FOR THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION.
- I. PARA 25. LAST LINE, CHANGE THE WORD "SITES" FOR "UNITS".
- J. PARA 28. TO THIS END...CALL ON THE PARTIES TO ENTER INTO DETAILED CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNAMIR II FORCE COMMANDER IMMEDIATELY. IT IS EVIDENT...SUPPLIES FOR ALL CONCERNED, BE THEY THE RECIPIENTS, THE DISTRIBUTORS AND THE MISSION MEMBER.
2. I FOUND THIS TO BE AN EXCELLENT DOCUMENT AND I FEEL CONFIDENT TO BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION WITH IT. HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THE SIXTH BATTALION MUST BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO GIVE THE FORCE THE DEPTH IT NEEDS FOR A DEDICATED QUICK REACTION FORCE TO HANDLE THE VOLATILE/UNEXPECTED THAT HAS CONTINUED TO BE NOTED IN THIS COUNTRY.
3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
194 MAY -6 11:20

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 6 MAY 1994
NUMBER: MIR-909

UNAMIR
194 MAY -6 11:47

SUBJECT: LOGISTIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEEDS OF PROPOSED FORCE
STRUCTURE UNDER POSSIBLE NEW MANDATE

1. THE PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE AND TASKS THAT MAY BE DERIVED FROM A NEW MANDATE FOR UNAMIR WERE EXPRESSED IN OUR CODE CABLE MIR-907 DATED 5 MAY 94.

2. THE THRUST OF THE EFFORT THAT SEEMS TO BE ANIMATING FROM YOUR HQ INDICATES THAT A SIGNIFICANT PREFERENCE FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE THE FORCES NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE PROPOSED TASKS. THIS IS A MOST APPROPRIATE SCENARIO OF FORCE COMPOSITION BUT WE SHOULD NOT LIMIT THE PARTICIPATION SOLELY TO THESE COUNTRIES. WE HAVE DISCUSSED SOME POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH PARTICULAR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND FC WILL NOT GO INTO THAT SUBJECT IN ANY MORE DETAIL.

3. IN CONDUCTING OUR PRELIMINARY STAFF CHECKS ON THE POSSIBLE NEEDS OR REQUIREMENTS OF THESE FORCES, COUPLED WITH THE VERY DEMANDING MILESTONES FOR THE DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THEATRE, WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO RAISE CERTAIN POSSIBLE SHOW STOPPERS.

4. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY AFRICAN, HAVE BEEN HESITANT TO GIVE ANY COMMITMENT OF TROOPS DUE TO THE ENORMOUS FINANCIAL BURDEN THIS MISSION COULD BE FOR THEM. WE ARE GETTING INFORMAL RESPONSES THROUGH OFFICERS ALREADY WITH THE MISSION THAT UNLESS SOME TYPE OF GUARANTIES ARE PROVIDED TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS, THEY SIMPLY WON'T BE ABLE TO RESPOND.

5. THE AREAS OF LOGISTICAL AND PERSONNEL CONCERNS ARE:

- A. TRANSPORT OF MEN AND MATERIEL TO THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT SUSTAINMENT OF THE TRANSPORT NEEDS FOR ROTATIONS ETC.
- B. THE EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY OF NOT ONLY MAJOR SYSTEMS SUCH AS APC, BUT ALSO WHEELED SUPPORT VEHICLES, RADIOS, HEAVY MACHINE-GUNS, AMMUNITION, BIVOUAC STORES, MOBILE KITCHENS, GENERATORS, WATER PURIFICATION UNITS ETC.

P2/2

C. THE COSTS IN PERSONNEL BENEFITS, INCREASED SALARIES AND THE LIKE.

6. IT SEEMS THAT PRECEDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED WHERE A FOREIGN COUNTRY HAS PROVIDED ALL THE ESSENTIAL NEEDS TO EQUIP, DEPLOY AND SUSTAIN UNITS LIKE INFANTRY BATTALION, LOGISTICS TRANSPORT ELEMENTS, FIELD HOSPITALS, ENGINEER PLANT.

7. NO DOUBT THAT THIS WHOLE SCENARIO COULD CREATE SIGNIFICANT INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROBLEMS FOR THE FORCE, BUT THE MISSION WILL NOT END WITH THE CRITICAL HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY WE ARE FACING AT THIS TIME. THE CEASE FIRE MAY HAVE TO BE OF A CERTAIN LENGTH OF TIME UNTIL A PEACE AGREEMENT IS PRODUCED AND SIGNED. THAT PEACE AGREEMENT MAY REQUIRE A PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE THAT COULD ALSO BE OF SEVERAL MONTHS AT LEAST.

8. SO INITIALLY WE NEED TROOPS ON THE GROUND AS FAST AS POSSIBLE AND AS AUTONOMOUS AND EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE TO HANDLE THE IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN SECURITY PROBLEM. BUT THE MID TO LONGER TERM PEACEKEEPING PROBLEM IS REAL AND MAY AS WELL BE CATERED TO WITH THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT.

9. THIS COUNTRY HAS NOTHING TO OFFER TO A FOREIGN FORCE COMING HERE FOR SOME TIME. THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS VERY WEAK AND WILL REMAIN SPUTTERING FOR SOME TIME. THE FORCE WILL NEED A SELF-SUFFICIENCY CAPABILITY RIGHT UP FRONT.

10. YOUR SUPPORT AND COMMENTS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED.

11. REGARDS.

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRW 173

UNAMIR

194 MAY 12 05 11

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 12 May 1994
NUMBER: MIR 947
SUBJECT: PROGRESS REPORT ON UNAMIR OPERATIONS TO EVACUATE PERSONS FROM RWANDA
REFERENCE: CODE CABLE DPKO\UNAMIR DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994

1. ALTHOUGH UNAMIR WAS SUCCESSFUL IN EVACUATING A NUMBER OF FOREIGN NATIONALS DURING THE INITIAL OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, IT IS ACCURATE TO SAY THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME, THIS OPERATION INVOLVES CONSIDERABLE DANGER TO BOTH UNAMIR TROOPS AND TO THE PEOPLE BEING EVACUATED. UNAMIR REMAINS CONVINCED THAT RWANDESE FOUND TRAVELLING IN UNAMIR VEHICLES WILL BE SHOT ON SIGHT. IN ADDITION, MANY LOCATIONS WHERE EVACUEES ARE SAID TO BE LOCATED REMAIN IN CONTESTED AREAS BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FORCES AND INVOLVE MOVEMENT THROUGH INTENSE FIREFIGHTS ALONG ROUTES LEADING TO THESE AREAS.

2. TO DATE UNAMIR HAS RECEIVED 780 REQUESTS FOR EVACUATION FROM CONCERNED PARTIES OUTSIDE OF RWANDA. OF THESE 55 INVOLVE FOREIGN NATIONALS WHILE 725 INVOLVE RWANDAN CITIZENS. IN THE CASE OF RWANDAN CITIZENS 72 HAVE BEEN FORWARDED VISAS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

3. ALL REQUESTS FOR EVACUATION ARE FORWARDED TO THE UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS CELL (HAC) LOCATED WITHIN UNAMIR HQ IN KIGALI. ONCE RECEIVED THEY ARE PLACED IN A DATA BASE SO AS TO KEEP RECORDS OF ALL REQUESTS RECEIVED.

4. IN THE CASE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, THE MAJORITY OF REQUESTS INVOLVE RELIGIOUS ORDERS WITH MISSIONARIES IN THE COUNTRY. IN THE CASE OF RWANDANS IT USUALLY INVOLVES WORKERS FOR EMBASSIES AND COMPANIES WHO WERE LEFT BEHIND DURING THE MAJOR EVACUATION.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS THE PROCEDURE EMPLOYED AT PRESENT BY THE HAC FOR EVACUATING PEOPLE FROM RWANDA:

- A. AS A REQUEST IS RECEIVED, EITHER BY PHONE OR BY FAX, THE INFORMATION IS LOGGED IN THE DATA BASE.
- B. INDIVIDUALS WHO PHONE IN INFORMATION ARE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW UP THE CALL WITH A FAX INDICATING, BY SKETCH IF REQUIRED, THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF THE PERSON INVOLVED.
- C. ONCE THERE IS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE A TASKING IS FORWARDED TO DEDICATED UNMO PATROLS WHO THEN INVESTIGATE DEPENDANT UPON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREA. PATROLS HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN MANY INSTANCES DUE TO SOME OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
 - (1) ACCESS TO THE AREA HAS BEEN DENIED BY FORCES IN CONTROL OF THE AREA;
 - (2) THE PERSON IS NOT AT THE AREA INDICATED IN THE REQUEST AND NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS FORTHCOMING FROM PERSONS IN THE AREA;
 - (3) HEAVY FIGHTING IS ONGOING IN THE AREA; AND
 - (4) THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INITIATOR OF THE REQUEST IS INSUFFICIENT TO FIND THE PERSON INVOLVED.

6. TO DATE WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL WITH 63 TASKINGS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ACTIVE IN EVACUATING RWANDESE CITIZENS AT THIS TIME AS THERE REMAINS THE THREAT OF DEATH IF THEY ARE FOUND BY MILITIAS OR YOUTH GANGS IN UNAMIR VEHICLES. FURTHERMORE, RWANDANS WILL NOT GAIN ENTRY INTO NAIROBI WITHOUT A FOREIGN VISA. E.G. ON THE 3 MAY AN UNAMIR CONVOY FROM HOTEL MILLES COLLINES TO THE AIRPORT, WITH 60 RWANDANS HAVING VISA GUARANTEES, WAS STOPPED ON RGF ROAD BLOCK DESPITE THE EVACUATION AGREEMENT WITH THE RGF CHIEF OF STAFF. AFTER TWO HOURS OF TENSE NEGOTIATIONS THE OPERATION HAD TO BE ABORTED. DURING THAT TIME MILITIA AND RGF SOLDIERS LOOTED THE BAGGAGE AND MONEY FROM TRANSPORTED REFUGEES AND WERE BEATING THEM WITH MACHETTES, CLUBS AND RIFLE BUTTS. FOUR OF THE EVACUEES WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED.

7. BE ADVISED THAT WE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO FOUR DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS UNDER OUR CONTROL AS WELL AS MOBILE PATROLS TO CONFIRM THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER CAMPS WITHIN THE KIGALI AREA. OTHER PATROLS ARE INVOLVED WITH ESCORTING HUMANITARIAN AID AGENCIES IN DELIVERIES TO DISPLACED CAMPS.

8. IT IS MY INTENTION TO FORWARD TO YOU, AS AN ADDITION TO THE DAILY SITREP, UPDATED INFORMATION AND PROGRESS ON THIS SUBJECT.

9. REGARDS.

MIR 929

CRN 172 UNAMIR
MIR 946

UNAMIR

OUT GOING CABLE MAY 11 22 05

TO: ANNAN, UN NEW YORK
FROM: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 11 MAY 1994

NUMBER:

NON-PAPER ON POSSIBLE UNAMIR FUTURE MANDATE

OBSERVATION

1. WHILST CONSIDERING THE LATEST WRITE-UP ON THE NON-PAPER FOR RWANDA, A NUMBER OF POINTS CAME UP. SPECIFICALLY ARE THE FOLLOWING WHICH ARE RELATED TO THE ASSUMPTIONS AT PARAGRAPH SIX.

2. THE LAST TWO SENTENCES IN PARAGRAPH ONE UNDER THE HEADING RWANDA SEEM TO ACCEPT THAT THE FIRST STEP IN RESTORING PEACE IS TO ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND HOPE TO ACHIEVE CEASE-FIRE IN THE PROCESS. AS MUCH AS THE WHOLE WORLD IS TOUCHED AND MOVED BY THE SUFFERINGS OF THE RWANDESE PEOPLE, THERE IS NO WAY A CEASE-FIRE CAN BE RELEGATED TO A SECOND POSITION. FROM WHAT WE HAVE OBSERVED SO FAR IN RWANDA, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WHEN THE FIGHTING IS CONTINUING. HELP WILL GET TO THE NEEDY PEOPLE TOO LATE. THEY WOULD HAVE DIED. THOSE LAST TWO SENTENCES SHOULD THEREFORE BE COMBINED TO READ "IN ORDER TO BRING THE PARTIES BACK TO THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS, ALL EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO OBTAIN A CEASE FIRE FROM BOTH PARTIES WHICH WILL ESTABLISH A STABLE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COUNTRY TO ALLOW A POSITIVE PURSUANCE OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME"

PARA 6b. THE ASSUMPTION THAT AT THE TIME OF DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR A AN AGREED CEASE FIRE WOULD NOT BE IN PLACE DOES SEEM TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE FACT THAT UNAMIR HAS ACCEPTED DE FACTO THE HARDENED POSITION OF THE WARRING FACTIONS AND AS SUCH HAS AGREED THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE FIGHTING BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE MOVING THROUGH THE FIRE AS WE ARE DOING PRESENTLY TO CHANNEL THE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE NEEDY PEOPLE. THIS POSITION IS OF COURSE NOT CORRECT. THE PARAGRAPH SHOULD THEREFORE CHANGE TO READ "A CEASE FIRE WILL CONTINUE TO BE

PURSUED AS THE FORCE IS BEING PUT IN PLACE. INDEED THE CEASE FIRE WOULD CONTRIBUTE IMMENSURABLY TO AN EFFECTIVE AND SECURE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RELIEF ITEMS".

PARA 6e. THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH ALSO NEEDS A LITTLE ADDITION AT THE END. IT SHOULD " READ KIGALI AIRPORT WHICH IS CRITICAL TO THE DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OF THE MISSION, WOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS A "NEUTRAL ZONE" UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BUILD-UP OF THE FORCE".

PARA 6g. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO GIVE A PERIOD OF FOUR MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE AS CONNECTED WITH THE CEASE-FIRE. THE BELLIGERENT ARE LIKELY TO INTERPRET THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH AS A LICENSE TO CONTINUE FIGHTING FOR THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS SINCE THEY KNOW THAT WHETHER THEY STOP HOSTILITIES OR NOT THE FORCE WILL CONTINUE OPERATING UNDER THE PRECARIOUS CONDITIONS THAT EXIST WITH FIGHTING. PARA 6g SHOULD THEREFORE READ "THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL EXPECT AND INSIST ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AT THE LATEST FOLLOWING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE IN ORDER TO ENABLE IT TO FULLY CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE WITH SUCCESS."



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UNAMIR

MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU

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194 MAY -8 16

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN162

MIR 925

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 8 MAY 1994
NO OF PAGES: 2
SUBJECT: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S "NON-PAPER" TO SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I WOULD LIKE TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THANKS RECEIPT OF MR. ANNAN'S CODE CABLE NUMBER 1505 OF 7 MAY AND THE DRAFT "NON-PAPER" ATTACHED THERETO.
2. WE HAVE EXAMINED THE DRAFT "NON-PAPER" AND ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH ITS PREMISE, THRUST AND CONTENT. WE NEVERTHELESS WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, AS APPROPRIATE, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND QUESTIONS:

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herewith.
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(A) IF IT IS ASSUMED, AS REFLECTED IN PARA. 5(A) OF YOUR DRAFT "NON-PAPER", THAT "ALL EFFORTS WILL BE CONTINUED TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND RESTORING THE PEACE PROCESS", SHOULDN'T THIS IMPORTANT IDEA BE REFLECTED IN THE PROPOSED MANDATE FOR UNAMIR-A OUTLINED IN PARA.4 OF THE DRAFT "NON-PAPER"? WE FEEL THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR, FROM THE OUTSET, AND INCORPORATED IN THE MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, THAT THE PROPOSED HUMANITARIAN TASKS ARE MEANT TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ONGOING OVERALL EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE PEACE PROCESS.

④
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10/5

(B) AS YOU ARE AWARE, UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 872 OF 5 OCTOBER 1993, PART OF UNAMIR'S MANDATE HAS BEEN TO "ASSIST" IN COORDINATING HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA, WITH THE UNDP RESIDENT COORDINATOR SERVING AS HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS COORDINATOR. IS IT YOUR THINKING THAT UNDER THE ENVISAGED REVISED OR EXPANDED MANDATE: (i) UNAMIR-A WOULD ASSUME OVERALL COORDINATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA; OR (ii) UNAMIR-A WOULD CONTINUE TO "ASSIST", FOR INSTANCE BY PROVIDING SECURITY, PROTECTION AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT?

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under this
new
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The UNDP
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This is at
least for the
start. When
we have a
cease fire and
going to peace
process, then
...

we could as deal- is operation mission under this new mandate. The UNDP has rep in town, but he is doing a lot of op- collect work in warrior. This is at least for the start. When we have a cease fire and going to peace process, then ...

(C) WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE OUTLINED IN PARA.8 OF THE DRAFT "NON-PAPER", WE WOULD LIKE TO REFER SPECIFICALLY TO SUB-PARA 8(g) WHICH PROVIDES FOR 90 CIVILIAN POLICE PERSONNEL "DEDICATED TO MAINTAINING LIAISON WITH THE LOCAL CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES". WE ARE WONDERING IF IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO MENTION CLEARLY THAT CIVPOL WOULD LIAISE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES SPECIFICALLY ON MATTERS OF LAW AND ORDER, PUBLIC SECURITY AND RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. SUCH A CLARIFICATION, WE FEEL, WOULD RE-ENFORCE THE "SUPPORT" ELEMENT CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED MANDATE (PARA.4 OF DRAFT "NON-PAPER") AND IN THE PROPOSED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (PARA.6).

7
2 (D) ON PAGE 7 OF THE DRAFT "NON-PAPER", UNDER THE SUB-HEADING ENTITLED "COMMAND AND CONTROL", WE WOULD LIKE TO ENQUIRE IF THIS REFERS TO THE LEADERSHIP OF UNAMIR-A AS A WHOLE OR JUST TO ITS MILITARY COMPONENT.

(E) THE FIRST LINE OF PARA.16 OF THE DRAFT NON-PAPER SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "IN CONSIDERING THE ELEMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE, IT SHOULD BE"

(F) TO AVOID AMBIGUITY AND FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, THE PHRASE "EVEN IF THE COUNCIL ESTABLISHES A REVISED MANDATE FOR UNAMIR", SHOULD BE DELETED FROM LINES ONE AND TWO OF PARA.17 OF THE DRAFT "NON-PAPER"

3. THE FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE FORWARDING TO YOU HIS COMMENTS ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE "NON PAPER".

4. BEST REGARDS.

CRN 165

1/3

PAGE
UNAMIR

1994 MAY -9 06 25

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 9 MAY 1994

NUMBER: MIR929

SUBJECT: RPF ACTION IN KIGALI

1. AS DISCUSSED, ENCLOSED IS A LETTER I JUST SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RPF *HIGH COMMAND*
2. REGARDS.



FORCE HQ
UNAMIR
KIGALI, RWANDA

8 MAY 1994

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL KAGAME
CHAIRMAN
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY
HIGH COMMAND

1. The UNAMIR Force Commander (FC) has deducted from information received that RPF elements may well conduct an offensive operation against RGF elements in the general area of the Kigali airfield tomorrow or the next day. The UNAMIR FC reaffirms his stance that his forces will not withdraw unless an ultimatum is given us by RPF forces. In such a case, the UNAMIR forces will withdraw only on order from the Secretary General of the United Nations. Such an operation would take at least 03 hours to conduct after authority is received from New York.

2. Under our current deployment concept certain fixed areas on the airport are manned permanently by UNAMIR forces. These areas are the main airport terminal, the control tower, the Presidential hangar, the old control tower and the fire hall on the south side of the airfield. All these sites are well known and easily identifiable. UNAMIR currently has over 150 personnel located in these areas.

3. Certain measures have been taken to improve the local protection of these personnel but as this does not give a 100% guarantee of our not sustaining any possible casualties. Such an eventuality is well known to you and has been the subject of some of our discussions. Although I have attempted to convince you of the risks to the UNAMIR mission should the airport either be significantly damaged or should any UNAMIR personnel become casualties, I regret to note that this does not seem to alter your tactical plan of operations in the KANOMBE area.

4. In that regard, I must express my concern and disappointment should any UNAMIR personnel become casualties from an operation to clear the airport surrounding area of RGF elements. I must also note that my concern for the safety of my personnel and the accomplishment of my duty at the airfield should we be confronted with the eventuality of the RGF elements withdrawing through the areas of the airport manned by UNAMIR personnel. This plausible situation may create a scenario where either:


a. RGF personnel seek refuge in UNAMIR controlled area and that they do so unarmed, thus in a surrendering manner.

b. RGF personnel decide to continue to fight during a withdrawal through the airport and such will become enmeshed with UNAMIR personnel defending or even simply occupying their already clearly identified areas.

c. RGF personnel avoid UNAMIR areas because UNAMIR forces exchange fire with them in order to keep them out of our areas. This may create considerable confusion on the ground as there is no guarantee that RPF elements would understand the situation clearly, and possibly think UNAMIR personnel are firing them.

5. All the above options have serious ramifications to the security of UNAMIR personnel at the airfield and of course have wider impacts outside of RWANDA. It is thus strongly requested that you provide UNAMIR Force Commander with your appreciation of the situation and your reaction to the very possible unfortunate turn of events should your forces attack RGF elements in close proximity of the airport.

6. As explained previously UNAMIR absolutely needs the airport for its logistic life line and for its part in the humanitarian effort. Should the RPF conduct operations in and/or around the airfield against the RGF elements, and should such operations lead to any of the very regrettable possibilities expressed above, then the resultant UN reaction will certainly affect its future support in easing and assisting in the resolution of the Rwandese crisis.



R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

CRN 164

U N A M I R
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
154 MAY -9 06 25

TO: BARIN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAINE, UNAMIR KIGALI
DATE: 9 MAY 1994
NUMBER: MIR 928

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES FOR UNAMIR~~AA~~

1. THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES ARE PROPOSED FOR UNAMIR~~AA~~ AS INDICATED:

- A. PHASE 1. GHANA;
- B. PHASE 2. AUSTRALIA, CANADA, MALI, MORROCO, SENEGAL AND ZIMBABWE; AND
- C. PHASE 3. BANGLADESH, CONGO, NIGERIA, TUNISIA AND ZAMBIA.

2. REGARDS.

KYF 788
MIR 933

U N A M I R
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
18 MAY -9 18 42

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: SITUATION CENTRE, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 9 MAY 1994
NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY CASUALTY REPORT

1. BE ADVISED THAT A GHANAIN SOLDIER WAS KILLED BY MORTAR ROUND AT 1900 HOURS LOCAL AT THE AMAHORO STADIUM.
2. DETAILED NOTICAS TO FOLLOW.

FL SRSB CAO EDIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 08 MAY 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR _____
SUBJECT: DRAFT NON-PAPER ON RWANDA - COMMENTS

1. Reference your Code Cable 1505, of 07 May 94 please find attached my comments on the above subject.
2. Thanks and regards.

NOTES/COMMENTS TO
NON-PAPER ON RWANDA
08 MAY 94

1. Herewith are comments on the reference "Non-Document". The "Non-paper" is truly excellent and a most perspicacious presentation of the situation and the needs that will hopefully solve the problem.

2. FC has met on three occasions with RPF Chairman of High Command (Maj Gen P Kagame) and some of the political staffs and on four occasions with the leadership of the RGF (The Chiefs of Staff Army, at least twice, Gendarmerie, Minister of Defence and Minister of Works and Social Affairs who is responsible for Humanitarian dossiers). Their responses vary:

a. RPF. Consistent about force not having an intervention task, nor be so strong as to be able to have such a mandate thrust upon it. In agreement with the Humanitarian security tasks although convinced we are at least three weeks too late. Very specific in stating that our forces must not place themselves in any situation that may obstruct the operational and tactical aims of the RPF, unless we are involved in cease fire mode.

b. RGF. The COS of the Army has noted the overall concept and deployment plan but does not seem to have fully grasped the details of it all. He stated however that no force should come in to impose a cease fire nor to divide the country in two. The option of Humanitarian security assistance tasks behind the lines seemed reasonable to him as he did not have the forces to do it himself unless there was a cease fire. Both ministers were concerned that the Security Council might create a mandate and a force without full consultation/support from the Rwandese. They both, although the meetings were held separately on different days did not feel that such strong security measures were needed as the situation really calmed down, that Kigali was not the reflection of the whole country, that pacification of the militia and self-defence units was on its way. We discussed the fact that their credibility in this area was weak and that even recent incidents did not fully support the statement. The Minister of Social Affairs stressed that they needed aid now and that the troops deployment and new mandate approval process in New York should not, must not slow down nor prevent the immediate distribution of aid.

c. UNAMIR must continue particularly on the RGF side, to sell the mandate and force structure to them, and they to their public, as fast as possible so as to avoid confrontation and serious implementation complications. FC has meetings set up for tomorrow 09 May 94 with COS Army and Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior.

3. The following are specific comments to the "Non- paper":

a. Para 1. We suggest that the last sentence should read "The First Step in bringing the parties back to the Arusha process is to address the humanitarian crisis, and assist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in the country. This hopefully will ease the tension between the warring factions and possibly lead to a cease fire.

b. Para 2. Paragraph to now read: " At present, the situation in Rwanda has not improved to any significant extent with some massacres still being reported indirectly slaughter with the displacement of nearly 2 million civilians as well as combat between Rwandese Government Forces RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)..Militia and other unruly elements continue to operate although in lesser numbers than at the outbreak of the conflict, killing and ...

c. Para 3 Line 5. It states: "their safety assured on an urgent basis". The word assured is too strong for the task in question. We cannot assure the safety of about 2 million displace persons. The words "significantly enhanced" would be more appropriate unless we wish to speak of those minorities who are held up in churches etc and are at risk of being massacred, then we can say "assured" as it will be one of our primary tasks anyway.

d. Para 4. Line 1. The word "support" does not reflect the true nature of the mission. The change should read "assist in the provision of security and support to the displaced".....and to "cooperate with the Humanitarian Agencies in the provision of aid".

e. Para 5. b. To read: an agreed cease fire will. "most likely" not...

f. Para 5. d. To read the need to "assist in stabilizing the security situation" in Rwanda.....

g. Para 5. e. The threat of imposing Kigali Airport as a neutral zone in the second part of the phase is very much out of character with the rest of the document. The sub-para should read: the mission "will be established... parties. Should consent not be given by both parties the force will consider possible alternate airheads such as Goma Zaire or

Entebbe Uganda".

h. Para 6. Line 1 Should read: would be "to assist in the provision of support".

j. Para 6. b. Line 5 Should read: will be "patrolled and monitored by UNAMIRA in conjunction with authorized security forces".

k. Para 8. d. Line 1 Should read: approx "219 which includes" a supporting ...

l. Para 8. f. Should read: group of "320" officers.

m. Para 9. Phase 2. Last sentence should read: "be deployed in the Kigali Sector and in surrounding Prefectures where the security situation is of greatest concern and where we have the highest concentration of displaced persons".

n. Para 9. Phase 3. Should add: The rest of the support battalion will establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare Prefectures in order to better serve the field force. The two new battalions will be deployed principally in the Western and Northern portions of the country where in the first case significant security / extremist pockets could spontaneously come back to life and cause serious problems and in the latter case where intensive de-mining and of refugees moving back into Rwanda after over 30 years may be a cause of serious friction due to a lack of living space.

o. Para 11. Line 4. Please add "GABIRO".

p. Para 12 Line 5. Please change Area Commanders to "Sector Commanders".

q. Para 12. Last phase. Please eliminate this phrase as the rear link with UN HQ is already established by our civilian communications branch.

r. Para 15. You may wish to amend this para according to the points raised in para 2 of this cable.

4. May I say once again that FC can achieve the aim with the mandate and the force structure described in this non-paper if, and only if, the force made at his disposal will demonstrate the desire the determination and the courage to implement the clear rules of engagement that have been proposed for these tasks.

5. Lastly the proposed name of the Mission "UNAMIR-A" seems rather cumbersome. Simply UNAMIRA is phonetically most acceptable in the local parlance, and it would stand for "United Nations

physical damage/harm or death. DRAFT
it included are, knife, sword, gun, etc.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
FOR

ESTABLISHMENT OF KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA

General

1. In light of Arusha Peace Agreement and UN Resolution 872 (1993) dated 05 Oct 93, there is a requirement of establishing a weapon secure area in and around KIGALI.
2. The aim of establishing this area is to ensure smooth and peaceful formation of a Broad Based Transitional Government in Rwanda, security to the international expatriate community at KIGALI and to control movement and employment of military components of RGF, RPF and other factions in and around KIGALI.
3. KIGALI Weapon Secured Area shall be established in Phase 1 of UNAMIR operation and will be maintained throughout Phase 2 and phase 3.

Responsibility

4. Battalion commander of the designated battalion for KIGALI sector is responsible to establish KIGALI Weapon Secure Area.
5. Infantry battalion of KIGALI and UN military observers of KIGALI Sector will be responsible to man and monitor the weapon secure area.

Area of Operation

6. Kigali Weapon Secure Area covers an area of approximately 10 kilometers in radius from KIGALI city center. The important landmarks demarcating the boundary are :-

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

7. The actual boundary shall be physically reconnoitered and demarcated by the designated infantry battalion commander.

Definitions Related to Establishment and Enforcement of Weapon Secure Area

8. Weapon Any lethal object which can be used to cause

Assistance Mission In Rwanda.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: BARIL
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 08 MAY 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR _____
SUBJECT: DRAFT NON-PAPER ON RWANDA - COMMENTS

1. Reference your Code Cable 1505, of 07 May 94 please find attached my comments on the above subject.
2. Thanks and regards.

NOTES/COMMENTS TO
NON-PAPER ON RWANDA
08 MAY 94

1. Herewith are comments on the reference "Non-Document". The "Non-paper" is truly excellent and a most perspicacious presentation of the situation and the needs that will hopefully solve the problem.

2. FC has met on three occasions with RPF Chairman of High Command (Maj Gen P Kagame) and some of the political staffs and on four occasions with the leadership of the RGF (The Chiefs of Staff Army, at least twice, Gendarmerie, Minister of Defence and Minister of Works and Social Affairs who is responsible for Humanitarian dossiers). Their responses vary:

a. RPF. Consistent about force not having an intervention task, nor be so strong as to be able to have such a mandate thrust upon it. In agreement with the Humanitarian security tasks although convinced we are at least three weeks too late. Very specific in stating that our forces must not place themselves in any situation that may obstruct the operational and tactical aims of the RPF, unless we are involved in cease fire mode.

b. RGF. The COS of the Army has noted the overall concept and deployment plan but does not seem to have fully grasped the details of it all. He stated however that no force should come in to impose a cease fire nor to divide the country in two. The option of Humanitarian security assistance tasks behind the lines seemed reasonable to him as he did not have the forces to do it himself unless there was a cease fire. Both ministers were concerned that the Security Council might create a mandate and a force without full consultation/support from the Rwandese. They both, although the meetings were held separately on different days did not feel that such strong security measures were needed as the situation really calmed down, that Kigali was not the reflection of the whole country, that pacification of the militia and self-defence units was on its way. We discussed the fact that their credibility in this area was weak and that even recent incidents did not fully support the statement. The Minister of Social Affairs stressed that they needed aid now and that the troops deployment and new mandate approval process in New York should not, must not slow down nor prevent the immediate distribution of aid.

c. UNAMIR must continue particularly on the RGF side, to sell the mandate and force structure to them, and they to their public, as fast as possible so as to avoid confrontation and serious implementation complications. FC has meetings set up for tomorrow 09 May 94 with COS Army and Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior.

3. The following are specific comments to the " Non- paper":

a. Para 1. We suggest that the last sentence should read "The First Step in bringing the parties back to the Arusha process is to address the humanitarian crisis, and assist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in the country. This hopefully will ease the tension between the warring factions and possibly lead to a cease fire.

b. Para 2. Paragraph to now read: " At present, the situation in Rwanda has not improved to any significant extent with some massacres still being reported indirectly slaughter with the displacement of nearly 2 million civilians as well as combat between Rwandese Government Forces RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)..Militia and other unruly elements continue to operate although in lesser numbers than at the outbreak of the conflict, killing and ...

c. Para 3 Line 5. It states: "their safety assured on an urgent basis". The word assured is too strong for the task in question. We cannot assure the safety of about 2 million displaced persons. The words "significantly enhanced" would be more appropriate unless we wish to speak of those minorities who are held up in churches etc and are at risk of being massacred, then we can say "assured" as it will be one of our primary tasks anyway.

d. Para 4. Line 1. The word "support" does not reflect the true nature of the mission. The change should read "assist in the provision of security and support to the displaced".....and to "cooperate with the Humanitarian Agencies in the provision of aid".

e. Para 5. b. To read: an agreed cease fire will "most likely" not...

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k. Para 8. d. Line 1 Should read: approx "219 which includes" a supporting ...

l. Para 8. f. Should read: group of "320" officers.

m. Para 9. Phase 2. Last sentence should read: "be deployed in the Kigali Sector and in surrounding Prefectures where the security situation is of greatest concern and where we have the highest concentration of displaced persons".

n. Para 9. Phase 3. Should add: The rest of the support battalion will establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare Prefectures in order to better serve the field force. The two new battalions will be deployed principally in the Western and Northern portions of the country where in the first case significant security / extremist pockets could spontaneously come back to life and cause serious problems and in the latter case where intensive de-mining and of refugees moving back into Rwanda after over 30 years may be a cause of serious friction due to a lack of living space.

o. Para 11. Line 4. Please add "GABIRO".

p. Para 12 Line 5. Please change Area Commanders to "Sector Commanders".

q. Para 12. Last phase. Please eliminate this phrase as the rear link with UN HQ is already established by our civilian communications branch.

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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