

PleC

2nd WORLD CONFERENCE ON RACISM AND
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION - GENEVA

29 JULY - 2 AUG 1983

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (1 ITEM)

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JH/ddj
19 July 1983

ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Itinerary</u> | <u>Time</u> | <u>Hours from GMT</u> | <u>Airline and flight no.</u> | <u>Equip.</u> | <u>stops</u> |
|-------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Fri 29 July | Lv. New York (JFK) | 1000 | -4 | PA 100 | 747 | 0 |
| | Arr. London (LHR) | 2140 | +1 | | | |
| | Hotel Claridges | | | | | |
| Sat 30 July | London | | | | | |
| Sun 31 July | Lv. London (LHR) | 1250 | +1 | BA 624 | TRD | 0 |
| | Arr. Geneva | 1520 | +2 | | | |
| | Hotel De Bergues | | | | | |
| Mon 1 Aug | Geneva | | | | | |
| Tues 2 Aug | Lv. Geneva | 1530 | +2 | SR 110 | 747 | 0 |
| | Arr. New York (JFK) | 1805 | -4 | | | |
| | OR | | | | | |
| Wed 3 Aug | Lv. Geneva | 1530 | +2 | SR 110 | 747 | 0 |
| | Arr. New York (JFK) | 1805 | -4 | | | |

COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY -

- The Secretary-General,

- *Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah,
Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions and
Co-ordinator, Special Economic Assistance Programmes,

- Mr. Issa Diallo,
Principal Officer,

- Mr. Neil Breen,
Administrative Operations Officer,

- Mr. Gérard Levtchenko,
Administrative Travel Officer,

- Ms. Angeles Vidal,
Secretary to the Secretary-General.

* Will join the Secretary-General in Geneva.

C O N T A C T N U M B E R S

L O N D O N

Hotel Claridges: 629-8860

UNIC:

Director: Mr. Eric Jensen (on vacation in France)

Acting Director: Mr. Uttam Rana

Office: (01) 629-6411

Home: (01) 935-8192

G E N E V A

Hotel Des Bergues: 022/31.50.50

UNOG:

Director-General: Mr. Erik Suy

Office: 34.60.11

Home: 34.34.30

UNIC:

Director: Mr. Anthony Curnow

Office: 34.60.11 or 31.02.11

Home: 48.46.62

Secretary-General of the Second World
Conference to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination: Mr. James O.C. Jonah

Hotel Longchamps: 022/31.67.50

Office: 34.60.11 - Ext. 2194

Director, Centre for Human Rights: Mr. Kurt Herndl

Office: 34.60.11 - Ext. 3928/3941

Home: 53.18.08

Friday, 29 July 1983 -

- 10.00 - Lv. New York (JFK)

- 21.40 - Arr. London (LHR)
(Hotel Claridges)

Saturday, 30 July 1983 -

L O N D O N

Sunday, 31 July 1983 -

- 12.50 - Lv. London (LHR)

- 15.20 - Arr. Geneva
(Hotel de Bergues)

Monday, 1 August 1983 -

- 15.00 - Opening of the Conference

Tuesday, 2 August 1983 -

- 13.00 - Luncheon hosted by the Secretary-General
(see provisional list of invitees attached)

PROVISIONAL LIST

LIST OF THE PERSONS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON GIVEN BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN GENEVA (DDR) ON TUESDAY, 2 AUGUST 1983 AT 1 P.M.
ON THE OCCASION OF THE SECOND WORLD CONFERENCE ON RACISM AND
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION -

- H.E. Amb. Héctor Charry-Samper (Colombia)
Chairman of the Conference,
- 10 Vice-Presidents (2 from each regional group) (no names yet)
(Latin America - Cuba + Nicaragua)
- Rapporteur general from Asia,
- Chairman of the Credentials Committee from Africa,
- Chairmen of the 1st + 2nd Main Committees,
(Western European + other group:
 - H.E. Amb. Francis Mahon Hayes (PR of Ireland in Geneva)
(Eastern Europe: no name yet)
- 2 Ministers:
 - . Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka,
The Hon. A.C.S. Hameed,
 - . Minister of State of India,
(no name yet)
- H.E. Amb. Olara Otunnu,
PR of Uganda in New York,
- President of the General Assembly,
H.E. Mr. Hollai of Hungary,
- Mr. Kurt Herndl, ASG,
- + his deputy Mr. Nyamekye,
- Mr. Erik Suy,
- Mr. James Jonah,
- Mr. A.A. Farah,
- Mr. Issa Diallo.

Tuesday, 2 August 1983 -

O R

Wednesday, 3 August 1983 -

- 15.30? - Lv. Geneva
(Alternate departure 3 August)

- 18.05? - Arr. New York (JFK)

Palme Report - excerpts from UN and Conflict Prevention

Current situation

Chapter 7 never realized.

Peace-keeping instead; valuable, but with limitations:

- only launched after outbreak of conflict;
- need consent of parties;
- need mandate from Security Council;
- no pressure on parties for withdrawal occupied territories
- can even become guarantee of aggressor's gains;
- no automatic funding.

There no reliable international machinery for conflict prevention exists. Third World countries will thus continue to feel vulnerable and build up their conventional armaments.

Recommendations

A political "concordat" should be agreed between the Permanent Members of the Security Council to support collective unity action by the Council on Third World border disputes. UN "standby forces" would be deployed in the event of any threat of violation of territory in a 3rd world country. (Why only Third World? Palme sees it as a realistic first step" - both the great powers and the Third World would agree to such measures as in their mutual interests. An extension to the global level might be possible eventually.)

Secretary-General

1. "Collaboration between the Council and the SG to facilitate initiatives under Article 99 should be improved. The Council should adopt an "initiating resolution" calling on the SG to bring to its immediate attention potential threats to the peace.

2. SG should report to the Council on a regular basis throughout the year.

3. SG should deliver an annual "state of the international community" message to a meeting of the Council at Foreign Minister level (first a public meeting, then discussions in private).

SG and Preventive Security Measures

1. On being alerted by at least one of the disputing parties to the danger of a possible conflict, SG would constitute a fact-finding mission;

2. If necessary, and with the consent of at least one of the disputing parties, SG would seek the authorization of Council to send a military observer team to assess the situation;

3. If necessary, Council would authorize dispatch of UN military forces to be deployed in the territory of the requesting state.

If violation of territory had already taken place, ceasefire would be negotiated and withdrawal called for while UN forces would be deployed. (Chapter 7 measures short of military action, to be used to enforce withdrawal.)

For the standby forces, Military Staff Committee should be re-activated. Forces would be recruited from Permanent Members and Third World Countries.

Members of the Commission

Chairman : Olof Palme (Sweden)

Georgi Arbatov (USSR)

Egon Bahr (Federal Republic of Germany)

Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)

Josef Cyrankiewicz (Poland)

Jean-Marie Daillet (France)

Robert A.D. Ford (Canada)

Alfonso Garcia-Robles (Mexico)

Haruki Mori (Japan)

C.M. Nuthamma (India)

Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria)

David Owen (United Kingdom)

Shridath Ramphal (Guyana)

Salim Salim (Tanzania)

Soedjatmoko (Indonesia)

Joop den Uyl (Netherlands)

Cyrus Vance (USA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee on Disarmament submits to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly its annual report on its 1982 session, together with the pertinent documents and records. This report also includes an account of the organization of the Committee (Part II) and of the Committee's work based on the agenda adopted for 1982 (Part III).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. 1982 Session of the Committee

2. The Committee was in session from 2 February to 23 April and from 3 August to 17 September 1982. During this period, the Committee held 39 formal plenary meetings at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Committee.

3. The Committee also held 35 informal meetings on its agenda, programme of work, organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

4. In accordance with rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure, the following member States assumed the Chairmanship of the Committee: Iran for February, Italy for March, Japan for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the 1982 session of the Committee, Kenya for August and Mexico for September and the recess until the 1983 session of the Committee.

B. Participants in the Work of the Committee

5. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Committee: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire. The consolidated list of participants in the first and second parts of the session is included as Appendix I to the report.

I.D. This is the list of member States of the C.D. You might have to get the names of the Representatives to CD in Geneva.

i.e. - Mexico = Garcia Robles.
Peru = Morella.

[Signature]

Summary of Recent Events in Disarmament Negotiations

A. Intermediate or Medium-Range Nuclear Missiles

1. December 1979: NATO decides to deploy 572 Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles in Western Europe, as of December 1983 unless prior agreement is reached on reduction of Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles.

2. November 1981: President Reagan presents "Zero Zero" proposal under which USA will not deploy any missiles in Europe if USSR dismantles all its intermediate range nuclear missiles.

3. 30 November 1981: Bilateral negotiations start in Geneva.

4. December 1982: General-Secretary Andropov proposes that USSR will retain 162 intermediate range missiles in Europe, i.e., same number as total British/French arsenal, while USA should refrain from deployment.

5. 30 March 1983: President Reagan proposes interim solution under which USA will substantially reduce its planned deployment of missiles in Europe provided USSR reduces the number of its warheads on longer range intermediate nuclear force missiles to an equal level on a global basis.

6. 2 April 1983: Foreign Minister Gromyko rejects the proposal as unacceptable and says it cannot be used as basis for agreement.

B. Strategic Nuclear Weapons

1. June 1982: Negotiations on reduction of strategic arms start in Geneva. President Reagan presents "phased reduction plan" under which first, number of ballistic missile warheads on each side would be reduced by one third, no more than half to be land-based, and secondly, equal limits would be imposed on ballistic missile throw-weight.

2. December 1982: General-Secretary Andropov proposes a reduction of strategic delivery vehicles to an equal number on both sides, involving Soviet reduction by twenty-five percent. Also proposes substantial lowering of number of warheads and restriction of improvements of nuclear weapons.

3. Negotiations are continuing and both sides are reported to have made some offers.

4. 7 April 1983: it is reported that the commission studying the MX basing mode is proposing stationing one hundred MX missiles, each with ten nuclear warheads, in existing silos, while development would start on smaller mobile-based single warhead missiles, the destruction of which would involve greater expenditure of enemy missiles.

C. Battlefield Nuclear Weapons

1. The question of reducing battlefield nuclear weapons does not at present appear to be under specific discussion, although the presence of such weapons in Europe is no doubt taken into account in the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, which have been held in Vienna since 1973.

2. 7 April 1983: it is reported that both NATO and the USA are considering replacement of several thousands of such tactical nuclear weapons by missiles with conventional warheads with great accuracy ("Smart" or homing bombs), thus reducing present reliance on short-range nuclear weapons.

3. Several proposals have been made for regional denuclearization, including the "Palme proposal" for a corridor free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe, to which initial NATO reactions have been negative.

CURRENT DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN EUROPE

1. There are two parallel bilateral negotiations going on in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the United States. The negotiations on reduction of strategic arms (Western acronym: START) began in June 1982, at which time the United States presented a proposal originally outlined by President Reagan in May 1982 and characterized by him as a phased reduction plan. In the first phase, the number of ballistic missile warheads would be reduced by one-third and no more than half of them would be land-based. In the second phase, equal ceilings would be sought on other elements, including limits on ballistic missile throw-weight. The Soviet Union immediately called the plan unbalanced. In December 1982, General Secretary Andropov made public the counter-proposal of the Soviet Union, which aimed at, inter alia, a reduction of Soviet strategic arms by 25 per cent and a reduction of corresponding American arms so that the two States would have the same number of strategic delivery vehicles. This proposal refers to all types of strategic weapons without exception (reductions across the board). According to available information, the United States is currently studying the Soviet proposal.

2. The other bilateral negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (Western acronym: INF) began in November 1981, also in Geneva. While the Soviet Union maintained at the time that there was a rough balance of intermediate nuclear forces between the two Powers, the United States contended that the balance was heavily in Soviet favour (perhaps about 6 to 1). In December 1979, NATO decided to deploy 572 United States Pershing and cruise missiles in five Western European countries, starting in December 1983, if no agreement on mutual reductions is reached by then (the so-called "two-track"

decision. In November 1981, President Reagan presented his so-called "zero-option" proposal, according to which the United States would cancel the deployment of the missiles, if the Soviet Union dismantled its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The Soviet Union declared this proposal unacceptable, inter alia, because it disregarded the British and French nuclear forces. Whereas the United States has so far probably adhered to the "zero-option" in the negotiations, the Soviet Union has made a number of counter-proposals. In December 1982, General Secretary Andropov suggested, inter alia, that the Soviet Union would retain in Europe 162 intermediate-range missiles, which corresponds to the combined size of the British and French forces, if NATO abandoned its deployment plans. As the deadline set by NATO approaches, the deployment question has become an issue in the internal politics of the Western European countries concerned, resulting in appeals to the United States to show more flexibility in the negotiations. President Reagan in his statement to the nation on 23 March announced that on 30 March he will once again address the issue of intermediate-range missiles and make a new proposal which will presumably be a modification of his original "zero-zero" proposal. (According to press reports the new United States proposal will suggest the deployment of 100 missiles with 300 warheads for each side). France has declared that it would not agree to its nuclear forces being counted in the Soviet-American negotiations, and the British reaction has been similar.

3. Three proposals on nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe are at present under discussion. On the basis of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, headed by Dag Hammarskjöld, now Prime Minister of Sweden, Sweden took the initiative in sounding out attitudes

regarding a corridor in Central Europe free of battlefield nuclear weapons, the breadth of which could be 300 kilometers (assumed to mean 150 km on each side). Some socialist States, including the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have supported the Swedish idea, advancing slightly modified versions of the proposal (suggesting that the zone be wider). Official reactions in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, among others, have been negative. The NATO side maintains, inter alia, that a zone of this kind would involve a departure from NATO's collective security system which is based, among other things, on the concept of deterrence through nuclear weapons. A Finnish proposal, made originally in 1963, on a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone has not resulted in a consensus among the Nordic countries, although there has been a certain amount of narrowing down of the differences. Recently, Sweden has been in favour of the idea, but it entertains certain additional considerations, notably about the Baltic Sea. Norway and Denmark, while stating that they support the idea in principle, are critical in practice, holding that the Nordic zone is possible only within the context of parallel arrangements concerning Central Europe. The Soviet Union supports the proposal and announced in June 1982 that it was ready to consider certain measures applicable to its territory in the region adjacent to the proposed Nordic zone. In March 1983, a representative of the Soviet armed forces referred to the possibility of including the Baltic Sea in the zone. The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans has been proposed by Romania and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia has expressed its interest in principle in the proposal, provided the zone would also include parts of the Mediterranean.

Other questions

4. The Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments

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and associated measures in Central Europe (known as MBFR) between seven NATO and four Warsaw Treaty States (plus a number of other States members of the two alliances participating with special status), began in October 1973. For a long time there has been no progress in these negotiations except for an understanding envisaging the reduction of the armed forces of both sides to equal collective ceilings of 900,000 men. Within the framework of this understanding, the Soviet Union, in February 1983, tabled new proposals on behalf of the participating Socialist States with a view to breaking the deadlock on other questions. According to the Soviet proposals, each side would determine on its own the volume of the reduction of its armed forces from the present level, necessary to achieve the equal collective ceilings, which the NATO States have not accepted. Agreement should also be reached on mutually acceptable adequate measures for verification of the levels of the armed forces which remain after reductions.

5. The second follow-up conference to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid started in November 1980, but so far the participants have not been able to agree on a concluding document. The participants not present at the Vienna talks, i.e., France and the neutral and non-aligned European States, have supported the idea of a European Conference on disarmament and confidence-building measures (CEMC) and there has been some support within both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation for the convening of such a conference. Among five proposals on this idea, the French one is regarded as reflecting the Western position and the Polish proposal that of the socialist States. The group of neutral and

non-aligned participants have sought to promote a compromise through a proposal of their own. Uncertainty concerning the outcome of the ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union (see above) and the tense international situation in general have made the outcome of the Madrid Conference uncertain.

6. It should be recalled that in the framework of the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, important measures for confidence-building measures were envisaged which included: (a) prior notification of major military manoeuvres (defined as exceeding 25,000 troops; the signatories agreed to notify such manoeuvres 21 days or more in advance and to provide other relevant information on them); (b) prior notification of other military manoeuvres; (c) exchange of observers; (d) prior notification of major military movements; and (e) certain other measures.

7. A proposal of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on a treaty with NATO was made at the Warsaw Treaty summit meeting in Prague in January 1983 (see my memorandum of 11 January 1983). The essence of the proposal is the idea of a treaty on mutual non-use of force between the two alliances, but it also contains an appeal to provide more stimulus to the ongoing negotiations on a number of specific disarmament questions in the Committee on Disarmament.

NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION AND US POLICY

Background Note for the Secretary-General

1. The US policy regarding the limitation of nuclear weapons may be changing. The initial policy of the present Administration was (a) with regard to land-based strategic nuclear missiles, to attempt making up for the perceived inferiority vis-à-vis the USSR, by replacing obsolescent Minuteman missiles by the multi-warhead and more accurate MX ("Peacekeeper") and then to seek phased reductions of the respective arsenals; (b) in respect of intermediate-range nuclear forces, to deploy in Europe, by end 1983, 572 Pershing II ballistic, and ground-launched cruise missiles unless prior agreement is reached on the removal of Soviet SS-20 missiles (the "zero-zero option").

a) Strategic Missiles

2. There is much criticism of the MX project. Many Congressmen, supported by technical experts consider it unnecessary, because deterrence can be assured with sea-or air-launched missiles in which the US is not inferior to the USSR and because in any practical "basing mode" MX will be vulnerable to nuclear strikes (a single hostile warhead can put all ten MX warheads out of action). This would tend to make it essentially a first strike or offensive weapon, to be used preventively, before an enemy strike can disable it. Since this perception may induce an opponent to adopt a similar stance, MX is thought to be a de-stabilizing weapon.

3. The Scowcroft Committee, set up to study ways of deploying MX, has favoured the most economic mode of basing 100 missiles in existing silos. It has also proposed in the longer term replacing all heavy, multi-warheaded land-based missiles by a larger number of smaller, single warhead missiles (still to be developed), thought to be less destabilizing (because an enemy would have to use many missiles to disable all or most of one's warheads), and then to pursue arms reduction talks on the basis of warheads rather than delivery vehicles.

4. In consequence - and no doubt partly under the pressure of public opinion as reflected in the recent House vote for a nuclear freeze and the pastoral letter on nuclear war - the Administration is said to be changing its approach to strategic nuclear negotiations. The new policy has not yet been fully worked out but seems to include a "build-down" - initially proposed in the Senate - i.e., a reduction in older weapons as newer weapons are introduced, possibly already before a new treaty has been agreed to - and an emphasis on reductions of warheads rather than missiles. There have been indications that Soviet thinking may go in a similar direction. The new, apparent commitment of the Administration to arms control seems to help induce the Congress to vote budgetary means needed for MX deployment, which it had not so far been willing to do.

b) Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

5. The American offer of November 1981 not to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe if the Soviet-Union dismantles all its (300-plus) SS-20 missiles (the "zero-zero option") was countered by the USSR in December 1982 with a proposal to reduce its missiles in Europe to the number of British and French missiles (162) if the USA refrains from deployment of its missiles.

6. End March 1983 the USA proposed an "interim solution" under which it would substantially reduce its planned deployment in Europe provided the USSR reduced the number of its intermediate-range missiles so that the number of warheads on each side would be at an equal level. In early May the Soviet Union responded with the offer to reduce its nuclear forces in Europe to a level that would maintain approximate equality in that continent between the respective nuclear forces, including UK and France, in terms not only of missiles but warheads.

7. The two sides are still far apart; the USA has said it cannot agree to the inclusion of French and UK forces. There are also a number of questions regarding the latest Soviet proposal. Press reports say that the US negotiators have been given flexibility to explore possible formulations for agreement, in the INF talks, which will be resumed in Geneva on 17 May, but prospects for early agreement are not considered to be bright.

c) Various Other Issues

8. The President's recent idea to develop space-based electronic defenses against missiles has met with criticisms: with regard to its feasibility, effectiveness and the likely high cost, it is seen as contravening the A(nti) B(allistic) M(issile) Treaty; it is considered to be highly destabilizing; and it would add a new dimension to the arms race. The Soviet Union has expressed concern at the prospect.

9. Both Parties have indicated their wish to adhere to the terms of SALT II, the unratified Treaty of 1979 which sets ceilings on the number of strategic delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers) to be deployed, and includes some prohibitions on development of new missiles. Notwithstanding mutual allegations of non-compliance, the SALT II appears to be a stabilizing element.

10. Two bilateral treaties, on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE, signed 1976) and on limitations of the size of underground nuclear tests (the Threshold Test Ban or TTB, signed 1974) have been before the Senate for ratification for several years. The US Administration has said recently that the USSR was exceeding the limits set by the TTB and that, before it could be ratified, some means of verification would have to be introduced.

11. This is connected with the subject of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While a great number of States have for years seen a CTBT as an essential and feasible step towards the cessation of the qualitative arms race, the trilateral (USSR/UK/USA) negotiations have long been in abeyance and there is no progress in the CD. Reliable reports have it that underground testing would play a part in the development of a space defense system or a new, small strategic nuclear weapon, so that a CTBT is not likely to be concluded soon. NOTE: the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which mainly prohibits testing in the atmosphere, and which was concluded 20 years ago this summer, says in its preamble that Parties seek "...to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and are "determined to continue negotiations to this end"... US Vice-President Bush has stated before the CD in Geneva that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests remains a long-term goal of US policy.

d) Comment

The respective missile forces face each other in increasingly unstable fashion. The risk of nuclear conflict grows. Public concern becomes stronger. There are some signs that both super-Powers may begin to realize that some well-considered form of mutual arms limitation may add to their security. From the viewpoint of the United Nations, that would be highly encouraging. A clear demonstration of a new approach in this direction - through the conclusion of meaningful arms limitation measures - could contribute greatly to an improvement of the international situation.

BRIEF FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Below are some brief speaking notes on items in the field of disarmament on which the Secretary-General may wish to comment

a. The present state of the arms race - the main issues facing the world today

In 1983 the world will spend over \$650 billion on arms and armed forces, of which some 60 percent will be spent by the USA and USSR - while 1/4 of the world's population live below any reasonable standard of human decency. Military expenditures consume vast resources whilst recession and unemployment are widespread in the industrialized world and hunger, sickness and illiteracy abound elsewhere. Overshadowing all is the risk to humanity of a nuclear conflagration, the avoidance of which remains the greatest single priority on the international agenda.

b. Nuclear weapons competition between USA and USSR

Despite all the technological advances in missiles and nuclear warheads, neither of the two super-Powers can feel secure. Indeed, in this nuclear age complete security through the possession of weapons is no longer possible for any State. Efforts to achieve strategic arms limitations and lower levels of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe are strongly encouraged. Any further initiative that could reduce the destabilizing effects of modern technical developments, e.g. a return to single warheads, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban, significant reductions in the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, is urgently needed not only as a step in itself but as a sign to the world that the spiral of nuclear weapon competition between USA and USSR can be reversed. Without such

steps, international concern will continue to mount.

c. The growth of public concern

One recent development has been the growth of public concern over nuclear weapons. This has been seen in many countries, albeit in differing forms and by differing means, and primarily in countries where the risk of nuclear war is particularly keenly felt. Not only are more numbers of people becoming anxious but also the nature of the questioning is becoming deeper and more thoughtful. In 1982 the General Assembly launched the World Disarmament Campaign to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Campaign will be long-term, will be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner and requires the co-operation and participation of all States.

d. Chemical weapons and the United Nations investigation

Chemical and biological weapons are means of mass destruction whose use is generally condemned. Their use in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the USA is a Party. A Convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons entered into force in 1975. A similar convention on chemical weapons is being negotiated in the (forty nation) Committee on Disarmament (in Geneva): this is expected to include provisions on investigation, including on-site. Its conclusion would be a major achievement. Allegations made, inter alia, by the USA, that certain toxic agents ("yellow rain") had been used in several Asian countries were investigated in 1981 and 1982 by an international expert team under the United Nations' aegis. The team operated

under rigorous requirements of strict impartiality. It was not able to go to places where toxic agents were alleged to have been used. As the evidence presented to it was largely circumstantial its report remained inconclusive. At present an expert group convened by the Secretary-General is devising procedures for the investigation of information on violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use of chemical weapons.

e. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons remains a consideration of great concern. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to play a major role but its authority is increasingly eroded by the fact that Article VI of the Treaty, which conveys an obligation on particularly the nuclear Powers to pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race at an early date, remains a dead letter. The Third Review Conference of the NPT will be held in 1985 and if by then there has been no concrete progress in nuclear disarmament, criticism of the Treaty among especially Third World nations may grow to the point where it impairs the Treaty's viability. This should be of particular concern to the USA as one of the principal supporters of the Treaty.

f. Conventional warfare

Although effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority, the persistent recurrence of outbreaks of conventional war are cause for rising concern. There have been some 150 armed conflicts since 1945 resulting in over 20 million dead and untold physical destruction. Modern technology makes conventional weapons ever more lethal. Another noticeable aspect is that often it is the civilians and non-combatants that suffer most. International arms transfers are now very big business. None of these trends show any sign of diminishing, and there is always the risk that

-4-

conventional conflict will be the spark to a nuclear exchange. At present an expert group convened by the Secretary-General is making a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.

g. What can the United Nations do?

The United Nations is the forum where almost all of the world's States, large and small, come to express their concerns and set out their views of international problems. For many years the United Nations has seen growing demands to halt and reverse the modern arms race, to prevent nuclear war, to take steps towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The United Nations is a vital pulse-point of international opinion and, if used imaginatively and responsibly, can have a valuable role in resolving misunderstandings, disseminating objective and factual information and in certain circumstances effective conflict resolution. As to multilateral action, several international agreements and conventions have been achieved placing limits on the arms race, such as the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Sea-Bed Treaty of 1971, the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons of 1972, the Convention on Environmental Modification of 1977.

In the priority issue of removing the threat of nuclear weapons, the United Nations can discuss, debate, inform - but the prime responsibility for real action remains with the States concerned.

1963 (160) source its ... was ... dismantles ... deploy inter-

THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT
AND SECURITY ISSUES

(Palme Commission)

1. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was launched in Vienna (Austria) on 13 September 1980. Fashioned after the Brandt Commission (the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, under the chairmanship of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt), the Commission concerned itself with the alarming problems of security and disarmament, and after three years of meetings, published its report entitled "Common Security" which was presented by Mr. Olof Palme to the Ad Hoc Committee of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on 26 June 1982.

2. At the 37th session, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/100 B adopted on 13 December 1982, having noted the report the Independent Commission had submitted to the second special session, requested, inter alia, that the Secretary-General transmit the report to the Disarmament Commission for its consideration at its substantive session in 1983.

3. In the report, the Independent Commission suggests short-term and medium-term measures to facilitate the process of disarmament and to establish a system of common international security. Among the most immediate short-term measures are: a Soviet-American agreement and rough parity in intermediate-range nuclear forces; a Soviet-American agreement on banning the forward deployment of new short-range nuclear-weapons systems that might threaten some European targets; the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe; the convening of a conference on confidence-building measures in Europe; negotiations on a ban on the deployment of anti-satellite weapons; resumption

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of US/USSR negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons; talks between suppliers and recipient States to restrict and reduce the transfer of conventional weapons; guidelines for regulating the conventional arms transfers; and the question of reporting military expenditures in accordance with the standardized reporting system.

4. Among the medium-term measures proposed are, inter alia, a US/USSR agreement on additional reductions in strategic offensive forces and an agreement on equal ceilings on NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces at the reduced level in Central Europe; the establishment of a battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone starting with Central Europe and expanding ultimately to the northern and southern flanks of the two alliances; negotiations for disarmament throughout Europe; a total ban on the deployment of anti-satellite weapons; universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty; universal compliance with the General Assembly resolution on reporting military expenditures to the United Nations in accordance with a standardized reporting system; substantial reduction in military spending in developed and developing countries, releasing resources for national needs, development assistance and large-scale conversion of military, scientific and technological efforts to civilian purposes.

5. The ultimate goal must be general and complete disarmament and there is an immediate need to initiate a downward turn in the arms spiral. The report suggests that the short-term measures could and should be implemented in the next two years and the medium-term measures within the next five.

Members of the Commission

6. In addition to its Chairman, Mr. Olof Palme of Sweden, the Commission consists of statesmen, officials, intellectuals and national leaders. They include, in particular, Messrs. Giorgi Arbatov (Member of the Academy, USSR);

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Egon Bahr (Member of the Federal German Parliament); Jozef Cyrankiewicz (Former Prime Minister of Poland); Jean-Marie Daillet (Member of the French Parliament); Alfonso Garcia-Robles (Ambassador of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament); Haruki Mori (Former Ambassador of Japan to the United Kingdom); C.B. Mutha~~mma~~ (Ambassador of India to the Netherlands); Olusegun Obasanjo (Former Head of State of Nigeria); David Owen (Former Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom); Salim Salim (Foreign Minister of Tanzania); and Cyrus Vance (Former Secretary of State of the United States).

7. As its name indicates, the Commission is independent and its members serve in their private capacity.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Middle East

Despite the fact that Syria has not budged in its emphatic opposition to the Agreement signed a month ago by Lebanon and Israel, the Lebanese Government stands firmly and optimistically behind the accord. An overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Parliament ratified the Agreement on 14 June, and Foreign Minister Elie Salem has repeatedly said that he anticipates a breakthrough with the Syrians in the next few weeks. The U.S. in an attempt to break the present impasse has invited the parties concerned to Washington for high-level discussions. President Gemayel is scheduled to visit there on 22 July and Prime Minister Begin on 27 July. Syria's Foreign Minister advised that he would not be able to visit Washington in coming weeks in view of prior commitments.

Publicly, the Lebanese Government says that no part of the Agreement will be implemented until the Israelis have fully withdrawn. Foreign Minister Salem stressed this point in his recent talk with the troop-contributing ambassadors, and said that if the Agreement has not gone into effect by 19 July when UNIFIL's mandate expires, the Lebanese Government will request that the Security Council renew its mandate as is. In this connection, Salem plans to attend the Security Council meeting on 19 July. He has also indicated that he would be ready to travel to Moscow if there were serious doubts about Moscow's intentions concerning an extension of the present mandate. In the improbable event that Syria and Lebanon conclude an agreement before then -- which would indicate a withdrawal of all Syrian, Palestinian, and hence Israeli forces -- Lebanon will ask that UNIFIL be deployed throughout Lebanon, in the vicinity of the Palestinian camps. The ambassadors have expressed their concern about the ambiguity of UNIFIL's role as reflected in the vague wording of the Agreement, and United States Special Envoy Morris Draper has said that this language hints at only a small part of a much larger role envisaged for UNIFIL.

Regardless of a change in Syria's position, it appears that at least two parts of the Agreement will become effective once the instruments of ratification have been exchanged: the Israeli-Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission will be terminated, and a number of the militias now controlled by Haddad or directly by Israel will soon be under the official command of the Lebanese army. While both of these provisions have ramifications for the United Nations presence in southern Lebanon, the latter poses direct problems to UNIFIL. Many of these irregular groups have considered themselves to be "legitimate" since the Agreement was signed.

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And while the Israeli authorities have withheld comment till now, the IDF Chief of Northern Command Drori has endorsed their view in his talks with UNIFIL Commander Callaghan. Consequently, the activities of these groups have created a number of incidents in UNIFIL's AO, the worst of which resulted in the death of a Fijian soldier on 29 May. The Lebanese authorities maintain that these groups are illegal until a decision is taken regarding their status. Meanwhile, as they have no authority or control in the area, they are not in a position to help UNIFIL in dealing with this problem, which is of increasing concern to troop-contributing countries.

In the meantime, the recent escalation in anti-Israeli raids -- marked symbolically this month by the IDF's 500th casualty in Lebanon since the invasion last June -- and the reaction in Israel have prompted widespread speculation that Israel will withdraw at least some of its troops, most notably from the Beirut and Shuf regions. This possibility has been mentioned by several Israeli ministers, most notably the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Minister. It was supposedly discussed last week in Washington during the visit of David Kimche, Director General of the Foreign Ministry and the Israeli negotiator on troops withdrawal. The feeling now is that Israel may postpone a decision on a partial withdrawal of its troops until after the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister. An eventual partial withdrawal does not, however, rule out the possibility of an Israeli retaliatory attack on PLO positions, a move which would undoubtedly involve the Syrians and maybe even the Soviet Union.

PLO leader Arafat has loudly claimed responsibility for these raids -- but this appears to be a move to strengthen his drastically weakened hold over Al-Fatah. The rebellion against Arafat's leadership, which began 15 May among disgruntled Fatah guerrillas based in Eastern Lebanon, has widened in recent weeks and has pitted the rebels against Arafat loyalists in a series of armed clashes, the latest of which involved Syrian troops and tanks. This development is significant, for it marks Syria's open support of the rebels in contrast to its earlier neutrality in the dispute. The rebels now control the main supply route for all Palestinian forces in Lebanon, and Arafat may soon find himself relegated to Tripoli where he is currently establishing headquarters. Syria's position would thus be strengthened, since it has long sought control of the more moderate wing of the PLO, and especially Arafat who, till recently, favored diplomatic action to armed struggle.

The issue of protection for the Palestinians in Lebanon and the occupied territories continues to be of great concern to the United Nations. Pending agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, when the Security Council would decide on

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an eventual United Nations role in Lebanon in general, and with regard to the camps in particular, the Secretary-General is currently examining what possible positive steps, if any, could be taken to ensure the protection of the Palestinians living in the camps.

Bxu.

23 June 1983

Brian Urquhart

Iran/Iraq

The United Nations has been engaged in mediation efforts since November 1980 when the Secretary-General was asked by the Security Council to lend his good offices to achieve a political settlement. Mr Palme was appointed Special Representative and has travelled to the area five times. When Mr Palme became Prime Minister, he agreed to continue to be available to the United Nations and to the parties to the conflict in the further search for a settlement.

The UN effort has concentrated on securing an overall settlement in three stages:

- (a) acceptance of principles to govern relations between the two countries;
- (b) cease-fire and phased withdrawals to pre-war lines;
- (c) negotiations on substantive issues under UN auspices and conciliation on the Shatt-al-Arab issue.

Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet borne fruit.

Other mediation efforts since 1980, in particular those of the Non-aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference as well as those of Cuba, India, Algeria and, recently Kuwait have also failed so far.

The seventh Non-aligned Summit at New Delhi was unable to agree on a statement on Iran/Iraq in its Final Declaration, leaving it to its President, Prime Minister Gandhi, to issue an appeal. Mrs Gandhi has also indicated her intention, in her role as President of the Non-aligned Movement, to undertake a new mediation effort. She has informed the Secretary-General that she would keep him informed of those efforts.

During 1982, Iran launched three major offensives succeeding, at heavy cost, in recovering virtually all its territory from Iraqi forces, and occupying, in turn, small strips of Iraqi territory. Two more Iranian drives neither gained more territory nor did they shake the Iraqi regime - another primary goal of Iran's military strategy. Essentially, the military situation is a stalemate, with Iran maintaining pressure. The possibility of a new Iranian offensive cannot be dismissed.

On the political level Iraq had made several unsuccessful efforts, both unilaterally and through the Security Council in 1982, to bring Iran to negotiations. Iran has rejected the two Security Council resolutions, as well as various Iraqi offers of limited cease-fire formulas. The Iranian position is that it will negotiate only if three conditions are met:

(a) withdrawal to pre-war (not 1975 agreement) borders;
(b) condemnation of the aggressor; (c) payment of reparations by the aggressor (not an international reconstruction fund).

The Secretary-General will shortly present to the Security Council the report of the recent mission to inspect civilian areas, in Iran and Iraq, which have been subject to military attack. The mission was requested by Iran and agreed to by Iraq. The factual report clearly indicates that shelling of civilian areas has been resorted to by Iraq much more than by Iran. These findings parallel those of the ICRC, as indicated in its recent circular memorandum. What action the Security Council might take on this report is still not clear. Iran has shown no signs of any initiative in this respect, and Iraq has stated that if the Security Council discussions were focussed on the report, Iraq would move to widen the discussion to cover the basic issue of the Iran/Iraq conflict.

It is thus clear that the Secretary-General is continuously available to assist the parties whenever possible in efforts to reach a peaceful and just settlement of the Iran/Iraq conflict. Also Mr Palme, who has been following all developments very closely and is always in close contact with the Secretary-General, is ready at any time, despite his heavy responsibilities, to reactivate his mediation efforts. The parties are aware of this and have indicated their continued confidence in the Secretary-General. For any efforts to be meaningful, however, it is essential that the parties show the necessary political will and determination to work towards a peaceful settlement and that does not seem to exist thus far. In the meantime it is encouraging and gratifying to know that the United States has given the assurance that it is maintaining a neutral stance with regard to the Iran/Iraq conflict.

Since last April, the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), consisting of eight Gulf states, has made numerous unsuccessful efforts to deal with the oil spill in the Gulf. At its request, the UN offered assistance in the first two efforts. The main reason for the impasse is Iraq's effort to use this issue to bring about a limited cease-fire which might then, possibly through the Security Council, be expanded to a more general cease-fire. Iran has stoutly resisted any such "politicisation" of an issue which, it maintains, is of a purely technical nature and which can be dealt with in the ROPME framework, provided Iraq unilaterally undertook to suspend its military operation in the area which it has declared a military zone.

21 June 1983

Notes on the Secretary-General's meeting with
●. Rauf Denktash on Monday, 4 July at 10.00am
(Palais des Nations, Geneva)

Mr. Rauf Denktash
Mr. Kenan Atakol
Mr. Umit Suleyman Onan
Mr. Necati Munir Ertekun
Mr. Veziroglu
Mr. Nail Atalay

Secretary-General
Mr. Hugo Gobbi
Mr. Sherry
Mr. Michael Stopford

Mr. Denktash raised the question of a possible visit by the Secretary-General to Cyprus. The Secretary-General replied that he would be glad to pay such a visit if it would prove useful and fruitful and if the necessary preparations had been made with both sides. He was glad to have this opportunity to clarify his thinking on the Cyprus question with Mr. Denktash. He recalled the long discussions he had had with Mr. Atakol and reiterated that the intercommunal talks remained, from the UN point of view, the best available means of pursuing a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. His chief concern was therefore to have the intercommunal negotiating process resumed as soon as possible in the normal fashion. An analysis of the last General Assembly debate showed that the overriding common factor was the importance given to the intercommunal talks. He himself had long given high priority to the Cyprus problem and Mr. Denktash knew of his personal commitment to the Cypriot people.

The Secretary-General recalled that he had announced his recommitment to the efforts to resolve the Cyprus question and his intention of renewing these efforts within the good offices mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council. He had always emphasized his good offices role as providing a channel of communication. In this context, he would sound out ideas, but had never mentioned any intention of making proposals. There had been no change in his perception of the intercommunal talks. He stressed that he would never surprise either of the two sides with any ideas put forward in public but would first discuss suggestions with the two parties privately. As for an eventual visit to Cyprus, he repeated that this would only be helpful if there was to be a prior assurance of positive results. The General Assembly resolution did not affect the intercommunal negotiating process, which was only guided by the resolutions of the Security Council. He urged Mr. Denktash not to attach too much importance to the General Assembly resolution, since the talks and his own mandate stemmed only from the Security Council resolution. He would maintain his close personal involvement in the question, within the framework of the intercommunal talks, and would keep in constant touch with Mr. Denktash through his Special Representative.

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Mr. Denktash thanked the Secretary-General for his frank statement. He wished to put on record his community's difficulties with the current situation. The Secretary-General had referred to the importance attached by UN Member States to a resumption of the intercommunal process but had perhaps not assessed what the Member States considered to be the objectives of the talks. They seemed to think that the aims of the intercommunals were confined to securing a withdrawal of the Turkish troops and according certain rights to the minority. The Member States were clearly not aware that the adoption of the General Assembly resolution had destroyed the basis of the talks and of the good offices mission entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council. In fact, the General Assembly's main priority seemed to be to uphold the policy of the legitimate Government of Cyprus vis-à-vis an "ethnic group". As far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned, the situation was clearly deteriorating.

On 22 June a letter had been sent to him for circulation in the Security Council and the General Assembly by Mr. Moushoutas, according to which the Turkish Cypriots were simply an "ethnic group" in Cyprus. It was quite clear that the historic partnership between the two communities in Cyprus had now been overtaken and that the United Nations was accelerating the process. As for the chief actors in the question, Greece was totally committed to the Greek Cypriots, Britain was only interested in its bases and Turkey was trying to shield the basic concept of a partnership republic. In these commendable efforts, Turkey was receiving the opprobrium of an Organization whose basic function was supposed to be the upholding of human rights and the sanctity of international treaties. This current one-sidedness was a tragedy for the United Nations. The Turkish Cypriots had come to the point where they could no longer tolerate the situation and they could no longer be restrained by Turkey. It was for this reason that an enabling law had been introduced in the Turkish Cypriot Legislative Assembly in order to authorize his Government to hold a referendum at a time to be decided later. It was not possible simply to proceed from the General Assembly resolution to the intercommunal talks on the basis of an assurance from the Secretary-General. The Turkish Cypriots supported the talks as the only means of arriving at a solution but could not close their eyes to such developments as the General Assembly resolution and the various letters circulated.

He wished to ask for the Secretary-General's assistance in making clear the fundamental objectives of the talks to the Greek Cypriots. The General Assembly had of course forgotten these basic objectives, since they were only informed by the representative of the Government of Cyprus, and even the Security Council seemed to have lost sight of the fundamental goal: this was to re-establish the intercommunal partnership as clearly set out in the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, the opening statement of the Secretary-General of 1980 and the "evaluation" paper of 1981. The second element it was necessary to clarify was that there was no point in continuing to refer to the return of populations. There had been an exchange of populations in 1975 and there had not been any understanding on a later return. His fundamental concern was the need to pin down agreement on the basic concepts - as had been the case with bizonality. It was also vital to find some assurance that if the talks were to resume, the Greek side would not once more resort to the General Assembly or the Non-aligned Conference.

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The Secretary-General emphasized his strict impartiality on the Cypriot issue. Mr. Denktash's representative in New York knew that he had often fought against various aspects of the General Assembly resolutions. He had also opposed internationalization and had succeeded in having the proposals for a Security Council advisory committee dropped from the draft resolution. It was important to bear in mind that the very use of the term "intercommunal" belied any notion of dealing with a simple ethnic group or a minority. The fundamental principle of the intercommunal talks had always been the equality of the two communities. As for the concept of federality, this had in fact been accepted in the two high level meetings. He agreed that he could embark on a new effort to pin down the basic principles in order to remove any terms such as "ethnic groups" or other discriminatory language.

Mr. Denktash again referred to the letter by Mr. Moushoutas and to the recent statement by Mr. Mavrommatis in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly. After that statement, the Turkish Cypriots had considered rejecting Mr. Mavrommatis as interlocutor, but decided, at the request of Ankara, to withhold action. It would have been helpful for the Secretary-General to have called the attention of the Greek Cypriots to the apparent change of policy contained in these statements, which had nothing to do with the aims of the intercommunal talks. It was vital to establish the basis on which the negotiations would continue. The Secretary-General might be able to do this in the form of an opening statement. Alternatively, the Turkish Cypriots could present him with the real background which refuted the line put forward in the General Assembly resolution.

Mr. Gobbi agreed that it might be possible to help meet the Turkish Cypriot concerns in a suitable statement. It would not, however, be possible to make any remarks critical of the General Assembly resolution. He emphasized that the intercommunals remained the only framework which placed the two communities on an equal basis. Mr. Denktash disagreed. The two sides were not on an equal basis since at any moment the Greek side, as the legitimate Government of Cyprus, could leave the intercommunals and resort to international fora.

The Secretary-General explained that Mr. Denktash had defined exactly what he had in mind by a recommitment. He could pin down the basic principles agreed on and give them a new validity. The best way to do so must be by re-stating such agreed fundamental principles in his opening statement to the intercommunal talks. He assured Mr. Denktash that he would discuss the question of Mr. Moushoutas' letter with the Greek Cypriot side and would transmit the views of Mr. Denktash to them. These would be the necessary elements in order to re-establish the intercommunal talks in an atmosphere of trust. One positive point was that there had been some evolution in international public opinion, since the visit of the non-aligned contact group had been a success in informing the international community about the situation of the Turkish Cypriot community. The members of the contact group had all found their visit most useful in this regard. He suggested that the Turkish Cypriots might make re-doubled efforts to inform the international community along these lines. Mr. Denktash assured the

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Secretary-General that he would wish to help him in his endeavours. since his people knew they could find no better friend than the Secretary-General. They also believed that the only hope for Cyprus was the intercommunal talks. [He proceeded to hand over to the Secretary-General a dossier for the IPU.]

The Secretary-General mentioned the question of missing persons, which could be discussed by their respective aides. Mr. Sherry explained that the Greek Cypriots had at last accepted in their entirety the procedural proposals submitted by Mr. Pilloud on 2 September 1981 and accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side in February 1982. Mr. Denktash stressed that the Turkish Cypriots had no intention of starting any movement under that heading until the political talks were established on an appropriate basis. In conclusion, he referred to the increasing concern, both amongst the Turkish Cypriot population and in the Assembly, at the current state of affairs. Mr. Veziroglu expressed the view that the members of the Legislative Assembly did not doubt the Secretary-General's sincerity but felt that he lacked sufficient power to help them. The General Assembly was composed of enemies of the Turkish Cypriot side. The latest resolution had had the effect of taking the problem out of the hands of Turkey and of Mr. Denktash. Mr. Denktash interjected that this would be the case unless the Secretary-General could help the Turkish Cypriot side meet its concerns.

It was agreed that the press would be informed that there had been a useful exchange of views. Mr. Denktash added that he would tell the press that the Secretary-General had been put into the picture on how the Turkish Cypriots saw the situation. He would say that it was now for the Secretary-General to ensure that the equal status of the Turkish Cypriots was recognized. If this was the case, the Turkish Cypriots would continue to help him to achieve a peaceful solution on the basis of a bizonal federation.

KAMPUCHEA

Update on Developments since the end of March 1983

1. At the end of March, Viet Nam launched a vigorous offensive along the Thai-Kampuchean border. A Khmer Rouge encampment and another one held by followers of Sihanouk were overrun and destroyed. A Son Sann camp had been attacked and burned down in January. The Vietnamese offensive against the Khmer resistance groups led to a number of direct clashes with Thailand and to renewed tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border. On 5 and 18 April respectively, statements were issued to express the Secretary-General's concern about the armed incidents on both fronts.

2. Following allegations by Son Sann that the Vietnamese had "massacred several hundred" Kampuchean civilians during the fighting, the ASEAN countries expressed the view that, short of a formal investigation which would require a specific mandate, the Secretary-General should look into the situation, with a view to ascertaining the facts. The matter has now been taken up by ECOSOC which adopted, on 27 May, a decision introduced by Thailand which requests the Secretary-General to look into the "violations of humanitarian principles perpetrated against Kampuchean civilian refugees". Considering the context in which the ECOSOC decision was introduced, it would seem appropriate to assign this task to the Centre for Human Rights.

3. By the end of April, the tension had largely receded and, following a meeting of the three Indochinese Foreign Ministers in Phnom Penh, Viet Nam appeared to be reverting to diplomatic action. The statement issued in Phnom Penh stressed Viet Nam's "respect" for Thailand's territorial integrity and its readiness to examine "any proposal" for the restoration of peace and security along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

4. On 2 May 1983, Viet Nam undertook a new "partial" withdrawal of its troops in Kampuchea - the previous one had been announced in July 1982. For the first time, details were given about the units to be withdrawn and foreign journalists were invited to witness the beginning of the process. Although Vietnamese sources have indicated that from ten to thirty thousand troops would be pulled out, ASEAN, China and Western countries have generally expressed doubts about the reality of the withdrawal, pointing out that it could be a mere "rotation of troops".

5. Following the 18 April general elections in Thailand and the subsequent formation a new Government, Foreign Minister Siddhi announced that Bangkok envisaged to adopt a more "flexible" approach on Kampuchea. In this context, Siddhi offered to visit Hanoi (for the first time since the Kampuchean crisis erupted), if Viet Nam agreed to pull its troops thirty kilometres away from the Thai-Kampuchean border. This proposal is expected to be taken up between 8 and 10 June, when Vietnamese Foreign Minister Co Thach stops in Bangkok, on his way back from a visit to the Philippines.

6. In an interview with French journalists in Beijing, Prince Sihanouk threatened, on 29 May, to resign from the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. He strongly criticised Son Sann's "hostile" attitude towards his coalition partners. Sihanouk said he might continue to lead the coalition for "a few more months" but "certainly not for a few years". He also stressed that the only way out of the present impasse was the formation of a Government of national "reconciliation" including the Heng Samrin faction.

7. Rafeeuddin Ahmed will undertake a new mission to the area, starting on 7 June. He is scheduled to visit Manila, Jakarta, Vientiane and Hanoi, before attending the 24-25 June annual ASEAN Ministerial meeting in Bangkok, where he will meet the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Mr. Ahmed will visit Beijing before returning to New York. He is also scheduled to meet the ICK President, Willibald Pahr, some time in July.

8. The Ad Hoc Committee on Kampuchea held consultations with US officials in Washington on 25 May 1983. The US re-affirmed its firm support for the ICK and the Committee and confirmed that it did not intend to take specific initiatives as its basic policy remained to follow the "ASEAN lead". The Committee will dispatch a mission to Tokyo, Beijing, Bangkok and London, from 19 June to 5 July 1983. The mission will report to Dr. Pahr before returning to New York. It will be recalled, in this connexion, that the new Austrian Government wishes Dr. Pahr to continue as Austria's representative to the ICK and, consequently, as President of the Conference.

3 June 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Note for the Secretary-General's possible meeting in Geneva
with Minister Rodrigues (Kito)

1. You are considering a trip to Southern Africa. If it materializes, the trip would include South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia (OAU).
2. You are trying to get the Western governments to use their good offices to persuade the South Africans to be forthcoming on the two remaining issues in connection with resolution 435, namely, the electoral method and the question of the composition of the military component of UNTAG.
3. You are not very optimistic about positive developments on the two issues. The South Africans seem to be waiting for what the United States Government might get from the Angolan Government on the Cuban issue before taking up the remaining resolution 435 issues.
4. You had reiterated your well-known position on the linkage question both to Ambassador Fourie and Dr. Crocker. However, the issue has not disappeared.
5. It was, however, interesting that the South African Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Fourie, who came to see you on 12 July, said that the withdrawal of Cuban troops could start after UNTAG is deployed.
6. Dr. Crocker on the other hand told you on 21 July that they were not asking Angola to lose face or sacrifice its security interests.
7. The Angolan Ambassador in New York, H.E. Mr. de Figueiredo, told you on 21 July that the Angolan Government was thinking of a gradual withdrawal of both South African and Cuban forces within a timetable. In this connection, Angola is prepared to discuss a formula which will provide a guarantee that the Cubans will withdraw, either through the Secretary-General or a third country.
8. You are concerned about the delays in reaching an agreement on the implementation of resolution 435. You are prepared to make every effort and exhaust all possibilities in order to find out whether the parties are prepared to go forward. You told President dos Santos in Luanda on 31 January 1983 that you want to help. You need, however, to know how you are going to render your assistance to Angola in this respect.
9. Before you make up your mind concerning the trip, you need a frank assessment of what the Angolan Government is planning to do. There was expectation in June that some kind of answer would be forthcoming from Luanda to Washington putting the onus on the United States Government and particularly South Africa to respond. Nothing happened.
10. You were also told by Ambassador de Figueiredo that the Angolan Government would understand if the Secretary-General decided to go to South Africa and Namibia.



UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

*With the compliments
of*

Martti AHTISAARI

**The Special Representative of
the Secretary-General for Namibia**



* THE UN VISIT

When, and if, the UN Secretary General Mr Perez de Cuellar lands in Windhoek in a few weeks' time it will be sign of movement once again in the bogged independence talks.

Foremost on the agenda of this visit by a UN representative, will be the question whether he talks to the non-Swapo parties or not.

Meeting with these leaders will not necessarily solve anything, however.

But it will give certain quarters the satisfaction that they are being considered in the scheme of things.

Not that this is not already the case.

The prospect of an election under joint South Africa-UN auspices — for which 435 allows — includes the other contenders for a share in an independent Namibian government.

Internal elections there have been aplenty.

There are reasons for the UN's favourable attitude towards Swapo. These are inextricably linked with SA's attitude to the independence question.

The fact that in a public debate on TV the other night, the National Party and Republican Party leaders could argue about SA's actual commitment to independence at all, shows the extent to which political sensibility has been obscured by diplomatic posturing and evasiveness.

Whatever SA's real commitments and motives might be, there is one message that non-Swapo political leaders can deliver via Mr De Cuellar.

And that is that the overwhelming majority of political sections in this country want independence.

With that supplementary mandate to give weight to Swapo's own commitment, the obstacles can be tackled with a greater unity of purpose.

While the Secretary General's possible meeting with non Swapo leaders may be against Swapo's wishes, and serve to satisfy some of its political opponents' desires, the call for 435 will have become stronger.

A F R I C A

Western Sahara

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

WESTERN SAHARA

1. The resolution on Western Sahara, adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa on 11 June, contains certain new elements, designed to get around the difficulties that had blocked previous efforts by the OAU to implement resolutions calling for a cease-fire and referendum. The following new elements appear to be significant:

- a) Morocco and the Polisario Front are recognized as being the parties to the conflict;
- b) These two parties are to undertake direct negotiations to bring about a cease-fire and to "fix the modalities" of "a referendum without any administrative or military constraints";
- c) The cease-fire and referendum are to be "under the auspices of the UN and the OAU" (the order, placing the UN first, is significant);
- d) The Peace-keeping Force is to be provided by "the United Nations in conjunction with the OAU" (here the UN is not only listed first, but is explicitly given primary responsibility for providing the Force);
- e) All necessary measures to ensure implementation of the resolution are to be taken by the OAU Implementation Committee "with the participation of the UN".

2. The resolutions raises certain important questions, such as:

- a) Do both Morocco and the Polisario Front accept to enter into direct negotiations to bring about a cease-fire and referendum?
- b) What kind of cease-fire ("in place" or with withdrawals, restrictions to base, etc)?
- c) What will be the voting qualifications in the referendum, and will the "refugees" now in Algeria be eligible to vote?

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The role of the United Nations will have to be considered and clarified. Under the resolution, the referendum is to be "under the auspices of the UN and the OAU". Does this imply a veto by either side, or a division of labour? The Peace-keeping Force to be provided by the United Nations requires Security Council authority, with operational control by the Secretary-General. It will therefore be necessary to interpret the OAU resolution in a manner consistent with UN principles, while at the same time assigning a suitable and politically acceptable role to the OAU and its Implementation Committee. Furthermore, "the participation of the UN" in the Implementation Committee, as called for in para. 6 of the resolution, will have to be clarified.

Observations

4. It is now for the parties, with the assistance of the OAU Implementation Committee, to begin direct negotiations for a cease-fire and referendum, as called for by the OAU resolution. At this stage, the Secretary-General may be requested by the OAU to provide information and informal advice concerning various aspects of organizing a peace-keeping force and referendum. Mr. Farah is in touch with the OAU Acting Secretary-General concerning a possible visit to New York by the OAU team. At the same time, it may be advisable to reactivate the Secretariat team which travelled to Nairobi in February 1982 when the question of a UN involvement was first raised.

5. We shall of course have to make it clear to the OAU that it would be for the Security Council to consider a formal request from the OAU for a UN involvement along the lines indicated in the OAU Summit resolution. If and when the Security Council receives such a request, it may wish to authorize the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the OAU and the parties concerned with a view to determining the precise role and involvement to be assumed by the UN, and report thereon to the Security Council. It would be for the Council to decide on the mandate of the UN operation covering both the referendum and peace-keeping aspects, the nature of its relationships with the OAU Implementation Committee, the allocation of functions, structure of authority, etc.

6. In his contacts with various parties concerned in the Western Sahara problem, the Secretary-General may wish to indicate that while the United Nations is prepared to help, any such involvement would have to be based on the established principles governing United Nations operations of this kind, including authorization of the Security Council, co-operation of the parties, a unified and integrated command structure reporting to the Secretary-General and through him to the Security Council, etc. It may also be useful to ascertain whether the parties are in fact prepared to work with one another and with the United Nations in achieving a genuine cease-fire and free referendum to determine the future of the territory. The financial aspect would also have to be addressed.

WEST RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Nineteenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 11 June 1983.

Having examined the Report of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara,

Recalling the solemn commitment made by His Majesty King Hassan II during the 10th Summit to accept the holding of referendum in the Western Sahara to enable the people of that territory to exercise their right to self-determination.

Recognizing with appreciation, His Majesty King Hassan's acceptance of the Recommendation of the Sixth Session of the Ad-Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara contained in document AHG/DCE/Res.103(XVIII) Annex I and well as his willingness to cooperate with the Ad-Hoc Committee in the search for a just, peaceful and lasting solution.

Reaffirming its previous Resolutions and Decisions on the question of Western Sahara, and in particular AHG/Res.103(XVIII) of 27 June 1981.

1. TAKES NOTE of the Reports of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara;
2. URGES the parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, to undertake direct negotiation with a view of bringing about a ceasefire to create the necessary condition for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, under the auspices of the UN and the OAU, and CALLS on the Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the ceasefire;
3. URGES FURTHER the two parties to the conflict to start direct negotiations without delay to fix the modalities of the referendum; a referendum without any administrative or military constraints.

REQUESTS the Implementation Committee to meet as soon as possible, and in collaboration with the parties to the conflict to work out the modalities and all other details relevant to the implementation of the cease fire and the conduct of the referendum within six months;

5. REQUESTS the United Nations in conjunction with the OAU to provide Peace Keeping Force to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace and security during the organization and conduct of the referendum;

6. MANDATES the Implementation Committee with the participation of the United Nations to take all necessary measures to ensure the proper implementation of the decision;

7. REQUESTS the Implementation Committee to report to the 20th Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the result of the Referendum with a view to enabling the 20th Summit to reach a final decision on all aspects of the question of the Western Sahara;

8. DECIDES to remain seized with the question of Western Sahara;

9. REQUESTS the Implementation Committee in the discharge of its mandate to take account of the proceedings of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Ordinary Sessions on the Question of Western Sahara and to this end INVITES the OAU Secretary-General to make available the full records of the said proceedings to the Committee;

10. WELCOMES the constructive attitude of the Saharawi leaders in making it possible for the 19th Summit to meet by withdrawing from it voluntarily and temporarily;

End Session - 10 July

UN - Western Administration
International Conference

INFORMATION NOTE ON THE OAU'S SUMMIT (JUNE 1983) AND
WESTERN SAHARA

20 June 1983

On 8 June 1983, with the agreement of the Frente POLISARIO "voluntarily and temporarily" not to occupy its seat as member of the organization, the nineteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU was able to convene. This ended three days of informal consultations to bring about a solution to the crisis precipitated by the non-acceptance by Morocco and its supporters of the decision regarding SADR becoming the OAU's fifty-first member last year.

Against this background, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 11 June 1983, adopted a resolution by which it urged the parties to the conflict, Morocco and POLISARIO, to undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum without any administrative or military constraints under the auspices of OAU and the United Nations and called on the Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the cease-fire.

The Assembly directed the Implementation Committee to meet as soon as possible and in collaboration with the parties to the conflict, to work out the modalities for the implementation of the cease-fire and the conduct of the referendum in December 1983.

It requested the United Nations in conjunction with OAU to provide a peace-keeping force to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace and security during the organization and conduct of the referendum.

It mandated the Implementation Committee with the participation of the United Nations to take all necessary measures to ensure the implementation of its resolution and to report to its twentieth Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the result of the referendum with a view to enabling the twentieth summit to reach a final decision on all aspects of the question of Western Sahara.

As stated in the resolution, the United Nations' role is envisaged in the following: a) supervising the referendum together with OAU; b) providing in conjunction with OAU, a peace-keeping force during the organization and conduct of the referendum; and c) participating in assuring the implementation of the resolution.

It is still unclear whether the resolution will be implemented by the deadline indicated above. The outstanding problems impeding any early resolution of the conflict remain as they were prior to the OAU June Summit. These are: Morocco's opposition to negotiations with POLISARIO; POLISARIO's insistence on Moroccan withdrawal (military and civilian) prior to the referendum; and last but not least, the determination of who is entitled to vote in the referendum.

A F R I C A

Chad

Question of Chad

The following are notes relating to major problems which confront Chad:

1) Border dispute with Libya

The border dispute with Libya erupted in 1973 when Libyan forces occupied the northern Chad town of Aczou. Libya claims the town as well as the region in which it is located (approximately 500 miles long and 60 miles wide) under an agreement signed between France and Libya in 1935 when Libya and Chad were under colonial rule. The pact was never ratified by the French Parliament of the day, and in 1938 it was denounced by France in a diplomatic exchange of letters between the two countries. Many attempts have been made by OAU members to negotiate a settlement but have failed.

Chad argues that the Charters of the OAU and the UN uphold the claim of sovereignty, a claim further borne out by an OAU resolution of 1964 on the inviolability of borders inherited from colonial powers. The problem has not been resolved and Libya still occupies the disputed area.

2) Internal political situation

The present Government in Chad, under Hissene Habre, won control of the capital as well as most areas of Chad in June 1982. The ousted government of Goukouni fled the country. Goukouni has again reappeared in Chad and has declared his headquarters to be at Bardai, which lies in the disputed territory controlled by Libya.

3) Status of Hissen Habre's Government

At the OAU Conference in Tripoli in November 1982, some states demanded that a delegation sent by Goukouni should occupy the seat of Chad in the Conference, on the grounds that the OAU had recognized the National Transitional Government (under Goukouni) as being the legitimate authority and that the OAU decision was still in force. The problem eventually led to an impasse. Not only were both sides prevented from occupying the seat but the Conference as a whole was subsequently cancelled.

The position of Habre's Government within the U.N. is secure. Its credentials were accepted in the General Assembly at the Law of the Sea Conference in Jamaica without opposition.

At the Non-Aligned Conference in New Delhi, Hissen Habre's delegation was allowed to take the seat of Chad. At the OAU Summit meeting in Addis Ababa, Libya attempted to revive the issue of Chad's representation but the Conference overwhelmingly agreed to the seating of Habre's delegation.

4) Security Council debate

In the middle of February 1983, tension flared up between Libya on one side and Sudan and Chad on the other.

On 17 February, Chadian President Hissen Habre accused Libya of concentrating troops and mercenaries on Chad's northern border, which prompted the release of a joint Chadian-Sudanese communique calling on African nations to keep out of each other's internal affairs.

On 6 April the Security Council, through its President, issued a statement expressing concern "that the differences between Chad and Libya should not deteriorate". The Council called on the two countries "to settle these differences without undue delay and by peaceful means" on the basis of the Charters of the United Nations and OAU "which demand respect for freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity".

5) Latest developments

Reports from Chad in recent weeks have pointed to increased activity by rebel forces in the northern region of the country, and to charges by the Chadian Government that Libyan troops and armour were operating in close support of the rebel forces.

On 21 June, President Mitterrand, while addressing the National Assembly of Cameroon warned that France would not tolerate further intervention in Chad. Reuters reported him as saying "France must repeat that it cannot accept reckless actions that would make Chad fall prey to foreign ventures". Reuters further reported that French authoritative sources had said recently in Paris that the two countries (France and Chad) were tied by a military co-operation agreement which excludes direct military intervention by France but could entail increased arms deliveries. French diplomatic sources in N'Djamena are reported to have denied the existence of any formal military agreement. President Mitterrand's statement in Cameroon has been welcomed by U.S. State Department.

On 23 June President Hissen Habre addressed an urgent cable to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, charging that Libya had launched a large-scale operation against Chad and called upon the United Nations to afford the people of Chad every assistance. (Copies of President Habre's message have been distributed to all members of the Security Council).

6) Border problem with Nigeria

Unfortunately for Chad, relations with Nigeria were severely damaged in May as a result of an outbreak of fighting between their troops on the south-western border. This resulted in Nigeria closing its borders thereby causing a serious interruption in the flow of food and other vital supplies in transit from Nigerian ports to Chad.

The World Food Programme is particularly concerned by the closure as it has halted the movement of essential food supplies to the drought-stricken areas of Chad. Moreover, if the borders are not opened soon, roads will become impassable because of the onset of the rainy season.

While in Addis Ababa, Mr. Farah raised the matter with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria. The Minister replied that a solution would have to await a meeting between the Presidents of Nigeria and Chad, which was expected to take place in the near future. Latest reports indicate that the meeting is likely to be held over the coming weekend.

7) National reconstruction and development

The International Conference on Assistance to Chad took place at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 29 and 30 November 1982 and considering the circumstances under which it was held, can be regarded as having been moderately successful. A target figure of approximately \$470 million had been set to cover urgent reconstruction and development projects over the next two years. More than half of that amount is estimated to have been realized. Chad has expressed satisfaction with the result.

The economic situation has recently been aggravated by the unexpected return of 700,000 Chadian nationals from Nigeria. UNDRO has provided emergency assistance.

THE QUESTION OF THE BORDER DISPUTE
BETWEEN CHAD AND LIBYA

1. Background information

The border dispute with Libya erupted in 1973 when Libyan forces occupied the Aouzou strip, a region of 114,000 sq. kms in the extreme north of Chad, believed to be rich in uranium and manganese. Libya claims the Aouzou strip under an agreement signed between France and Italy in 1935 when Libya and Chad were under colonial rule. The pact was never ratified by the French Parliament of the day, and in 1938 it was denounced by France in a diplomatic exchange of letters between the two countries. Many attempts have been made by OAU members to negotiate a settlement but have failed.

Chad argues that the Charters of the OAU and the UN uphold the claim of sovereignty, a claim further borne out by an OAU resolution of 1964 on the inviolability of borders inherited from colonial powers. The problem has not been resolved and Libya still occupies the disputed area.

2. Consideration by the Security Council

In a letter dated 6 February 1978 (S/12554) to the Security Council, Chad accused Libya of military aggression and occupation of northern Chad and of ignoring the OAU Libreville recommendations. It requested a meeting of the Security Council on the issue and informed its President (letter S.12555 of 8 February) that Libya had refused to attend any meeting of the OAU ad hoc committee, and that heavy fighting had been taking place since 1 February at Faya between Chadian troops and the Libyan army assisted by foreign elements. Chad had thus decided to break off diplomatic relations with Libya, it said.

Libya dismissed these complaints as baseless and unfounded (S/12560), adding that the problem of boundaries could be dealt with in bilateral negotiations or in the context of OAU. Libya had always welcomed African efforts to restore cordial relations between the two countries, and had agreed to attend a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Niger, Chad and Libya in Nyamey on 7 February, but Chad, instead, suspended diplomatic relations with Libya.

The Security Council met on 17 February 1978 on the matter (2060th meeting). No decision was taken, and the same day, Libya informed the Council (S/12565) of diplomatic contacts and efforts which had been made by various quarters to improve the relations between the two countries.

Chad, in a letter dated 18 February (S/12568), and Libya, in a communication of 21 February (S/12570), informed the Council that following talks between Sudan, Chad and Libya at Tripoli between 16 and 18 February, a trilateral joint communique had been issued, in which Chad had agreed to withdraw its complaint to the Security Council and to work for the restoration of links with Libya. Chad told the Council on 22 February (S/12572) that it had decided not to press for consideration of its complaint. Libya said also on 22 February (S/12573) that in view of Chad's communication, it hoped the Council had taken measures to delete the item from its agenda. The item was deleted on 27 February.

Recent developments

3. In November 1982, the Habré's Government, during the period of the OAU meeting in Libya, issued a statement in which it accused Libya of subversion and expansionism. The statement further said that Libya was still occupying the 150,000 sq. Kms Aouzou strip of Northern Chad and was exploiting its oil and mineral resources. The statement also demanded the withdrawal of Libya from the strip where it was reported that former President Goukouni had been installed with Libya support.

On 1 March, a Libyan envoy arrived in Chad for what appeared to be the first direct talks between the two countries since President Hissene Habré's take-over of N'Djamena, according to informed sources. The envoy was named as Colonel Radwan, who had led the Libyan occupation troops in Chad until their withdrawal two years ago. Then on 4 March, the sources said that a Chadian delegation had gone to Libya to discuss ways of defusing the border tension between the two countries.

In an address to the recent Non-Aligned Summit Meeting at New Delhi, Chadian Vice-President and Foreign Minister Idriss Miskine said that a "neighbouring country occupies more than 150,000 sq. Kms of Chadian territory on which it has tens of thousands of troops", a reference to the Aouzou strip.

4. On 17 March Chad called for a Security Council meeting charging Libya of aggression and occupation of part of its territory. Libya contested the charge and said that the territory in question was an integral part of its territory. No resolution was adopted by the Council but a statement was issued by the President on 6 April calling on both parties to settle their dispute in a peaceful manner in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In May further fighting broke out in the northern part

of Chad between Government and opposition forces. Chad again complained to the Security Council on 20 May that Libya was involved in the fighting and reserved the right to raise the matter again in the Council. The Chadian representative stated that Libya's aim was to invade Chad and install a regime of its liking.

France, which maintains close relations with Hissene Habré, expressed its concern about the situation in northern Chad, adding that it could lead to a decision by Paris to provide the Chadian Government with military assistance if requested.

5. The situation within Chad has been aggravated by fighting which has broken out between Nigeria and Chadian troops in a contested border zone near Lake Chad (to the west). The fighting took place on 19 May and many casualties were suffered by both sides. Talks have taken place between the two Governments on the incident and according to latest report the matter has been resolved. Nigeria is strongly supportive of Hissene Habré as being the legitimate Government of Chad. Col. Quaddafi paid a State visit to Lagos towards the end of April and in a communique issued jointly with Nigeria called on the international community to provide generous aid for the reconstruction of Chad and also emphasized that there should be no foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the territory.

6. Hissene Habré's delegation to the Non-Aligned Conference was officially seated, thereby strengthening its claim as a legitimate and recognized government of the country.

7. The seating of Hissene Habré's delegation at the forthcoming OAU Summit Conference is not likely to be contested by the majority of States.

A F R I C A

Horn of Africa

HORN OF AFRICA

History

At the turn of the century, a series of treaties between Ethiopia, on the one hand, and Italy and Britain, on the other, established the political boundaries within the region.

The Somalis maintain that the treaties are illegal as the inhabitants played no part in the negotiations and were not consulted. Moreover the agreements were contrary to the treaties which the Somalis had entered into previously with Britain and Italy. According to Somalia, the Ogaden was incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire in the 1890s as a result of Emperor Menelik's conquest of the area. As part of an Empire the people of the Ogaden were entitled to the right of self-determination as in the case of other colonial territories.

Ethiopia strongly rejects Somalia's demand, and maintains that the Ogaden historically has always been an integral part of Ethiopia, and that Somalia was in substance calling for the dismemberment of a sovereign and long independent state.

Developments since 1960

While ex-Italian Somaliland was under the UN trusteeship from 1950 to 1960 many attempts were made to settle the boundary disputes with Ethiopia but all were unsuccessful. On independence, Somalia inherited the problem.

Somalia's independence in 1960 gave rise to increased nationalism throughout the region. A number of serious clashes occurred at various border points between Ethiopian and Somali forces. In 1963 the situation developed into armed conflict albeit on a limited scale. A cease-fire was arranged under the auspices of the OAU and through the mediation-efforts of the Sudan.

Following a relatively peaceful period, tension again developed in 1974. The overthrow of Haile Selassie and the chaotic conditions within Ethiopia gave rise to increased guerrilla activities against the central Government in various provinces. Somalia openly supported the cause of the Western Somali Liberation Front which had begun guerrilla activities in the Ogaden as well as other insurgent movements in the southern region of Ethiopia. By July 1977, the situation had become so serious in the Ogaden that Ethiopia called for an emergency session of the OAU to consider 'Somalia's invasion' of the Ogaden area. Somalia continued to deny involvement.

OAU action

In 1977 the OAU decided to convene a meeting of its Good Offices Commission to mediate. It met in Libreville (Gabon) but ended in a failure when Somalia decided to boycott its closing session because it wanted the OAU to examine in depth the problem of the Ogaden, and invite the liberation movement to participate in its proceedings. Ethiopia opposed both conditions. The Commission, however, reaffirmed that in accordance with the OAU Charter, member states were bound to respect the borders existing at independence and to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states.

In the months that followed, Somalia officially admitted that it had sent its army into the Ogaden to support the insurgents because of the introduction, by Ethiopia, of Cuban forces and Soviet advisers. Somalia's forces were obliged to withdraw in March 1978.

At the Nairobi OAU Summit Conference in 1981, the Conference adopted a report prepared by the Good Offices Commission. In that report cognizance was taken of Ethiopia sovereignty over the Ogaden. It called on both parties to adhere to the principles of the Charter. The Conference called upon the Good Offices Commission to continue its efforts of bringing the Heads of State of Ethiopia and Somalia together to facilitate the peace process initiated by it. Somalia expressed reservations with respect to the OAU decision.

Latest developments

Somalia has accused Libya of arming and supporting Somali dissidents in order to destabilize the country and overthrow the present regime. The dissidents have been allowed to operate from Ethiopia. Two villages on Somalia's side of the border have been the scene of heavy fighting. Somalia maintains that the dissidents are being used as a cover by Ethiopia, and that Ethiopian forces are doing the actual fighting. By August 1982 it was reported that an Ethiopian division was involved in the fighting. According to Somalia the two villages are still in Ethiopian hands. Ethiopia has rejected the claim saying that Somalia's problem is not with Ethiopia but with its own dissidents.

In July 1982 President Moi appealed to both sides to exercise restraint and to desist from action which could again plunge the region into war, and to abide by OAU decisions and the provisions of the OAU Charter.

Both parties have addressed several communications to the Secretary-General on the matter for circulation giving their version of the situation, and countering each other's accusations.

At the OAU Conference in Tripoli in November 1982, the Secretary-General met President Mengistu of Ethiopia. He touched briefly on the problems of the Horn of Africa and expressed his concern over the situation.

In January 1983, President Barre was reported by the media to have made a statement in Mogadiscio announcing that Somalia was prepared to enter into negotiations with Ethiopia over the settlement of the problems between the two countries. Following that report, the Secretary-General met with the Somali Permanent Representative to the U.N. to obtain further information. The Somali Ambassador said that while he did not have the record of the press statement, President Barre had made similar proposals in the past for a negotiated settlement. It was suggested at the meeting that the forthcoming Non-Aligned Conference in New Delhi could present opportunities for the Secretary-General to meet with senior representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia. The Somali Ambassador indicated that President Barre was likely to be present at the Conference.

The Somali Ambassador informed the Secretary-General that there were three prerequisites for meaningful negotiations:

1. Ethiopia should evacuate its troops from Somali territory. At the present time it occupied two areas within the Somali borders by force of arms.
2. There should be no foreign interference in the affairs of the Horn of Africa. To that end efforts should be made to persuade the Soviet Union and Cuba to withdraw their troops and military advisers.
3. Any negotiations should have as their objective a just and lasting solution to the problems of the 'Horn'.

At the Non-Aligned meeting in New Delhi, both Somalia and Ethiopia launched attacks against each other. Ethiopia accused Somalia of being in the hands of the U.S.A. and Somalia accused Ethiopia of genocidal practices against the various populations under its rule. Relations between the two countries have shown no improvement.

In May the Secretary-General had discussions with President Mengistu in Addis Ababa during the ECA jubilee celebrations on matters relating to the Horn of Africa. Nothing concrete emerged from those talks.

A F R I C A

Refugees problems

AFRICAN REFUGEE SITUATION

Preparations are in hand for the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa. Following the Secretary-General's meetings with donor states and the African Group in New York in February 1983, letters and guidelines were sent to the countries requesting them to prepare their submissions. The governments concerned have been advised to prepare their submissions in close co-operation and consultation with the representatives of the local donor community as well as with those of the UN system. The UNDP Resident Representative in each capital has been asked to play a co-ordinating role. A technical team will visit each country between July and October for the purpose of discussing with the Governments their submissions. The purpose is to ensure that requests for assistance are kept to a reasonable level, that they specifically relate to the African refugee situation and that they are in accord with priority needs. The African Governments have also been urged to assist in the search for durable solutions so that refugee problems can help in accelerating solutions.

The Secretary-General is required to submit a progress report to the next session of the General Assembly concerning the status of preparations.

The Conference itself will take place in Geneva in May 1984.

Refugees in the Horn of Africa

There have been some positive developments in the Horn of Africa, notably with regard to the repatriation of refugees from Djibouti and Somalia. Following tripartite discussions between the Governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti, and UNHCR, which concluded in May 1983, the prospects of Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti returning to their homeland has improved considerably. The Government of Ethiopia has announced an amnesty agreement and is prepared to work closely with UNHCR on the question of the rehabilitation of the refugees once they return to their homes. This programme will affect approximately 30,000 refugees in Djibouti but it is still too early to tell how many are returning voluntarily. The Government of Djibouti has announced that it will continue to offer asylum to those who choose to remain on its territory.

With regard to Ogaden refugees, a small number are already reported to have returned and teams have been set up to deal with their needs. UNHCR has allocated \$20 million for the relief and rehabilitation of returning refugees to Ethiopia. UNHCR has appointed the League of Red Cross Societies to administer the programme on its behalf.

With regard to displaced persons and refugees in Ethiopia, the EEC launched an investigation into allegations that food aid destined for those groups had been diverted to the Ethiopian army. Upon investigation, these allegations were found not to be true.

The next few months will be crucial with regard to the problem of refugees in the Horn of Africa. While it is recognized that voluntary repatriation may not be a solution to all who left in recent years and found asylum in surrounding countries, it is possible that large numbers might cross back on satisfying themselves that they will receive adequate assistance in their homelands, particularly those who left because of conflict and drought conditions.

Refugee problems affecting Rwanda/Uganda

Following the representations made by the Secretary-General to President Obote of Uganda in February 1983, discussions between the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda took place at Kabale in March. Agreement on principle and procedure was reached and if implemented, would lead to a solution of the situation. The High Commissioner for Refugees has allocated \$500,000 to meet the cost of registering refugees in the two countries and has also dispatched a team of six officials to help in the registration process. However, there does not seem to have been much progress on other aspects of the agreement according to the President of Rwanda when he met with the Secretary-General in Addis Ababa in May 1983. The President asked the Secretary-General if he would consider sending a letter to President Obote urging him to maintain the momentum which led to the Kabale agreement. This was done on 23 May 1983.

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Note for the Secretary-General

JUL 9 1983

East Timor


Ambassador Medina of Portugal came to see me on 5 July, to inform that he had sought a meeting with you to confirm formally that the position of the new Portuguese Government on East Timor is identical to that of its predecessor. After meeting with the Secretary-General, he was going to Lisbon to consult with his Government. I felt that it would be important for him to have a first contact with Ambassador Alatas before that and enquired whether a message had been passed on to the Indonesian side through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government, with a view to opening a process of dialogue. He replied that it was not his understanding that, for talks between the two Permanent Representatives, such a message was necessary. In his view, once he had formally informed the Secretary-General of the new Government's position, he would be ready to meet Ambassador Alatas anywhere on the UN premises. I told him that I would clarify this point with Ambassador Alatas.

Ambassador Medina also mentioned the recent reports concerning talks between the Indonesian Government and FRETILIN and enquired whether the Secretary-General had been informed about them. I responded that, as far as I was aware, no formal communication had been received; however, Foreign Minister Mochtar had mentioned them to me in Jakarta. Ambassador Medina hoped that, in view of these developments, it would be possible to avoid a debate on East Timor in the Committee of 24. He was also interested in exploring how the consideration of the item could be postponed at the forthcoming General Assembly. I said that it would be preferable to do that right at the beginning of the session, when the General Committee takes up the provisional agenda. He enquired whether a suggestion to that effect could be made in the Secretary-General's report and I replied that it certainly could be considered, but it could also be proposed from the floor by a delegation friendly to both sides.

I contacted Ambassador Alatas the following day and he confirmed that there would be no objection to a meeting between the two Permanent Representatives, even without a message through the Dutch channel. He then complained that the FRETILIN leaders in Portugal had been making statements which were not in accordance with the facts. The correct situation was that the new Governor in East Timor, Mr. Mario Viegas Carrascalao, had sought permission to talk to the remnants of FRETILIN who were still holding out in the mountains, with a view to convincing them to accept the amnesty offer made earlier by the Indonesian Government. No formal cease-fire agreement had

been signed with them, nor was there any commitment to inform the Secretary-General formally about these talks. There was no question of an exercise of self-determination. He intended to put out a press release to set the record straight. On the question of the deferral of the item at the forthcoming General Assembly session, he was not prepared to make any commitment at this stage.

On 7 July, I called Ambassador Medina and suggested to him that he should invite Ambassador Alatas to lunch after 12 July (Ambassador Alatas would not be available on 11 or 12 July because of the celebrations to mark the end of Ramadan). On the basis of this first contact, he would obtain the necessary instructions from his Government to resume direct contacts in early August, when both he and Ambassador Alatas would be back in New York. He agreed to do so.



Rafeeuddin Ahmed
8 July 1983

Meeting with Mr. Hocké in Geneva on 6 July 1983

On East Timor - the Secretary-General said he had been in contact with the various parties. Mr. Hocke indicated that guerilla activities were continuing on the island. The Indonesians had transferred 3.000 - 4.000 inhabitants of East Timor to the neighbouring island of ~~Timor~~^{Autaro} where they had been detained in unsatisfactory conditions. There were some discussions between the local FRETILIN representatives and the Indonesians on a possible return of some of those displaced. FRETILIN was still talking of holding a referendum. The present situation was precarious in East Timor. One positive development was the appointment of a new Indonesian Governor in East Timor, who had formerly been in the Indonesian Mission to the UN in New York. *Mario Carrascalão -*

On Central America - Mr. Hocke expressed concern with the situation in Nicaragua where 2.000 to 3.000 people had been detained for the past 4 years in the "Zona Falca".

M.J.Stopford/8 July 1983



A I D E M E M O I R E

Asunto: Posición peruana en relación a la iniciativa
del Secretario General

1. La misión del Sr. Hugo Navajas-Mogro a los tres países había previsto el apoyo de Naciones Unidas, tanto para la etapa de emergencia, como -principalmente- para la etapa de rehabilitación de los daños causados por los desastres.
2. La constatación local de la realidad en los países, además del pedido de los tres Presidentes, quienes han dirigido cartas al Secretario General en este sentido, ha orientado la atención de la misión en un primer momento, a la satisfacción de necesidades urgentes de emergencia (alimentos, medicinas, semillas, puentes, transportes, etc.) para que luego visite los tres países, una misión técnica de Naciones Unidas que examinará proyectos y alternativas para la etapa de rehabilitación.
3. Bolivia y Ecuador han expresado interés en el apoyo de las Naciones Unidas para ambas etapas; no así el Perú que aparentemente no considera la visita de la misión técnica y en consecuencia, la ejecución de la segunda etapa.
4. La decisión peruana obligaría a reexaminar las alternativas de la acción de las Naciones Unidas, al perder su carácter conjunto (regional, en términos del PNUD) el tratamiento de la etapa de rehabilitación
5. La presencia en el Perú de la misión técnica para la segunda etapa, no interferiría naturalmente, con gestiones o acciones que otras fuentes multilaterales o bilaterales de cooperación puedan realizar en relación a la etapa de rehabilitación.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'M. Gucovsky'.

Michael M. Gucovsky
Oficial Encargado

Dirección Regional para América Latina

20 de julio de 1983

C O N F I D E N T I A L

cc: EO

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Subject: Navajas Mission

Me llamó Larrabure de Lima. Oscar Maúrtua le ha revelado confidencialmente que la razón por la cual el Presidente no firmó la carta preparada por Navajas y los funcionarios peruanos, análoga a la que le envió Siles Zuazo, es que no le atrae la idea de la segunda misión orientada hacia la reconstrucción. Al parecer, FBT estima que una misión así interferiría con los programas actuales y las prioridades establecidas. Larrabure me dice que este temor se basa en un malentendido, pues la misión de Naciones Unidas no interferiría ni en prioridades ni en detalles técnicos de los programas; se limitaría a coordinar y a dar un enfoque unificado a los tres países incluidos en el llamamiento.

FBT parte mañana hacia Venezuela por la vía fluvial, pero antes podría firmar una nueva carta que le sometería Maúrtua, limitada a exhortarle a hacer un llamamiento para la primer parte (alimentos; emergencia). Maúrtua no quiere insistir ante el Presidente que reconsidere la segunda misión, pese a las explicaciones de Larrabure. Han habido "Muchas misiones y poca asistencia", según FBT.

Entiendo que Ecuador va a pedirle lo mismo que Bolivia (1º llamamiento; 2do. misión técnica para la reconstrucción). Curiosamente el Perú estaría ausente de la 2da parte, y sin esa 2da evaluación difícilmente podría usufructuar de la ulterior conferencia de contribuyentes. Navajas está en Quito ahora y viaja a Caracas el jueves. No sería útil que usted explicara a FBT los alcances de la propuesta en Caracas?

Alvaro de Soto/lc
18 de julio de 1983



PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA

Lima, 19 de julio de 1983.

No. 0538.

Señor ERIC PERRIN,
Representante Residente Adjunto de la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas en el Perú.
Ciudad.

Tengo el agrado de dirigirme a usted en ocasión de alcanzarle con el presente, a título informativo y para los fines a que hubiere lugar, copia de la carta que el señor Primer Vice-Presidente de la República Encargado del Despacho, doctor Fernando Schwalb López Aldana, está enviando al Secretario General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Excelentísimo señor Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, agradeciendo su preocupación y especial dedicación respecto a los efectos de los desastres naturales que azotan diversas regiones del Perú y manifestando la satisfacción de haber recibido a la Misión que presidió el Enviado Especial del Secretario General de la ONU, señor Hugo Navajas Mogro, con referencia a las conversaciones sostenidas con esa importante Representación.

Me valgo de la oportunidad para reiterar a usted las seguridades de mi más distinguida consideración.



OSCAR MAURTUA DE ROMAÑA
Secretario General de la
Presidencia de la República



PERU

Lima, 18 de Julio de 1983.

Señor Secretario General :

Tengo a honra dirigirme a Su Excelencia para expresarle en nombre propio y del Gobierno Peruano el más vivo agradecimiento por su preocupación y especial dedicación respecto a los efectos de los desastres naturales que azotan diversas regiones de nuestro país.

He tenido la satisfacción de recibir a la Misión que presidió su Enviado Especial señor Hugo Navajas Magro. De las conversaciones sostenidas con la digna Representación de las Naciones Unidas ha surgido el convencimiento que las graves dificultades que afligen al Perú debido a los desastres naturales son tanto por las devastadoras inundaciones, principalmente en la costa norte, como por una aguda sequía en la región sur.

La respuesta a tales dificultades se orientaría a superar, con la celeridad requerida, la emergencia en que se encuentran los habitantes directamente afectados con las cuantiosas pérdidas a consecuencia de las inundaciones, como los agobiados con una creciente severidad por la falta de alimentos derivada de la sequía. Cabe anotar que el esfuerzo interno del Gobierno Constitucional para contrarrestar los efectos de estos fenómenos naturales, que comprometen una vasta porción de nuestro territorio, ha recibido el respaldo solidario de algunos países de la Comunidad Internacional.

Dentro de este contexto, la muy plausible iniciativa de Su Excelencia, permitiría satisfacer las necesidades aún no cubiertas. Para ello se ha elaborado conjuntamente con la Misión que preside el señor Navajas Magro un documento que resume la situación de emergencia y recoge las necesidades inmediatas que ésta genera; documento que de ser puesto en conocimiento de los Miembros de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, por su digno intermedio, estoy seguro que motivará a éstos a cooperar con nuestro país en superar, con la urgencia que la situación reclama, los efectos de los desastres naturales.

Me valgo de la oportunidad para renovar a Su Excelencia, junto con mi reiterado reconocimiento por su valiosa gestión, la expresión de mi más alta consideración y estima personal.

FERNANDO SCHWALB LOPEZ ALDANA
Primer Vice-Presidente de la República
Encargado del Despacho,

Al Excelentísimo Señor
JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR
Secretario General de la

ECZO DAL3537 CUI104

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047 ALVARO SOTO PARA SECRETARIO GENERAL INFO DP153 MORSE/CHICOUSKY
DE NAVAJAS NEGRO AAA COMPLACEME ANUNCIABLE MINISTRO RELACIONES.
EXTERIORES HIZOME ENTREGA HOY CAPTA PERSONAL DEL PRESIDENTE
HURTADO A SECRETARIO GENERAL EXPRESANDO RECONOCIMIENTO NUESTRA
SOLIDARIDAD Y PREOCUPACION SECRETARIO GENERAL ANTE DESASTRES
NATURALES QUE HAN AZOTADO ECUADOR. PRESIDENTE HURTADO REITERA
RECONOCIMIENTO POR ASISTENCIA OTORGADA POR ORGANISMOS NACIONES
UNIDAS ANTE SITUACION EMERGENCIA Y POR FUTURA COOPERACION AL PLAN
REHABILITACION. AL MISMO TIEMPO MINRELACIONES ENTREGOME DOCUMENTO
RESUMIENDO NECESIDADES AYUDA EMERGENCIA CONSISTENTE CONSTRUCCION
PUENTES Y REPARACION CAMINOS A CENTROS DE PRODUCCION, INSUMOS PARA
PRODUCCION AGRICOLA, ALIMENTOS, MEDICAMENTOS E INSECTICIDAS POR
TOTAL 11.4 MILLONES DOLARES. BBB ADICIONALMENTE CANCELLERIA
ENTREGOME NOTA COMPLEMENTARIA DIRIGIDA A MI EN CALIDAD
REPRESENTANTE PERSONAL SECRETARIO GENERAL SOLICITANDO
EXPRESAMENTE PRESENTACION DOCUMENTO AYUDA INMEDIATA AL SECRETARIO
GENERAL OBJETO ECUADOR SEA INCLUIDO EN LLAMADO DEL SECRETARIO
GENERAL A COMUNIDAD DONANTES (SOLARI UNDEVPRO QUITO)
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CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA

Guyana/Venezuela

CONFIDENTIAL

Guyana-Venezuela

The Secretary-General's role in this issue derives from the Geneva Agreement of 1966 between the two governments which provided (Article IV-2) that should they fail to reach agreement on one of the means of settlement provided for in Article 33 of the Charter, they would refer this decision to the Secretary-General. The Port-of-Spain Protocol suspended this provision until June 1982.

During 1982, Venezuela pressed for direct negotiations with Guyana, who insisted on referring the issue to the International Court of Justice. In September, Venezuela proposed reference to the Secretary-General, while Guyana proposed reference to the Court, the General Assembly or the Security Council. Eventually, in March 1983, Guyana agreed to referral of the issue to the Secretary-General, who informed both parties that he would inform them of his conclusions regarding the discharge of this responsibility. This has still to be done.

During June, the Secretary-General and Mr Cordovez met with the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. Venezuela has indicated that it considers the dispute to be essentially a political and diplomatic issue, and should not be the subject of a purely judicial settlement, suggesting that at this stage, the Secretary-General should confine his efforts to the choice of one of the several means of peaceful settlement. Venezuela also has indicated that it is in no hurry to resolve the matter. There has been no approach from Guyana so far, but Guyana has consistently favoured a judicial settlement in the past. Mr Cordovez expects to visit both capitals in August to ascertain the views and attitudes of the two governments.

If queried on the subject during his trip to Caracas, the SG might reply along the following lines:

"El propósito de mi visita a Caracas es asistir a las ceremonias que marcan el bicentenario del Libertador Simón Bolívar. Sobre el diferendo entre Guyana y Venezuela, ambos gobiernos me han solicitado que señale el medio de solución. Se trata de un problema antiguo y complejo. No conviene esperar que yo proporcione una solución instantánea. Es materia de detenido estudio, y oportunamente haré conocer mis conclusiones a las Partes."

20 July 1983

CENTRAL AMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL

Central America

At its 2437th meeting on 19 May 1983, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 530 (1983), which, in its operative paragraphs 4 and 5, states the following:

4. Urges the Contadora Group to spare no effort to find solutions to the problems of the region and to keep the Security Council informed of the results of these efforts.
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the development of the situation and of the implementation of the present resolution.

In order to co-ordinate the full implementation of the relevant paragraphs of Security Council resolution 530 (1983), the Secretary-General met on 27 May 1983 with the Permanent Representatives of the countries comprising the Contadora Group.

In the aforementioned meeting, the Representatives of the Contadora Group expressed their intention of keeping the Secretary-General informed of their efforts and of developments in the Central American situation.

Expressing both his deep concern with the situation in Central America and his desire to follow up on developments there, the Secretary-General urged the Contadora Group to continue its efforts. The Secretary-General also voiced his hope that these efforts would be successful.

On 15 June, the Permanent Representatives of Nicaragua and Honduras called on the Secretary-General and each in turn separately expressed his Government's concern at the aggravation of the situation and the seeming inevitability of war.

On 21 June, the Foreign Ministers of Colombia and Mexico accompanied by the Permanent Representatives of Panama and Venezuela visited the Secretary-General and, as a result of a 2-hour discussion, the need to breathe air into the Contadora exercise was recognised and the Secretary-General decided to make a report to the Security Council, which he did orally on 23 June.

On 11 July, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Nicaragua told the Secretary-General that the military danger had receded somewhat, but a build-up was underway for a major attack. He and the Permanent Representatives of Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala, in separate, individual talks with the Secretary-General, shared the judgement that the Contadora Group's efforts were not making much progress.

The OAS met last week at Honduras' request, but it was inconclusive, surely in part because of the abrupt decision of the Contadora Group to hold a 2-day meeting of Foreign Ministers followed by a weekend meeting of the four Heads of State in Cancún, Mexico. The four Presidents adopted a communiqué containing comprehensive, specific proposals going beyond the mere agenda/procedure exercise which had occupied the Group heretofore. It not only made concrete proposals for the Central American States but also addressed unequivocal appeals to Cuba and the USA to co-operate in the implementation of the proposals.

Nicaragua seems since to have scaled down its position vis-à-vis the Contadora exercise through a major speech by Commander Ortega, Co-ordinator of the Sandinista Government. The new flexibility has been recognized in a public statement by the State Department.

The Foreign Ministers of the four Central American countries met on 20 July in Guatemala to examine urgently the communiqué of the Contadora Presidents, and are reported to have presented their own proposals.

The United States, while publicly supporting the Contadora Group, does not seem to have fixed a clear, cohesive position, if one bears in mind the, as yet, tentative Stone mission -- launched at the prodding of Congress -- and the appointment of the Kissinger Commission, whose announced purpose is to draw up a national consensus.

The Contadora Group will meet at the Foreign Minister level from 28 to 30 July in Panama.

21 July 1983

Excelentísimo señor
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar,
Secretario General,
Organización de las Naciones Unidas,
Nueva York, N.Y.

Cancún, México, a 17 de julio de 1983

Excelentísimo señor Secretario General:

Como es de su conocimiento, los Presidentes de Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela nos reunimos el día de hoy, 17 de julio, con el fin de examinar la grave y compleja situación centroamericana. Nos preocupa el franco deterioro que se observa en el área y que se manifiesta en una creciente escalada de violencia, en un aumento progresivo de las tensiones y de los incidentes fronterizos y en un permanente riesgo de conflictos bélicos que podrían generalizarse. Todo ello ha obstaculizado el avance de las instituciones democráticas, de la libertad, la justicia social y el desarrollo económico.

Durante nuestro encuentro, adoptamos la Declaración de Cancún sobre la Paz en Centroamérica que nos complace adjuntarle y que recoge los propósitos de distensión y pacificación impulsados por el Grupo de Contadora. Estimamos que nuestra Declaración contiene un conjunto de propuestas positivas que, con el apoyo de los gobiernos directamente involucrados y el respaldo de los miembros de la comunidad internacional, permitirán alcanzar nuestro cometido.

Lo saludamos afectuosamente,

(Firmado)

Belisario Betancur,
Presidente de la República
de Colombia

Miguel de la Madrid H.,
Presidente de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos

Ricardo de la Espriella,
Presidente de la República
de Panamá

Luis Herrera Campíns,
Presidente de la República
de Venezuela

Excelentísimo señor
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar,
Secretario General de la Organización
de las Naciones Unidas,
Nueva York, N.Y.

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JUL 20 1983

Nueva York, N.Y., a 19 de julio de 1983

Excelentísimo señor Secretario General:


Tenemos el honor de hacer llegar a Vuestra Excelencia el texto de la Declaración de Cancún sobre la Paz en Centroamérica, formulada por los Presidentes de Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela al concluir la reunión que sostuvieron el 17 de julio de 1983 en Cancún, México.

Solicitamos a Vuestra Excelencia que tenga a bien disponer que el texto de esta Declaración sea distribuido como documento de la Asamblea General, en relación con los temas 64, 66, 78 y 125 de la lista preliminar, y del Consejo de Seguridad.

Hacemos propicia esta ocasión para reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de nuestra más alta y distinguida consideración.



Carlos Albán Holguín
Embajador
Representante Permanente
de Colombia



Miguel Marín Bosch
Embajador
Representante Permanente Alterno
de México
Encargado de Negocios, a.i.



Leonardo Kam
Embajador
Representante Permanente Alterno
de Panamá
Encargado de Negocios, a.i.



Alberto Martini Urdaneta
Embajador
Representante Permanente
de Venezuela

DECLARACION DE CANCUN
SOBRE LA PAZ EN CENTROAMERICA

Ante el agravamiento de los conflictos en la América Central, los Jefes de Estado de Colombia, Belisario Betancur; de México, Miguel de la Madrid; de Panamá, Ricardo de la Espriella; y de Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campíns, decidimos reunirnos en Cancún, México, hoy 17 de julio de 1983.

Analizamos la crítica situación centroamericana y coincidimos en nuestra profunda preocupación por su rápido deterioro ante una creciente escalada de violencia, el aumento progresivo de las tensiones, los incidentes fronterizos y la amenaza de una conflagración bélica que podría generalizarse. A todo ello se suman la carrera armamentista y la injerencia foránea, para formar un cuadro dramático que afecta la estabilidad política de la región y en el que no logran avanzar y consolidarse instituciones que respondan al anhelo democrático de libertad, justicia social y desarrollo económico. Los conflictos de Centroamérica plantean a la comunidad internacional la disyuntiva de apoyar y fortalecer decididamente la vía del entendimiento político, aportando soluciones constructivas, o aceptar pasivamente que se acentúen los factores que podrían conducir a confrontaciones armadas de mayor peligrosidad.

El uso de la fuerza como alternativa de solución no resuelve, sino que agrava, las tensiones subyacentes. La paz centroamericana sólo podrá ser una realidad en la medida en que se respeten los principios

fundamentales de la convivencia entre las naciones: la no intervención; la autodeterminación; la igualdad soberana de los Estados; la cooperación para el desarrollo económico y social; la solución pacífica de controversias; así como la expresión libre y auténtica de la voluntad popular. La creación de condiciones favorables para la paz en la región depende, fundamentalmente, de la actitud y de la genuina disposición para el diálogo por parte de los países centroamericanos, a los que corresponde la responsabilidad primordial y el mayor esfuerzo en la búsqueda de los acuerdos que aseguren la convivencia.

En tal sentido resulta indispensable que la voluntad política de entendimiento, ya manifiesta desde el inicio de la gestión del Grupo Contadora, se continúe expresando claramente en la prosecución de los esfuerzos de paz a fin de que se traduzca en acciones y compromisos concretos.

Es necesario, además, que otros Estados con intereses y vínculos en la región contribuyan con su influencia política a fortalecer los cauces del entendimiento y se comprometan, sin reservas, en favor de la opción diplomática por la paz.

Los esfuerzos del Grupo de Contadora han hecho posible, hasta ahora, la iniciación de un diálogo con la participación de todos los gobiernos de América Central, el establecimiento de un mecanismo de consultas y la definición, por acuerdo unánime, de un temario que recoge los aspectos más relevantes de la problemática regional.

Estos logros, aunque todavía insuficientes, se han visto estimulados por el apoyo de numerosos países, diversas organizaciones y los más variados grupos de opinión a nivel internacional. Todos coinciden en que la acción del Grupo de Contadora ha contribuido a moderar los sentimientos y reducir los riesgos de una confrontación generalizada y su acción ha permitido identificar problemas y causas de un escenario que hoy se expresa en conflicto y temor.

Este generoso respaldo de la comunidad internacional nos compromete a persistir en nuestro empeño y hacer todos los esfuerzos en favor de la causa cuyas nobles finalidades compensan cualquier posible incompreensión.

Inspirados por el amplio espíritu de solidaridad de nuestros países con los pueblos hermanos de la América Central, creemos necesario acelerar los procesos que traduzcan la voluntad de paz en propuestas que, debidamente desarrolladas, puedan contribuir con eficacia a la solución de los conflictos.

Con tal fin hemos convenido las directrices generales de un programa para ser propuesto a los países centroamericanos que supone, además del estricto cumplimiento de los principios esenciales que rigen las relaciones internacionales, la celebración de acuerdos y compromisos políticos que conduzcan, en el ámbito regional, a un efectivo control de la carrera armamentista; la eliminación de asesores extranjeros; la creación de zonas desmilitarizadas; la proscripción del uso del territorio

de unos estados para desarrollar acciones políticas o militares de desestabilización en otros estados: la erradicación del trasiego y tráfico de armas: y la prohibición de otras formas de agresión o injerencia en los asuntos internos de cualquiera de los países del área.

Para hacer eficaz este programa general, se requiere la concertación de acuerdos estableciendo los compromisos políticos destinados a garantizar la paz regional. Estos acuerdos podrán comprender:

Compromiso para poner término a toda situación de beligerancia preexistente;

Compromiso para la congelación en el nivel de armamentos ofensivos existentes;

Compromiso para la iniciación de negociaciones sobre acuerdos de control y reducción en el inventario actual de armamentos, con la constitución de mecanismos adecuados de supervisión;

Compromiso de proscribir la existencia de instalaciones militares de otros países en su territorio;

Compromiso de dar aviso previo de movimientos de tropas cercanas a las fronteras, cuando estos contingentes rebasen la cuantía definida en el acuerdo;

Compromiso para efectuar, según el caso, patrullajes fronterizos conjuntos o supervisiones internacionales de fronteras por grupos de observadores seleccionados de común acuerdo por los interesados;

Compromiso de constituir comisiones mixtas de seguridad, con el fin de prevenir y, en su caso, resolver incidentes fronterizos;

Compromiso de establecer mecanismos internos de control para impedir el trasiego de armas desde el territorio de cualquier país de la región hacia el territorio de otro;

Compromiso de promover un clima de distensión y de confianza en el área, evitando declaraciones y otras acciones que pongan en peligro el indispensable clima de confianza política que se requiere;

Compromiso de coordinar sistemas de comunicación directa entre los gobiernos a fin de prever conflictos armados y de generar una atmósfera de confianza política recíproca.

De la misma manera, consideramos que, en forma simultánea a la ejecución de este programa general, la tarea de zanjar diferencias específicas entre países debe acometerse inicialmente con la suscripción de memorandos de entendimiento y la creación de comisiones mixtas que permitan a las partes desarrollar acciones conjuntas y garantizar el control efectivo de sus territorios, especialmente en las zonas fronterizas.

Estas medidas, orientadas a la eliminación de los factores que perturban la paz regional, deben ir acompañadas de un gran esfuerzo interno para fortalecer las instituciones democráticas y garantizar la observancia de los derechos humanos.

En ese sentido es necesario perfeccionar los métodos de consulta popular, asegurar el libre acceso de las diversas corrientes de opinión al proceso electoral y promover la plena participación de los ciudadanos en la vida política de su país.

El fortalecimiento de las instituciones políticas democráticas está vinculado estrechamente a la evolución y a los avances que se logren en materia de desarrollo económico y de justicia social. De hecho se trata de dos dimensiones de un mismo proceso que, en definitiva, se orienta hacia la realización de los valores fundamentales del Hombre.

Con esta perspectiva debe enfrentarse el atraso económico que está en la raíz de la inestabilidad regional y es causa próxima de muchos de sus conflictos.

Fortalecer los mecanismos de integración, incrementar el comercio intrazonal y aprovechar las posibilidades de complementación industrial, son algunas de las acciones más urgentes para neutralizar los efectos de la crisis económica mundial. Pero el esfuerzo propio debe completarse con el apoyo de la comunidad internacional, especialmente de los países industrializados, mediante créditos de fomento, programas de cooperación y el acceso de los productos centroamericanos a sus mercados. Los Gobiernos de los países del Grupo de Contadora reiteran su decisión de continuar los programas de cooperación en favor de la subregión y ofrecer su concurso para canalizar el apoyo internacional hacia estos propósitos de reactivación económica. Con base en estos lineamientos

Por lo tanto, hemos confiado a nuestros Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores la elaboración de propuestas específicas que habrán de presentarse a la consideración de los países centroamericanos con motivo de la próxima reunión conjunta de cancilleres.

Hacemos un llamado a todos los miembros de la comunidad internacional, especialmente a los que han manifestado su simpatía con los esfuerzos que realiza el Grupo de Contadora, así como al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas y al Presidente del Consejo Permanente de la Organización de Estados Americanos, para que contribuyan con su experiencia y capacidad diplomática en favor de soluciones pacíficas para los problemas centroamericanos. Por todas estas consideraciones nos hemos dirigido a los Mandatarios del continente americano en busca de su necesaria solidaridad.

Los Jefes de Estado de Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela reafirmamos los propósitos que unen a nuestros Gobiernos en esta tarea de ayudar a contribuir la paz justa y duradera que anhelan los pueblos de América Central.

Dado en Cancún, México, a los diecisiete días del mes de julio de mil novecientos ochenta y tres.

(Firmado)

Belisario Betancur,
Presidente de la República
de Colombia

Miguel de la Madrid H.,
Presidente de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos

Ricardo de la Espriella,
Presidente de la República
de Panamá

Luis Herrera Campiñs,
Presidente de la República
de Venezuela

Distr.
GENERAL


S/15878
20 July 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1983 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF NICARAGUA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Vuestra Excelencia a fin de adjuntarle texto del Comunicado emitido por la Dirección Nacional del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional el día 19 de julio del presente año. Dicho documento al haber sido acogido como suyo por la Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional de la República de Nicaragua, contiene las posiciones del Gobierno de la República de Nicaragua y sus propuestas concretas en torno a la difícil situación regional, en la esperanza y convicción de llegar a la solución de los graves problemas centro-americanos por la vía pacífica del diálogo y la negociación.

Mucho agradecería a Vuestra Excelencia haga circular la presente nota y su anexo como Documento ~~Oficial~~ del Consejo de Seguridad.


(Signed) = Julio Icaza Gallard
Embajador
Encargado de Negocios a.i.
Representante Permanente Alterno de Nicaragua
ante las Naciones Unidas

A Su Excelencia
Señor Ling Qing
Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad
NACIONES UNIDAS

"La Dirección Nacional del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional comparte el criterio expresado por los Jefes de Estado del Grupo de Contadora, de que el uso de la fuerza, como alternativa de solución, no resuelve, sino que agrava las tensiones subyacentes. La paz centroamericana solo podrá ser una realidad en la medida que se respeten los principios fundamentales de la convivencia entre las Naciones, la no intervención, la autodeterminación, la igualdad soberana de los Estados, la cooperación para el desarrollo económico y social, la solución pacífica de las controversias así como la expresión libre y auténtica de la voluntad popular.

Compartimos tales criterios porque nuestros ideales y principios, el poder popular, las transformaciones socio-económicas en beneficio de las grandes mayorías de la Nación, la soberanía y la independencia plena de nuestra Patria, la decisión de construir una nueva sociedad libre, democrática, pluralista y sin explotación, son hechos y convicciones profundamente arraigadas en el corazón de millones de nicaraguenses.

La Revolución Popular Sandinista, es una realidad política irreversible, con repercusiones nacionales e internacionales reconocidas por todo el mundo.

Nicaragua no tiene ambiciones expansionistas, ni pretende imponer su sistema socio-político a otros países. No tenemos inversiones económicas en el extranjero, ni sueños de dominación imperial, por lo mismo nuestro pueblo no necesita ni desea la guerra. Para Nicaragua es de principio su compromiso de no agredir jamás país alguno.

El Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, que ha luchado y continuará luchando para asegurar a nuestro pueblo una existencia de paz y seguridad, consciente del deterioro a que ha sido llevada la situación en la región y, consecuente con los últimos pasos constructivos de los Gobiernos del Grupo de Contadora, ha decidido hacer un nuevo esfuerzo para contribuir a la paz, pese a la absoluta convicción que tenemos de que la mayor amenaza a la paz de la región exige soluciones bilaterales.

El Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional aceptará que sea de carácter multilateral el inicio del proceso de negociaciones propiciada por el Grupo de Contadora, a fin que se acaben las excusas y quienes se declaren interesados en la paz den pasos concretos para que se desarrolle el proceso que pueda sentar las bases de la misma.

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Más aún tomando en cuenta que los Jefes de Estado han confiado en sus Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores la elaboración de propuestas específicas que habrán de presentarse a la consideración de los países centroamericanos, con motivo de la próxima reunión conjunta de Cancilleres y que los mayores peligros de la paz de la región pueden venir del exacerbamiento de los conflictos militares ya existentes, el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional propone de inmediato se inicie la discusión de los siguientes puntos básicos:

- 1) Compromiso para poner término a toda situación de beligerancia prevaleciente a través de la firma inmediata de un acuerdo de no agresión entre Nicaragua y Honduras.
- 2) El cese absoluto de todo suministro de armas por parte de cualquier país a las fuerzas en conflicto en el Salvador, para que ese pueblo pueda resolver sus problemas sin injerencia externa.
- 3) El cese absoluto de todo apoyo militar bajo la forma de suministro de armas, entrenamiento, utilización del territorio para lanzar agresiones o cualquier otra forma de agresión, a las fuerzas adversas a cualquiera de los Gobiernos centroamericanos.
- 4) Compromisos que aseguren el respeto absoluto a la autodeterminación de los pueblos centroamericanos y la no interferencia en los asuntos internos de cada país.
- 5) El cese de las agresiones y de la discriminación económica hacia cualquier país de Centroamérica.
- 6) La no instalación de bases militares extranjeras en el territorio de Centroamérica, así como la suspensión de ejercicios militares en el área centroamericana con participación de ejércitos extranjeros.

El avance en la solución de estos puntos automáticamente contribuirá a que otros puntos que también inquietan a los Estados centroamericanos y que están registrados en la agenda del Grupo de Contadora, sean discutidos a fin de encontrar viable y duradera solución para la seguridad y estabilidad de los países de la región.

Alcanzados los acuerdos con el Grupo de Contadora y aprobados los mismos, el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, como máximo organismo internacional encargado de velar por la paz y seguridad internacionales, deberá supervisar y garantizar a todos los países el cumplimiento de dichos acuerdos.

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Nicaragua adelanta su disposición a sumir con plena responsabilidad todos los compromisos que se deriven de dichos acuerdos y lo pone de manifiesto aceptando el punto de vista de los Jefes de Estado del Grupo de Contadora, en el sentido de que la tarea de zanjar diferencias específicas entre países debe acometerse inicialmente con la suscripción de Memorandum de entendimiento y la creación de comisiones que permitan a las partes desarrollar acciones conjuntas y garantizar el control efectivo de sus territorios, especialmente en las zonas fronterizas. Mientras estas iniciativas se materializan el pueblo de Nicaragua continuará completamente movilizado, listo para levantar una muralla de patriotismo y fusiles donde se estrellen los agresores.

DIRECCION NACIONAL DEL FRENTE SANDINISTA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL".

CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA

Malvinas/Falklands

CONFIDENTIAL

- for Caracas trip

Talking points for Secretary-GeneralRe: Malvinas/Falklands

1. Mediante resolución 37/9 de 9 noviembre 1982, Asamblea General instó a Argentina y el Reino Unido a reanudar negociaciones sobre la soberanía, y pidió al Secretario General que prestara sus buenos oficios con ese fin. El Secretario General tiene que presentar un informe sobre el particular a la 38a. Asamblea.
2. El 16 de diciembre de 1982, el Secretario General transmitió la resolución a ambos Representantes permanentes mediante una nota en la que ofrecía sus buenos oficios.
3. El 23 de diciembre de 1982 Argentina aceptó el ofrecimiento del Secretario General mediante nota del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores en la cual extendió el ámbito de la eventual negociación a las Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur, que no están mencionadas en la resolución. El texto de la nota fue circulado como documento oficial a pedido de Argentina. El Reino Unido manifestó su sorpresa pues estimó que tal publicidad violentaba la norma de confidencialidad de los buenos oficios.
4. Mediante nota del 4 de enero de 1983 el Representante Permanente del Reino Unido dijo en el primer párrafo que había transmitido la nota del Secretario General y la resolución anexa a su Gobierno, lo que dio la impresión de constituir una respuesta provisional. Sin embargo, paso seguido observó que Argentina no ha aceptado hasta ahora la cesación de jure y definitiva de las hostilidades. No llegó a rechazar el ofrecimiento del Secretario General expressis verbis.

5. Usted había pensado reiterar la gestión una vez que hubiera pasado la Cumbre No Alineada, pero en eso intervinieron las elecciones en Gran Bretaña.

6. Desde las notas de diciembre y enero, Argentina ha enviado una sucesión de cartas circuladas en la Asamblea General y el Consejo de Seguridad. El Reino Unido ha sido más parco, pero ha hecho uso en forma reiterada, como justificación tácita de su negativa a negociar la soberanía, del que Argentina solamente acepte la cesación de facto de las hostilidades. Esta situación supone, desde el punto de vista del Reino Unido, que Argentina podría desencadenar una nueva acción militar intempestivamente, lo que hace necesario mantener una "fortaleza" militar en las islas.

7. Se acaba de hacer público un informe del "Select Committee" sobre Relaciones internacionales de la Cámara de los Comunes que sugiere que a la larga la mejor solución posible es la cesión de la soberanía a la Argentina, con garantías apropiadas para los habitantes de extracción británica, y el "leaseback" (retroarriendo) de las islas al Reino Unido. Esta solución, empero, tendría que esperar que transcurriera mucho tiempo, posiblemente generaciones.

8. Ultimamente el Reino Unido decidió gastar una suma importante en la construcción de un aeropuerto que podría servir para aviones militares; Argentina ha protestado airadamente.

9. Ambas partes y asimismo la prensa están alertadas de su propósito inminente de efectuar una nueva gestión, con miras al informe a la Asamblea General. Nadie vaticina posibilidades de éxito. Argentina está promoviendo un proyecto de resolución para la 38a. Asamblea en el que presupone esa falta de éxito. El Reino Unido le ha pedido que no invoque la resolución 505 del Consejo de Seguridad, que para ellos perdió vigencia cuando Argentina no se reiteró voluntariamente de las islas.

Alvaro de Sotc/jb
19.7.83



Consejo de Seguridad

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/530 (1983)
19 mayo 1983

RESOLUCION 530 (1983)

Aprobada por el Consejo de Seguridad en su 2367a. sesión,
celebrada el 19 de mayo de 1983

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Habiendo escuchado la declaración del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Nicaragua,

Habiendo escuchado también las declaraciones formuladas por varios Estados miembros de las Naciones Unidas en el curso del debate,

Profundamente preocupado, por una parte, por la situación imperante en la frontera septentrional de Nicaragua y dentro de esa frontera y, por la otra, por el peligro consiguiente de un enfrentamiento militar entre Honduras y Nicaragua, que podría agravar más la situación de crisis que reina en América Central,

Recordando todos los principios pertinentes de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, en particular la obligación de los Estados de resolver sus controversias exclusivamente por medios pacíficos, de no recurrir a la amenaza o al uso de la fuerza y de respetar la libre determinación de los pueblos y la independencia soberana de todos los Estados,

Tomando nota del deseo ampliamente expresado por los Estados interesados de encontrar soluciones a las diferencias que los separan,

Encomiando el llamamiento formulado por el Grupo de Contadora, integrado por Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela, en su comunicado del 12 de mayo de 1983 (S/15762) en el sentido de que las deliberaciones del Consejo deberían fortalecer los principios de libre determinación y no intervención en los asuntos de otros Estados, la obligación de no permitir que se utilice el territorio de un Estado para cometer actos de agresión en contra de otros, la solución pacífica de las controversias y la proscripción de la amenaza y del uso de la fuerza para resolver conflictos,

Considerando el amplio apoyo expresado a los esfuerzos del Grupo de Contadora hallar soluciones para los problemas que afectan a los países de América Central y por lograr una paz estable y duradera en la región,

1. Reafirma el derecho de Nicaragua y de todos los demás países de la región a vivir en paz y seguridad, libres de injerencia externa;
2. Encomia los esfuerzos del Grupo de Contadora e insta a que se persevere en esos esfuerzos;
3. Hace un urgente llamamiento a los Estados interesados para que cooperen plenamente con el Grupo de Contadora mediante un diálogo franco y constructivo a fin de resolver sus diferencias;
4. Insta al Grupo de Contadora a que no escatime esfuerzos para encontrar soluciones al problema de la región y a que mantenga al Consejo de Seguridad informado de los resultados de esos esfuerzos;
5. Pide al Secretario General que mantenga al Consejo de Seguridad informado de la evolución de la situación y de la aplicación de la presente resolución.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/530 (1983)
12 May 1983

RESOLUTION 530 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2437th meeting,
on 12 May 1983

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Nicaragua,

Having also heard the statements of various States Members of the United Nations in the course of the debate,

Deeply concerned, on the one hand, at the situation prevailing on and inside the northern border of Nicaragua and, on the other hand, at the consequent danger of a military confrontation between Honduras and Nicaragua, which could further aggravate the existing crisis situation in Central America,

Recalling all the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the obligation of States to settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means, not to resort to the threat or use of force and to respect the self-determination of peoples and the sovereign independence of all States,

Noting the widespread desire expressed by the States concerned to achieve solutions to the differences between them,

Commending the appeal of the Contadora group of countries, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, in its 12 May 1983 communiqué (S/15762) that the deliberations of the Council should strengthen the principles of self-determination and non-interference in the affairs of other States, the obligation not to allow the territory of a State to be used for committing acts of aggression against other States, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibition of the threat or use of force to resolve conflict,

Considering the broad support expressed for the efforts of the Contadora Group to achieve solutions to the problems that affect Central American countries and to secure a stable and lasting peace in the region,

1. Reaffirms the right of Nicaragua and of all the other countries of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside interference;
 2. Commends the efforts of the Contadora Group and urges the pursuit of those efforts;
 3. Appeals urgently to the interested States to co-operate fully with the Contadora Group, through a frank and constructive dialogue, so as to resolve their differences;
 4. Urges the Contadora Group to spare no effort to find solutions to the problem of the region and to keep the Security Council informed of the results of these efforts;
 5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of the development of the situation and of the implementation of the present resolution.
-

CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA

Miscellaneous subjects

UNITED NATIONS

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



NATIONS UNIES

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Secretary-General
A:

DATE: 19 July 1983

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Mr. Viacheslav A. Ustinov
DE: Under-Secretary-General
Department of Political and Security
SUBJECT: Council Affairs
OBJET:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to the Under-Secretary-General mentioned in the 'FROM' field, is written over the signature line.

Latin American Regional Conference for Action against Apartheid

The Special Committee against Apartheid has decided to organize the Latin American Regional Conference for Action against Apartheid in Caracas, Venezuela, from 16 to 18 September 1983.

The dates were chosen as they may be convenient for some Foreign Ministers to attend on their way to the General Assembly session.

The Conference, in co-operation with the Government of Venezuela, will pay tribute to Simon Bolivar, express appreciation to Latin America and the Caribbean for their contribution to the struggle against apartheid, and consider further action. (The Special Committee greatly appreciates the fact that the first Simon Bolivar award is being presented to Nelson Mandela, South African leader in prison.)

Participants will include representatives of Governments, and inter-governmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations.

INFORMATION NOTE

Subject: Regional Symposium in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Self-determination.

Place: San José, Costa Rica

Date: 16 to 19 August 1983

Venue: Hotel Cariari

Participants: Non-Governmental Organizations, Union members, Prominent personalities from Latin America.

Estimated number of participants: about 75 (The United Nations will cover travel and subsistence for 30 participants). The Council for Namibia will be represented by a delegation of six members led by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Amb. Paul J.F. Lusaka.

Contribution expected of the Government of Costa Rica:

- local staff (26)
- equipment (photocopy machines, typewriters, telex, office supplies.
- local transportation (3 cars, 1 small bus)

Remarks: The Government and the members of the survey mission felt it would not be practical to use the facilities of the University for Peace. The site is too far from the city (40 km) and difficult to reach.

ALLOCUTION DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL A LA
2EME CONFERENCE MONDIALE DE LA LUTTE CONTRE LE RACISME
ET LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE -
GENEVE, LE 1er AOUT 1983

EXCELLENCES, MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,

TOUT ÊTRE HUMAIN, QUELS QUE SCIENT LE LIEU DE SA NAISSANCE, LA COULEUR DE SA PEAU, SA SITUATION ÉCONOMIQUE OU SES CONVICTIONS POLITIQUES OU RELIGIEUSES, A LE DROIT DE NE PAS SUBIR DE DISCRIMINATIONS. AUX TERMES DE LA DÉCLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, "LA RECONNAISSANCE DE LA DIGNITÉ INHÉRENTE À TOUS LES MEMBRES DE LA FAMILLE HUMAINE ET DE LEURS DROITS ÉGAUX ET INALIÉNABLES CONSTITUE LE FONDAMENT DE LA LIBERTÉ, DE LA JUSTICE ET DE LA PAIX DANS LE MONDE". C'EST LÀ L'UN DES PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX PROCLAMÉS PAR LES NATIONS UNIES. POUR QU'IL SOIT APPLIQUÉ, L'ORGANISATION DOIT SE BATTRE AVEC UNE RÉOLUTION INÉBRANLABLE. C'EST POURQUOI JE ME FÉLICITE DE L'OCCASION QUI M'EST DONNÉE D'OUVRIR CETTE DEUXIÈME CONFÉRENCE MONDIALE DE LA LUTTE CONTRE LE RACISME ET LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE. CETTE CONFÉRENCE EST IMPORTANTE CAR ELLE EST PARTIE INTÉGRANTE DU COMBAT QUI DOIT ÊTRE LIVRÉ. LORSQUE NOUS OBSERVONS LE MONDE OÙ NOUS VIVONS, NOUS VOYONS, EN EFFET, QUE BEAUCOUP RESTE À FAIRE POUR COMBATTRE TOUTES LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION ET, NOTAMMENT, LES PLUS PERNICIEUSES D'ENTRE ELLES QUI PRÉOCCUPENT SI VIVEMENT CETTE ASSEMBLÉE.

LA DÉCENNIE DE MOBILISATION CONTRE LE RACISME ET LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE A ÉTÉ PROCLAMÉE PAR L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE LE 10 DÉCEMBRE 1973. ELLE AVAIT POUR BUT DE PROMOUVOIR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET LES LIBERTÉS FONDAMENTALES POUR TOUS : D'ÉLIMINER LES POLITIQUES RACISTES QUI SUBSISTENT ET D'EMPÊCHER LA FORMATION D'ALLIANCES FONDÉES SUR L'ADHÉSION COMMUNE AUX PRINCIPES DU RACISME ET DE LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE ; DE S'OPPOSER À TOUTES POLITIQUES ET PRATIQUES ABOUTISSANT AU RENFORCEMENT DES RÉGIMES RACISTES ET CONTRIBUANT AU MAINTIEN DU RACISME ET DE LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE ; DE DÉCELER, DE DÉGAGER ET DE DÉNONCER LES CROYANCES FALLACIEUSES QUI CONTRIBUENT AU RACISME ET À LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE ; ET DE METTRE FIN AUX RÉGIMES RACISTES.

DANS CE BUT, L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DEMANDAIT QUE L'ON PRENNE LES MESURES PROPRES À ASSURER LE SOUTIEN DE TOUS LES PEUPLES MILITANT EN FAVEUR DE L'ÉGALITÉ RACIALE ET QUE L'ON MÈNE AVEC VIGUEUR UNE CAMPAGNE MONDIALE D'INFORMATION VISANT À DISSIPER LES PRÉJUGÉS RACIAUX, À ÉCLAIRER L'OPINION PUBLIQUE MONDIALE ET À L'ASSOCIER AU COMBAT CONTRE LE RACISME ET LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE. L'ACCENT ÉTAIT MIS, PLUS PARTICULIÈREMENT, SUR LA PLEINE PARTICIPATION DES FEMMES À LA FORMULATION ET À LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE CES MESURES ET SUR L'ÉDUCATION DES JEUNES DANS LE RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DES LIBERTÉS FONDAMENTALES ET DANS LA RECONNAISSANCE DE LA DIGNITÉ ET DE LA VALEUR DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE.

NUL DOUTE QUE LA DÉCENNIE AIT CONTRIBUÉ AUX PROGRÈS RÉALISÉS DANS CE DOMAINE. IL EXISTE, AUJOURD'HUI, DANS LE MONDE, UNE CONSCIENCE PLUS AIGUË DES PROBLÈMES DU RACISME ET DE LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE, AUSSI BIEN SUR UN PLAN GÉNÉRAL QUE DANS TELLE OU TELLE SOCIÉTÉ. IL EXISTE UNE MEILLEURE COMPRÉHENSION DE LA NATURE DU PHÉNOMÈNE DONT NOUS TRAITONS, ET DES MÉTHODES ET MOYENS QUI PERMETTENT DE S'Y ATTAQUER. DANS LE CADRE DE LA DÉCENNIE, RÉUNIONS ET ÉTUDES ONT FOURNI L'OCCASION D'ANALYSER LES CAUSES DU RACISME TELLES QUE L'IGNORANCE, LA SUPERSTITION, LA PEUR OU L'ETHNOCENTRISME. ON A DÉCOUVERT QUE LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE AVAIT DE PROFONDES RACINES ÉCONOMIQUES. L'EXPLOITATION ÉCONOMIQUE DES ÊTRES HUMAINS ET LES SITUATIONS DE SOUS-DÉVELOPPEMENT SONT D'IMPORTANTES FACTEURS DE RACISME ET DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE DANS LE MONDE. JE VOUDRAIS INSISTER SUR CE POINT CAR J'AI LA FERME CONVICTION QUE, POUR PARVENIR À ÉLIMINER LE RACISME ET LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE, IL FAUT NOUS ATTAQUER AUX RACINES DU MAL. IL FAUT QUE LES PROGRAMMES D'ÉDUCATION ET D'INFORMATION SE POURSUIVENT ET QUE LES VICTIMES DE PRÉJUGÉS ET DE DISCRIMINATIONS SOIENT INSTRUITES DES DROITS QUE LEUR CONFÈRENT LA CHARTE, LA DÉCLARATION UNIVERSELLE ET LES AUTRES PACTES ET CONVENTIONS NORMATIFS ADOPTÉS PAR LES NATIONS UNIES. IL FAUT QUE LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE CONTINUE AFIN QUE RÉGRESSENT LA PAUVRETÉ ET LES INÉGALITÉS DE RESSOURCES.

AU COURS DE LA DÉCENNIE, NOUS AVONS MULTIPLIÉ LES ÉCHANGES INTERNATIONAUX PORTANT SUR L'EXPÉRIENCE DES MÉTHODES DE COMBAT CONTRE LE RACISME ET LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE. DES INSTITUTIONS D'UN TYPE NOUVEAU ONT ÉTÉ CRÉÉES DANS CERTAINS PAYS, TELLES QUE LES COMMISSIONS DES RELATIONS RACIALES, LES COMMISSIONS DES RELATIONS COMMUNAUTAIRES ET LES COMMISSIONS DES DROITS DE L'HOMME QUI SE CONSACRENT À FAIRE RÉGNER L'HARMONIE SOCIALE ET RACIALE ENTRE LES DIFFÉRENTS GROUPES DE POPULATION.

LES ACTIONS CONDUITES EN APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ÉLIMINATION DE TOUTES LES FORMES DE DISCRIMINATION RACIALE QUI EST, AUJOURD'HUI, L'UN DES INSTRUMENTS DES NATIONS UNIES AYANT RECU LE PLUS GRAND NOMBRE DE RATIFICATIONS, CONSTITUENT ÉGALEMENT UNE OEUVRE IMPORTANTE DE LA DÉCENNIE. LE COMITÉ POUR L'ÉLIMINATION DE LA DISCRIMINATION RACIALE INSTITUÉ PAR LA CONVENTION A OUVERT UN CHAMP ENTIÈREMENT NOUVEAU À LA COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DESTINÉE À AIDER LES GOUVERNEMENTS À TRAITER DES PROBLÈMES QUI PEUVENT SE POSER DANS CE DOMAINE.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

WHILE RECOGNIZING THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE, WE MUST NEVERTHELESS FACE THE FACT AS THE DECADE NEARS ITS END THAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ARE STILL FAR FROM ERADICATED. THERE ARE OVERT SITUATIONS OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION SUCH AS "APARTHEID" WHICH DENIES TO AN ENTIRE PEOPLE ITS BIRTHRIGHT AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE CONTINUANCE OF THIS PRACTICE CASTS AN OBSCENE SHADOW ON HUMANITY AS A WHOLE.

IN A WORLD SUBJECT TO WIDESPREAD POVERTY, RECURRENT ECONOMIC CRISES, AND UNEQUAL ACCESS TO RESOURCES, RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CAN TAKE OVERT FORMS AS POPULATION GROUPS SEEK ECONOMIC DOMINANCE OVER MINORITY ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY ALIEN COMMUNITIES. IN SUCH SITUATIONS, GOVERNMENTS HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROMOTE HARMONY AMONG THE DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES PRESENT IN A NATIONAL SOCIETY.

GROUPS SUCH AS MIGRANT WORKERS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ARE PRONE TO BE VICTIMS OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND SPECIAL PROTECTION IS CALLED FOR ON THEIR BEHALF. SIMILARLY, VULNERABLE GROUPS OF SOCIETY SUCH AS WOMEN, CHILDREN, THE DISABLED AND THE AGED OFTEN EXPERIENCE DISCRIMINATION AKIN TO DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF RACE.

CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE THEREFORE REQUIRED TO PROTECT SUCH GROUPS AND TO PROMOTE THEIR ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN FULL EQUALITY. WE MUST RECOGNIZE IN ALL HONESTY, TOO, THAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION PERSIST IN MANY SOCIETIES IN COVERT AND SUBTLER FORMS AND CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH SUCH PROBLEMS.

EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

THIS CONFERENCE HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY. IT IS YOUR TASK TO EXAMINE THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS TODAY AND TO CHART A COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE GOALS OF THE DECADE. THIS IS A CHARGE THE IMPORTANCE OF WHICH CANNOT BE OVER-STATED. WE MUST BE RELENTLESS IN OUR STRUGGLES TO ERADICATE RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNIVERSALLY. WE MUST KEEP THE MAIN GOALS AT THE FOREFRONT OF OUR MINDS AND DEVELOP REALISTIC PROGRAMMES OF ACTION WHICH CAN ADDRESS PROBLEMS CONCRETELY. WE MUST ENGAGE THE ENORMOUS POTENTIAL OF THE MEDIA. WE MUST DRAW ON THE FRESHNESS OF YOUTH, THE SPECIAL INSIGHTS THAT WOMEN CAN BRING. WE MUST MAKE FULL AND IMAGINATIVE USE OF THE ENERGY AND COMMITMENT OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE GLOBAL POPULATION.

EACH OF US, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES, SHOULD CONSIDER THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMISSIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS OR RACE RELATIONS COMMISSIONS TO PROMOTE COMMUNAL HARMONY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE.

THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR ITS PART, MUST PERSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATE PROCLAIMED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ALL HUMAN BEINGS ARE BORN FREE AND EQUAL IN DIGNITY AND RIGHTS. WE MUST STRIVE TO MAKE THIS ABSOLUTELY FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPT A LIVING REALITY IN EVERY PART OF THE WORLD. I WOULD URGE THAT STATES WHICH HAVE NOT YET RATIFIED THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION SHOULD GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO EARLY ACTION. I EARNESTLY RECOMMEND THAT THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BE CARRIED OUT IN RECOGNITION THAT THE COMMON OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO ACCUSE BUT TO CORRECT.

WE SHOULD DEVELOP FURTHER EXCHANGES OF NATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. PERHAPS FOLLOWING ON THE SERIES OF REGIONAL MEETINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DECADE IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD, WE SHOULD NOW GO A STAGE FURTHER AND DEVELOP TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND RACE RELATIONS PERSONNEL. THESE ARE JUST A FEW THOUGHTS AMONG THE MANY WHICH COULD BE MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT AS A RESULT OF YOUR DELIBERATIONS YOU WILL BE ABLE AT THE END OF THIS CONFERENCE TO IDENTIFY PRACTICAL AREAS AND FORMS OF ACTION WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE TANGIBLY TOWARDS ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN THE WORLD AND THEREBY MATERIALLY IMPROVING THE HUMAN CONDITION EVERYWHERE.

NOW, RECALLING AS A CHALLENGE TO US ALL THE ADMONITION OF THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION THAT ALL HUMAN BEINGS ARE ENDOWED WITH REASON
AND CONSCIENCE AND SHOULD ACT TOWARDS ONE ANOTHER IN A SPIRIT OF
BROTHERHOOD, I DECLARE OPEN THIS SECOND WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT
RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.

TOAST FOR THE LUNCHEON HOSTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE OCCASION OF
THE SECOND WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
HELD IN GENEVA, 2 AUGUST 1983

MR. PRESIDENT. EXCELLENCIES.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

ON THIS IMPORTANT OCCASION, IT IS INDEED A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO
SHARE THIS MEAL WITH YOU.

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SECOND WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT
RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IS AN EVENT OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE IN
THE ANNALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. MORE THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE ISSUE,
THE QUESTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BRINGS INTO SHARP RELIEF THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS.

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I ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND I DEPLORE THAT, ALTHOUGH THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS
UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED, RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION REMAIN A CONTINUING
PART OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD.

RACISM IS A NEGATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND AN AFFRONT TO THE DIGNITY OF MANKIND. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO
CONDEMN IT VERBALLY. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL, MUST HARMONIZE THEIR
EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE IT RADICALLY. RACISM AND RACIST POLICIES ARE A
SERIOUS HINDRANCE TO GENUINE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND HAVE LONG BEEN
ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT. ONLY THE CONTINUED EFFORTS OF ALL NATIONS AND
PEOPLES WILL LEAD TO THEIR TOTAL ERADICATION.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT NOT ONLY HUMAN DIGNITY, BUT THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE ARE THREATENED BY THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF RACISM IN THE WORLD. I PERSONALLY CONSIDER THIS ISSUE ONE OF THE THREE GREATEST URGENCIES FOR HUMAN SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. THE OTHER TWO ARE TO PUT AN END TO THE ARMS RACE AND TO BRING ABOUT EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SO THAT THE RESOURCES OF THE DEVELOPED AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN BECOME MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE.

THE SOLUTIONS OF ALL THESE ISSUES REQUIRE THAT WE RECAPTURE THE VISION WHICH PROMPTED THE FORMULATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. NONE OF US, OF COURSE, ENVISIONS QUICK SOLUTIONS TO ALL OUR PROBLEMS. BUT WHAT WE NEED IS A NEW BEGINNING IN A MORE HOPEFUL DIRECTION. I AM THEREFORE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL EXPLORE ALL AVENUES TO PROMOTE THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOU, AMBASSADOR CHARRY-SAMPER, MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THIS IMPORTANT CONFERENCE. THE CONFERENCE WILL CERTAINLY BENEFIT FROM YOUR TALENT, EXPERIENCE AND COMPETENCE.

I WOULD LIKE ALSO TO COMMEND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL JAMES JONAH, TOGETHER WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, ON THEIR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS SECOND WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. I AM SURE THAT THE TIME AND ENERGY THEY HAVE DEVOTED TO THIS CONFERENCE WILL MAKE IT AN EVENT OF LASTING SIGNIFICANCE.

MAY I ALSO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION TO ALL THOSE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WORKED SO DILIGENTLY BEHIND THE SCENES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SMOOTH AND EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THIS CONFERENCE. THIS APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THOSE HERE, BUT ALSO TO THEIR MANY COLLEAGUES ELSEWHERE WHO DESERVE GREAT CREDIT FOR THEIR WORK.

MR. PRESIDENT, EXCELLENCIES,

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

THIS CONFERENCE HAS RAISED HOPES WHICH CANNOT BE DISAPPOINTED. IT WILL CONTRIBUTE IN A MAJOR WAY TO THE REALIZATION OF THESE HOPES, AND THIS IS THE OUTCOME WHICH I WISH WITH ALL MY HEART.

MAY I NOW INVITE YOU TO JOIN ME IN A TOAST TO THE FULL SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE.

UNITED NATIONS

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



NATIONS UNIES

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

RECEIVED

JUL 8 1983

TO: The Secretary-General

DATE: 8 July 1983

REFERENCE: _____

THROUGH:
S/C DE:FROM:
DE:

James O. C. Jonah *J. O. C. Jonah*
Secretary-General for the Second World
Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination

SUBJECT:
OBJET:

Second World Conference to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination

As I leave for my vacation, I would very much like to bring you up to date on the preparation for the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Regrettably, despite your own efforts, the Nordic countries were unable to produce a candidate for the presidency of the Conference. Following further consultations with the other regional groups, an approach was made to the Latin American Group with a request that they provide a candidate for the presidency. I have now been informed by the Chairman of the Latin American Group for the month of June, Ambassador Zumbado Jiménez of Costa Rica, that Colombia was being requested to produce a president. In this connexion, he stated that, subject to the completion of his consultations, the name of the candidate might well be Ambassador Charry-Samper, who is currently the Ambassador of Colombia in Geneva. I may also add that he is highly regarded by his Latin American colleagues. Indications have already been given to the other regional groups that Colombia may designate the President of the Conference.

With respect to the other members of the Bureau, I have exchanged views with the regional groups on the proposal of the Socialist countries that the two committees of the Conference be chaired by nominees from the WEOG Group and the Socialist Group. Thus far, no objection has been voiced to this proposal. However, we have not yet reached agreement on which group will chair what committee. I have proposed that we should reach final agreement on this matter at the latest by 15 July. Furthermore, in my meeting with the Asian Group, I proposed that the Group should nominate the Rapporteur General for the Conference. In addition, each regional group will be required to nominate two candidates for the ten vice-presidents of the Conference. Once we have reached agreement on these main offices of the Conference, there will be no difficulty in designating the vice-chairmen and rapporteurs of the two committees.

As I previously indicated, at the conclusion of my vacation I plan to depart for Geneva on the evening of 26 July. This would give me ample time on 28 and 29 July to round up arrangements in Geneva with Dr. Kurt Herndl, head of the Centre for Human Rights and others concerned with the planning of the Conference.


I previously discussed with your Chef de Cabinet about your own plans for attendance at the Conference. Accordingly, on the assumption that you will be in Geneva on Tuesday, 2 August, we would be grateful if you could be at a luncheon being arranged that day for members of the Bureau of the Conference. If it is possible for you to do so, I know this would be highly appreciated by all.

I am attaching a draft of your statement for the Conference.

Note à l'attention du Secrétaire général

Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination

1. La conférence se tiendra du 1er au 12 août 1983 à Genève.
2. Selon les informations que j'ai pu obtenir du Bureau de M. Jonah, actuellement en congé, cette conférence est la deuxième du genre : la première ayant eu lieu également à Genève en août 1973.
3. La plupart des pays seront représentés par des délégués au rang d'Ambassadeur . Quelques pays comme le Sri Lanka ou l'Allemagne de l'Est seront représentés au niveau ministériel.
4. Le Secrétaire général Kurt Waldheim a inauguré la séance d'ouverture de la première conférence.
5. M. Jonah compte sur votre présence à l'ouverture de la Conférence et non pour la durée de la réunion.


Issa Diallo/JH
Le 12 juillet 1983

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
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1. The purpose of the Commission is to enhance public awareness of important humanitarian issues; to promote international climate favouring progress in the humanitarian field; to review, where necessary, existing instruments and mechanisms relating to humanitarian issues and to make recommendations for furtherance of solutions to humanitarian problems.
2. The Commission is an independent body whose members participate in their personal capacity and not as representatives of governments or international bodies to which they may belong.
3. The work of the Commission is not intended to interfere with governmental negotiations or inter-State relations nor to duplicate work being done by existing governmental or non-governmental international bodies.
4. The Commission is to carry out its deliberations and reach conclusions in a purely humanitarian and non-political context.
5. The Commission is free to determine its own programme of work and fields of study. It may invite eminent persons or recognized bodies to share the benefit of their experience with the Commission. It may, as appropriate, visit countries at their invitation or seek views of world leaders on issues under discussion.
6. The Commission's discussions shall take place in an open and frank atmosphere, without undue public exposure and without giving its meetings the character of official conferences. Both written and oral presentations may be made to the Commission. Their eventual use, for purposes of the Commission's report or related publications, will be determined in close consultation with the person(s) submitting them.
7. In furthering the purpose of the Commission, it may, in the first place, direct its efforts to the following:
 - (i) Promotion of a "New International Humanitarian Order" in the general context of the pertinent UN General Assembly Resolution and related UN documents.

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- (ii) Review of existing problems and solutions relating to situations of refugees and displaced persons; phenomena of mass exodus and demographic movements.
- (iii) Examination of various aspects of manpower movements North/South and South/South; brain drain and related issues
- (iv) Identification of shortcomings in the existing body of International Humanitarian Law and practice relating to war and peace.
- (v) Review of methods and means for promoting protection of human rights and for improving the 'quality of life'.
- (vi) Enquiry into ways and means to further strengthen, where necessary, international humanitarian institutions and their activities.

Le 28 juillet 1983

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre du 22 juillet 1983 et j'ai le plaisir de vous informer que des instructions ont été communiquées à Genève pour que S.E. M. Koreissi présente ses lettres de créances.

M, l'Ambassadeur Koreissi se trouverait actuellement à Genève. Etant donné que le Secrétaire général sera lui-même présent à Genève du 1er au 2 août courant, la cérémonie pourrait avoir lieu au cours de cette période.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Le Directeur de Cabinet,

Emilio de Olivares

Son Excellence
M. Seydou Traore
Représentant permanent de la République
du Mali auprès de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies
New York