MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS

3 DEC 1993 - 4 SEPT 1994

DEPUTY CHIEF OPERATION OFFICER

[1 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

[3 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

DUTY ROSTER FOR FORCE HQ OPS ROOM DUTY OFFICERS
PERIOD COVERING FROM 28 AUG 94 TO 04 SEP 94

DATE	0730 - 1930	1930 - 0730	STANDBY
28 AUG 94	CAPT NANI	MAJ KAMAL	CAPT ANDERSEN
29 AUG 94	MAJ NDLOVU	CAPT ANDERSEN	CAPT NANI
30 AUG 94	MAJ KAMAL	CAPT NANI	MAJ NDLOVU
31 AUG 94	CAPT ANDERSEN	MAJ NDLOVU	MAJ KAMAL
01 SEP 94	CAPT NANI	MAJ KAMAL	CAPT ANDERSEN
02 SEP 94	MAJ NDLOVU	CAPT ANDERSEN	CAPT NANI
03 SEP 94	MAJ KAMAL	CAPT NANI	MAJ NDLOVU
04 SEP 94	CAPT ANDERSEN	MAJ NDLOVU	MAJ KAMAL

A. THIS ROSTER IS SUBJECT TO CHANGES AT ANY TIME BY THE COO.

B. STAND BY DUTY OFFICER WILL REPORT FOR DUTY FROM 0900-1230 HRS AND 1500-2000 HRS.

C. OFFICERS NOT ON DUTY WILL SEEK PERMISSION FROM COO OR DCOO BEFORE MOVING OUT.

D. TEL NO OF OPS BRANCH OFFICERS ARE:

(1) COL ARP (COO) - BELGIC VILLAGE.
(2) LT COL YELLA (DCOO) - "
(3) MAJ NAZMUL (SDO) - 1213.
(4) MAJ KASAMALE (SDO) - HOTEL MERIDIEN ROOM-204
(5) MAJ ALBERT (SDO) - BELGIC VILLAGE.
(6) MAJ KAMAL (DO) - HOTEL MERIDIEN ROOM-214.
(7) MAJ NDLOVU (DO) - " 205.
(8) CAPT NANI (DO) - " 113.
(9) CAPT ACHEAMPONG (DO) - " 106.
(10) CAPT ANDERSON (DO) - BELGIC VILLAGE.

Date: Aug 94

A P YELLA
LT COL
DCOO

3000.2(DCOO)

31

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

22 Apr 94

3000.2(DCOO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **LOCATION AND EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES**

1. Please find below the tasks for today on the above subject:

a. A woman who suffered a knife injury is to be evacuated from the CND Complex as soon as possible. The necessary coordination and negotiations have been completed. Contact point is Mr Seth Sendashonga of the RPF. Ambulance and doctor to accompany patient to airport.

b. A woman named Ceille Mukarubunga and kids at Hotel Milles Collins (Rwandese). Necessary coordination has already been done with the RGF.

c. 3 nuns at 17 Kiyouva Ave.

d. Two Tanzanian Embassy Staff stranded at the Tanzanian Ambassadors residence. The two to be evacuated to Force HQ for them to give the DCOO information on about 260 Tanzanian refugees in hiding for a mass evacuation to be arranged.

e. Mr Gassana family (Rwandese). Check King Faisal or Meridien for one member of the family whose name appears on the compiled list of refugees. If found to be brought to DCOO.

f. Ms Amelia Barberi, Director of Muhura Orphanage declined expatriation earlier. Italian Govt would like her offered another chance. RPF Sector to be tasked to do this. Escort required for her through GATUNA.

g. A Russian woman at King Faisal Hospital. Contact to be made with her and particulars obtained for arrangements to be made for the Russian Embassy in Nairobi to arranged visa for her husband.

2. Please ensure that these tasks are completed by 221800 Apr 94. Your cooperation on this will be greatly appreciated.

E C QUIST
Maj
For Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MILOB GP HQ

Information:

Internal:

A/MA to FC

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

22 Apr 94

3000.2(DCOO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **LOCATION AND EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES**

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a. A woman who suffered a knife injury is to be evacuated from the CND Complex as soon as possible. The necessary coordination and negotiations have been completed. Contact point is Mr Seth Sendashonga of the RPF. Ambulance and doctor to accompany patient to airport.

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E C QUIST Maj
Maj
For Force Commander

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

15 Apr 94

3000.2(DCOO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **CEASE FIRE MEETINGS BETWEEN UNAMIR, RGF AND RPF - MERIDIEN HOTEL**

1. In order to discuss the possible cease fire between the warring RGF and RPF, UNAMIR with organize confidential meetings at the MERIDIEN HOTEL.

2. As the MERIDIEN HOTEL actually is in the area controlled by RPF, free movement of their leadership is essentially guaranteed. The Representatives of RGF on the other hand need special escorts of UNAMIR.

3. **Procedure**. The overall commander of this operation is the Senior UNMO of Lt Col rank minimum:

a. Kigali Sector to provide:

(1) One armed escort (RUTBAT rifle platoon).

(2) Two BTR 80 APC.

(3) Both have to report to Force HQ on call for their tasking.

b. MILOB HQ to provide four UNMO Teams:

(1) Team 1: Senior UNMO and overall mission commander.

(2) Team 2: Escort team and RGF escort lead.

(3) Team 3: Escort team and RPF escort lead.

(4) Team 4: Security team, to control the access to MERIDIEN HOTEL between forward positions of RPF and the meeting place, making sure that no ambush or other aggression against the RGF convoy is intended by RPF troops or any other element. This control has to be executed before and after the meeting.

c. Force HQ to contact: (F-3)

(1) F-9 A(LO at Army HQ): He will gather the RGF representatives by the time that the escort arrives at the RGF Army Headquarters or the designated pick up point.

(2) CL-1(LO at RPF HQ, CND): He is to ensure that RPF agrees with the movement of the escort through their lines and that cease fire action is taken along the route.

(3) KT-9 (Tunisian Coy Comd): He will deploy a complete platoon in all round defence at MERIDIEN. Another section will ensure security of the entrance, corridors and meeting hall.

d. RUTBAT rifle platoon is to insure close security of RGF representatives in and around the APCs and inside MERIDIEN HOTEL.

e. RPF leadership to move with their own escort and an UNMO escort team. This escort will stay outside of the perimeter occupied by Tun Coy. RPF escort to be not more than two sections.

f. After the meeting, RPF will leave first with their escort, controlled by the RGF escort leader. Subsequently but no later than 30 minutes after the departure of RPF leaders, the escort will bring the RGF representatives back to their HQ.

W. BALIS
LT COL
DCOO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Kigali Sector HQ
MILOB GP HQ
Tunisian Coy

Info:

SRSG
DFC/COS
Chairman, RPA
Chief of Staff, Rwandan Army
Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO	X		
Sr Duty			
Duty Offr			
Engineer			
Info			
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination / = No need to see			

3000.2 (DCOO)

N° CT
N° CT

Filing time | Syst. | Opr n° Opr nr

Traitement spécial
Bijzondere behandeling P

(5) URGENCE/VOORRANG
(Action/Actie) P | (Info) R

Groupe date-heure
Datum-uur Groep 20 0930 Mar 94

(6) De
Van UNHQ

(7) Pour/Voor
1 RUTBAT

(8) Info
1 FHQ – F3

(10) GR

(12) Sécurité
(a) Veiligheid : UNCLAS

(12) N° expéditeur
(b) Afzenders nr

(12) (c)

BERICHT — MESSAGE

SUBJECT: GUARDPOST AT MR LANDO'S HOUSE
REF : ORDER FROM FHQ – F3 FROM 200930 MARCH 94

1. KSC TASKS RUTBAT TO FOURNISH A STATIC GUARDPOST AT MR LANDO'S HOUSE.

2. STRENGTH : THREE MEN DAY AND NIGHT.

3. REGURALY A MOBILE PAT HAS TO BE SEND TO THIS HOUSE PASSING BY LANDO'S RESTAURANT AND LANDO'S HOTEL.

4. THE MISSION HAS TO START NLT 20 1230 MARCH 94.

Page de pages
Blz van blz
1/1

Grade et nom du rédacteur :
Graad en naam van de opsteller :
Maj A. Provincial

Bureau
Bureel G3

Signature
Handtekening

Nom
Naam Provinciael

Grade
Graad Maj

Cat. Nr 0.1755 - NSN 7540-70-050-8592 - 914 Dep

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO	X		
Sr Duty			
Duty Offr			
Engineer			
Info			
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination / = No need to see			

28

UNITED NATIONS — ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Inter-office Memorandum

To: ALL COMMANDERS — File: 1000.7(DFC)/G/7

From: FORCE HQ

Info: COO
MIO

Date: 9th MARCH 1994

Subject: CRATER ANALYSIS AND FRAGMENT IDENTIFICATION

---

1. The attached document on crater analysis and fragment identification is to be reproduced and distributed to all UNMO teams as SOPs and part of their packages. It is believed portions of it can meet the Force Component requirements during investigations. It is also useful to the troops who operate in the field.

2. Training would be required to ensure they understand the package.

3. This document is provisional. An amended copy will be forwarded when received.

GK ZOWONOO
Lt Commander
For Force Commander

3000.2 (DCOO)
R-5

27

10081-1 (FAS)

Field Artillery School
Canadian Forces Base Gagetown
Cromocto, New Brunswick
E0G 2P0

18 February 1994

BGen R.A. Dallaire
Force Commander, UNAMIR
KIGALI, RWANDA

CRATER ANALYSIS AND FRAGMENT IDENTIFICATION

Reference: Fax dated 14 Feb 94

1. The Field Artillery School received your Fax requesting information on Crater Analysis. This is certainly a subject that all UN personnel should be familiar with.

2. My staff has put together the information that we hold in our Locating Artillery wing (enclosed). The information was drawn from Annexes from 307(1) Locating Artillery Employment, and Appendix A from FM 6-121 Target Acquisition (American). I hope this information will help in your efforts to observe the cease fire violations in the Demilitarized Zones. If additional information is required please do not hesitate to call/fax. Our fax number is 506-422-2794.

3. Ubique.

BW MacLeod
B.W. MacLeod
Lieutenant-Colonel
Commandant

Enclosure: 1

Romeo

I hope this will help. FD ARTY SCHOOL is REDOING the package and will forward better copy when ready.

Ubique

Bryan
Comd CTC.

CRATER ANALYSIS

1. One of the most positive methods of obtaining information about enemy weapon locations and new types of ammunition is the examination of craters and projectile fragments. This information assists in the development of countermeasures, ie, CB.

2. An examination of projectile and mortar craters may permit the identification of:

a. the bearing to the HB;

b. the position of the area being shelled;

c. determination of the angle of descent and hence the possible range of mortar rounds; and

d. collection of fragments for identification, see Annex E.

3. Crater analysis is unlikely to be viable during fluid mobile operations, but in static operations may provide useful information on enemy artillery and thus all arms should be made aware of the value of the information which may be determined.

4. The initial step in crater analysis is to locate a suitable crater for use in determining the direction to the HB. The crater should be clearly defined on the ground and should be reasonably fresh. Since the crater is the beginning point for plotting the direction to the enemy weapon, the grid coordinates of the crater should be determined as precisely as time and the method used will allow. The direction of the firing weapon must be determined (using one of the methods described below) and projectile fragments must be collected for use in identifying the type and calibre of the weapon.

5. Fuze Quick Craters (Artillery). The detonation of a projectile causes an inner crater. The burst and momentum of the projectile carry the effect forward and to the sides, forming an arrow which points to the rear (toward the weapon from which the round was fired). The fuze continues along the line of flight, creating a fuze furrow. There are two methods of obtaining a direction of a hostile weapon from this type of crater. The best results are obtained by using both methods:

a. Fuze Tunnel and Centre of Crater Method. In the fuze tunnel and centre of crater method, one stake is placed in the centre of the crater and another is placed in the furrow at the point where the fuze was blown forward to the front of the crater, see Figure F-1. A direction measuring instrument is set up in line with the two stakes and the direction measured to the hostile weapon. A variation of this method is to place a stake where the projectile entered the ground, instead of in the centre of the crater, and determine the direction in the same manner. This is rarely possible, however, since indications of the point of entry are usually destroyed by the explosion of the projectile. The five steps of the fuze tunnel and centre of crater method are -

(1) place a stake in the centre of the crater,

(2) place a second stake in the fuze furrow,

(3) set up a direction measuring instrument in line with the stakes and away from fragments,

(4) orient the instrument, and

(5) measure the direction to the HB.



Figure F-1 Fuze Tunnel and Center of Crater Method.

b. Side Spray Method. Another method used to measure the direction to a hostile weapon is to bisect the angle formed by the lines of side spray by striking an arc, see Figure F-2. The five steps in measuring the direction of a fuze quick crater by the side spray method are -

(1) place a stake in the center of the crater,

(2) place two stakes, one at the end of each line of side spray, equidistant from the centre stake,

(3) hold a length of wire to each side spray, stake and strike an arc forward of the fuze furrow,

(4) place a stake where these arcs intersect,

(5) set up a direction measuring instrument in line with the stake and the center stake,

(6) orient the instrument, and

(7) measure the direction to the HB.



Figure F-2 Side Spray Method

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SIDE SPRAY METHOD - COMPASS OPTION

1. A SECOND METHOD AVAL FOR DETERMINING THE BEARING TO THE HOSTILE WPN IS TO EMPLOY A COMPASS. FIGURE F-1A HIGHLIGHTS THE PROCEDURE. THE FOL STEPS ARE TO BE FOL:

a. BEARINGS ARE TAKEN FROM B TO A AND FROM B TO C ALONG THE SIDE SPRAY OR WINGS, AND THE FOL CALCULATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT;

(1) MAG BEARING B TO A ... 900 MILS

(2) MAG BEARING B TO C ... 4900 MILS

(3) ANGLE ABC (1-2 + 6400 MILS IF REQR) ... 2400 MILS

(4) MAG BEARING LINE OF FIRE = 4900 + 2400/2 ... 6100 MILS

(5) MAG BEARING TO HOSTILE BTY
6100 +/- 3200 ... 2900 MILS

(6) **GRID BEARING TO HB 2900 + MV AND COMPASS ERROR**

2. THIS METHOD CAN BE EMPLOYED WHEN TIME IS SHORT OR THE TACTICAL SITUATION WILL NOT PERMIT THE MORE DELIBERATE SIDE SPRAY METHOD OUTLINED ON PAGE F-3 AND FIG F-1.

5/22



FIGURE 1-A

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6. Fuze Delay Craters (Artillery). There are two types of fuze delay craters - ricochet and mine action:

a. Ricochet. The projectile enters the ground in a line following the trajectory and continues in a straight line for a few feet, causing a ricochet furrow. The projectile normally deflects upward and at the same time, changes direction. The change of direction usually is to the right as the result of the rotation of the projectile. The effect of the airburst can be noted on the ground, see Figure F-3. Directions obtained from ricochet craters are considerd to be most reliable. The five steps required to determine direction from a ricochet furrow are -

(1) clean out the furrow,

(2) place stakes at each end of a useable straight section of the furrow,

(3) set up an instrument in line with the stakes and away from fragments,

(4) orient the instrument, and

(5) measure the direction to the HB.

b. Mine Action. Mine action occurs when a projectile bursts beneath the ground. Occasionally, such a burst will leave a furrow which can be analyzed in the same manner as the ricochet furrow. A mine action crater which does not have a furrow cannot be used to determine the direction to the weapon.



Figure F-3 Ricochet Furrow Method

7. Mortar Shell Craters. In a typical mortar crater, the turf at the forward edge (the direction away from the hostile mortar) is undercut. The rear edge of the crater is shorn of vegetation and grooved by splinters, see Figure F-4. When fresh, the crater is covered with loose earth which must be carefully removed to disclose the firm, burnt inner crater. The ground surrounding the crater is streaked by splinter grooves which radiate from the point of detonation. The ends of the splinter grooves on the rearward side are on an approximately straight line. This line is perpendicular to the line of flight when on level ground or on slopes with contours perpendicular to the plane of fire, see Figure F-5. A fuze tunnel is caused by the fuze burying itself at the bottom of the inner crater in front of the point of detonation. Three methods may be used to determine direction from a mortar shell crater - main axis, splinter grove and fuze tunnel:

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a. Main Axis Method. The four steps used to determine direction by the main axis method when a definite and regular crater is formed are, see Figure F-4 -

(1) lay a stake along the main axis of the crater, dividing the crater into symmetrical halves - the stake points in the direction of the mortar,

(2) set up an instrument in line with the stake and away from fragments,

(3) orient the instrument, and

(4) measure the direction to the HB.



Figure F-4 Main Axis Method

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b. Splinter Groove Method. The five steps used to determine direction by the splinter groove method are, see Figure F-5 -

(1) lay a stake along the ends of the splinter grooves which extend from the crater,

(2) lay a second stake perpendicular to the first stake through the axis of the fuze tunnel,

(3) set up an instrument in line with the second stake and away from fragments,

(4) orient the instrument, and

(5) measure the direction of the HB.



Figure F-5 Splinter Groove Method

c. Fuze Tunnel Method. The four steps used to determine direction by the fuze tunnel method are, see Figure F-6

(1) place a stake in the fuze tunnel,

(2) set up an instrument in line with the stake and away from fragments,

(3) orient the instrument, and

(4) measure the direction to the HB.



Figure F-6 Fuze Tunnel Method.

6. When examing craters, no attempt should be made to remove fragments until the bearing has been determined. Bearings and other information should be reported by the quickest means to the artillery intelligence office using the BOMBREP/MORTREP/SHELREP format.

11/22

1. **MOR BOMB CRATERS - ANGLE OF DESCENT.** THE FOLLOWING DETAILS WILL ASSIST WITH DETERMINING THE ANGLE OF DESCENT:

a. IF THE ANGLE OF DESCENT IS VERY STEEP, THE SPLINTER PATTERN GIVES LITTLE INDICATION OF THE BEARING OF FIRE, AND THE CRATER WILL BE ALMOST ROUND. IF THE ANGLE OF DESCENT IS COMPARATIVELY SMALL THE CRATER WILL BE PEAR SHAPED, AND AN INDCIATION OF THE DIRECTION OF THE MORTAR IS GIVEN BY THE LONGEST AXIS OF THE CRATER.

b. AN ANGLE OF DESCENT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM A MORTAR BOMB CRATER DUE TO THE FACT THAT FUZE AND FINS FOL EA OTHER INTO THE EARTH AT THE FRONT END OF THE CRATER, FORMING A TUNNEL OF WHICH THE AXIS IS IDENTICAL WITH THE TRAJECTORY AT THE MOMENT OF IMPACT. THIS IS ILLUSTATRATED BY THE SIDE VIEW OF A CRATER SHOWN IN FIG F-6. THE FOL PTS SHOULD BE NOTED;

(1) THE EDGE FARTHEST FROM THE MORTAR HAS TURF UNDERCUT, WHILE THE NEARER EDGE IS SHORN OF GROWTH, AND VERY MUCH SERRATED BY SPLINTER GROOVES.

(2) WHEN FRESH, THE CRATER IS COVERED WITH LOOSE EARTH WHICH, WHEN CLEARED, DISCLOSES THE FIRM INNER CRATER **A**. THIS SHOWS SIGNS OF BURNING.

(3) THE FINS AND FUZE ARE BURIED IN THE TUNNEL **B**, OFTEN AT A CONSIDERABLE DEPTH. THE TUNNEL IS FULL OF SOFT EARTH, BUT ITS SIDES CAN EASILY BE FELT WHEN REMOVING THE SOFT EARTH BY HAND.

(4) TO FIND THE ANGLE OF DESCENT, A PEG IS DRIVEN INTO THE CENTRE OF THE FIRM INNER CRATER **A** UNTIL THE TOP OF THE PEG REPRESENTS THE PT OF DETONATION. THE ENTRANCE TO THE TUNNEL IS CAREFULLY CLEARED OF LOOSE EARTH AND A STICK INSERTED IN THE CENTRE OF THE TUNNEL AS IN FIG F-7. THE ANGLE OF DESCENT IS MEASURED WITH A PROTRACTOR AND PLUMB BOB. IN SOME CASES THE INNER CRATER MAY BE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY. IF THIS IS SO THE STICK SHOULD BE INSERTED AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE DOWN THE AXIS OF THE TUNNEL. THE BEARING OF THIS STICK WILL ALSO GIVE AN INDICATION OF THE DIRECTION OF THE MORTAR.



FIGURE F-6

Finding Angle of Descent



FIGURE F-7

FRAGMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. In conjunction with crater analysis, when possible, fragment identification is carried out to determine the calibre of the projectile and, hence, often the equipment from which it came. This can be determined from a visual or dimensional analysis of the fragment. Artillery intelligence staffs may identify the calibre of the projectile from any fragment displaying an undistorted segment of the circumference of the round. This segment should be at least 2 centimetres in size for the analysis to be accurate.

2. Generally speaking, the easiest method to identify projectile fragments is by examining or measuring the rotating band, or rotating band seat, however, other portions from between the bourrelet and band are acceptable if large enough. Such fragments are generally available only after low order burst, ie, explosive filler not completely detonating. Fragments from high order bursts are generally small and useless, unless they include a portion of the rotating band or rotating band seat. These sections will positively identify the projectile, as each projectile has its own distinctive band markings, see Figure 1.



Figure E-1 Soviet 122mm (Left) and 152mm (Right) Rotating Band Markings

3. Undistorted fragments can be measured with reasonable accuracy using a template. This is a sheet of thin metal or other material having arcs of a known radius cut in it. The various projectile fragments are presented to the cut areas to determine which fits. Actual size templates are shown at Figures E-2 and E-3.



Figure E-2 Curvature Template Soviet Equipments



Figure E-3 Curvature Template NATO Equipments

4. In certain instances it may be possible to measure fragments directly to determine calibre of the projectile:

a. The tail fins of mortar rounds may be measured to determine the calibre of the mortar.



Figure E-4 Mortar Calibre by Measurement of Tail Fins

b. The diameter (calibre) of the projectile may be measured if very large fragments are found.



Figure E-5 Determination of Calibre by Measurement

5. Fragments showing 5 centimetres of the undistorted circumference of a projectile can be measured by geometric construction. This method requires careful draughtmanship and is normally attempted only if a suitable template is not available:

a. Select and mark three points on the projectile. They are labelled A, B and C and must be on a straight line around the circumference of the projectile, see Figure E-6.



Figure E-6 Fragment Showing Points A, B and C

b. The triangle ABC is now constructed -

(1) Measure the distance AC with a compass and transfer it to a piece of paper, marking A and C.

(2) Measure the distance AB and strike an arc from A on the paper at the distance, see Figure E-7.



Figure E-7 Line AC and Arc of Radius AB

(3) Measure the distance BC with a compass and strike an arc from C, intersecting the arc of radius AB, see Figure E-8.



Figure E-8 Arc of Radius BC

(4) The point of intersection of arcs is B. Join AB and BC to form triangle ABC, see Figure E-9.



Figure E-9 Triangle ABC

c. The right bisector of AC is constructed -

(1) With the compass at A and a distance of approximately 3/4 of AC, an arc is struck above and below line AC, see Figure E-10.



Figure E-10 Arcs with Centre A

(2) With the compass at C and the same radius, draw arcs cutting arcs from A, see Figure E-11



Figure E-11 Arcs with Centre C

(3) Join the intersections to construct the right bisector of AC, see Figure E-12



Figure E-12 Right Bisector of AC

d. Construct the right bisector of AB and BC in the same manner. They will all pass through the same point. Label this point P, see Figure E-13.

e. Measure the distance in millimetres from P to A, B and C. These distances should be the same, if not, mean them. This distance equals 1/2 the calibre of the projectile.



Figure E-13 Right Bisector of Sides AB, AC and BC Forming Point P

6. A useful handbook for visual fragment identification is:
PROJECTILE FRAGMENT IDENTIFICATION GUIDE - FOREIGN
Prepard by: US ARMY, ARMY MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND, FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTRE
Code: DST-1160G-209-80



Figure 15. Determination of projectile caliber by geometric analysis of a fragment

26

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

Date : 25 Feb 94

TO: DMZ SECTOR HQ	FROM: DALLAIRE, FORCE COMD, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX NUMBER: 64168	FAX NUMBER: 250-84265
SUBJECT: **DMZ VIOLATIONS**	
INFO:	ORIGINATOR: LT COL BALIS
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING FILE COVER: TWO	

1. Please confirm the details of the document attached hereby.

2. Regards.

3000.2(DCSO)

Kigali, February 1994

General,

During recce UNAMIR has found out that the RPF defence positions have crossed into the DMZ on three specific locations:

1. Hill ridges in the area of NYABUAMBU SQ-1133, 1134 and 1535 are occupied by forward detachments of 21 Infantry Battalion.

2. Bridge at NYAGANITA SQ 2236 is occupied by a platoon of 101 Infantry Battalion.

3. The areas of RUGAZAMA SQ-2343 and GISHORO 2442 are occupied by forward troops of 7 Infantry Battalion.

The occupation of the above mentioned positions are violations of the rules of the DMZ.

You are to withdraw these troops from within the limits of the DMZ upon receipt of this formal letter of protest on the KINIHIRA and ARUSHA Peace Agreements, article ... and ... respectively.

R.A. Dallaire
Brigadier-General
Force Commander

Maj Gen Paul KAGAME
Chairman RPA High Command
Mulindi

KMF

FAX 64168 25

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

C

@ DMZ Sect Comd
Pls confirm the details Lee in ASAP.
RC
23/2

UNAMIR
FEB 23 10

Kigali, February 1994

General,

During recce UNAMIR has found out that the RPF defence positions have crossed into the DMZ on three specific locations:

1. Hill ridges in the area of NYABUAMBU SQ-1133, 1134 and 1535 are occupied by forward detachments of 21 Infantry Battalion.

2. Bridge at NYAGANITA SQ 2236 is occupied by a platoon of 101 Infantry Battalion.

3. The areas of RUGAZAMA SQ-2343 and GISHORO 2442 are occupied by forward troops of 7 Infantry Battalion.

The occupation of the above mentioned positions are violations of the rules of the DMZ.

You are ~~requested~~ d to withdraw these troops from ~~any~~ ~~positions~~ within the limits of the DMZ s~~oonest.~~ upon receipt of this formal letter of protest on a Kinihira and Arusha peace agreement, article — and — respectively.

R.A. Dallaire
Brigadier-General
Force Commander

Maj Gen Paul KAGAME
Chairman RPA High Command
Mulindi

23

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH
KIGALI

16 Feb 94

3000.2(DCOO)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **SECURITY FOR FOOD SUPPLY OPERATIONS**

1. UNAMIR food has been pilferred by ground handling staff from the airport. Similar incidents are very likely to happen in the future.

2. To resolve this situation following actions will be undertaken:

   a. Kigali Sector Comd to task KIBAT troops deployed at the airfield to provide two soldiers whilst the food is unloaded. Each flight is on the ground for about one hour.

   b. Due to constant changing of flight dates and times, it is recommended that the Chief Logistic Officer representative brief the Belgian airfield security on a daily basis.

   c. This task should commence immediately.

W. BALIS
LT COL
DCOO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Kigali Sector HQ

Internal:

Action:

Chief Logistic Officer

Info:

CGSO

3000.2(DCOO)

|| February 1994

Distribution List

SUBJECT: SUSFECTED VIOLATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT BY RPF

1. In his letter 0343/06.1.0 dated 07 Feb 94 (copy herewith) the Minister of Defence Complains about RPF troops having fired with individual weapons and MG on the RPF position at MUVUMBA and REIKOMO on 03 Jan 94.

2. Please investigate and send your comments to Force HQ, Ops Branch soonest.

3. Regards.

W. BALIS
LT COL
DCOO

Distribution List

Action:

External:

MILOB GP HQ

RPF Sector Comd

Info:

Internal:

COO

21

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
CABINET DU MINISTRE
B.P 23 KIGALI

KIGALI, le 07/02/1994
N°0343/06.1.0

①

Général Roméo A.DALLAIRE

Commandant de la MINUAR.

Objet: Violation de l'accord de paix par le FPR

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur les cas de violation de l'accord de paix par le FPR qui en date du 03 janvier 1994 a tiré aux armes individuelles et mitrailleuses sur les positions des Forces Armées Rwandaises de MUVUMBA et RUKOMO (position PARA). Ces tirs n'ont cessé qu'après une riposte proportionnelle de nos éléments.

Je demande que ces actes de provocations et de violation flagrante de l'accord de paix soient énergiquement condamnés et désapprouvés par la MINUAR.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, l'assurance de ma franche collaboration.

Le Ministre de la Défense

BIZIMANA Augustin

C.P.I:
Monsieur le ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération

(2)
DCOO
Please send a copy of letter with this letter & ask their comments. Put up ② once we have the reply.

COO
Have RPF sector comd check this out.

9/2

9/02/94

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF FC
Date 9/2/94
No 618 By JP

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

04 Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

TO: Comd Kigali Sector

SUBJECT: **UNAUTHORISED MOVEMENT OF RPF**

1. At least at two occasions armed RPF soldiers have carried out movement outside of the CND Compound, without UNAMIR escorts or UNMO's monitoring them.

2. All such movements are strictly forbidden.

3. Any attempt to further transgression as above of KWSA Instructions will be prohibited by blocking the RPF exit of the CND Compound with tracked vehicle(s).

W. BALIS
LT COL
COO

19

3000.2(DCOO)

11 February 1994

Distribution List:

SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF AMMO BY RPF IN THE DMZ

1. In his letter 19/UNAMIR/LN/SITREP/94, dated 08 Feb 94, the RPF Liasion Officer at Force HQ states that RPF troops have moved ammunition stocks from KAMINGO(B 0226) to the hill top at NYANKEKE (0122).

2. Please investigate and send your comments to Force HQ, Ops Branch.

3. Regards.

W. BALIS
LT COL
DCOO

Distribution List

Action:

External:

DMZ Sector Comd

Info:

Internal:

COO

18

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Letter out

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUN INTERIEUR

Date: 11 February 1994

Ref.: 040/GS/02/94

TO : LtCol. BALIS, DCOO

THROUGH: Per O. HALLQVIST, CAO

pp.

FROM : Stephan SETIAN, CGSO

SUBJECT : Security for Food Supply Operations

1. During the course of the first deliveries of dry food deliveries from Nairobi, the UNAMIR food was pilferred by ground handling staff from the airport. UNAMIR and Economat cannot control this situation as the goods have at that stage not been released by customs.

2. To resolve this situation and to prevent a reoccurrence of this problem it is recommended that UNAMIR utilize the services of the Belgium unit already deployed to the airfield to provide a presence whilst the food is being unloaded. It is estimate that this task will take two soldiers to perform.

3. Currently Economat have three flights per week from Nairobi of a Boeing 737, containing dry rations and one flight per week from France of an Boeing 747, containing frozen rations. Each flight is on the ground approximately one hour.

4. Flight dates and times cannot be given as the schedule is constantly changing. In lieu, it is recommended that the UNAMIR Logistic Staff Officer Food, Captain Okai, brief the Belgium airfield security on a daily basis.

5. This task should commence no later than Monday 14 February 1994. Your assistance in this matter is much appreciated.

3000.2 (DCOO)
R-2

PG1
16

Kigali le 07/02/94

Général DALLAIRE
Hotel AMAHORO
Kigali

①

Mon Général,

Dans le cadre de nos activités dans le Nord du Rwanda nous aimerions effectuer ce jeudi 10 février une mission d'évaluation des besoins de santé dans la zone FPR.
Notre coordinatrice médicale le Docteur Karolien Fonck a pris contact avec vos hommes à Ruhengeri afin d'effectuer cette mission avec eux.
Je me permets par la présente de vous demander une autorisation pour cette mission.
Les deux membres de mon équipe qui participeraient à cette mission sont le Docteur Karolien Fonck et monsieur Jacques Massart (administrateur logisticien).
Ils partiraient toute la journée.
Je vous remercie par avance de votre collaboration.
Veuillez agréez, Mon Général, mes salutations respectueuses.

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES M.S.F. BELGIQUE BP 708 1090 BRUXELLES TEL 425.03.00

Paule DELCAMBE
Chef de mission MSF/Belgique

② DCOO 8/2
CLO
Please note and ensure
CO0 8/2/94

③ COO action
FC 7/2

3050.2 (DCOO)

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF FC
Date 7/2/94
No 606 By SP

15

Note n° 3000.2/OPS/

03 Féwier 1994

DE : QG MINUAR - Branche Ops

POUR : Offr de Ln FAR - Lt Col BEM RWABALINDA

OBJET : <u>Contrôle des unités des FAR par les observateurs des Nations Unies.</u>

1. Dans le cadre général de la mission de la MINUAR ainsi que, plus spécifiquement, de l'établissement de la zone de consignation d'armes de Kigali (KWSA), des observateurs de l'ONU ont la mission d'effectuer des contrôles dans les unités casernées ou déployées dans la totalité du secteur des FAR.

2. Certains observateurs nous signalent un manque de coopération de la part d'un nombre de Chefs de Corps ou de Commandants de Quartier.

3. Il vous est demandé de bien vouloir intervenir auprès de tous les responsables concernés, pour permettre aux observateurs d'accomplir normalement les tâches de contrôle qui leur sont imposées.

W. BALIS
Lt Col
Adjoint au Chef des Opérations

<u>Liste des annexes</u>

<u>Liste de distribution</u>

<u>Information :</u> Comd Secteur KIGALI
Comd Secteur MILOB

14

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

15 Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

To : Distibution List

From : DCOO

Subject: SUSPECTED MINE FIELDS IN DMZ AREA

Preliminary remark: grid references are preceded by a letter A, B, C or D indicating the quadrant (A = NORTH-WEST, B = NORTH-EAST, C = SOUTH-WEST, D = SOUTH-EAST) centered on OO NORTH of KIGALI.



Force HQ gathered information on suspected mine fields as follows:

1. ROADS

   a. KIRAMBO (A8335) - KABONA (A8041) - BUTARO (A8143)
   b. KIRAMBO (A8335) - RUHANGA (A8139)
   c. BYUMBA (B0725) - BISIKA (B1125) - BWISIGE (B1627)
   d. From B300523 to B306530
   e. From B300520 to B310510

2. AREAS

   a. Former RPF defence Posn at:
      A7948 - A8050 - A7945 - A8239 - A7938 - A9434
   b. Border of the swamp RUGEZI on the WESTERN side (A8042 - A9025).
   c. Areas in:
      A9925 - A9621 - B0629 - B0228 - B0730 - B0830 - B2861
      B2959 - B2136 - B2337 - B1636 - B1736

W. BALIS
LtCol
DCOO

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Force Headquarters Standard Distibution List A

13

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

15 Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

To : Distibution List

From : DCOO

Subject: SUSPECTED MINE FIELDS IN DMZ AREA



Preliminary remark: grid references are preceded by a letter A, B, C or D indicating the quadrant (A = NORTH-WEST, B = NORTH-EAST, C = SOUTH-WEST, D = SOUTH-EAST) centered on OO NORTH of KIGALI.

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      A9925 - A9621 - B0629 - B0228 - B0730 - B0830 - B2861
      B2959 - B2136 - B2337 - B1636 - B1736

W. BALIS
LtCol
DCOO

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Force Headquarters Standard Distibution List A

This Doc replaces the Doc of 12 Jan
(same subject)

12

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

15 Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

To : Distibution List

From : DCOO

Subject: SUSPECTED MINE FIELDS IN DMZ AREA

Preliminary remark: grid references are preceded by a letter A, B, C or D indicating the quadrant (A = NORTH-WEST, B = NORTH-EAST, C = SOUTH-WEST, D = SOUTH-EAST) centered on OO NORTH of KIGALI.



Force HQ gathered information on suspected mine fields as follows:

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      B2959 - B2136 - B2337 - B1636 - B1736

W. BALIS
LtCol
DCOO

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Force Headquarters Standard Distibution List A

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO	/		
DCOO		[signature]	20 Jan 94
Sr Duty			
Duty Offr			
Engineer			
Info			
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination / = No need to see			

→ CIVPOL

KIGALI, 13 Jan 94
File Nr: 94/5000.5/0024

From: Planning Section
Humanitarian Officer
Maj PODEVIJN

E VAN PUT
Lt Kol
CPLO

To: Force Commander

Info: Information Officer

SUBJECT: Aggression on Mrs UZAMUREBA on 08 Jan 94.

Attached is a report of an aggression on Mrs UZAMUREBA that took place on 08 Jan 94.

The reason that Mrs UZAMUREBA carried a lot of foreign currency is that she was prepared to travel to EUROPE.

The mentioned NIBASEKE Lucien is a well known member of INTERAHAMWE. It has to be stressed, that at the moment that two gendarms wanted to intervene, the crowd stopped them doing so. Those people were carrying traditional weapons such as clubs and chased the gendarms away.

Investigation is underway.

2 COO Pass to Kigali Sector and UNCIVPOL for follow-up.

FC 17/1

3 UNCIVPOL for follow-up in coop with KISEC

DCOO

Mme UZAMUREBA Béatrice
C/O CARITAS RWANDA
B.P. 124
KIGALI
Tél.: 76818 Hab.
75786 Bureau
73148 "

Kigali, le 11 Janvier 1994

Monsieur l'Officier Chef du CRDC
KIGALI

Objet: Plainte c/le nommé NIBASEKE Lucien et compagnie.

Monsieur,

J'ai l'honneur de m'adresser à votre autorité pour porter plainte contre le nommé NIBASEKE Lucien et compagnie, résidant à KIMICANGA, Commune KACYIRU.

Cette bande m'a attaquée ainsi que mon mari le 08/01/1994 vers 6H30' du matin à Kimihurura près du Rond Point sis à côté de l'IMKI.

En effet je me rendais à l'Aéropot de Kanombe pour prendre l'avion à destination de France pour une mission de service.

Cette bande a attaqué la camionnette AB 9736 de CARITAS RWANDA pilotée par NZAMURAMBAHO Emence en lui arrachant le rétroviseur et l'outillage tout en faisant sortir de force son équipage pour s'emparer des effets mobiliers dont 500 FF, 700 DM, 400 US$ et 400 FR.Suisses.

.../...

Par après le même groupe a attaqué le véhicule BB 1181 à bord duquel se trouvait mon mari UWIMPUHWE Samuel accompagné de Monsieur SEBUDANDI J.Baptiste. Il leur a pris leurs montres dont une portait la marque SEIKO. Il a également pris la clé de contact du véhicule attachée à un trousseau d'autres clés de bureau et de maison.

Le suspect NIBASEKE Lucien a été identifié chez lui à Kimicanga par 2 gendarmes habillés en civil et qui étaient dépêchés par le Lieutenant NGARAMBE qui était de garde au CRDC le 11/01/1994.

Monsieur l'Officier, je demande à vos services de faire tout ce qui est à leur compétence pour retrouver les objets volés et de punir les coupables conformément à la loi.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Officier, l'expression de mon profond respect.

Pour Mme UZAMUREBA Béatrice
UWIMPUHWE Samuel
Son mari.

<u>Copie pour information à:</u>

- Monsieur le Procureur de la République
  <u>KIGALI</u>
- CARITAS RWANDA
  <u>KIGALI</u>

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO			
Sr Duty		[illegible]	[illegible]
Duty Offr			
Engineer			
Info			
Trg			
Air Ops			
Signals			
Mov Con			
Liaison			
Other			
x = Final destination / = No need to see			

6

Kigali, le 23.12.1993.

Monsieur le Commandant
Contingent Belge Minuar
Kigali

② COO
Check this out with G-2 and show me on the map.
12/1

Monsieur le Commandant,

Les Habitants de la région de Mumena, Route de Rwampara, en-dessous du Collège Saint-André sont désireux qu'un groupe Minuar y soit basé pour assurer la sécurité des lieux. Une demande de leur part est en cours.

Dans cette perspective, je porte à votre connaissance que je possède des locaux qui seraient fiables pour loger un tel groupe, sis Route de Rwampara, à 1 Km. de la route goudronnée. Le croquis ci-joint donne l'implantation des constructions disponibles.

Dans l'éventualité où vous seriez intéressé par ce complexe, je suis à votre disposition pour tout arrangement. Le plus simple serait que vous me fixiez un rendez-vous par téléphone au N° 72369.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Commandant, mes salutations très distinguées.

M. Berruex.

M Berruex

Adresse : M. Berruex
BP. 1029
Kigali
Tél. 72369

P.S. Le complexe de Mumena est pourvu d'un téléphone: N° 74596

- Nirambo
- Route Rwampara
- descend dans la vallée
- 5 chambres
- 2 grands livings

③ CIVPOL
Since FC is not so happy with proposal of office near Méridien, this might be a solution. Advantage: near to "hot spot" in Kigali.
DCOO

387
Rec'd
10/1/94

Bernex
Tél. 72369



Parcelle Mumena environ 1 hectare

A: Maison d'habitation : 3 ch. à coucher, téléphone
1 gr. living
1 cuisine
1 s. de bain
1 W.C
B : Annexe : 2 ch. à coucher, grand living
salle repassage, magasin
C : 2 grands locaux
D : poulailler ou clapier
E : Maison des employés.
F : Haie 2 m. haut d'épineux - arbres cafra
G : Haie grillage + bougainvillées
H : 2 locaux
I : Eucalyptus

Très Urgent et Personnelle

A. Monsieur le GÉNÉRAL Dallaire
Chef des FORCES ARMÉES UNAMIR
Quartier HOTEL AMAHORO
Kigali.—

BY AIR MAIL
MU NDEGE

~~From~~: FHQ
To : K/G Sector

Concerne : sécurité physique d'une personne politique

1. Veuillez trouver ci-joint une requête émanant de l'ancien 1er ministre du Rwanda.
2. Prière de contacter le Mr en question et de lui donner le No de téléphone d'une unité UNAMIR, à proximité de sa résidence, en mesure d'intervenir à temps en cas de...
3. A l'hotel il devrait être en sécurité...

08 1400 Jan 94 DCOO

W. BALIS
LTKol
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3182

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ROUTING SLIP **FICHE DE TRANSMISSION**

TO:
A: SRSG

FROM:
DE: Kabia

Room No. – No de bureau	Extension – Poste	Date
		5/1

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

I suggest you send ~~[illegible]~~ the attached to the Force Commander for appropriate action

AMA 5/1

② COO

Je désire que l'on [illegible] bon contact avec lui (la cie en [illegible] doit faire cela) et [illegible] tellement lui donner le [illegible] de téléphone et à l'occasion aller voir pour le [illegible] assurer [illegible]

[illegible] (2–78)

Dr NSENGIYAREMYE Dismas
C/O Hotel des Diplomates

Kigali, le 04/01/1994

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF SRSG
Date 5 jan 94
No. 199 By EL

A Son Excellence Monsieur le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies au Rwanda.

FC

F.C
6 janvier 94

Excellence Monsieur le Représentant spécial,

J'ai l'honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir m'assurer une protection rapprochée par des éléments de la force des Nations Unies, d'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR).

Depuis le 16/07/1993, date où j'ai cessé d'exercer les fonctions de Premier Ministre de la République Rwandaise, je fais l'objet de menaces et d'actes d'intimidations de sorte que j'ai du m'exiler en Europe du 1er Août au 30 Novembre 1993.

Dès mon retour au Rwanda le 1er Décembre 1993, ces menaces ont repris et je me trouve dans une insécurité totale au point que je suis obligé de vivre momentanément à l'Hotel.

Dans l'attente d'une suite rapide et positive à cette demande, je vous prie d'agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Copy to 41 SEC
08-1415 Ja 94

Dr NSENGIYAREMYE Dismas
Ancien Premier Ministre.

OK

FC
368 Rec'd
6/1/94

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO		[illegible]	8 Jan 04
Sr Duty			
Duty Offr		[illegible]	8/1
Engineer			
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Other			

x = Final destination
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UNITED NATIONS
COMM CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

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FACSIMILE

TO: BOOH-BOOH UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 4 January 1994	
SUBJECT: SG's report on UNAMIR	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 17	

Please find attached copy (in English and French) of the Secretary-General's report on UNAMIR (S/26927) which was issued this morning. Additional copies are being sent to you by pouch. Regards.

② Susana
make one copy for distribution to COS and Section Heads. Return

COS OK
CMPO 25/01/94
COO
CLOGO
CPO OK

6/1

SRSG

UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26927
30 December 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, by which the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months, subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial 90 days upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement.

2. By the same resolution, the Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's proposal that the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), established by Council resolution 486 (1993), should be integrated within UNAMIR. Finally, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to report on the progress of UNAMIR following its initial deployment, and resolved to review as appropriate, on the basis of that report, the requirement for further deployments in the scale and composition recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488).

3. The Arusha peace agreement, signed on 4 August 1993, called on the United Nations to play a major support role during a 22-month transitional period, beginning with the installation of a broad-based transitional government and ending with the holding of national elections. The Security Council in resolution 872 (1993) authorized UNAMIR, inter alia, to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali through the establishment of a weapons-secure area; to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, including cantonment, demobilization and integration of the armed forces of the parties; to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate; to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes; to investigate, at the request of the parties or on its own initiative, instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement; to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons; to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations; and to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the Gendarmerie and police.

I. POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. My Special Representative, appointed in pursuance of paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 872 (1993), arrived in Kigali on 23 November 1993 and established his headquarters in the Rwandese capital. Since his arrival, my Special Representative has established contacts and working relations with the parties signatories to the Arusha peace agreement as well as with the diplomatic missions accredited to the Rwandese Government and the religious and traditional leaders of the country. Pursuant to resolution 872 (1993), my Special Representative will help in bringing about the appropriate political environment to promote and enhance a dialogue between the parties to the Arusha peace agreement.

5. In his meetings with representatives of concerned Governments and diplomats, my Special Representative stressed the need to harmonize their efforts and activities with those of UNAMIR in order to reach a successful conclusion of the Arusha peace agreement. Following a series of violent incidents in the months of November and December 1993, which caused the death of some 40 persons, my Special Representative undertook several initiatives in order to help defuse the tension prevalent in the country and to get the parties signatories to the Arusha peace agreement to renew their commitment to implement the peace plan.

6. Those initiatives included the convening of a meeting between the Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) at Kinihira, 80 kilometres from Kigali. At that meeting, the two parties issued a joint declaration in which they reaffirmed their commitment to do their utmost in order to achieve the goals set by the Arusha peace agreement, namely peace and national reconciliation. They agreed to set up a broad-based transitional government before 31 December 1993. During that meeting, the Chairman of RPF reaffirmed that the Front was more willing than ever to respect all its commitments, especially the one relating to the cantonment of its security battalion in Kigali.

II. MILITARY ASPECTS

7. By paragraph 12 of resolution 872 (1993), the Security Council requested me to conclude expeditiously an agreement on the status of UNAMIR and its personnel in Rwanda. The Council requested that this agreement come into force as near as possible to the outset of the operation and no later than 30 days after the adoption of the resolution. Following the adoption of resolution 872 (1993), a draft status of forces agreement was presented to the Government of Rwanda. After consultations with the Government, the agreement was signed on 5 November 1993. A copy of the agreement was then forwarded to RPF, which confirmed its readiness to cooperate in the implementation of its provisions.

8. It will be recalled that in my report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488) I had proposed, and the Council had approved, a concept of operations with an implementation schedule comprising four phases. Phase I commenced on 5 October 1993 with the adoption by the Council of resolution 872 (1993). During this phase, preparations for the establishment of a secure area in Kigali

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were to be made, the monitoring of the cease-fire between the two parties in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) was to be undertaken by UNAMIR and the foreign forces stationed in Kigali were to depart. This phase was to last approximately 90 days, until the establishment of the broad-based transitional government in Kigali. Phase II would begin the day after the transitional government was installed and would end when the preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration of the armed forces and Gendarmerie were completed. It was estimated that this phase would also last about 90 days. Phase III would comprise the actual disengagement, demobilization and integration process. The duration of this phase was estimated at about 9 months. Finally, during phase IV, which would last 10 months, UNAMIR would assist in maintaining a secure environment and creating conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections.

9. As stated in my report of 24 September, it was foreseen that the strength of military personnel required for the implementation of UNAMIR's mandate would stand at 1,428 all ranks by the end of phase I and that it would reach a peak at the end of phase II, with a total of 2,548 military personnel. A process of gradual reduction would begin during phase III, leading to a residual strength of some 930 military personnel by the beginning of phase IV.

10. In my implementation plan, I had indicated that the mission's operations would be divided into five sectors, including a Kigali sector and a demilitarized zone sector. Two other sectors would be located with the Rwandese Government forces (RGF) and the forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) respectively (see attached map). For internal administrative purposes, UNOMUR would be considered as the fifth sector.

11. The Force Commander of UNAMIR, General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), arrived in Kigali on 22 October 1993, followed by an advance party of 21 military personnel on 27 October 1993. On 1 November, as foreseen in my report, the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II), which had been monitoring the cease-fire in the DMZ, was integrated into UNAMIR. UNAMIR's headquarters were formally inaugurated on 17 November in the presence of General Juvenal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda. The Force headquarters has been able to fulfil most of its projected tasks for phase I, though under certain logistic constraints due to delays in the arrival of vehicles, communications equipment and other supplies.

12. The Kigali sector headquarters has developed a calendar and operational plans for the establishment of the weapons-secure area, for the movement of an RPF security battalion to Kigali and for the conduct of other tasks in the area, as foreseen in my previous report. The Kigali weapons-secure area was established on 24 December and the RPF security battalion arrived in Kigali on 28 December 1993. Intensive discussions are being held with the parties with a view to facilitating the installation of the transitional government by the end of the month.

13. The demilitarized zone sector headquarters was established upon the arrival of the advance party and became operational on 1 November 1993 when the NMOG II elements were absorbed into UNAMIR. Until now it has not been possible, in the absence of the necessary logistic support, to deploy personnel to Byumba.

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However, the deployment of the required equipment is expected to take place in January 1994.

14. The Military Observer Group headquarters was established from elements of the advance party and NMOG II and became operational on 7 November. It has been commanding and administering all deployed military observers. It has also been conducting valuable reconnaissance of both parties' sector headquarters locations, as well as liaison tasks and investigations.

15. In addition, the Military Observer Group has been given the task of following the situation which developed on the southern border of Rwanda following the coup d'état of 21 October 1993 in Burundi. The unexpected flow of Burundese refugees into Rwanda, as well as allegations of cross-border military movement, have taxed the operations of the observers. In this connection, I instructed Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah, who was in Burundi to attend the funeral of President Ndadaye, to visit the southern border area of Rwanda in order to assess the situation. Mr. Jonah travelled from Bujumbura to Kigali by road on 7 December and was thus able to observe the impact of the sudden flow of Burundese refugees in that area. While in Kigali, Mr. Jonah discussed the Burundese crisis with President Habyarimana and urged his assistance in reducing tensions in Burundi.

16. Although the southern region is at present reasonably quiet, the relative ease of access to considerable arms and the ethnic tensions amongst and around the refugees have created a potentially destabilizing situation which had not been foreseen in my initial assessment of requirements for the mission. For the time being, the Force Commander is attempting to reallocate personnel within the overall resources projected in my report of 24 September. This solution may be acceptable for the near term if the flow of observers planned for phase II is deployed on an urgent basis. If, however, experience and circumstances were to require additional observers, I would bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council for its consideration.

17. The RGF and RPF sector headquarters are in the process of being established. A small liaison office was opened in Milindi, within the RPF sector, following tensions in the north-western part of the country. The Military Observer Group is performing the necessary liaison and reconnaissance functions in the RGF zone.

18. It will be recalled that in paragraph 8 of resolution 872 (1993) the Security Council invited me to report on the requirements for further deployments, especially in the demilitarized zone. During the month of November, two separate incidents, in which some 60 civilians were brutally killed, took place in the vicinity of Ruhengeri. The nature of these attacks, directed against civilians primarily in and around the DMZ, has underscored the need for UNAMIR promptly to acquire the capability to monitor the area effectively. The investigations conducted into these killings by UNAMIR observers have revealed that a well-armed and reportedly ruthless group was operating in the area, with a view to disrupting or even derailing the peace process. The precarious security situation in that region confirms the need for a fully equipped infantry battalion, to enable UNAMIR to monitor the

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demilitarized zone and provide a safe environment for the large population living in the area.

19. The deployment of the Kigali battalion, composed of contingents from Belgium and Bangladesh, was completed in the first part of December. As a result, the foreign troops stationed in Kigali were able to complete their withdrawal on 15 December 1993. Regarding other elements of UNAMIR, 26 of the 50 members of the projected Medical Platoon have been deployed. Pending completion of the deployment of this unit, the Belgian contingent has agreed to allow the use of its Hercules aircraft for air evacuation in emergency cases. The 20 members of the movement control platoon and the 5 members of the military police group have also been deployed.

20. On 27 December 1993, the composition of UNAMIR consisted of a total of 1,260 military personnel, from Austria (5), Bangladesh (564), Belgium (424), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Canada (2), the Congo (25), Fiji (1), Ghana (37), Hungary (4), Mali (10), the Netherlands (10), Poland (5), Senegal (39), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61), Uruguay (21) and Zimbabwe (10). These figures include the 81 military observers serving with UNOMUR (see S/26878).

21. The composition of the military component of UNAMIR has revealed a need for interpreters/translators which had not been anticipated in my report of 24 September. A small number of interpreters/translators will therefore be put at the disposal of UNAMIR to assist its military personnel in the performance of their mandated tasks. I intend to reflect the financial impact in my next report to the General Assembly on the financing of UNAMIR.

III. CIVILIAN POLICE

22. The Arusha peace agreement called on the United Nations to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and communal police. In my report of 24 September, I had indicated that in order to verify that law and order were maintained effectively and impartially, a small United Nations civilian police unit consisting of 60 police officers would be required by UNAMIR. It has not so far been possible to deploy this personnel. However, some Member States have recently agreed to make civilian police officers available for this operation and it is anticipated that they will be deployed in January 1994.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

23. Since my report of 24 September (S/26488), emergency and rehabilitation efforts for the displaced persons have continued, but new difficulties have arisen as a result of a massive influx of Burundese refugees caused by ethnic violence in neighbouring Burundi as well as by an increasingly serious drought. Of an estimated 685,000 Burundese refugees, some 375,000 have fled to Rwanda. The revised budget of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other United Nations agencies to meet emergency needs of Burundese refugees in the region until May 1994 amounts to $52 million.

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24. UNAMIR, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system, will continue to provide all necessary assistance to facilitate the safe return of refugees as well as the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies to the needy populations. The continued cooperation of the parties with the international community is essential for the successful implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. I hope that the international community will continue to extend sufficient assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in Rwanda, so as to support the unimpeded implementation of the Arusha peace agreement.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

25. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments not exceeding $4.6 million for the initial requirements of UNAMIR, for the period from 5 October to 30 November 1993, under the provision of General Assembly resolution 46/187 of 20 December 1991 on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses.

26. The total cost of UNAMIR for the six-month period from 5 October 1993 to 30 April 1994, including the amount of $4.6 million previously authorized by the Advisory Committee, has been estimated at $51,120,000 gross ($50,478,000 net). The Advisory Committee recently recommended that the General Assembly authorize further commitments of up to $46.5 million gross ($45.9 million net). A detailed budget showing the breakdown of the estimated amount of $51.120 million will be submitted to the General Assembly shortly.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

27. In my previous report, I stressed that two essential conditions had to be met to enable the United Nations to discharge its mandate in Rwanda successfully and effectively. First, the parties had to cooperate fully with one another and with the United Nations in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha agreement. Secondly, the United Nations had to be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources.

28. Despite recent signs of mutual intransigence, the parties have continued to show good will and cooperation in their contacts with each other and with the United Nations. They have also managed to weather some tense and potentially disruptive moments in the wake of the events in Burundi. In addition, the fact that the cease-fire has generally been respected demonstrates that the parties remain committed to the peace and reconciliation process initiated by the Arusha agreement.

29. For their part, Member States have responded positively to my appeals for the provision of personnel at relatively short notice. As can be seen from section II above, the initial deployment of UNAMIR has proceeded largely on schedule. Although the logistic support capabilities of UNAMIR are for the time being inadequate, there is on the ground a minimum viable force which can respond to the most pressing needs in Kigali. However, the situation in the DMZ and in the north-west of the country remains unstable. Moreover, the situation

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in Burundi has created a new source of tension in the south. The deployment of the personnel required for the second phase of the operation should therefore be undertaken on an urgent basis.

30. In the light of the above, I recommend that the Security Council, in carrying out its review of the activities of UNAMIR, agree that this operation should continue to implement the mandate entrusted to it under resolution 872 (1993). In this regard, I intend to proceed with the implementation plan as outlined in my previous report, including the early deployment of the second battalion in the DMZ. I am aware that the Council had asked me to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR. I will continue to seek economies through the phased deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR personnel, in accordance with the timetable set out in my implementation plan. I am however convinced that, under the present circumstances, a reduction in the projected resource levels would negatively affect the performance and credibility of UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate. It could also jeopardize the peace process in Rwanda.



MAP NO. 3807.1 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
DECEMBER 1993

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Mardi 4 janvier 1994
Dinsdag 4 januari 1994

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04-01-94 la Nouvelle Gazette p. 4

Le général Briquemont, qui commande jusqu'à l'été les Casques Bleus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, serait éprouvé par la difficulté de sa tâche

Retour hâtif en Belgique ?

Le commandant des casques bleus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, le lieutenant-général Francis Briquemont, pourrait quitter cette fonction avant la fin de son mandat, en juillet prochain, a-t-on appris lundi soir auprès du cabinet de la Défense nationale.

Le général Briquemont avait succédé en juillet 1993 —en principe pour une durée d'un an— au général français Philippe Morillon comme commandant de la Force de Protection des Nations-Unies (FORPRONU) en Bosnie. Il pourrait être rappelé pour reprendre sa fonction de commandant du premier corps d'Armée belge en cette année importante pour la restructuration de l'Armée belge, a-t-on ajouté de même source.

Le général Briquemont, qui est aussi commandant des forces belges en Allemagne (CCFBA) depuis le 1er juillet dernier, avait été envoyé à Sarajevo quelques jours seulement après son investiture à Weiden, près de Cologne.

La décision définitive de rappeler le général Briquemont dépend toutefois du secrétaire-général des Nations-Unies, M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, et une demande en ce sens lui a été transmise, a-t-on encore indiqué de même source, en confirmant l'information donnée par la RTBf-télévision dans son journal de lundi soir. Si l'ONU accepte le retour de l'officier en Belgique, Bruxelles proposera toutefois un autre général pour terminer le mandat. Un porte-parole du ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Leo Delcroix, a précisé à l'agence Belga qu'il s'agirait alors d'un lieutenant-général (à trois étoiles) ou d'un général-major (à deux étoiles).

Certains observateurs font toutefois remarquer que le général Briquemont, âgé de 59 ans, a exprimé à plusieurs reprises au cours des dernières semaines sa frustration face au manque de moyens que lui accorde l'ONU pour exécuter sa mission de protection de la population bosniaque et d'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire. Il a ainsi souvent réclamé l'envoi de renforts pour la FORPRONU en Bosnie (actuellement forte de quelque 12.000 hommes), et notamment plusieurs milliers de soldats pour faire respecter la résolution 836 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, qui avait au printemps dernier, fait de six localités bosniaques —dont Sarajevo— des «zones de sécurité».

• Le général Briquemont (photo M. Bruneau).

Visiblement éprouvé par la difficulté de sa tâche, le général Briquemont avait même récemment affirmé qu'il ne *«lisait même plus»* les nombreuses résolutions de l'ONU à propos de l'ex-Yougoslavie.

04/01/94 — LA DERNIÈRE HEURE — 417 — p. 6

DÉSAVOUÉ POUR NE PAS AVOIR MÉNAGÉ SES CRITIQUES ?

Le général Briquemont pourrait rentrer avant juillet

SARAJEVO - Le commandant des casques bleus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, le lieutenant-général Francis Briquemont, pourrait quitter cette fonction avant la fin de son mandat, en juillet prochain.

Le général Briquemont, qui a succédé en juillet dernier pour en principe un an au général français Philippe Morillon comme commandant de la Force de Protection des Nations-Unies (FORPRONU) en Bosnie, pourrait être rappelé pour reprendre sa fonction de commandant du premier corps d'armée belge. La décision définitive de rappeler le général Briquemont dépend toutefois du secrétaire-général des Nations-Unies, M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Si l'ONU accepte le retour de l'officier en Belgique, Bruxelles proposera toutefois un autre général pour terminer le mandat. Un porte-parole du ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Leo Delcroix, a précisé à l'agence Belga qu'il s'agirait alors d'un lieutenant-général (à trois étoiles) ou d'un général-major (à deux étoiles).

Pourquoi cet éventuel départ avant terme ?

Le général Francis Briquemont n'a, en tout cas, pas ménagé ses critiques depuis sa prise de fonction. Pour lui, l'action des troupes de l'ONU qu'il dirige en Bosnie est paralysée par le manque d'effectifs et l'absence de volonté politique, et cette inefficacité met en question la crédibilité des futures opérations de pacification de l'organisation mondiale.

Pour le général belge, l'ONU est même coupable de s'être contentée de voter des résolutions sans se doter des moyens de les faire effectivement appliquer. « *Il y a un gouffre fantastique entre toutes les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et les moyens disponibles pour les faire appliquer. Ces résolutions ne peuvent pas être exécutées sur le terrain* », a-t-il déclaré dernièrement.

04/01/94 — LE PEUPLE — p. 2

Briquemont ne finirait pas son mandat à Sarajevo

Le commandant des casques bleus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, le lieutenant-général Francis Briquemont, pourrait quitter cette fonction avant la fin de son mandat, en juillet prochain, a-t-on appris lundi soir auprès du cabinet de la Défense nationale.

Le général Briquemont, qui a succédé en juillet dernier pour en principe un an au général français Philippe Morillon comme commandant de la Force de Protection des Nations-Unies (FORPRONU) en Bosnie, pourrait être rappelé pour reprendre sa fonction de commandant du premier corps d'armée belge en cette année importante pour la [illegible] de même source.

La décision définitive de rappeler le général [illegible] du secrétaire-général des Nations-Unies, M. [illegible] Boutros-Ghali, a-t-on encore indiqué de même source, en confirmant l'information donnée par la RTBF-télévision dans son journal de lundi soir.

04/01/94 — LA LIBRE BELGIQUE — p. 10

Bosnie-Herzégovine

Briquemont pourrait quitter Sarajevo

Le commandant des casques bleus en Bosnie-Herzégovine, le lieutenant-général Francis Briquemont, pourrait quitter cette fonction avant la fin de son mandat, en juillet prochain, a-t-on appris lundi soir auprès du cabinet de la Défense nationale.

Le général Briquemont, qui a succédé en juillet dernier pour en principe un an au général français Philippe Morillon comme commandant de la Force de Protection des Nations-Unies (Forpronu) en Bosnie, pourrait être rappelé pour reprendre sa fonction de commandant du premier corps d'armée belge en cette année importante pour la restructuration de l'armée belge, a-t-on ajouté de même source.

La décision définitive de rappeler le général Briquemont dépend toutefois du secrétaire-général des Nations-Unies, M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a-t-on encore indiqué de même source, en confirmant l'information donnée par la RTBF-télévision dans son journal de lundi soir. (Belga)

4-1-94 GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN 3/9 p 5

België zal andere generaal als opvolger voorstellen

Briquemont wellicht nog deze maand vervangen

Van onze redacteur

De Belgische generaal Francis Briquemont wordt wellicht nog deze maand als bevelhebber van de VN-troepen in Bosnië-Herzegovina vervangen. België zal een nieuwe kandidaat voorstellen.

Dat werd maandag op het kabinet van Landsverdediging 'zeer waarschijnlijk' genoemd. Eerder had Briquemont het voorbije weekeinde zelf in een vraaggesprek met het persagentschap AP gezegd dat hij verwacht de komende maanden te worden vervangen.

Briquemont volgde begin juli '93 de populaire Franse generaal Philippe Morillon op aan het hoofd van de blauwhelmen in Bosnië. Gelijktijdig werd hij ook opperbevelhebber van de Belgische troepen in Duitsland en van het Eerste Belgisch Korps. Van meetaf maakte hij duidelijk er niet op uit te zijn geweld te gebruiken in Bosnië.

De generaal (59) maakte van zijn hart geen moordkuil en zei herhaaldelijk publiek wat hij van het VN-optreden in Bosnië dacht. Dat bracht hem reeds na enkele weken hevig in aanvaring met de Amerikanen toen die met luchtbombardementen wilden ingrijpen. De voorbije weken bleek uit de verklaringen van Briquemont een toenemende ontgoocheling in het VN-optreden.

Op het terrein stelde hij vast dat het ene bestand na het andere schaamteloos aan flarden werd geschoten terwijl er anderzijds — volgens zijn verklaringen — een enorme kloof gaapt tussen de papieren VN-resoluties en wat daarvan terecht komt in Bosnië. Tegelijk werd net voor Kerstmis één van zijn Belgische chauffeurs door sluipschutters doodgeschoten. In zijn interview gewaagt Briquemont nu ronduit van een mislukking van het VN-optreden en heeft hij het over zijn mogelijke vervanging.

Vervanging

Op Buitenlandse Zaken weigerde men maandag elke commentaar en stelde men na enig aandringen dat "er tot nu toe geen sprake is van een vervanging". Op Defensie heet het dat het vertrek van Briquemont "hoewel niet 100 procent zeker, zeer waarschijnlijk is in de loop van deze maand, eerder naar het eind van januari". In dat geval zal België een Belgische kandidaat voordragen om het huidige mandaat tot juli '94 te voltooien. Dat zou zowel een luitenant-generaal als een generaal-majoor kunnen zijn. Als reden voor de aflossing houdt men het op het kabinet bij de belangrijke functie van Briquemont aan het hoofd van de troepen in Duitsland. "Die functie is nu al een half jaar niet ingevuld terwijl uitgerekend in 1994 de terugkeeroperatie haar cruciale fase bereikt".

Generaal Francis Briquemont.

HET LAATSTE NIEUWS

de Morgen

4/1

04/01/94 Het Nieuwsblad p 9

De Standaard

Opperbevelhebber Blauwhelmen wil optreden tegen Serviërs

PARIJS (reuter) — De Franse opperbevelhebber van de Blauwhelmen in gewezen Joegoslavië vindt dat het tijd wordt krachtig op te treden tegen de Bosnische Serviërs die de vredestroepen hinderen in hun werk. Hij sloot een vraag om militair optreden aan de Navo niet uit. Generaal Jean Cot, vanuit zijn hoofdkwartier in Zagreb geïnterviewd door France 2, zei dat zijn vrijheid van optreden meer beknot is dan hij wenselijk acht.

Volgens Cot moet krachtiger worden opgetreden tegen de Bosnische Serviërs omdat dezen het meest tegenwerken. Verder, aldus Cot, „moet druk uitgeoefend worden op onze onderhandelaars in Genève want we kunnen niet blijven optreden als lieve bemiddelaars en konversaties voeren onder heren met de politieke en militaire leiders van het gewezen Joegoslavië terwijl onze troepen op het terrein steeds meer worden onderworpen aan vernederingen en onder groeiende druk komen te staan".

Desgevraagd leek hij een luchtaanval op Servische posities niet uit te sluiten. Hij wees erop dat een resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties zulks mogelijk maakt. „We zijn er klaar voor. En onder de juiste omstandigheden zou ik niet aarzelen." Wel is een akkoord van sekretaris-generaal Boutros Boutros-Ghali van de Verenigde Naties nodig.

De generaal kreeg voor zijn protesten tegen de aanvallen op zijn mensen de steun van het Franse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

04/01/94 Het Volk p 7

Generaal Briquemont mogelijk vervroegd terug uit Bosnië

BRUSSEL — De bevelhebber van de blauwhelmen in Bosnië-Herzegovina, luitenant-generaal Francis Briquemont, zal misschien nog voor het einde van zijn mandaat, in juli, zijn functie neerleggen, zo werd maandagavond op het kabinet van Defensie vernomen.

Briquemont, die vorig jaar in juli de Franse generaal Philippe Morillon opvolgde als bevelhebber van de VN-strijdkrachten in Bosnië (Forpronu), zal misschien worden teruggeroepen om er zijn functie als bevelhebber van het eerste Belgische legerkorps weer op te nemen in dit voor de herstrukturering van het Belgische leger zo belangrijke jaar, zo wordt eraan toegevoegd.

De definitieve beslissing om generaal Briquemont terug te roepen hangt echter af van VN-secretaris-generaal Boutros Boutros-Ghali, zo voegde dezelfde bron er nog aan toe die daarmee het bericht van de RTBf-televisieredactie maandagavond bevestigde.

04.01.94 **Le Monde** 5/9 p. 4

BOSNIE-HERZÉGOVINE

Le général Cot dénonce les «humiliations» dont sont victimes les «casques bleus»

Le général Jean Cot, commandant de la Force de protection des Nations unies (FORPRONU) dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, s'est amèrement plaint, samedi 1er janvier, des *«humiliations»* subies par les «casques bleus», assurant qu'il adopterait une nouvelle stratégie pour mettre fin à cette situation.

Le problème le plus grave de la FORPRONU en Bosnie, *«c'est la réduction progressive, mais sûre de notre liberté d'action en général, en termes militaires, et de notre liberté de mouvement, au travers des humiliations et des tracasseries de plus en plus nombreuses que subissent nos gens partout aux check-points, dans beaucoup de circonstances»*, a déclaré le général Cot. *«Les trois parties sont coupables»*, a-t-il souligné, mais *«pour ne parler que des Serbes, je considère que cette volonté délibérée d'humilier le bras armé de la communauté internationale a atteint des limites, et je ne veux plus le supporter»*.

«On ne peut pas à la fois parler à un Karadzic ou à un Boban ou à un Izetbegovic gentiment à Genève et subir de leur part ce qu'on subit sur le terrain au travers des humiliations et des interdictions», a-t-il dit, évoquant les négociations engagées par les médiateurs internationaux avec les dirigeants des trois parties en conflit – le président bosniaque Alija Izetbegovic, le leader des Serbes bosniaques Radovan Karadzic et celui des Croates bosniaques Mate Boban. A l'issue d'une visite dans la capitale bosniaque, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing a, lui aussi, dénoncé *«l'humiliation»* des forces de l'ONU.

Six personnes au moins ont été tuées depuis samedi à Sarajevo, où trois bases de la FORPRONU ont été touchées par des obus, faisant un blessé léger parmi les «casques bleus» français. Dans leurs messages de Nouvel An, les dirigeants bosniaques ont promis de poursuivre la lutte s'ils n'obtenaient pas ce qu'ils voulaient par la négociation.

Ainsi, le chef des forces serbes de Bosnie, le général Ratko Mladic, a-t-il promis de défendre les portions de territoire sous contrôle serbe dont le dernier plan de paix prévoit la rétrocession. *«Nous devons être prêts à défendre ce que nous avons gagné, mais aussi être prêts, s'il le faut, à combattre jusqu'à la victoire finale»*, a-t-il déclaré.

De leur côté, les dirigeants musulmans ont affirmé que les forces de Sarajevo lanceraient prochainement une offensive pour prendre la vallée stratégique de la Lasva (en Bosnie centrale) si les 65 000 Croates qui y sont assiégés ne partent pas. *(AFP, Reuter.)*

Un homme qui met les pieds dans le plat

Le général Cot a du tempérament. Nul ne l'ignore dans les armées françaises. Les uns disent de lui qu'il sait donner de la voix, autrement dit, «c'est un gueulard». Les autres préfèrent évoquer sa forte personnalité, voire son mauvais caractère, c'est-à-dire sa capacité à dire souvent tout haut ce que beaucoup pensent tout bas.

En règle générale, partout où il est passé, ses subordonnés ont apprécié les coups de gueule d'un «patron» qui, en 1983, grâce à Charles Hernu qui l'avait distingué, devint le plus jeune général de brigade, à moins de quarante-neuf ans. Promu à cinq étoiles il y aura bientôt quatre ans, Jean Cot a même figuré dans la liste des candidats au poste de chef d'état-major des armées françaises, et sa rivalité – qui n'est pas une légende – avec l'amiral Jacques Lanxade l'a fait exiler, en quelque sorte, en ex-Yougoslavie.

D'aucuns, qui ne l'aiment pas beaucoup, parlent de sa capacité à accumuler les gaffes ou les maladresses, emporté qu'il serait par sa fougue et son franc-parler. Il est vrai que le général Cot ne fait pas habituellement dans la litote. En la circonstance, dans une affaire qui devrait rester toute de diplomatie, il exprime les ressentiments et les amertumes des «casques bleus» lorsqu'il se fâche tout rouge contre l'attitude ambiguë de l'ONU dans *«ses palais de Genève»*, où l'on discute sans considération pour ceux qui se font tuer.

C'est un comportement assez coutumier des chefs militaires – de quelque nationalité qu'ils soient – sur le terrain quand ils observent que «leurs» hommes sont pris pour cibles ou en otage et que, dans le même temps, les diplomates leur donnent l'impression de s'en laver les mains. Le général Cot a donc mis les pieds dans le plat. Il y a quelques jours, le général belge Francis Briquemont, qui est sous ses ordres, avait, à sa manière, dit son écœurement devant la situation, en prétendant qu'il ne lisait même plus les résolutions de l'ONU tant elles ne servaient à rien.

JACQUES ISNARD

04.01.94 **LA MEUSE** p. 20

Sarajevo Après une nuit étonnamment calme, les bombardements ont repris à Sarajevo : un obus est tombé hier à Otoka, dans la partie ouest de la ville, tuant deux enfants et en blessant plusieurs autres. Les combats ont baissé en intensité ailleurs en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Le général Jean Cot, commandant en chef de la FORPRONU, a dénoncé lundi sur France-Info le fait que les casques bleus soient *« devenus des otages »* des forces en présence dans l'ex-Yougoslavie ; il estime que *« maintenant le moment est venu de donner un coup d'arrêt et d'être plus fermes, d'abord à Genève, et puis ensuite sur le terrain »* face aux humiliations subies par la Force de protection des Nations unies.

82 7

83776 Fallun Erz-Fanz Sck

04/01/93 GRENZ-ECHO 6/9 p 6

Kroaten-Miliz blockiert

Mindestens acht Verletzte bei Angriffen auf Sarajevo

Sarajevo (AFP). — Bei Kämpfen in der bosnischen Hauptstadt Sarajevo sind am Montag nach Angaben von Krankenhausmitarbeitern mindestens acht Menschen verletzt worden, darunter drei Kinder.

Weiterhin verstießen die Kriegsparteien nach Angaben der UN-Schutztruppen (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo, Mostar und Bihac gegen den für den Jahreswechsel vereinbarten Waffenstillstand. Ein französischer Hilfskonvoi für Sarajevo wurde in Zentralbosnien von kroatischen Milizionären blokkiert.

Der Oberbefehlshaber der UN-Schutztruppen (UNPROFOR), General Jean Cot, betonte, daß die Blauhelm-Kontingente für eine militärische Intervention bereitstünden, falls die Vereinten Nationen einen entsprechenden Beschluß faßten. Die kollektive Staatsführung von Bosnien-Herzegowina beschloß am Sonntag die sofortige Einführung einer Verteidigungs- und Wiederaufbausteuer in Höhe von zehn Prozent der Netto-Einkommen.

Der bosnische Ministerpräsident Haris Silajdzic warf der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft vor, die bosnischen Moslems in ihrem Kampf gegen die serbischen Angreifer zu benachteiligen. Zur Begründung nannte Silajdzic das von der UNO verhängte Waffenembargo. Der bosnische Regierungschef forderte die Völkergemeinschaft auf, jetzt »endlich ihre Pflicht zu tun« und auf Seiten des Opfers dieser Aggression einzugreifen, »um den Völkermord in Bosnien zu beenden«.

04/01/93 LE SOIR p 6

Après vingt mois de siège et de matraquage

Sarajevo s'efforce de garder la tête haute

Malgre une certaine accalmie dans l'ensemble de la Bosnie-Herzégovine samedi et dimanche, la trêve que les trois parties belligérantes avaient décidé d'observer du 23 décembre au 15 janvier, est *inexistante*, selon le porte-parole de la Force de protection des Nations unies (Forpronu). Après une nuit « étonnamment calme » à Sarajevo, lundi les bombardements ont repris sur la ville, tuant quinze personnes. Le déluge de tirs et d'obus a commencé dès le début de l'après midi et un obus a terminé sa course à 500 mètres des bâtiments de la présidence, tuant les six membres d'une même famille. Au total, les Nations Unies ont dénombré 14 morts du côté bosniaque, dont trois enfants et 22 blessés. De nombreuwx enfants ont été blessés alors qu'ils profitaient du temps un peu plus clément pour jouer à l'extérieur. Cependant, après vingt mois de siège, les habitants de la capitale bosniaque se sont efforcés encore de garder un semblant de normalité à leur vie. Par exemple, en se levant toujours le matin pour aller travailler, histoire, surtout, de défier les tireurs serbes qui veulent que cette ville meure.

Pour de nombreux Bosniaques, la guerre demeure le seul métier qui offre des débouchés, car usines et commerces ont souvent dû s'arrêter. Les monnaies locales ont perdu toute valeur, imposant le troc et le marché noir comme moyens d'échange.

La société yougoslave a régressé au niveau de la simple subsistance tandis que la morale est devenue celle du chacun pour soi. Le général Jean Cot, commandant de la Forpronu en ex-Yougoslavie, compare la dévastation et l'existence redevenue primitive des populations à la Guerre de Trente Ans qui a dévasté l'Europe centrale au 17e siècle. Il constate *une prolifération de bandits et de hors-la-loi qui meurent de faim et qui, en conséquence, commettent des actes de banditisme.* Le général français a ajouté que ses 30.000 Casques bleus seraient *prêts* à une éventuelle intervention militaire si l'ONU la décidait. De son côté, le général Briquemont a déclaré qu'il serait prêt pour des raisons de service, à regagner la Belgique. En réalité, il est évident que les deux officiers supérieurs de la Forpronu sont écoeurés par leur impuissance et par les embûches qu'ils rencontrent dans leur tâche d'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire.

Il y a plus de deux millions de réfugiés dont la vie a été réduite à néant, qui survivent dans des camps, dans des familles d'accueil ou qui dépendent de l'aide humanitaire. Alors qu'à Sarajevo, même sans chauffage, ni lumière, ni eau, les habitants ont la satisfaction morale de maintenir une façade de normalité en travaillant et en ayant un semblant de vie sociale.

Quant à l'aide humanitaire, elle semble ironiquement contribuer à prolonger la guerre. L'ONU nourrit trois millions de Musulmans, de Croates et de Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine cet hiver. Mais les Casques bleus ont dû conclure des ententes avec les parties en présence pour pouvoir acheminer leur aide.

En Serbie et en Croatie, l'absence de combat ne signifie pas que la vie y soit normale. Il y a d'abord les réfugiés. La Serbie en abrite près d'un demi-million, la Croatie, plus de cinq cent mille. Ils n'ont pas d'emploi, pas de domicile, pas d'avenir. Quant à ceux qui ont la chance d'avoir toujours un toit, leur vie est devenue extrêmement dure. La production industrielle a baissé de 70 % en Serbie depuis 1990, la dernière année de paix. Les deux tiers des personnes en âge de travailler sont au chômage. En une année, les salaires ont perdu la moitié de leur valeur tandis que les prix sont poussés par une inflation galopante.

En Croatie, la production industrielle est en baisse de 42 % par rapport à 1990. Le chômage atteint officiellement les 17,5 %, et un tiers au moins du budget de l'État est destiné à l'armée. (AP.)

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Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

12 Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

To : Distibution List

From : DCOO

Subject: SUSPECTED MINE FIELDS IN DMZ AREA

Preliminary remark: grid references are preceded by a letter A, B, C or D indicating the quadrant (A = NORTH-WEST, B = NORTH-EAST, C = SOUTH-WEST, D = SOUTH-EAST) centered on OO NORTH of KIGALI.



Force HQ gathered information on suspected mine fields as follows:

1. ROADS

   a. KIRAMBO (A8335) - KABONA (A8041) - BUTARO (A88033)
   b. KIRAMBO (A8335) - RUHANGA (A8139)
   c. BYUMBA (B1120) - BISIKA (B1323) - BWISIGE (B1627)
   d. From B300523 to B306530
   e. From B300520 to B310510

2. AREAS

   a. Former RPF defence Posn at:
   A7948 - A8050 - A7945 - A8239 - A7938 - A9434
   b. Border of the swamp RUGEZI on the WESTERN side (A8042 - A9025).
   c. Areas in:
   A9925 - A9621 - B0629 - B0228 - B0730 - B0830 - B2861
   B2959 - B2136 - B2337 - B1636 - B1736

W. BALIS
LtCol
DCOO

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Comd Sec DMZ, Comd Sec KIGALI, Comd MILOB
UNAMIR Force Headquarters Standard Distibution List A

UNAMIR

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

3000.2/Ops

To : General Services - Supply
Attn to Mr. Serge SMITH

From : COO

Date : 12 Jan 94

Subject : OFFICE IMPROVEMENT

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1. Please take necessary action for the installation of three shelves, wall-mounted, in my office at Force HQ, Office Nb 1 023.

2. PLANS

a. General



b. Detail

(1) Shelf:



(2) Mounting:



W. BALIS
LtCol
DCOO

UNAMIR

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

3000.2/Ops

To : Distribution List

From : COS

Date : 12 Jan 94

Subject : REGULAR MOVEMENT FROM/TO MULINDI

---

1. UNAMIR Force HQ has no objection against the movements in subject.

2. LIMITATIONS

   a. All requests for escorts concerning those movements have to be addressed to Force HQ 72 hours in advance.

   b. **No movement**

      (1) To MULINDI

      - before 06.00 AM
      - after 15.00 PM

      (2) From MULINDI

      - before 08.00 AM
      - after 16.00 PM

ASRARUL HACQUE
Colonel
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

Action:	INFO:
RPF Liaison Offr	Sec KIGALI
COO	Sec DMZ
	MILOB

7

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

From : DCOO

To : SRSG
CAO

Through: FC

Subject: **RUN FOR PEACE**

1. UNAMIR Force intends to organize a "Run for Peace". The earliest possible date for the event is 29th of January 1994.

2. Two options are submitted hereby to your consideration:

Option 1: Anx A
Option 2: Anx B

W. BALIS
LtCol
DCOO

Anx A: RUN FOR PEACE - OPTION 1

1. From Stadium to WEST outskirts of the city and back to the stadium, 6 x 2 KM relay of about ONE hour total time increasing i.e. every 2 KM 30 runners are added to the group.

2. **Participants.** 6 X 30 "Mil Pers", each group of 30 = 10 UNAMIR, 10 RGF and 10 to RPF. 180 runners will so attend the stadium.

3. **Equipment.** Each group should carry banderoles "Amahoro" and UN - RW flags and should wear ad-hoc T-Shirts.

4. **T-Shirts:**

   a. Front side : UN and RW flag.
   b. Back side : AMAHORO - PEACE
   c. To be ordered ASAP.
   d. Amount: 10,000 for free distribution to spectators.

5. Departure and arrival at Stadium to be filled by media-campaign.

6. Arrival of all athletes at the stadium lining up with UNAMIR, RGF and RPF Battalions followed by performance of the UN Hymn (if existing) and the RW National Hymn in the presence of RW Government, Diplomats and various VIP (see also 7.h hereafter).

7. **Various:**

   a. Hymns could be followed by folkloric dancers and firework.
   b. Provide loudspeaker systems in front of run to make crowd shout "Amahoro" all over KIGALI.
   c. Monitoring of the run on giant TV screen in the stadium.
   d. UN and RW flags, small sized, to be distributed all along circuit (10000 of each) or dropped by helicopters.
   e. DTG: to be determined in order to have darkness for the fireworks.
   f. Participants of the relay should try to mobilize as many people as possible to run together with them in order to create a huge popular movement towards the stadium.
   g. The event day might become the "National Day of Peace" for the following years.
   h. Invite Mr BOUTROS B GALI and government of all nations participating at UNAMIR.

8. Details to be specified.

9. Some money would help.

Anx B: RUN FOR PEACE - OPTION 2

This option consists in a simple 1/2 marathon with departure and finish at AMAHORO stadium.

1. **Participants:**

    a. There has to be a participation of RGF, RPF and UNAMIR personnel (to be determined).
    b. Locals to be invited to join - no restriction on the numbers.

2. **Equipment:** military personnel to wear T-Shirts as under Anx A, Par. 4.

3. Any of the proposals listed in Anx A can be added to this option.

INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch		Sign	DTG
COO			
DCOO			051455
Sr Duty	x	[illegible]	081144
Duty Offr	/		
Engineer	/		
Info	/		
Trg	/		
Air Ops	/		
Signals	/		
Mov Con	/		
Liaison	/		
Other	/		
x = Final destination / = No need to see			

6

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United Nations Nations Unies
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: COS
A:

DATE: 21 Dec 93

①

REFERENCE:

THROUGH: COO
S/C DE:

FROM: CMO ~~SO~~ 21 Dec 93.
DE:

SUBJECT: Milob Escort Report
OBJET:

1. Attached please find report of the escort commander, (CLAO, milob HQ) who was in charge of the escort of RPF reconnaissance team into KIGALI.

2. For your information

Spoken to CMO
Action already taken, please file
COO
COS
31/12/93

②
FC
- A report from Col Tikoka's HQ.
- For information please.
COS
21/12

③
COS
Plse speak to CMO about carrying either side/party in our vehicles. Is this acceptable to our position of neutrality?
FC
27/12

Sr Duty
File
05/01

3050.1 (OPS)
R-1

United Nations — Nations Unies
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM — MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: / A: CMO . MILOB HQ

DATE: 21/12/93

REFERENCE: MILOB/22/5

THROUGH: / S/C DE:

FROM: / DE: Chief Liaison Officer
MILOB HQ

SUBJECT: / OBJET: <u>RPF Insistance for bringing their own armed escort to Kigal</u>

1. This morning at about 0810 hrs a group of militar
observers went to Mulindi along with Belgium armed
escort to bring RPF Military officials to Kigali for the purpo
of recce of their battalion location/deployment site. The escor
team could not start from Mulindi in time because of
What was the problem → the RPF hassle on the subject matter. It took more than an
hour to convince them to ~~be~~ refrain from the demand. They
again insisted to bring their own vehicles for travelling t
Why not? Kigali, which was also not accepted/aggreed upon by the
UNMO team. At one stage they refused to travel by the
microbus provided by UNAMIR HQ. However later on they
Never again → were convinced to travel with the observers vehicle. They
Their own vehicles. were total 10 in numbers. 3 high officials were taken to the
observers vehicles and rest were accommodated in the
microbus with the presence of one observer.

2. The UNMO team tried to establish communication
with the MILOB HQ for necessary advice but to no avail.
Even the communication could not be establish with the
Belgium set.

3. It may be mentioned that, RPF military leaders seem
to be very much cautious about their security. They were
in suspicion that they might be killed/detained by RGF at

United Nations Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM   MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO:
A:

DATE:

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM:
DE:

SUBJECT:
OBJET:

any time. That was the prime reason for raising ~~an~~ claim

||to bring their own armed escort to Kigali.

4. During the conversation one of the RPF leader ~~stressed~~ stressed upon the presence of KOBRA Security force at Kigali. It reveals from their statement that, these are the highly motivated people recruited from the hardcore RGF to carry out killing/massacre to disrupt the peace process. They suggested that these force may be integrated with the Gendarmerie.

5. It may be further mentioned that they are quite apprehensive about the success of the overall peace process.

6. Forwarded for your info and action.

Rahman

HAFIZUR RAHMAN

MAJOR

CHIEF LIAISON OFFICER

5

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

04 Jan 94

3000.2/Ops

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **NIGHT VISION INSTRUMENTS(NVI)**

1. Different kinds of NVI are:

a. Goggles for individual troops short range observation and patrolling.

b. Goggles for drivers.

c. Goggles for heli pilots.

d. Long range night vision instrument for area control.

2. Please forward your request of NVI to Force HQ, Ops Branch as soon possible.

W. BALIS
LT COL
COO

Distribution:

Action:

Comd Kigali Sector

Comd DMZ Sector

CMO

Info:

Chief Log Offr

FROM: COO

TO: COMD SEC KIGALI

INFO: COS

DATE: 26 DEC 93

SUBJECT: **TRG AND ARMING OF POLITICAL MILITIES.**

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, PLEASE NOTE THAT ACTIVITIES ON TRAINING AND ARMING OF POLITICAL MILITIES TOOK PLACE IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

   * KABUYE (053929)
   * GITIKINYONI (023848) (name of the place is not indicated on the map)
   * KICUKIRO (124815)
   * GIKONDO (083824)

2. A POSSIBLE TASK FOR THESE MILITIES IS TO EXECUTE ACTIONS AGAINST HUTU AND THEN CLAIM RPF ABOUT IT.

W. BALIS
LtKol
DCOO

271620 Dec 93

Force HQ
UNAMIR
Ops Branch

23 Dec 93

3000/2/Ops

See Distribution:

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

Ref:

A. UNAMIR OD No. 2.

In order to finalize the ROE of UNAMIR, your proposals and comments on the OD No. 2 are awaited by DCOO/Force HQ not later than the 251000 Dec 93.

W. BALIS
LT COL
DCOO

Distribution:

Action:

Comd Kigali Sector

Comd DMZ Sector

2

INTER OFFICE MENO
UNAMIR

TO: Senior Duty Officer
Chief Engineer Officer
Mil Training Officer
Mil Signal Officer
Chief Air Ops Officer
Dy Chief Air Officer
Chief Mov Con Officer
Mil Info Officer
Chief Liaison Officer
Liaison Officer

FROM: OPS BRANCH

DATE: 22 DEC 93

SUBJECT: **USE OF VEHICLE UNAMIR 1014**

1. UNAMIR 1014 has been allocated to Ops Branch.

2. Use of this vehicle is decided by DCOO, according to the following principles:

a. During Office Hours: i.e. from 0800 hrs to 1200 hrs and 1400 hrs to 1700 hrs:

(1) Vehicle is stationed at Force HQ and can be used, after approval by DCOO, for duty matters by all Sub Sec of Ops Branch.

b. After Office Hours: i.e. from 1200 hrs to 1400 hrs and from 1700 hrs to 0800 hrs:

(1) Vehicle is stationed at MERIDIEN HOTEL and can be used by Officers of Ops Branch only if needed for duly reasons, such as:

(a) Join the Force HQ.

(b) Investigation, collecting of information.

(c) Liaison.

(d) Control and monitoring tasks.

3. Any user of the vehicle will fill out the trip ticket at the end of each trip.

4. The tpt of Duty Offr to and from Force HQ will be arranged through tpt officer, as usual.

5. If DCOO is out of the hotel, the key of the vehicle will be available with the Senior Duty Officer, Major Nazmul. In this case, any user will forward following information:

a. Name and Rank.

b. Purpose of the use of the vehicle.

c. Time of departure.

d. Estimated time of arrival at MERIDIEN HOTEL.

6. <u>Accommodation(Hotel Meridien)</u>

a. Lt Col Balis - Room No. 515 Phone - 82177 Ext-1515.

b. Maj Nazmul - Room No. 512 Phone - 82177 Ext-1512.

W. BALIS
LT COL
DCOO

/

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FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION TKF 17

Outgoing Fax #: MCC 12/03-	Date: 03 DECEMBER 1993
To: PER O. HALLQVIST CAO Attn: MOVCON	From: BEISSEL/ACT. DIRECTOR FOD/DPKO/UNHQ - NEW YORK
Fax #: 250-84265	Fax #: (212) 963-8655
Number of transmitted pages: 1	Ref.:
Subject: DEPLOYMENT OF BANGLADESH BATTALION	

@ Cos
action ASAP
with Kigali
sector comd
and our
staff.
4/12

URGENT

1. PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT BANGLADESH HAS PLANNED TO DEPLOY 450-470 PERSONNEL 05 AND 07 DECEMBER. DPKO HAS APPROVED PLAN.

2. FLIGHT DETAILS ARE NOT AVAILABLE HERE IN U.N.N.Y.

3. REGARDS.

SRSG
FC
SAO
TTA

Drafted/Cleared by: TIMO ROUHIAINEN TELEPHONE: 963-7840	Authorized by: S.B.BJORNSSON

CAO MOVCON

3050.1(053)
R-1