Notes of the Secretary-General’s meeting with the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council

Held at United Nations Headquarters on 14 July 1992 at 11:00 a.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Petrovsky
Mr. de Soto
Mrs. Aboulnaga
Mr. Warot

H.E. Mr. Li Daoyu
Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations

H.E. M. Jean-Bernard Mérimée
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Yuliy M. Vorontsov
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Edward Perkins
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations

H.E. Sir David Hannay, KCMG
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Aides, including Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, Special Negotiator for Cyprus, Department of State of the United States of America

Subjects: Cyprus talks in New York. Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Secretary-General expressed satisfaction that the two statements adopted by the Security Council had sent a clear message that the Council did not find the status quo in Cyprus an acceptable option. He intended to start his separate
meetings with the two protagonists of the dispute by presenting them with the whole set of ideas and the map. The Secretary-General would ask each leader to accept both the set of ideas and the map as a basis to the forthcoming negotiations. He would begin with the issues of territory and displaced persons, and try to avoid the issue of criteria. However, he would use the criteria "to explain to the parties why the Security Council had chosen this kind of arrangement."

In individual talks with each leader, the Secretary-General would emphasize that the time had come to settle their dispute. He would also try to organize a joint luncheon with them, but could not guarantee at this time that they would accept. The Secretary-General promised the Permanent Members of the Security Council to keep them informed of the progress of the talks on a daily basis.

The Secretary-General feared that the two leaders might be encouraged to procrastinate by a false perception that the Security Council was so busy with the many urgent issues before it, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa or Somalia, that by comparison the problem of Cyprus would be considered secondary. Therefore, it was important to send a clear message to the two protagonists and their godfathers, i.e., Greece and Turkey, that the Council still considered Cyprus a priority.

After stating that he did not feel limited by any date and that he was ready to spend the next two or three weeks in New York to achieve "at least the beginning of an agreement," the Secretary-General asked the Permanent Members for their advice on how to proceed.

The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom had three points to make. First, his Government shared the Secretary-General’s view that the Cypriot issue, which had been a festering sore for so many years, was not a marginal problem or any less significant than the other problems currently exercising the Security Council. Never had the hopes of a major breakthrough been so high, the Ambassador explained, and the opportunity should not be missed.

Based on the British experience with the two parties, the Ambassador recommended that if the Secretary-General started to get some momentum going, he should go as far as possible. "Go on as long and as far as you can," the Ambassador insisted.

Secondly, the British Government would be happy to play a role with any of the protagonists, if the Secretary-General felt that it could help his efforts.

Thirdly, that very morning, the Ambassador had received a telephone call from President Vassiliou, who had expressed
"considerable concern that the revised set of ideas should not enter in the substance of the issue of the rotation of the Presidency from the outset, because it would be like introducing the cuckoo into the nest, and the cuckoo would push every other egg out of the nest." President Vassiliou felt that should this point be put on the table right at the beginning of the talks, he might be compelled to give a very negative answer that would be detrimental to the negotiating process. Sir David specified that he was only passing the message on, without having consulted his authorities, who therefore had not endorsed it.

The Permanent Representatives of France, China and Russia expressed their respective Governments’ strong support for the Secretary-General’s approach and efforts.

The Permanent Representative of the United States "re-echoed" what his colleagues had said, and added that if at any point the Secretary-General wanted the United States Government to be involved with any one of the protagonists, he should just ask. He then invited Ambassador Ledsky, Special Negotiator for Cyprus in the Department of State, to elaborate on the territorial aspect of the negotiation.

Ambassador Ledsky, who had read with great interest and approved the Secretary-General’s report, believed that the first and most difficult issue would be that of the territorial adjustments. He warned that should the Turkish Cypriots produce a map of their own, an immediate decision would have to be made as to whether that map was reasonable. The United States Government wished to be involved in that decision. If the map were deemed reasonable, the Ambassador believed that the Secretary-General would then be able to proceed to a more detailed discussion. "My hope is that you will come to us to weigh on one side or the other, because we think that your map and your set of ideas are the guidelines that we should follow," the Ambassador said.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Secretary-General wished to convey to the Permanent Members some information that had yet to be confirmed: General MacKenzie, a Canadian who was No. 2 in command of UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, had asked to leave because he felt that his life was in danger. Should that information be confirmed, and with the authorization of the Permanent Members, the Secretary-General would replace General MacKenzie as early as possible.

The Secretary-General took the opportunity to express concern that the United Nations did not have much "real information" about what was going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the exception of Sarajevo, a city which represented "only ten or
twenty per cent of the problem." The United Nations did not have the infrastructure needed to gather information from all over the country, and had to rely on press reports or on information provided by the ICRC, with whom, incidentally, the Secretary-General had discussed the possibility of an International Conference on Humanitarian Assistance. Therefore, the Secretary-General would welcome any information about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Governments of the Five Permanent Members would want to share with him.

The U.S. Ambassador said that everybody understood the terrible constraints under which the United Nations was operating, and that none of the Permanent Five harboured any illusion that the Secretary-General might be able to offer them a complete picture of the situation. The Russian Ambassador recognized that it would be very valuable to have first-hand information. His own Government was trying to obtain information from its information-gathering system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was ready to share it with the Secretary-General. At the same time, the Ambassador added, Belgrade's offer to open its airports for inspection should be taken seriously. The Russian Ambassador underscored that it was "difficult to take decisions based on one-sided information from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government."

Eric Warot
16 July 1992
NOTE TO THE FILE

The attached was given by me to UK Ambassador Hannay at 6.45 p.m. on Friday 10 July 1992, on the Secretary-General’s behalf, with the request that he transmit it to Foreign Secretary Hurd. No-one else has been given a copy.

Alvaro de Soto
14 July 1992
1. Pursuant to his discussions in London at the beginning of July 1992 and to the consultations he has since had with Lord Carrington in New York, the Secretary-General has given some thought to the question of a possible United Nations role in the peace-making process in Yugoslavia.

2. The Secretary-General’s consideration of this question is based on the following premises:

(a) the United Nations will continue to play a role on the ground, given its extensive presence in the area and the resources of personnel, equipment and infrastructure available to UNPROFOR;

(b) the division of labour agreed upon between the United Nations and the European Community has been eroded in recent months with the increasing involvement of the United Nations in a number of "peace-making" activities, including the promotion and facilitation of cease-fire and evacuation negotiations with the JNA and the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in Sarajevo, the negotiations leading to the 5 June agreement to reopen Sarajevo airport, ongoing negotiations on the delivery of humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the political problems relating to the "pink zones" in Croatia;

(c) the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, has been closely associated with the "peace-making" process since September 1991 and has collaborated closely with Lord Carrington in his efforts in this regard.

3. Given these considerations, it is clear to the Secretary-General that a meaningful role for the United Nations in the peace-making process in Yugoslavia would require the following:
(a) a decision by the Security Council that the time had come for the United Nations, under the Council’s authority, to approach the crisis in Yugoslavia in all its aspects on the basis of principles and approaches traditionally applied by the United Nations in such situations; among them, the freedom to engage with any and all interlocutors and parties who may be in a position to help resolve the conflict, irrespective of their legal or political status and without regard to the issue of recognition;

(b) a clear-cut mandate to the Secretary-General from the Security Council arising from the assumption that since the United Nations is dealing with a conflict situation on the ground, its peace-making efforts would have to focus on all aspects of the conflict, with a view to its resolution; other matters relating to the constitutional settlement of the Yugoslav question and problems of state succession would continue to be dealt with by the European Community;

(c) that the Security Council, in asking the Secretary-General to offer his good offices, would invite other organizations, notably the European Community, to assist the Secretary-General in his efforts so that he might avail himself of the considerable expertise acquired during their involvement in Yugoslavia;

(d) that negotiations would take place in a flexible framework in which the question of existing forums and new mechanisms would be dealt with in consultation with the Chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, and in a continuous and uninterrupted manner, until areas of agreement are identified;

(e) that in this process, the United Nations will seek to build upon what has already been achieved in the European Community’s Conference on Yugoslavia and related bodies, while
adhering to the principle that negotiations will need to take place without preconditions.

4. If the above conditions are fulfilled, the Secretary General would be prepared to despatch his Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, to the area to examine, in consultation with the European Community and Lord Carrington, the modalities for the United Nations role in the pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis.
NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S MEETING WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

held at Headquarters on Monday, 13 July at 1.00 p.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Alvaro de Soto

H.E. Sir David Hannay, KCMG
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom

Mr. Paul Ritchie
First Secretary

LIBYA

The Ambassador said that the meeting in Cairo with Libyan representatives had been business like. Obviously the Libyans were labouring under the illusion that they were, by meeting separately with the British, driving a wedge between them and the French and the US. The Secretary-General said he had told the Libyans to avoid the impression that they wanted to profit from the fact that an electoral campaign was going on at this moment in the US and from an illusion of division between the three. He had urged them to give something at each encounter lest they not be taken seriously. The Ambassador said that the UK could not complain about the present process. The Secretary-General said he had met with Ambassador Perkins and he had mentioned to him their main preoccupation regarding the sending of an inspection mission: what if, they asked, it couldn’t find anything? The Secretary-General agreed to this preoccupation. He said that the mission should in any case be composed of terrorism experts and that their first purpose should be to ask questions and only in light of the reply to those questions to carry out an inspection and that this should be done through the UN system, that is to say under a UN umbrella. The British Ambassador said that he agreed with the US that the top priority was to give the Secretary-General a list of demands. The Secretary-General added, with respect to his earlier remarks, that the experts in such a mission should be of three nationalities.

The Ambassador then took up the matter of a conversation between David Gore-Booth and the Secretary-General at Chatham House during the latter’s visit to London and he confirmed what Mr. Gore-Booth had said to the effect that if the two were acquitted they would return to Libya and second that they would in any case not be extradited to the US. The Secretary-General said that the problem
and in this he was conveying the analysis of Mr. Osama El Baz an adviser to President Mubarak - was that the Libyans were simply not ready as President Mubarak had originally thought. Qathafi was not at this moment in a position to deliver the two suspects. **The Ambassador** said, returning to the question of the material to be provided to the Secretary-General, that they hoped to give it to him very soon. They had been working with the US on Friday on this matter. **The Secretary-General** said that the list of conditions was a long term matter. The immediate goal should be to set up the investigation mission under a UN umbrella. **The Ambassador** said that the position paper that the UK, US and France were preparing was only regarding terrorism activities. **The Secretary-General** pointed out that what was needed was a list of the conditions for the removal of sanctions. **The Ambassador** said that there seemed to be a misunderstanding but that he hoped that this was not a real discrepancy. The list that they were preparing related to terrorism only. It consisted of a list of issues on which Libya must give continuing satisfaction, it is related to assistance to terrorist groups, both in terms of money and arms, as well as offices abroad. **The Secretary-General** said that the problem with that was that it seemed open-ended and it therefore conceded the argument of President Rafsanjani according to which if it could not be specified that having met certain requirements the Libyans would be let off the hook, then the Libyans were right not to give in. **The Ambassador** said that the Secretary-General would be right to press for anything that he thought was required in addition to what was on the list, but he urged the Secretary-General not to do so at this time, but only once he had received the list. **The Secretary-General** said that in order for this list to be useful he needs through it to be able to reply the question of when there could be a) an undertaking on the part of the co-sponsors that there would be no more sanctions and b) that when the present sanctions would be removed. **The Ambassador** said that the three would in all likelihood ask to see the Secretary-General this week on this matter.

**Agenda for Peace**

The Ambassador then turned to Agenda for Peace. He specifically discussed one matter that had come up in London regarding getting better political assessments from Member States and he emphasized that this would not be intelligence material as such. **The Secretary-General** had emphasized that it should be only on a demand basis, that is a request from the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General had said that it would be useful to have such a political assessment regarding the situation in South Africa. **The Ambassador** then produced and handed to the Secretary-General precisely such a political assessment regarding the situation in South Africa, and he said that it covered the situation up to 7 July and that it was not earth-shaking but it was useful nonetheless. He needed to know from the Secretary-General if he would want this provision of information and assessments to be of a more systematic character.
Yugoslavia

Turning to Yugoslavia the Ambassador handed over a message from Mr. Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, which was subsequent to the message that the Foreign Secretary had received from the Secretary-General regarding his position on a UN role in Yugoslavia peace-making. The Secretary-General read it and he remarked that this was postponing the idea for the time being. The Secretary-General said that he would not be conveying either his own paper which had been handed over to the Ambassador on Friday evening by Mr. de Soto or this paper to anyone but Cyrus Vance. The Ambassador mentioned that he himself might discuss it with Cyrus Vance in the next few days.

The Secretary-General then said that he had spoken to Mrs. Ogata, the High Commissioner of Refugees who had said that the time had come to press ahead on the idea that she had taken up with him in Rio regarding a conference on refugees in Yugoslavia. She would be seeing Douglas Hurd the following day in London.

South Africa

Turning to South Africa, the Secretary-General said that he had learned that Mandela’s interest in coming to New York was derived from his wish to attend the Democratic Convention.

The Ambassador remarked that the Zimbabwe draft resolution which was floating about regarding South Africa would not pass. The Secretary-General said that he had seen Foreign Minister Botha that morning and he had emphasized to him that the UN was not keen to play a role. The Ambassador said that he had told Zimbabwe that it was not advisable to propel the UN into being the inquisitor in South Africa. The Secretary-General should, if he was going to get involved, have an open flexible mandate. The Secretary-General mentioned that he would be seeing Foreign Minister Shamuyarira of Zimbabwe who was in New York and he would also be seeing Salim and he hoped to exercise moderating influence on both. The Ambassador said that he was a little bit worried about what would happen in the Security Council regarding South Africa and its effect on the continuation of the South African process. The Secretary-General said that nonetheless there was a silver lining because Buthelezi would be talking there for the first time; there are certain things that are not widely known, such as for instance, that the police which is accused of repression is composed of blacks rather then whites and that the responsibility for the recent incident was not only to be shouldered by Inkatha but rather that it was widely shared.

The meeting ended at 1.20 p.m.

Alvaro de Soto
14 July 1992
MESSAGE FROM THE RT HON DOUGLAS HURD MP, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, TO HIS EXCELLENCY DR BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have been reflecting on your conversations with John Major and with me last week about how we might most effectively ensure proper coordination of the efforts of the Community and the UN to bring peace in the former Yugoslavia. I was also grateful for your message on the subject relayed to me by Sir David Hannay over the weekend.

We do not, on reflection, believe that the time is right to consider a fundamental shift in the present division of responsibilities. Lord Carrington and his team have built up a store of experience of the difficult personalities and complex issues involved. This should not be dissipated nor their clear work programme disrupted. They have established principles (eg no changes of frontiers except by agreement, protection for rights of all, full account taken of all legitimate concerns) which might be thought to be called in question if the lead responsibility were changed. Among the disadvantages of a shift of responsibility, we can foresee that the Serbs would claim a victory. They have as you probably know been pressing for some time for a conference under UN auspices. Both they and perhaps some other participants would believe that they had been given a breathing space and that the pressures were relaxed while a new instrument was created. Finally, we believe that setting up a new structure would certainly give rise to pressure to bring in new parties, notably the self-proclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. If this were accepted, the resulting conference would be much larger and more unwieldy and, I fear, more open to political manipulation. I believe that these arguments point to our maintaining the existing
conference for the present in its present form. None of this detracts from the need to ensure good coordination between the UN and the EC. I hope that Mr Vance and Lord Carrington will maintain their close liaison and I have given instructions that the British Mission in New York should systematically brief the Secretariat on our thinking on all aspects of the problem. In particular I should like to be in touch with you after my visit to the region next week and when I have taken stock of the situation with my EC colleagues on 20 July.
Notes of the Secretary-General’s meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia

Held at United Nations Headquarters on 10 July at 6:05 p.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. de Soto
Mr. Annan
Mr. Tharoor
Ms. Zelter

H.E. Dr. Milan Ramljak
Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia
H.E. Mr. Zvonimir Separovic
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations
Mr. Heven Pelicaric
First Secretary
an Interpreter

Subjects:
- Croatia’s complaint to the Security Council
- Croatia’s views on resolution 762
- Croatian border patrols

The Secretary-General expressed his dismay about the fact that Croatia had complained about UNPROFOR in writing to the Security Council. He should have been contacted first and more informally in the first place. Within UNPROFOR mechanisms existed to receive and deal with such complaints. In any case, his reply should have been awaited before addressing the Council. Croatia was unnecessarily complicating his job. If it wanted help it should cooperate. He understood that Croatia was new to the United Nations but there were rules which had to be respected.

The Minister apologized in case Croatia taken the wrong steps.
The Secretary-General replied that he was not asking for a different approach for his own sake but for the sake of Croatia's position. Also, Croatia should not, as a first step, go to the press which would do nothing for them. The Minister was still free to make those moves should the appropriate first steps fail to satisfy him. The Members of the Council have asked for the distribution of the letter. There the Secretary-General could not help. Apologizing again, for the wrong timing, the Minister promised not to repeat such a move.

The Secretary-General warned that whoever accused the UN system of being partial would risk a negative response from the international community, as the system was the international community. The Minister said that Croatia had never intended to criticize the international community. The Secretary-General explained that he was so frank only in order to help. The Minister thanked the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR for all their efforts.

Croatia's views on Security Council resolution 762

The Minister maintained that there was some misunderstanding concerning his Government's reading of resolution 762 of 30 June 1992. The Minister wished that all efforts be made for a successful deployment of the UN operation. Croatia had unconditionally accepted the provisions of resolution 762: the deployment of UNPROFOR, the provisions for the pink zones and to retreat behind the lines existing before 21 June 1992.

The discussions about an amnesty, however, involved very important political and legal issues. According to the new constitution, an amnesty could only be granted by the Parliament. General elections would be held on 2 August. Therefore, he did not wish to elaborate on that complicated problem at this time. He only noted that there were preemptory norms of international law about crimes against humanity and war crimes which should be taken into account.

The acceptance of resolution 762 had been a positive move of the Government of Croatia. But it was noticing more impatience among the population. Although UNPROFOR had been in Croatia already for months, some tasks had not yet been completed. There was no timetable in which the different steps should be implemented. He had raised that question with General Nambiar and Mr. Thornberry of UNPROFOR. In his view, it would heighten the acceptance of UNPROFOR among the population if it was shown how UNPROFOR intended to achieve its goals. The public opinion was reading governmental weakness into some elements of the resolution. The Minister believed that those feelings should be addressed by two operations: a timetable and concrete actions. By concrete actions he meant opening all means of communication and transportation in Croatia (all air and river traffic was blocked),
beginning the resettlement of displaced persons and the withdrawal of all JNA forces from the Dubrovnik region.

The Government and the people of Croatia did not see any reason whatsoever for the Yugoslav army to stay in Dubrovnik, which was not linked to pink zones or to UNPAs. There were no minorities; the entire population was Croatian.

The negative reactions could partly be ascribed to the fact that, even where UNPROFOR had taken control, Croatian houses were burnt down and non-Serbs expelled. From the Eastern Sector, where the UN had taken over two months ago, he had received a list of persons who had been expelled in the last few days. He would present the pertinent documentation. Croatia had consented to restore its control of the pink zones under international control. It was ready to "accept and cooperate with any international help" in those areas. However, in Croatia’s view, the continuation of the pogroms in the East Sector should be stopped, as well as the resettling of Serbs in houses by left empty by refugees.

Border patrols

Croatia was an internationally recognized state and a member of the UN, but in the absence of any control at the "non-existing" borders, Serbs were taking away factories and trespassing. Therefore, the Minister had discussed with General Nambiar and Mr. Thornberry the possibility of having Croatian authorities as customs and police officers patrol the area in conjunction with UNPROFOR.

The Secretary-General promised that he would explore all the issues thoroughly with his collaborators.

The Minister thanked him and asked what the expectations were towards Croatia.

The Secretary-General said that he would address that issue after an in-depth discussion, including all technical details.

The Minister handed to the Secretary-General several documents including a joint statement issued by Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic in Helsinki on 9 July 1992, a table on the ethnic composition in the pink zones and copies of correspondence with UNPROFOR.

Cornelia Zelter

12 July 1992
1. Fighting erupted again in Sarajevo hitting UN headquarters. Shelling was also reported on Serb positions around the city, raising rumours of a Croatian military presence nearby. UN spokesman Fred Eckhard deemed the ongoing relief operation as fragile due to the precarious military situation, which might delay the arrival of a French squadron of attack helicopters to protect the airport.

2. US President Bush urged the CSCE to pursue the humanitarian effort in BH "no matter what it takes" and was reported as taking into consideration President Izetbegovic’s demand to neutralize Serbian heavy artillery pounding Sarajevo, provided that a new Security Council resolution allowing it was passed. He reportedly envisaged land convoys protected by NATO forces, but under UN command, to begin delivering humanitarian aid to Sarajevo within days, and considered involvement of WEU troops as well. The possibility of a future naval blockade was not ruled out, as the Sixth Fleet returned to the Adriatic. The WEU was also considering to send a naval flotilla to the area.

3. Serbian leaderships in Belgrade and in BH declared its support to an unconditional end to war in the two-third Serb-controlled republic and the resumption of the Cutileiro Talks, "on the grounds of the results attained so far". The Presidency of the so-called "Serbian Republic of BH" also proposed the establishment of a corridor allowing residents of Sarajevo to cross from the Serb to the Muslim-Croat controlled sections. The Defence Minister of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina", Stojan Spanovic, supported submitting to popular decision whether Croatian authority should be reestablished in the UNPROFOR-controlled "pink zones".

4. In Belgrade Federal PM-designate Panic held talks with Serbian President Milosevic on ways to solve the Yugoslav crisis and then flew to Helsinki where he met Croatian President Tudjman and US Secretary of State Baker. Meanwhile, University students planned a new protest march through the city. Thirty three opposition deputies proposed the use of summary proceedings to raise the question of recall and responsibility of the Serbian President.

5. EC envoy Lord Carrington showed pessimism on the prospects for a negotiated solution in BH and urged the members of the Security Council to persuade President Izetbegovic to take part in the negotiations. The Hungarian government vowed strong support for the Hungarian ethnic minority’s plea for the deployment of peace-keeping force in Vojvodina.

GM/LV 9 July 1992
Sir,

14 JUL RECD

This is for your meeting with Lord Carrington at 11:15 (today).

9/7
9:00
Estela

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By Mr. Moussoures

1. Mondote
2. UN responsibilities of the peace under the umbrella of the UN.
Meeting with Lord Carrington
Thursday, 9 July 1992

1. On Tuesday, 7 July 1992 the final communique of the Munich meeting the G-7 favoured "close consultations between the Conference on Yugoslavia presided by Lord Carrington, the European Community, the United Nations and other parties concerned by the Yugoslav crisis. These consultations might lead to the convening of a broader international conference which would deal with unsettled issues, in particular those relating to minorities". The possibility of convening such a conference had been discussed by the Secretary-General last week in London in meetings with British officials and Lord Carrington. The G-7 announcement follows a short and predictably disappointing trip by Lord Carrington to Sarajevo.

2. The proposal for a broader international conference raises a number of issues:
   a) format of the Conference: in the London talks mention was made for a joint EC/UN conference. Would that be under UN or EC umbrella? what would be the implications for a joint Carrington/Vance chairmanship?
   b) participation: would the EC participate as one entity or member states within the EC also have a separate saying? what would be the role of the CSCE? what are other "interested parties" mentioned in the G-7 communique? is the Security Council to participate?
   c) rules of procedure
   d) agenda: what would be the objectives of the conference? is the the Hague draft treaty going to be the basis of negotiations? would various negotiating groups on a number of issues be established?
   e) secretariat: is the EC or the UN going to provide secretariat services to the conference?

Gen vra
14 JUL Rec'd
LV
8 July 1992
Notes of the Secretary-General's meeting with the President of the Serbian Democratic Party

Held at United Nations Headquarters on 7 July 1992 at 1:00 p.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Mousouris
Mr. Tharoor
Mr. Warot

Mr. Dragoljub Micunovic
President of the Serbian Democratic Party (Serbia)

Mr. Zoran Hodjera
Member of the Executive Committee of the SDP

Mr. Fedor Rajic
Member of the Executive Committee of the SDP

Subject: Efforts to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Request to lift sanctions against Yugoslavia.

After thanking the Secretary-General for receiving him, Mr. Micunovic said that everybody in Yugoslavia was very concerned by the situation in which they found themselves. His political party, which was an opposition party, was trying to achieve peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and had tabled in the Serbian Parliament a proposal for a conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be held preferably under the auspices of the Security Council or of the five Permanent Members. What was new in that proposal, Mr. Micunovic pointed out, was that, in addition to the three local ethnic groups, the states of Serbia and Croatia would be invited as "guaran tors of peace". Because Serbs and Croats accounted for over 50 percent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and because Serbia and Croatia were the only countries sharing borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina and susceptible to having territorial claims
over it, they should be called to guarantee the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Mr. Micunovic's opinion, the projected conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina was a priority.

The Muslim side should accept the multi-ethnic concept of Bosnia and Herzegovina and allow for some flexibility in solving problems, Mr. Micunovic continued. Only with mutual guarantees could a lasting peace be achieved. The first step should be the restoration of economic activity, because it would help bring peace.

Mr. Micunovic's party believed that Serbia and Croatia should actively participate in establishing peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What they were currently doing, i.e. declare that they had nothing to do with what was happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was not enough. It only made it all the more imperative that both those states guarantee the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Another issue was of particular concern to Mr. Micunovic, namely the sanctions against Serbia. Part of Mr. Micunovic's mission in North America was to find out what his party, as a democratic opposition party, could do to speed up the lifting of sanctions. These were deteriorating the economic and social fabric of Serbia to the point that they might have devastating long-term consequences. It was to be feared that their impact would create conditions for demagogues or a military junta to seize power in Serbia.

The Secretary-General interjected that sanctions were like war: easy to declare but most difficult to end.

Mr. Micunovic asked what kind of first step could be made that would indicate seriousness? Would it be participating in an international conference? Or a joint declaration by Serbs and Croats?

The Secretary-General said that he could not answer that question easily, because he had to take into account the many different voices in the Security Council, as well as the pressure that the international community was applying on that body. Nevertheless, he had no objection to Serbia's participating in an international conference, and such a conference might indeed help create a more positive climate.

Mr. Micunovic understood the kind of pressure that was being applied on the Security Council. However, he was expecting some political change in the leadership of Serbia, and a consensus was being reached in the Serbian Parliament on the necessity of a coalition government.
Sarajevo, that step would be considered much more positive than any statement declaring an intention to establish a special ministry for minorities. When Mr. Mousouris added the name of Dubrovnik to that of Sarajevo, the Secretary-General said that Dubrovnik was only number 2, whereas Sarajevo was the real focus of international public concern.

Mr. Micunovic assured the Secretary-General that his party would do whatever it could, and apply all its credibility to facilitating peace. The Secretary-General reminded Mr. Micunovic that credibility was the practical result of, for instance, "having 10 whole days without fighting, so that food could be distributed in Sarajevo. That would have much more of an impact than any declaration of intention." Mr. Micunovic pointed out that at this moment he could only hope to influence the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but certainly not stop the fighting there. His own efforts with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he added, should be paralleled by similar efforts being made with the Croats.

"You have to give us some basic material results on which we can build", the Secretary-General emphasized. If that could be achieved, the United Nations would then help at the political level. Again, the Secretary-General cautioned that his role was limited by that of the fifteen members of the Security Council.

Mr. Micunovic promised that his party would do whatever it could. However, he added, it would greatly help if a formal conference for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina were announced, or "at least on the horizon". The Secretary-General informed Mr. Micunovic that three days earlier, in London, he had announced that the Security Council would be receiving Lord Carrington. That announcement had been meant to prepare public opinion to the idea of a conference. But a conference would not solve all problems in one day, the Secretary-General warned, and the Serbian Democratic Party should still spare no effort to stop the confrontation in the field.

Mr. Micunovic stated that when he returned to Yugoslavia the next day, he would head for Sarajevo and have talks with President Izetbegovic as well as the local Serb leaders, because it was important that some initiatives come from within. During his stay in Washington, Mr. Micunovic had had talks with the representative of President Izetbegovic, and before coming to the United States he had met with Mr. Karadzic, who was the Serbian leader in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Secretary-General informed Mr. Micunovic that he was trying to persuade Mr. Cyrus Vance to travel again to the region, where he could play the role of a catalyst and achieve material results. Mr. Hodjera rejoiced in that prospect, while Mr. Micunovic reported that he had met in Washington with the new Serbian Prime Minister, Mr. Panic, and that he had been encouraged
The Secretary-General asked whether the Serbian Democratic Party was social democrat or liberal democrat, and whether it had any contacts with socialist parties. Mr. Micunovic replied that even though his party was "liberal democrat just right of center", it maintained excellent relations with the French socialists and the German social democrats. The Secretary-General suggested that these relations might be a good way to try and influence public opinion, upon which Mr. Micunovic mentioned that his party had recently participated in the Socialist Convention, notwithstanding the fact that it was not a member of the Socialist International. It also had close contacts with the social democrat group within the European Parliament.

The Secretary-General assured Mr. Micunovic that he would do all that he could to promote the idea of an international conference. He did think that Serbia's participation was important. At the same time, the Secretary-General believed that it was essential to obtain some results in the field. Only concrete results in the field would help, he insisted.

In addition to his party's peace efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expected changes in the Serbian leadership, Mr. Micunovic wished to brief the Secretary-General on the issue of Kosovo. The Serbian Democratic Party had recently issued a platform for the solution of inter-ethnic problems in Serbia that stressed the importance of human rights and recommended a special status for minorities. At a round table of all political parties in Serbia, it had proposed to institutionalize the protection of minorities through a Crisis Control Center which would examine the roots of the problems among the Serbs as well as among the Albanians. In other words, the Serbian Democratic Party had suggested that Serbia not only declare its acceptance of international standards for the protection of minorities, but establish institutions for the application of these standards. Mr. Hodjera specified that this proposal included a special status for Kosovo within the Federal State.

If the Serbian Democratic Party was successful in its attempt, Mr. Micunovic said, "Serbs would expect that it would help them return to the international community". Insisting that a prolonged application of the sanctions would have a devastating effect on the fibre of society, Mr. Micunovic repeated that he was seeking the Secretary-General's advice on the first step that his party could make toward the lifting of sanctions, because he wished to table a proposal in Parliament upon his return to Belgrade.

The Secretary-General reiterated that any such step would have to be practical, and that a declaration would not be sufficient, because there had already been too many declarations of intention. There was a "crystallization" of public opinion on Sarajevo, the Secretary-General explained. Therefore, should the Serbian Democratic Party succeed in brokering a long-lasting cease-fire in
by their discussion. The Secretary-General wished Mr. Micunovic
good luck in his efforts.

Eric Warot
10 July 1992
YUGOSLAVIA: VISIT OF MR MICUNOVIC

The Secretary-General's decision to receive Mr Micunovic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party, will be seen as significant in political circles in Yugoslavia. First, no political leader from any of the former Republics of that country not holding governmental office has been received at so high a level before by the United Nations. Second, Mr Micunovic enjoys a decidedly mixed reputation. On the one hand, he heads an opposition party that is widely described as "moderate" and "liberal"; on the other, his party is affiliated with the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina headed by Dr Radovan Karadzic, which has been responsible for many of the excesses in that Republic, and with the intransigent faction in the Knin Krajina, led by Dr Milan Babic (who resisted the deployment of UNPROFOR under the Vance Plan). Some political analysts have therefore seen Mr Micunovic as a clandestine ally of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic (of whom he is officially an opponent). His exact role in the Byzantine world of Serbian politics remains a matter for speculation.

Recent strains in the Serbian Democratic Party have seen the emergence of two wings: the larger, under Mr Micunovic, has been less confrontational in its attitude to the Government, while the smaller faction took a more radical stance in supporting the recent anti-Milosevic demonstrations in Belgrade under the leadership of the best-known Serbian opposition leader, Mr Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement. Mr Micunovic's decision to travel to North America at the time of the mass movement and demonstrations in Belgrade came in for considerable criticism in opposition circles there.

During his visit to North America, Mr Micunovic has apparently been received by Deputy Secretary Eagleburger in Washington and by several Western Permanent Missions in New York. The main official purpose of his visit appears to be to discuss the internal political situation in his country; he has reportedly been speaking of the imminence of President Milosevic's downfall. Unless the Secretary-General has a specific reason for agreeing to see Mr Micunovic, it may be more appropriate for him to be received by the Departments handling the situation in Yugoslavia, i.e. jointly by Mr Annan and Mr Mousouris.

Shashi Tharoor
7 July 1992

cc: Mr Goulding o/r; Mr Annan; Mr de Soto; Mr Mousouris
Confidential

Situation in Former Yugoslavia

7 July 1992

1. Despite renewed fighting in central Sarajevo and around the airport that had reached several humanitarian convoys, the airlift continued and the distribution of food in the city proceeded satisfactorily, according to UNHCR sources in the BH capital.

2. The Group of Seven responded to persistent fighting hampering the operation of the airport with a draft statement and a final declaration threatening with the use of force to assure relief supplies, demanding full compliance with UN sanctions, supporting Lord Carrington peace efforts, expecting to hold a broader international conference on the crisis, and supporting BH territorial integrity. Options considered in the summit appeared to include the expansion of the aid supply beyond Sarajevo by the UN SC, the permission for UN troops to return fire if under fire, and/or a naval blockade to thwart alleged oil shipments to Serbia from the Romanian port of Constanza. While Japan declined participating in any international military action in Yugoslavia and the US appeared still reluctant to go beyond air cover, France and Italy were reportedly considering to send ground troops to BH with a UN mandate to protect access roads for relief convoys.

3. As heavy fighting flared up in northern BH, where Serbs are trying to contact the Serbian-held Krajina in southern Croatia, BH Serbian leader Karadzic proposed the establishment of a confederation between Serbian and Croatian held areas in BH. The President of the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina", Goran Hadzic, complained to the UN SG that Serb populated areas in Slavonia had been left out of UNPROFOR-controlled zones. Commander of the south sector of UNPROFOR Gen. Arap Rob announced that Croat forces were withdrawing their heavy arms from the so-called "pink zones" and that the withdrawal of forces and arms by warring sides in the south sector was running according to plan.

4. UNHCR representatives appealed to European countries to complement humanitarian relief by keeping borders open for refugees from former Yugoslavia. In this respect the Yugoslav Interior Ministry pledged to stop distributing travel documents to Bosnians.

5. The EC mediator Lord Carrington was expected to have talks in New York on Thursday with the UN SG regarding the coordination of efforts to end the bloodshed in BH.

GM/LV 7 July 1992
Notes of the Secretary-General’s meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria

Held at United Nations Headquarters on 6 July 1992 at 5:15 p.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. de Soto
Ms. Zelter

H.E. Mr. Stoyan Ganev
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Deputy Prime Minister of
the Republic of Bulgaria

H.E. Mr. Svetlomir Baev
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Bulgaria to
the United Nations

Mr. Slavi Pashovski
Head of International
Organizations, Department of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Bulgaria

Mrs. Sylvia Rolinsky
Special Adviser of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Subjects:  - General UN policies
- The current situation in the Balkans

UN policies

The Secretary-General welcomed the Minister who was in New York on the occasion of the ECOSOC session. The Secretary-General explained that his address to ECOSOC earlier that day related to the "Agenda for Peace". It was important to develop comprehensive post-conflict concepts. The UN activities in Cambodia and El Salvador offered examples for that direction. In future, the UN would be increasingly involved in elections, boundary disputes and a growing refugee problem. Rehabilitation and reconstruction
activities were becoming an integral part of peace-keeping operations. That concept demanded a new approach from ECOSOC and the UN agencies. The Minister agreed that what the Secretary-General had said at ECOSOC was important and affected the UN structure altogether.

The Balkans

The Secretary-General asked for the Minister's views on his "neighbouring region". The Minister said it was very difficult. He saw a possibility for a viable solution only if all countries were connected to the efforts of the UN and the CSCE. He pointed out that Bulgaria was the one Balkan country that did not create problems in the region. Enumerating a number of Balkan conflicts (Greece/Turkey, Greece/Macedonian Republic, Albania/Yugoslavia, Romania and Moldova etc.), he explained that those conflicts were rooted in history. Bulgaria was the stable element in the Balkans. It had recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina three to four months earlier than other European countries, whose decision had been belated. Bulgaria had realized early the larger issue of Yugoslavia's territorial claims and had tried to preempt them by recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now Bulgaria's approach was better understood as a move for stability in the region. The recognition of all existing borders was essential.

The Minister reported that Bulgaria was organizing a Balkan forum, including Slovenia and Croatia and, hopefully, Macedonia, once the EC would have recognized it. To a question of the Secretary-General the Minister answered that Bulgaria was the first country to have recognized the Republic of Macedonia, followed by Turkey. However, Bulgaria had not established diplomatic relations with Skopje. There were some problems related to the Macedonian constitution. One article referred to "all Macedonians", which meant Macedonians within the Republic of Macedonia and outside, namely in Bulgaria and Greece. He explained that the geographical region of Macedonia, not the Republic, encompassed parts of the former Yugoslavia, of Greece and also of Bulgaria. The Government of Macedonia wanted to create a new situation in which all Macedonians, irrespective of their geographical location, would be connected to Skopje.

The Secretary-General inquired whether the Republic of Macedonia would be willing to change that part of the Constitution. The Minister answered that President Gligorov had rejected that idea at a meeting in Skopje, playing down the importance of the issue.

The Secretary-General inquired about the number of Albanians in Macedonia. He was receiving different information from different sources. The Minister replied that, according to the Albanian President, there were about 40% Albanians in Macedonia,
but his estimate would be about 25%, 30% at the most. Albania currently was indeed a very important factor in the Balkans. However, he viewed the issue of Kosovo as the present single most important issue. A solution to the problem in Kosovo would be the best for the stabilization of the region. Unfortunately, he was not optimistic.

Referring to the referendum of the Albanians in Kosovo, the Secretary-General asked whether that showed a way. The Minister answered that Kosovo was the most important part of Serbia. As he saw it, Serbian civilization originated there and he could not imagine how Kosovo could be outside Serbia. In his opinion, the best solution would be to give Kosovo real autonomy, not the ex-Yugoslav form of autonomy which had been only formal. A solution had to be found in a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia without any participation of Albania. Reiterating his wish to find a peaceful solution for the Balkans, the Minister showed little understanding for the Greek position which came down to recognizing a country without granting it the right to choose its own name. For Bulgaria, "Macedonia was not the issue". However, it would like guarantees that Macedonia would proceed on the basis of human rights and the Helsinki process. Therefore the Balkan forum should include not only all Balkan countries but also give European institutions, like the EC, the Council of Europe and CSCE, observer status in order to guarantee the process.

The Secretary-General inquired about the status of the Balkan forum. The Minister answered that the Bulgarians had initiated it two months ago, inviting all Balkan countries which were CSCE members. That explained why now Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited but not Serbia. The CSCE had barred Serbia from taking their seat until 15 September 1992. The Foreign Ministers of the respective countries would be meeting in the Bulgarian Embassy in Helsinki. Bulgaria’s basic policy was very simple. It would like peace in the Balkans in accordance with CSCE standards. The Secretary-General recalled that after World War II it had been Bulgaria which had advocated the idea of a Balkan federation. The Minister answered that had been then, in the communist period which was over.

The Secretary-General congratulated the Minister on his selection to represent Bulgaria which would hold the Presidency of the General Assembly. He was sorry that he was unable to go to Helsinki, but Mr. Petrovsky would attend the CSCE meeting.

Cornelia Zelter
7 July 1992
Note for Mr. Mousouris
Situation in Former Yugoslavia
3-6 July 1992

1. The UN was pushing ahead with an international relief operation despite more fighting in Sarajevo. Lord Carrington’s talks on 3 July with BH President Izetbegovic and BH Serbian leader Karadzic offered no progress in ending the conflict. Mr. Karadzic rejected Izetbegovic’s demands that all weaponry left by former JNA in BH be put under international control and that a seven-day cease-fire be respected by the Serbs. Meanwhile an ethnic Croatian-dominated Hrvatska Drzava Herceg-Bosna state was proclaimed in Western Herzegovina on 4 July by Mate Boban, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union in BH. It was declared illegal by the government of BH. Croatian President Tujdman and BH FM Silajdzic criticized the world for focusing in the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo while ignoring Serbian offensive in BH aimed at opening a road to the Serb-held Krajina area of Western Bosnia and Croatia.

2. Designated Federal PM Milan Panic arrived in Belgrade on 3 July and vowed to stop the fighting in BH, to assert human rights in Serbia, and to revitalize the Yugoslav economy under the principles of the free enterprise system. Perhaps reflecting this public relations success, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia declined an invitation for round table talks with opposition parties organized by Belgrade University students. On another front, the Serbian government reportedly set up a commission in charge of human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities, inviting representatives of minorities for talks on the actual exercise of these rights. In this regard, Serbian PM Bozovic renewed the twice declined invitation to hold talks with ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo-Metohija, to which ethnic Albanian parties responded showing disappointment with Lord Carrington’s attitude and rejecting offers of special status for the province, vowing not to settle for less than a republic.

3. While Federal designated PM Panic asked the CSCE to delay any action against Belgrade and pledged to do his utmost to end the carnage in BH, the G-7 was expected to threaten Serbia with outside military intervention if fighting did not stop in BH. On another front, the Macedonian parliament called for the resignation of President Kiro Gligorov and his government for their failure in gaining international recognition for Macedonia. While there appears to be a widespread consensus among political parties against changing Macedonia’s name, the leader of All-Macedonian Action (MAAK), Ante Popovski, proposed confederal alliances with other states.
Notes of the Secretary-General's meeting with the Rt. Hon. Douglas Hogg, QC, MP, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Held at the Dorchester Hotel, London on 3 July 1992 at 10:00 a.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Goulding
Ms. Aboulnaga
Mr. Briscoe

H.E. The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hogg, QC, MP
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

H.E. Sir David Hannay, KCMG
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Dr. Glynne Evans, Head, United Nations Department, Foreign Office

Mr. Nicholas Archer, Private Secretary

Yugoslavia

Mr. Hogg reported that the Prime Minister had enjoyed his meeting with the Secretary-General the previous evening and had been very interested by the discussion of Yugoslavia. The Prime Minister wished to move things forward. Mr. Hogg wondered where, in the Secretary-General's opinion, the initiative for a joint EC/UN peace conference should come from.

The Secretary-General replied that if there were agreement on this proposal he would be very flexible. If the EC preferred the initiative to be seen to come from the United Nations' side then the Secretary-General could do that. The first step should be to arrange a discussion between Lord Carrington and the members of the Security Council. One could then mention that as a result of their conversation it had been decided that it was time for a joint initiative.

Mr. Hogg was unsure whether Lord Carrington should be informed by the British of these proposals or whether he would prefer to be told by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would follow the advice of the British authorities in this regard. He observed that the forthcoming
G-7 summit in Munich would provide an occasion to prepare the initiative. Perhaps a sentence could be included in the final communique to the effect that the participants had followed with great attention what had already been achieved by the European Community and the United Nations, but believed that now was the time for a new initiative. The statement need not give any details of the initiative in order to keep all options open.

Mr. Goulding raised the question of a new French non-paper referring to the demilitarization of the whole of Sarajevo; this would be a reinforcement of the Secretary-General's mandate to negotiate a security zone. He suggested that the Secretary-General might wish to entrust negotiations on this topic to Mr. Vance. This might help reduce any objections to the idea of a joint EC/UN conference. The Secretary-General queried whether the Bosnians would accept 'losing' their capital. Mr. Goulding felt that they might be interested by the proposal for demilitarization, which he agreed was very ambitious. Mr. Hogg suggested that this proposal could provide the United Nations with an entrée to a joint conference, which could then be built upon.

The Secretary-General recalled that, since the beginning, he had favoured a division of labour between the European Community and the United Nations. However, the UN had become more and more involved in the Yugoslav problem and the situation had grown ever more complicated. The Organization's role had developed to include the neutralisation of Sarajevo airport and now there was even talk of demilitarizing the whole city.

The Secretary-General then referred to the discussion the previous day of a possible new resolution being considered by the United States authorising measures to protect humanitarian assistance. Dr. Evans declared this to be "US back-pocket thinking". Mr. Goulding observed that the Secretariat had only learnt about the idea from Member States; it had not been shown a draft. Dr. Evans replied that United States representatives had only shown the draft to the European members of the Security Council. Currently, it was not pressing ahead with a draft resolution to authorise further measures if the humanitarian operation was not successful. The Americans, she repeated, were not prepared to pursue the idea and felt that the United Nations should be allowed to get on with the operation.

The Secretary-General noted that with the evolution of the situation in Yugoslavia the division between the work of the United Nations and that of the European Community had begun to become counterproductive. Whatever happened, they were either accused of a lack of cooperation or the protagonists tried to create competition between them. Fortunately, relations between Lord Carrington and Mr. Vance were excellent.
Mr. Hogg reported that whenever Lord Carrington returned from a mission he was very despondent and felt unable to put forward any proposals which would advance the negotiations. Reverting to a subject discussed the previous evening, Mr. Hogg wondered whether the parties to the conflict might agree to any redrawing of frontier lines. The Secretary-General felt that if this were the case, then ad hoc concessions from one side might lead to some from the other side. Such a process could establish some continuity of negotiations and reinforce bargaining positions. Mr. Hogg said that the British wanted to elaborate the proposal for a joint conference and they needed to work quite quickly.

The Secretary-General proposed that if there was agreement on a comprehensive approach to the problems in the region, then it would be important to consider a preventive approach for Kosovo. The United Nations’ contacts with the Serbs might facilitate negotiations on establishing a preventive UN presence in Kosovo. Mr. Hogg concurred and said that it could also help draw Albanian Kosovans into talks with the Serbs; so far, there had been no discussions between those two parties. It was important to work swiftly on this question. Mr. Goulding added that the Serbs still thought better of the United Nations than of the European Community.

The Secretary-General thought that if such contacts took place at the UN premises in Geneva this could have a positive effect. While a joint initiative might not signify a dramatic change in substance, a change in forum could give the impression of some movement. Mr. Hogg saw the advantage of this argument, but stressed that it would have to depend on the agreement of Lord Carrington.

Mr. Goulding recalled that Lord Carrington and Mr. Vance had hosted talks in Geneva on a previous occasion. He felt that if a continuing conference were to be set up in Geneva then it might take some persuasion for the two officials to take up residence there. Mr. Vance would probably be prepared to stay longer than Lord Carrington. Mr. Hogg agreed that this could present a major problem. The first task, Mr. Goulding continued, would be for the British authorities to establish whether Lord Carrington was willing to accept the idea. Personally speaking, he did not regard it as a certainty. Mr. Hogg believed that Lord Carrington could be persuaded if he felt that the proposal had the backing of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary-General.

**Libya**

The Secretary-General mentioned that the previous day Mr. Hurd had discussed a plan for the next meeting between Libyan
1. I attach herewith a cable I received from MacKenzie last night; SRB-002, dated 12 July.

2. While I am somewhat distressed to read the contents in view of my deep personal regard for MacKenzie and my appreciation of the superb job he has been doing with UNPROFOR generally, and now in Sarajevo, I have tried to take an objective view of what he has conveyed.

3. There is no doubt in my mind that MacKenzie has been under great personal stress in carrying out his tasks at Sarajevo; in fact, I was struck by his weariness when I visited him on 5 July 1992 and had then suggested he should delegate more of his work to his subordinates, which he has since attempted to do. Unfortunately, in my view, a great deal of the pressure on him has been generated by the focus of world attention on Sarajevo and by the high profile media coverage the operation and his views/statements have received.

4. While I do not agree with him that he should consider himself responsible for the alleged danger to the personnel under his command, I recognize his feelings on the subject. Considering the views he has expressed, and allowing for the fact that these would
condition his future responses in dealing with the developments in Sarajevo. I recommend that we allow him to disengage gracefully and with dignity at this stage of the operation. The best way of doing it would be for the French Deputy Sector Commander to be briefed by MacKenzie on the situation, after which MacKenzie be allowed to take some leave; during his leave period, we could release him from UNPROFOR on the pretext that Canada requires his services elsewhere. The French could then be asked to appoint a Sector Commander (in the rank of a Brigadier-General) with a deputy from Egypt or the Ukraine. I am suggesting a French Commander because that arrangement would be more acceptable to all parties to the conflict; it may also be easier for him to manage the Canadian battalion.

5. I think this would be the best possible way to manage this unfortunate development without conveying undesirable connotations and speculation.
TO: NAMBIAN BELGRADE  
FROM: UNPROFOR //BELGRADE// //COMD//  
DATE: 12 JULY 92  
SUBJECT: DISTURBING TRENDS

1. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE DESIRES OF THE PRESIDENCY TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN ORDER TO REGAIN THEIR COUNTRY AND THEIR CAPITAL. THEY ARE IN FACT PERPETUATING THE CURRENT CONFLICT WHILE THE SERBS ARE SHOWING CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT (I CAN ONLY SPEAK FOR SARAJEVO). OBVIOUSLY THE PRESIDENCY DOES NOT LIKE TO HEAR ME DESCRIBE THE FACTS AS I KNOW THEM AS THIS WEAKENS THEIR CASE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. SO FAR I HAVE NOT GONE PUBLIC.

2. EARLIER THE PRESIDENCY KEYED IT PERSONAL ATTACK ON ME BY USING THE PLAUSIC INCIDENTS. INTERESTINGLY I WAS IN BELGRADE AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT; HOWEVER, EVERYONE IN TOWN WAS MADE TO THINK THAT I APPROVED IT (REINFORCED BY AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT IN THE NY TIMES). FLYERS WERE PRODUCED REFERRING TO US AS SERBPROF, AND UNWARRANTED ALLEGATIONS ABOUND SUGGESTING THAT UNPROFOR IS A (CHETNIK) TAXI SERVICE. THE PEOPLE OF DOBRINJA (SOME 2000 OF THEM) HAVE WRITTEN TO 117 NEWSPAPERS REQUESTING THAT I BE TRIED AS A WAR CRIMINAL FOR NOT STOPPING THE SHELLING OF THEIR MUNICIPALITY, AND FOR BEING "EVEN-HANDED" WITH THE SERBS. I HAVE RECEIVED SEVEN DEATH THREATS AND A DETAILED BRIEFING FROM THE PRESIDENCY'S MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR INDICATING THAT THE OTHER SIDE INTENDED TO DO ME IN, PREFERABLY BY BURNING MY VEHICLE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE THOUGHT CROSSED MY MIND THAT THE PRESIDENCY SIDE WAS SETTING ME UP FOR AN ATTEMPT-BY THEIR PEOPLE-TO BE BLAMED ON THE SERBS.

WHEN I CONFRONTED THE PRESIDENT WITH THE GROWING AND UNWARRANTED SMEAR CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNPROFOR HE PROMISED HIS SUPPORT AND FOLLOWED THROUGH IT WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PRESS.

UNFORTUNATELY THE MOMENTUM OF ANTI-MACKENZIE PROPAGANDA HAS CONTINUED TO BUILD WITHIN THE PRESIDENCY POPULATION IN SPITE OF SOME HEROIC ACTS BY TWO CAMARIANS WHEN RESCUING TWO WOUNDED CIVILIAN WOMEN UNDER FIRE YESTERDAY.

I CAN LIVE WITH ALL OF THE ABOVE, AFTER ALL I'M A SOLDIER! HOWEVER OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS SOME OF MY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN TARGETED DUE TO THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH ME. MY SLO WAS PRESENT IN A VEHICLE WHEN AN ANGRY TDF MEMBER AT A CHECK POINT INSISTED IN SEARCHING A VEHICLE FOR "MACKENZIE", AN UNNO AT ONE OF THE PRESIDENCY HEAVY WEAPON POSITIONS HAD A MAGAZINE OF AK-47 FIRED NEXT TO HIS HEAD BECAUSE HE "WORKED FOR MACKENZIE". THIS I CANNOT ACCEPT NOR TOLERATE AS I AM PUTTING MY PERSONNEL IN NEEDLESS
DANGER.

I WILL DISCUSS THIS SITUATION WITH MY CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. I DO NOT WISH MY COUNTRY TO LOSE A GENERAL OFFICER POSITION IN THE MISSION AND WILL SUGGEST CANADA REPLACE ME WITH A BGEN AS SECTOR COMMANDER. IF THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE AS WE DO NOT HAVE A BATTALION IN SARAJEVO, THAN FRANCE/EGYPT/OR UKRAINE COULD BE ASKED TO NOMINATE A BGEN WITH A CANADIAN DEPUTY. CANADA COULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE COMMANDER SECTOR WEST POSITION IN FEBRUARY 93.

THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST DIFFICULT MESSAGE TO WRITE OF MY CAREER. I HAVE TRULY ENJOYED THE CHALLENGE OF UNPROFOR AND IT WILL ALWAYS STAND OUT AS THE HIGH POINT OF MY LIFE. REGRETTABLY THROUGH NO FAULT OF MY OWN, MY PERSONNEL ARE BEING THREATENED. THAT I CANNOT LIVE WITH.

REGARDS.
le 10 juillet 1992

Monsieur le Président,

Je réponds à votre lettre du 1er juillet, dans laquelle vous me posez certaines questions au sujet de la participation aux Jeux de la XXVème Olympiade à Barcelone d’athlètes de la Yougoslavie ou des républiques qui appartenaient à l’ancienne République fédérale de Yougoslavie.

En ce qui concerne la Bosnie-Herzégovine et de la Macédoine, je vous informe que la résolution 757 du Conseil de Sécurité ne vise aucun de ces deux pays, il n’y a aucun problème en ce qui concerne les Nations Unies pour que des athlètes de ces nationalités participent aux Jeux.

En ce qui concerne la Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro), par contre, les sanctions prévues dans la résolution 757 du Conseil de Sécurité sont applicables sauf exemption accordée par le Comité créé par la résolution 724, auquel j’ai transmis votre lettre.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de mes salutations distinguées.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

M. Juan Antonio Samaranch
Marqués de Samaranck
Président du Comité International Olympique
Lausanne
Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have just returned from a 5-day working visit to former Yugoslavia and thought I would share a few preliminary findings with you.

I would like to be in touch with you to discuss further steps including the idea of an international meeting or conference – as we already discussed in Rio. Several Governments have contacted me urging the Office to take a humanitarian initiative which would deal with longer-term aspects of solutions, i.e. return and reconstruction, mobilise international support for the relief programme as well as attempt to devise mechanism for burden-sharing.

May I express through you my deep appreciation for the excellent support we received and are receiving from UNPROFOR.

I am sending a copy of my brief note to Jan Eliasson with whom I will, of course, also be in contact.

Yours sincerely,

With best wishes,

Sadako Ogata

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations Headquarters
New York, N.Y. 10017
United States of America
MEETING WITH DR BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

1. HRH is the major chance for a peaceful change in the former Yugoslavia.

He is a man of dialogue and reconciliation. Democratic government in Belgrade is a precondition to any peaceful settlement.

HRH has a difficult task in trying to contribute to democratic change without violence in his country and the support of international bodies such as the United Nations would be most welcome.

The international media has not paid sufficient attention to the warmth and enthusiasm with which he has been received in Belgrade and the other towns he has visited.

An increasing number of people in Serbia - even those who were not in favour of monarchy in the past - see the crown as a possible framework for a solution.

2. The Crown Prince can articulate the aspirations of the Serbian people in a reasonable and rational manner with a readiness to negotiate rather than fight.

3. His desire to co-ordinate his efforts with the UN reflects his emphasis on an urgent ceasefire as a precondition for talks.

Please help.
DEAR SIR,

With regret we inform You that the armed forces of the official Republic of Croatia, which was recently recognized by the United Nations, for two months have already been invading not only Western Herzegovina and central Bosnia, but also Eastern Herzegovina, where almost exclusively Serbian Orthodox people live. Using most modern weapons obtained from Europe, with technology, mechanization, and equipment, under NATO-Pact labels, the Croatian regular units have from Western Herzegovina crossed over the Neretva River and taken over the valley East of the Neretva, Mostar and its vicinity, Mostar Polje and the settlement Blagaj-Stolac-Ravno in Popovo Polje, a large part of Trebinje County, quite near Hum and Trebinje, that is, deep behind the border between "Avnoj" Croatia and Herzegovina-Bosnia.

Thousands of Croatian military formations are even today advancing along Popovo Polje, Bobani and Trebinjska Suma, where an exclusively Serbian Orthodox population lives and where there was never, even not today, any Croatian population. With German-made tanks and modern Western weapons, the Croatian occupying forces destroy and burn in their wake all Serbian settlements, cities and villages, and especially churches and monasteries. Till now, they have destroyed and set fire to the Serbian Cathedral in Mostar and Serbian churches in: Čapljina, Maljković, Gloga, Upuzen, Gabela, Duvno, Raščani, Bajlo Polje, Bajlovići, Gornja Hrasno, Duvno, Oplišići, Kipci, Prebilovci etc. as well as churches along the Neretva in Čelebic, Kučiće and Bradina, and a number of smaller Orthodox churches in the region of Popovo Polje and Bobani.

A particular crime is represented by the Croatian destruction and burning of Serbian Orthodox medieval monasteries: Zitomislić (16th C.), Zavala (15th C., with frescoes), and the burning down of the Memorial Crypt of the Serbian New-Nactyrs in Prebilovci, where remains removed from pits into which Croatian Ustaše and Fascists threw Orthodox Serbs in 1941 were placed last year. Today, Monastery Đuši (18th C.) is directly endangered, and Monastery Turđaš (16th C.) — the Residence of the Orthodox Bishop of Zahum-Hercegovina — is shelled almost every day, as well as the nearby city of Trebinje, whose 20,000 Orthodox Serbs, 1,500 Muslims and only a few Croatian families live. The aggression of the regular Army of the Republic of Croatia threatens the Serbian people in Eastern Herzegovina with genocidal extermination and the wiping out of their homes, places of worship and graves, which the Croats dig up with bulldozers, as well as the places where they demolished Serbian churches.

Along with this report, full of pain and suffering, we request You, esteemed Mr. Secretary, that You — with Your authority — aid in bringing an end to the suffering of the Serbian Orthodox Church and her faithful in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We greet you wholeheartedly and thank You in advance.

[Signature]

Serbian Patriarch

July 9, 1992
THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

THE COMMUNE TUZLA

THE PRESIDENTSHIP OF THE COMMUNE TUZLA

THE NUMBER: 01/92-708/92.


In the last two days, the Radio-Television of Serbia, the Studio Belgrade, has made the two news, which, surely, in the relation of the news of the same Studio, and, as well, the aggression's activities on Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are predicted, the soon, violence attack on the industrial port of Tuzla by the aviation or by the rockets land-land.

The first, July 7, '92, in the information's edition "The News," at 7:00 o'clock P.M., this Studio invented the "News," that in the immediate nearness, at 400 metres from the Chlor-Alcal Complex, there is the tank's fortification, the which actions to the villages around Tuzla, which are taken place almost by the Serbian people, and after that, the same Studio, tonight, July 9, '92, also in the News reported, that it had the threat the Croatia's Arm's Forces, by its sources of the communication to the Territory Defence the commune Tuzla, that, if the Territory Defence of Tuzla won't stop the piercing the Serbian Arm's Forces on the industrial zone of Tuzla, that the Croatian Arm's Forces will shell the industrial part of Tuzla.

These two, the same false news, are announcing the aviation's attack or the same shelling on the industrial part of the town, because, in those two news, the industrial part was mentioned.
By the first news, is made efforts to justify the aviation's or the shell's attack on the highrisk industrial part of Tuzla, because the alleged placed those tanks in it.

By the first second news, was invented the mentioned danger from the Arm's Forces of Croatia to the industrial complex in Tuzla, that, after the shelling and bombarding by the Federal Republic Yugoslavia on Tuzla, the aggressor will cover who is the real aggressor.

We please and warn the whole World's Public, that with its political, economic and military power, stop this, absolutely surely, planned attack on the industrial part of Tuzla, with which will be initiated the big ecologic catastrophe, which will imperil the extensive Balkan and the Middle European territory.

The Crisis Staff of the Commune Tuzla
The President

Mr. Selim Bešlagić