

SECTOR I , BYUMBA

18 JAN - 23 JUNE 1994

OPERATION ORDERS

AND REPORTS

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

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ORIGINAL ORDER

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BOX 154

FILE 4

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MILOB GP HQ

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02

Copy No. 1 of 30  
UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
Kigali

5

23 Jun 94

3000.15 (Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: OPERATION ORDER NO. 14

1. SITUATION

a. Fighting Factions

(1) RPF has surrounded Kigali from all directions and virtually cut off the city from rest of Rwanda. RPF advance, though slow, is firm and effective. They are continuing their advance towards west and gaining ground as much as possible. They have already captured RUNDA and KABGAYE and encircled GITARAMA. The RPF have cut off Gitarama - Butare road and are on the southern outskirts of Gitarama. They are continuing to put pressure on the near isolated government pockets of resistance in Kigali. They are maintaining minimum essential pressure on the Ruhengeri front. The RGF seems to be giving in on the Gitarama front. They seem despondent in Kigali and there are no overt signs of any offensive intentions, except few isolated maneuvers. The militia leadership have moved out of Kigali for seemingly Gitarama, but just like the Interim Government, it is not sure of their actual presence in that area. RGF are however holding on to most of their defensive positions in Kigali, Ruhengeri and Gitarama.

(2) On 30 May 1994 representative of the RPA and RGF met at UNAMIR Headquarters in Kigali to start discussions on a cease fire document prepared by UNAMIR. They again met on 02 June 1994. The on going negotiations of the cease fire are evolving rather slowly but at least there is a genuine desire to see such a prospect happen in the reasonably near future. These negotiations have not reduced to any significant level the combat operations in the field.

b. UNAMIR Forces.

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(1) During the thick of the battle, it was decided to thin out UNAMIR forces to a residual strength under the modified mandate of 21 Apr 94. The total strength of UNAMIR is presently at about 450 personnel. Present formed troops strength is in the order of two and half companies.

(2) Current force structure is based on a very limited self defence capability of UN installations, including the airfield, monitoring displaced persons camps in Kigali, liaison with all factions and humanitarian monitoring/assistance tasks.

(3) The Security Council has decided to increase the force structure with an expanded mandate. The increased strength will have two mechanized bns, three motorized bns of which one coy will be mech, 320 UNMOs, 90 UNCIVPOLs, Force Support Bn, Helicopter Wing, Force Signal Sqn and a re-organized Force HQ.

2. MISSION. Pursue a cease fire implementation and assist in the security and support of the humanitarian efforts in Rwanda in cooperation with local authorities.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. Five Infantry bns supported by an Engr Coy, Helicopter Squadron, UNMOs and CIVPOLs will be deployed to concurrently monitor a cease fire and to also assist in humanitarian and security tasks. Each bn will be structured in three line coys each and a combat support coy which is to include a mortar platoon, assault pioneer platoon and a recce platoon with snipers. The bns will be deployed in six geo/administrative sectors. Bns in turn will deploy in coy locations through out their respective sectors and be employed in peripheral humanitarian security tasks. MILOB Group and CIVPOL will have their own Sector HQ and will either be with the Sector HQ or co-located with Sector HQ established by the Bns. All Sectors will be commanded by Bn Commanders except for MULINDI/BYUMBA Sector which will be commanded by the MILOB Sector Comd.

b. Deployment. This deployment options are to be considered a Cease Fire Deployment and a Non-Cease Fire Deployment option. However the overall deployment will be conducted in three phases of which Phases 1 and 2 are concurrent:

(1) Phase 1. The Ghana Bn (GHANBATT) would be brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with 50 X M 113 APCs provided by US Forces. This unit will be deployed at the Kigali International Airport (KIA), the BYUBAT GOLF location, the Bugesera

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prefecture area and Gitarama. Force Signal Squadron will deploy at Amahoro Complex with Tunisian Coy as HQ security. Field Hospital will deploy at King Faisal Hospital and Engineer Coy will deploy in Byumba. Force Movement control will deploy at KIA. Logistic Support will be through civilian contact operating a logistics mission base in Kigali area and airheads in KIA and Nairobi and Entebbe as the main route of entry.

(2) Phase 2. Phase 2 deployment may take place concurrently with Phase 1. Deployment of two battalions (one mechanized and one motorized), some advance elements of the support battalion.

(3) Phase 3. Induction of the remaining two motorized battalions and the rest of the force support battalion with helicopter squadron and MP Coy.

c. The essence of the deployment is based on the flexibility of concentrating forces for the humanitarian security or support tasks and be able to meet the monitoring of an eventual cease fire. Protected sites will be constituted through armed/formed elements of the force at locations where Rwandese are in need of security be they isolated pockets in and around built up areas, or temporary displaced persons camps, or more permanent/settled refugee camps. The mobility and protection afforded the Bns and the inherent flexibility of the UNMOs permit convoy escorts, quick redeployments to threatening situations, temporary security sites at distribution points, secure transfer by vehicle or on foot of returning to their place of origin. These activities will be directed from either Force level decisions from within the Sectors or in transit between sectors. Routine monitoring/patrolling will be implemented in each Sector in complete coordination between formed troops (Bns), MILOBs HQ and CIVPOL HQs, dependant on threat.

d. GHANBATT

(1) Grouping. Full strength of 800 personnel.

(2) Deployment Plan

(a) Cease Fire Condition

- i. Bn HQ : Old KIBAT Location /Terminal Bldg/Tech School.
- ii. A Coy : AMAHORO STADIUM/GITARAMA.
- iii. B Coy : BYUBAT GOLF Location.

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- iv. C Coy : KIA (Presidential Hanger & Old Tower)/ BUGESERA.
- v. Combat Sp Coy : KIA (Tactical).
- vi. Sp Coy : KIA (Presidential Hanger and Old Tower).

(b) Non-Cease Fire Condition No change from Cease Fire Condition.

(3) Tasks

(a) Phase 1 and 2

- i. Receive rest of the strength and reconstitute the bn.
- ii. Deploy troops as per deployment plan.
- iii. Provide upto 4 armed escorts on requirement.
- iv. Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.
- v. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on orders from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vi. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vii. Be prepared to provide convoy escorts from alternative airhead to Kigali.
- viii. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- ix. Undertake, control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- x. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.
- xi. Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.
- xii. Earmark one platoon to be the Force Reserve.



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xiii. Be prepared to monitor the cease fire according to separate instructions.

xiv. Stand by 2 Platoons for deployment on security and admin duties at KIA and Entebbe Airports respectively. The platoon for Entebbe will move on order from Force HQ.

xv. Be prepared to deploy Coy to BUGESERA and GITARAMA at short notice.

(b) Phase 3. No change from Phase 1 and 2. Any changes will be intimated later.

c. Mechanized Bn Two

(1) Grouping. As per UN Table of Organization and equipment.

(2) Deployment Plan

(a) Cease Fire Condition

i. Bn HQ	:	GITARAMA.
ii. A Coy	:	KIBUYE.
iii. B Coy	:	To be selected by recce team.
iv. C Coy	:	"
v. Combat Sp Coy	:	"
vi. Sp Coy	:	GITARAMA.

(b) Non Cease Fire Condition

i. Bn HQ	:	GITARAMA.
ii. A Coy	:	KIBUYE
iii. B Coy	:	GISENYI
iv. C Coy	:	RUHENGARI
v. Combat Sp Coy	:	To be selected by recce team.
vi. Sp Coy	:	GITARAMA.

(3) Tasks

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(a) Phase 1 and 2

- i. Receive rest of the strength and reconstitute the bn.
- ii. Deploy troops as per deployment plan.
- iii. Provide upto 4 armed escorts on requirement.
- iv. Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.
- v. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on orders from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vi. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- vii. Be prepared to provide convoy escorts from alternative airhead to Kigali.
- viii. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- ix. Undertake, control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- x. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups. Be prepared to stabilize military/political situation in AOR.
- xi. Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.
- xii. Earmark one platoon to be the Force Reserve.
- xiii. Be prepared to monitor the cease fire according to separate instructions.

(b) Phase 3. No change from Phase 1 and 2. Any changes will be intimated later.

d. Motorized Bn - One

(1) Grouping. As per UN Table of Organization and equipment.

(2) Deployment Plan

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(a) Cease Fire Condition

- i. Bn HQ : BUTARE
- ii. A Coy : GIKONGORO.
- iii. B Coy : TO be selected by recce team.
- iv. C Coy : " " "
- v. Combat Sp Coy : " " "
- vi. Sp Coy : BUTARE.

(b) Non Cease Fire Condition

- i. Bn HQ : BUTARE.
- ii. A Coy : GIKONGORO.
- iii. B Coy : CYANGUGU.
- iv. C Coy : To be selected by recce team.
- v. Combat Sp Coy : "
- vi. Sp Coy : "

(3) Tasks

(a) Phase 1 and 2

- i. Deploy troops as per deployment plan.
- ii. Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.
- iii. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- iv. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- v. participate in security operations with local authorities.
- vi. Undertake control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.



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vii. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.

viii. Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.

ix. Be prepared to stabilize military/political situation in AOR.

x. Be prepared to monitor cease fire on orders.

(b) Phase 3. No change from Phase 1 and 2. Changes will be intimated in time.

e. Tunisian Pl(+)

(1) Grouping. Present strength to be brought to 60.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1.

i. Continue to provide security at Hotel Meridien, King Faisal Hospital and Mille Collins.

ii. Provide APC escorts on order.

iii. Be prepared to undertake tasks as ordered by Force HQ.

(b) Phases 2 and 3.

i. Establish HQ at Basketball Court within the Amahoro Complex.

ii. Ensure security and protection of Force HQ.

iii. Provide APC escorts on order.

iv. Be prepared to under take any task given by Force HQ.

v. Be administratively under control of Force Communication Sqn.

f. Force Engr Coy

(1) Grouping. As per Annex A.

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(2) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1 and 2

- i. Deploy troops as at BUYMBA, coy HQ to be located at BUYMBA.
- ii. Establish safe haven areas for displaced persons and secure these camps.
- iii. Conduct exchange of refugees/displaced persons on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- iv. Provide convoy escorts on order from Force HQ Humanitarian Cell.
- v. Participate in security operations with local authorities.
- vi. Undertake control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc) in conjunction with local authorities.
- vii. Undertake deterrent operations with local authorities against illegal groups.
- viii. Implement the Sector Operations Guidance.
- ix. Be prepared to stabilize military/political situation in AOR.
- x. Be prepared to monitor cease fire on orders.

g. Force Sig Sqn.

(1) Grouping. As per Annex A.

(2) Tasks.

(a) Phases 1 and 2. In addition to the tasks mentioned in the Comms Instr 100.1/FC(Comms) dated 17 May 94 you will:

- i. Deploy troops at the Amahoro Sports Stadium (KIGALI).
- ii. Provide own security and security for Displaced persons in the Amahoro Stadium.

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iii. Be responsible for the administration of the Tunisian Coy (-).

h. MILOB GROUP

(1) Strength. Will be 320 UNMOs by Phase 2.

(2) Deployment Plan

(a) Cease Fire Condition

- i. MILOB HQ : Co-located with Force HQ.
- ii. KIGALI Sector : Amahoro Stadium.
- iii. BYUMBA Sector : BYUMBA.
- iv. GITARAMA Sector: GITARAMA.
- v. BUTARE Sector : BUTARE.
- vi. RUHENGARI Sector: RUHENGARI.

(b) Non Cease Fire Condition

- i. MILOB HQ : Co-located with Force HQ.
- ii. KIGALI Sector : Amahoro Stadium.
- iii. BYUMBA Sector : BYUMBA.
- iv. GITARAMA Sector: GITARAMA.
- v. BUTARE Sector : BUTARE.

(3) Tasks.

(a) Phase 1 and 2

- i. Be under operational control of Sector HQs. Administratively under MILOB HQ.
- ii. Organize Sectors and deploy the UNMOs as per deployment plan.
- iii. Be prepared to monitor the observance of the cease fire agreement.
- iv. Provide escorts for humanitarian aid

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convoys.

v. Assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with Humanitarian Relief Agencies.

vi. Monitor the process of the return of Rwandese refugees/displaced persons and their resettlement.

vii. Monitor the security situation on a 24 hrs basis.

viii. Investigate any case of violations in conjunction with local authorities through:

aa. Mobile Patrolling.

bb. Static Check Points.

cc. Investigation of complaints.

dd. Continuous Liaison with all parties.

ix. Investigate and report on any incidents of harassment of refugees/displaced persons by illegal gangs or individuals.

x. Be prepared to deploy on order to places for the protection of threatened isolated refugees/displaced persons.

(b) Phase 3. Deploy UNMOs in rest of Sectors for the following tasks:

i. Continue performing tasks as per Phase 1 and 2.

ii. Be prepared to deploy on order to other areas for the protection of threatened isolated refugees/displaced persons.

i. CIVPOL

(1) Strength. 90 police officer under command of Force Commander.

(2) Deployment Plan

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(a) Cease Fire Condition

- i. MILOB HQ : Co-located with Force HQ.
- ii. KIGALI Sector : Amahoro Stadium.
- iii. BYUMBA Sector : BYUMBA.
- iv. GITARAMA Sector: GITARAMA.
- BUTARE Sector : BUTARE.
- i. RUHENGARI Sector: RUHENGARI.

(b) on Cease Fire Condition

- MILOB HQ : Co-located with Force HQ.
- ii. KIGALI Sector : Amahoro Stadium.
- iii. BYUMBA Sector : BYUMBA.
- iv. GITARAMA Sector: GITARAMA.
- V. BUTARE Sector : BUTARE.

(3) Tasks.

- (a) Be under operational control of Sector HQ. Administratively under command of CIVPOL HQ.
- (b) Deploy police teams as per deployment plan.
- (c) Monitor the process of the return of Rwandese refugees/displaced persons and their resettlement.
- (d) Monitor the police/gendarmerie security situation.
- (e) Investigate any cases of violations in conjunction with local authorities through:
  - i. Mobile patrolling.
  - ii. Investigation of complaints.
  - iii. Continuous Liaison with all the parties.



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iv. Investigate and report on any incidents of harassment of refugees/displaced persons by illegal gangs or individuals.

v. Investigate cases of human rights violations.

vi. Assist local authorities in maintaining law and order.

vii. Assist MILOB and ground troops in police matters.

j. Force MP Coy

(1) Strength. 50 Military Policeman.

(2) Location. Coy HQ will be at Amahoro Stadium. MP detachment to be located at Force HQ, KIA and in all Sector HQs.

(3) Tasks. Assist the FC to maintain discipline, law and order in all sectors within the force through:

(a) Foot/Mobile patrols.

(b) Traffic Control.

(c) Criminal investigations.

(d) Special investigations.

(e) Traffic Accident Investigations.

(f) Liaison with UNCIVPOL and local police.

k. Movement Control

(1) Strength. 20 Persons. The strength is likely to increase.

(2) Deployment. To be located at KIA (Terminal building).

(3) Tasks

(a) Organize all movements from Rwanda to other countries.

(b) Receive and despatch goods through KIA.

(c) Organize all road moves.

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l. Force Helicopter Wing

(1) Deployment. Wing HQ to be located at KIA.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Be prepared to carry out CASEVAC on order.
- (b) Be prepared to perform air reconnaissance on order.
- (c) Main standby to lift up to a coy of troops for rapid deployment.
- (d) Be prepared to provide close support to ground troops.
- (e) Be prepared to lift humanitarian aid to urgently required areas and where roads are not passable.
- (f) Provide logistic support to ground troops on order.
- (g) Be prepared to carry out command and liaison tasks on order.
- (h) Be prepared to provide helicopter support to UNAMIR.

m. Force Humanitarian Cell.

(1) Grouping. Integral.

(2) Tasks. - All Phases.

a. Coordinate all Humanitarian Activities passing through Force HQ.

b. Coordinate with UNREO Reps attached to UNAMIR and also ensure that they in turn coordinate with all other NGOs working in Rwanda.

(3) All tasking and requests should pass through the Operations Branch.

n. Coordinating Instructions.

Timings.

(a) Phase 1. Will be intimated later.

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- (b) Phase 2. Will be intimated later.
- (c) Phase 3. Will be intimated later.
- (d) All Tac HQs to be operational 5 days after arrival of adv party.
- (e) Main HQs to be operational 3 days after the arrival of the last flight.
- (f) Bns to be operational within 7 days after the deployment of its total str.

(2) Deployment Adjustments.

- (a) Force HQ is to be notified of any adjustments/modification to Sector plan outlined in orders.
- (b) Sector final deployment details to be submitted to Force HQ 7 days on arrival of last chalk.

(3) Reinforcements. Bn is to maintain an adequate Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) capable of influencing critical unforeseen situations.

(4) OPs/CHPs. The estb of OPs and CHPs must be of high professional standards.

(5) Improvisation. Improvisation is essential in area ops due to lack of adequate logistics.

(6) Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD). All unexploded EODs and unsafe ammo should be fwd to Force HQ for nec disposal action.

(7) Reports.

- (a) Daily SITREPS covering the past 12 hrs are to be submitted to Force HQ by 0630 and 1830 hrs each day.
- (b) Weekly SITREP/INTREP to be submitted by 0700 hrs on Monday.
- (c) Other reports (SHOOTREPS, VIREPS, INCREPS) are to be submitted as soon as occurrence takes place.

(8) Inter Sector Boundaries. Annex B.

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(9) Rules of Engagement. See Annex C.

(10) Road Moves - Convoys. See Annex D.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. Food/Water. 10 days min rations/water to be maintained.

b. Accommodation. 1. Incoming units to bring own tentage.

c. Dress. As per UNAMIR dress instructions. Flak jackets will be worn at all time.

d. Weapons/Air. As per UNAMIR instructions.

e. Detail Log instructions to be issued by C Log O.

f. C Log O to establish forward Log Bases at KABALE (UGANDA), KAGITUMBA / GABIRO and between BUTARE and GITARAMA and between TARE and RUHENGERI.

g. Medical. The Force Base Hospital will be located at King Faisal Hospital in KIGALI.

h. Force Log Base. To be loc in abandoned school on airport road.

i. KIGALI Airhead Log Office. Office to be based in warehouse at KIA.


5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Locations of HQ

- |     |                |   |                            |
|-----|----------------|---|----------------------------|
| (1) | Force HQ       | - | Amahoro Hotel.             |
| (2) | GHANBAT HQ     | - | Old KIBAT HQ, KIGALI.      |
| (3) | Mech Bn 2 HQ   | - | GITARAMA.                  |
| (4) | Motorized 1    | - | BUTARE.                    |
| (5) | Motorized Bn 2 | - | Will be intimated later.   |
| (6) | Motorized Bn 3 | - | Will be intimated later.   |
| (7) | Force Sp Bn    | - | RWANDEX (Old Log Coy Area) |

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b. Radio Net. Signal instructions being issued separately.

  
R.A. DALLAIRE  
Maj Gen  
Force Commander

Annexes

- A. Grouping.
- B. Inter Sector Boundaries.
- C. Operation Directive 9. Rules of Engagement.
- D. SOP for Road Moves.

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Mechanized Bn 2	4
Motorized Bn 1	5
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Annex A  
To OPO 14  
Dated 23 Jun 94

GROUPING

1. GHANBATT.

- a. Bn HQ.
- b. 3 x Rifle Coys (Mech - M113 APC).
- c. 1 x Combat Support Coy (Mor Pl, Recce Pl, Asslt Pnr Pl)
- d. 1 x Support Coy (Maint Pl, MT Platoon, QM Pl).

2. Mech Bn Two.

- a. Bn HQ.
- b. 3 x Rifle Coys. (Mech - M113 APC).
- c. 1 x Combat Support Coy (Mor Pl, Recce Pl, Asslt Pnr Pl).
- d. 1 x Support Coy (Maint Pl, MT Pl, QM Pl).

3. Motorized Bn One.

- a. Bn HQ.
- b. 3 x Rifle Coys. (On 3/5 Ton Trucks).
- c. 1 x Combat Support Coy (Mor Pl, Recce Pl, Asslt Pnr Pl).
- d. 1 x Support Coy. (Maint Pl, MT Pl, QM Pl).

4. Motorized Bn Two.

- a. Bn HQ.
- b. 3 x Rifle Coys. On 3/5 Ton Trucks ).
- c. 1 x Combat Support Coy (Mor Pl, Recce Pl, Asslt Pnr Pl).
- d. 1 x Support Coy. (Maint Pl, MT Pl, QM Pl).

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
5. Tunisian Coy (-).
  - a. Coy HQ.
  - b. 2 x Rifle Pls.
6. Force Signal Squadron.
  - a. Sqn HQ.
  - b. 1 x Rad Troop.
  - c. 1 x Acc Troop.
  - d. 1 x Support Troop.
  - e. 1 x Defence Coy.
7. Force Engr Coy.
  - a. Coy HQ.
  - b. Construction Pl.
  - c. Fd Engr Pl.
  - d. Plant/Resources Pl.
  - e. Workshop Pl.
8. Force Medical Coy.
  - a. Coy HQ.
  - b. 1 x Out Patients Section.
  - c. 1 x Amb Section.
  - d. 1 x Surgery Section.
  - e. 1 x Ward Section.
  - f. 1 x Dental Section.
9. MILOB GROUP.
  - a. MILOB Group HQ.
  - b. MILOB Sector HQ.
  - c. 52 x Teams in Sectors - Non Cease Fire.

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- d. 67 x Teams in Sectors - Cease Fire.
- 10. Force Helicopter Squadron.
  - a. Recce Flight - 8 x Lt Hells.
  - b. Troop Lift Flight - 8 x Utility Hells.
- 11. Force Military Police Coy.
  - a. Coy HQ.
  - b. 2 x Military Police Platoons.
- 12. UNCIVPOL. Teams in Sectors.

# SECTOR BOUNDARIES

ANNEX B.  
TO OPO 14  
DATED 23 JUN 94



MAP NO 3717 UNITED NATIONS  
DECEMBER 1992

## LEGEND :

————— CEASE FIRE CONDITION  
- - - - - NON CEASE FIRE CONDITION

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ANNEX C TO  
OPO-14  
DATED 15 JUN 94

## UNAMIR

### INTERIM

See Distribution

Subject. OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO.9 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

#### GENERAL

1. The conduct of military operations is controlled and regulated by the provision of international and national law, conventions and precedence. Within this legal framework, it is for the United Nations (UN) to set the parameter within which UN Forces will operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide political and legal direction and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. The ROE are drafted by the Force, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority.

2. In accordance with the particular articles of Security Council Resolution 925 (1994) dated 8 June 1994 listed below, the UNAMIR ROP reflect a determined stance to be adopted in the accomplishment of security tasks in either humanitarian activities and in self defence:

"Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;"

"Reaffirms that, consistent with paragraph 4 of the Resolution 925 (1994), UNAMIR may be required to take action in self defence including resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging duties, such as contributing to the security of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel and helping protect the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief, and thus be adequately equipped and provided the rules of engagement to do so;"

3. UNAMIR is a peace-keeping force, without commitments to either party in the Rwandese civil war. Under the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the UN Mandate, UNAMIR has a commitment to all parties in assisting them to achieve peace. Impartiality is the key in this regard and all UNAMIR's actions must be aimed at

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ensuring the furtherance of this objective. However, circumstances could arise where the use of force by UNAMIR personnel would be justified. When this occurs, the nature of peace-keeping will demand that such actions by UNAMIR will be applied with restraint: Use of Minimum Force.

4. The ROE stated in this directive apply to all personnel from all nations providing personnel to UNAMIR. The ROE are written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as permission, they will be guidance to commanders that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary in achieving the aim of the mission. Commanders at all levels are required to translate this directive and to also ensure its dissemination to every soldier under their command. In addition they are to ensure that troops under their command understand this directive.

5. Amendments to this directive will be issued as required and as approved by the UN.

6. This directive will be classified UN RESTRICTED.

DEFINITIONS

7. The following key definitions must be clearly understood by all personnel in UNAMIR.

a. Force. The use of physical means to impose one's will. Military force is the use of the physical means provided by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of troops under unified command to the same end and generally implies the use of significant levels of violence. However, the whole raison d'être of peace-keeping is that peace should be achieved without the use of military force. Peace-keeping is substantially different from peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN peace-keeping operations, including UNAMIR, will be carried out by unarmed military and police observers and armed forces only equipped for self-defence.

b. Self Defence. Action to protect oneself or one's unit, when faced with an instant and overwhelming need, leaving no choice of means and no time for deliberation.

c. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is an action(s) which appear(s) to be preparatory to an aggressive action against personnel or equipment of Peace-keeping Forces and/or property under their responsibility.

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- d. Hostile Act. A hostile act is any aggressive action against personnel or equipment of Peace-keeping Forces and/or property under their responsibility.
- e. Minimum Force. The minimum authorized degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.
- f. Collateral Damage. Damage to persons or property adjacent to, but not part, of an authorized target.
- g. Positive Identification. Assured identification by a specific means can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, track behavior, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or IFF procedures.
- h. Armed Force. The use of fire arms and other weapons (ie batons, bayonets, CS Gas, etc) including warning shots.
- i. Unarmed Force. The use of physical force short of the use of firearms or other weapons (ie batons, bayonets, CS gas, etc).
- j. UNAMIR Installations. UNAMIR installations are:
- (1) Compounds or structures surrounded by a fence or wall containing UN personnel, UN stores and Equipment or UN property.
  - (2) Vital Points/Installation, Key points/Installations protected by UN troops. (ie installations into which UN troops will not allow any entry unless to persons presenting themselves through the normal entrances/exits and after going through proper identification checks).
  - (3) Displaced Persons/Refugee Camps established under UN auspices and guarded/protected by UN troops.
- k. Threat. A threat under the circumstance is defined as:
- (1) The directing of a weapon(s) to any UNAMIR installation will be considered as hostile intent and must lead to preparedness by troops to respond to any fire from that weapon(s).

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(2) Any firing at the UN troops protecting/guarding/escorting displaced persons/refugees, authorized persons or store/equipment will be considered as a hostile act and must lead to an immediate response by fire.

l. Humanitarian Convoy. A convoy carrying humanitarian/relief items or persons who are either displaced or refugees under UNAMIR protection.

m. Armed Escort. Troops/Armoured Personnel Carriers detailed to escort VIPs, FC/DFC/Other UNAMIR personnel/Convoy or Humanitarian activity convoys.

AUTHORITY

8. The general guideline on the delegation of authority for the use of different types of weapons in self defence is as follows:

a. Force Commander or Commander Officiating in his absence.

(1) Heavy Support Weapons (ie rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc).

(2) Heavy Machine Guns or Cannons (.50 cal, 20mm etc).

(3) Medium Machine Guns ie FN MAG, M60 etc).

b. Battalion Commander down to NCO level at the scene of a threat.

(1) Personal weapons for single shot fire.

(2) Light Machine Guns.

(3) Personal weapons in automatic fire role.

9. Where the situation permits, the subordinate HQs must inform Force HQ before resorting to armed force. Where this is not possible, the commander at the threatening incident scene must use his discretion, based on these guidelines.

CONCEPT

10. UNAMIR personnel may use their weapons:

a. To defend themselves, UN protected Humanitarian Convoys, other UN lives, or persons under their protection against direct attack, acting always on the orders of the officer or SNCO at the threatening incident;

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- b. To defend the possession of property of installations belonging to or under the protection of the UN from damage, theft or destruction.
- c. To resist attempts by forceful means to prevent this Force from discharging its duties, acting under the personal authority of the Force Commander or his authorized replacement only.
- d. To resist deliberate military or para-military incursions into United Nations protected areas (ie UN displaced persons/ Refugee camps).

PRINCIPLES

11. When an incident occurs that requires the use of force, the following principles will be adhered to:

- a. Only minimum force consistent with achieving the immediate aim will be employed.
- b. If possible, prevention by negotiation must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated.
- c. If possible, verbal warning and an escalation of unarmed force must be exhausted before any use of armed force is initiated.
- d. If possible, warning shots should precede "fire for effect" (fire for effect is firing at the centre of mass of the target).
- e. If a threatening situation develops where firing for effect seems the only option, it will be initiated only after all the warning procedures above have been exhausted, except if there is an immediate threat as per para 10 where a delay would cause casualties or destruction of property, in which case fire for effect may be initiated under the order of the senior commander present without delay.
- f. In firing for effect, the guiding principles must be minimum force. Care must be taken that collateral damage is minimised (ie action which will cause collateral damage prohibited) and that no escalation of the level of violence is initiated by UNAMIR. RETALIATION IS PROHIBITED. Each action should be met with a like action from UNAMIR.
- g. Fire must be controlled by the senior commander present and is to cease once the aim has been achieved; and



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h. After the firing incident, the senior commander present must transmit a full report at the earliest opportunity to Force HQ followed by a detailed written report.

12. When possible, each escalation in the use of force should be authorized by the chain of command of UNAMIR. A request in clear by radio for authorization to fire can have a calming effect on its own. Permission to use higher level of force must be obtained from the appropriate commander as per para 8. The senior commander on the spot is responsible for assessing the situation.

TYPES OF FORCE

13. There are two types of force, Unarmed force and Armed force.

a. Unarmed Force. Unarmed force involves the use of all means, short of the use of fire arms or other weapons, to discharge the duties mandated to UNAMIR. Examples are the use of physical means like wrestling, use of vehicles to block, etc. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use unarmed force under the following circumstances:

(1) When the safety of UN personnel is threatened with unarmed threats.

(2) When infiltrations or envelopments are attempted without firing.

(3) When UN installations/displaced persons camps are violated.

(4) In self-defence from unarmed attack.

(5) When unarmed attempts are made to abduct or arrest UN civilians or military personnel or displaced persons/refugees.

(6) When unarmed attempts are made to steal UN property/Relief items or property under charge of the UN

(7) When unarmed attempts are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

b. Armed Force. Armed Force is the use of any weapon of fire-arm. Examples are the use of CS gas to deny entry into a UN installation/UN displaced persons/refugee camps, the use of bayonet to disperse a crowd, the use of aimed shots to defend a convoy from armed attack. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use armed force against armed persons as follows:



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- (1) In self defence.
- (2) Against attempts to disarm UNAMIR personnel.
- (3) When other UN personnel are in mortal danger.
- (4) When other lives are in mortal danger.
- (5) In defence of UNAMIR installations, displaced persons/refugee camps under UN protection, UNAMIR convoys/Humanitarian Relief convoys under armed attacks.
- (6) When attempts are made to compel UNAMIR personnel by armed force to withdraw from a position they were ordered to occupy by their superiors.
- (7) When attempts are made with the use of armed force to penetrate a UN premises, installation, Displaced persons/refugee camps, or cut off a UN force convoy.
- (8) When attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out missions assigned them by their commanders; and
- (9) When attempts are made to abduct or arrest UN civilians or Military personnel, displaced persons/refugee in a UN camp, using force.

CRIMINAL ACTS

14. The recent history of Rwanda is burdened with civil war, dislocation of large elements of the population as a result of the civil war, terrorism, ethnic and political violence, armed banditry and virtual economic collapse. The potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry during the UNAMIR mandate, due to the high unemployment rate, mass deprivations and desertion from the army, is very high.

15. For the most part, the maintenance of law and order, and, therefore, responding to the control of criminal activity, is the responsibility of the local police, monitored by the UNAMIR Civilian police (UNCIVPOL) monitors. However, the ability of the local police may be questionable in view of the role they played in the war. As a very real possibility, UNAMIR military personnel may be required to assist UNCIVPOL and local authorities, in maintaining law and order. In these circumstances, these rules of engagement would be used in support of the local authorities and UNCIVPOL. In these circumstances, military personnel or units

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be placed in support of UNCIVPOL, who would act to support the local police/ Gendarmerie in the maintenance of law and order.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

17. UNAMIR has witnessed the brutal ethnically/politically motivated massacres of innocent civilians during the war and these are likely to continue. This will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt these atrocities. Examples are summary executions, massacres, attacks on displaced persons or refugees, in UN camps, ethnic riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel will follow the ROE outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent the commitment of any further crimes against humanity.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

18. RULE NUMBER ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.

- a. STATE A: AUTHORITY.
- b. STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

19. RULE NUMBER TWO STATUS OF WEAPONS

- a. STATE A: WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES.
- b. STATE B: WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED AND CHARGED AND MADE SAFE.

20. RULE NUMBER THREE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT WITHOUT THE USE OF FIRE.

- a. STATE A: OBSERVE AND REPORT BUT WILL WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE.
- b. STATE B: STAY IN PLACE. MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH OPPOSING FORCE(S) AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED.
- c. STATE C: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. WARN AGGRESSOR VERBALLY OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS WITHOUT OPENING FIRE.

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- d. STATE D: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. WARN AGGRESSOR VERBALLY OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS. DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF FIRE IS AUTHORIZED.

21. RULE NUMBER FOUR: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY OR CIVILIANS.

- a. STATE A: NO AUTHORIZATION GRANTED.
- b. STATE B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED. IN DOING SO, MAKE OF MINIMUM FORCE AND ESCALATE TO INCLUDE USE OF FIRE ARMS IF HOSTILE INTENT OF ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

22. RULE NUMBER FIVE: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS

- a. STATE A: INTERVENTION IS PROHIBITED.
- b. STATE B: INTERVENTION BY FIRE FOR EFFECT AGAINST POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND DESIGNATED TARGETS ONLY AFTER WARNING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AS PART OF THE WARNING PROCESS.

23. RULE NUMBER SIX: CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

- a. STATE A: MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PROHIBITED.
- b. STATE B: DESIGNATED ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCE IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED BUT WILL BE SPECIFIED BY THE FOLLOWING NOTES:
  - (1) MAN (TYPE OF SYSTEM).
  - (2) PREPARE (TYPE OF SYSTEM).
  - (3) MOVE (TYPE OF SYSTEM).
  - (4) FIRE (TYPE OF SYSTEM)

24. Normal Rules and States. In the normal, daily situation the following ROE status will apply:

- a. Rule No 1: State B (AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS).
- b. Rule No 2: State A (WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED AND CHARGED AND MADE SAFE.

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- c. Rule No 3: State B (STAY IN PLACE. MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH OPPOSING FORCE(S) AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED);
- d. Rule No 4: State B (AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED. IN DOING SO, USE MINIMUM FORCE AND ESCALATE TO INCLUDE USE OF FIRE ARM IF HOSTILE INTENT OR ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY);
- e. Rule No 5: State A (INTERVENTION IS PROHIBITED);
- f. Rule No 6: State A (MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PROHIBITED).

25. Thus to recap normal status: Changes in normal status of ROE as described in para 21 for the Force as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or in his absence by his designated replacement. Unit commanders may request changes in normal status which will be authorized by the Force Commander or his designate. Unit commanders may order changes in normal status for units or sub-units under their command if authorized by the Force Commander or his representative.

CHALLENGING PROCEDURE

26. The following challenging procedure is to be followed in all cases except where the immediate threat to self-defence dictates immediate firing:

- a. Warn the aggressor verbally to stop.
- b. Repeat the verbal warning as many times as necessary to ensure understanding.
- c. Charge weapons if authorized.
- d. Fire warning shots into the safe ground ensuring ricochet is impossible; and
- e. If warning shots are ignored, open fire, on order and under the control of a superior with single aimed fire for effect until the protection task is complete. Escalate fire for effect with other weapons systems on order only of the appropriate commander.

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OPENING FIRE WITHOUT CHALLENGING

27. The only circumstances under which it is permissible to open fire without challenging are if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that even a moment's delay could:

- a. Lead to death or serious injury to personnel.
- b. Lead to death or serious injury to persons who are under the protection of UNAMIR; and
- c. Lead to the theft, damage or destruction of UNAMIR property or property UNAMIR has been mandated to protect.

ACTION BEFORE OPENING FIRE

28. On all occasions before opening fire, UNAMIR personnel will be guided by the principle of minimum force. Commanders will always give a verbal warning before commencing to fire and warning shots should be fired before resorting to fire for effect, except in the circumstances outlined in para 27, where fire for effect will be opened immediately. In normal circumstances, the following sequence should be applied:

- a. Warning. Depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc). Warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;
- b. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, warning shots should be fired into a safe area where there is no danger of ricochet or collateral damage; and
- c. Fire for Effect. If the above measures have had no effect on the situation, UNAMIR personnel may, under orders and control, fire for effect.

ACTION DURING FIRING

29. Aimed fire will be fired for effect, ie fired at the center of visible mass of the target. Fire must be controlled and will not be indiscriminate. Automatic fire and fire of support weapons will only be used as a last resort and only on the orders of the appropriate commander in the chain of command. Fire for effect will only continue as long as it is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Through fire control orders, the commander on the scene will indicate and control the fire, preferably directed at the leaders or instigators of the threat. Continual situation reports will be forwarded through the chain of command.



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ACTION AFTER FIRING

30. After firing for effect, commanders should ensure the following actions are taken:

a. Medical. Any wounded, including those fired upon by UNAMIR personnel will be given first aid, if such an action can be done without further endangering the lives of UN personnel.

b. Recording. The incident will be recorded including:

- (1) Time of firing.
- (2) The weapons fired.

c. Reporting. The above information will be reported through the chain of command to Force HQ, ATTN Force Commander and Chief Operations Officer:


- (1) Who or what was fired on.
- (2) Where the incident occurred.
- (3) Why UN personnel opened fire.
- (4) When the incident and all activities including firing occurred.
- (5) How the situation developed.
- (6) What the current situation is.

CONCLUSION

31. No definitive directive can be created that can detail every possible action for every possible situation. The aim of this directive is to issue direction that would serve to guide commanders and soldiers at all levels in the use of force. It is critical and mandatory that all members of UNAMIR understand this directive and apply it to any situation that may develop and will require the use of force.

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32. In conclusion, all commanders must ensure that this directive is translated into their national language and that all soldiers under their command are completely familiar with its contents and intent.

  
RA DALLAIRE  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Appendices:

1. Aid Memoire for UNAMIR Troops.
2. Rules of Engagement - Hostile Aircraft.

Distribution:

Action:

Information:

External:

Milob Gp HQ  
UNOMUR Sector Comd  
Ghanbatt HQ  
All Incoming Battalions/Companies  
Tun Coy

CAO

Internal:

COO  
CHAO  
C Plans O  
C Log O  
CMPO

DFC

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APPENDIX 1  
TO ANNEX C  
TO OPO 14  
DATED 23 JUN 94

AIDE MEMOIRE

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ALL MEMBERS OF UNAMIR  
MILITARY COMPONENT AUTHORIZED TO CARRY ARMS  
AND AMMUNITION IN RWANDA

1. GENERAL RULES

- a. You have the right to use force in self defence.
- b. In all situations, you are to use the minimum force necessary.
- c. Fire arms must ONLY be used as a last resort.

2. CHALLENGING

- a. Shout "UNO, HALT OR I SHOOT" or "ONU, HAGARARA CYANGWA NIWANGA NKURASE".
- b. Repeat the warning as many times as necessary.
- c. Charge weapons.
- d. fire warning shots into safe ground ensuring that a ricochet is impossible.
- e. If necessary, open fire on order or under control of a superior.

3. OPENING FIRE WITHOUT CHALLENGING. Opening fire without challenging is permissible if an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment's delay could:

- a. lead to death or serious injury to UN personnel.
- b. Lead to death or serious injury to persons who are under the protection of UNAMIR.
- c. lead to the theft, damage or destruction of UNAMIR property or property UNAMIR has been mandated to protect.

4. ACTION DURING FIRING

- a. Aim while firing.

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- b. Don't shoot more than necessary.
- c. Take all possible precaution in order not to hurt anybody else but the target.

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5. ACTIONS AFTER FIRING

- a. Give first aid to any wounded.
- b. Record time of firing and type of weapons used.
- c. Report through chain of command by answering the questions: Who? Where? What? Why?

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APPENDIX 2  
TO ANNEX C  
TO OPO 14  
DATED 23 JUN 94

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT  
HOSTILE AIRCRAFT

1. Identification of Friendly Aircraft. All aircraft following the procedure laid down in Annex B will always be treated as friendly aircraft by both parties.
2. Co-ordination Between Air Defence System and Air Traffic Control
  - a. A point to point land line is to be established for the necessary co-ordination between Air Defence Systems and the Control Tower for identification of aircraft.
  - b. Land line communication or any other suitable communication system should be available with LO of RGF and RPF with the Air Traffic Control Tower.
3. Declaration of Hostile Aircraft. No commercial or transport (be it civil or military) aircraft is to be declared as hostile by either side without a proper counter-check with Kigali approach/tower.
4. No aircraft is to be engaged without being properly identified as foe.
5. Aircraft within approach funnel and take-off path will have free passage to operate.
6. No aircraft can be engaged within the circuit area.
7. Aircraft, if in doubt, must be warned with at least 03 warning shots. After the warning shots, if the aircraft's manoeuvre does not indicate hostility the aircraft is not to be engaged.
8. No small arms firing is to be conducted within the immediate vicinity (within 05 miles radius of Kigali airport pointing towards the airfield or aircraft).
9. Outside the Kigali airport circuit area, all aircraft should fly above 3,000 ft AGL to avoid small arms fire.
10. No indirect weapon system is to be released pointing towards the air field or aircraft and its path.



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11. Any Air Defence Arty unit should inform the KIA tower of their gun conditions (Gun tight or gun free) to facilitate the safe conduct of air traffic.

12. Should there be the need for air Defence Arty to open fire on any hostile aircraft or on any other object, they must inform the tower in order to allow time for any friendly aircraft to climb to a safe level.

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ANNEX D  
TO OPO 14  
DATED 23 JUN 94

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)  
UNMAIR ROAD MOVES

GENERAL

1. These SOP are designed to ensure that all UNAMIR convoys operate under a clear and unambiguous guidelines to ensure their safety and efficiency within RWANDA and any of the neighboring countries. Under the present conditions, these guidelines cover all aspects and to that end, common sense and good judgement are essential.

AIM

2. The aim of this SOP is to provide convoy commanders with direction and to also outline his duties in order to conduct the safe movement of convoys in and outside RWANDA.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE

a. CONVOY

(1) All UNAMIR vehicles carrying Humanitarian Aid, with the intention to off load, or empty with the intention to load at a wirehouse.

(2) All military resupply, rotation and/or deployment movement of more than three (3) vehicles.

(3) Every single vehicle movement that is oversized and/or carrying a special or dangerous road.

(4) Convoy should not exceed 15 vehicles.

b. Convoy commander is responsible for the discipline of the drivers and the convoy. The documentation of the vehicles and load as well as any negotiations on aspects affecting the convoy. The convoy commander will ensure any even facility during any critical time.

c. DOCUMENT. Means the list of the convoy personnel, UN ID card, general description of weapon carried, general description of ammunitions carried, list of military vehicles and general description per veh.

d. BORDER CROSSING POINT. The dividing point between two

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states.

e. CHECK POINT (WP). A control point established by control movement with in AOR>

f. REPORT LINES. The establishment of permanent and visibly marked report lines has greatly enhanced the ability of the operations rooms to monitor and control convoys. All convoys crossing Report Lines to report to Ops Room.

ROUTES

4. These will be determined in movement instructions prior to the move, depending on the situation at the time.

SPEED

5. The following speed limits will be strictly adhered to:

a. Day

- (1) First Class Roads - Not more than 60km/hr.
- (2) Second Class Roads - Not more than 50km/hr.
- (3) Hilly Areas - Not more than 40km/hr.
- (4) Through Built up - Same as (3) above.

b. Night. Unless emergency, no move will be undertaken during night. However, if under taken, speed limits are as under:

- (1) First Class Roads - 60km/hr.
- (2) Second Class Roads - 50km/hr.
- (3) Hilly Areas - Same as (2) above.
- (4) Built up Areas - Same as (2) above.

VEHICLE DENSITY

6. The gap between vehicles will be as follows:

- a. Day. 80-100 meters between vehicles.
- b. Night. 25-40 meters between vehicles.
- c. Hilly Terrain. 30-50 meters between vehicles.

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DOCUMENTS

7. Personnel travelling in the convoy will carry their ID cards at all times. Drivers will carry their Drivers Permits and Vehicle Trip Tickets in addition to their ID cards.

8. For convoys proceeding outside RWANDA, all will carry their passports and International Vaccination Certificates in addition to the documents mentioned in paragraph 6 above.

DRESS

9. Dress will be as per UNAMIR dress regulations. Flak jackets and steel helmets will be worn by all.

WEAPONS

10. Personnel weapons will be carried by all military personnel (those in possession of weapons) on convoys within RWANDA. For convoys going outside RWANDA, all personnel weapons will be handed over to personnel at the last UNAMIR position closest to the border. The convoy commander will ensure that the weapons are properly received and documented. Weapons will be collected on the return trip into RWANDA.

SAFETY MEASURES

11. Before Move. All vehicles in the convoy needs to have detail checking by CTO/Unit MT. Following to be ensured:

a. Load Table for each vehicle has to be prepared and load the vehicle accordingly.

b. All vehicle should not be over loaded. Some space to be kept for unforcene.

c. UNAMIR MT Unit must ensure all the cargo are loaded properly and in cases sufficient lashing should be done.

d. CTO/Unit vehicle mechanic to inspect all the vehicles before the move.

e. All drivers should be physically fit.

f. CTO/Unit to detail a vehicle Technical Team for each convoy.

g. Ensure sufficient fuel for the journey with the requisite reserve capacity and check the fitness of the vehicle.

12. During Move.

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- a. Ensure that the convoy is properly manned and all personnel are correctly equipped to meet the task.
- b. Route should be maintain as per move plan.
- c. Vehicle should maintain speed and spacing.
- d. 360 degree observation must be guaranteed at all time.

ACTION AT HALTS

13. At short halts vehicles will park off the road. Convoy escorts will dismount and take position for all round defence.

14. At long halts, vehicles will be parked in a harbour area off the main road. The harbour area will be determined by the convoy commander.

15. Troops escorting the convoy will dismount and be deployed for all round defence of the harbour area.

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16. All vehicles will fill full tank before the start of the journey. All vehicles will carry 2 x spare jerricans, filled will be carried on all vehicles.

FIRST AID KIT

17. All vehicles will carry a first aid kit at all times.

18. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Convoy Commander. The convoy commander is responsible for the safety and security of the convoy. When operating, his decision is final. However advice and assistance should be sought from higher HQ. The convoy commander is responsible for:

(1) Ensuring that the convoy is properly manned and that personnel are correctly equipped to that the task.

(2) The behavior, conduct and security of convoy personnel, vehicles and equipment under the change of the convoy commander.

(3) Route planning - convoy commander should use only authorised route, that have been fully evaluated and secured.

(4) Briefing the convoy PRIOR to departure. The briefing should not be given by radio and should cover



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the following points:

- (a) Route.
  - (b) Enroute weather/road condition.
  - (c) Security situation both general and local en route.
  - (d) Convoy marching order.
  - (e) Role of escorts and escort procedures.
  - (f) Safety measures.
  - (g) Action to be taken in the event of hostile action.
  - (h) Action to be taken in the event of a break down.
  - (i) Vehicle speeds and spacing.
  - (j) Radio procedure and action to be taken in the event of communication failure.
  - (k) Convoy chain of command.
- (5) Ensuring that all convoy personnel carry their UNAMIR ID cards and are properly dressed.
- (6) Ensuring that convoy vehicles are serviceable and have been inspected PRIOR to departure.
- (7) The safe loading and unloading of the convoy vehicles.
- (8) Maintain convoy speed, spacing, position of escort vehicles, communication, action on when coming under fire.
- (9) Checking that load manifests are correct and distributing them in accordance to vehicle availability.
- (10) Submit the convoy planning to the coordinating authority prior to move.
- (11) Submit the convoy report on completion of the tasks.
- (12) Ensure all accident reports are compiled and promptly submitted to the controlling authority.

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(13) In the event of a security incident involving hostile action send an immediate incident report covering time, type and location of incident and ensure a detail report is prepared subsequently and submitted to the authority.

b. Deputy Convoy Commander. The role of the deputy convoy commander to assist the convoy commander in the execution of his duties, take over as convoy commander in case of convoy commander is sick or unable to perform his duties. The deputy convoy commander is to familiarize him self with the duties of the convoy commander is to advise him on all safe driving techniques. he should all so ensure that all personnel driving. Vehicles know driving and aware of their duties.

c. Drivers

(1) To follow the instruction of the convoy commander at all times.

(2) To be responsible for the basic care, maintance, cleanliness and good order of the vehicles in his charge.

(3) To be responsible for the loading and unloading of the vehicle and for the security of the road whiest en route.

(40) Conduct daily vehicle checks and take the necessary remedial actions.

ACTION ON BREAKDOWN

19. In case of a breakdown en route, mechanics accompanying the convoy will attempt to rectify the fault. Should the repairs be beyond the mechanics, vehicles will be parked off the road and secured before leaving it action should also be taken to immobilized the vehicle before being left behind. This sis to prevent the vehicle falling into the wrong hands.

20. For convoys travelling outside RWANDA, all efforts must be made to repair the vehicle before moving.

TRAFFIC REGULATIONS

21. Drivers of vehicles will obey the traffic regulations pertaining to the country the convoy is driving in.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

22. The following action will be taken by the convoy commander. Should any vehicle in the convoy be involved in an accident:

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- a. Administer First aid to any injured parties.
- b. Evacuate wounded to the nearest hospital.
- c. Make a report to the nearest local police (UNAMIR).
- d. Report by radio (if possible) to UNAMIR Military Police/Ops Room.
- e. Ensure all measurements are taken before the convoy proceeds.
- f. Should the above mentioned procedure delay the convoy, some troops and another vehicle are left at the scene to witness the police procedures.
- g. The vehicle should be driven away if possible. Should this not be possible, the vehicle should be moved off the road before the convoy proceeds.
- h. Submit a written report to the Military Police/UNCIVPOL and the CTO on the return of the convoy to its destination.

ACTION WHEN FIRED UPON

23. The following actions will be taken by the convoy commander should the convoy be fired upon:

- a. Move fast and get out of the ambush area.
- b. Give a sitrep by radio if within range.
- c. The convoy commander will halt the convoy at a safe distance from the area, take up defensive positions and to check if there are any injuries or damages.
- d. If there are no injuries, the convoy will proceed and a full report submitted to the COO on reaching your destination. The report will include the following:
  - (1) Time and location of incident.
  - (2) A brief description of the incident.
  - (3) Action taken.
  - (4) Possible reasons and which party fired at the convoy.
- e. Should there be injuries, first aid will be administered and the injured quickly evacuated to the nearest hospital and a full reported as per sub para 'c'

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above.

24. Should the situation demand the return of fire, the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement will apply. Remember to stay calm at all times.

ACTION AT CHECK POINTS

25. The following procedure will be followed at Check Points:

- a. All personnel on board the vehicles must be prepared to identify themselves with their ID cards. Under no circumstances should ID cards be surrendered.
- b. Vehicles in the convoy will maintain 10-15 meters distance.
- c. Drivers will keep their engines running.
- d. Remember to be polite and calm and cheerful at all times.

COMMUNICATIONS

26. All vehicles in the convoy should remain in radio contact with each other. The convoy commander will issue call signs before the move commences. The convoy commander will remain in radio contact with the HQ (Ops Room) at all times. The Simplex Channels (1-5) will be used by vehicles in the convoy in order not to overburden the operational channel. Comm must be maintained all time between first and last vehicle. Convoy commander to be in comm with duty officer throughout the move. SDO in his brief will give in channel.



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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
U N A M I R

TO : ALL MILOB IN SECTOR 1

File Ref:oct098.DOC

FROM : SECTOR 1 HQ

DATE : 24 Oct 94

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ORDERS

1. DUTY GENERAL

- a. The daily duty period is from 0700 Hrs to 0700 Hrs next day.
- b. Teams on duty and Stand-by must be in military uniform during the duty period.
- c. Stand-by team must be ready, with the assigned vehicle, to be deployed within 15 minutes notice.

2. OPS ROOM DUTY OFFICER

- a. He must be in military uniform throughout the duty period.
- b. He must remain in the OPS ROOM at all times.
- c. He must log all incoming and outgoing messages including other significant incidents.

3. GENERAL

- a. All MILOBS moving out of the Sector must inform the Duty Officer of destination, estimated time of arrival and number of vehicle being used.
- b. On fridays, Log/Pers officer must give a brief on MILOBS on CTO/Leave and MILOBS wishing to proceed to KIGALI or KABALE on weekend rest. This is to assist the Sector Cdr or his representative to determine state of MILOBS in the Sector and to determine authorization as required.

4. These orders are with immediate effect and all concerned to comply.



W FURTSCHER  
Lt Col  
Sector Commander

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Sector HQ

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

MILOB GP HQ

COPY NO..12. OF...18.....

MILOB GP HQ  
UNAMIR  
KIGALI  
TEL; 82342

04 MAR 94

OPO 5/94

See Distribution

References:

A. Briefing of FC by CMO dated 03 Mar 94.

B. OPO 4/94

Time Zone used Throughout the Order - LT.

1. SITUATION

a. Other Forces

(1) The political situation remains tense. People's hope on the formation of transition Govt dashed.

(2) Criminal activities on the increase.

(3) The RPF in particular, is concerned about the present political impasse. Its political functionary have moved en masse to MULINDI.

(4) General fear of a major show down between the 2 forces.

(5) Meanwhile, no maj redeployment by the rival forces.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) UNAMIR forces are to increase their monitoring activities and surveillance in all sectors.

(2) Deployment of flanking forces remains unchanged.

1 of 6  
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(3) Kigali sector recently reenforced by Ghanain forces.

c. Atts and Dets. No change.

2. Mission. MILOB is to intensify its monitoring activities within bdrys.

3. Execution

a. Gen Outline

(1) The ops will be conducted in two phases.

(a) Phase-1. Move to base areas.

(b) Phase-2 Continuation of monitoring activities. Both political and military.

b. Detailed Tasks

(1) RPF MILOB Sector

(a) Under Comd from 1000 hrs 4 Mar 94. One team from RGF Sector. Team 101 from MILOB HQ.

(b) Revert to under Comd forthwith Team P-503 Kigali Sector.

(2) Tasks

(a) Team P-501

i. Phase-1. Remain present loc.

ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report activities of 59 Bn within bdrys. Be prepared to sp Team P-503.

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(b) One Team from RGF Sector

- i. Phase-1. Remain present loc.
- ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report all activities of CMF ~~58~~ within bdrys. Prepare to support team P-501.

(c) Team P-502

- i. Phase-1. Move from RWAMAGANA to MUHAMBO.
- ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report activities of 157 Bn. Be prepared to support team C-101A.

(d) Team C-101A

- i. Phase-1. Move from KIGALI to MUHAMBO.
- ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report activities of 7 Bn.

(e) Team 101.

- i. Phase-1. Move from KIGALI to MUHAMBO.
- ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report activities of 101 Bn within bdrys.

(f) Team P-503

- i. Phase-1. Move from KIGALI to BYUMBA.
- ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report activities of BMF within bdrys. Main route NGODORE - GATUNA.

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(g) Team P-504.

i. Phase-1. Remain in MULINDI.

ii. Phase-2. Monitor and report activities of AMF and 21 Bn within bdrys.

(3) RGF MILOB Sector

(a) Det to Comd RPF Sector One team with veh from 1000 hrs, 5 Mar 94.

(4) Tasks.

(a) Continue to monitor and report all activities within bdrys.

(b) Intensify surveillance within area.

(c) Be prepared to support RPF MILOB Sector on orders of CMO.

(5) Southern MILOB Sector.

(a) Grouping. No change.

(b) Tasks.

i. Cont to monitor and report activities throughout Sector.

ii. Be prepared to support RPF or RGF MILOB Sectors on orders of CMO.

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c. Coord Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) Time for which move to Base complete 1800 hrs 4 Mar 94

(b) Time monitoring activities commence 0900 hrs 5 Mar 94

(c) Routes fwd be worked out by respective comds.

(d) Teams to monitor and report any vital information on continuous basis.

(e) All sectors to secure basis and intensify monitoring activities.

(g) Sitrep be submitted as per SOP.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Rat. C - rat for initial 48 hrs issued to RPF MILOB Sector. Be consumed on orders of HQ MILOB.

b. Tpt. Four additional vehicles allotted to RPF Sector. Each team to have at least one vehicle.

c. Other Admin Sp All officers must be self sufficient in admin.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

a. Command

(1) Location of HQ MILOB - No change.



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(2) Location of HQ UNAMIR - No change.

(3) Communication. Vehicles be fitted with motorollas to facilitate effective communication.

(4) Channels. As allocated.

(5) Code Words. Issued later.

(6) Nick Names To be issued later.

Ack Instrs: Ack.

Authentication

S ILIYA

Lt Col

A/COO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Comd RPF MILOB Sector

Comd RGF MILOB Sector

Comd Southern Sector

Informtion:

HQ UNAMIR

Coord DMZ MILOB

Sector Coord Kigali

Internal:

Action:

Chief Plan/Trg Br

Chief Ops Br

Chief of Admin Br

Chief of Log Br

Copy No

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I D TIKOCA  
Colonel  
CMO

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

MILOB GP HQ

TO: See Distribution

FILE: 6005/MILOB

FROM: MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 09 MAR 94

SUBJECT: URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE RPF MILOB SECTOR

GENERAL

1. There has been numerous significant change on the overall distribution of MILOBs to the various sectors against the UNNY approved establishment for UNAMIR since inception.

2. These changes were influenced by the operational requirement to cater for different security situation UNAMIR encompasses almost on a fortnightly basis. These changes do not only affect MILOBs of UNAMIR but also of UNOMUR right from the start of the mission. These will continue to happen as long as the security situation continues to change, and on emphasis to operational effectiveness, there are no other alternatives but to rearrange to meet the change.

3. The Commanders at all levels are fully aware of the operational difficulties these changes do to operational effectiveness, as in most cases MILOB were just beginning to perfect their job description when change has to occur. It also appreciate the personal administrative and logistic difficulties an UNMO goes through especially in Rwanda. Needless to say one of the principles of war is co-operation and flexibility. This change does not affect MILOBs only, as just recently the force puts into operation, OPERATION BOOMERANG, which saw the

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movement of a huge Chunk of BYUBAT redeployed into Kigali. All UNAMIR ranks and files will have to undergo such change one way or the other as UNAMIR pursues its objective to bring peace and stability in Rwanda.

CURRENT SITUATION

4. As the political stalemate continues, finding no solution to the formation of the BBTG, simultaneously the security situation deteriorates especially in Kigali. Kigali being the nerve centre of Rwanda, maximum attention has to be focused in Kigali to keep Kigali secure as possible everyday.

5. RPF is one of the two major prominent players in the formation of the BBTG and the implementation of the Arusha Accord in which UNAMIR is here to assist in all way possible, for its success. RPF is also one of the two major organization that also on a major scale may violate the cease-fire for reasons of its own, especially if their element in Kigali is subjected to a high level of danger and risk or if they foresee that there is no more possibility existing to resolve the current political crisis.

6. On both situation above, a military commander has to prepare itself for the worse. UNAMIR has an instrument of peace in Rwanda must also make all necessary move, much far ahead of the two major conflicting parties to be able to contain and stops resumption of hostilities as it is mandated to do.

7. The Force Commander has decided to move 200 plus men from the BYUBAT down to Kigali and immediately order the CMO to send MILOBs teams to monitor each RPF Bn deployed immediately North of the DMZ and spread across east to west approximately 100 km with a depth reaching the Uganda border. At present RPA has deployed seven Infantry Battalions and one Infantry battalion in reserve the total of eight Battalions altogether.

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RPF/MILOB SECTOR DEPLOYMENT.

8. As the situation is urgent and warrants immediate and rapid deployment of MILOBs, the MILOBs were deployed in the RPF area on 03 Mar 94 on 24 hours notice. The deployment detail and equipments states are given at Annex A.

IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT

9. Manpower. At present all sectors are under manned and are currently operating with some in 3 men per team, some with five and few with six men per team. The only resource available to extract some MILOBs from, are from the MILOBs at Kigali Sector. The immediate manpower requirement is 13. It is requested that Kigali sector release 7 seven MILOBs and the additional six will be from those newly arrived UNMOs from Liberia.

10. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS. The sector has sufficient communication equipments to enable them to operate effectively. BUT many of these teams neither can communicate at each other nor to their HQ at Mulundi using channel 11. Very few locations can communicate using channel 10. This unit appreciate the receptive assistance the DMZ, CS D/ZERO accommodate to MILOB as relay stations from time to time. This unit also finds difficulty most time to enter channel 10 as users of this channel are DMZ Sector HQ, DMZ MILOBs, the whole BYUBAT Bn and the Engn unit at Byumba. The only solution it to install a REPEATER station immediately at MULINDI. The importance of this cannot be overemphasised. At present the RPF/MILOB HQ can only transmit message to all its team from MULINDI by requesting RPF authority for the use of their radio to relay message to their Bn Comds who will then send the message down to the deployed MILOB teams, and this is what is happening to date.

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11. VEHICLES. Without being able to communicate, coupled with only one vehicle per team, No repair kit existing in 90% of the vehicle, the difficult terrain and bad condition of roads & tracks, the wet season in Rwanda, the use of one vehicle for both operational and admin and log runs, etc, it is strongly recommended that the RPF Sector be issued with seven(7) more vehicles as soon as possible. This HQ is fully aware of the risks MILOBs or any soldiers for that matter, live with each day and he is trained for it, but it also at the same time must not entertain unnecessary risk which can be avoided.

12. At present to reduce this risk at a certain level, each neighbouring team will conduct joint patrol and monitoring on a Battalion one day and they will do the same to the other Bn on the next day, this reduces some risk but it certainly affect the overall affectiveness on the daily monitoring activity that has to be executed to all RPF units on the ground every day. Once again this HQ requests the FHQ to place some high priorities on the issue of these seven (7) additional vehicles to RPF MILOB Sector.

RECOMMENDATION

13. The following are strongly recommended to enable the RPF MILOB Sector execute its mission:


- a. Provision of seven UNMOS from Kigali Sector to be posted to RPF MILOB Sector.
- b. Provision of 7 x (4 x 4) vehs.
- c. An urgent immediate installation of a repeater anywhere in the North to provide maximum communication output with a separate channel.



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CONCLUSION

14. Force Headquarters is urgently requested to provide some high priorities to this request and would like to ensure, with or without support the MILOBs will continue to be deployed in whatever condition and will without question execute tasks allocated to them to the fullest.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
I D TIKOCA  
Colonel  
CMO

Distribution:

External:

Action:

DFC, FHQ  
COO, FHQ  
Sector Comd Kigali  
KSMOC  
CTO, FHQ  
CCO, FHQ  
CLOGO, FHQ

Information:

FC  
CAO, FHQ

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Annex A

a. RPF MILOB SECTOR OF TOTAL STR OF 29

S/NO	TEAM	STR	VEH	COMMS	DEPLY	REMARKS
(1)	RPF/MILOB SECTOR HQ	5	1 x L/C (1278)	1 x B/Station 3x H/Talkie	MULINDI (RPF HQ)	All veh radio mntd
(2)	Team-504	4	1 x Pickup	2x H/Talkie	MULINDI (RES Bn)	"
(3)	Team-501	5	1 x L/C (1235)	2 x H/Talkie	RUHENGI RI/BUTA RO C Mob Force	"
(4)	Team-502	6	1 x 4 runner (1047) 1 X pickup	1 xB/ Station 2 x H/Talkie	MUHAMBO 157 Bn	"
(5)	Team-503	6	1 x Pickup	1 x H/Talkie	BYUMBA B Mob FCE	"

b. Team G-603 from RGF/MILOB Sector Under Command RPF/MILOB Sector

(1)	G-603	3	1 x L/C (1260)		RUHENG I 59 Bn	"
-----	-------	---	-------------------	--	----------------------	---

c. Escort Team 101 from MILOB HQ

(1)	Team-101	3	1 x L/C (1294)		CYONDO 7 Bn	"
(2)	Team-101A	3	1 x Pickup (522)		CYONDO 21 Bn	"
TOTAL	8 x Teams	35	9	-	-	
Imme- diate Addi- tional Requi- rement	0 x teams	13x MILOB	7 X 4 x 4 veh	1 x repeater	-	-

**Format for daily sitrep from Sectors to MilOb Gp HQ**

**From:** ...Sector HQ

**To:** MilOb Gp HQ

**Subject:** Daily Sitrep covering period from ..0600... to ..0600... 94

1. **General Situation** This para should include a summary of all major events and trends in the AO of your sector.
2. **Political Activities** Political activities of any party.
3. **Factional Activities** This para has to include all military events since last report, changes of deployment, movement of troops and military equipment, incidents in which one/both forces are involved, etc.
  - A. RGF.
  - B. RPF.
  - C. Others.
4. **Own Activities** All operational important activities of HQ and MilOb Teams in your Sector, e.g. patrols, meetings, investigations, observations, check points, liaison with local authorities, change of deployment etc.
5. **Logistics** Major logistic status, activities, problems affecting the operations and requests.
6. **Miscellaneous** In this para you may report or request any points which do not fit in one of the other paras.

---

**NOTE:** 1. When reporting incidents make sure your report is as complete as possible. When, Where, Who, What, Why, Own Activities. Also mention How and/or from Whom you have obtained the information.

2. Incidents of major operational importance have to be reported immediately. Even if you do not yet have all the details of the incident give a preliminary report with the points you already have. After completion of your investigation forward a full report of the particular incident.

## **RATIONS + EQUIPMENT FOR MILOBS ON MOTORISED PATROL**

### **Complementary**

2 days ration/ person = 2 MRE/person (Meals Ready to Eat/ US ration)

min 1.5 liter of water/person and day

bedding (sleeping bag, blanket, insulation mat)

spare clothes, toilet articles

tools + spare tire

maps

First Aid Kit

### **if necessary/ available**

hand held radios

compass

field glass

helmet

flack jacket

## **EMERGENCY RATIONS TO BE KEPT IN MILOBS LOCATIONS/ACCOMMODATIONS**

4 days/person = 4 MRE /person



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File No. 6203.3/OPS

Copy No. 7 of 17 Copies

MilOb Group HQ  
UNAMIR  
KIGALI  
16 FEB 94

*May Saav  
Pl go through it  
and all the stuffs to  
2nd Sec Comd  
20/2*

MilObsGpHQ/Operational Order No. 4

References:

- A. Security Council Resolution 872 (1993) 5 October 1993.
- B. OPO 1/ 94 dated 27 Jan 94.

Time Zone used throughout the order is LT.

1. SITUATION

a. General. Political and military situation is tense but calm. The parties are still deadlocked in reaching agreement on the formation of the BBTG. General feeling of the population is that both RPF and RGF forces are ready to resume hostilities.

b. Border Activities.

(1) Refugees: In border areas there has been an influx of refugees and displaced persons from UGANDA, BURUNDI and ZAIRE.

(2) Illegal import of arms: It is also suspected that illegal warlike materials are being ferried into the country through GISENYI and CYANGUGU from ZAIRE and BUKOBA from TANZANIA.

c. Own Activities. UNAMIR forces are conducting foot and mobile patrols in the KWSA and the DMZ in order to create a peaceful climate through confidence building activities for formation of the BBTG. RGF, RPF and SOUTHERN Sectors will deploy with minimum resources available to monitor the situation throughout RWANDA. The intent is to gather sufficient information with the assistance of Gendarmerie and CivPol on activities and movement of armed elements and refugees/ displaced persons.

d. Atts and Dets. Integral.

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2. MISSION. To monitor the observance of the cease-fire and investigate instances of non-compliance with the provisions of the ARUSHA Agreement.

3. EXECUTION.

a. General Outline. The mission will be carried out in three phases.

- (1) Phase 1. Deployment of MilObs to all Sector HQs.
- (2) Phase 2. Monitoring of the security situation and preparation of Assembly and Cantonment Points.
- (3) Phase 3. Monitor the disengaging, demobilisation and integration (DDI) of the forces.

b. Tasks.

(1) RPF Sector.

(a) Phase 1.

- i. Establish Sector HQ in MULUNDI and immediately deploy three teams at RWANANGANA, BYUMBA and RUHENGRI.
- ii. Deploy rest of your teams to cover MUTARA, BYUMBA and RUHENGRI Sectors of RPF.

(b) Phase 2.

- i. Monitor the refugees/ displaced persons and illegal transportation of war materials into RWANDA.
- ii. Monitor the activities of RPF through following:
  - (i) Foot, static and vehicle patrols
  - (ii) Vehicle checks at border crossing points
  - (iii) Observation and reporting
- iii. Recce and assist in the preparation of RPF assembly, cantonment points and integrated training centers.

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iv. Maintain close liaison with UNOMUR.

(c) Phase 3. TBA.

(2) RGF Sector.

(a) Phase 1.

i. Establish Sector HQ in RUHENGARI and immediately deploy teams at GISENYI, RUHENGARI, KIBUNGO and BUKOBA.

ii. Deploy rest of your teams to cover your AOR.

(b) Phase 2.

i. Monitor the refugees/ displaced persons and illegal transportation of war materials into RWANDA.

ii. Monitor the activities of RGF through following:

(i) Foot, static and vehicle patrols

(ii) Vehicle checks at border crossing points

(iii) Observation and reporting

iii. Recce and assist in the preparation of RGF assembly, cantonment points and integrated training centers.

iv. Liaison.

(i) with CivPol, Military, Gendarmerie and civilian agencies on information.

(ii) with immigration authorities on verification of goods being transported into RWANDA.

(c) Phase 3. TBA.

(3) Sector SOUTH

(a) Phase 1.

i. Establish Sector HQ at BUTARE and immediately

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f

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deploy teams at CYANGUGU and the RWANDA-BURUNDI border post on the main road BUTARE-KAYANZA-BUJUMBURA.

ii. Deploy rest of your teams to cover your AOR.

(b) Phase 2.

i. Monitor the refugee camps, movement of displaced persons and illegal transportation of war materials into RWANDA.

ii. Monitor the activities of RGF through following:

- (i) Foot,static and vehicle patrols
- (ii) Vehicle checks at border crossing points
- (iii) Observation and reporting

iii. Liaison.

(i) with CivPol, Military, Gendarmerie and civilian agencies for information on illegal activities.

(ii) with immigration authorities on verification of goods being transported into RWANDA.

(c) Phase 3. TBA.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings.

(a) Initial deployment of Phase 1 to be completed by 121200 Feb 94.

(b) RGF, RPF and Sector SOUTH teams to GISENYI, RWAMAGANA and CYANGUGU respectively to deploy concurrently with HQ and be in position by 111600 Feb 94.

(c) Timings for the rest of Phase 1 deployment TBA.

(2) Movement details.

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- (a) Sector HQs deploy with two vehicles each.
  - (b) One bus provided by CLogO MilOb Gp HQ will transport teams to GISENYI and BUTARE on timings to be coordinated with SecComds.
  - (c) Once deployed, teams are authorised to hire vehicles to conduct operational tasks.
- (3) Monitoring. The following activities are to be conducted 24 hours/day:
- (a) Observation from OPs or Vantage Points.
  - (b) Random patrols/ check points to achieve surprise.
  - (c) Searching of suspected vehicles/persons.
  - (d) Investigations of alleged or suspected violations.

All activities are to be recorded on the operational log sheet which is to be available with each team. Log sheets are to be compiled and sent to Sector HQs by each team leader on a weekly basis.

(4) Searches. Searches of vehicles, persons or suspected areas are to be conducted in the presence of Gendarmerie, CivPol and local immigration authorities. Sector Comdrs are to design a proposed search form for use by MilObs and submit it to MilOb HQ for finalisation.

(5) Crossing Points. All known refugee crossing points are to be monitored 24 hours/day by MilObs through OPs/Check Points with possible assistance of Gendarmerie and CivPol. Once established these should be reported on the daily sitreps including situation in the refugee camps.

(6) Incidents. Procedure for all incidents is as follows:

- (a) Report at once to MilOb HQ.
- (b) Carry out immediately an initial investigation to establish details.

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(c) Conduct detailed investigation.

(7) Reports and Returns. Reports to be sent to HQs are at ANNEX B. The timings for all reports are to be strictly adhered to. Priority to send reports are:

(a) Fax. Only sitreps, urgent and confidential information and med/cas evac requests

(b) Radio. Formal messages and routine reports and sitreps.

(c) Telephone. Only if the above facilities are not been provided.

FHQ has authorised use of private telephones to send sitreps. The bills incurred are to be forwarded to CLogO MilObHQ for processing and payment.

(8) Disengagement, Cantonment and Demobilisation (DDI) of Forces.

The details of above phases of operations will be issued later.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTIC.

a. Transport. Due to severe shortages Sector HQs will deploy each with two (2) vehicles. CLogO MilObHQ will plan with available transport to complete the initial deployment.

b. POL. Petro-RWANDA stations are to be used for all refuelling.

c. Service. CLogO will arrange for all servicing of vehicles. UNAMIR work shop KIGALI is responsible for all repairs.

d. Accn and feeding. MSA.

e. Emergency rations.

(1) Sector HQs and Team locations are to keep 4 days MRE rations for each MilObs as emergency ration.

(2) MilObs going out for task (e.g. recce, patrol, investigation) are

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to take bedding, rations and other equipment with them in order to be self-sufficient for 48 hours. (ref. ANNEX D.).

f. Water. RPF Sector to co-ordinate with DMZ Log Coy on provision of water and other necessities to sustain life.

g. Medical.

(1) Refer all hospital cases to UNAMIR Field Hospital in KIGALI. For medical advise call UNMIR Field Hospital (King FAYASAL Hp):

Duty Room	86 136
Ward	86 138

(2) No local hospitalisation is authorised only individual first aid can be applied.

(3) Casevac.

(a) Air. Requests are to be sent to MilOb Gp HQ with the quickest means available.

(b) Vehicle. Only minor cases.

(4) Health. Adhere to the Health Instructions for UNAMIR personnel.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Location of HQs.

(1) Force HQ	AMAHORO
(2) MilOb Gp HQ	KIMIHURURA
(3) KIGALI Sector	KACYIRU
(4) DMZ Sector	BYUMBA
(5) RPF Sector	MULUNDI
(6) RGF Sector	RUHENGERI
(7) Sector SOUTH	BUTARE

All HQs to be operational by 121200 Feb 94.

b. Signals.

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- (1) Call Signs. Refer to ANNEX C attached.
- (2) Frequencies. Channel 11 and alternate Channel 3.
- (3) Fax. Fax machine will be installed at MilObGpHQ and BUTARE. The numbers of each will be advised. The remaining fax machines are planned to be installed in MULUNDI and RUHENGRI.
- (4) Radio. Base stations will be installed at BUTARE, RUHENGRI and CYANGUGU on depl. Other equipment will be installed as soon as it is available. The timings for daily radio checks will be as follows:
  - (a) 0530
  - (b) 1100
  - (c) 1500
  - (d) 1800
  - (e) 2100

All radios to stay open on Channel 11 on 24 hours/day.

- (5) Telephone. To be used for duty purposes only when no other means of communication is available. MilOb Gp HQ Duty Officers telephone number is 82342.

*2 Hugo*  
for ID TIKOCA  
Col  
CMO

Annexes

- A. Deployment Plan
- B. Reports>Returns and Timings
- C. Command Nets Call Signs and Telephone Numbers

Distribution

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Force HQ	1-2
KIGALI Sector	3
DMZ Sector	4
CAO	5
CIVPOL	6
RPF Sector	7 -
RGF Sector	8 ✓
Sector SOUTH	9 -
OPS	10-11
LOG	12
PERS	13
CMO	14
DCMO	15
Spare	16-17

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UN SECRET

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA  
UNAMIR

Date : 18 Jan 94

File : 7318.0

To : Chief Military Observer  
MILOB GP HQ

From : Sector Commander  
RPF MILOB HQ

Subj : A REPORT ON RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARMY AND  
OTHER UNAMIR RELATED ISSUES OF RPF HELD TERRITORIES

GENERAL

1. On establishment of RPF MILOB Sector, the officers of the Sector HQ under took a project to carry out a detailed recce of the RPF held areas in the northern portion of Rwanda. The recce commenced on 27 Dec 93 and have been completed on 14 Jan 94.
2. The aim of the recce was as under :-
  - a. To familiarize with the terrain and topography of the area and with the RPF army.
  - b. To locate and verify the exact deployment of RPF forces, its strength and their command structure.
  - c. To ascertain the location of Assembly areas and the Cantonment site, which will be used in subsequent phases of UNAMIR operation related to demobilization of the RPF forces.
  - d. To finalize the location of MILOB Teams and to determine their area of operation (AO).
3. The recce reports are at Annex A, B and C.

TERRAIN AND TOPOGRAPHY

4. RPF occupies the northern region of RWANDA bordering with UGANDA. The area stretches from north of RUHINGERY in the west to MASHAKA (SQ 3036) in the north east. The southern limit of the area is the start of the DMZ. They are physically holding a little less than approximately 1/5th of RWANDA. The major exit

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to UGANDA i,e the KIGALI-GATUNA highway passes through the centre of the RPF held territory. This is the only tarmac road in the entire area.

5. The terrain is rugged and mountainous in the west and in the centre. The eastern area is relatively flat, where the hill ranges meets the plains of LAKAGERA park. There are a large number of roads and tracks in the area which provides cross country mobility to light vehicles. These roads and tracks often originates from the highway and follows the folds of the mountains/hills. They are narrow, muddy/dirt country roads, with steep uphill or down hill climbs and have sharp bends, which makes driving hazardous.

a. The Western Region. The western portion of the area is dominated by the immediate slopes of the volcanic mountain of MUHABURA. The average height of the area is about 2700 metres. Lake BULERA and the marshy land of RUGEZI forms a natural barrier in the south of the area. The major roads in the area are road RUHINGARY-KIDAHU(7147)-BUTARO(8244) and road KIRAMBO(8236)- BUTARO. BUTARO is a major township. The roads and tracks are very narrow and the sides have sharp fall of up to 90 degrees.

b. The Central Region. This area is dominated by the hill ranges of KIVUYE and MUKERENGE. The average height of the area is approximately 2200 meters. MULINDI has a height of 1950 meters. National highway KIGALI-GATUNA passes through the approximate geographical centre of the area. The marshy land of RUZEGI fall in the south west of the area. The major road in the west of the highway originates from the highway, connects KIVUYE(9236), goes up to UGANDA border and continues inside into UGANDA. The same road branches off at KIVUYE II(9432) and goes towards north to RUBAYA(9938) and ends at GATUNA(5143) border. The major road to the east of the highway originates at MULINDI and connects MUKARANGE(0832), RUSHAKI(1138), CYONDO(1341) and goes eastward. From RUSHAKI a road goes to the south and connects NYARUBAMA(1823) in the DMZ. Most of these roads are narrow one way mud/dirt roads and follows the up/down hill slopes with hair pin bends. Driving needs extra skill and alertness.

c. The Eastern Region. The eastern portion of the RPF held areas are relatively plain and flat. The hill ranges of the central region gradually slopes downwards and forms large plateaus, which ultimately merges with the plains of AKAGERA park. Long grass covers the plateaus and the plains as a contrast to the mountain bushes and thick vegetation of the western and central region. Visibility is good and clear up to long distances. The major road in this area is a continuation of the road coming from the central region that passes through CYONDO(1341). This road goes towards



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the north up to TABAGWE(2358) and then goes into UGANDA. Another road from TABAGWE extends to the east up to NYAGATARE(3556). The other important road of the area originates from CYONDO and goes south up to NAGARAMA(2628) passing through the bridge at GAKOMA(1133). All the roads are one way dirt/mud roads but as they pass through generally flat terrain, driving is easier than in other areas of the west and the centre.

6. Built up Areas and Inhabitation.

a. The major built up areas are MULINDI, BUTARO, KIVUYE, MUKARANGE, RUSHAKI, CYONDO and MUHABE. These are either sub prefectures or communes having small township. These areas have churches, schools, Government establishments like sub prefecture/commune offices, courts, community centres, health complexes etc. Duelling houses and small market also exists in these areas.

b. The entire RPF dominated area looks dead and ghostly because the civilian population have abandoned the area since the wars in 1990 and 1993 and have not yet returned back. Most of the buildings, houses and huts in the small townships are damaged and have not been repaired or renovated since the war. RPF soldiers live either in damaged houses or in newly constructed temporary sheds. The area does not have electricity, water or telephone communication system.

INFORMATION ON RPF ARMY

7. RPF army is known as Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). The army was created in 1960 by the TUTSI tribe in the bushes in UGANDA-RWANDA border, when the TUTSI kingdom of RWANDA was over thrown. Till recently the entire army was essentially a guerilla force and was organised as such. The main intention or the aim behind organizing RPA was to start a resistance movement against the HUTU dominated Government of RWANDA with an ultimate goal to over throw the Government. RPA gained its power, strength and recognition as a viable fighting force during the UGANDAN bush war, when they were used by Mr Museveni, the present President of UGANDA to stage a military coup and take over power in that country in 1986. Since then the RPA have been getting all kind of operational, training and material support from UGANDA (at times openly and sometimes covertly).

8. The bulk of the present strength of the RPA i,e more than 80% are infantry soldiers. The army is controlled, operated and administered by a General HQ located at MULINDI. The forces are divided into battalions and are placed under sectors for

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operational and administrative control. The small contingents of artillery, engineers, communications and logistics forms an integral part of the General HQ. The current organizational set up of RPA came into being after the 1993 war and is shown at Annex D. Some of the important RPF personalities are listed in Annex E to this report.

9. The General HQ

a. The General HQ of RPA is located in and around MULINDI. The estimated strength of HQ staffs (Directors and other staff officers) are approximately 80 to 85. The various departments and branches are spread over an area of approximately 4 to 5 KM around MULINDI due to shortage of office accommodations at MULINDI and for security reasons. The office of the Army Commander (the chief executive of RPA) Maj Gen Paul Kagame is at MULINDI. Operations Department is collocated with the Army Commander's office. The second man of the army is Col Dugute and he is known as the Operational Co-ordinator (not a Deputy Chief or Deputy Commander which would have looked normal). His office/HQ is approximately 2 KM away from the General HQ. Organization of RPA General HQ is shown at Annex F.

b. The various Departments of General HQ are :-

- (1) Operations and Training Department. It is headed by a Lt Col.
- (2) Intelligence Department. It is headed by a Col.
- (3) Political Department. It is headed by a Col.
- (4) Administration Department. Headed by a Lt Col.
- (5) Logistics Department. It is headed by a Col.
- (6) Medical Department. It is headed by a Col.

10. HQ Troops. Following contingents are a part of RPA General HQ :-

a. Artillery. The artillery is a part of the General HQ and its employment is directly controlled by the Army Commander. The troops, approximately 400 in numbers are commanded by a Lt Col. The entire artillery resources of RPA is at MULINDI. During 1990 and 1993 war the assets were distributed to the sectors. The artillery is divided into two groups :-

- (1) Field Artillery. Field artillery is organized into a coy which has various platoons. The Coy commander is a Major. Major artillery assets are :-

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- (a) 81 mm Mortar 8 to 10 numbers.
- (b) 82 mm Mortars 45 to 50 numbers.
- (c) 120 mm Mortars 03 to 04 numbers.
- (d) 107 mm Multiple Barrel Rocket Launchers (12 barrels in each launcher) 02 numbers.

(Most of the artillery pieces are of East European origin. They are either Russian or Chinese or Yugoslav made)

(2) Air Defence Artillery. The small Air Defence component is commanded by a Major. They comprise of following weapon systems (but they do not have any target acquisition or early warning systems) :-

- (a) 12.7 mm AA gun (single barrel)
- (2) 14.5 mm AA gun (single barrel)
- (c) 14.5 mm AA gun (4 barrel)
- (d) 23 mm AA gun (single barrel)
- (e) 37 mm AA gun (single barrel)
- (f) 37 mm AA gun (twin barrel)
- (g) .50 inch Browning AA machine gun (single barrel).

(Except for .50 Browning all other weapons are of East European origin)

b. Engineers. RPA Engineer elements are commanded by a Major and has approximately 250 to 300 men. 1x platoon (approx 30 men) are attached to each infantry battalion. The Engineer elements have mines and explosives only. They have no plants/equipments. Quantity of mines and explosives could not be found out.

c. Communication Component. RPA Communication components are distributed to the battalions in platoon or section strength. The most common mode of communication is Motorola hand held radio sets. They have few HF sets. For Motorola the RPA uses a repeater and a base station at MULINDI. Radio communication from MULINDI down to battalions and even to the coys and platoons are good. During recce it was found out that all battalions, coys and platoons had radio communications.

d. Infantry Battalion of the General HQ. There is one infantry battalion (unidentified number/name) under the General HQ and is located at MULINDI. It has 600 to 700

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men. This is the only reserve battalion of RPA. This battalion primarily is also responsible for security of the General HQ and the VIPs at MULINDI.

e. Infantry Battalion at KIGALI. 3 Infantry Battalion is located at KIGALI. It has 600 men and is directly controlled by the RPA General HQ.

11. Deployment of RPA. A total of 8 (eight) infantry battalions are deployed in defensive locations along the entire areas presently held by the RPF. They are under three sectors namely the BYUMBA Sector, the RUHINGERY Sector and the MATURA Sector. The deployment is shown in the overlay at Annex G.

a. BYUMBA Sector. This is the central sector. The Sector operational area stretches from general area KIVUYE (SQ 9335) in the north to GAKOMA bridge (SQ 2236) in the north east. There are 4x infantry battalions under this sector. They are :-

(1) A (Alpha) Mobile Force. It is a normal infantry battalion. It has 4x coys having a total approximate strength of 700-800 men. HQ located near MUKARANGE at SQ 0532.

(2) B (Bravo) Mobile Force. This is also a normal infantry battalion. It has 4x coys with a total estimated strength of 700-800 men. HQ is located at KIVUYE (SQ 9431)

(3) 21 Infantry Battalion. The battalion has 6x coys having a total estimated strength of 1000 men. HQ is located at BUSHARA (SQ 1031).

(4) 101 Infantry Battalion. It has 5x coys and an administrative coy with a total estimated strength of 900-1000 men. The HQ is located at CYONDO (SQ 1341).

b. MUTARA Sector. This is the eastern sector. It has 2x infantry battalions. The operational area stretches from GAKOMA bridge (SQ 2236) in the north east to NYAGASIGATI (SQ 2760) in the north near UGANDA-RWANDA border. The battalions are :-

(1) 157 Infantry Battalion. This battalion is deployed in the extreme north eastern part of RPF held territory. It has 5x coys and an administrative coy. HQ is located at BUSHARA (SQ 2150). The total estimated strength of the battalion is 900-1000 men.

(1) 7 Infantry Battalion. The battalion has 5x coys. HQ is located at KARAMA (SQ 1747). The total

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estimated manpower is 900-1000.

c. RUHINGERY Sector. This sector has 2x infantry battalions (both the battalions are much larger than the other RPA battalions) and covers the western and north western areas of the RPF held territory. The operational area stretches from BUTARE (SQ 7547) in the north west near UGANDA-RWANDA border to KIVUYE (SQ 9335). The battalions are :-

(1) C (CHARLIE) Mobile Force. This battalion is in the extreme western boundary of the RPF held territory. The battalion has 12x coys with an estimated 1300-1400 men. 4x coys are deployed in the forward edge of the RPF held side of the DMZ. Rest of the coys are in reserve. Battalion HQ is located in KINYABABA (SQ 7848).

(2) 59 Infantry Battalion. The battalion has 10x coys with an estimated 1100-1200 men. The HQ is located at BUTARO (SQ 8244). Out of the 10 coys 3 to 4 coys are deployed in the FEBA and rest of the coys are in reserve.

12. Deployment Pattern of the RPA. The deployment pattern of RPA has following characteristics :-

a. Major concentration of the RPA is in the west towards RUHINGERY. In a small elongated area of about 10 sq KM the RPA has approximately 22x coys in 2x battalions. The major task of these battalions are to counter any possible offensive of the RGF Army and Gendarmerie in RUHINGERY (where the Government forces are also believed to be very strong). The fact that bulk of the coys of these two battalions are in reserve and that the area does not have enough depth to take so much of troops indicates that, the RPA is poised to go into offensive in the RUHINGERY area if situation so demands.

b. RPA is fairly strong along both sides of high way KIGALI-GATUNA. Three battalions i.e A Mobile Force, B Mobile Force and the reserve battalion at MULINDI are in close proximity to the highway. This indicates that the RPA in this Sector has the capability to counter any possible intrusion of Government forces into their territory and to keep the MSR (within their area) clear of interference by the Government forces.

c. RPA defense in the eastern side are relatively thinner than the other areas. Approximately 75% of the troops are deployed in the forward edge of the defence in this area.

d. The defensive locations generally follows the contours

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of the hill features. The forward edge of the entire defense of RPA runs very close to the RPF side of the DMZ. To take advantage of the dominating hill features, some platoon positions have even crossed into the DMZ (marked DMZ of Force HQ).

e. Forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) have close knitted weapon pits and bunkers with over head cover. But most of them are not permanently occupied.

f. Some of the battalion HQs are far away (in the depth) from the FEBA and are located along with the logistics base of the battalion. Some of the battalion HQs are very close to the FEBA.

g. Inter battalion and inter coy gaps in the FEBA are minimal. Normally a valley/river bed in between two hills is the inter battalion or inter coy gap (which at times is too close).

h. RPA carries out extensive patrolling activities along the FEBA as well as deep inside their defended areas specially during night. Recce team encountered several such patrols in the eastern areas at night.

i. Rotation of troops from FEBA is done at regular interval with the troops who are in the rear areas of the defense. Rotation is normally done within the troops of the battalion. But some times a complete battalion is also rotated with another battalion. 7 Infantry Battalion in the east was rotated with some unidentified battalion in the west about 5/4 month back.

j. Defense within the DMZ. During recce it was found out that at least in three specific locations, the RPA battalion defence have crossed into the DMZ (marked DMZ in UNAMIR map). The recce team did not officially notify the RPA about it. The areas are :-

(1) Hill ridges in general area NYABUAMBU SQ 1133, 1134 and 1535 are occupied by forward coys of 21 Infantry Battalion.

(2) Bridge at NYAGAHITA SQ 2236 is occupied by a platoon of 101 Infantry Battalion.

(3) Area RUGARAMA SQ 2343 and GISHORO SQ 2442 are occupied by forward troops of 7 Infantry Battalion.

13. RPA Logistics

a. Logistics System. Unlike regular army, the RPA has no standardised logistics system. Like most Guerrilla Army,



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the RPA is used to living off the ground. However, the General HQ is responsible to procure and distribute the logistics items, stores, equipments and provisions to the battalions. Most logistics item are brought in from UGANDA through various identified and unidentified tracks and kept under centralized control at MULINDI. They are either purchased or donated. Fund comes from various sources, about which the RPA did not want to speak.

b. Ration. Dry ration items like rice, beans, edible oil, pulses, bread, corns, (some times items like cheese, noodles, etc) comes from across the border (UGANDA, TANZANIA etc) and are distributed to the battalions from the General HQ. Most of the fresh items like vegetables, fruits etc are grown in limited quantities by the RPA within their defensive areas. Soldiers are utilized to grow these items.

c. Water. Rain water is collected in the natural wells in the hills and is used for drinking and other purposes. The small lakes, water falls and streams within the RPF held areas also meets the requirement of water. Soldiers are used as porters, who collects water from the wells, streams or lakes in small plastic containers. In 7 Infantry Battalion location the recce team saw running tap water supply. On inquiring it was found out that under ground water pipes are connected to a near by well from where regular water supply comes. This system was in vogue even before the battalion occupied that area.

d. POL. Supply comes in POL bowzers from UGANDA. The bowser is kept at MULINDI from where all vehicles draw their POL.

e. Electricity. There is no electricity in the RPF held area. At MULINDI a generator is used to produce electricity for the General HQ offices and accommodations of some VIPs. In other areas either kerosine lantern or improvised dry cell battery operated lights are used.

f. Transport. RPA has very limited quantity of transport. Most of the transports have either been donated by UGANDA or by the RPF sympathizers. Some have been captured from the RGF during the last wars in 1990 and 1993. Recce team has seen various make and type of transports of various companies like Mitsubishi, Toyota, Marceds, Dihatsu, Tata, Land Rovers etc. One or two of them looked very new, but most are old and in bad condition. Generally vehicles have been distributed in the following manner :-

(1) Deployed Troops. Each battalion has one pick up (half truck) and one lorry.

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(2) General HQ. 2/3 jeeps, 3/4 pick up (half trucks) and 3/4 lorry are available for the General HQ.

14. Administration. Administration Department of the General HQ is responsible for over all administration of the RPA. Battalion Commanders are responsible for discipline and welfare of the soldiers.

a. Discipline. RPA has an established Code of Conduct which are followed by all soldiers and officers. Defaulters are punished by the competent authority. The RPA stated that there are very few cases of violation of the rules.

b. Leave and Recreation. There is no system of leave in RPA. No one is allowed any leave or time off. Troops in the rear are treated as troops on leave and on recreational tours.

c. Marriage and Family. The women soldiers and officers are not allowed to get married as long as they remain in the RPA. The RPA said that this restriction have been put to avoid complications of maintaining families, their children, maternity problems etc. Male members who are married are not allowed to have their families in the RPF held areas.

d. Medical. Medical facilities hardly exists. The General HQ has some doctors in the Medical Department. No medical facilities are available with the deployed troops. In case of serious illness patients are evacuated either to a neighbouring country or are covertly brought to KIGALI.

15. Summary and Comments on RPA

a. RPA Strength.

(1) RPA has a total of 10 infantry battalions (8 battalions are deployed, one in reserve at MULINDI and one is in KIGALI). Some of the battalions have 600-700 men, some have 900-1000 men and only two battalions have over 1100 men. Taking 1000 men per battalion as an average, the total strength in 10x infantry battalions are  $10 \times 1000 = 10,000$  men.

(2) The total strength of HQ component (including artillery, engineers and communications) is estimated to be approximately 1500 men.

(3) Total Strength. The total strength of RPA therefore is approximately 11,500. Their officers strength is approximately 500.

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b. RPA Deployment. 8x infantry battalions are deployed all along the length and breadth of the RPF held areas. The western areas have the largest concentration of forces. The general line of the DMZ is the FEBA and it is held in strength. Each battalions have maximum strength in the forward lines. To gain maximum advantage of the terrain (ridge lines and hill features along the DMZ), some of the battalions have pushed their FEBA inside the DMZ.

c. RPA Logistics and Administration

(1) RPA has very little logistics backup. Most of their logistics supply comes from UGANDA. Some vegetables and fruits are grown within their area.

(2) RPA follows a Code of Conduct for running their daily administration, the details of which were not made available to the members of the MILOB recce team.

d. Attitude of RPA Towards UNAMIR. RPA officers in general are friendly, helpful and cooperative. Most of their officers served in the Ugandan army at one time or the other. Most of their young officers have attended various junior level courses in countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Yugoslavia etc. Some have visited countries like the USA, UK and Canada. So foreigners are not strangers to them. This probably is the reason that they have a natural warmth and an easy attitude towards the officers of UNAMIR (who are all foreigners). RPA soldiers are well motivated, hard working, disciplined and possibly well trained. They are also well behaved and respectful towards the UNAMIR officers. The Battalion Commanders were polite, gentle and friendly, but would not give out their exact strength, dispositions or deployments to the MILOBs Team very easily.

REPORT ON ASSEMBLY AREAS AND THE CANTONMENT SITE

16. General. RPF held territory is a war ravaged area. All the small town ships, cluster of villages, educational centres, Governmental establishments etc have been severely damaged during the wars in 1990 and 1993. Except for the RPA, there are no inhabitants in the entire area since early 1990. As these complexes are abandoned and have not been repaired since the war, most of these have become unsuitable for human living. The MILOB team however have carried out extensive survey and recce to find out suitable areas which can be used as assembly areas and cantonment sites.

17. Factors Affecting the Selection of Assembly Areas and Cantonment Sites

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- a. For centralized control, ease of administration and to ensure adequate security measures, each assembly area should have no more than 1500 to 2000 men.
- b. Assembly areas and cantonment sites should be so located that troops/weapons can be moved into these camps with minimum administrative and logistic efforts.
- c. These areas should be easily accessible but should not be so close to the main MSR that the forces can easily go out and occupy the MSR and hinder normal traffic/UNAMIR movements.
- d. As much as possible, the existing Governmental buildings/establishments are to be used, so that minimum time, effort and resources are spent on construction of accommodation and other facilities.
- e. The assembly areas should have enough open space to organize routine activities in the camp. There should be enough space around the camp to erect fences/barbed wire.
- f. The assembly areas should have minimum facilities of water, latrines and bathrooms.
- g. Each assembly area and the cantonment site should be easily defensible.

18. Total Requirement of Assembly Areas and Cantonment Sites

- a. RPA deployment pattern shows that they have 5x infantry battalions on the eastern side of high way KIGALI-GATUNA (i.e approximately 5000 men). Three assembly areas are required for these troops.
- b. On the western side of the high way there are 3x infantry battalions with approximately 3000 men and MULINDI has approximately 2000 men. Three assembly areas are required for these 5000 men.
- c. Therefore, ideally there should be 6 assembly areas to house 12,000 RPA men.
- d. There should be one cantonment site for all the weapons of the RPA. This will economize UNAMIR security efforts and ensure centralized accounting/inventory of weapons and ammunition.

19. Probable Cantonment Sites

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a. Recommended Location. Considering all the factors mentioned in para 17 and 18 the only suitable cantonment site available in the entire area is at RUSHAKI SQ 1138 (the primary school and the church complex).

b. Existing Facilities

(1) A church complex consisting of a big church building and a large L pattern accommodation with about 20 rooms.

(2) A primary school complex consisting of 4 large one storied buildings and a play ground.

(3) A secondary school complex consisting of 9 large one storied buildings and a play ground.

The primary school and the church complexes are co-located. The secondary school complex is about 600-700 meters away in a separate valley. RPA presently uses some of these buildings as one of their battalion logistics areas.

c. Engineering Effort Required. The whole complex seems to have been unaffected by the wars of 1990 and 1993. It would need minimum engineers effort in the form of :-

(1) Erection of security fencing.

(2) Arrangement of water facilities.

(3) Some repair works to repair doors, windows etc may be needed.

20. Probable Assembly Areas

a. Locations

(1) MUKARANGE (SQ 0832) Commune HQ complex and the surrounding areas.

(2) RUSHAKI (SQ 1138) Secondary School complex.

(3) MUHABO (SQ 1840) Commune HQ complex and the town ship. *cyoend b*

(4) BUNGWE (SQ 9636) Church and Primary School complex.

(5) KIVUYE (SQ 9532) Commune HQ complex and the surrounding areas.

(6) KIDAHU (SQ 7147) Commune HQ complex and the

surrounding areas.

b. Existing Facilities

(1) MUKARANGE (SQ 0832). The Commune HQ has 5 one storied buildings and some open space around the complex. One of the buildings is large and the others are of medium size. Existing facilities can take about 1000 men. All the buildings are war damaged.

(2) RUSHAKI (SQ 1138). 9 School buildings of the Secondary School (refer to para 19b) can accommodate approximately 2000 men. The buildings are in good condition. This area will however be close to the proposed cantonment site.

(3) MUHAMBO (SQ 1840). This is a small commune and a small township. It has a primary school and a number of abandoned houses. Existing facilities can take roughly 500 men. All the buildings and houses are damaged and needs repair.

(4) BUNGWE (SQ 9636). The Commune HQ has a large church complex, a primary school complex with 4 buildings, a medical centre complex and the commune HQ building. The existing facilities, which are all abandoned, can house approximately 2500 men. The buildings are all in good condition.

(5) KIVUYE (SQ 9532). This is a small commune HQ complex and has an abandoned township. Most of the buildings are damaged. The existing facilities can accommodate approximately 500-600 men.

(6) KIDAHQ(SQ7147). This is a commune HQ, located out side the RPF held area. It has a church, a court building and a secondary school building which are all damaged. Existing facilities can take about 800-1000 men. Although the location is slightly away from the RPF held area, it is the only suitable assembly area in the western region.

c. Engineers Effort Required. It was not possible to asses the exact amount of engineering effort required in each of the above mentioned locations without a proper engineers recce. However generally speaking, except for RUSHAKI and BUNGWE all other locations will need major efforts by the engineers in the following forms :-

(1) Repair of the existing facilities i,e repair of the buildings by erecting roofs, fixing/repairing doors/windows, walls etc.



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(2) Construction of new sheds/huts/buildings as accommodation.

(3) Construction of cooking, bathing and latrine facilities.

(4) Engineers Effort For Security Arrangements

(a) Erection of barbed wire fencing.

(b) Security lights and generators for each locations.

DEPLOYMENT OF MILOB TEAMS

21. General. As per UNAMIR deployment plan a total of 12 MILOB teams each consisting of 6 observers are allocated to the RPF MILOB Sector. After the detailed recce of the area and on analyzing the probable task of the MILOB Teams, it is felt that a total of 10 MILOB Teams are sufficient to carry out the mission of the RPF MILOB Sector.

22. Deployment. The teams will be deployed as under :-

a. 6x teams in the six suggested assembly areas.

b. 1x team in the cantonment site.

✓c. 1x team on high way KIGALI-GATUNA to monitor the highway. They will be deployed in the general area of NGONDORE near KM 64.

d. 1x team to be located at or around MULINDI as a Sector team for investigation into allegations by either parties of any violation of the Arusha Peace Accord, cease fire violation (CFV), special recce missions, escort duties etc.

e. 1x team for constant patrolling duties on routes leading from Sector HQ to all the assembly areas, cantonment sites and border entry points to check and monitor the unauthorised movement of traffic and goods in the RPF held areas. This team would be deployed near MULINDI or near MUKARANGE (SQ 0832) which is roughly the geographical centre of the RPF held area.

23. Ops Requirements of the Team. Each MILOB team will need following support to carry out their mission :-

a. Map. One set of map of 1:50,000 and 1: 250,000 of the Ops area are required for each team.

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b. Transport. 3x vehicles (4x4) per team and 4x vehicles (4x4) in the HQ i,e a total of 34 vehicles are required. It has been experienced that it is very difficult to negotiate the steep, hilly, dirt/mud tracks and roads of the RPF held areas with the Toyota 4 Runner (present UN jeeps). Toyota Land Cruiser 4.5 litre (the one used in UNTAC or UNIFIL) is a better and more powerful vehicle, and these may be allotted to the MILOBs of the RPF MILOB Sector. This will provide more safety to the MILOBs.

c. Communication

(1) 3x hand held Motorola per team i,e 30x Motorolas and all vehicles should have vehicle mounted radios.

(2) MULINDI Sector HQ location needs one base station and possibility a repeater.

(3) Some teams are likely to need base stations at their office locations. For example, the eastern and northern most teams will be at a distance of approximately 55 to 65 KM away from MULINDI and they may need Base Stations.

(4) Fax, telephone and courier/messenger facilities are also needed in due course of time for carrying and communicating classified/sensitive messages/documents from MULINDI to KIGALI.

d. Generator. As there is no electricity in the entire area of operation, all teams will need generators to run their radios and to light the assembly areas and cantonment site for security reasons. There is a total requirement of 9 generators ( one at MULINDI, six for assembly areas, one for the cantonment site and one for the team at NGONDORE near KM 64).

24. logistics Need of the Teams

a. Office Accommodation. For operational and administrative reasons, each team will need an office accommodation. These offices will be collocated or closely located near the assembly areas and cantonment site. The office accommodation should have toilet facilities.

b. Living Areas. MILOB teams will have to find out their own living areas in their operational area. These are being coordinated with the RPF. In case proper accommodations can not be found out, either the office accommodation will have to be used or tents would be needed for living.

c. Provision of Water and Food. RPF held areas do not

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have assured, adequate and reliable source of water. There are no restaurants or market where food can be eaten or bought. The nearest source of food for MULINDI and eastern areas is BYUMBA and for western areas is RUHINGERY. It would be necessary to make some arrangements by the UNAMIR to ensure drinking water supply. A canteen facility can be established at BYUMBA by the Force Logistics elements or by the Ghana battalion so that MILOBs can buy food/essential items from there instead of going to KIGALI.

d. Medical Facilities. UNAMIR medical facilities should be made available at MULINDI or at BYUMBA. MILOB teams will not be able to go to KIGALI for attending to their basic and emergence medical needs due to distance and time involved to undertake the road journey.

e. CASEVAC. All MILOBs of the sector will be under constant threat of becoming a casualty by accidents, hostile acts of the parties concerned, unfriendly and unhealthy living environment etc. CASEVAC therefore should get due priority in this Sector. In most cases CASEVAC can not be undertaken by vehicles due to poor and dangerous state of the existing roads/tracks of the area. Use of helicopter must therefore get priority in the RPF MILOB Sector.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

25. A deliberate attempt has been made in this paper to elaborately discuss the RPA organization, strength, deployment, logistics, administration, behaviour etc and an evaluation have been done about the UNAMIR requirement to monitor, demobilize and canton them in Phase II and III of UNAMIR operation. The entire paper has been compiled basing on the recce of the RPF held areas and on the information obtained through informal discussions with commanders and staffs at various levels during the recce.

26. The facts and figures obtained from interviewing various RPA Commanders and staff officers indicates that the total strength of RPA is approximately 12000 persons. Eight out of their ten infantry battalions troops are deployed along the DMZ. The General HQ at MULINDI has approximately 1500 to 2000 troops which includes their artillery, engineers, communications, logistics and medical elements.


27. Considering the command, control and security aspect, an assembly area should house 1500 to 2000 men. The total requirement of assembly areas for 12,000 men therefore is six. As per the pattern of RPA deployment and as per the availability of suitable location, three assembly areas have been selected on

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either side of KIGALI-GATUNA high way. One cantonment site have been chosen to canton the arms and ammunition of the RPA.

28. RPF areas have been severely damaged during the wars of 1990 and 1993 and most of the townships, villages, educational institutions and Government establishments are abandoned since then. It is difficult to find out suitable assembly areas, cantonment sites and MILOB teams locations in the area. The recommended sites have been found to be the most suitable from the point of view of security, economy of effort to renovate, repair/reconstruct it, involvement of finance, etc. An engineers recce team may be sent to all the recommended sites to make their final assessment.

29. Deployment of MILOB teams will depend on the availability of the MILOBs, transports and communication equipments. Each team will be placed on ground as soon as the MILOBs have been able to make necessary agreements for their accommodation with the RPF. The teams can be made fully operational once they have been provided with an office and living accommodation, and necessary operational and logistics requirements mentioned earlier in this paper.



NAZRUL ISLAM  
LT COL  
SECTOR COMMANDER

ANNEXES :

- A. Recce Report no 2.
- B. Recce Report no 3.
- C. Recce Report no 4.
- D. Organization of RPA.
- E. Organization of RPA Gen HQ.
- F. Important Personalities of RPF.
- G. Overlay of RPA Deployment, Assembly Areas, Cantonment Site and MILOB Team Locations.

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ANNEX A TO  
RECCE REPORT  
OF RPF AREA

RPF SECTOR RECCE REPORT NO:2


1. Composition.

- a. Lt Col Nazrul Islam (BAN)
- b. Maj B K Gborglah (GHA)
- c. Maj Linares (URU)
- d. Maj Shahidul Haque (BAN)

2. Mode of Transport. UNAMIR vehicle no: 1018 (TOYOTA 4 RUNNER)

3. References.

- a. Map MULINDI, scale; 1: 50,000
- b. Map BYUMBA, scale; 1: 50,000
- c. Folding.



4. Date/ Time.

- a. Dep MILOBS HQ KIGALI - 070915B Jan 94
- b. Arr at MULINDI - 071045B Jan 94
- c. Dep MULINDI for AOR - 071130B Jan 94
- d. Returned to MULINDI - 071800B Jan 94
- e. Returned to KIGALI - 071930B Jan 94

5. Notification/Liaison.

- a. RPA Gen HQ info by formal message and through LO.
- b. Lt Col Ceaser (RPA Dir Ops) accompanied the recce team from CND, KIGALI to MULINDI and handed over the recce party to Maj J Birasa, his deputy.

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6. Routes.

- a. Out. MULINDI (0336)- RIDGE(0434)- MUKARANGE(0831)-  
NYAMIYAGA(0931)- NKAMBA(1039)- RUSHAKI(1137)- KIZINGA(0844)-  
CYONDO(1341).
- b. In. CYONDO- KIZINGA- KIYOMBA(0940)- RD JUNC(0838)- RD JUNC(0634)-  
RD JUNC(GR 039359)- MULINDI.

7. Tasks. To get acquainted with RPA tps/units on the ground, cfm their deployment and locate possible Assy Points, Cantonment Sites and possible MILOB Teams deployment areas.


8. Findings. The recce party found four bns deployed in the area shown by the map coords in para 3c. the bns are:

- a. ALPHA MOBILE FORCE, deployed between eastings 03 and 10.
- b. 21 INF BN, depolyed between eastings 10 and 14.
- c. 101 INF BN, deployed between eastings 14 to 23.
- d. A res bn (designation to be cfm) loc at RPA Gen HQ(GHQ) at MULINDI.

9. ALPHA Mobile Force(AMF).

a. Deployment/Str. Three coys fwd and one in depth. Bn strength is approx 700-800. Exact figure was not communicated to the recce team.

b. Area of Responsibility(AOR).



c. FEBA. Along stream WAGARA running east to west from 097303 to br at 062297.

d. Bn HQ and Admin Area. SQ 0532

e. Rt Fwd Coy. Deployed from top of HILL(0529) to reentraant east of HILL(0630). The RPA Check Point at GR 058297 (near DMZ on rd BYUMBA-GATUNA) is manned by this bn.

f. Centre Coy. Shares bdry with rt fwd coy and stretches eastward to rd bend at GR 087311.

g. Lt Fwd Coy. Shares with bdry centre coy and streches to the east.

h. Depth Coy. Loc at SQ 0433.



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
j. Key Appt.

- (1) Bn Comd - Col SAM KAKA (Also sector co-ordinator of BYUMBA sector)
- (2) Bn 2IC - To be cfm
- (3) Ops Offr - Capt SAM MARESEG
- (4) Admin Coy Comd - Maj ALEX

10. 21 Inf Bn.

a. Deployment/Str. 21 Inf Bn is deployed with two coys on a narrow front and four coys in depth between easting 11 and 14. The depth coy i,e Foxtrot coy loc in KANIGA(6442) for border ptl along UGANDA-RWANDA border. Bn str is approx 1000.

b. AOR.



c. FEBA. Gen Line drawn from GR 104305 through stream bed south of Rd/Tr junc GR 130313 to eastern slopes of HILL BUNGWE(1429).

d. Bn HQ and Admin Coy. Loc at RUSHAKI(1137). On the day of recce(7 Jan) Bn HQ was redeployed to a new loc in BUSHARA(1031). Admin coy remains in RUSHJAKI.

e. Rt Fwd Coy. Deployed from upper valley of Stream MUSAYO (1030) northeastward to Rd running NW to SE just north of HILL NYABUSHITWE(1231).

f. Lt Fwd Coy. Deployed from Rd mentioned in sub para e above and stretches NE to NE slopes of BUNGWE(1434).

g. Depth Coys. Locs of three depth coys were not revealed. However a sixth coy(F Coy) was said to be on independent border ptl and loc at KANIGA(0442) near the border with UGANDA.

h. Key Appt.

- (1) Bn Comd - Col CHARLES MUSITY
- (2) Bn 2IC - To be cfm
- (3) Ops Offr - To be cfm

11. 101 Inf Bn.

a. Deployment. 101 Inf Bn is deployed in linear fashion facing south and south-east with five coys fwd. Bn HQ and Admin coy are co-located at CYONDO(1341). The five coys are stretched along gen line RUSABEYA(1436)- KABONGOYA(1736)- NYAGAHITA Br in GAKOMA(2236).

b. Str. Believed to be about 1000.

c. Key Appt.

- (1) Bn Comd - Col MUHIRE
- (2) Bn 2IC - Lt Col GHADAFI
- (3) Ops Offr - Lt Col SAM BIGABIRO

12. Rd Condition. All rds in the area are oneway dusty/muddy, rough, rugged and steep in most parts, just running along the folds of the hills/cliffs. Driving needs extra caution.

13. Gen Attitude of RPA. The gen attitude of the offr towards the recce party was one of caution and sceptism. Without the accompanying guides access to the area would have been impossible. It is felt that as the MILOB teams deploy in the area and begin to interact with RPA offr and men, mutual confidence will develop.

14. RPA Activities/Training.

a. The team observed that tps of bns were tactically deployed and alert in well prepared defensive posns. Standard of trg seems to be high; evidence of trg were seen in the HQ complex at RUSHAKI with black board notes and used target practice boards.

b. In one of the coys of 101 Inf Bn, pls were rotating posns, a practice said to be common, to prevent over-familiarization with the terrain and complacency(relaxation) among the tps.

c. The offr seemed to be well-trained and are knowledgeable.

15. Boundary/FEBA Violations. From the RPA fwd deployment loc it is seen that 21 Inf Bn has deployed some of its tps inside the DMZ.

16. Suggested Assy Area and Cantonment Sites. Following are the suggested Assy Areas and Cantonment Sites:

a. MUKARENGE(GR 0831) Sub-prefecture HQ Area. Engr effort required in the form of construction of new accn(at least one big shed), repair of existing bldgs(construction of roof). This area can accommodate 1500 to 2000 tps.

b. RUSHAKI(GR 1137) School and Church bldgs. No engr efforts required. It can accommodate appox 3000 tps. It can be also used both as assy area and cantonment site .


c. CYONDO(GR 1341) Football Grd and School bldg. Engr effort are required to construct new accommodation and repair the existing facilities. It can accommodate appox 1500 tps.

RPF SECTOR RECCE REPORT NO 3  
(MUTARA ZONE)1. Composition.

- a. Lt Col Nazrul Islam(BAN)
- b. Maj Gborglah(GHA)
- c. Maj Shahidul Haque(BAN)

2. Mode of Transport. UNAMIR 1018 (TOYOTA 4 RUNNER)3. References.

- a. MULINDI, Scale; 1: 50,000
- b. NYAGATARE, Scale; 1: 50,000
- c. KAGITUMBA, Scale; 1: 50,000
- d. Folding.



4. Date/Time. Recce took place on Mon, 10 Jan 94. The team started from MULINDI to TABAGWE(2358) at 1140 hrs and returned to MULINDI at 2015hrs.

5. Notification/Liaison. Two RPA offrs from MULINDI accompanied the team as guides.

6. Routes.

a. Out. MULINDI - CYONDO(1341)- MUHAMBO(1941)- KARAMA- BUSHARA(2150)- SHONGA(1952)- TABAGWE(2354).

b. In. Reverse of para 6a.

7. Tasks.


- a. To get acquainted with comd and tps on the grd.
- b. To cfm deployment of units on the grd.
- c. To locate possible Assy Points, Cantonment Sites.
- d. To locate possible MILOB Teams deployment areas.

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- e. To locate alleged Returnees Camps and ascertain their problems/needs.
- f. To find any other pertinent info/issues.

8. Findings.

- a. Units. Two units, 7 Bn and 157 Bn are located in gen area:



This area is referred to as MUTARA Sector.

- b. Offrs. COs and offrs were friendly. CO 157 Bn offered tea and informal lunch to the recce team.
- c. Assy/cantonment points. No possible Assy/Cantonment Points seen with ready infrastructure except Catholic Church and the township MUHAMBO(1840). However with UN construction effort the two places could be used for Assy Point. They have football field and other open spaces.
- d. MILOB Team. One MILOB Team could be loc in CYONDO(1341) or KARAJUMBA(1441).
- e. Returnees. About 1000 Rwandese herdsmen incl a few women had returned from UGANDA with their herds and were scattered in around TABAGWE(2354). Numbers are increasing by the day. They need humanitarian assistance in the form of food, shelter, clothing and medicare. (Separete report submitted)
- f. Terrain/Vegetation. Terrain changes from the mountains west of eastings 18 to low hills as one travels east and NE. It is almost flat further north. Correspondingly, vegetative cover changes from open jungle to grassland.
- g. Distances.
  - (1) MULINDI - RUSHAKI JUNC : 15 KM
  - (2) RUSHAKI - CYONDO : 17 KM
  - (3) CYONDO - MUHAMBO : 7 KM
  - (4) MUHAMBO - BUSHARA : 23 KM
  - (5) BUSHARA - TABAGWE : 16 KM

9. 7 Inf Bn.

- a. Deployment/Str. 4 coys with approx 800 men.
- b. AOR. From GR 141490 - MUHAMBO(1840) - MUKAMA(2041) - BUFUNDA(2742) - NDEGE(1851).

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- c. FEBA. MUHAMBO - MUKAMA - BUFUNDA - RWEBARE(2346).
- d. Bn HQ Fwd. MUHAMBO GR 196414.
- e. Bn HQ Rear. KARAMA(1747).
- f. Commanding Offr and Zone Operational Coordinator. Col WILLIAM BAGIRE.

10. 157 Inf Bn.

- a. Deployment/Str. 5 Coys. 4 Coys fwd and one in res. Appox 35 offrs and 850 men.
- b. AOR. From NDEGE(1851) - RUKOMO(2546) - RURENGE(3152) - NYAGASIGATI(2760).
- c. FEBA. RUKOMO - RURENGE - NYAGASIGATI.
- d. Bn HQ. BUSHARA(2150).
- e. CO. Lt Col Fred Ibingira.

11. Remarks. Rds are very bad and TOYOTA 4 Runner is not suitable for this area. TOYOTA LANDCRUISER may be a better option.

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ANNEX C TO  
RECCE REPORT  
OF RPF AREA

RPF SECTOR RECCE REPORT NO 4  
(BYUMBA AND RUHENGARI ZONE)


1. Composition.

- a. Maj Saar (SEN)
- b. Maj B K Gborglah (GHA)
- c. Maj S P Traore (MAL)

2. Mode of transport. UNAMIR 1048 (TOYOTA 4 Runner).

3. References.

- a. MULINDI, Scale; 1: 50,000
- b. BYUMBA, Scale; 1: 50,000
- c. KIRAMBO, Scale; 1: 50,000
- d. GAKENGE, Scale; 1: 50,000
- e. Folding.



4. Date/Time. Tthree days recce on 12, 13 and 14 Jan 94.

- a. 12 Jan. MULINDI - KIVUYE(9532) - MULINDI
- b. 13 Jan. MULINDI - BUTARE(GR 754479) - MULINDI
- c. 14 Jan. KIGALI - RUHENGARI - NKUMBA - KIDAHU - KAGOGO and back.

5. Notification/Liaison. Maj Birasa and Lt Taisire, both from RPA HQ MULINDI accompanied the recce party.

6. Route.

a. 12 Jan.

(1) Out. MULINDI - GATUNA(0142) - RUBAYA(9938) - GATUNA(0142) - MUKONO(0139) - CYHMBA(0035) - GAKUDO(9932) - BUNGWE(9634) - KIVUYE(9531).

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(2) In. KIVUYE - NYAMBARE(0035) - MUORE(0236) - MULINDI.

b. 13 Jan.

(1) Out. MULINDI - NYAMBARE - KIVUYE - BUTARO(8143) - KINYABABA(7847) - BUTARE(7547).

(2) In. Reverse of para 6b(1).

c. 14 Jan. KIGALI- RUHENGARI- NKOMBA- KIDAHU- KAGOGO and back.

7. Tasks.

- a. To get acquainted with commanders/tps on the grd.
- b. To cfm unit deployment on the grd.
- c. To locate poss Assy/Cantonment Areas.
- d. To locate poss MILOB Teams deployment location.
- e. To find out terrain characteristics and rd conditions.
- f. To find any other relevent info.

8. Finding.

- a. Units. The team found three heavily rft bns in the western half of RPF Sector west of rd KIGALI - GATUNA. Eastern half of that area is part of BYUMBA Sector and western half is RUHENGARI Sector of RPA Sector.
- b. Offrs. The few offrs met were very friendly, hospitable and open to discussions. CO 59 Bn organized a Qtr Gd for the Recce Team, and a formal lunch. Present at the lunch was CO, CHARLIE MOBILE Force and some staff offrs.
- c. Men. Men everywhere were well dressed and disciplined in appearance.
- d. Poss Assy/Cantonment points.
  - (1) BUNGWE(9634) with large space and ideal infrastructure(living accn, water, kitchens) is suitable as an Assy Point. This place can take 2,500-3,000 tps. Needs very little engrs effort.
  - (2) KIVUYE(9531) commune bldg for Cantonment Point(for wpns). Some engrs effort in the form of building windows and providing locks on the doors are required. Doors and windows are rft with iron bars.
  - (3) No existing structure found in RUHENGARI Zone. Moreover, zone is too difficult in terms of terrain and may present resupply problems.



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(4) KIDAHO(7147), although is out of RPF held area is a suitable Assy Area. Existing commune bldg, court bldg, and secondary school can take approx 800-1000 men. Engr effort required to repair these facilities and to construct new sheds.

e. MILOB Teams. A team each could be located in BUNGWE(9634), KIVUYE(9235) and BUTARO(8143).

f. Displaced Persons. Two displaced persons camps loc at RUBAYA(9937). Estimated population incl children and babies is 10,000. Engage in productive activities, farming. Well clothed and said by our guides to be catered for by charity orgs like Red Cross. On 12 Jan 94, hundreds were seen clearing weeds off rd GATUNA - RUBAYA(supply route for charity org). Some of same group found on rd NYANGOZI(9532) - BUNGWE(9634).

g. Terrain/Vegetation. In BYUMBA Zone- mountainous terrain with fairly wide plateaus. Settlements are on plateaus. Vegetative cover is mixed forest with dense bushes. In RUHENGERRI Zone terrain is rugged with very high mountains, very steep slopes and valleys. Zone is mostly bordered on the west by the vast long RUGEZI marshland.

h. Rd Conditions. Rds in BYUMBA Zone are fairly wide dust/mud. In RUHENGERRI Zone rds are very narrow, one way, rugged and bordered by very sharp edged 90 degree drops into the deep valleys. Very high driving skills required in this zone.

i. Water Bodies. Lake BULERA comes into sight as one exits BUTARO(8143). Presents spectacular view, with River RUSUMU cascading into it as a waterfall at GR 812431.

j. Distances.

- (1) MULINDI - RUBAYA : 16KM
- (2) MULINDI - KIVUYE(9532) : 20KM
- (3) MULINDI - BUTARO : 50KM
- (4) MULINDI - BUTARE : 65KM

9. BRAVO MOBILE Force(BYUMBA Zone).

a. Deployment/Str. Apart from one coy comd who was unwilling to give info about the unit, no offr was met. However, judging from later finding of other bns on the west, and from the vast AOR of the force, one can hazard a guess of between 5-8 rft coys. Str could be 1000-1200. To be cfm later.

b. AOR. By deduction GATUNA(0142) - RUGARAMA(0529) - RUHENDA(0229) - MIYOVE(9722) - RUGEZI MARSH(8933) - KIVUYE(9036).

c. Bn HQ. KIVUYE(9530).

d. Key Appts. Yet to be cfm.

10. 59 Inf Bn (RUHENGERRI Zone).

a. Deployment/Str. This bn consists of Bn HQ and 10 coys. Approx str is 1200.

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- b. AOR. BUTARO(8144) - NDAGO(7939) - RUHANGA(8140) - KIVUYE(8936).
  - c. Bn HQ. BUTARO GR 821446.
  - d. CO and Zone Op Coord. Col NGOGA
  - e. 2IC. Lt Col NYAMORANGA
  - f. Ops and Trg Offr. Maj KAMJISHA
  - g. Tps. Disciplined, alert and friendly with high sense of security.
  - h. Remarks. BUTARO could house a MILOBS Team, but not tps in Assy Pt. Town said to be very densely populated when inhabitants in loc. This area and KAGOGO Area said to be one of the most agriculturally productive areas of the country, probably due to the volcanoes loc north of it.
11. CHARLIE MOBILE Force(CMF) (RUHENGARI Sector).
- a. Deployment/Str. The bn has 12 coys deployed as fol:
    - (1) Bn HQ and Two coys : KINYABABA(7847)
    - (2) Four coys : BUGAMBA(7747)
    - (3) Two coys : KAGOGO(7548)
    - (4) Two coys : RULIBA(7744)
    - (5) Two coys CASENGE(8044)
- Str is appox 1400 tps.
- b. AOR. KAGAGO(7548) - RULIBA(7744) - CYASENGE(8044) - KINDOYI(8348)
  - c. Offrs.
    - (1) CO. Lt Col DAVID KARANGWA
    - (2) 2IC. Lt Col FRED KALEBA
    - (3) Ops and Trg Offr. Maj JOHN GASHAIJA
  - d. Remarks.
    - (1) CMF lies in the shadow of Mount MUHABURA, the second biggest volcanic mt in RWANDA, regarded by all RWANDESE exiled in UGANDA as the 'hand' that guides them back to their homeland.
    - (2) Radio MUHABURA. "The Voice that Guides" is the clandestine radio station of RPF and is loc on Mt MUHABURA. Exact loc not known.

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
ANNEX F TO  
RECCE REPORT  
OF RPF AREA

IMPORTANT RPF PERSONALITIES

1. PRESIDENT OF RPF : KANYARANGWE ALEX
2. VICE PRESIDENT NO 1 : MAZIMHAKA PATRICK
3. VICE PRESIDENT NO 2 : POLISI DENIS
4. GENERAL SECRETARY : MR RUDASINGWA THEOGENE
5. MINISTERS OF BBTG
  - A. INTERIOR MINISTER : BIZIMUNGU PASTEEN
  - B. HEALTH MINISTER : COL DR KAREMERA JOSEPH
  - C. YOUTH MINISTER : KAYUMBA IMMACULEE
  - D. VICE PRIME MINISTER : BIHOZAGARA JACQUES
6. COMMANDER OF ARMY : MAJ GEN PAUL KAGAME
7. OPS COORDINATOR(DY OF ARMY) : COL DUGUTE
8. DIRECTOR OF OPS(GEN HQ) : LT COL CESEAR
9. DIRECTOR OF INT(GEN HQ) : COL KAYUMBA
10. DIRECTOR OF ADMIN(GEN HQ) : COL MUZUNGU
11. DIRECTOR OF LOG : COL BISERUKA
12. POLITICAL ADVISOR( GEN HQ) : COL MUGABAGE
13. COMD ALPHA MOBILE FORCE : COL SAM KAKA
14. COMD OF BRAVO MOBILE FORCE : TO BE CFM
15. COMD OF CHARLIE MOBILE FORCE : LT COL DAVID KARANGWA
16. BN COMD 3 INF BN : TO BE CFM
17. BN COMD 7 INF BN : COL WILLIAM
18. BN COMD 21 INF BN : LT COL CHARLES MUSITY
19. BN COMD 59 INF BN : COL NGOGA
20. BN COMD 101 INF BN : COL MUHIRE
21. BN COMD 157 INF BN : LT COL FRED IBINGIRA
22. BN COMD MULINDI BN : LT COL JAMES

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ORGANISATION OF RPF - FORCE HQ



## ORGANISATION OF RPF

