

[ 7 CONFIDENTIAL ]

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SERIES S-1062

BOX 63

FILE 7

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Copy No...of....

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
Kigali

3000.15 (OPS)

23 Dec 94

See Distribution

SUBJECT: SECURITY INSTRUCTION-OP RETOUR.

References: .

- A. Z723 Sheet 40 BUTARE, Ed 1 1:50,000
- B. Z723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- C. Z723 Sheet 17 KIGALI, Ed 1, 1:50,000
- D. Z723 Sheet 23 GITARAMA Ed 1, 1:50,000
- E. Z723 Sheet 26 KIBUNGO Ed 1, 1:50000
- F. 3000.15/1/OPS dated 21 Dec 94.

1 GENERAL

a. The recent conflict in RWANDA has resulted in the displacement of approximately 3 million people from their homes. It is estimated that there are 1.1 million refugees in the areas of GOMA and BUKAVU in ZAIRE. The refugee camps in these areas are controlled by military/militia elements of the former Rwandan government which sees the continuing existence of these camps as a way of maintaining their political power base. There are an additional 1.9 million displaced persons within RWANDA. Most of these DPs are concentrated in camps in the South West of the country in Sector 4. DP camps have been used as operating bases for former government militia elements to carry out attacks within RWANDA.

b. The return of the refugees to their homes will help to break the hold that the former government has over the people in GOMA and BUKAVU, improve the security situation in the border areas and assist in the normalisation of RWANDA.

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(c) Phase III.

- i. Provide secure environment in Home Communes.
- ii. Liaise with Bourgmestres, UN Agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR in Home Communes.
- iii. Provide route security for coys from target camps to ORCs/Home Communes.

c. COORD INSTRS.

(1) Timings.

- (a) D-Day - 29 Dec 94.
- (b) D-Day to D+14 (29 Dec to 12 Jan 95) - Move from CYANIKA camp (Sector 4AN).
- (c) D+4 to D+19 (02 Jan 95 to 17 Jan 95) - Move from RUKONDO camp (Sector 4AN).
- (d) D+14 to D+24 (12 Jan 95 to 23 Jan 95) - Move from KIZI, KINAZI, MUSANO, KANYINA, NYASISUYA, KARAMBI, BUHORO, GISUNZA and NYAMIRA camps.
- (e) D+19 to D+34 (17 Jan 95 to 01 Feb 95). Move from KIBEHO camp (Sector 4AS).
- (f) D+29 to D+39 (27 Jan 95 to 06 Feb 95) - Move from NDAGO camp (Sector 4AS).
- (g) D+39 to D+43 (06 Feb to 10 Feb 95) - Move from MUNINI camp (Sector 4AS).
- (h) D+43 to D+47 (10 Feb 95 to 14 Feb 95) - Move from KARANA camp.
- (i) D+47 to D+49 (14 Feb 95 to 16 Feb 95) - Move from BUSANZE camp (Sector 3A).
- (j) D+49 to D + 53 (16 Feb 95 to 20 Feb 95) - Move from MUSABEYA camp.
- (k) D+29 to D+59 (27 Jan 95 to 26 Feb 95 and beyond) - Move of refugees.

(l) Refugees. It is hoped to begin the move of refugees from D+30. Details of this part of Op RETOUR will be promulgated later.

OP RETOUR - ORC DESTINATIONS

CAMP	PREFECTURE	ORC/COMMUNE
CYANIKA	South Kigali	Open from D-3 (26 Dec) <u>Ngenda</u> <u>Gashora</u> Kanzenze
	Butare	Runyinya Geshamvu Kigembi Niakazu
	Gitarama	Ntongwe Masango Murama
	Kibungo	Kigoma Sake
RUKHONDO	All of the above + Butare	Open from D + 2 (31 Dec) All of the above + Muyira Ntyazo Nyabisundu
	Gikongoro	Musango Rukhondo (to be activated only when camp has closed)

This list will be updated as time progresses. Planning for subsequent camps on the Schedule, and their ORCs, is currently being carried out.

## OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
BYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
SUHHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
LIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)												
MUNINI (12,000)									43			
KARANA (21,000)									43	47		
BUSANZE (9,000)										47-9		
MUSABEYA (14,000)										49	53	

Notes:

All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis

From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLING  
THE  
INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Stability, security and development are objectives of tantamount importance to the people of Rwanda, their Government and the international community. Fundamental to these objectives is the return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandese who are displaced within their own nation. Towards this specific goal, the Government with the support of the international community will intensify its efforts to settle the displaced in an expeditious and humane manner. In pursuing this immediate goal, the Government and the international community are determined to ensure that the principles set out below will underpin all their efforts:

Immediate Objectives

1. The immediate objective of the Government and international community is to have the internally displaced people of Rwanda return home with dignity and in conditions of safety and security.
2. In ensuring that these immediate objectives are upheld, it is agreed that there be:
  - i. Total Political Endorsement. All plans established to support the IDP operation will have the full support and active cooperation of the Government of Rwanda;
  - ii. No Enforced Camp Closure. Camps will not be forcibly closed. That said, an environment in which the people are motivated to leave voluntarily will be created;
  - iii. Initial Operations to Create Confidence. It is essential to build confidence amongst the displaced population and momentum in the operation. Therefore from the very outset full attention must be given to ensuring success along these lines;
  - iv. Secure Environment. Conditions in the Home Communes will be established to create a secure environment and provide essential social services which attract people home from the camps;
  - v. Confidence Building. Confidence building measures, primarily concerning security and information dimensions, will be essential;

vi. Impartial Information. Information promulgated as part of confidence building measures must be impartial;

vii. Return in Safety. All effort must be made to ensure that people return in safety. While ensuring this principle, the Government maintains the right to bring to justice, consistent with the due process of law, those accused of perpetrating genocide;

viii. Cooperation. The success of the operation will require the full cooperation of all contributing organisations, within the scope of their mandates;

vi. Flexibility. All plans developed to support the settlement of IDPs must be flexible and lend themselves to modification. Mechanisms must be in place to ensure that any adjustments take place in a way that fulfills the aforementioned principles both at the policy and implementation levels.

### OPEN RELIEF CENTRES

1. The concept of Open Relief Centres (ORC) has been established to address the fundamental concerns of Internally Displaced Persons and the recipient communities, ensuring the re-integration of IDPs while maintaining the security and dignity of both groups. The ORC is a temporary place where displaced persons on the move and other returnees as well as locals in vulnerable conditions can freely enter or leave and obtain essential relief assistance in a relatively safe environment.
2. Open Relief Centres will be set up in accordance and in phase with local conditions and requirements in Rwanda. The ORC, are transit points, in the home communes, for IDP's returning to their homes. They are to facilitate immediate re-integration, through the provision of basic food items, seeds and construction materials, and by increasing confidence in law and order in the home communes. At the same time Quick Impact Project will promote rehabilitation of the country, at the communal level.
3. Material assistance provided through the ORC's in the home communes is aimed at re-integration, and will be phased out; dependency must be avoided.
4. The actors in setting up Open Relief Centres will be UNHCR (set-up and protection), WFP (food), UNICEF (water and sanitation), WHO (health), UNAMIR (security), UNHCR (protection), NGOs and local authorities. Each ORC will be managed by a designated NGO or UN Agency. Information gathering and dissemination will come under the responsibility of UNREO. Overall coordination will take place in the context of the Integrated Humanitarian Operations Centre framework, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Rehabilitation.

#### ORC components

##### a Food distribution

Food needs are best covered by food (for work) programmes, distributions of food or rations at the commune level. Sustained direct distribution at the ORC-site should be avoided so as to not have concentration of foodstuffs at one location nor provide an incentive for people to stay at the ORCs. One-off distribution to IDPs for a two week period will be effected in conjunction with WFP/CRS/ICRC targeted distributions. (half rations/250grms/person/day)

Once IDPs leave the ORCs for their homes, they should be absorbed to the ongoing food, seeds and tools, distributions in the communes

##### b Temporary shelter

Ideally, ORCs would be considered a temporary solution limited in time (3-10 days), while the local authorities find an acceptable temporary, or preferably durable solution for those whose homes are either occupied or need repairs. It will be forbidden to build huts at the ORC's. Construction materials will be made judiciously available in the vicinity of the ORC to targeted populations in order for people to instantly work on rebuilding their houses. For planning purposes, plastic sheeting for one out of four families will be made available in each ORC.



c. Health

Ideally people in transit at the ORCs needing medical assistance should be referred to the health system in place at the commune level. Where such structures are inadequate NGOs or the appropriate UN Agency will be given the responsibility of supplying such services.

d. Water and sanitation

Access to a water source or water availability will be one of the criteria to determine the ORC location. These should be simple latrines; For planning purposes 1 pit latrines per 50 IDPs.

e. Transport

It is considered advisable to have transport facilities available at the ORCs, for people who cannot reach their secteur on foot (distance too big, disabled persons etc.).

f. Protection

Protection is one of the key issues of the ORCs. The protection role will be taken care of by UNHCR and UNHR in close collaboration with local authorities. It is considered important to register the IDPs on arrival to the centre, so as to monitor further events. UNHCR/UNHR or ICRC in principle will ensure presence in each of the ORCs.

Local residents as well as IDP's having returned to their homes, can contact the local authorities and the ORC in case of security problems in their home areas, including tensions over house occupation etc. In such cases admission and emergency shelter may be granted on a case by case basis. Solutions will then be found by, and in cooperation with the local authorities, including the gendarmerie or army as required

The local authorities have at all times access to the ORC's in order to promote confidence etc.

The ORC's should not be a sanctuary for persons having committed crimes. Local law enforcement agents, including army personnel if duty authorized, can enter the ORC to arrest persons, if it can be demonstrated that substantiated suspicions against such persons exists. Arrests can in principle only be made in the presence of UN or ICRC official unless there is an emergency situation (risk of escape, genuine threat to the security of others, etc. The law enforcement agents will sign, at the ORC, for any arrest made, and family members, the ICRC and the UNHCHR will have access to the person concerned.

## LEGAL ISSUES FOR OP RETOUR

### References:

- A. Resolution 925 dated 8 Jun 94
- B. Operational Directive No 2: Rules of Engagement dated 6 Oct 94
- C. FC Directive on Legal Jurisdiction Applicable to UNAMIR and Rwandan Authorities dated 3 Nov 94

### Introduction

1. UNAMIR troops will be required to provide security to displaced persons and NGOs taking part in OP Retour. It is therefore essential that soldiers be briefed by their commanders as to what their legal rights and obligations are during the OP.

### Rules of Engagement

2. Reference A states that the mandate of UNAMIR is to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda and to provide security and support to humanitarian relief operations. This mandate and its legal ramifications are reflected in Reference B. All UNAMIR troops are to follow the ROE as stated in Reference B.

3. To achieve the above mandate and to comply with the Rules of Engagement (ROE), soldiers should be aware that their orders allow them to protect themselves, other UNAMIR troops, displaced persons and other civilians at risk (including humanitarian aid workers and UN personnel) from a hostile intent and/or hostile act.

4. To afford this protection a soldier is entitled to use minimum force to stop a serious offence from being committed against any of the aforementioned categories of people. A serious offence is defined as murder, rape or serious bodily harm.

5. If extremist individual(s) are intimidating or harassing IDPs from leaving the camps, UNAMIR troops are to use minimum force to separate the extremist(s) from the general population of IDPs. The use of force is to be consistent with the constraints stated in Reference B.

### Handling Detainees

6. Rwandan nationals should only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display a hostile intent or carry out any of the acts referred to in Reference B, paragraph 8. The detainee(s) and any relevant evidence is to be handed at the earliest opportunity to the Fce MP.

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To : See distribution

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 07 Dec 94

Sub : WARNING ORDER

1. SITUATION. There have been increase in acts of banditry, intimidation and criminal activities especially in certain DP camps. The most affected camps are those of KIBEHO (5007) stretching to NDAHO (5201). Both the DP camps are located in sector 4A. It is imperative that firm action is taken to restore security in accordance with UNAMIR mandate. UNAMIR forces will undertake operations in cooperation with 2 RPA battalions to get rid of criminal elements from the mentioned camps/area.

2. MISSION. The MILOB GP will conduct operations in conjunction with formed troops to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO DP camps.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search will be conducted concurrently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR coy will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

b. MILOB Sect 1

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO NICOF effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Detach 2 MILOB teams under ops command of MILOB Tac HQ with effect from 11 Dec 94. Teams to report to sec 3 by 111600 Dec 94.

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(3) Conduct MILOB operations in conjunction with formed troops.

c. MILOB Sect 2

(1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO ZAMBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

d. MILOB Sect 3

(1) Receive two teams from sec 1 by 111600 Dec 94.

(2) Deploy two MILOB teams by 09 Dec 94 to the camps. Be prepared to deploy three additional teams by 12 Dec 94.

(3) Monitor and report on 24 hours basis the situation at the camps.

(4) Sect comd (Lt Col Hasnain) will be the assistant MILOB commander; to be co-located with MILOB Tac HQ.

e. MILOB Sect 4A

(1) Detach three MILOB teams to ops command of CO GHANBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Prepare to conduct operations in support of formed contingent.

f. MILOB Sect 4B

(1) Detach one MILOB team to ops command of CO FRAFBATT effective 10 Dec 94

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

g. MILOB Sect 4C

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO

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ETHIOBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

h. MILOB Sector 5.

(1) Provide three MILOB teams under ops command of CO TUNBATT effective 10 Dec 94.

(2) Conduct MILOB operations in support of formed contingent.

i. MILOB Sect 6.

(1) Provide one MILOB team to MILOB Tac HQ.

(2) Keep two MILOB teams on 1 hr NTM to move to operational area.

(2) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB sectors, on orders from DCMO/TAC HQ.

j. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

(a) D - 2 (12 Dec 94) Move to assembly area commence.

(b) D - 1 (13 Dec 94) Move to assembly area complete.

(c) D Day 14 Dec 94

(d) H - Hour First Light D Day

(e) H + 2 Operation complete (16 Dec 94).

(f) D + 3 Commence redeployment

(2) FCs ops orders at 090930 Dec 94 at UNAMIR HQ. All

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
MILOB Sector Comds to attend. DCMOs coord conference on 091400 Dec 94. All Sect Comds to attend.

(3) Assembly area -- BUTARE

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. MILOBs to be self sufficient on Water/Food throughout the operations (48 Hrs). Sleeping bags, Flak Jackets and Helmets be worn during cordon and search operation.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

(a) <u>Loc of MILOB Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO (5007) -- Time later
(b) <u>MILOB HQ (Rear)</u>	Present Loc
(c) <u>Force Tac HQ</u>	KIBEHO
(d) <u>Alternate</u>	BUTARE
(e) <u>Communication</u>	Instructions to follow.

  
MOEEN U AHMED  
COL  
For CMO

Distr :

Action :

All MILOB Sectors

SLOGO

S PLAN/TRG O

SMPO

Info :

FHQ

DFC/COS/CMO

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MILOB GP HQ

TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)  
ALL MILOB SECTORS

DATE: DEC 94

FROM : DCMO  
MILOB GP HQ

REF: 6465/OPS/MILOBS

INFO : FC  
DFC/CMO

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE

1. Please find herewith attached an After Action Report on 'OP HOPE' containing 11 pages.

2. This letter may please be down graded to UNCLAS after detaching the contents.

3. Best Regards.

Sd/-  
MOEEN U AHMED  
Col  
DCMO

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MILOB GP HQ

OP HOPE  
AFTER ACTION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Over the recent past, there have been continuous reports of spurts of criminal activities by some threat forces in KIBEHO and NDAGO refugee camps located in Sector 4A. By virtue of these unlawful acts, these threat elements had begun tarnishing the good and noble work of UNAMIR, NGOs and Humanitarian agencies working hand in glove for peace and stability in RWANDA. Therefore, in response to this internal threat, UNAMIR in coordination with RPA , took up the onus to carry out 'OP HOPE' from 14 to 16 Dec 94. It was the maiden operation of such magnitude undertaken by UNAMIR and its outcome truly reinforced an age old ethos of UN, ie "Unity in Diversity".

AIM

2. The aim of 'OP HOPE' was to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements and in that MILOB GP was to remain in a supporting role to the formed troops.

PARTICIPATION

3. A total of 79 MILOBs participated alongside 1473 troops and staff. Also, two RPA battalions took active part in this operation. Acting Force Commander/CMO had established his Tac HQ at KIBEHO and commanded/conducted the operation. His participation on the ground gave impetus to the operation. The details of MILOB participation are as follows:



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- a. HQ MILOB GP. 5 Officers including DCMO.
- b. Sector 1. Total three MILOB teams out of which one team was placed under command Nigerian Company and two teams placed under Sector 3 as reserves located at BUTARE.
- c. Sector 2. Total three MILOB teams; one team under command company ex ZAMBATT and two teams placed under command Sector 3 as reserves located in BUTARE.
- d. Sector 3. Total three MILOB teams besides the Sector Comd and four MILOBs to establish and man the alternate MILOB Tactical HQ at BUTARE. These three MILOB teams were located at KIBEHO and placed under command the MILOB Tactical HQ.
- e. Sector 4A. Total three MILOB teams, all placed under command GHANBATT.
- f. Sector 4B. One MILOB team placed under command company ex FRAFBATT.
- g. Sector 4C. Total three MILOB teams, all under command ETHIOBATT.
- h. Sector 5. Total three MILOB teams all under command TUNBATT.
- j. Sector 6. Total three MILOB teams all placed on one hour's notice at KIGALI.

TASKS OF MILOBS

- 4. The MILOB GP HQ was tasked to establish a MILOB Tactical HQ at KIBEHO, to be co-located with the Force HQ. Also an

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alternate MILOB tactical HQ was to be established and manned at BUTARE. The tasks that were assigned to the MILOBs operating under command contingents included the following:

- a. Perform MILOB tasks assigned by respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform MILOB Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives to their force elements.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of operations.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities within own area of operations.
- g Submission of SITREP on 12-hour basis.
- h. Maintain post operation presence in KIBEHO and NDAGO camps and report situation.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

5. Mov to Assy Area. The assy area selected was BUTARE. The troops and the MILOBS participating in this operation assembled at BUTARE on 12 Dec 94. The logistics infrastructure catering for rations, water and POL was created at the Assy Area. Marrying up of MILOBs with their respective contingents took place. Selective recce of the objective area was carried out by certain key appointments holders. Confirmatory orders were issued at various

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levels. This phase of the operation passed off smoothly as planned.

6. Mov from Assembly Area to Camp Site. The move from the Assy area to the camp sites (objectives) was carried out over two routes, ie, BUTARE-GIKONGORO-KIBEHO (RED ROUTE) and BUTARE-KIBEHO (GREEN ROUTE), commencing 140015 hrs. The troops arrived at the release point at 140315 hrs. This phase of the operation was carried out smoothly and as per the time plan despite it involving movement of large convoy of vehicles over hilly terrain and during night on approximately 45 kms of unmetalled road.

7. Area To be Searched. The KIBEHO and NDAGO camps put together constituted an area of approximately five square kilometers. The whole area was divided into 11 distinct objectives. The distribution of the objectives for the purpose of the search was done as follows:

- a. TUNBATT - 1 & 3.
- b. GHANBATT - 2 & 8.
- c. ETHIOBATT - 4 & 6.
- d. FRAFBATT - 5 & 9.
- e. ZAMBATT - 7 & 10.
- f. INDIBATT - 11.

8. Search Operations. The troops commenced simultaneous search of these assigned objectives at 140530 hrs. RPA identification and liaison teams were integrated with the contingent down to platoon level. Force and MILOB Tactical HQ were co-located at KIBEHO and so were Advanced dressing Station under AUSMED and

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Detainee Processing Centre under CIVPOL and MP. Initially the search operation progressed slowly but later on it picked up the right momentum. The MILOB teams with each search party gave a continuous progress of operation over radio. The three MILOB teams earmarked as reserves at KIBEHO were tasked to carry out patrolling on the entire area and monitor the activities in the Detainee Processing Centre. The Force Tactical HQ was constantly kept informed of the MILOBs' reports. The complete operation was carried out with true professional zeal and military finesse which helped prevent any untoward incident. Finally, at 141700 hrs, the search ended on completion of the task. The whole operation resulted in the arrest of 43 potential criminals and confiscation of following weapons:

- a. Machetes - 810.
- b. Spears - 58.
- c. Axes - 190.
- d. Bayonets - 4.
- e. 7.62 rounds - 21.
- f. Magazines - 1.
- g. Swords - 5
- h. Knives - 214.
- j. Harpoons - 16.
- k. Sickles - 10.

9. De-Induction. The de-induction of troops from the camp

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sites commenced at 150800 hrs. Five MILOB teams were left behind for maintaining post operation presence and to monitor the situation.

LESSONS LEARNT

10. A deep peep down memory lane of military history would reveal that many battles have been lost by strong armies just because their commanders ignored the valuable lessons they learnt from their previous battles. During OP HOPE, many important military lessons have been re-validated. The aim here has been to avoid any surgical approach to the retrospection but reviewing to embed certain important military issues involved in this operation which ensured success.

a. Planning and Preparatory Stage.

(1) Need for Detailed Planning. In an operation of this magnitude and that too conducted by a unified force of heterogenous characteristics, there is an over-riding need for planning into greater details. The objective area was quite vast, and therefore divided into 11 parts which automatically called for detailed planning, which was done meticulously.

(2) Intelligence Acquisition. P r o c e s s e d information about the objective much prior to the launching of the operation, is the key to success. Therefore, there is a need to evolve some kind of intelligence acquisition plan long before the launching of intended operation which would ensure coordination of intelligence effort.

(3) Secrecy. An operation of this nature needs absolute secrecy. The secrecy of this op was

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neutralised to a great extent. UNAMIR comprises not only force components but also various other agencies. Also, UN operations have always attracted the media. Therefore, utmost care should be exercised while conceiving such operations or else the outcome may prove disproportionate to the effort involved. Also, plans should be unfolded on need-to-know basis only. All personnel must handle operation-related documents with due vigilance.

(4) Liaison and Coordination. OP HOPE enticed the participation of force elements, MILOBs, staff at various levels, a few UN agencies and the RPA. A constant liaison and coordination was to be the order of the day. Commanders at various levels have to apply their minds to various contingencies and problem areas and thereafter endeavour to sort out arising nitty-gritties. Liaison and coordination was planned from the very beginning of the operation and was executed throughout the conduct of the operation.

(5) Intergration of Logistic Representatives. As the logistics infrastructure would always take time to create, re-establish or move, it is of prime importance to involve the logistics representatives right from the initial stages of the planning. This would enable them to plan and pre-position the logistic requirements at correct point of time and place. The only drawback worth mentioning in the operation is logistics. it could have been better if logisticians had given due importance after they had received the warning order.

(6) Detailed Briefing. Need for a detailed briefing requires no emphasis. The most effective way of

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amalgamating force elements of different nationalities with varying shades of training and weaponry into a single mould, enabling them to operate shoulder to shoulder would be by means of a detailed and thorough briefing by commanders at all levels.

(7) Need for Simple Plan. Plan should be as simple as possible. It is easy to execute a simple plan which also readily lends itself to any modification when need arises. Such need is further felt especially when troops with varied training backgrounds are involved together.

b. Move and Occupation of Assy Area.

(1) Guidance at Assy Areas. Proper arrangements for guidance while the troops arrive in the assy area would avoid confusion, save movement and result in rapid deployment.

(2) Recce of Objective Area. A controlled recce of the objective area while troops are in occupation of the assy area is a must. This will have to be done discreetly.

(3) Need for Minimising Movement. During OP HOPE, there was a large volume of unnecessary movement in BUTARE. This is totally uncalled for and may result in premature disclosure of our interest. Therefore, all ranks need to be educated about this. Establishing certain numbers of Traffic Check Posts and manned by MP personnel would help curtail all unnecessary movements.

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c. Conduct Stage.

(1) Flexibility of Plan. Though the plan should be made flexible, any last minute changes should be avoided since it will only result in confusion and fatigue.

(2) Correct Radio Procedure and Discipline. There were many outstations on Force as well as MILOB radio net. Everyone was operating concurrently and required to pass on information simultaneously too. Therefore, the knowledge of correct radio procedure and discipline is vital for smooth conduct.

(3) Human Rights Implications. OP HOPE was a delicate operation since it could attract a lot of human rights implications. It called for utmost care and attention while conducting a search, handling detainees or interrogating them. Any harsh treatment or deviation from the laid-down rules of the game could have tarnished the image of UNAMIR since the media would have blown the issue out of proportion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. Loc of HQ. During 'OP HOPE', the force and MILOB Tactical HQ were located inside the objective area right on the commencement of the operation. It could have invited trouble had there been any retaliation or reaction from the threat forces while the troops commenced the search. It is therefore suggested that the HQ should only be brought inside the objective area once the initial phase is over and a secured area within the objective has been created.



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12. Aerial Recce of the Area of Intended Operations. Prior aerial recce of the area of intended operations would surely pay rich dividends. Though it was planned, it could not be undertaken due to bad weather. Some of the contingent commanders missed ground recce which should have been carried out prior to the operation.

13. Maintenance of Secrecy of Intended Operations. Utmost discretion has to be exercised at all levels such that while planning, preparing and executing the operation-related activities, no lapse of security is allowed to occur. Classified information must be unfolded strictly on a need to know basis. Moreover, omnipresence of enthusiastic media personnel adds a new dimension to the security threat. One has to be very careful while dealing with these media men and avoid temptation of publicity. Best thing would be to leave such interaction to the UN authorised personnel only. It was discouraging to hear the news of OP HOPE on BBC and Rwandan local radio prior to the commencement of the operation.

14. Need for Joint Planning. So as to evolve a credible tactical plan, it is suggested that the logistic representative be incorporated into the planning process right from the conception stage. This arrangement will produce matching tactical and logistic plans. Moreover, it will provide more reaction time to the logistics branch to make arrangements to cater for logistical needs at various stages of the operation.

CONCLUSION

15. OP HOPE has been a success because it was meticulously conceived and planned and boldly executed. The operation was orchestrated in a truly professional manner and hence prevented any violence. All the troops and MILOBs performed their tasks with pride, enthusiasm and sense of respect for the human race.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

As a spin off, UNAMIR has earned a better rapport with the RPA and also earned the confidence of local populace, which is definitely a positive sign for all future operations. MILOBs are looking forward for such operations in the future.

MOEEN U AHMED

Col

DCMO

MILOB GP HQ  
KIMIHURURA  
KIGALI

10 Dec 94

OPO 12/94

References:

- A. Z 723 Sheet 40 BUTARE Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
- B. Z 723 Sheet 31 GIKONGORO Ed 1, 1 : 50,000.
- C. WNG 0 (MILOBS) dated 7 Dec 94.

1. SITUATION

a. Threat Forces. Additional to Ref C, criminals elements continue to unleash acts of terror, harassment and banditry in the camps. The following have also been recorded:

(1) Criminal elements are known to spread false propaganda with the aim of preventing lawful citizens from returning to their normal life.

(2) Threats Forces have access to small arms, hand grenades, machetes etc.

(3) Recent recorded incidents inside the camps include:

(a) Three hand grenades recovered during a search in KIBEHO on 20 Nov 94.

(b) Two bandits killed at NDAGO on 28 Nov 94 and another bandit killed on 28/29 Nov.

(c) Grenades explosion apparently thrown within the camp including several killings (over 50).

1 of 10

UN SECRET

b. Friendly Forces

(1) The FHQ intends to rid both the KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps of criminal elements in order to encourage the return of peaceful Rwandese people to their homes.

(2) The ops will involve approximately 8 UNAMIR Coys excluding support elements.

(3) The CIVPOL, NGOs, B & R and two RPA Battalions will be co-operating with UNAMIR Forces.

(4) Interpreters in support of UNAMIR Forces.

c. Atts and Dets. No change.

2. MISSION. MILOB GP is to conduct operations in support of formed Contingents to clear criminal elements from KIBEHO and NDAGO Camps.

3. EXECUTION

a. Gen Outline. UNAMIR will conduct Cordon and Search Ops in co-ordination with the RPA. Two RPA Bns will form the outer cordon. Seven Coys (UNAMIR) will form the inner cordon. They will perform the search with the RPA Ident and Liaison Teams. A Coy will be inserted at NDAGO as a blocking force. A preliminary CS consisting armed tps and MILOBs already in progress to increase UN presence.

b. MILOB SE T 1

(1) Det to Ops Comd CO NICOY wef 11 Dec 94

- One MILOB Team.

(2) Det to ops comd MILOB sect 3 wef 11 Dec 94

- 2 MILOB Teams.

(3) Tasks

(a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd NICOY.

- (b) Monitor all security and ops situations along GREEN ROUTE.
- (c) Monitor and report to Tac HQ the security situation of Detainee Cage.
- (d) Report on continuous basis, progress of operations within your AOR.
- (e) Report violation of human rights to MILOB Tac HQ.
- (f) In conjunction with formed troops document arrested criminals.
- (g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.
- (h) Carry out investigation as directed by Comd or MILOB Tac HQ.
- (i) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops, with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.
- j. Monitor humanitarian requirement within boundaries.

c. MILOB SECT 2

(1) Grouping

- (a) Det to Ops Comd CO ZAMBATT  
wef 11 Dec 94 - One MILOB Team.
- (b) Det to Comd MILOB Sect 3  
wef 11 Dec 94 - Two MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Perform MILOB tasks assigned by Comd ZAMBATT.
- (b) Monitor all activities and security situation within your AOR.
- (c) Inform MILOB Tac HQ the situation on objectives 7 and 10.
- (d) Report on continuous basis the progress of ops within your AOR.
- (e) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

- (f) Report any violation of Human Rights.
- (g) Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.

d. MILOB Sect 3

(1) Grouping

- (a) Under Ops Comd  
wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 1 MILOBs.
- (b) Under Ops comd.  
wef 111600B Dec 94 - two MILOB Teams, Sect 2 MILOBs.
- (c) Det to under comd MILOB Tac HQ  
wef 121600B Dec 94 - three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue monitoring the security situation in the Camps.
- (b) Establish MILOB Tac HQ at KIBEHO.
- (c) Prepare the alternate MILOB Tac HQ at BUTARE.
- (d) Monitor and report on 24hr basis the situation in the camps.
- (e) Submit SITREP on 12 hourly basis to MILOB Tac HQ, KIBEHO commencing 1200hrs D Day.
- (f) Report any human rights violations.
- / (g) Prepare to maintain post ops presence with 3 x Teams till further order.
- (h) Provide liaison between UNAMIR and NGOs, civil authorities within your AOR.

e. MILOB Sect 4A - (GHANBATT)

- (1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by formed contingent.
- (b) Monitor the activities and security situation

within your AOR and report on continuous basis.

- (c) Info MILOB Tac HQ - KIBEHO on the progress of ops.
- (d) Report any violation of human rights.
- (e) Provide liaison between formed contingent with NGOs and civil authorities.
- (f) Prepare to maintain post ops presence in the camps with 3 MILOB Teams.
- (g) Fwd SITREP 12 hourly commencing 1200 D Day.

f. MILOB Sect 4A (ZAMBATT)

- (1) Grouping. One MILOB Team from MILOB Sect 2.
- (2) Tasks
  - (a) Continue to perform MILOB tasks assigned by CO ZAMBATT.
  - (b) Monitor activities and security situation on 24hr basis.
  - (c) Report violations of human rights.
  - (d) Provide liaison between UNAMIR forces with NGOs and civil authorities.
  - (e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ KIBEHO.
  - (f) Report on continuous basis the situation on objective 7 and 10.

g. MILOB Sect 4B

- (1) Det to Comd FRAFBATT wef 11 dec 94 - One MILOB Team.
- (2) Tasks
  - (a) Continue to support FRAFBATT.
  - (b) Monitor the activities and security situation within your AOR.

- (c) Report any human rights violation.
- (d) Provide liaison between FRAFBATT with NGOs and the civil authorities within your AOR.
- (e) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200hrs D Day to MILOB Tac HQ.
- (f) Report the security situation of objective 5 and 9 on continuous basis.

h. MILOB Sect 4C

(1) Det to Comd ETHIOBATT

wef 11 Dec 94 - Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to support ETHIOBATT.
- (b) Monitor and report the security situation on 24 hour basis.
- (c) Report on the situation or progress of ops on obj 4 and 6.
- (d) Report any human rights violations within your AOR.
- (e) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities.
- (f) Fwd 12 hourly SITREP commencing 1200 hrs D day.

i. MILOB Sect 5

(1) Det to Comd TUNBATT wef 11 dec 94

- Three MILOB Teams.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue to support TUNBATT.
- (b) Monitor the activities and security situation on 24hr basis.
- (c) Provide liaison between UNAMIR with NGOs and civil authorities within your AOR.
- (d) Report any situation on obj 1, 3 and 11 to MILOB Tac HQ.



- (e) Fwd a 12 hourly SITREP on the ops commencing 1200hrs D Day.
- (f) Fwd report on any human rights violation to MILOB Tac HQ.

j. MILOB Sect 6

(1) Grouping

- (a) Keep three MILOB Teams on 1 hr NTM to Ops Area.
- (b) Keep close liaison with MILOB HQ on op OVERTURE.

(2) Tasks

- (a) Continue with your present tasks.
- (b) Be prepared to support any of the MILOB Sectors on order of DCMO/MILOB Tac HQ.

k. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Timings

- (a) D - 2. (12 Dec 94) - Move to Assy Area
- (b) D - 1 / D Day. Move to blocking/cordon positions / Secure Force Release Point.
- (c) D Day
  - (i) H - 3 - (0130hrs) Outer cordon and blocking force in posn at NDAGO.
  - (ii) H - 2 - Secure Force Release Point.
  - (iii) H - 1 - Occupy Force Release Point.
  - (iv) H hr - 0430hrs Tps commence search.
  - (v) H + 1 - Holding/Screening facility estb.
- (d) D + 2 Ops completed.
- (e) D + 3 Commence redeployment.

- (2) MILOBs continue to increase presence forthwith.
- (3) Search to be conducted only during daylight hours.
- (4) Curfew will be imposed at night (1800 - 0500hrs).
- (5) Assy Area - BUTARE.
- (6) Limit of search will be edge of NDAGO Camp.
- (7) Routes
  - (a) RED ROUTE - ROAD BUTARE - GIKONGORO - KIBEHO.
  - (b) GREEN ROUTE - BUTARE - KIBEHO.
- (8) Dispositions - Annex A.
- (9) Force Release Point
  - (a) Red Route. Track Junction GR 839195.
  - (b) Green Route. Road Junction GR 868077.
- (10) Air Plan. Annex C.
- (11) Detainee Handling Procedure. Annex D.
- (12) Liaison Plan. Annex E.
- (13) Comms. Coordinated later. Teams to continue with the present C/S. (Annex F)
- (14) Public Info Plan. Annex G.

#### 4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS

- a. MILOBs are to be self sufficient in food and water throughout the period of operations.
- b. C Rat will be available but issued at US\$8.00 per meal.
- c. Dress. Helmets and Flak Jackets will be worn.
- d. Med. Cas Clearing Post will be loc in AICF Building on OBJ 2.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

- a. Loc of HOS
  - ✓ (1) FORCE TAC HQ. KIBEHO ( Double Storey Building on OBJ 2) Tac HQ opens 140200B Dec 94.
  - (2) MILOB TAC HQ. Same loc as above.

- b. Comms.
- (i) Min conversation during OP
  - (ii) Ch-12 (Sect 4) will be used for the OP
  - (iii) Detail callsigns at ANX F
- c. Press Info. Comm with the Press only on permission of Force HQ.
- d. OPS SEC. Sec of Ops be enforced.

Authentication:

S ILYA

Lt Col

S O O

MOEEN U AHMED

Col

DCMO

Annexes:

- A. Sketch of Ops Plan, Bdrys, and Report Lines KIBEHO (issued later)
- B. Sketch showing objectives bdrys and Report Lines in NDAGO DP Camp. (Issued later)
- C. Air Plan.
- D. Detainee handling procedures.
- E. Liaison Plan. — NOT AVAILABLE
- F. Comms Plan.
- G. Public Information Plan. — NOT AVAILABLE
- H. Sketch of Area of Ops and Induction Routes. — NOT AVAILABLE

Distribution:

Copy No

Incl Annex A to H

MILOB Sect

1

1

2

2

3


3

UN SECRET

		4A	4&5
		4B	6
		4C	7
		5	8
		6	9
MILOB	Plans	Br	10
	Log	Br	11
	Pers	Br	12
A/FC/COS/CMO			13
CIVPOL			14
FHQ			15
Spare			16 - 18


ANNEX A  
REPORT  
12 Dec 64  
10 Dec 64

SKETCH SHOWING EDYS AND REPORT LINES  
AT KIBEHO CAMP



SKETCH SHOWING OBS, BDA'S AND  
REFUGEE LINES AT NDAHO CAMP

ANNEX B TO  
 DPO 12  
 DD 10 DEC 54



UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

Annex C to  
Op Order / 2  
Dated 10 Dec 94

1. SITUATION. As WNGO dated 05 Dec 94.
2. MISSION. To provide helicopter support for Casevac and Command and Control for Operation OVERTURE.
3. EXECUTION.
  - A. General Outline. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search operation with the RPA to clear KIBEHO and NDAGO camps of criminal elements. Two Bell 212 helicopters will provide Casevac and C2 support for the operation.
  - B. Group.
    1. Canadian Helicopters.
      - A. Gp.
        - (i) 2 Bell 212 helicopters.
        - (ii) Guarding provided by RPA and TAC HQ for the Forward Air Refuel Point (FARP) at MUTARE AIRSTRIP for day/night operation.
        - (iii) Crews to man 2 helicopters for day operations mounted from the FOB, one of which will include an on board medical team.
        - (iv) A standby crew on 30 mins readiness based at KIGALI, from dusk to dawn.
  - C. Tasks.
    - (1) Helicopter support is to establish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Grid - 49351050 corresponding to 2 deg 37.1'S and 29 deg 32.7'E. This position will be co-located with a medical coordination team.

UNITED NATIONS - CONFIDENTIAL

PROCEDURES FOR THE ARREST AND SEARCHING OF PERSONS AND THEIR  
PROPERTY BY TROOPS EMPLOYED ON OP OVERTURE

GENERAL

1. The way in which detainees are handled by the troops of UNAMIR will be of critical importance to the success of Op OVERTURE in the eyes of NGOs and of the world's media. It is essential, therefore, that:

- a. Detainees are handled with the utmost dignity and propriety.
- b. Detainees' processing is reliably documented.
- c. The troops employed in the task of handling detainees understand that they will be dealing with persons who are suspected of having participated in a range of serious offences but who have not been convicted. The possibility that detainees will not eventually be convicted requires that they are handled with as much sensitivity and respect as possible.
- d. Detainees are to be treated sufficiently firmly that no attempt is made to escape or to embarrass the UN.
- e. Troops understand that any detainees are under the protection of the UN and that they must be closely guarded against any attempt at revenge or reprisal.

2. CIVPOL is to be used to monitor the process of arrest and transfer to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC) whilst MPs are to be involved in the process of handling detainees thereafter. ICRC, UNHRC and other agencies may be present at any stage in the process and will be requested to be present at the handover of individuals to the Public Prosecutor.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ARREST OF DETAINEES

3. The procedure for the handling of Rwandese and other nationals detained by UNAMIR troops during Op OVERTURE is to be as follows:

- a. Having been identified, detainees are to be apprehended as swiftly as possible using the absolute minimum of physical force. Troops are to be reminded of UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (which allow for the use of deadly force for self defence including the protection of detainees but do not extend to the use of deadly force to apprehend a person who is trying to evade capture).

- b. Detainees are to be searched to:

6. The following procedure is to be followed if it is possible, detainees are to be searched only by a person of the same sex. If because of the unavailability of a person of the same sex, a person of the opposite sex is not available, detainees are to be searched by a person of the opposite sex.



(1) Confirm that they are not armed. Any firearms that are collected are to be unloaded and magazines discharged.

(2) Collect, document and safeguard any evidence - including weapons - that may be relevant to a prosecution case.

(3) Collect and document any valuables held by detainees so that UNAMIR is protected against any suggestion that it has been party to theft or looting.

These possessions are to be placed in a plastic bag which is to be taken with the detainee to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC).

#### SEARCHES OF DWELLINGS AND VEHICLES

4. If a detainee can be associated with a vehicle or dwelling, it, too, is to be searched - an action that will be best conducted in the presence of the detainee if at all possible. The procedure to be adopted is as follows:

a. The condition of the vehicle or dwelling to be searched is to be recorded and a list made of the persons present on the Record of Search (ROS), an example of which is at Appendix 1.

b. Conduct the search, if possible in the presence of the detainee or a relative or other associate, causing a minimum of damage. The location of the search is to be recorded as accurately as possible, using a sketch plan if necessary, either on, or attached to, the ROS.

c. In the event that any material evidence is discovered, it should be photographed in situ. It should then be transferred to a plastic bag for carriage to the DPC.

d. At the conclusion of the search, a description of any damage that was done in its execution should be entered on the ROS and those present at the conclusion of the search should be listed.

e. Any evidence, including the ROS and all photographs that may have been taken, should be transferred to the DPC and passed to the MP officer supervising the custody of the detainee.

#### BODILY SEARCHES

5. Photography by the Media. Under no circumstances are the media to be allowed to photograph or film detainees in the process of being searched.

6. The Searching of Females. If it is possible, detainees are to be physically searched only by a person of the same sex. If, because a person of the same sex is not available, detainees may be

...ed by a member of the opposite sex only in the presence of another person and, preferably, one of a more senior rank than the person doing the searching. Extreme care is to be taken to minimize the risk of an allegation of improper behaviour in this process and to document any complaint or suggestion - by any person - that improper behaviour has occurred.

#### TRANSFER TO THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

7. Use of "Plasticuffs". Detainees' hands are to be bound behind their backs with "plasticuffs" (either before or after the search procedure, as thought necessary by the senior person present). Care is to be taken that the plasticuffs are not too tight and that the circulation of blood to the hands is not restricted. Subsequently, frequent checks are to be made that the hands of bound detainees are healthy and that the plasticuffs have not been over-tightened, perhaps by one of the detainees in an attempt to embarrass or hinder the UN.

8. Escorting Detainees to the DPC. If necessary, detainees are to be collected in groups (but not allowed to assemble so closely that they can touch or talk with each other) for transport to the DPC where they are to be handed to an MP officer. It is important to ensure that continuity is achieved in the handling of detainees to minimize the chances of an accusation of brutality being made against a UN soldier, his unit or UNAMIR; for this reason, and to ensure that the process is properly documented, detainees must be escorted to the DPC by the soldiers who detained them.

9. Evidence. Any bags containing any items taken from the detainee and any photographs pertaining to the detainee are to be handed to the MP officer. He is to label the items with the details of circumstances under which they were found and the name and UNAMIR ID number of the soldier giving it to him. Any ROS that has been completed is to be passed to the MP officer for retention with the DPR.

#### THE MP DETAINEE PROCESSING CENTRE

10. Perimeter and Segmentation. The DPC is to be surrounded and segmented as necessary with concertina wire with the joint aims of inhibiting:

- a. Any attempt by detainees to escape or to riot.
- b. Unauthorized entry.

The perimeter is to be patrolled to defend against, and deter, any attempt at attack.

11. Accommodation. Detainees are to be provided with covered and secure accommodation (9' x 9' and larger tents are permissible) with adequate heating, lighting, ventilation and seating for their comfort.

12. The Conditions of Detainees. The following rules are to apply:

... any bags containing property

a. Detainees are to be segregated as much as possible and not permitted to touch or talk.

b. Males and females are to be kept separate except that small children may accompany - and be comforted by - their parents should it be necessary.

c. Plasticuffs may be removed if, in the opinion of the MP officer, the individual is not likely to cause danger to others or to attempt to escape. In the event that the MP officer decides not to release a detainee from plasticuffs or to reapply them for a protracted period, the fact and cause is to be written clearly and in full on the DPR. The conditions of the detainees hands are to be monitored, as described above.

d. Food and drink is to be available for detainees at all times.

13. Photographs. At the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee standing with the soldier who made the arrest and with the officer into whose safe custody the detainee is being passed. The photograph is to show clearly the condition of the detainee at the time of the handover and to identify the persons responsible for him or her. The UN ID numbers, ranks, names and unit of the UN personnel are to be written legibly on the reverse of the photograph together with the place, date and time of the taking of the photograph. In addition, if it is known, the name of the detainee should be written on the reverse of the photograph.

14. Medical Officer. A medical officer is to be present at the processing of all detainees. He/she is to be available to deal with any request for medical attention from a detainee.

15. Searching of Detainees. The detainee is to be searched by an MP and any items recovered in addition to those recovered earlier are to be secured in the same way as before.

16. Detainee Processing Records. A Detainee Processing Record (DPR), of which an example is at Appendix 2, is to be compiled for each detainee. It is to:

a. Record the personal details of the individual, so far as they are known, including name, place date and time of arrest, approximate height and weight, sex, differentiating features and details of any languages known to be spoken.

b. Record the personal details of the soldier who made the arrest and of the witnesses of any searches, should this be applicable.

c. Record the personal details of the MP officer into whose care the detainee passed at the DPC and the date and time of this event, together with any observations made about the condition of the detainee at this stage.

d. Record the details of any bags containing property

removed from the detainee or a vehicle or dwelling with which he was associated in some way.

e. Have stapled to it, photographs taken:

(1) At the time of handover to the MP officer on the detainee's arrival at the DPC.

(2) Show further entries, as necessary, relating to:

(a) Any handover of responsibility of MP officers perhaps resulting from a shift change occurring while the detainee is in the DPC.

(b) The date and time of departure from the DPC.

(c) The condition of the detainee at each handover of responsibility.

(d) The date and time of the detainee's handing over to the Public Prosecutor together with the latter's signature to confirm the transfer of responsibility for the safekeeping of the detainee.

17. Transport to the Public Prosecutor's Office. Detainees are to be collected into groups for transport by a shuttle of minibuses to the Public Prosecutor's Office in Gikongoro with an escort of one MP for each 4 or 5 detainees -who are to have plasticuffs reapplied for the move - and not more than 1 detainee for each 2 seats in the minibus.

18. Departure Documentation. On departing the DPC, a photograph is to be taken of the detainee together with the MP officer from whose care he or she is passing and the MP who has been detailed to escort the detainee to the Public Prosecutor. Once again, the details of these individuals are to be recorded on the rear of the photograph and it is then to be stapled to the DPR.

APPENDICES (to which additional pages may be fixed if necessary):

1. Example of a Record of Search (ROS).

2. Example of a Detainee Processing Record (DPR).

others (if any) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP OPC.

Signature of Search  
Commander

RECORD OF SEARCH (ROS) (FIX ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY)

Date and time of start of search:	Immediate supervisor of the search:	Subject of the search (give a description):
	UNAMIR ID No:	Car/truck/house/hut /other:
Location (address or grid reference if known, or draw a sketch map/plan on the reverse of this page or on another page fixed to it):	Condition of property before the search (list features showing obvious damage):	Names and UNAMIR ID numbers of others conducting the search:
Non-UNAMIR persons present during the search:	Reason for the search including name of suspect if known:	Description of any damage done in the execution of the search:
Other comments:	Outcome of search (list any evidence found and removed):	Date and time at the end of the search:
Certified that the information on this page (and any others fixed to it) is true to the best of my knowledge and that all items collected have been dispatched to the MP DPC.	Total number of pages including this one:  Signature of search commander:	Date and time of signature:


APPENDIX 2 TO  
ANNEX D TO  
OPORD 12  
DD 10 DEC 94

DETAINEE PROCESSING RECORD (DPR)

Date and time of arrival of the detainee at the MP DPC:	MP officer on duty:	UNAMIR soldier escorting the detainee on his arrival:
	UNAMIR ID No:	UNAMIR ID No:
Name and address of detainee (if known)	Brief description of the detainee (add another page if necessary):	Medical officer on duty and details of any observations/treatment):
Languages known to be understood by the detainee:	Approx Height (in metres) Approx Weight (kg): Male or female? Date of birth or approximate age: Other characteristics:	Signature: UNAMIR ID No:
Subsequent checks of detainee (date & time, with initials of MP officer incl any handover of responsibility between MP officers:	Requests made by the detainee (with date and time):	Details of UNAMIR MP escort to the Public Prosecutor's office:
		UNAMIR ID No:
Date and time at departure of detainee from the MP DPC:	ICRC and other agency representatives present at handover to the Public Prosecutor:	Public Prosecutor's signature for receipt of the detainee:
		Date & Time:
Certified that the detainee to which this form relates was handed to the Public Prosecutor together with all evidence that could be attributed to his case.		Signature of MP officer: Date & time:

# COMM INSTRUCTIONS

## Milob Radio Net Diagram



Annex F  
To OPD 12  
DATED 10 Dec 9



COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUCTION

APRX 9 PD GINEXF  
TO MILVJ 000 12  
PHSEN 10 DEC 94

NICKNAMES

1. The following nicknames will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Nickname</u>
Assy Area	Paper Tiger
Release Point Red Route	Jungle Juice
Release Point Green Route	Cow Leg
Tac HQ (Op Overture) Loc	Open Door
Casualty Collection Point	Soft Bed
Screening and Holding area	Big Brother

Report Lines

Report Line No 1	Mango Grove
Report Line No 2	Apple Pie
Report Line No 3	High Ball
Report Line No 4	Happy Home
Report Line No 5	Iron Lady
Report Line No 6	Last Stand
Report Line No 7	Low Loader
Report Line No 8	Little Girl
Report Line No 9	Table Lamp
Report Line No 10	Good Hope
Report Line No 11	Shoe Polish



(NICKNAMES CONTIN)

Objectives

Obj 1	Hungry Bear
Obj 2	Rocking Horse
Obj 3	Active Edge
Obj 4	Snow Ball
Obj 5	Arctic Breeze
Obj 6	Flying Arrow
Obj 7	Long Shot
Obj 8	Flat Cap
Obj 9	Rummy Punch
Obj 10	Red Sox
Obj 11	Short Stop

CODEWORDS

2. The following seven Codewords will be used for the duration of OP OVERTURE:

<u>Codeword</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>To be issued by:</u>
Hunter	Advance (H Hour)	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Scatter	Commence Search	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Basket	Move to second Obj	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Flower	All Obj searched	Tac HQ (OP Overture)/Units
Helmet	Cordon in position	RPA
Baboon	Mov to Assy Area	Tac HQ (OP Overture)
Bingo	End of OP Overture	Tac HQ (OP Overture)

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UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Copy No 8 of 24

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
KIGALI

ADMINO 01

10 Dec 94

RELATED OPO NO 21

Reference:

A Map Series Z723 BUTARE Sheet 40 Edition 1, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: BRAVO

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces As per OpO.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) As per OpO.

(2) In addition 3 CSG, GHA Sup Pl and BRSC pers will provide sp for the op.

c. Att and Det

Under comd for daily maint:

TUNBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys  
ETHIOBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys  
GHANBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys  
FRAFBATT - One Indep Inf Coy  
ZAMBATT - One Indep Inf Coy  
NICOY - One Indep Coy  
less 2 pls  
INDIBATT - TBA  
20 MILOBS  
30 RPA LO/Interpreter

1 of 11

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2. MISSION. To maint UNAMIR Force during OP OVERTURE.

3. GENERAL

a. General Outline

- (1) Estb of Log Base at Butare.
- (2) Selected log elms to deploy fwd to Op area.

4. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a. Supply

(1) Class 1 - Rat

- (a) 3 days CRP and water per soldier to be provided by the contingents.
- (b) 3 CSG to deliver qty 5600 CRP to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1. Note CRP to include menu that do not contain pork.
- (c) 3 CSG is to deliver 500 german rations and 500lt bottled water to GHA Sup Pl GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1. These rations are for sustenance of detainees only.
- (d) 3 CSG to deliver bottled water qty 11200 bottles to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
- (e) Units to collect 2 days CRP and water from GHA Sup Pl at Butare GR 7011 D + 1 and D + 3.
- (f) Brown and Root to provide 1 x Water Tanker with 20,000lt ROWPU water. Report GHA Sup Pl and move fwd to KIBEHO GR 5007 and NDAGO GR 5201 when ordered by GHA Sup Pl Comd.

- (2) Class 2 - Gen Stores. Contingents to provide and deploy with their immediate requirements. Specific requirements as indicated on contingent returns will be provided as far as possible and delivered to GHA Sup Pl.

(b) General base to be provided by 64346.

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(3) Class 3 - POL

- (a) 3 CSG to deliver 10,000 lts (in drums) of diesel to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
- (b) 3 CSG to deliver 1000 lts (in drums) of gasoline (petrol) to GHA Sup Pl loc Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
- (c) 3 CSG is to deliver 2000LT JET-A1 fuel to BUTARE airstrip for helo op by H-HR + 2.
- (d) GHA Sup Pl to confirm any additional requirement for hand fuel pumps to G4.
- (e) POL resup is by unit collection from GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011. Resup pt will open 140600B Dec 94.

(4) Class 4 - Def Stores. 3 CSG to deliver the following def stores to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.

- (a) Barbed Wire - 5 rolls.
- (b) Concertina - 50 rolls.
- (c) Tie Wire - 2 rolls.
- (d) Sand Bags - 500 bags.
- (e) 6" Post Picket - 300.

(5) Class 5 - Ammunition. Contingents to deploy with contingent first line holding.

(6) Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items. Not required.

(7) Class 7 Major Items. Not required.

(8) Class 8 - Medical Stores. To be covered under medical.

(9) Class 9 - Repair Parts

- (a) First line repair parts to be catered for by all units.
- (b) Second line to be provided by BRSC, fuel, water and ration  
ordered by GHA Sup Pl Butare as required.

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b. Transportation.

(1) G4 TPT. G4 TPT is to;

- (a) Provide one potable water tanker to be located at the GHA Sup Pl Butare for the duration of op.
- (b) Arrange provision of four minibuses to the Provost Marshal for movement of detainees.

(2) 3 CSG. 3 CSG is to;

- (a) deliver the stores and equipment detailed at para 4a. and as otherwise instructed to GHA Sup Pl Butare.
- (b) return all unused stores and equipment from GHA Sup Pl Butare at end of op.

(3) ZAMBATT. ZAMBATT is to;

- (a) Provide the G4 TPT cell for the operation of TAC HQ.
- (b) Ensure the nominated offr to be G4 TPT contact HQ UNAMIR G4 TPT for briefing prior to op.
- (c) Provide and operate 15 MDM veh for tpt tasking in support to op.
- (d) Tpt TUNBATT elm and their stores and equipment from Busogo to the assembly area at Butare.
- (e) Redeploy TUNBATT elm and stores and equipment to Busogo at end of operation.
- (f) Tpt GHANBATT and their stores and equipment from Gikongoro to the assembly area at Butare.
- (g) Redeploy GHANBATT elm and their stores and equipment to Gikongoro at the end of op.
- (h) Coordinate tpt for deployment of units from the assembly area to the FUP.
- (i) Coordinate the tpt of stores, equipment, water and rations forward of GHA Sup Pl Butare as required.

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- (4) All Units Less TUNBATT AND GHANBATT. Deploy and redeploy unit personnel stores and equipment to and from the assembly area at Butare. Unit tpt used for deployment are to come under op con ZAMBATT for deployment of units from the assembly are to the FUP.

c. Services

- (1) BRSC to deliver qty 2000 garbage bags to GHA Sup Pl at Butare at the rate of 100 bags per coy.
- (2) All contingents are to back load their garbage to GHA Sup Pl at Butare.
- (3) BRSC to collect for disposal, all garbage from GHA Sup Pl on a daily basis and at the end of the operation.

d. Maintenance

- (1) All units to provide first line repairs.
- (2) Second line repairs to be provided by BRSC at Butare.
- (3) BRSC to provide MRT at Butare.
- (4) BRSC to provide first and second line recovery.
- (5) Requests for recovery and second line repairs are to be directed to the G4 staff at op TAC HQ.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. Medical Support. Companies are to deploy with organic level one health including Coy Aid Posts (CAP). AS MSF is to provide a Casualty Collecting Post (CCP) capable of limited level one and a level two capability of two resuscitation teams and a 10 bed holding facility. The CCP is also to provide three ambulances and crews and AME teams as required. The AS MSF will continue to provide level three support in Kigali. One MO to be deployed to sp detainee holding area.

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b. Casualty Evacuation

- (1) Casevac is to be conducted using road and AME assets. Units are responsible for evacuation with their unit area of responsibility. The normal means from CAP to CCP is to be by road. AME is to be normal means of evacuation from KIBEHO to level three facility.
- (2) Road. Three ambulances and crews are to be available for road evacuation and are to be positioned at the CCP. Sub-units requesting evacuation to the CCP are to initiate the request using the Casevac Request format transmitted on the OP OVERTURE command net. Road evac rearward of the CCP will be directed by Med Br, HQ UNAMIR.
- (3) Air. Dedicated AME is to be allocated under op con HQ UNAMIR. This ac is to be pre-positioned at KIBEHO during daylight hours and will be re-positioned at KIGALI during hours of darkness. AS MSF in consultation with Air Ops are to ensure this ac is equipped for AME prior to H hour. Requests for AME are to be transmitted on the UNAMIR Command net to HQ UNAMIR using the Casevac Request format. Casualty regulation rearward of KIBEHO is to remain the responsibility of Medical Branch, HQ UNAMIR.

c. Holding Policy. Holding policy for casualties is as follows:

- (1) CAP - nil.
- (2) CCP - 24 hrs.
- (3) Level Three - 28 days.

d. Health

- (1) All units are to be responsible for organic field sanitation and hygiene throughout the Op. Units are to deploy with sufficient health stores for this purpose. Given the high concentration of personnel during the op, unit commanders are to ensure that the highest standards of field hygiene are maintained.
- (2) Queries on appropriate health measure are to be directed to Med BR and HQ UNAMIR.

e. Dental. Dental support will not be provided at Level ONE and Level Two facilities. Casualties requiring dental treatment will be evacuated to AS MSF Kigali.

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- f. Medical Resupply. CAP and CCP are to deploy with 9 days Class 7 (medical) supplies. Requests for resupply are to be staffed to G4 Med at HQ UNAMIR, through TAC HQ using normal message demand procedures.
- g. Health Report CAP are to provide reports to their unit HQ as required. CCP is to provide a daily medical SITREP for the duration of the Operation to Med Branch as per UNAMIR Medical Branch SOP. They are also to provide the AS MSF with medical statistics for weekly reports as required. All personnel elements are to be aware of Casualty Evacuation request formats prior to deployment.

6. PERSONNEL

- a. Units are to fwd nominal roll of all personnel taking part in the operation to Tac HQ (G1), copy to Force HQ (CMPO) by 1800 hrs D-1.
- b. Personnel are to wear ID tags (if aval) and UN ID cards for immediate identification.
- c. NOTICAS. Any occurrence of death or serious injury is to be reported to the KIBEHO HQ immediately. As soon as possible thereafter, as much of the following information as possible in respect of the casualty is to be passed to the HQ:
  - (1) UN ID CARD number.
  - (2) Service number.
  - (3) Rank.
  - (4) Name.
  - (5) Sex.
  - (6) Contingent.
  - (7) Status (MILOB or contingent).
  - (8) Nature of casualty (death or serious injury).
  - (9) Cause of casualty.
- d. Detainees. The correct handling of detainees is a critical component of Op OVERTURE and is, therefore, covered in the OpO. The following stores are required:



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- (1) Polaroid cameras. 4 cameras (with film) have been issued for the authentication of evidence, to document finds and to ensure that any damage caused in the searching of dwellings and vehicles is accurately and fully recorded.
- (2) Bags for the Collection and Handling of Evidence. Any evidence and personal property collected will need to be safeguarded and transferred to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC). It is to be placed in bags and taken by the soldier who collects it to the DPC where it will be documented and labelled by MP personnel. There is a requirement, therefore, for 2,000 heavy duty plastic bags (or sandbags if none better are available) and luggage labels:
  - (a) Bags. Bags are to be issued to:
    - (i) Infantry coys: 200 to each.
    - (ii) The MP Coy: the remainder, both for the processing of evidence and to act as a reserve for redistribution to infantry coys.
- (4) Labels. Labels are to be issued to the Force MP Coy.
- e. Paper proforma. Locally produced proforma - examples of which are included with the OPO - will be needed for the documentation of searches and detainees; the requirement is:
  - (1) Search Proforma: 200 to each infantry coy.
  - (2) Detainee Proforma: 1,000 to the Force MP Coy.
  - (3) CCO is requested to provide, a photocopier and 4 reams of paper to the Force MP Coy for the local production of additional forms should the need arise.
- f. (1) Loud Hailer. A loud hailer (with batteries if necessary) is needed by the Force MP Coy.
- (2) Eating and drinking utensils. Eating and drinking utensils are required for the provision of meals and drinks to detainees; 50 sets are required.

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8. Engrs

- a. Erection of wire and tentage. Engr sp is to be provided from NICOY is to establish the MP DPC - specifically, the erection of tentage and concertina wire. NICOY and the CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary to ensure that it is positioned as required.
- b. Route Maintenance. Bad weather may give rise to problems with the 2 x main routes, in particular. The ability to place fascines may be required, should any minor bridges be washed away.
- c. Generator and Lighting. CCO is requested to provide a generator and lighting for the DPC as it will need to be lit at night. CCO and CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary.

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Location of HQ.
  - (1) TAC HQ KIBEHO, to incl GI/G4 rep.
  - (2) Alternate HQ - TAC HQ Butare.
  - (3) MILOB HQ Det co-loc with TAC HQ.
- b. ZAMBATT is to provide personnel for operation of TAC HQ G4 cell.
- c. TAC HQ Butare is to provide G4 personnel for SUP and MAINT for operation of TAC HQ G4 for the duration of op.
- d. 15 X ZAMBATT mdm veh under op con of operation TAC HQ.
- e. Unit first line veh used to deploy unit elements to assembly area Butare to come under op con of operation TAC HQ for deployment of troops from assembly area to FUP.
- f. Electronic Silence. As per OPO.
- g. Code Words. As per OPO.

10. Ack Instrs: Ack.

HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
FC



K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS SP

Authentication:

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Copy No

GHANBATT  
ETHIOBATT  
FRAFBATT  
ZAMBATT  
TUNBATT  
NICOY  
INDBATT  
MILOB GP HQ  
AUSMED  
CANSIG  
3CSG  
FMO  
MP COY  
G3 OPS  
TAC HQ BUTARE  
GHA SUP PL  
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Internal:

Information:

FC'S FILE	18
DFC	19
DCOS OPS	20
DCOS SP	21
G3 PLANS	22
FILE	23
SPARE	24

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NO RPA LO/Interpreter

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TO: HQ MILOBS GROUP, KIGALI

FROM: HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

DATE: 11 DEC 94

SUBJECT: DETAILED REPORT ON ACTIVITIES IN KIBEHO AND NDAGO DPCs

GENERAL

1. Two MILOBS teams from this sector were tasked to establish a presence in the above camps and to monitor various activities as per tasks given. A report on the situation in the camps, as requested vide Para 3 (d)(3) of your Warning Order dated 07 Dec 94, is given in succeeding paragraphs.

LOCATION AND LAYOUT

2. KIBEHO DPC covers approx 5 KM sq and extends northwards to NYACYONDO (4910) and southwards towards NDAGO. It comprises approx 100,000 DPs. The camp is divided into sub camps with no visible boundaries - 32 communes in all, based on where the DPs have originated. The population is concentrated around the 2 commercial centres in the area. There are three vehicle entry and exit points.

ORGANISATION

3. The Chef de Camp is M. FABIEN MUTAGANDA, whose antecedents are as yet unknown. Each commune has its own chief.

4. Two commercial centres exist within the camp where considerable small scale business activities have been observed.

ACTIVITIES

5. DPs move freely in and out of the camps in daylight hours in search of firewood and to buy/sell goods. Movement appears to commence at 0500 and ceases around 2100-2200.

6. Daytime concentration has been noticed at the medical facilities, commercial centres and relief distribution points.

7. It is significant to note that food distribution takes place on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays each week. DPs appear to commence concentrating for this from the early hours of the morning. Actual distribution commences at 0800. In view of the impending ops on 14 Dec 94 (Wednesday) this factor may have some importance.

8. RPA. RPA conduct routine patrols in the camp and occasionally arrest suspected criminals. One platoon each is located at NYANGE

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(5307) and BANGA (5507). On the night of 08/09 Dec at approx 2150 h, 3 DPs were injured in an alleged assault by some RPA personnel. It is reported that the RPA personnel were attempting to extort money.

RUMOURS

9. Routine, mundane rumours appear to be in circulation and DPs seem to believe that their security can only be guaranteed in the camps.

10. Significantly, a rumour is also afloat that the camps will be cordoned, searched and possibly destroyed by the RPA by 12 Dec 94.

NGO ACTIVITIES

11. There appears to be no significant change in the activities of NGOs in the camps. Offices/establishments of IOM, ICRC, OXFAM, MSF, GOAL, AICF, UNICEF, CARITAS and MERLIN are located within the camps. Most NGO personnel work at the camps by day but retire to GIKONGORO by 1500 h.

12. It appears that some NGOs are aware of the impending operation by UNAMIR on 14 Dec 94. The NGOs have been seeking advice on whether to continue their activities on this date or not. No comments were offered by our teams in response to these queries.

ASSESSMENT

13. In view of the rumours circulating among the DPs and the information on the impending ops available from NGOs, security of the op appears to have been compromised.

14. Troops to task ratios for different communes within the camps need to be assessed based on detailed recce which takes into account the flow of DP concentration in different areas during the day.

15. Timings for the commencement of the ops may need review since movement in and out of the communes appears to commence fairly early.

16. It is recommended that an aerial recce by officers up to coy comd level and selected MILOBS be conducted prior to the ops.



S.A. Hasnain  
Lt Col  
Comd Sect 3

UN SECRET

FM: MILOB TEAM SECT 4-A  
L/K GHANBATT TAC HQ

To: MILOB GP TAC HQ

SUB: DAILY SITREP AS AT 141200 H.

OP OVERTURE.

1. OWN FORCES.

A. MOV. GHANBATT ARR IN OBJ AREA AT 140430.

B. EXEC.

- (i) CORDON AND SEARCH COMMENCED AT 140430, OF OBJ TWO.
- (ii) SEARCH PARTIES ASSISTED WITH RPA IDEN TEAM AND INTERPRETER.
- (iii) FEMALE DPs SEARCHED BY TWO LADY SOLDIERS.
- (iv) AOR SEARCHED SYSTEMATICALLY AND EVERY POSSIBLE PLACE WAS SEARCHED THOROUGHLY.

(v)

C. OBSERVATIONS

- (i) ON ARR OF UNAMIR FORCES THE DPs WERE OUT OF THEIR TENTS GREETING THE TRS.
- (ii) A RIF SHOT FIRE HEARD AT 0600 H AT ABOUT 1.5 KM NW OF MILOB GP TAC HQ.
- (iii) FEW MACHATES WERE RECOVERED.

D. APPREHENSIONS. DURING SEARCH ON OBJ TWO FOLLOWING DPs WERE APPREHENDED.

- (i) MUNYANKAZI JOSEPH AGED 50 YRS AT 0830 H WAS FOUND IN POSSESSION OF MIL BOOTS AND A KNIFE.
- (ii) KABILIGI FAUSTIN AGED 36 YRS SUSPECTED TO BE FORMER RGF SOLDIER IDENTIFIED BY RPA IDENTIFICATION TEAM, AT 0840 H
- (iii) NDAYISABA JUVENAL AGED 33 YRS ARRESTED AS FEW DPs STATED THAT HE THREATENED TO KILL DPs AFTER DEPARTURE OF UNAMIR FORCES.

E. TRANSFER OF DETAINEES TO DPC. ALL THE THREE DETAINEES WERE HANDLED OVER TO DPC AFTER COMPLETION OF NECESSARY FORMALITIES.

F. PRESENT SIT. SEARCH CONTINUING ON OBJ 2.

2. HUMAN RTS. NO VIOLATION OF HUMAN RTS HAS OCCURRED.

3. MISC. NTR.