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*Ack*

15 November 1

Base Admin Officer, UN Air Tpt Base, NDJILI  
MA to Force Commander

Reference your UNATB/ADMIN 9/B-1104  
dated 13 Nov 61, herewith, as requested, two  
copies of ONUC Operation Directive No.9 and  
two copies of Amdt No.1 thereto.

*KOB.*

(K. O'Brien) Maj

*Copies passed under Confidential  
Cover on 15/10/61.*

*[Signature]*

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

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UNATB/ADMIN 9/B-1104

Base Command,  
U.N. Air Transport Base,  
N'Djili Airport

13th November, 1961.


OFFICE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER  
ONUC HEADQUARTERS

ONUC Operation Directive No. 9.

The newly-arrived Ethiopian F.86 Jet Squadron here has requested that they should be supplied with a copy of the above Operation Directive which was issued during November, 1960.

They had been informed by you that the Headquarters of this Base should be in a position to supply them with a copy. However, we hold no copy in our files as the U.N. Air Transport Base was not adequately organized as such until December 1960. We shall therefore appreciate receiving two copies, one of which will be placed in our files.

Our civil assistant recently visited your office in order to obtain a copy but was informed that it was an Air Operation Directive. This however is not correct as we have since received amendment No. 1 issued by the office of the Force Commander. Your early action in this matter will be much appreciated.

  
JOHS. BJUGN (MAJOR)  
BASE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER  
U.N. AIR TRANSPORT BASE, N'DJILI

CVS/s

A/c

Léopoldville, le 13 novembre 1961

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre N°000590/61/J0 du 9 novembre 1961 et ai le plaisir de vous assurer de notre entière collaboration pour le documentaire que votre section "Cinéma" est en train de préparer.

J'ai donné les instructions nécessaires pour qu'un hélicoptère soit mis à votre disposition ainsi que vous en avez exprimé le désir, et vous prierais de vous mettre en rapport directement avec le Commandant ONU des Forces Aériennes, l'Air Commodore Morrison, pour ce qui est de la date et de l'heure qui vous conviendront le mieux à cet effet.

Le Commandant de l'Air Morrison peut être contacté au Royal, Bureau N° 531, numéro de téléphone 3921 (extension 153).

Je vous prie d'agréer, M. le Ministre, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Sture Linnér  
Chargé de la Mission  
des Nations Unies au Congo

Son Excellence M. J. Ilco,  
Ministre de l'Information et des Affaires Culturelles,  
Léopoldville

cc: Force Commander ✓  
A/Cdre. Morrison

JP/SG

*Act*

Le 12 novembre 1961

Avons reçu dans la nuit le message suivant qui émane du Quartier général de la brigade malaise de Bukavu, message qui nous est confirmé par notre représentant dans cette Province:

"Deux avions de transport C-119 qui transportaient deux petites autos de reconnaissance ont atterri hier à Kindu en provenance de Kamina. Les 13 hommes de l'équipage se sont rendus au mess des officiers pour déjeuner. Ce mess a été attaqué par les troupes de l'ANC et l'équipage a été fait prisonnier après avoir été maltraité. Le mess a été pillé et toutes les armes s'y trouvant confisquées. Quelques coups de feu ont été tirés par l'ANC; nos troupes n'ont pas répondu.

Il n'y a aucun blessé et le Commandant de la garnison de Kindu est en conférence avec l'ANC.

L'officier commandant le 6ième régiment malais s'envole pour Kindu à l'aube.

N'avons plus aucun contact avec Kindu depuis 6 heures hier soir.

Il est impératif que le Général Lundula soit contacté afin qu'une action immédiate soit entreprise étant donné que la situation va en se détériorant et que l'on peut s'attendre à des incidents beaucoup plus graves si des ordres immédiats ne sont pas donnés en vue de rétablir le calme.

Aux tout derniers renseignements qui nous arrivent à midi trente, certains membres des équipages auraient été tellement maltraités qu'ils auraient perdu la vie.

*cc Fon Commandant*

---

AHQ/6002/1/ADMIN

Date :- 10 November 1961

*Handwritten signature*

To : Distribution Lists A, B, C and D  
From : Air Commander  
Subject : CHANGE OF COMMAND - AIR TRANSPORT BASE

With effect from 14 November 1961, COLONEL ANTONIO PASQUALI will take over the command of Air Transport Base, N'Djili, vice COLONEL L. NIMIS, being repatriated on completion of his term with UN in the Congo.

*Handwritten signature*  
(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

S E C R E T

Nov 09/1961.

AHQ/6600/20/P-OPS

MISSION ORDER N° 13

- Plot*
- a) N° 5, 22, C-47. and 2 ACT.
  - b) One each time.
  - c) Nov 10 / 0500 to 1500 Zulu.
  - d) N° 5 and 22 remain alert equally. C-47 continue same task.
  - e) Report own Fighter activities and aerial observation of ANC.  
N° 22 to continue ACT training and ground crew training.

THIS CONFIRMS TELEPHONIC INSTRUCTIONS TO LULUABOURG.

(A.S. Shannani) W/C

Senior Fighter Ops Officer.

TO : 22 SQN Lulu  
N° 5 SQN Lulu and N° Djill  
C-47 SQN Lulu and N° Djill  
N° 2 ACT Lulu

INFO : Maj O'Brien ADC to Force Cntr ✓

Ack

8 November 1961

Chief Administrative Officer,  
Air Commander,

UN AIR TRANSPORT FORCE AND CHARTER AIRCRAFT

1. As an outcome of meetings with yourself, Colonel Quinn, Colonel Madan, Brigadier Rikhye, S/L Harrison and myself to discuss the UN Air Transport requirements it has been decided that effective 1 January 1962;
  - (a) the UN Air Transport Force should be comprised of:
    - (i) 6 - C119 aircraft;
    - (ii) 10 - C47 aircraft plus 4 reserves - to be retained in the Congo;
    - (iii) 8 - light aircraft i.e. 4 Otter and 4 Beaver aircraft but as each Beaver acquires 1200 flying hours it is to be replaced by an Otter aircraft;
    - (iv) 12 - H19 Helicopter aircraft (at present there are 11 plus one that is temporarily misplaced as a result of the Katanga incident) ; and
    - (v) approximately the same number of servicing personnel and aircrew except for C47 aircrew which will be reduced.
  - (b) the charter aircraft should be reduced to:
    - (i) 9 - DC4 aircraft;
    - (ii) 4 - C46 aircraft (Super-Curtis preferably); and
    - (iii) 1 - DC6 aircraft for the Force Commander.
2. Therefore you are requested to arrange:
  - (a) for the disposal of the extra C47<sup>1</sup> aircraft (in conjunction with my technical staff) ;



2.
  - (b) the procurement of four Otter aircraft to replace the Beaver aircraft as they are phased out of service; and
  - (c) the reduction in the number of chartered aircraft.

3. There has been considerable discussion and correspondence with regard to charter companies. I do not care which companies we have providing they are reliable and have safe operational and maintenance procedures. To ensure that this is maintained the UN must have it written in the contract that designated UN personnel are authorized to inspect the records of aircraft and personnel to ensure that they meet the ICAO standards and to have a penalty or cancellation clause which this inspector can enforce if necessary. This is mandatory if the UN is to operate an economical yet safe air transport service. It is recommended that the inspection team be drawn from ICAO.

4. Furthermore, I think that the present rates are too high. As an example the C54 aircraft are contracted from \$432.00 per flying hour with a prime contractor but I believe there are subcontractors operating at approximately \$250.00 per hour. In addition, the C46 aircraft are chartered from \$330.00 per hour but certain aircraft (Super Curtis) are faster and have a higher pay load.

5. However, if a six-month contract were arranged the UN could probably get a better rate. It is suggested that this be done as soon as possible but please ensure that the conditions in para 3 are met. It would be more prudent to pay the present high rate for January providing the UN ultimately obtained more economical yet satisfactory contracts.

6. I hope that it is apparent to the Field Service Staff in New York that it is essential that at least four of the DC4 aircraft are chartered from Sabena. Administratively it is better to charter the remaining aircraft from one company. However, unless the cost was very low experience has shown that it is better to have two companies involved but definitely no more.

(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

c.c. Force Commander,  
Brigadier Rikhye,  
Colonel Quinn,  
Colonel Maden.

MEMORANDUM

STATEMENT REGARDING CABLES N° 7741 - 7757

FROM NEW YORK

1. Ammo for the F86 Ethiopian Squadron available since end of October.
2. The accomodation is definitely not proper regarding standards and is also very awkward from operational point of view. It is scattered and far away from the airfield and this HQ. //
3. Staff meetings have been arranged, and available information given to all unit commanders. They have been given instructions to pass information on to units as they consider suitable themselves.

However, it is to be noticed that the amount of staff conferences have been not at all sufficient owing to:

- a) Lack of staff officers to prepare for conferences.
- b) Lack of air intelligence; not even for fighter operations. Responsible officers have got nearly as much information as needed to operate in a proper way. Referring to Fighter Ops Order N° 1, Information Summarys are planned to be issued regularly but so far there has been no capacity to produce them.
- c) Lack of transport for the units. This, with very outspread location, necessitates the officers from the units, if called to a staff meeting, to stay in HQ all day, which, very often, is not desireable.
- d) As to the special radio control system requested for the F86 SQN, it has not yet arrived in the Congo. Radio communication is for the moment arranged by means of Airborne UHF sets at ATC's in Léo, Luluabourg and Kamina. This and the fact that the F86 SQN can operate only from runways more than 2,500 meters length greatly hampers the possibilities to use them in operations. In fact, they can be based only in Léo and Kamina.

It is to be noticed that the other two Fighter units and also the two ACT's are equipped with VHF radio sets. This makes it extremely difficult to organize combined operations with the F86 SQN and also greatly minimizes the possibilities for close support in cooperation with the ACT. At the present the operational capability of the F86 SQN is very limited. They cannot be of any operational use till they are allowed to be based at Kamina.
- e) As to para 2, all sorts of legal efforts have been made by the air branch of this HQ but no succesful results have been obtained from the accomodation section which is run by civilians. We suggest that an explanation be demanded, therefore, from the civilian accomodation people.

The above statement about accomodation, also is valid for transports (para 3c). This is even more serious as it

gravely affects our possibilities to operate the Fighter units effectively and efficiently.

As to para 3b, an air intelligence officer has been made available from Oct 6 and matters are expected to improve essentially in this aspect.

As to para 3a, demand of two officers with staff education will be put forward immediately.

*Wm. L. Lamer*

FIGHTER OPS ORDER N° 4INFORMATION

Reports have been received about bombing raids in Kasai presumably by Aircraft based at Kaniama Airfield in Katanga. The Katanga authorities are being warned to stop all offensive action and to ground aircraft with any attack potential.

INTENTION

To take action against bandit aircraft.

EXECUTION

Fighter Units detailed by this HQ will take the following action:

KASAI

Air reconnaissance will be carried out along Kasai, Katanga border with particular reference to areas which have recently received attention of bandit aircrafts from Katanga. They will report:

1. Any movement of Congolese National Army or Katanga gendarmerie across the frontier.
2. Movement of all aircraft observed in the area.
3. If any bandit aircraft is observed taking offensive action it will be followed and immediately reported.
4. UN fighters will be kept on alert stated on Mission Orders and on receiving information of bandit aircraft from reconnaissance planes will take counteraction by destroying the aircraft either in the air or on the ground within area of ONUC responsibility.

KATANGA

If any aircraft attacks UN or carry out any offensive mission in Katanga, following action will be taken:

1. Information on nature of offensive action type of aircraft, direction in which it has flown will be immediately reported.
2. Air reconnaissance will establish aircraft or the field from which it has operated.
3. If it is determined that it is a bandit aircraft which has actually carried out an offensive action, it will be destroyed.
4. If any bandit aircraft is caught by UN fighters in the act of committing an attack or is seen to leave the area when an attack has been carried out, will be destroyed.
5. Aerial reconnaissance will be ordered to locate unknown airfields and aircraft.
6. In the event of hostilities breaking out in Katanga UN fighters and light bombers will be called for direct support and to take any neutralization action that is considered fit.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

of all Fighter Units will be exercised by this HQ.

Orders will be passed to Fighter Units by means of Mission Orders in code. Verbal orders will be confirmed by signal.

(H.A. Morisson) A/C  
Air Commander.

(S. Lampell) COL.  
Chief Fighter Ops.

Approved: *[Signature]*  
S. MacEoin, Lt Gen  
Force Commander.

DISTRIBUTION:

Order to : All Fighter Group Units

Info to : All Base Commanders  
All Brigade Commanders  
Force Commander (2 copies)  
Chief of Staff  
Chief of Military Operations  
Chief of Logistics  
Air Commander  
Deputy Air Commander  
Chief Air Operations Officer  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Personal Assistant to the Officer-in-Charge of ONUC

28. Standards of Maintenance and Operation - Charter Aircraft (Your 100-28)

The standards to which planes are chartered are those of the countries in which the planes are registered. These may not necessarily follow ICAO standards and charter to these standards may not be practical. The responsibility for validating certificates of air worthiness and pilot qualifications must rest with ONUC, since time will not permit pre-clearance before the planes and/or crew leave for the Congo. Changes in personnel and substitution of aircraft are at the option of the charterer and must, in our opinion, be checked in the Congo. It is therefore agreed that two or three aircraft engineers with experience in maintenance standards and operating techniques be recruited for a period of six to eight weeks to establish proper standards for charter aircrafts. We plan, as a start, to approach certain countries for military personnel to meet this need. Alternatively, we may have to seek assistance from some civilian organization, but before doing so it is considered advisable to obtain from you the terms of reference under which these engineers would operate and any additional information you consider necessary as to specifications for the positions, qualifications and salary ranges.

Force Commander

452

Office of the CAO  
Room ~~642~~ 613  
Le Royal

ONUC  
Leopoldville

EXTRACT FROM UN HEADQUARTERS' ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT NO. 132 OF 7/11/1961.

Ask

Aur

ACTION AGAINST BANDIT AIRCRAFT

KASAI

Air reconnaissance will be carried out along Kasai, Katanga border with particular reference to areas which have recently received attention of bandit aircrafts from Katanga. They will report :

1. Any movement of Congolese National Army or Katanga gendarmerie across the frontier.
2. Movement of all aircraft in the area.
3. If any bandit aircraft is observed taking offensive action it will be followed and immediately reported.
4. Swedish fighters will be kept on alert and on receiving information of bandit aircraft <sup>from</sup> reconnaissance planes will take counteraction by destroying the aircraft ~~will~~ <sup>the aircraft found within the area of their responsibility?</sup>

KATANGA

The Katanga authorities are being warned to stop all offensive action and to ground aircrafts with any attack potential. If, however, any aircraft attacks UN or carry out any offensive mission in Katanga, following action will be taken :

1. Information on nature of offensive action type of aircraft, direction in which it has flown will be immediately reported.
2. Air reconnaissance will establish aircraft or the field from which it has operated.
3. If it is determined that <sup>it is</sup> a bandit aircraft which has actually carried out an offensive action, it will be destroyed.
4. If any bandit aircraft is caught by UN fighters in the act of committing an attack or is seen to leave the area when an attack has been carried out, will be destroyed.
5. Aerial reconnaissance will be ordered to locate unknown <sup>airfields</sup> and aircraft.
6. In the event of hostilities breaking out <sup>in Katanga</sup> ~~as result of UN~~ <sup>UN</sup> action against Katanga bandit aircraft, fighters and light bombers will be called for direct support and to take any neutralization action that is considered fit.



SECRET

MISSION ORDER N° 17

- a) N° 5, 22 and C-47
- b) C-47 one each time. N° 5 and 22 two each time
- c) Nov 15, C-47 0500 to 1500 Zulu. N° 5 and 22 0400 to 1500 Zulu.
- d) C-47 to continue same task. N° 5 at Thirty minute readiness and N° 22 at one hour readiness, for offensive mission Kindu on orders from originator.
- e) Written reports required. N° 22 to carry out ACT training if conditions permit. N° 5 SQN at base to carry out operational reconnaissance as briefed.

This confirms verbal instructions.

(A.S. Phammani) W/C  
Senior Fighter Ops Officer.

TO : 22 SQN Lulu  
N° 5 SQN Lulu and N° Djili  
C-47 SQN Lulu and N° Djili  
N° 2 ACT Lulu

INFO : Maj O'Brian, ADC to Force Cdr  
Air Base Commander, N° Djili

SECRET

MISSION ORDER N° 17

- a) N° 5, 22 and C-47
- b) C-47 one each time. N° 5 and 22 two each time
- c) Nov 15, C-47 0500 to 1500 Zulu. N° 5 and 22 0400 to 1500 Zulu.
- d) C-47 to continue same task. N° 5 at Thirty minute readiness and N° 22 at one hour readiness, for offensive mission Kindu on orders from originator.
- e) Written reports required. N° 22 to carry out ACT training if conditions permit. N° 5 SQN at base to carry out operational reconnaissance as briefed.

This confirms verbal instructions.

(A.S. Bhawnani) W/C  
Senior Fighter Ops Officer.

TO : 22 SQN Lulu  
N° 5 SQN Lulu and N° Djill  
C-47 SQN Lulu and N° Djill  
N° 2 ACT Lulu

INFO : Maj O'Brien, ADC to Force Cdr  
Air Base Commander, N° Djill

SECRET

MISSION ORDER N° 16

*Handwritten signature/initials*

- a) N° 5, 22 and C-47
- b) C-47 one, 5 and 22 two each.
- c) Nov 14. C-47 0500 to 1500, N° 5 and 22 0400 to 1500 Zulu.
- d) C-47 continue task in Luputa-Luisa area. Readiness N° 5 half-hour and N° 22 one hour for offensive mission Kinds on instructions from originator.
- e) Submit written reports. N° 22 to carry out ACT training if conditions permit.

This confirms telephonic instructions to Luluabourg.

(A.S. Bhawani) W/C  
Senior Fighter Ops Officer.

TO : 22 SQN Lulu  
N° 5 SQN Lulu and N° Djill  
C-47 SQN Lulu and N° Djill  
N° 2 ACT Lulu

INFO : Maj O'Brian, ADC to Force Cmdr  
Air Base Commander, N° Djill

Nov 08/11/61  
AHQ/6600/20/P-OPS

SECRET

MISSION ORDER N° 12

- 102
- a) N° 5, 22 and C-47
  - b) One each time
  - c) Nov 09 / 0500 to 1500 Zulu
  - d) N° 5 and 22 remain alert equally. C-47 to continue patrol over ANC positions Kasai area.
  - e) Report own Fighter activities and aerial observation of ANC movements. N° 5 to send two aircraft from base at 0800 Zulu. N° 22 to continue ACT training and ground crew training.

This confirms telephonic instructions to Lulus.

TO : 22 SQN Lulu  
N° 5 SQN Lulu and N° Djili  
C-47 SQN Lulu and N° Djili  
N° 2 ACT Lulu

INFO : Maj O'Brian ADC to Force Commander

*S. Lampell*  
(S. Lampell) Colonel  
Chief Fighter Ops Officer.

AHQ/6005/12/ADMIN  
6 November 1961

*Handwritten signature/initials*

To : See Distribution

From : Air Commander

Subject : PROGRESS REPORT NO.9 COVERING SEPTEMBER 1961 ✓

A. SUMMARY:

1. During September 1961 UNATF operations were severely influenced by the crisis in Katanga. From September 8 to the cease-fire agreement of September 21 the Katangese gendarmerie launched repeated ground and air attacks on the Kamina and Elisabethville airbases. The activity of a single Katangese jet trainer hampered to a large extent the UN possibilities to carry out requested air transports. A number of UN aircraft as well as charter aircraft were destroyed or damaged by air attacks. Further damages were caused by anti-aircraft weapons and small arm fire. All charter companies but one objected to operate during the prevailing situation. Air transportation within this area had to be carried out during darkness and as normal electrical supply was blocked, emergency lightening of the runways had to be arranged. Elisabethville airport was taken over completely and ran by the UN since all civil authorities and employees left their positions when hostilities started. Workshops, stores and even aircraft deteriorated rapidly due to lack of maintenance and protection against unauthorized admittance. At Albertville all attempts of the gendarmerie to get hold of the airfields failed and both could be used without restrictions. As the Katangese personnel of the Control Tower disappeared, an emergency control tower was created by making use of helicopter.
2. Flying hours decreased from 5,437 in August to 4,892 in September.

3. The total load airlifted within the Congo in September (August in brackets) was:

(a) Freight	6,003,462 lbs	(3,353,865)
(b) Passengers (troops)	3,565	( 8,277)
(c) Vehicles	67	( 124)

4. Accidents and incidents during September:

UN C.119 No.6031 was damaged and one member of the aircrew injured during aerial bombardment at Kamina.

UN C-47 No.216 overshot the runway at Kamina causing extensive damage to the aircraft.

UN C-47 No.205, 214 and 215 were struck by bullets and bombs and are temporarily unserviceable. No.209 was damaged beyond repair at Elisabethville.

Helicopter H-19 No.259 was destroyed during fighting at Elisabethville.

Helicopter H-19 No.620 captured by Katangan forces at Jadotville, and crew taken prisoner.

UN C-47 No.216 at Albertville and No.219 at Elisabethville were damaged by sabotage of the fuel system.

Concerning chartered aircraft the following accidents were recorded:

No.298 C-46 Panama: During take off at Elisabethville on September 15, the right wing was damaged by fire from the ground. Aircraft accomplished flight but unserviceable until September 23.

No.300 C-46 Panama: During landing at Elisabethville on September 14 undercarriage damaged by fire from the ground. Aircraft interrupted landing and returned to Kamina where it had to land with wheel-up. Aircraft unserviceable until November.

GA-FIN DC-4 Sabena destroyed by air attack at Kamina on September 17.

SE-BDY DC-6 Transair crashed at N'Dola, Northern Rhodesia on September 17. No survivals.

B. AIR OPERATIONS

5. Hours Flown, Aircraft Status etc.

Type of a/c	July	Aug	Sept	A/C Numbers 30 Sept
C.119	243	462	343	10
C.47	806	968	943	19
C.54	-	-	-	1
Otter/Beaver	372	360	424	8
Helicopters	253	319	264	13
F-86	-	-	-	4
Total	1674	2109	1974	55
Charter a/c	3061	3328	2918	20
Grand Total	4735	5437	4892	75

Remarks:

During September the following charter a/c operated and flew the hours indicated:

SABENA:	4 DC-4	671 hrs
INTEROCEAN:	6 DC-4	880 "
PANAMA:	1 DC-4	215 "
	6 C-46	721 "
TRANSAIR:	1 DC-6	98 "
	2 C-46	333 "

6. Flying Analysis - Charter Aircraft

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>
Average a/c Strength:	19	21	16
Average daily flying:	12 (52.2%)	12 (50%)	11 (55%)
Average daily maintenance:	4 (17.4%)	3 (12.5%)	4 (20%)
Average serviceable but not flying:	7 (30.4%)	9 (37.5%)	5 (25%)
Average monthly flying hours per a/c:	133	139	146

C. AIR ADMINISTRATION

7. Total air personnel effective 30th September 1961 are shown below:

Argentina	26	(+ 2)	
Brazil	32	(- 3)	
Canada	82	(+ 68)	Increase due to arrival of 2 C.119
Denmark	31	(+ 26)	" " " " " 1 C.54, 1 C.47 and helicopter personnel
Ethiopia	47	(+ 45)	Increase due to arrival of 4 F.86 Sabres
Greece	25	(± 0)	
India	44	(- 1)	
Italy	75	(+ 2)	
Norway	72	(+ 17)	Increase due to arrival of 2 C.119
Sweden	80	(- 1)	

8. The establishment of the UN Air Transport Organization in the Congo as of the 1st of September consisted of 514 posts. In addition there were 59 persons working for ONUC Air Transport Organization who were not accounted for in the above establishment.



9. The situation in Katanga during September evoked a demand for fighters, additional military transport aircraft and helicopter personnel. Due to this request the following units arrived during the end of September:

		<u>Number of a/c</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
September 25	Norwegian C.119 Transport Group	2 C.119	14
"	26 Danish Transport Group	1 C.54, 1 C.47	14
"	26 Helicopter personnel: 4 Pilots, 1 Air Eng. Officer, 7 Mechanics		12
"	27 Ethiopian Jet Fighter Unit	4 F-86 Sabres	45
"	27 Canadian C.119 Transport Unit	2 C.119	85

10. Sqd/Ldr R. J. Lemieux arrived on September 18 to fill the vacant post as Officer-in-Charge, Flying Safety Standards and Proficiency.

11. With effect from September 10 Air Detachment Commanders are appointed as Commanders of the Air Detachments based at the following stations:

Albertville  
Luluabourg  
Elisabethville

The Detachment Commanders will also act as Air Liaison Officers to the Area Commanders (Army).

D. UN AIR TRANSPORT BASE, N'DJILI

12. Aircraft Serviceability 30th September

The serviceability of aircraft as per 1st October was as follows:

<u>Type of a/c</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>
C.47	16	3
C.54	1	0
C.119	9	1
Otter	1	3
Beaver	4	-
Sikorsky H.19	7	5
Alouette A.51	-	1
F.86	2	2

Detachments 30th September

	<u>C.47</u>	<u>C.119</u>	<u>Light a/c</u>	<u>Helicopter</u>
Albertville	1	No Detachment	2	4
Elisabethville	1		-	2
Luluabourg	1		3	3
Stanleyville	1		-	-
Kamina	1		-	-
Bukavu	1		-	-

13. Medical: Overall health conditions have been satisfactory.

D. ENGINEERING

14. General: Because of the occurrence in September it seems necessary to look at the serviceability in the period up to the 18th of September and after the 18th because of the drop in serviceability when the hostilities broke out. In the period up to 18th the serviceability for C.119, C.47 and Helicopter was good. The light aircraft serviceability was hampered by the lack of engines.

When the hostilities started some aircraft were grounded due to sabotage on the fuel system. Contaminated fuel had entered the aircraft fuel system causing clogging up of pipelines.

Other aircraft were damaged by enemy fire or were hit by shrapnels from bombs dropped on the airfields. Two H.19 were out of action, one in Elisabethville and the other in Jadotville.

15. Supply Support

The month of September started up with 48 outstanding AOCPs. When the month terminated the number of outstanding AOCP had got down to 38. This shows some improvement but still leaves room for improvement.

16. C.119 Serviceability 1-17/9 September 88% and 18/9 - 30/9 - 87%.

One aircraft 6031 was badly hit by shrapnel on 24 September 1961 at Kamina and the aircraft was flown to N'Djili for repair. This aircraft was not serviceable before the month had expired.

17. C.47 Serviceability rate: 1/9-17/9 - 72%,  
18/9-30/9 - 51%. Aircraft 209 was put unserviceable  
on the 18th at Elisabethville due to sabotage to the  
fuel system. On the 20th it was damaged beyond repair  
due to bomb dropped by Fuga. 211 was sabotaged at  
Elisabethville but was later made serviceable again.  
216 was grounded at Albertville due to trouble with  
fuel system and was not serviceable for a few days.  
205 (50 hits) and 219 (87 hits) were shot up in the  
air but were flown back to 'Djili for repair and 205  
is serviceable again while 219 is still under repair  
at Air France. 216 crashed under landing at Kamina  
and it is doubtful whether it can be repaired.

18. Light Aircraft

Serviceability rate:	1/9	-	12/9	71%
	18/9	-	30/9	60%

Otter serviceability has been hampered greatly by the  
engines gone unserviceable due to high oil consumption.  
This is due to bad oil seals mounted in the supercharger  
section. All unserviceable engines are to be returned to  
Pisa. Five newly overhauled engines are arriving.  
Beaver serviceability rate is extremely good.

19. Helicopters Serviceability rate: 1/9 - 17/9 - 53%  
18/9 - 30/9 - 48%

Helicopter 259 slid into a ditch when it was parked at  
Lido Hotel, Elisabethville causing slight damage to  
undercarriage. Soon after the military troops decided  
to withdraw from that area. As a result the aircraft  
was left and was later robbed and destroyed by Katangan  
forces.

Helicopter 620 was attacked three times by Fuga during  
a supply mission to Jadotville. During landing the  
undercarriage was slightly damaged. Shortly thereafter  
the aircraft and crew were taken prisoner along with  
the Irish troops. Whereabouts and condition of the  
Helicopter are not yet known.

20. SERVICEABILITY

C.47:	1/9 to 17/9	=	72.7%
	18/9 to 30/9	=	51%
C.119:	1/9 to 17/9	=	88%
	18/9 to 30/9	=	87.3%
Helicopter	1/9 to 17/9	=	53%
	18/9 to 30/9	=	48.5%
Otter and Beaver	1/9 to 17/9	=	71%
	18/9 to 30/9	=	60.2%

21. DAMAGED AIRCRAFT BY ENEMY

C.47

216	-	18/9/61	-	A'ville (Sabotage on Fuel System)
209	-	18/9/61	-	Sabotage on Fuel System
209	-	20/9/61	-	E'ville (Bombed)
211	-	20/9/61	-	Sabotage on Fuel System
205	-	21/9/61	-	E'ville (Shot up)
219	-	22/9/61	-	E'ville (Shot up)
C.47	-		-	Crashed
216	-	22/9/61	-	Kamina

C.119

6031 - 24/9/61 - Damaged by enemy on ground

1 C.46 - Shot up - Belly landing, Kamina

2 DC.4 - GA-PIN destroyed on ground at Kamina and OO-ADN (Air Katanga) destroyed on ground at Elisabethville.

HELICOPTERS

259	-	-	Destroyed by Katanga at E'ville
620	-	-	Taken by Katanga at Jadotville

22. Base Operations Wing

The Base Operations Wing is at present manned by 2 officers. There should be an officer on watch at all times. Every effort will be to obtain services of additional two officers from within our own resources.

A similar problem concerns the Flight Information Centre where an additional 2-3 NCOs may be required - this is under study.

The need for a separate Flying Safety Officer will be further investigated.

TECHNICAL WING

23. Aircraft Maintenance

Difficulty has been experienced in the maintenance of aircraft on detachment. Nevertheless the overall serviceability rate is considered satisfactory and should improve.

F. ADMINISTRATIVE WING

24. Accommodation


Satisfactory accommodation for the Air personnel who have recently arrived in great number has not so far been provided. Accommodation offered to them are not properly furnished and even need repairs. Since beds and mattresses have not been provided the personnel are sleeping on camp cots. Accommodation in Camp Basoko are very isolated and too far away from the airfield. It takes nearly an hour's drive each way. This is a great inconvenience to the air crew specially when they have to operate during early hours. It is suggested that the accommodation when offered to the UN personnel should be adequately furnished along with the necessary linen.

25. Transport

The transport which so far has been allotted to the Air Division is insufficient. It is however understood that more vehicles will shortly be issued to the new squadrons which might ease the situation.

26. Morale

During the recent incident in Katanga the morale of both air and ground crews remained good.




For (H. A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

Force Commander ✓	1	UN HQ, New York	6
COS	1	Chief Air Eng. Officer	2
DCOS	1	Base Commander, N'Djili	25
Air Commander	1	Movement Control	1
Deputy Air Commander	2	ICAO Mission	2
Chief Air Ops. Officer	2	Charter Companies	8
Air Info and Stat Officer	2	Chief Admin. Officer	6
Chief Air Admin. Officer	6		

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During the recent incident in Katanga the morale of both air and ground crews remained good.



For (H. A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

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Air Info and Stat Officer	2	Chief Admin. Officer	6
Chief Air Admin. Officer	6		



COPY

TRANSLATION

GT/S.G./00802

Leopoldville, 30.10.61.

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS  
AND TRANSPORTATION  
CABINET OF THE MINISTER

SUBJECT: Acces to the airports and airfields with a view to official ceremonies.

MINISTERIAL CIRCULAR No CT/SG 1  
of 1961

- All Departments
- Chief of OACI in the Congo  
(for distribution)  
Basic Statute

According to the Decree of Item 137 of the ~~Fundamental Ordinance~~ of Air nabigation No 62/321 of 8 October 1955, an Airport command is established on all public airports.

The person in charge of the command of an airport is responsible for the administration, the smooth running and police of his airport. His function is to see to the implementation of the air navigation rules. He has to take on the spur of the moment any urgent measures that might prove necessary to ensure the security of the air navigation.

It therefore follows from the aforesaid that the official exercising the command of an airport is the only legitimate responsible authority.

The result is, that, he is the only person that can authorise acces to the airport in accordance with the dispositions of Items 141 and 143 of the above mentioned ~~Basic Statute~~.

It has been brought to my ears that the premises of Leopoldville airport at N'Djili have been the scene of certain demonstrations or reviews (parades) in the <sup>zones</sup> ~~areas~~ that were specially prohibited, such as the tarmac.

I would like to stress (to recall) that any demonstration or parade of any kind, civilian or military, is to be first submitted to the authorisation of the airport commander, who, in this realm, ~~will~~ applies the high authority instructions.

There is no exception to this rule. The International Organisations that were called for in the Congo to give it technical assistance, are submitted to it for the same reason than the National Organisations.

It is with due respect to its sovereignty that the Government firmly intends to respect and see to its being respected the laws and regulations which were enacted according to the international rules and particularly to the reglementation dealing with the security of the air navigation.

make an

I/appeal <sup>that</sup> ~~to~~ all the services, those of the General Government as well as those of the Provincial Government, <sup>that</sup> ~~to~~ the civilian and Military services of the United Nations, respect the ~~legitimate~~ authority legitimately invested to the airport command.

I will personally see to it that this legitimate authority is complied with.

The MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS  
AND TRANSPORT

(signed S.KAMA)

Commander UN force


HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761 MOV  
Dated : 27th October 61

To : List "C" and "D"  
From : Chief Movement Control Officer  
Subject : USE OF HELICOPTERS

1. With immediate effect all Helicopter flights to and from BRAZZAVILLE, excluding those in support of repair of aircrafts at Air France will be controlled by the Chief Movement Control Officer HQ ONUC.

2. As regards requests for flights the following procedure will be followed :-

- a. Flights will be arranged only once a day and will depart from N'DJILI airport. Suitable time from operational point of view is 1345 hours and this should be kept in mind when making requests.
- b. Only VIP flights will originate and terminate from ROYAL.
- c. Requests for helicopter flights will have to be directed to Movement Control Air Move Section (Room No 113 Ext 161) atleast the day before the flight is wanted.
- d. Sanction for the use of helicopter lift from BRAZZAVILLE to LEO of persons arriving from outside should be obtained by the unit/section concerned.
- e. Passengers proceeding from LEO to BRAZZAVILLE must be in possession of proper travel authorisation and will have to report to MC Detachment N'DJILI 30 minutes before departure time.
- f. Requests will only be complied with to a limited extent and only when no other means of transportation are available.

  
Lt Col  
Chief Movement Control Officer  
(A. A. K. YUSUF ZAI)

Copy to:-

Movement Control N'Djili

FIGHTER OPS ORDER N° 4INFORMATION

Reports have been received about bombing raids in Kasai presumably by Aircraft based at Kaniama Airfield in Katanga. The Katanga authorities are being warned to stop all offensive action and to ground aircraft with any attack potential.

INTENTION

To take action against bandit aircraft.

EXECUTION

Fighter Units detailed by this HQ will take the following action:

KASAI

Air reconnaissance will be carried out along Kasai, Katanga border with particular reference to areas which have recently received attention of bandit aircrafts from Katanga. They will report:

1. Any movement of Congolese National Army or Katanga gendarmerie across the frontier.
2. Movement of all aircraft observed in the area.
3. If any bandit aircraft is observed taking offensive action it will be followed and immediately reported.
4. UN fighters will be kept on alert stated on Mission Orders and on receiving information of bandit aircraft from reconnaissance planes will take counteraction by destroying the aircraft either in the air or on the ground within area of ONUC responsibility.

KATANGA

If any aircraft attacks UN or carry out any offensive mission in Katanga, following action will be taken:

1. Information on nature of offensive action type of aircraft, direction in which it has flown will be immediately reported.
2. Air reconnaissance will establish aircraft or the field from which it has operated.
3. If it is determined that it is a bandit aircraft which has actually carried out an offensive action, it will be destroyed.
4. If any bandit aircraft is caught by UN fighters in the act of committing an attack or is seen to leave the area when an attack has been carried out, will be destroyed.
5. Aerial reconnaissance will be ordered to locate unknown airfields and aircraft.
6. In the event of hostilities breaking out in Katanga UN fighters and light bombers will be called for direct support and to take any neutralization action that is considered fit.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

of all Fighter Units will be exercised by this HQ.

Orders will be passed to Fighter Units by means of Mission Orders in code. Verbal orders will be confirmed by signal.

(H.A. Morisson) A/C  
Air Commander.

(S.Lampell) COL.  
Chief Fighter Ops.

Approved: *S. MacEoin*  
S. MacEoin, Lt Gen  
Force Commander.

DISTRIBUTION:

Order to : All Fighter Group Units

Info to : All Base Commanders  
All Brigade Commanders  
Force Commander (2 copies)  
Chief of Staff  
Chief of Military Operations  
Chief of Logistics  
Air Commander  
Deputy Air Commander  
Chief Air Operations Officer  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Personal Assistant to the Officer-in-Charge of ONUC

MISSION ORDER N° 5*Act 1/11*MOVEMENT:

1. Captain C. Banerjee OC N° 2 ACT will move to Luluabourg on 2nd Nov. 1961 in support of Fighter Patrol Operations in Kasai area for one week with the following personnel and equipment:
  - a) Five Personnel.
  - b) One Jeep with AN/GRC-19 set and VHF Set.
  - c) One extra AN/GRC-19 set and 2 sets antenna.
  - d) Spare equipment.
  - e) Rations for one week.
  - f) White fuel for charging unit.
2. Move from N'Djili to Luluabourg will be by air at 0900Z in C-119 aircraft. Officer to contact Movement Control at N'Djili for loading.

ACTION ON ARRIVAL:

3. On arrival at Luluabourg, the officer will report to the Air Base Commander and hand over the extra AN/GRC-19 set and one set Antenna for installation in the Flying Control Tower. Contact will be established between the two sets.
4. The VHF set will also be tried out with the Aircraft sets. Crystals for the sets will be taken from Signals Officer N° 5 SQN and handed over to OC N° 22 SQN.
5. The Nigerian Brigade Commander will be contacted to arrange army support and provision of one Jeep, tentage and interpreter.

OPERATIONAL MOVE:

6. The operational move will be under orders of the Nigerian brigade Commander to Luputa area.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE:

7. On arrival in Luputa area, contact will be established with Luluabourg on a predetermined channel.
8. One aircraft of N° 22 SQN will fly over the area to establish Ground to Air Contact.
9. The ACT will act as an observer for movements of hostile a/c and if any such aircraft is identified, attempts will be made to contact Fighter a/c on R/T stating "Bandit in my area report overhead" and then guide the Fighter towards the direction of the "Bandit".
10. The ACT will also contact Luluabourg tower on AN/GRC-19 set and request for alert mission to be airborne.

ALTERNATE PLANS:

11. In case the mission is not performed due to change of situation the ACT will remain in Luluabourg for one week and train with N° 22 SQN.

SIGNALS INSTRUCTIONS:

12. ACT VHF set and a/c sets will be crystallised on the confidential 118.6 MC/S frequency with standby channel.
13. All a/c will fly for patrol missions on this channel.
14. Call signs for this mission will be as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>
N° 2 ACT	Tiger
N° 5 SQN	Juliet
N° 22 SQN	Tusker

15. R/T conversation will be kept to the minimum. ACT VHF set will be switched on when required only.

16. AN/GRC-19 set will be switched on from sunrise to sunset.

TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17. OC N° 2 ACT will maintain his sets in the field. Major snags to be reported to the Nigerian Brigade through the supporting Nigerian Platoon who will inform Luluabourg and obtain assistance.

ADMINISTRATION:

18. OC N° 2 ACT will be under Command and Control of this HQ through Air Base Commander Luluabourg.
19. First aid kit will be carried.

RETURN MOVE:

20. The return move will be requested through Air Base Commander Luluabourg from this HQ.

REPORTS:

21. Air Base Commander Luluabourg will notify this HQ of operational move of Unit and firm location of the ACT in the operational area.
22. Further moves will be notified.

(A.S. Bhawnani) W/C

Senior Fighter Ops Officer,  
For Chief Fighter Ops Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Order to N° 2 ACT

Action by: Movement Control N'Djili  
Air Base Commander Luluabourg  
Nigerian Brigade Commander  
N° 5 SQN  
N° 22 SQN

INFORMATION:

Force Commander  
Deputy Force Commander  
Air Commander  
Deputy Air Commander  
Chief Air Ops Officer  
Chief Air Admin. Officer  
Chief of Fighter Ops Officer  
Air Telecom Officer  
Air Base Commander N'Djili  
Chief of Military Ops  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Signals Officer

1001/ /OPS

26 October 1

Legal Adviser to Force Commander  
Acting Chief of Staff

Courts of Inquiry

1. The Force Commander wishes to have courts of inquiry convened to investigate two recent incidents.

- a) The unauthorized removal of a Viking aircraft from E'ville airport on 18 October 1961.
- b) The unauthorized airtransport of a Congolese passenger named Theophile Kanker from Kamina to Leo on 24 October 1961.

2. The officers available for the courts are :

President : Brig. Surtaj Singh  
Member : Lt. Col. L.M. Skern  
Legal Adviser : To be nominated by you.

3. The following points would need to be specifically covered in the terms of reference of the court ;

- a) Is there any evidence that the two pilots who took the aircraft from E'ville arrived there beforehand in UN aircraft.
- b) If they travelled by UN aircraft, who authorized the journey.
- c) Can it be established how they got into E'ville airport.
- d) What assistance were they given in getting the engines of the aircraft started.
- e) What freedom of movement had they in the airport itself.
- f) The exact time and date of the incident.
- g) What recommendations should be made, if necessary, to achieve better control in airtravel.




4. As regards the second case the following question should be covered in the terms of reference :

a) What control exists at Kamina of passengers and crew on board of UN aircraft ?

b) Is there a check carried out on people actually boarding UN aircraft ?

c) Are Manifests checked before take off and on arrival ?

d) Is the incident due to negligence on the part of any UN official?

  
(James J. Quinn) Colonel  
A/COS



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*Handwritten signature/initials*

26 October 1961

A: General S. Mac Eoin, Force Commander  
DE: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer *me*  
OBJET: Press release

Attached is the press release issued in Brazzaville concerning traffic across the Congo River affecting ONUC personnel. I have given a copy of it to Bill Cox.

We have not so far received information from the control tower at Brazzaville whether or not UN planes are allowed to land there. As soon as I receive this I shall let you know.

cc: Bill Cox

P.S. I have just now been informed by the Air Operations who contacted the Brazzaville control tower that the Brazzaville authorities will not give permission for our aircraft to land at the Brazzaville airport.

UN PERSONNEL IN LEOPOLDVILLE ARE NO LONGER AUTHORIZED TO COME  
TO BRAZZAVILLE

Declaration of Vice-President OPANGAULT

BRAZZAVILLE 25/10 - It is 48 hours since a ban was imposed on the travel of Leopoldville-based UN personnel by river or by air to Brazzaville.

This decision was taken by Mr. Jacques OPANGAULT, Vice-President of the Republic of Congo - Brazzaville, after a frontier incident that occurred on Sunday morning at the landing stage of the river port of Brazzaville, where a launch from Leopoldville had just come alongside bringing foreign passengers.

President OPANGAULT, who was there, gave the boat a quarter of an hour to turn back and leave the territorial waters of the former French Congo.

On being questioned by the Agence France Presse, President OPANGAULT commented as follows on his decision: "The UN people came to Equatorial Africa at the request of the former Belgian Congo and not at our request. Neither the UN military personnel nor their accomplices the technicians have access to our territory any longer. Let them apply to the people of the former Belgian Congo, for there is no need to recall that they broke off the river traffic between the two Congos - we didn't.

In fact it is well known that river traffic and telephone and telex communications between Leopoldville and Brazzaville were interrupted more than a month ago by a decision of the authorities in Leopoldville following a declaration of the President of the Republic of the Congo, l'Abbé Fulbert YOUNG, which was considered by Mr. Adoula's government as interference in the internal affairs of the former Belgian Congo.

In this declaration, President Fulbert YOUNG gave Sweden formal notice to withdraw her "Blue Helmets" from the Congo following the outbreak of hostilities between the UN and the Katangan forces on 13 September last.

The breaking-off of communications between the two countries, however, did not affect representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, who were the only persons still able to make a daily return journey between Leopoldville and Brazzaville. (A.F.P.)

SECRET

*located*

No 1001/2/OPS

20 OCT 61

Chief of Staff

Chief of Military Operations

REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS

1 Consequent to the repatriation of the Irish Inf Group in early November, NYUNZU will be without a garrison. It is necessary at this stage to earmark a relief in order to avoid a similar situation as occurred during the Ghanaian repatriation.

2 During the hostilities in KATANGA, the area of KABALO, NYUNZU and NIEMBA were without incident. It appears that large number of gendarmerie had fled from their posts towards KANGOLO and into the bush. Subsequent recess and events have shown that the gendarmerie in this part are a broken force and unlikely to be a threat in any future outbreak of hostility. Besides the threat from ANC Stan and the antipathy of the local Balubas strengthen the position of any small garrison in these places.

3 In view of the above it is recommended that a Coy Gp of the 25th Eth Bn at KABALO be earmarked to replace the Irish Gp. The strength of our troops would then be :-

(a) KABALO - Bn HQ , HQ Coy and Coy 25 Eth Bn.

(b) NYUNZU - Coy gp 25 Eth Bn

(c) NIEMBA - Coy Swedish Bn XII

4 This would only be a stop gap measure, since it is recommended that the Coy of Ghanians arriving in late November be sent to NYUNZU. This will enable the Eth Coy gp to revert to its parent body at the earliest. Subsequently when the remainder of the Ghana Bn arrives, it be given the entire responsibility of the NYUNZU/NIEMBA area. This would release the Swedish Coy for E'VILLE, to rejoin its Bn, which would by then be due for repatriation, for Sweden.


.....2

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

- 5 This arrangement has the following great advantages :-
- (a) Provides for garrisoning of NYUNZU
  - (b) Involves a minimum move of troops
  - (c) Keeps adequate strength of troops in other provinces which have only a bare minimum and where any withdrawal would cause considerable problems of deployment.
  - (d) Logistical support unchanged
- 6 This is submitted for your perusal and decision.

  
Lt Col

---

( G S PAUL )

Chief of Military Operations

cc Force Commander.



SECRET

## ROUTING SLIP

TO MA TO FORCE COMMANDER

Elite 19694

APPROVAL	NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE	YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE	FOR ACTION

As discussed.

Clearance request  
through New York  
will be necessary.  
Plse advise

DATE

FROM

*Macli*



INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*File*

Oct 61

A: Force Commander  
DE: Deputy Force Commander  
OBJET: AIR LIFT

I have received a cable from my Home Government to send a plane to Ethiopia for air lift of 50 Quintal equipment (shoes for units and spare parts for the jets etc).

I shall, therefore, appreciate very much if you would authorize the despatch of a plane for the above mentioned air lift at your earliest convenience.

*Yacobi Salim Lind*

Maj Gen  
Deputy Force Commander

*Request sent to NY 26 Oct 61  
(16)*


4. At this juncture I would therefore ask for your direction - should we provide the necessary maintenance and pilot personnel to get this program underway. My personal opinion is that it would be a most worthwhile project - of benefit to all residents of Leopoldville.

5. I appreciate that specific agreements must be made with the Congolese to cover such items as:

(a) Expense - spares, fuel and oil, etc...

(b) Liabilities - aircraft accident, damage to public property.

In this regard I suggest we consult with Mr. Ahmed.

 7/c  
(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

HM:hd



ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

26 October 1961

A : Force Commander,  
De : Chief Administrative Officer,  
Air Commander,  
Objet : MOSQUITO SPRAYING - LEOPOLDVILLE AREA.

1. I was approached on 20 October 1961 by Dr. Falkland, Assistant Chief, WHO Advisory Team, with a request that we provide support in the manner of helicopter maintenance and pilotage to the Central Government in order to get a mosquito spraying program under way. Dr. Falkland was accompanied by the Senior Medical Officer of ONUC military headquarters.
2. During the discussion I was advised that a Congolese helicopter, suitably equipped with spraying equipment, was available at N'Dola airport. I, in turn, advised Dr. Falkland that on the presentation by him of suitable clearances from Congolese authorities I would undertake to have the helicopter engineering officer from N'Djili inspect the aircraft to determine its state of serviceability but that I could not proceed beyond that point without approval of higher authority.
3. On 23 October Dr. Fulkland, accompanied by a Congolese official from the Ministry of Health, arrived in my office with the required authorization. On Monday afternoon an examination of the aircraft was started and completed on Wednesday morning. It was found that the aircraft was in relatively good condition needing only a rotor clutch change. This spare part is available from Congolese resources. On completion of this work the aircraft will have 75 flying hours available before coming up for a periodic inspection.

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

General Rikhye

*Akbar*  
*Heuplader*  
*h*

*CAO*

Your concurrence .....( )  
See me, please .....( )  
Your signature .....( )  
Your approval .....( )  
Please note .....( )  
Your comments .....( )  
Your information .....( )  
For action .....( )  
Please return .....( )

REMARKS: I have been holding the attached memo from Morrison to discuss with you the overall position of the ONUC aircraft fleet with reference to our future plans. I suggest that we arrange a meeting with Morrison during your current visit so that the whole matter of aircraft strength may be thoroughly thrashed out.

DATE: 30 / 10 / 1961

FROM: S. Habib Ahmed

Chief Administrative Officer

*S. H. A.*  
*C. A. O.*

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

*File*


INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

AHQ/6301/4/ENG

24 October 1961

A : Mr. Habib S. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer,  
De : Air Commander,  
Objet : BEAVER AIRCRAFT - REPLACEMENT

1. The attached signal will indicate to you that the Beaver aircraft are approaching the 1200 hour inspection period somewhat earlier than what I forecasted in my letter to you on 14 July 1961. This can be attributed to the overall increase in air activity over the past two months. However, I am still of the opinion that the Beavers should not continue in operation in the Congo - disposal action should be taken as each one comes up to the 1200 hr inspection period.
2. When I wrote the first letter I hoped in view of the conditions existing at the time that I would be in position to advise you that a replacement aircraft for the Beaver would not be required. However, conditions have changed to such an extent that I now hold the view that a continuing requirement exists to maintain the light aircraft fleet at a total of eight. I consider the Otter aircraft to be suitable for the task and recommend that action be taken to provide four additional Otter aircraft coincident with the phase out of the Beavers. I would point out that such action will help to streamline our aircraft logistic pipeline by concentrating on one type of light aircraft.

  
(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

c.c. F/Commander.  
c.c. W/Commander A.J. Mackie.  
c.c. Col. G. Annerlov.

encl.  
HM:hd

NNNN

UC 006

CUL 003

SSS CUA

DE CUL 03/24

FM AIR OPS LULU

TO ONUC AIR OPS LEO

BT

UNCLAS AIR/OPS/56

BEAVER 403 TOTAL FLYING TIME 2397 HRS GROUNDED PENDING REPLACEMENT  
AS IT MAY NOT BE FLOWN MORE THAN 2400 HRS. BEAVER 404 2277 HRS WILL  
HAVE TO BE REPLACED IN ABOUT 6 WEEKS

BT

CTN 56 403 2397 2400 404 2277 6

24/0729Z OCT CUL

A-2

AHQ/6301/4/ENG


24 October

1

Mr. Habib S. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer,  
Air Commander,

BEAVER AIRCRAFT - REPLACEMENT

1. The attached signal will indicate to you that the Beaver aircraft are approaching the 1200 hour inspection period somewhat earlier than what I forecasted in my letter to you on 14 July 1961. This can be attributed to the overall increase in air activity over the past two months. However, I am still of the opinion that the Beavers should not continue in operation in the Congo - disposal action should be taken as each one comes up to the 1200 hr inspection period.
2. When I wrote the first letter I hoped in view of the conditions existing at the time that I would be in position to advise you that a replacement aircraft for the Beaver would not be required. However, conditions have changed to such an extent that I now hold the view that a continuing requirement exists to maintain the light aircraft fleet at a total of eight. I consider the Otter aircraft to be suitable for the task and recommend that action be taken to provide four additional Otter aircraft coincident with the phase out of the Beavers. I would point out that such action will help to streamline our aircraft logistic pipeline by concentrating on one type of light aircraft.

  
(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

→ c.c. F/Commander.  
c.c. W/Commander A.J. Mackie.  
c.c. Col. G. Annerlov.

encl.  
HM:hd

REPUBLIC OF CONGO  
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE  
HQ ANC

LEOPOLDVILLE 18 Oct 61

No 1033

To Lt General Mac Eoin  
ONUC Force Commander

SUBJECT : Airport of NDOLO  
REF : Your Memorandum dated 13 Oct 61

*File*

~~Dear~~ General,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note dated 13 October concerning the use of the Airport of NDOLO.

It is very difficult for me to give you satisfaction; the airport in question, being the only one at present the ANC can effectively dispose of, is occupied by our Air training school which strength and equipment is going to be strongly increased very shortly. The buildings there are occupied not only by the Congolese Airforce but also by a Company of Gendarmerie that I cannot at present move.

However, I fully appreciate the difficulties you are faced with at present and am ready to study the problem which solution might be facilitated if your services would on their side consider the possibility of putting the airport of KITONA at the disposal of the ANC and if I could be authorised to put there a Company who would thus be able to ensure the security of material and installations.

Hoping that this problem can be solved for the best of our common interest, please believe, General in the assurance of my high consideration.

MOBUTU

NNNN

UC 006

CUL 003

SSS CUA

DE CUL 03/24

FM AIR OPS LULU

TO ONUG AIR OPS LEO

BT

UNCLAS AIR/OPS/56

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BT

CFN 56 403 2397 2400 404 2277 6

24/0729Z OCT CUL

SRIANTA

Tagairt: CS 93


RANNÓG PHLEANANNA AGUS OIBRÍOCHT,  
CEANNCHEATHRÚ AN AIRM,  
GEATA NA PÁIRCE,  
BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH.

23 Deí Fóm, 61

PROVISIONAL OUTLINE PLAN OF AIR MOVEMENT OPERATIONS

Samhain/Nollaig 1961

1. Attached herewith please find copies of a PROVISIONAL Outline Plan of Air Movement Operations for Samhain/Nollaig 1961 which are issued for information and planning purposes.
2. This Plan is PROVISIONAL and timings, etc. are liable to alteration. Firm details will be issued later.



CORNAL

(C.E. Shortall)

STIÚRTHÓIR PLEANANNA AGUS OIBRÍOCHT.

IMDHÁIL

Cóip Uimhir

Cóip Uimhir

CF	2	OIC Ceann O	10
A Adn	5	OIC Ceann D	10
A Crn	5	OIC Ceann I	10
FC	2	OIC CTC	10
J P&O	5	Cft Col Mil	3
S Trn	5	OIC Aer-Chór	5
S Fais	5	OCSC	2
S Airt	5	OIC 4 Frith-Aer	3
S Mar	5	OIC 1 Gp Cois	3
S Inlr	5	OIC 35 Cn Cois	5
S Corí	5	OIC 36 Cn Cois	5
S Ord	5	Irish L.O. - ONUC	5
S S&I	5		
SCLA	5		
SPA & PM	5	Comhad	5

SRIANTA



SRIANTA

PROVISIONAL OUTLINE PLAN OF AIR MOVEMENTS : NOV/DEC 15

Rng P & O  
C C A  
20/10/61  
C.S. 93

- 1 Departure to Congo of 4 A.A. Bty and 36 Inf Bn
- 2 Repatriation from Congo to Ireland of 1 Inf Gp and 35 Inf Bn.

UNIT	ETD Ireland	Provisional Timings			No of personnel	Provisional Aircraft Loads (Type C.124) Personnel Weight (275 lbs.)	Cargo Weight	Total Weight	Max load (25,000 lbs.) No. of AC (C.124) required (11)	REMARKS
		ETA Congo	ETD Congo	ETA Ireland						
1 UNIT (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Advance Party 4 A.A. Bty	4/6 Nov 61	5/7 Nov 61	-	-	5 ALL Ranks	-	-	-	-	Commercial Flight
4 A.A. Bty	11/13 Nov 61	14/16 Nov 61	-	-	59 "	16,225 lbs	230,160 lbs	246,385 lbs	10	
1 Inf Gp.	-	-	15/17 Nov 61	17/19 Nov 61	334 "	91,850 lbs	20,000 lbs	110,850 lbs	5	Must be home before 23 Nov
Advance Party 36 Inf Bn.	21/22 Nov 61	24/25 Nov 61	-	-	50 "	13,750 lbs	11,000 lbs	24,750 lbs	1	
Advance Party 35 Inf Bn.	-	-	26/27 Nov 61	28/29 Nov 61	70 "	19,250 lbs	4,000 lbs	23,250 lbs	1	
36 Inf Bn	5/8 Dec 61	8/11 Dec 61	-	-	617 "	169,675 lbs	165,000 lbs (x)	334,675 lbs	14	
35 Inf Bn.	-	-	9/12 Dec 61	11/14 Dec 61	577 "	158,675 lbs	25,000 lbs	183,675 lbs	8	Must be home before 18 Dec

(x) Based on wt of eqpt sent with 35 Inf Bn plus one additional Armd C - less engr plant items : Incls 15,000 lbs additional arm if required.

SRIANTA

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 170/1

21 October 1961.

To: Force Commander  
From: Chief Logistics Officer

Subject: Aviation Gas - JP4

Info: Senior Supply and Transport Officer

1. Reference your instructions given verbally last evening, herewith the outlying information on the above subject:

- (a) JP4 aviation gas is at present stored in Port Francqui, to the amount of 994,000 litres. Arrangements with Soco-Petrol have been made whereby 2 tanks, each with a capacity of 50,000 litres have been put at the disposal of the United Nations. With the help of these two tanks this aviation gas will be transferred by Soco-Petrol from Port Francqui to Luluabourg, at the rate of 3 rail tankers per week. The capacity of each rail tanker is 38,000 litres, which means that Luluabourg will have a weekly supply of 114,000 litres.

12 cylindrical tanks of 500 gallon capacity have also been made available in Luluabourg. These tanks will be mounted on 3 Bedford trucks and will operate as bowsters from Luluabourg airport to Soco-Petrol installations to draw the daily requirements for the aircraft based in Luluabourg. Arrangements for refuelling have also been organised by means of two very good wheeled Swedish pumps. This will enable the jet fighters to be refuelled quickly and efficiently.

- (b) At present 800 drums of this aviation gas are available at N'Djili airport for airlift. 1,000 more such drums can also be made available to be airlifted wherever desired.

(N N MADAN) LT-COL  
Chief Logistics Officer

Will see Madan  
1200 Sunday.

11  
UNITED NATIONS



Free Command's  
NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS • UNATIONS NEWYORK • ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE

FILE NO.:

19 October 1961

Dear Sture,

I enclose herewith a copy of the Portuguese note of 18 October 1961, referring to the case of Robert Holden.

As I informed you in my cable of this date, the effect of the note is to revoke authorization for overflights of Angola by United Nations aircraft. As you will see from the final paragraph, the Portuguese consider the matter to be closed.

Sincerely yours,

C. V.

C. V. Narasimhan  
Under-Secretary for  
Special Political Affairs

Dr, Sture Linner  
Officer-in-Charge  
United Nations Mission  
in the Congo  
Leopoldville  
Republic of the Congo



MISSÃO PERMANENTE DE PORTUGAL  
JUNTO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS  
NEW YORK

October 18, 1961

Q-9  
59

The Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Secretariat and with reference to the latter's Note of 12th October 1961, has the honor to state the following in connection with instructions received from its Government:

The Portuguese Government registers that the Secretariat-General believes it possible, on one hand, to maintain and to insist on alleging ignorance of the previous activities of Mr. Holden, without, on the other hand, being able to deny the facts as indicated by the Portuguese Government, namely, the existence of a large file on that individual, his connections with the United Nations Headquarters in the Congo, his contacts with the Sub-Committee on Angola, and his access to areas of the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York barred to the public. Furthermore, the Note of the Secretariat-General, while stating that there was no United Nations official present who could have had any personal or official knowledge of the antecedents of Mr. Holden, implicitly admits that there are other officials who do in fact have such knowledge. The Portuguese Government is at a loss to reconcile the foregoing with the allegation reiterated in the above-mentioned Note.

The Portuguese Government expresses its thanks and registers with appreciation the information that rules governing travel of persons on United Nations aircraft are clear and

/unambiguous

MISSÃO PERMANENTE DE PORTUGAL  
JUNTO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS  
NEW YORK

- 3 -

Finally, the Portuguese Government informs the Council that, on its part, it sees no need to carry this discussion further and that it considers the matter closed, wishing only to stress its surprise that the Organization which is at the service of all its Member States and which has acknowledged being an impartial body did not have considered it necessary to express a neutral opinion.



P.J.M. Garvin  
Administrative  
Officer, WHO

Mr P.J. Hason, Chief  
General Services ONUC

19.10.61

PG/eg

**LIAISON BETWEEN LEOPOLDVILLE AND  
BRAZZAVILLE**

*Brazz*

With reference to the discussions we had by telephone yesterday, Wednesday 18 October, I should be glad if you would confirm in writing the decisions you have taken regarding the cancellation of the helicopter service and the cancellation of all liaison by PIMA motor launches from Leopoldville to Brazzaville and return.

I was advised about a month ago of the cable you sent to New York giving instructions that UN and Specialized Agency staff should be booked only by air carriers with scheduled flights into Leopoldville. However, I must point out that some personnel or their dependents are still arriving in Brazzaville. Our Reception Unit in Brazzaville is faced with the problem of having to meet passengers and not knowing what to do with them. It is therefore of utmost importance that we should have precise written instructions as to what procedure to adopt concerning passengers arriving in Brazzaville.

*Garvin*

Copy for information:

Chief Administrative Officer, ONUC  
Force Commander, ONUC ✓  
Mr Lidval, TRAVEL ONUC  
Mr Hornett, Chief AF, AFRO-Brazzaville  
Mr Meijer, Reception Unit, AFRO-Brazzaville

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

AHQ/6001/ADMIN

*Ad*

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

16th October 1961

A : Force Commander  
De : Air Commander  
Objet : AMENDMENT - ORGANISATION AIR COMMAND

1. Please refer to para 1 of this Headquarters letter No. AHQ/6001/ADMIN dated 13th October in which it was recommended that "The Headquarters UN Air Transport Force be renamed as the Headquarters, UN Air Force in the Congo".

2. It has now been decided by the United Nations, New York that this Headquarters should be renamed as the Headquarters, UN Air Division and NOT as the Headquarters UN Air Force in the Congo. It is therefore requested that changes be made accordingly in the 1st and 2nd paragraphs on your copy as well as on Appendix "A" of the above mentioned letter.

(S.G.H. Norstrom) Brigadier  
Deputy Air Commander  
For Air Commander

cc: Chief Administrative Officer  
Chief of Military Operations  
Chief Logistics Officer  
Chief of Personnel (Civilian)  
Chief Military Personnel

Aur

HELICOPTER SERVICE BETWEEN ROYAL (LEO) AND MAYA-MAYA (BRAZZA)

MONDAY, 18 Sept. Departure: 14 H. POUCH WHO + Mr. GUERDER (LOGEMENTS)  
Returns: General Galiacy (WHO)

---

THURSDAY, 21 SEPT. Departure: 14 H. POUCH WHO  
Returns: 1 Journalist (Sweden) + 1 Pilot INTEROCEAN

---

FRIDAY 22 SEPT. Departure: 14 H. POUCH (TRAVEL) (WHO) + Mr. FPENDO  
FINANCE

---

SATURDAY 23 SEPT. POUCH TRAVEL - WHO + M. GARDER + FOURNIER + MOUDIER  
+ Mme ARGOUT + GENERAL GALIACY + Mr. DIETSCHI  
+ Miss BOUNDA.

---

SUNDAY 24 SEPT. Departure: Mr. RIGBY + BERGMANS + DEVENGE + DIERCKS  
Returns: MM. ARGOUT + Mr. DIETSCHI + Mme BOUNDA

---

MONDAY 25 SEPT.: Departure: Mr. FERBECK WHO + Mr. LOUIS (OPI)  
Returns: Mr. FOURNIER + MOUDIER + ELLOUK (INTEROCEAN)  
+ MR. RIVALS (FAO)

---

TUESDAY 26 SEPT.: Departure: 12 H. TOMBELAINE (OPI) + ELLOUK + SOUCY  
(SEC.) + TAMBURINI + POUCH ~~WHO~~ GARDER +  
Returns: Mr. LOUIS (OPI) TAMBURINI + SOUCY -

---

WEDNESDAY 27 SEPT: Departure:  
Returns: POUCH (WHO) + MEDICAMENTS WHO +  
Mr. OCONNOR (OPI) ROYER + BOOKER  
(Statisticians)

---

THURSDAY 28 SEPT. Departure: M. BEJOT (WHO)  
Returns:

---

FRIDAY 29 SEPT. Departure: KAUFMAN + GARDER + RIVALS (FAO)  
ROOZIANKO + BOOKER + ROYERS + HULTEN  
Returns: FERBECK (WHO) + BEJOT + KAUFMAN

---

SATURDAY 30 SEPT. Departure: FOURNIER (P.W.) + MOUTIER (F.R.) + VIEKA (F.R.)  
+ MOUGNEAU (FIN) + BEATON (FIN) + FRUCHTER  
+ ARGOUT  
Returns: FRUCHTER + FRANK HOUSE + CORNELIUS  
(INTEROCEAN)

---



---

SUNDAY 1st OCTOBER: Departure:  
Returns: MLL MOUGNEAU + BEATON + ARGOUT +  
MM. GRANDCHAMPS (STAN)

---

MONDAY 2 OCTOBER: Departure: KAUFMAN (2 children)  
Returns: MOUTIER + FOURNIER + GARDER

---

TUESDAY 3 OCTOBER: Departure: BACKMAN + SULLINGER (ALL SWISS  
RED CROSS) + CAPT. IVERSEN  
Returns: BOOKER + ROYER (STATISTICIENS)  
+ KAHN + AXELSSON + DR. AUJOULA (WHO)

---

WEDNESDAY 4 OCTOBER: Departure: Philippe de GAIGNERON + KAPLAN  
Returns: Dr. KIVITS + Dr. DEVENGE +  
MM. DELLILLE + Dr. DIERCK +  
BISETSA (ON)

---

THURSDAY 5 OCTOBER Departure: Mr. KNECHT + Mr. DE REYNIER (EMS)  
+ RIVALS (FAO)  
Extra: 16 H. = Col. BARBER + BLANCHARD  
Returns: LUNDIN + PEPSSON (INVESTIGATION  
COMMITTEE NDOLA AIRCRACH)

---

FRIDAY 6 OCTOBER: Departure: GROSSEN + SARMAN (Civ. Ops.) +  
BERAUD (Civ. Adm.) + Mr. JENGER  
(UNESCO)  
Returns: POUCH + DUPIN DE BEYSSAT

---

SATURDAY 7 OCTOBER Departure: (FAO) Mr. PRIETO + MM. PRIETO  
+ MR. SANCH (INTEROCEAN)  
Returns: Mme PIGAUD + Mr. PIGAUD ( Junior)

---

SUNDAY 8 OCTOBER Departure:  
Returns: Mr. WILLIAM + ENSTIPP ( INTEROCEAN)  
Mr. PRIETO + Mme PRIETO + M.SULLIGER  
+ Mr. BACHMAN (Svissled cross) +  
ANTONE (FORD)

---

MONDAY 9 OCTOBER Departure: CAPT HAMMARKRANS +  
Returns: Mr. SANCHI + PAAB (INTEROCEAN)  
+ SABATER (UNESCO)

---

TUESDAY 10 OCTOBER Departure: CANOUS + GOURMAY ( Ass. technique)  
+ GALLAI (UNESCO) + POUCH +  
Returns: K. RAYES + DELANY (UNESCO) + POUCH

---

WEDNESDAY 11 OCTOBER: Departure: \_  
Returns: = M. DENISOT (PX) + CORNELIS  
(INTEROCEAN) + GALLAI + 150 kilog.  
materiel scolaire.

---

THURSDAY 12 OCTOBER DEPARTURE= Mr. FOURNIER (KAO) VESSE  
(Ass. Technique)  
Returns: = MM. SAMAHA + 3 children + baggages  
+ Mr. SAMAHA + 120 kilog. Bagages

---

FRIDAY 13 OCTOBER: Departure= Mr. SOUSSOU (Fin) + James Brenen (Fin)  
Return = Mr. Max Wilde + Miss SIMMONDS  
(Civ. Ops)

---

SATURDAY 14 OCTOBER Departure  
Returns: Mr. CARVIN (OMS)

---

SUNDAY 15 OCTOBER: Departure:  
Returns: INTEROCEAN

---

To : See Distribution  
From : Air Commander  
Subject : PROGRESS REPORT No. 7/8 COVERING JULY/AUGUST 1961.

*Avk  
Progress  
Report*

A. SUMMARY:

1. During July/August UNATF operations present decreasing figures according to June.
2. Flying hours decreased from 5,564 in June to 4,735 in July and 5,437 in August.
3. The total load airlifted in July/August (June) was:

(a) Freight	3,024,250/3,353,865	(7,064,904) Lbs.
(b) Passenger (troops)	9,185/8,277	( 9,575) .
(c) Vehicles	52/124	( 153) .
4. On external airlift during July Ghanian and Malian troops were rotated - a total of 3,146 personnel.

The repatriation of the Tunisian troops started during the last week of July and up to the 31st of July. 1,241 men were repatriated. Ten of the flights were performed by temporarily chartered aircrafts totalling 200 hours (not included under point 2 above).

During August the repatriation of the Tunisian troops was completed. Repatriated were 1,748 personnel of which 1,450 were airlifted by temporarily chartered aircraft.

5. There were no accidents in July. On the 27th of August UN helicopter No. 929 crashed 30 miles south of Luluabourg. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. There were no injuries to the crew.

To : See Distribution  
From : Air Commander  
Subject : PROGRESS REPORT No. 7/8 COVERING JULY/AUGUST 1961.

*Avk*  
*Progress*  
*Report*

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B. AIR OPERATIONS

6. Hours Flown, Aircraft Status, etc.

Type of a/c	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	a/c numbers Jul/Aug	Engine Changes Jul/Aug	Major Inspection
C.119	535	480	521	535	471	457	243	462	6/6	2/1	-
C. 47	435	470	940	958	795	817	806	968	19/19	1/1	-
Otter/Beaver	170	242	295	330	468	394	372	360	8/8	1/2	-
Helicopters	360	142	313	372	365	302	253	319	17/14	2/2	-
	1490	1334	2069	2195	2099	1970	1674	2109	50/47		-

Charter a/c 1940 1350 2494 3664 3440 3594 3061 3328 23/24

Grand total 3430 2684 4563 5859 5539 5564 4735 5437 73/71

Remarks:

1) During July/August, the following civil aircraft operated and flew as per the hours indicated:

Sabena	:	5 DC-4/5 DC-4	732/745
Interocean	:	7 DC-4/7 DC-4	945/1101
Panama	:	3 DC-4/3 DC-4	478/420
		6 C-46/6 C-46	523/649
Trans Air	:	2 C-46/2 C-46	383/286
		- /1 DC-6	<del>427</del> /127

7. Flying Analysis - Charter Aircraft

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>
Average a/c Strength:	18	24	23	17.4	19	21
Average daily flying:	11(61%)	15(59%)	13(59%)	13(52%)	12(52.2%)	12(50%)
Average daily maintenance:	3(17%)	6.5(62%)	7.6(34%)	7.6(30.4%)	4(17.4%)	3(12.5%)
Average service-able but not flying:	4(22%)	2.5(12%)	1.4(7%)	4.4(17.6%)	7(30.4%)	9(37.5%)
Average monthly flying hours per a/c:	-	-	-	144	133	139

C. AIR ADMINISTRATION

8. Total air personnel by nationality effective 31st July/31st August 1961 are shown below:

Argentine	24/24
Brazil	44(i)/35 (i) 10 are replacements
Canada	14/14
Denmark	5/5
Ethiopia	4/2
Ghana	1/1
Greece	25/25
India	45/45
Italy	65/73
Norway	51/55(ii) (ii) 1 is replacement
Sweden	86/81

.... /4

9. The establishment of the UN Air Transport Organization in the Congo as of 1st July/1st August consisted of 423/422 posts. In addition, there were 36 persons working for ONUC Air Transport Organization who were not accounted for in the above establishment.
10. Personnel vacancies in the Helicopter Squadron will still seriously influence its ability to operate in the future. Norway has agreed to conversion courses for Scandinavian helicopter pilots in Germany as mentioned in Progress Report No. 6.
11. Medical: Overall health conditions have been satisfactory.

D. AIR ENGINEERING

12. General: The aircraft serviceability rate during the months is shown by a/c type:  
July : C.47 - 65%; C.119 - 75%; Helicopters - 59%; Light aircraft - 72%.  
August : C.47 - 70%; C.119 - 76%; Helicopters - 59%; Light aircraft - 71%.
13. Supply Support: Logistics support for aircraft has remained about the same during July/August. The flow of supplies does not correspond to the maintenance requirements. Consequently, AOCs appear with frequency, rather than by the exception, which in turn results in cannibalization of aircraft which again is waste of manpower. The supply at N'Djili is hampered by mainly:  
a) lack of adequate personnel; b) poor warehousing space; c) supply section is for a great deal occupied to satisfy other needs than aircraft needs.
14. C-119s  
  
The serviceability of the aircraft is extremely good but as flying hours show, the aircraft could have flown more in July which again would affect the serviceability rate. In August it was flown 461 hours which is above average.
15. C-47

The serviceability of the C-47 has shown improvement since the last month and if trend continues will be soon satisfactory. All C-47 aircraft except 212-214-215 have gone through periodical inspections once since their arrival in the Congo and resulting in an improvement on the serviceability rate. Many big repairs or checks which needed big dismantling have been carried out during the first inspection. Completion of this necessary work will show up as improvement on the serviceability rate. The squadron serviceability is still very much hampered, partly due to unknown modification

status and thereby not interchangeability of parts from one aircraft to another.

16. Light Aircraft

This aircraft's serviceability rate is very good. The Otter has had three engine changes during July/August. The reason is big oil consumption. This is the third engine changed for that reason and the matter is under investigation. It is decided to make a 1200 hours inspection at Sabena and the first one is scheduled to be ready for 1200 hours inspection in September/October.

17. Helicopters

The supply of parts and engines for H.19 aircraft becomes more and more difficult as predicted in Administrative Report No. 24 from Pisa. The H-13, 2 in order and one in pieces, has been decided upon to be returned to Europe. The flying with the Alouette is stopped and the aircraft will be disposed of as soon as it is in flyable status.

18. Supply Situation

The supply of parts for aircraft is not showing any improvement since June. Outstanding AOCF and other priority requisitions decreased from 60 by the end of July to 50 by the end of August. By renewing requisitions and cancellation, we will be able to bring this figure down by next report.

E. UN AIR TRANSPORT BASE, NIDIOLI

19. Aircraft Serviceability 31st July/31st August

<u>Type of a/c</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>
C-47	11/12	8/2
C-119	5/4	1/2
Otter	3/3	1/1
Beaver	4/4	0/0
Bell H.13	1/1	1/1
Sikorsky H.19	10/2	4/8
Alouette A-51	0/0	1/1



20. Detachments 31st July/31st August

	<u>C-47 Sqn.</u>	<u>C-119 Sqn.</u>	<u>Light a/c Sqn.</u>	<u>Heli. Sqn.</u>
Albertville	1/1 C-47		1/1 Otter, 1/1 Beaver	4/4 H-19
Elisabethville	3/2 " "		-	3/3 H-19
Luluabourg	-/1 " "	No detachment	1/1 Otter, 2/2 Beaver	4/4 H-19
Stanleyville	-/1 " "		-	-
Kindu	1/1 " "		-	-
Kamina	1/1 " "		-	-
Bukavu	1/1 " "		1/1 Otter	-

21. C-47 Squadron

5 Argentinian and 5 Brazilian aircrew arrived during July in replacement for those repatriated. Although there is a lack of certain special tools, the serviceability has increased from 51 to 65 approximately. This improvement is probably the result of the personnel having gained more experience.

22. C-119 Squadron

Owing to fewer request for air transport the flying time was only 243 hours for the month of July against 457 in June, but in August the flying hours increased again to 462 which is above average. The serviceability rate at present is good.

23. Light Aircraft Squadron

The requirements for light aircraft in the various areas seem to be decreasing and during the last months there has been a slow but steady reduction in flying time (May 468, June 394, July 372 and August 360 hours). The personnel is up to establishment and the Squadron has no serious technical problems except for 3 engine changes due to high oil consumption.

24. Helicopter Squadron

The main problem of this Squadron is lack of personnel. There are 68 positions on the establishment, 35 of which are vacant. 4 new pilots were posted to the Squadron during July without experience on H-19 helicopters. Training of these pilots has continued until the end of August. The pilots are now fully qualified on H-19s. UN Helicopter No. 529 crashed on 27th August at South Luluabourg and must be considered as a total loss. Special report on the accident is under preparation.

The H-13s were returned to USAF 31st August to be shipped back to Germany.

Capt. B. Warnbrink took over the command of the Helicopter Squadron 27th August after Captain P. Selin who was repatriated to Sweden.

25. The supply section is at present able to provide tools and spare parts within a reasonable time after units have submitted requisitions. The new location of the Supply Section has proved very satisfactory.
26. All serviceable and repairable parts of aircraft C-47 UN/203 that crashed at Tshikapa, as reported in progress report for June 1961, have been brought to N'Djili and the aircraft will be written off as "damaged beyond repair".
27. To take care of the C-119 which crashlanded at Kwamouth a salvage team was organized by the end of August and will start work at the beginning of September.
28. Base Operations Wing

The demand of a number of motor transport vehicles which is much below establishment remains. As reported earlier the base must have two ambulances with all first aid equipment. This is important as there are no other first aid facilities at the Base. At Kamina Airbase the fire tender is still unserviceable and the base is still lacking modern fire fighting equipment.

It is important that an efficient guard and a Military Police Detachment are assigned to Base Operations.

  
(H. A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

Force Commander	1	UN HQ, New York	6
COS	1	Chief Air Eng. Officer	2
DCOS	1	Base Commander N'Djili	25
Air Commander	1	Movement Control	1
Deputy Air Commander	2	ICAO Mission	2
Chief Air Operations Officer	2	Charter Companies	8
Air Info and Stat Officer	2	Chief Admin. Officer	6
Chief Air Administrative Officer	6		

13 octobre 1.

Monsieur le Général J. Mobutu  
Lt-Général Sean Mac Eoin

Aéroport de NDOLA.

Je me vois encore une fois dans l'obligation de faire appel à votre collaboration.

Comme vous le savez, nous avons dernièrement augmenté notre force aérienne à laquelle s'ajoutent maintenant des avions de chasse à réaction indiens, éthiopiens et suédois, ainsi que des avions de transport provenant de différents pays. Il en résulte que l'aérodrome à N'Djili souffre actuellement d'un gros encombrement et je vous serais en conséquence obligé de bien vouloir nous laisser utiliser provisoirement une partie de l'aéroport de NDOLA. Nous avons envisagé plusieurs alternatives telles que celle d'une dérivation du surplus sur Kitona, mais cette solution n'a pas été satisfaisante.

Je tiens à appuyer sur le fait que nous n'avons besoin d'utiliser qu'une toute petite partie de l'aérodrome et je veillerai à ce que notre personnel cause le moins de gêne possible au personnel de l'aéroport.

Pour des raisons de sécurité, il me faut aussi vous demander de bien vouloir accepter qu'un détachement de police nigérienne soit stationnée provisoirement à NDOLA, en vue d'y assurer la sécurité des avions et du matériel des Nations Unies.

Nous avons l'assurance que Monsieur le Premier Ministre ne formule aucune objection à ce que nous utilisions provisoirement une partie de l'aéroport de NDOLA et j'aimerais encore insister sur le fait que ce ne sera que momentanément et pour la plus courte période de temps possible.

En vous remerciant à l'avance, veuillez agréer l'assurance de ma plus haute considération.

*Sean Mac Eoin*  
Lt-Général  
(Sean Mac Eoin)  
Commandant des Forces de l'ONU

Monsieur le Général J. Mobutu  
Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Nationale Congolaise  
LEOPOLDVILLE.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
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BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

13 October 1961

A : General Mobutu  
De : General Mac Eoin  
Objet :

NDOLA AIRPORT

I again have to make a demand on your cooperation.

*add aircraft*  
~~For reasons well known to you~~ NDJILI airport has become  
*in consequence* congested, and therefore I request permission to use, temporarily,  
part of NDOLA airport. We have considered alternative  
solutions, e.g., using Kitona for the overflow, but this has  
been found to be an unsatisfactory solution.

I would like to stress that it is our intention to use only  
the barest minimum area of the airport for our requirements and  
I will see that our personnel encroach as little as possible on  
others there.

For security reasons I must also request you allow a detachment  
of Nigerian Police to be stationed at NDOLA temporarily. Their  
function will be to ensure the security of UN stores and aircraft.

We have been assured that the Prime Minister has no objection  
to our temporary use of part of NDOLA and I again want to stress  
the fact that this will be only for the shortest possible time.

Assuring you of my highest esteem, etc.

General

(Sean Mac Eoin)

We have recently, as you  
are aware greatly increased  
our AIR FORCE by the  
addition of jet ~~aircraft~~ fighters  
from India Ethiopia and Sweden  
and transport aircraft from many



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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

**SECRET**  
AHQ/6204/OPS

11 October 1961

A : Mr. S.H. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer  
De : Air Commander  
Objet : STANDARDS of MAINTENANCE and OPERATIONS - CHARTER AIRCRAFT.

1. Since my arrival I have been most concerned over reportedly low maintenance standards and operating techniques of some of the Charter Companies presently under contract to the UN. As you know I have written to all companies demanding that their operating standards be revised to an acceptable level. These letters have had some affect but I still continue to hear, far too frequently, of unsafe maintenance practices, flights made without proper number of crew on board etc.. The implications of an accident which could be traced to any such cause should not be underestimated.
2. I therefore strongly recommend that you request Field Service authorities to obtain the services of suitably qualified inspectors to carry out a detailed inspection of the companies in question. Those that do not meet accepted ICAO standards should be replaced by reputable operators. In addition it should be standard practice for the UN hiring authority to substantiate the validity of certificates of air worthiness and pilot qualifications before completing contractual action.
3. I would appreciate your early action on this matter.

  
(H. A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

c.c. Force Commander  
Chief Air Operations.

HM:hd

*File*  
*11/10*

11 October

1

To : Mr. J.P.Fournier  
From : S. Habib Ahmad, Chief Administrative Officer  
Subject : Staffing requirements for Elisabethville

1. I am writing with reference to your memo Ref 1301-1/E'ville Folio 350 dated 9 October, concerning the additional personnel required for the E'ville airport.

2. In view of the necessity and urgency of providing the additional personnel in the interests of safe and efficient operation of the E'ville airport for ONUC aircrafts it is agreed that the additional staff proposed by you should be recruited. Both Mr. Linner and General Mac Eoin are anxious that the safety of ONUC personnel and aircraft at the E'ville airport should be ensured.

3. I should be grateful if you will take necessary action through ICAO to undertake the recruitment of the additional staff in reference. The cost of this staff will be chargeable to the ONUC account. When advising ICAO please request them to channel the recruitment of this staff through the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

cc: General S. Mac Eoin, Force Commander ✓  
Mr. G. Dumontet, Officer-in-Charge, Civilian Operations  
Mr. J. McLean, Executive Officer, Congo Fund  
Miss N. Osborne, Chief of Civilian Personnel

ROUGH TRANSLATION

LEOPOLDVILLE 10 October 61

*Ack  
N'Dola*

~~His Excellency~~, Sir,

With reference to the discussions held on the 8 and 9 October between your Excellency and Mr. Dumontet, Acting Chief of ONUC Civilian Operations, I have the honour to confirm the arrangements which received your approval concerning:

- 1) the temporary and partial utilisation of N'Dola airport with a view to relieve congestion at the Airport of N'Djili for the reasons that you know of;
- 2) the relief move of the Nigerian Police troops at Matadi.

As far as the first point is concerned, it boils down to a derivation of the air traffic for middle type aircraft and as it has been brought to your knowledge to the presence of troops limited to a platoon for security aims.

As to the relief of the Nigerian Policemen in Matadi, it is a question of merely replacing the one hundred men composing the group of the Nigerian Policement now in service by a group of policemen of the same number, the same nationality, in the same conditions and enjoying the same liberty of movement.

I gather from the conversations that were exchanged that General Mobutu is aware of these two operations and that as far as the plan of execution is concerned, the Force Commander's office is to contact General Mobutu's Headquarters.

Assurance of high consideration, etc.

Sture Linner  
Chargé de mission  
ONUC

Mr. Cyrille ADJOLA  
Prime Minister  
Leopoldville

Copy for  
Galt Mac Eoin

Leopoldville, 10 octobre 1961

Excellence,

Me référant aux conversations que M. Dumontet, Chef des opérations civiles par intérim a eues avec votre Excellence les 8 et 9 octobre, j'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer les arrangements qui ont reçu votre approbation concernant :

- 1) l'utilisation temporaire et partielle de l'aéroport de Ndola de façon à décongestionner l'aéroport de N'Djili pour les raisons que vous savez;
- 2) le mouvement de relève des policiers nigériens à Matadi.

Concernant le premier point, il s'agit d'une dérivation du trafic aérien pour des avions de type moyen et, comme il a été porté à votre connaissance, d'une présence de troupes limitées à un peloton aux fins de sécurité.

Quant à la relève des policiers nigériens à Matadi, il s'agit de remplacer la centaine d'hommes composant le groupe de policiers nigériens actuellement en service par un groupe de policiers du même nombre, de la même nationalité, dans les mêmes conditions et ayant la même liberté de mouvement.

.../...

Son Excellence  
Gyrlle Adoula  
Premier Ministre  
de la République du Congo  
Leopoldville



- 2 -

Je comprends d'après les conversations qui ont eu lieu que le Général Mobutu est au courant de ces deux opérations, et que sur le plan de l'exécution c'est avec l'Etat major du Général Mobutu que doivent se mettre en contact les services du Général Mo Eoin.

Veuillez croire, Excellence, à l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Sture Linner  
Chargé de mission  
des Nations Unies  
au Congo

*AK*

9 October 1

Air Commander  
Force Commander  
Operational Use of Aircraft

1. I have read your submission of even date concerning the above.
2. I am in full agreement with the suggestions you make and would be glad if you will put them into operation forthwith.

*Signed 9/10/61*  

---

(Sean McEoin) Lt. Gen.  
Force Commander

*Passed to Air Commander  
on 18/10/61.*

*[Signature]*

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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*Auk*

Ref. : 1301-1/E'ville  
Folio : 350

9 October 1961

To : Lt-General Mc Eoin, Force Commander ONUC  
cc : UN Air Commander  
cc : Mr. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer  
From : J.P. Fournier, Chief ICAO TA Mission, Congo  
Subject : Elisabethville Airport

*J.P. Fournier*

May I refer to the meeting held in your office on Saturday, 7 October, regarding personnel requirements for the operation of essential ground services to aviation at Elisabethville Airport.

While the Air Commander and the Chief of ICAO Mission can easily come to an understanding regarding the division of responsibility for the emergency operation at this airport (and this has already been done successfully as far as we are concerned), I consider important that we should have an outline of policy concerning Elisabethville Airport so that the various agencies concerned can plan in accordance with known or anticipated requirements. What we must really know without delay is whether the airport is to be operated through the Central Government Directorate of Civil Aviation (such as N'Djili) or under the direct control of the United Nations (like Kamina). I am sure you will appreciate this is a rather vital point as far as budgetary considerations are concerned.

If the airport is to be operated through the Central Government Directorate of Civil Aviation under the heading of "Technical Assistance", we can anticipate quite a number of difficulties and it will be some time before we can reach a degree of efficiency compatible with even the basic principles of air safety. On the other hand, if it becomes a UN operation, we can move pretty quickly and all we need to recruit expert personnel is the official approval of the Chief Administrative Officer.

For the safe and efficient operation of essential ground services to aviation at Elisabethville Airport, the ICAO Mission would be prepared to recruit the following personnel :



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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

196.....

- 2 -

- 1 Airport Manager
- 1 Chief Air Traffic Control
- 5 Air Traffic Controllers
- 4 Radio Operators
- 2 Radio Technicians
- 1 Teletype Mechanic
- 1 Electrician
- 1 Diesel Mechanic
- 1 Fire Chief.

May I bring to your attention that the financial implication of this activity will require the availability of approximately \$250,000.00 (US) per annum.

*Please pass to Mr. Coe for info.  
Mr. Ahmelt is now dealing with  
the recruitment of the technicians  
referred to above.*

*Sue  
10/10*

Oslo, 5 October 1961

Commander-in-Chief  
of the Air Force

Lt. Col. L. Lovestad  
UN Forces  
NORCO  
Congo

(Hello, Lovestad)

Visit to the Norwegian Contingent in the Congo

It has now been decided that the Rt. Hon. Mr. Harlem and I are to visit the Congo at the end of October and the beginning of November. The question has been discussed with the United Nations and they agree provided nothing unforeseen happens in the meantime.

The Minister and I are to travel by different routes:

I shall be leaving Oslo by SCANAP on 26 October, arriving at Pisa on 27 October. Departure from Pisa by North Star on 30 October at 1600 hours, arriving at Leopoldville on 31 October at 1300 hours.

The Rt. Hon. Mr. Harlem will be leaving Oslo for Brussels on 31 October at 1125 hours, proceeding from Brussels at 1900 hours, and arriving at Leopoldville on 1 November at 0505 hours.

We shall be staying in Leopoldville for about one week as agreed, as I suppose a week will be necessary for us to meet most of our people.

For our return trip we may have to consider whether to go by commercial or by military flight, depending on which is more suitable. I have previously asked you to look into the possibilities of getting transportation via Lake Victoria and along the Nile to Cairo if this fits into our schedule. Please examine other possibilities as well so that on our arrival at Leopoldville we may have a general picture of the various possibilities for our return trip.

I shall appreciate it if you would let me know what we should take with us for our stay in the Congo.

(Best regards)

(signed) Odd Bull

No. 1001/15/ops

6 October

1


Air Commander  
Chief of Staff

SECURITY AT N'DJILI AIRPORT

*Adm*

Reference your AHQ/6012/1/Adm dated 30 September 61.

1. HQ Leo Command have arranged that vigorous patrolling is carried out by the units stationed at the airport. These patrols go round the airport at two hourly intervals and keep in contact with the Ethiopian Guards at the fighter jets.
2. It is not practical to post guards near all UN aircraft owing to a lack of troops.
3. The Provost Marshall is in direct contact with the Base Commander at N'Djili and working out details regarding the strength and functioning of an MP Detachment.

 Colonel  
(James J QUINN)  
Chief of Staff

cc Force Comdr ✓  
HQ Leo Comd

*Adh*

5 October 1961

STATEMENT BY LT-GEN SEAN MAC EGIN, COMMANDER UN FORCES  
IN THE CONGO, TO THE BOARD OF ENQUIRY ON ACCIDENT SE-BDY

With some members of my staff I took off from N'Djili Airport in the DC-6, used subsequently by Mr Hammarskjöld, at 2145Z on 16 Sep 61, arriving Elisabethville at 0320Z 17 Sep 61.

During the flight the aeroplane flew without lights and observed radio silence. It flew a direct course from N'Djili to Elisabethville. On arrival over Elisabethville the Captain of the aircraft was in some doubt as to the airfield he had spotted as there are two airfields near Elisabethville. After circling for some minutes he decided, using his landing lights, to fly over the airfield which was marked by runway gooseneck flares only. He identified some of the aircraft on the ground as ONUC planes. He immediately flew out, turned and landed. This landing was carried out with particular skill.

Due to the fact that we regarded the airfield at Elisabethville insecure because of the bombing and strafing attacks being made by the Katangese Fuga jet, I decided to ~~return~~ the DC-6 to Leopoldville. It took off from Elisabethville for Leopoldville at 0350Z on 17 Sep.

During the forenoon of 17 Sep I learned in Elisabethville by telex from Leopoldville that the aircraft had been struck by fire from the ground on leaving Elisabethville. I was informed that the damage was slight and that the aircraft would be serviceable by the evening of 17 Sep.

The Captain and crew of this aircraft had impressed me greatly during the time I knew them. Insofar

.../-

as I may be competent to judge, I regarded them as a highly skillful and highly efficient crew.

(Sean Mac Eoin) Lt-Gen



# ROUTING SLIP

Major O'Brien

APPROVAL	NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE	YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE	FOR ACTION

Thank you

I have sent to you (General's office)  
 copy of Dr. Linner's  
 letter to M. Aboula  
 concerning y Ndoba and y  
 Meladi.

DATE

10/10/61

FROM

fg — let

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
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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

5 October 1961

A : Force Commander,  
De : Air Commander,  
Objet : N'DOLA AIRPORT.

1. Before I can take any positive action to move DC3, light aircraft and helicopters to N'Dola it will be necessary to obtain permission from Congolese authorities. This is somewhat beyond my field of influence and I would request that you obtain such authority for me.
2. If, in addition, to obtaining parking space, authority is granted for me to make use of one of the hangars essential maintenance facilities can be shifted from N'Djili. This will help to provide an effective servicing element which will be necessary if any sort of reliable service is to be achieved. UN troops will be required to provide necessary security for aircraft and material.

  
(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
Air Commander.

HM:hd

M.

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*Handwritten initials*

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

5 October 1961

A : Force Commander,  
De : Chief Administrative Officer,  
Air Commander,  
Objet : VISIT REPORT - ELIZABETHVILLE AIRPORT.

1. Attached find a brief report on my recent trip to E'ville airport.

*Handwritten signature of H.A. Morrison*  
(H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
Air Commander.

HAM:hd

encl.

ELIZABETHVILLE

INSPECTION of AIRPORT and FACILITIES by AIR COMMANDER  
on 30 September 1961

- (1) All workshops and control tower facilities were looked at. Briefly it can be described as a mess. Personnel, identity undetermined by me, have circulated through workshop facilities in uncontrolled numbers, upsetting and turning inside out a large percentage of items that were moveable. The extent of pilfering (if any) or permanent damage was impossible to estimate. The air traffic control equipment has been kept in operating condition by superhuman efforts of ICAO personnel. All other normal services that are required for efficient movement of Air traffic of course are non existent. (Weather briefing facilities, flight planning etc..). Movement control personnel although far to few in number have managed to get two fuel tenders back into operation and have full knowledge of contents of fuel dumps. Equipment such as fork lifts aircraft towing mules, have been abused to such an extent that it is almost all unserviceable and will require skilled workmen to put it back in operation. I took a quick look into large offices which were used by immigration and customs personnel. The vandalism that has taken place is most disturbing, trunks, mail bags, etc.. burst open and with contents widely scattered.
- (2) The above paragraph describes a situation which is undoubtedly serious and one that can be made much of by many parties. The real problem however in so far as the Air Force is concerned lies in the fact that all normal services have come to a halt

and without the necessary expert control and maintenance will continue to deteriorate rapidly. Where we obtain such a staff to replace those who were run-off I do not know - certainly they are not available within the Air Force.

- (3) The present situation for handling aircraft at E'ville requires immediate study and support by those responsible at this headquarters. Virtually nothing has been done since the Katanga flare-up to bolster the personnel situation in the Movement Control Detachment (the same situation prevails at Kamina). Personnel at both places are required to handle large numbers of aircraft each day. A staff visit by a vigorous officer from Movement Control is essential and long overdue.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

On assumption that existing conditions at E'ville continue i.e. UN will remain responsible for airport and its facilities for foreseeable future the following recommendations are made:

- (a) Action by UN to immediately obtain qualified management personnel and technicians for airport.
- (b) Troops on location be used (under competent direction) to clean up the mess and restore a state of orderliness to buildings and contents.
- (c) That Movement Control Detachment be bolstered and recognized as vital part of Air Detachment. HQ Katanga be ordered to provide additional manpower during peak periods.

5 October 1961

Folio : 333

5 October

1

To : Mr. G. Dumontet, Chief Civilian Operations, ONUC  
cc : UNOC Supreme Commander  
cc : UNOC Air Commander  
From : G. Pêche, Acting Chief ICAO TA Mission, Congo

....

Enclosed please find copies of cables exchanged between the Commanding Officer of Kamina Base and ICAO Mission, Leo.

After inquiry, it would appear that Mr. Kiernan, OIC/ICAO Kamina, had somehow influenced the Commanding Officer of the Base.

Since then, the members of the ICAO team at Kamina were recalled to Leo for a few days rest.

*G. Pêche*

[C O P Y]

"FM COMMANDING OFFICER KAMINA BASE  
TO UN SUPREME AIR COMMANDER LEO  
BT

UNCLAS. THIS AIRPORT IS OPERATING UNDER MILITARY JURISDICTION.  
MR. J.C. KIERNAN OF ICAO HAS BEEN APPOINTED BY ME TO UNDERTAKE  
THE OPERATION OF THE AIRFILED AND COMMUNICATIONS OF ICAO.  
MR. KIERNAN IS AT LIBERTY TO UTILISE AT HIS DISCRETION STAFF  
REQUIREMENTS AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES PLEASE ADVISE MR. PECHE  
ICAO HQ IMMEDIATELY THAT MR. KIERNAN WILL ADVISE MR. PECHE  
WHEN CHANGES OF STAFF ARE REQUIRED AND THE NUMBERS REQUIRED  
UNTIL THIS EMERGENCY IS AT AN END PLEASE ACTION IMMEDIATELY"

(Monday 25 September, 1200 local)

[C O P Y]

COMMANDING OFFICER - KAMINA BASE

INFORMATION TO UN REP - KAMINA

" " " KIERNAN - OIC - ICAO - KAMINA

**L48 - FROM PECHE ACTING CHIEF ICAO STOP FIRST ROTATION OF  
ICAO STAFF KAMINA NOT UNDER YOUR JURISDICTION THIS  
STAFF UNDER YOUR PROTECTION STOP SECOND KIERNAN ~~and~~  
SYLVAIN AND RODGERSON MEMBERS OF ICAO MISSION CONGO  
ARE ORDERED BACK TO LEOPOLDVILLE FOR APPROX ONE  
WEEK REST STOP THIRD THIS TRANSFER EFFECTIVE AFTER RELIEF  
TEAM ARRIVES STOP FOURTH RELIEF TEAM TO BE EMPLOYED IN  
RESPECTIVE SPECIALITIES ONLY AND ARE BRIEFED ACCORDINGLY  
END**

Copy for information to :

cc; UN Supreme Commander ONUC  
UN Air Commander  
Chief Civilian Operations ONUC

25 Sept. 61



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UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

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*See*

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

S E C R E T

2 October 1961


A : Force Commander,  
De : Air Commander,  
Objet : Fighter Aircraft - Strength.

*Att. [unclear]*

1. We are presently in possession of 4F86 aircraft armed with six 5 MG each and will be in receipt of 5 SAAB 29 fighters by 4 Oct. which we armed with 4 X 20 mm cannon and six rockets each. These aircraft will be based at Luluabourg as soon as necessary NAV Aids are in position. They have a strike capability throughout the known combat area. It is my opinion that they are more than capable of keeping the skies clear for air transport operations. There is no factual evidence up to this time indicating an opposition of more than one Fouga.
2. To support your ground force it is essential that an effective air transport force be in operation - in fact the ground forces cannot exist without it. In order to provide this service to you I must have one main base from which to operate. As most of the airlift is generated either from or to LEO it is only sensible and practicable to consider N'Djili as that base. I have advised you frequently over the past few days that in order to keep this base running efficiently additional aircraft of any type cannot be accepted because of the high level of congestion that exists. I have also stated that this restriction applies particularly to jet aircraft which cannot be stuffed nose to tail because of large danger areas fore and after.- "Safe areas" for armed aircraft must be provided for on any aerodrome - but particularly so on one that belongs to the Civil authority servicing international airlines.

In line with the foregoing paragraphs I must recommend to you and ask that you accept that

- (a) Fighter force presently available to us is adequate to meet the threat.
- (b) No additional aircraft and in particular jet fighters be added to the N'Djili air base.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. A. Simon', written in a cursive style.

HAM/hd

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
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

3 October 1961

A : Force Commander,  
De : Air Commander,  
Objet : TELEGRAM AIR OPS E'VILLE NO. 02319 DATED OCT. 2/61.

Following action has been taken in response to the  
attached signal:

- (a) 1 - DC3 left for E'ville on 3 October.
- (b) 1 - Helicopter and 1 - Beaver have been ordered  
from A'ville to E'ville.
- (c) A 2nd DC3 will be dispatched from Léo to E'ville  
as soon as it becomes serviceable.

  
(H.A. Morrison) A/C  
Air Commander.

HAM/hd

encl.

FC. informed  
103.

**SECRET**  
**PRIORITY**

S 021020Z

FM HQ KATANGA COMMAND EVILLE

TO ONUC LEO

INFO HQ SECTOR A AVILLE

BT

CANADIAN CIPHER

**AC**

Paraphrase NOT required.  
No unclassified reply or  
reference

S E C R E T AIR OPS EVILLE 02319 RAJA TO MACEOIN AND MORRISON

FIRSTLY WE HAVE NO DC3 AVAILABLE AT EVILLE AND AVILLE. ESSENTIAL  
THAT AT LEAST 2 DC 3 BE POSITIONED AT EVILLE AND 1 AT AVILLE URGENTLY.  
AT PRESENT WE ARE USING DC 3 FROM LULU WHICH IS NOW REQUIRED BACK  
URGENTLY BY BRIG GOULSON

SECONDLY THERE IS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT FOR RECCE  
AROUND EVILLE TO OBTAIN NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. AIRCRAFT  
REQUIRED FOR THIS ARE 1 BEAVER AND 1 MORE HELICOPTER

THIRDLY IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE REQUEST POSITION 1 DC3 AT AVILLE.  
2 DC3 1 BEAVER AND 1 MORE HELICOPTER AT EVILLE

BT

11/02/LW/021250Z OCT 61

1- DC 3 To Eville 30 Oct  
1 Helicopter & 1 Beaver  
ordered from Aville  
to Eville departure  
from Aville not yet  
advised by Aville.  
These request 2nd DC3  
for Eville from the Single  
this morning no reply as yet

**SECRET**

- (3) The present situation for handling aircraft at Eville requires immediate study and support by those responsible at this headquarters. Virtually nothing has been done since the Katanga flare-up to bolster the personnel situation in the Movement Control Detachment (the same situation prevails at Kamina). Personnel at both places are required to handle large numbers of aircraft each day. A staff visit by a vigorous officer from Movement Control is essential and long overdue.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

On assumption that existing conditions at Eville continue, i.e. UN will remain responsible for airport and its facilities for foreseeable future, the following recommendations are made:

- (a) Action by UN to immediately obtain qualified management personnel and technicians for airport.
- (b) Troops on location be used (under competent direction) to clean up the mess and restore a state of orderliness to buildings and contents.
- (c) That Movement Control Detachment be bolstered and recognized as vital part of Air Detachment. HQ Katanga be ordered to provide additional manpower during peak periods.

5 Oct 61

ELISABETHVILLE

INSPECTION of AIRPORT and FACILITIES by AIR COMMANDER  
on 30 September 1961

- (1) All workshops and control tower facilities were looked at. Briefly it can be described as a mess. Personnel, identity undetermined by me, have circulated through workshop facilities in uncontrolled numbers, upsetting and turning inside out a large percentage of items that were moveable. The extent of pilfering (if any) or permanent damage was impossible to estimate. The air traffic control equipment has been kept in operating condition by superhuman efforts of ICAO personnel. All other normal services that are required for efficient movement of Air traffic of course are non existent. (Weather briefing facilities, flight planning etc..). Movement control personnel although far too few in number have managed to get two fuel tenders back into operation and have full knowledge of contents of fuel dumps. Equipment such as fork lifts aircraft towing mules, have been abused to such an extent that it is almost all unserviceable and will require skilled workmen to put it back in operation. I took a quick look into large offices which were used by immigration and customs personnel. The vandalism that has taken place is most disturbing, trunks, mail bags, etc.. burst open and with contents widely scattered.
- (2) The above paragraph describes a situation which is undoubtedly serious and one that can be made much of by many parties. The real problem however in so far as the Air Force is concerned lies in the fact that all normal services have come to a halt and without the necessary expert control and maintenance will continue to deteriorate rapidly. Where we obtain such a staff to replace those who were run-off I do not know - certainly they are not available within the Air Force.

[COPIE]

CT/S.G./00802.

MINISTÈRE DES COMMUNICATIONS  
ET DES TRANSPORTS  
CABINET DU MINISTRE

Leopoldville, le 30 septembre 61

Objet:

Accès des aéroports  
et des aérodromes aux  
fins de cérémonies  
officielles.

W.6.002

CIRCULAIRE MINISTÉRIELLE

N° CT/SG/ 1 DE 1961

- Départements (Tous)
- Chef Mission O.A.C.I. au Congo  
(pour diffusion)

Au prescrit de l'article 137 de l'ordonnance fondamentale de navigation aérienne N° 62/321 du 8 octobre 1955, il est institué sur tout aérodromes public un commandement d'aérodrome.

Le fonctionnaire investi du commandement d'un aérodrome est responsable de l'administration, du bon entretien et de la police de son aérodrome. Il est préposé à l'application des règles de la navigation aérienne. Il prend sur le champ toute mesure urgente nécessaire pour assurer la sécurité de la navigation aérienne.

x

x

x

Il suit de ce qui précède que le fonctionnaire exerçant le commandement d'un aérodrome est la seule autorité légitime responsable.

Il s'ensuit que, seul, il a le pouvoir d'autoriser l'accès du domaine d'aérodrome conformément aux dispositions des articles 141 et 143 de l'ordonnance fondamentale précitée.

x

x

x

Il me revient que le domaine de l'aérodrome de Léopoldville-Ndjili aurait été le théâtre de certaines manifestations ou parades dans les zones spécialement interdites, tel le tarmac.

Je rappelle que toute manifestation ou parade quelconque, de nature civile ou militaire, est soumise à l'autorisation préalable du commandant d'aéroport qui, dans ce domaine, applique les directives de l'Autorité Supérieure.

Cette règle ne souffre aucune exception. Les organisations internationales, appelées au Congo pour lui donner l'aide technique, y sont soumises au même titre que les organisations nationales.

C'est dans le respect de sa souveraineté que le Gouvernement entend respecter et faire respecter les lois et les règlements édictés conformément aux normes internationales et particulièrement les règlements qui ont trait à la sécurité de la navigation aérienne.

Je fais un instant appel à tous les services tant du Gouvernement Central que du Gouvernement Provincial, aux Services civiles et militaires de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, pour que soient respectée l'Autorité légitimement investie du commandement d'aérodrome.

Je veillerai personnellement au respect de cette autorité légitime.

LE MINISTRE DES COMMUNICATIONS  
ET DES TRANSPORTS

sé. S. KAMA.



CONSULAT GENERAL ROYAL DE GRECE  
A LEOPOLDVILLE

Léopoldville, September 28th, 1961


No. I.087 A/3

MS

Sir,

On instructions from my government I have the honour to request that I be allowed to fly to Elisabethville aboard a United Nations aircraft at the earliest possible date and to return to Leopoldville by the same means after a sojourn of a few days in the Katanga. In the Greek government's view this request is justified by the fact that the Greek Community in the Katanga numbers more than two thousand persons whom, under the circumstances, it is impossible for me to visit without the aid of the United Nations.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my high consideration.

  
GEORGES E. SEKERIS  
Consul General of Greece

Lt. General S. Mac Eoin  
Force Commander  
ONUC  
Leopoldville

Pch

No 17 St Ruths Post.  
Altkone  
Sept 22<sup>nd</sup> 61

To

General McKeown.  
Supreme Commander. V.N. Forces.  
Congo

Dear Sir,

I am the wife of  
No 89748 CPL. JOHN O'BRIEN  
now a Prisoner in JADITVILLE.  
For a week now, JADITVILLE is  
not mentioned on our Irish News  
on the Radio. I have no information  
whatsoever about my husband, apart  
from the fact that he is a PRISONER  
in JADITVILLE. There has been no  
news to be forgotten week here,  
and I am appealing to you, as a  
woman, whose limits of endurance  
has reached its Peak, to get news

of my husband ~~for~~ me.

I shall wait a reply from you  
 see the Mrs. census about  
 Elizabeth Hill and what about  
 those one hundred and fifty (150)  
 men in JADITVILLE.

Please, before it is too late,  
 take those men home, while they  
 still have their lives.

Anxiously awaiting a reply.  
 Re my husband,

Yours Faithfully.

Mary Frances O'Brien.

## ADDITIONAL AIR SUPPORT

The following is a summary of the additional air support which is being made available to our forces in the Congo. It consists of fighter, bomber and transport support. It gives us the capability of neutralizing any air effort which the Katangese are likely to produce and also the capability of neutralizing any ground AA positions which might be used to fire on our own transport aircraft in the vicinity of airfields.

- A. Four F86 fighter aircraft from Ethiopia. Arrival date to be determined when technical problems resolved.
- B. Four Swedish jet fighters departing Sweden 28 September. IF TAC PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED
- C. Six Canberra jets, interceptor role. Arrival Léo to be determined with Indian Air Force authorities on 24 September.
- D. One C47 and one C54 from Danish Air Force will arrive Léo 252100Z.
- E. Two C119 aircraft Norwegian Air Force will arrive Léo 251830Z.
- F. One C124 aircraft USAF in Léo now. Three more aircraft (C124) will arrive PM 23 September.

23 September 1961

MR AIKEN

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO


BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

22 September 1961

A : Military Assistant to Force Commander  
De : Chief Air Operations Officer  
Objet : VIP Delayed Departure

1. Reference is made to the special flight arranged for Mr. Aiken, the Irish Foreign Minister to Kamina and Elisabethville, due to depart 0600Z, 21 September.
2. A preliminary investigation by this office has uncovered a grave error on the part of Base Operations N'Djili, thereby resulting in the delayed departure of Mr. Aiken. It is most regrettable that this delay occurred and in retrospect you may be assured that action is being taken against those responsible.
3. It is requested that you convey our apologies to Mr. Aiken for any inconveniences which may have resulted.

  
W/C A. J. Mackie,  
Chief Air Operations.

AJM/hd

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*Adh*  
No 1001/5/OPS

~~20 Sep~~ 1961

A : Chief of Logistics  
De : Chief of Military Operations  
Objet : SCHEDULES - AIR LIFT

Reference conversation (tele) Col PAUL and Col MADAN of date.

On my request, the Air Ops have consented, as a special case, to defer the commencement of regular air schedules until such time the back load of Supplies and Ord stores is cleared from LEO. You are requested to ensure that this period does not exceed more than one week maximum.

*27*  
LT COL  
CHIEF OF MILITARY OPS

cc:

Force Commander  
Air Commander  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Adm Officer  
Chief Ord Officer  
Chief S & T Office  
Chief of Mov Control



INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Ref. : 2506

Folio :212

18 September 1961

A :

Supreme Commander, ONUC, Leopoldville

DE :

G. Pêche, Acting Chief ICAO TA Mission, Congo

OBJET :

I am pleased to inform you that the frequency now being used between Kamina and Leopoldville for the purpose of ONUC military operations is one for the exchange of air/ground communications in the following stations of the Congo :

11,318 kcs. : This frequency is used in the FIC Leo/NDjili, Kamina, Elisabethville, Stanleyville and Usumbura. It is necessary to provide you with this information because of the ONUC military operations presently taking place in Katanga. As you are aware, Usumbura is still under Belgians control who may listen to any communications exchange concerning the ONUC military operations in Katanga.

15  
Seen

17 September 1

Dr S. Linner, Officer in Charge  
A/Chief of Staff

The Air Commander wishes me to bring to your notice the desperate position with respect to air transport support, as at 1300 hrs 17 Sep 61. Total available lift of charter aircraft is one DC4 and three C46s. This means that we are unable to put in effective reinforcements to either KAMINA or EVILLE, and secondly, we are not in a position to send forward necessary supplies which from now on will be acutely required.

The reduction in this air effort today is caused by the loss on the ground of one DC4 at KAMINA, which has resulted in charter companies refusing to fly to KAMINA or EVILLE.

It is recommended, therefore, that immediate steps be taken with New York to provide the necessary transport support, from any source. If this is not forthcoming the length of time which units can hold out on the ground will be limited. We have exhausted all local contacts for charter aircraft. For example, this morning Sabena withdrew eight DC4s; it was their aircraft that was destroyed at KAMINA this morning.

(J.J. QUINN) Col



LEOPOLDVILLE, 1er Septembre 1961

RECOMMANDÉ

A Monsieur le Ministre de l'Education Nationale  
de la République du Congo  
à  
LEOPOLDVILLE/KALINA

sous couvert du Commandant des  
Forces Aériennes Congolaises  
Base de N'Dolo  
LEOPOLDVILLE

Copie pour information à

- Au Commandant MONFORT Jean-Pierre  
35 Rue de César 35  
LIEGE (Belgique)
- Au Chef d'Etat-Major de l'ONU  
Building "Le Royal"  
LEOPOLDVILLE/KALINA
- A Monsieur le Ministre de la  
Défense Nationale  
36 av. Prince Charles  
LEOPOLDVILLE/KALINA

OBJET: Réclamation diplômes

Excellence,

Nous avons l'honneur de venir vous exposer ce qui suit:

Nous sommes anciens élèves de l'ex-base de Kamina où nous nous avons fini nos études à la fin de l'année scolaire 59-60 à l'école technique d'aviation.

La fin de l'année scolaire coïncida avec les troubles de l'Indépendance, nous allâmes en vacances sur l'ordre de nos chefs et ces derniers, nous affirmèrent que nous avions bien tous réussis nos épreuves finales et que la remise des diplômes devait se faire à la rentrée de l'école.

La rentrée fut impossible et les belges expulsés de la Base. Nous nous, <sup>voilà</sup> obligés de recourir à vous, pour nous fournir nos diplômes.-

Excellence, nous vous suggérons de contacter les autorités de l'O.M.U.C. de la place; elles auraient nos résultats de fin d'études et nos dossiers.

TRANSMIS SOUS N° 1033/CC061 FAP

Comptant sur votre intervention, nous sommes convaincus que vous ferez le maximum pour nous servir.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de notre haute considération.-

Boniface LUKUSA et Oscar NIONGOLO  
Forces Aériennes Congol.  
Base de N'Dolo  
LEOPOLDVILLE

Personnel and  
Finance Officer  
Air Staff  
ONUC Headquarters

AHQ/6024/ADMIN  
Sept 11 . 1961

CONTINGENT LIST OF AIR PERSONNEL (MIL).

Serial No	Repatriation due	Name and initials	Rank	ONUC ID-no	Appointment	Unit	Date of joining
1	150961	PERSSON WJ	1/Lt	8741	Ajudant	Helicopter	270960
2	160961	THURESSON BEC	WO/3	8746	Ops assistant	Kamina	"
3	250961	GEMMING SE	1/Lt	9061	Transm techn	"	300960
4	"	ROSEN CEG	2/Lt	8749	Radio operator	"	270960
5	290961	SOLLENBERG SLV	Major	23624	Detachm commander	Eville	100161
6	031061	GRENHAGEN CV	WO/2	34707	Pilot	Helicopter	120461
7	"	HEDIN BG	WO/3	34710	Mechanic	"	"
8	"	HULTQVIST LO	"	34711	"	"	"
9	"	SEFSTROM RG	"	34708	"	"	"
10	"	STENSHAMMAR TCA	"	34704	Admin NCO	Kamina	"
11	061061	SUNDEQUIST GS	WO/2	23685	Pilot	Light	180161
12	091061	ANDERBERG SB	WO/3	37139	Mechanic	"	180461
13	"	BRINK GA	"	37140	"	"	"
14	"	OLSSON NOT	"	37141	"	"	"
15	"	PERSSON KJV	"	37142	"	"	"
16	311061	ANDERSSON LOB	WO/2	41136	Pilot	"	140561
17	"	ERIKSSON JL	"	41135	"	"	"

Serial No	Repatriation due	Name and initials	Rank	ONUC ID-no	Appointment	Unit	Date of joining ONUC
18	311061	GRADIN PO	WO/3	41140	Radio Operator	Base HQ	140561
19	"	LINDBERG SEA	"	41137	Electrician	Helicopter	"
20	"	LJUNGKVIST KO	Major	41128	Offfly SafStaPro	Air HQ	"
21	251161	FLODMARK BA	WO/3	42989	Mechanic	Light	060661
22	"	FYHN JAF	"	42981	"	"	"
23	"	KARLSSON CEU	2/Lt		OPS officer	Aville	"
24	"	NYMAN EM	WO/2	42987	Pilot	Light	"
25	"	SANDAA HO	1/Lt	42986	"	"	"
26	"	STENEMAIM AA	WO/3	42985	Mechanic	"	"
27	"	THIMGREN BGR	"	42984	Ops assistant	Aville	"
28	"	WEDHAM SEW	Major	42988	Fire Brig Officer	Kamina	"
29	"	WIJKSTROEM NE	WO/3	42983	Mechanic	Light	"
30	"	WILLIG BG	"	42982	"	"	"
31	271161	BACKNER NT	"	44792	Pilot	Helicopter	070761
32	"	THEANDER WA	WO/2	44791	Pilot	"	"
33	061261	FREDHOIM BNA	Capt	43617	"	Light	200661
34	"	KYLBRINK CE	WO/3	43616	Mechanic	"	"
35	"	LAGERLUND CG	1/Lt	43617	Pilot	"	"
36	"	MAIM SOH	WO/3	43618	Mechanic	"	"
37	"	MATTISON ES	"	43619	"	"	"

Serial No	Repatriation Due	Name and initials	Rank	CNUG ID No	Appointment	Unit	Date of Joining
38	061261	NORSTROM SGH	Colonel		Dep Air Cmr	Air HQ	200661
39	"	REGE NI	WO/2	43620	Pilot	Light	"
40	"	ROLFF HT	WO/1	43621	Chief Engineer	Light	"
41	"	STJERNFELT CB	"	43622	Technical Officer	Kamina	"
42	"	WALL GA	"	43623	Pilot	Light	"
43	101261	MELIN PEG	WO/2	27025	Radio Operator	Kamina	210361
44	301261	ANDREN SO	Major	44779	Air Inf Sta Officer	Air HQ	070761
45	"	ANDERSON LE	WO/3	44793	Radio Operator	Base HQ	"
46	"	ANDERSON OF	WO/2	44784	Pilot	Light	"
47	"	HAKANSSON BYL	WO/3	44781	Air Ops Assistant	Evville	"
48	"	HOVENDAL SB	Major	44783	Detachment Commander	Kemine	"
49	"	LIND AS	"	23625	" " "	Luluebourg	100161
50	"	MOLIN G	WO/3	44787	Mechanic	Light	070761
51	"	NILSSON OA	WO/2	44785	Pilot	"	"
52	"	SANDSTROM GF	1/Lt	44780	Air Ops Officer	Evville	"
53	"	SKOGSBERG KBH	WO/2	44786	Pilot	Light	"
54	"	SVENSSON LGB	WO/3	44788	Mechanic	"	"
55	"	WARNBRINK BI	Capt	44790	Commanding Officer	Helicopter	"
56	"	WETTERGAARD BJ	WO/3	44789	Mechanic	Light	"
57	030162	JOHANSSON AOA	WO/2	34705	Administrative NCO	Helicopter	120461

Serial No	Repatriation Due	Name and initials	Rank	ONUC ID No	Appointment	Unit	Date of Joining
58	030162	KOELVIK BA	WO/3	34703	Motor Transport NCO	Base HQ	120461
59	"	PETERSSON BA	"	34713	Electrician	Helicopter	"
60	050162	OLSSON KL	"	23683	"	Light	180161
61	060162	HAGBERG AG	"	46300	Pilot	Helicopter	180761
62	"	IJUNG TO	"	46302	Mechanic	"	"
63	"	NILSSON AS	"	46301	Pilot	"	"
64	"	SJØLANDER T	Capt	46303	"	"	"
65	070162	JONASSON JH	WO/3	23688	"	"	180161
66	100162	CARLSSON LHH	Major	27013	Pers & Finance Officer	Air HQ	210361
67	"	JOHANSSON KG	WO/3	23686	Electrician	Light	180161
68	300162	LUNDGREN JTB	"		Mechanic	Helicopter	190861
69	"	NILSSON BAG	"		"	"	"
70	230262	BECK BO	"	50986	Radio Operator	Base HQ	060961
71	"	BILTMARK JB	"	50982	Mechanic	Light	"
72	"	DAHLBERG KG	"	50983	"	"	"
73	"	ERIKSSON EU	WO/1	50980	Adjutant	"	"
74	"	POLCKER J	2/Lt	51202	Motor Transport Officer	Base HQ	080961
75	"	HELLSTROM AVE	WO/1	50981	Aircraft Inspector	Light	060961
76	"	JOHANSSON HB	WO/3	50985	Radio Operator	Base HQ	"
77	"	PERSSON BH	"	51205	Mechanic	Helicopter	080961
78	"	PICARD RL	"	50987	Radio Operator	Base HQ	060961

Serial No	Repatriation Due	Name and initials	Rank	ONUC ID No	Appointment	Unit	Date of Joining
79	230262	ROSENBERG GEA	WO/2	51204	Pilot	Helicopter	080961
80	"	THELL SEW	WO/3	50984	Mechanic	Light	060961
81	"	YVEDAHL KDI	"	51203	"	Helicopter	080961
82	100361	BYSTROEM CTA	Capt	27024	Base Telecom Officer	Base HQ	210361
83	160362	BLOMQUIST TM	2/Lt	8742	Radio Operator	Kamina	270960
84	"	HJERTQUIST UKT	"	8747	Radio Technician	"	"
85	170362	VIKBERG AER	WO/2	9062	Ops Assistant	Base HQ	300960
86	260362	APPLEQUIST ESW	Major	14886	Detachment Commander	Aville	041060
87	010462	HOEGLUND MI	WO/2	34706	Mechanic	Helicopter	120461
88	030462	NILSSON REB	"	34712	Pilot	Light	"
89	"	RENGIAN KOH	"	34709	Mechanic	Helicopter	"
90	300462	ISAKSSON RU	WO/3	41139	Electrician	"	140561
91	"	THORS EO	WO/2	41138	Radio Technician	"	"
92	080562	JANSSON KET	WO/3	37145	Clerk	Base HQ	160960

SUMMARY.

Commanding officers	6	Technical officers	7
Staff officers	4	" NCO	1
Pilots light a/c	13	Operations officers	2
" helicopter	8	" assistants	4
Mechanics light a/c	20	Admin NCO:s	4
" helicopter	14	Radio operators	9
Total:		92	

Commander UN Force

HQ ONUC (LOGS)761/1-MOV

Dated : 7th Sep 1961


To : List A, B, C and D  
All Movement Control Detachments

From : Chief Logistic Officer

Subject: Priorities on UN Planes within the Congo

Reference this office letter of even number  
dated 18 Aug 61.

In para 2 of the letter under reference please  
add "/Chief Civilian Affairs Officer" after "Brigade  
Commander" appearing in line 3.

  
Lt Col)  
for Chief Logistic Officer  
( N N MADAN )

The same letter has been sent to InterOcean, Transair and Sabena

7 September 1961


Dear Sir,

Violation of Portuguese Angola Air Space

Several complaints have been received by ONUC HQ through official channels that aircraft bearing the insignia of the United Nations have been reported overflying parts of Portuguese Angola territory without prior diplomatic clearance. Such actions constitute a direct violation of Portuguese airspace.


You are requested to brief all aircraft captains of your company that overflights of other than Congolese territory are strictly forbidden unless prior clearance has been given. Should the occasion arise whereby a UN chartered aircraft is forced to violate the airspace of a country other than the Congo through circumstances that involve the safety of the aircraft, such as the avoidance of thunderstorms, a full report is to be submitted to this HQ. This report should include the area violated, time, altitude and any other pertinent information.

Yours truly,

  
H.A. Morrison, Air Commodore  
Air Commander

The Operations Manager,  
Panama Airways,  
Léopoldville.

cc: Force Commander  
Dr. Linnér





6 September

1

Base Commander N'Djili


Air Commander

Violation of Portuguese Angola Air Space

1. Several complaints have been received by ONUC HQ through official channels that aircraft bearing the insignia of the United Nations have been reported overflying parts of Portuguese Angola territory without prior diplomatic clearance. Such actions constitute a direct violation of Portuguese air space.
2. You are directed to issue an order to all UN military pilots that overflights of other than Congolese territory are strictly forbidden unless prior clearance has been given. Should the occasion arise whereby a UN aircraft is forced to violate the airspace of a country other than the Congo through circumstances that involve the safety of the aircraft, such as the avoidance of thunder storm activity, a full report is to be submitted to this HQ. This report should include the name of the country, area, time, altitude at which flown, and other pertinent information.
3. A similar instruction is being issued to all charter companies presently under contract to the UN.

  
(H.A. Morrison) A/C  
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander  
Dr. Linnér



SECRET

SECRET

2 September

1

Commander, Léopoldville Command

Acting Chief of Staff

Airport Security: Arrival of Mr. Gizenga

1. Information. Mr. Gizenga is expected in Léopoldville tonight, 2 September. Time of arrival is not yet certain, but it will ~~not~~ be before 1800 hours LT. He is travelling from Stanleyville in the Force Commander's DC6B aircraft. Time of arrival can be obtained from Air Operations.

2. Security. Commander, 2 Jat Battalion, will be responsible for the security of Mr. Gizenga whilst in the airport area. The following precautions will be taken by the Jat Battalion Commander:-

- (a) A Coy of Infantry will be put on stand-to at N'Djili, but their presence will not be readily apparent.
- (b) The Jat Battalion Commander will be present at the aircraft on the arrival of Mr. Gizenga. He will have in the immediate vicinity six to eight of his officers armed with revolvers, but here again they will carry such weapons in their pocket and not apparent.
- (c) 2 Jat Commander will arrange for two jeeploads of Military Police to be available as escort if required. He will offer this escort to Mr. Gizenga and if not accepted, it will be stood-down.

3. Report. A report will be submitted to the Mil Ops room on completion of the operation or any other time considered necessary.

4. Departure. On notification of the time of departure of Mr. Gizenga from Léopoldville which is expected to be on Sunday, 3 September, precautions will be put into operation at the airfield less the Police escort.

  
(James J. Quinn) Colonel  
A/COS

## PRESENT AIRLIFT CAPACITY

113

CHARTER

DC 4 - 12

C 46 - 6

PANAM

1 X DC4

4 X C46

UN

C 119 - 6

C 47 - 18



INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO :

AIR COMMANDER

FROM :

SUBJECT :

SF is a DC 3 HTD L20509107  
for Matadi & returned L20 HTD  
151150Z. Although the times  
do not correspond too closely it is  
possible that this was one of the  
to leave Matadi due bad weather.  
Letter being prepared for your signature  
to Base Com Ndjili & all charter  
Cos to avoid future incidents.

J. L. L.  
C. L. L.

YC26 4 310N COPY  
259 5

18 10:25  
to be completed

Return to Registry

YC26 S-NY 259 5 2323Z ;

ETATPRIORITE

ONJC

LEO ;

6050 LINNER FROM SEGGEN FOLLOWING LETTER RECEIVED FROM PORTUGUESE  
MISSION: QUOTE EXCELLENCY, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BRING TO YOUR  
EXCELLENCYS ATTENTION THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCE: ON 25  
AUGUST 1961, AT 10 A.M. (ANGOLA LOCAL TIME) A TWO ENGINE  
"DAKOTA" PLANE BEARING ;

P2 ;

THE INSIGNIA AND COLOURS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FLEW INTO  
PORTUGUESE AIR SPACE OVER SANTO ANTONIO DO ZAIRE AND OTHER  
PARTS OF PORTUGUESE TERRITORY AT A LOW ALTITUDE. THE SAID  
PLANE FLEW IN FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE KITONA BASE AND TURNED  
BACK TOWARD THE SAME DIRECTION. ;

P3 ;

UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT I HAVE THE HONOUR TO  
REQUEST YOUR EXCELLENCYS ATTENTION TO THE NECESSITY  
OF THE ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PREVENT THE REPETITION  
OF THIS INCIDENT WHICH CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF PORTUGUESE  
AIRSPACE. PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE RENEWED ASSURANCES  
OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE ;

P4

TO THIS I REPLIED TODAY AS

FOLLOWS: QUOTE DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO

Received on 2/1 at \_\_\_\_\_ hrs.  
Action by \_\_\_\_\_  
Actioned on \_\_\_\_\_

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1961,  
REGARDING AN OVERFLIGHT BY A TWO ENGINE "DAKOTA" PLANE BEARING  
THE INSIGNIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE ATTENTION OF OUR ;  
P5/59 ;

REPRESENTATIVES IN LEOPOLDVILLE HAS BEEN DRAWN TO THIS  
OCCURRENCE WHICH, IF CONFIRMED AS RELATING TO A UNITED NATIONS  
PLANE, IS NATURALLY ACCIDENTAL. IT IS OUR WISH TO FORESTALL  
SUCH ACCIDENTS BY APPROPRIATE MEASURES, AND I REGRET IF,  
IN SPITE OF THAT, ONE HAS TAKEN PLACE. YOURS SINCERELY,

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD UNQUOTE "

COL 25 25 1961 10 4 1961 "

*C1 Air Ops.  
How what have  
you to say to this  
6 Sep*

Nb. 1661/35/695  
22 August 61

Chief Administrative Officer  
Acting Chief of Staff  
North Star Flights from Pisa

1. I do not understand your reference to several instances where cable were sent from the Military Command to the Movement Control Office at Pisa asking that priority be given to certain individuals. I know of only two cases of late where this occurred. One was in the case of Lt. Col. Mitra: after waiting 14 days in Pisa, the Force Commander required his presence here in Léopoldville. The second case was that of Colonel Hajeebhoy who was required back at this Headquarters to deal with several personnel problems that had arisen.
2. It would be much better in relation to a subject of this kind if specific cases were quoted.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(James J. Quinn) Colonel  
A/COS

cc: Force Commander ✓  
Chief of Military Personnel  
Chief Movement Control Officer

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

3 August 1961

A : Distribution  
De : Major A. Woodcock  
Objet : Summary of Tunisian Airlift


1. Total Tunisians airlifted out of the Congo as of 0800 hours 3 August is 1517.
2. Total cargo airlifted as of 0800 hours 3 August is 38,500 lbs.
3. One hundred and ninety-five (195) passengers are to move later today. There is no cargo plane for today.
4. As of 0010 hours 4 August there will remain 1359 Tunisians to move plus a Rear Party of 26 All Ranks (including Col. Lasmar and his staff officers).
5. There are 70 to 80 tons of cargo to move excluding vehicles.
6. The Tunisians are anxious to send back Comd Post Vehicle (wireless). The weight and dimensions will be supplied today. It can be moved in a Globemaster.
7. The following are their vehicles they have in Léopoldville. They may request that some or all of these be flown back to Tunisia:-

4 m/c  
10 Jeeps  
2 Ambs  
1 Comd Post Veh  
1 Trailer (1 ton)  
1 Trailer (1/4 ton)

8. They now request that one cargo plane be available to them daily to move cargo to Tunisia (the 70 to 80 tons).
9. There are 625 Dogras arrived and 127 Gorkhas.

Distribution

A/COS  
MA to Force Commander  
Nil Ons

  
(A. Woodcock) Major



BF 7/7

26 14/7

UW

NO 1204/4/10/2

3 July

6 1

Chief Movement Control Officer  
Acting Chief of Staff  
Air Transportation of ONUC Vehicles

The WHO has four jeep station wagons in Stanleyville which require to be lifted to the Goma area. They also have one station wagon in Léopoldville for lifting to Luluabourg. I know that our available vehicle airlift is very restricted, but in view of the specialized nature of the work involved by WHO, you will please arrange to have those vehicles lifted within the next 14 days.

Started lift

James J. Quinn  
(James J. Quinn) Colonel  
A/COS

cc: MA to FC ✓  
Air Ops  
Mr. B. Halbert  
Admin Offr, Civilian Ops

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

29 June 1961 196

A : ONUC Force Commander, Attention Lt. Col. J.J. Casseley  
De : B. Halbert, Administrative Officer, Civilian Operations  
Objet : Air Transportation of ONUC Vehicles

I have been advised by Movement Control that requests for space on ONUC planes should be directed to the Force Commander for the allocation of priorities.

The World Health Organization has four jeep station wagons in Stanleyville which were intended for the use of doctors working in the Goma area, but as there has been no way of transferring these vehicles, they have been sitting in Stanleyville for over three months. In view of the urgent need for these vehicles in Goma, I should appreciate it if you could authorize their being airlifted to the latter destination.

As a result of the difficulty of transferring equipment from Port Franqui to Luluabourg, it is also requested that you authorize the air movement of one station wagon from Leopoldville to Luluabourg. I have been advised by Movement Control that a considerable backlog of supplies and equipment is awaiting shipment from Port Franqui to Luluabourg. In view of this and the fact that we recently lost a new vehicle in Port Franqui as a result of ANC action, we should like to transfer this vehicle by air. This request is based on an urgent need for additional transportation in Luluabourg.

An aircraft (FLIGHT NO DE 252  
8 Apr 61 - D-ABEF) arrived  
at LEO 11 1140 hrs from  
KOLIWITZE - KATANGA on  
~~a mission~~ where it  
unloaded <sup>police</sup> arms.

The aircraft, the property of  
a West German firm (CONTINENTAL)  
was chartered by SABENA (BRUSSELS)  
to carry cargo from BRUSSELS  
to KOLIWITZE. The cargo  
weighed ~~7 tons~~ 7600 k.

CHARTERER: LUFTSAMMELFRACHT  
HAMBURG

CONSIGNEE: AIR CAMEROON, BRIZZANIE

SHIPPER: COMME TEN ANSTALL,  
ZÜRICH

LOAD: 7600 kgs General CARGO

from BRUSSELS to KOLWIEZI

HANDLING AGENTS:

SABENA BRUSSELS

OPEN KATANIA

SABENA FORT LAMI

UAT BRAZZAVILLE

AIR KASAI, KOLWIEZI

W/C Dobbin came and left the following:-

Gen MacEoin departed Kamina on Convair estimating Eville at 1452Z. However, report received at 1600Z through air traffic control stated that the aircraft was unable to land at Eville and returning Kamina estimating approx 1600Z. The Air peoples' own aircraft had to do the same thing. There are six aircraft available tomorrow here in Léo. ~~and~~ All the aircraft that went to Kamina this morning have been told to remain there by Gen MacEoin. Do you want the Air people to carry on the Indian lift into Kamina tomorrow with aircraft available here?

Tel no 4737

message received from Ind Brigade  
commander that one company group  
must reach Kamina to-morrow. I have  
assigned all available aircraft to this  
task.

rc slw/c  
c. air ops

# AFRICAN RESEARCH FOUNDATION (AFRICA)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:  
P.O. BOX 9502,  
NAIROBI, KENYA  
TELEPHONE: NAIROBI 65136  
CABLES: AFRIFOUN, NAIROBI

22nd June, 1961.

The Commander,  
United Nations Forces,  
Leopoldville,  
Republic of Congo.

Dear Sir,

This letter will serve to confirm our cable to you of 20 June 1961, as quoted below:

Request permission technical stops Elizabethville  
Luluaborg and Kitwit ETA on or about 2 July stop  
Piper Aztec VP-KRB owner African Research Foundation  
stop Aircraft equipped with VHF and HF all route  
frequencies and ADF Cable reply

Afrifoun Nairobi (Prepaid reply for  
E.A.Shs.40.00)

Please be advised that the purpose of this trip is to transport the following persons from Nairobi to Elizabethville, and thence to Brazzaville, etc.:-

Mr George W. Croker, American, Executive Director, African  
Research Foundation, Inc., New York

Dr Frederick D. Patterson,  
American, President, Phelps-Stokes Fund, U.S.A.

Mr Michael Wood, M.B.B.S., F.R.C.S.,  
British, Executive Director, African Research  
Foundation (Africa), Nairobi

Mr Keith Smith, American, President, Agricultural Technical  
Assistance Foundation, Los Angeles,  
California, U.S.A.

Listed below is pertinent information re the aircraft which might be of interest to you:-

- (1) Type of aircraft: Piper Aztec, twin engine, range 1200 miles.
- (2) Owner and operator: African Research Foundation (Africa), Nairobi, Kenya.
- (3) Call letters and / or Aircraft Identification: VP-KRB ; Kenya registry.
- (4) VPKRB is equipped with HF and VHF transceivers, having all standard N.S.A.I and N.S.A.II frequencies. This aircraft is also equipped with I.L.S. (Glide path only), V.O.R., and two automatic direction finders.
- (5) Pilot in command: Paul U. Nones, American, current Kenya and American Airline Transport Licences and/or ratings.

(6) Proposed routing will be as follows:-

Nairobi/Mbeya airways  
Mbeya/Elizabethville direct  
Elizabethville direct Kamina  
Direct Luluaborg  
Direct Kitwit  
Direct Brazzaville.


It is respectfully requested that the matter of issuing the proper flight clearances for this aircraft receive your early attention. An answer by cable would be greatly appreciated, for which E.A.Shs.40.00 has been prepaid by us.

Our cable address is:-

AFRIFOUN NAIROBI

Thanking you in advance, I remain,

Yours very truly,

  
Paul U. Nones.

C.c. to Director of Civil  
Aviation, Nairobi.

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-MOV  
Dated: 14 June 61

To : List A, B, C and D  
ONUC Coquilhatville  
ONUC Kamina  
ONUC Port Francqui  
Movement Control Detachment Albertville  
Elisabethville  
Goma  
Luluabourg  
Matadi (presently at N'Djili)  
N'Djili  
Stanleyville

From : Acting Chief of Staff

Subject: AIRLIFT - NON UN PERSONNEL

Ref : HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-MOV of 20 April 1961.

1. In partial modification of the above referred memorandum, the following revised instructions are being issued for your information and necessary action:-

"The Force Commander has decided to allow the Brigade/Sector/Station Commanders in outposted stations to use their discretion in permitting non UN personnel on UN chartered aircrafts. It may be found necessary by the local Commander to carry members of the Provincial Government, local ANC officers, local Chiefs and other officials to meetings or on joint fact-finding or peace-making missions. Similarly at times it may be necessary to evacuate patients, refugees, etc., at short notice. In all the above cases, the authorities mentioned above are permitted to use their discretion to allow non UN passengers on aircrafts allotted to them within their own operational area. Permission to allow the non UN press representatives to use UN aircrafts will, however, continue to be cleared with this Hq. in advance.

2. Please acknowledge receipt.

Col  
Acting Chief of Staff  
(J.J. QUINN)



To : List A, B, G and D  
ONUC Coquilhatville  
ONUC Kamina  
ONUC Port Francqi  
Movement Control Detachment Albertville  
Elisabethville  
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Acting Chief of Staff  
(J.J. QUINN)

Commande Un Force

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-MOV  
Dated: 14 June 1961

*File*

To: List A, B, C and D  
ONUC Coquilhatville  
" Kamina  
" Port Francqui  
Movement Control Detachment Albertville  
Elisabethville  
Goma  
Luluabourg  
Matadi (presently at N'Djili)  
N'Djili  
Stanleyville

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Subject: AIRLIFT - NON UN PERSONNEL

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2. Please acknowledge receipt.

Col  
Acting Chief of Staff  
(J.J. QUINN)

1001/321/Op

13 June 1961

Air Operations  
Chief Operations Officer

FORCE COMMANDER'S TRIP TO KAMINA

1. Reference our previous correspondence dated 8 and 12 June 1961 on the same subject, the following passengers will form the Party of the Convair leaving N'Djili at 0800 Hrs Local, 14 June 1961:


a. For KAMINA

Force Commander  
ADC to Force Commander  
Chief Mil Ops  
Chief Logistics Offr  
Secretary to Force Comdr.  
Brig Michel (being picked up at Luluabourg)  
Maj. D. Furney, Malayan LO  
Maj. A. Harris, Nigerian LO  
Comdt K.O'Brien

b. For ELISABETHVILLE

Dr. Cruise O'Brien  
Comdt H. Mac Namee (35th Irish Bn)  
" T. Moygnihan -do-  
Capt. A. McGinnis -do-  
" C. O'Halloran -do-  
" T. Whyte -do-  
BQMS Linnane -do-

2. As already notified, the whole party will arrive KAMINA approx 12.30 hrs 14 June for lunch. After lunch, those listed on 1 b. will proceed to E'ville.

  
Lt Col  
(J.G. Poulin)  
Chief Operations Officer

cc. COS

MA to Force Comdr  
ADC to Force Comdr  
Chief Communications Offr  
Chief Logistics Officer  
Chief of Personnel  
Movement Control

## UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE  
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	X	PRIORITE NATIONS
----------------	------------------	-------------------	---	---------------------

Priorité Nations traffic  
is strictly limited.

J R

Address(es)

HQ NORTH KATANGA ~~NTH KATANGA~~  
 3rd Nigerian Bde, HQ KAMINA & NEO GHANA Bde, LULU  
 1st Ethiopian Batt, KABALO  
 CO Swedish Batt. ELIZABETHVILLE

(TEXT &amp; SIGNATURE)


insert prefix &amp; / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.



OPS \_\_\_\_\_ STOP REFERENCE FORCE COMMANDER'S TRIP TO KAMINA  
 FOR A CONFERENCE OF 14 JUNE STOP CONVAIR WILL CONTINUE TO  
 ELIZABETHVILLE WITH DR CRUISE O'BRIAN AFTER ~~XXXXX~~ DEPOSITING  
 FORCE COMMANDER AND PARTY AT KAMINA STOP CONVAIR WILL RETURN  
 SAME NIGHT TO KAMINA FOR RETURN TRIP TO LEO ON 15 JUNE STOP  
 FORCE COMMANDER HAS AGREED TO PRESENT CONGO MEDALS TO REMAINING  
 MEMBERS OF 1ST ETH. BN AT KABALO AT APPROXIMATELY 151100 LT STOP  
 PARTY WILL PROCEED TO LEO ~~DIRECT~~ FROM KABALO\* STOP AN ADDITIONAL  
 5 OFFICERS AND ONE NCO OF THE ADVANCE PARTY 35TH IRISH BN WILL  
 ALSO ARRIVE ELIZABETHVILLE ON THE CONVAIR STOP ENTIRE COMPLIMENT  
 WILL LUNCH AT KAMINA WITH E'VILLE GROUP DEPARTING KAMINA FOR  
 EVILLE AFTER LUNCH STOP

INFO: MA to the Force Commander  
 Air Operations  
 Movement Control

 Lt Col  
 (J.G. POULIN)  
 Chief Operations Officer

\* Stopping at Lulu to deposit Brig Michel.

Imp. Sarfati 10035

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : Lt Col JG POULIN

Authorized : Chief Ops Offr

Date 12.6.61.

1601

Annex "A" to UNOC Board  
of Inquiry  
12 June 61.

FIRST WITNESS: Capt. W. FIDDES

Colonel MOLLERSWARD questioned Capt. FIDDES.

- Have your Capt. FIDDES received orders from General Mac Eoin to provide an escort?

Capt. FIDDES - Yes Sir, I did, Saturday afternoon at about 1.30 p.m.

Col. MOLLERSWARD - Will you please tell us what you did after receiving this order.

403  
779  
806  
779  
15-85

Capt. FIDDES - My orders were to prepare escort for 3 gentlemen from STANLEYVILLE from the time of their arrival until I was assured they were properly housed in Apartment D;48 'ROYAL' Building. I ordered my assistant, Lt. Hans SORENSEN, Sgt Major W.T. WATTS and Mr. Paul WIIS, Security Officer to meet me at 3.00 P.M. on Saturday. I held the briefing and told them what my plans were and that they were to be on stand by until I ordered them out. At 5 p.m. I met General Mac Eoin. At this time I was told the visitors were not to appear till Monday which is to-day. I was also told to arrange for food, refreshments and other requirements for these gentlemen.

On Monday at 8.30 a.m. I again contacted the people who were to assist me and I told them to stand by on duty for the escort.

I was called by Col. CASELEY at 9.30 a.m. this morning 12.6.61 and told that the aircraft would be arriving at 13.30Z i.e., 14.30 LT.

I advised Sgt Major WATTS and Lt. SORENSEN to stand by until further notice. I checked with Mov Control and I was told the aircraft would not be arriving until 5 p.m. tonight. 17.00 hours LT.

At least three times during the day I contacted the airport and was assured by NGO on Duty that the aircraft in question would be delayed.

I passed this information on to Col. CASELEY at 3.30 this afternoon.

I contacted Col. STETHEM, the Contingent Commander of the Canadian Contingent and arranged through him to provide a cook, rations and refreshments for these visiting gentlemen, which is not part of my responsibility, however, I did it.

Shortly after, having done this, I told my

personnel to be on duty standby at 16.00 and that they were to remain on this status until they were told by myself.

I arranged to have the airport contacted and had their assurance that I would be given one hour's notice of the arrival of the aircraft in question.

At 16.30 I took permission from Col. H. HAJEENHOY to go to my quarters, change clothing and have an early dinner.

At 1705 hours, I was notified by Military Police NCO that the Airport had called with the information that the aircraft was arriving 28 minutes after 1700 hours.

I was also informed Mr. Wiis, Security Officer, had left for the Airport.

My standby Duty personnel at that time were on the road for the Airport and joined me at 1715 hours.

At approximately 1720 hours I contacted my office by radio and I ordered the Duty NCO to contact Movement Control at N'DJILI and I gave the order that the dignatories were not to leave the aircraft until I personally had arrived at the airport.

This message was confirmed 5 minutes after my call.

I arrived at the Airport at approximately 1735 hours LT and upon my arrival I reported to Mr. Wiis who informed me that the 3 gentlemen whom he had in the Security car were to be held under the orders of the ANG.

Capt. FIDDES said that his orders were to escort these gentlemen to town regardless of the consequences.

Mr. P. Wiis advised Capt. FIDDES that the situation was extremely dangerous and that he should make no moves without orders from the Force Commander.

Capt. FIDDES obtained permission from the Officer in charge (Tunisian guard) to contact General Mac Eoin on urgent basis. On each occasion the connection was cancelled. A few minutes after this, Capt. FIDDES was asked by the Tunisian officer if he were prepared to use force to leave the airport and if he desired use of force he would order his men to open fire.

Capt. FIDDES declined use of force and suggested that they contacted Dr. Linner for his advice and help.

Before this action could be taken Capt. FIDDES was told about a gentleman whom he believed to be Mr. GARDNER. He was informed this gentleman was accompanying the dignitaries from STANLEYVILLE and that he was a member of the UN. Immediately after Capt. FIDDES entered the car and signalled the escort to follow him into LEOPOLDVILLE. They went at a very high speed with the police escorting the convoy to the 'ROYAL' Hotel. To the best of Capt. FIDDES' knowledge this convoy was composed of:

1. Capt. FIDDES' car with himself and Sgt. WATTS
2. The security jeep with 2 security officers
3. UN Sedan containing the 3 VIPS
4. Military Police jeep with 3 Canadian MPs
5. Two Tunisian Jeeps containing approximately 10 men

All of the personnel of the escort were armed and prepared to shoot if Capt. FIDDES gave the order.

Upon arrival at the 'ROYAL', Capt. FIDDES personally escorted the three dignitaries to their quarters in Apartment D.48 where Capt. FIDDES was met by the Canadian Army Staff Sgt. who had been appointed as cook and Security Officer St. LOUIS who was on duty in the apartment.

Capt. FIDDES reported to Col. CASELEY and briefed him on the difficulties suffered at the airport.

Then Capt. FIDDES spoke to Col. QUINN and made similar report to him and received his compliments for a job well done.

Shortly after this, Col. QUINN appeared in Apartment D.48 and having satisfied himself that the arrangements for the security of the visiting dignitaries were adequate, they left the apartment together.

At each time Capt. FIDDES had informed Col. QUINN that he would be on standby duty until 0200 hours Tuesday morning.

Col. MOLLERSWARD asked:

What is the failure in this case?

Capt. FIDDES replied:

I cannot identify the name of the person at Control Movement - I believe he was a Norwegian, but I was



not given one hour's notice as agreed.

Col. MOLLERSWARD

So, Capt. Fiddes, you arrived at the airfield too late because you were not given enough notice.

Capt. FIDDES

Yes, I was only given 25 minutes' notice. I have been on duty till 6 p.m. tonight - I gave a number of calls at the UN office, at the Military police number and I received the assurance I would be given one hour's notice.

Capt. FOGARTY

Had Movement Control any idea of the importance attached to this flight.

Capt. FIDDES

replied that he was quite sure that the man did not know who were the passengers on that flight from Stanleyville. He believed him to be Danish.

Major LINDEBLAD

asked what was the situation at the airport.

Capt. FIDDES

replied: "The Tunisian guards throughout the airport area appeared to have been alerted and well armed. In the car the dignitaries were sitting and there were at least 8 members of the ANC, one of whom was a sergeant. There was a group of people standing by the car, Congolese, UN people some in uniform some in civilian clothes. The situation appeared to be one of explosive nature. The ANC Sgt. declared they would not leave the airfield until he had authorisation given by the Minister of Interior.

Col. MOLLERSWARD

asked Capt. FIDDES how long the plane had been in before his arriving at the airport.

Capt. FIDDES

replied: 20 minutes.

Col. MOLLERSWARD

When you arrived, these three men had left the plane?

Capt. FIDDES

They were sitting in the car, at the back.

Major LINDEBLAD

asked Capt. FIDDES:- Had you arrived in due time would you have taken action?

Capt. FIDDES

replied:- My orders were explicit, to expect these gentlemen and escort them as quickly as possible to town and to drive them off from the airport.

Capt. FOGARTY

raised the following point:

"In view of the importance of these people and all the precautions that had to be carried out and the fact that we all know that most of the time the information one gets from Mov Control is incorrect, don't you think you should have been on location at the airport?"

Capt. FIDDES

"the question crossed my mind and this is why I had made sure to have my men on standby duty from 1600 hours. But Movement Control were told the aircraft would not arrive until 1900 hours. I would like to add that they have been on standby duty since Saturday 1330 hours awaiting confirmation of the arrival of this aircraft.

Major LINDBLAD

raised the question about the Military Police station being on the whole time.

Capt. FIDDES

replied that this would have been beyond their mission that the Tunisian guards were already there.

Major LINDBLAD

stressed the point to Capt. FIDDES that at least Capt. FIDDES had been successful in that he had achieved his mission to get the VIPs out of the airport.

Capt. FIDDES

Yes, I achieved this because of the lateness of the departure and the speed I used regardless of speed limitation.

Major LINDBLAD

asked Capt. FIDDES if there had been some threats of firing.

Capt. FIDDES

replied that there would have been firing had they left the Airport without the ANC approval which he got after having in vain tried to contact General Mac Boin; the connection was cut from the airport and the Second in command (Tunisian) said to him in French "Tout est réglé, vous pouvez partir" ("all is arranged, you may go"). So Capt. FIDDES left.

Capt. FIDDES finally gave his personal opinion that the situation this evening was most dangerous. Capt. FIDDES then asked if he was any more required or any of his own personnel Sgt. Major WATTS or Lt. SORENSEN or Mr. Paul WIS. It was decided to call in the witnesses.

SECOND WITNESS: Mr. Paul WIIS, HQ ONUC Security Officer.

Col MOLLERSWARD - "As you know, the General had ordered Capt FIDDES to be present at the airport to meet the plane from STANLEYVILLE carrying 3 people supposed to take part in a meeting at Leo and Capt. FIDDES arrived too late. Were you present at the airport? Please tell us what you know."

Mr. Paul WIIS - I can only tell you the time was about 1655 hours when Capt. FIDDES told me that the airplane was coming at 1855 hours and that he would take me to the airport. He left for his house at Mayumbe. At about 5 p.m. I got a phone call from Rino (HQ Transport officer) asking me whether I could provide transport for Mr. GARDNER arriving from STANLEYVILLE. I was most confused as barely 10 minutes before this call I had just seen Mr. GARDNER at Headquarters. It was 1728 hours. To clear matters, Mr. WIIS tried to phone Capt. FIDDES, but the latter was not in the office. Mr. Wiis tried to contact Col. QUINN but the line was busy. So after a few minutes he got Col. CASELEY and asked him who was coming from STANLEYVILLE - if it were Mr. GARDNER that was expected together with the party from Stanleyville. Then Mr. Wiis called back the airport and got RINO and asked him again about Mr. GARDNER and RINO said the aircraft was coming in at 1728 hours. Then Mr. Wiis called the Canadian Interpreters and told them that Security was proceeding to the airport immediately and should contact Capt. FIDDES and tell him that he, Mr. Wiis was on his way to the airport and that the aircraft was due in at 1728 hours.

"I went very fast to the airport and at about 18 minutes past 5 or even 16 minutes past 5 o'clock, I turned into the airport. And here was RINO outside Movement Control Office. Mr. Wiis jumped into a jeep and went direct to the plane. The aircraft had arrived 10 minutes before. Mr. GARDNER had left HQ Leo before Mr. Wiis. Then Mr. GARDNER told him to hurry up to leave the airport but Mr. Wiis said they had to wait for the military escort. They arrived 5 minutes later. Mr. Wiis asked them about Capt. FIDDES who they replied was on his way and would arrive about 5 minutes later.

Major LINDEBLAD - Had you been given any orders by Capt. FIDDES

Mr. Wiis - Yes, I was called by Capt. FIDDES and told by him to see Col. QUINN. I was told that Capt. FIDDES was made responsible by the FC for this mission. I am responsible for the security of ONU personnel and of convoys.

- Major LINDEBLAD - Was it up to you to contact Movement Control?
- Mr. WIIS - No Sir, up to Capt. FIDDES. It had been agreed that Capt. FIDDES would come and pick him at his apartment.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Have you any idea as to the reasons why the military police arrived too late.
- Mr. WIIS - Because Movement Control could not give the correct time. They mentioned 1728 and the plane arrived at 1708 - Movement Control failed and Air Ops failed.  
We have been on standby duty since Sunday morning and we had extra duties in Security and Military Police.
- Mr. Wiis was requested to come in next morning 13.6.61 at 0800 hours.
- Capt. FOGARTY - What time did you get this phone call from RINO?
- Mr. WIIS - I think it was 10 minutes to 5 p.m. and the aircraft arrived at 5.08 p.m.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Then if you had proceeded after the phone call from RINO, you still would not have arrived in time.
- Major LINDEBLAD - Had you any idea as to the importance of your mission?
- Mr. WIIS - Yes Sir, I had.

THIRD WITNESS: Col. NIMIS, Base Commander of N'DJILI.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - "As you know Colonel, there is a court ordered by the Force Commander - There was failure to turn up in time to the airport when 3 people from STANLEYVILLE were supposed to arrive and that happened probably because of lack of information from Mov Control. Have you any idea?
- Col. NIMIS - No - This morning I was at N'Djili at 7 a.m. and I have seen the flight scheduled for 6 p.m. would come in at 7.50. I did not speak to the pilots because the flight was delayed. I intended to call them later and to ask them for the reason of the delay.
- Major LINDEBLAD - So you knew there were to be important persons on that flight and you did not know exactly when it was due in.
- Col. NIMIS - No, I did not know.

I am only responsible to know what passengers are on the planes but it is for the Air Traffic Control (Congolese organisation) to be responsible for knowing when the planes arrive.

Colonel NIMIS was requested to come next morning at 0800 hours 13.6.61.

FOURTH WITNESS: Lt. Hanz SORENSEN, Military Police.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - "What are the reasons in your mind why the escort was not there in time?  
Did you know that the escort was supposed to meet 3 VIPs at the airport. Why did the aircraft come in too late?
- Lt. SORENSEN - Well I did not realise this until I got the message to come here for the Court of Enquiry. I understood that there was very little time but I did not know we were late. Capt. FIDDES was to go to the airport and I was told to provide one jeep and had the order to be ready at 1600 hours with 3 men and at 1600 this afternoon I was ready with one jeep. At about 1630 hours on the radio I got the message that patrol should leave for N'DJILI. I went to Military Police Station and there I was told that Capt. FIDDES had said on the radio that there was only 20 minutes left and that we were to hurry.  
That is all I know about it.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Was your order to be ready to go?
- Lt. SORENSEN - My order was to be ready from 1630 hours this afternoon.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Did you get a message at 1630 hours?
- Lt. SORENSEN - I was myself on radio and Sgt Major WATTS told me about the message which I did not understand clearly if only that the escort was to start at once. I understood Sgt Major WATTS was to contact Capt. FIDDES to get further orders and I arrived back at the Military Police Station and I was told to go at once.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Did you have any communication with Capt. FIDDES?
- Lt. SORENSEN - Yes, when I was at the Military Police Station when the escort started, Capt. FIDDES asked me to phone MOVEMENT CONTROL telling them they must arrange for the crew to stay on in the plane.

FIFTH WITNESS: Col. J.J. QUINN ACOS.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Have you anything to say to bring on any light
- Col. QUINN - The first thing I heard was the sirene at five minutes to 6 p.m. I asked Colonel CASELEY and we thought it must be the people coming from STANLEYVILLE. So a column was moving into the 'ROYAL'. So when they came in I went up to Apartment D.48 to see whether they were alright and properly looked after, which they were. I had a cup of tea with them. One of them wanted to see his wife at a Refugee Camp, so I told him we could not allow him to see her but that it would be possible tomorrow when he would be escorted. The cooking arrangements were OK and 3 Security men were there. I made arrangements with Mr. Wiis for people wanting to see them to have a Pass and be checked through Security Office.
- Col. QUINN said he did not know the 3 VIPS were to come to-day. On Saturday he had made arrangements with Capt. FIDDES to be responsible for the escort from the airfield and that he was to standby for orders to that effect. I received no message as to when the aircraft from Stanleyville was to be expected. Capt. FIDDES' orders were to standby ready to go as soon as he knew of the arrival of the aircraft.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - addressed Col. Quinn saying in conclusion that to his mind the reason why the escort arrived too late must lie with Movement Control.

SIXTH WITNESS: Lt. Tor Ansgar Nygaard, Base Air Operations.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - A little incident happened when three people came from Stanleyville and the escort was not on time.
- Lt. NYGAARD - On duty at that time.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Tell us your point of view regarding what happened. You are responsible for the time of arrival of aircraft - you were notified?
- Lt. NYGAARD - Yes. We received first detail about 1400, saying that this aircraft was arriving at 1628Z. Received this information about 1500. This was forwarded to Air Ops HQ and also passed to Lilja who was on duty. He said he would forward message to Security. Later on, the Corporal received a new ETA - aircraft due at 1617ZT was forwarded to Air OPS HQ. Also Capt. Rynneng gave this information. Was forwarded to Move-

ment Control at N'Djili - both ETAs. First thing we noticed - this aircraft calling on radio. We checked with Air Ops and they said they had informed Security about this. Security was 'phoned. Told stewardess to keep passengers in aircraft.

- Capt. FOGARTY - At 1400 LT you had ETA of 1728 LT. You immediately conveyed information to Air Ops.
- Lt. NYGAARD - Took about 5 minutes. Movement Control N'Djili informed.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Three hours and 28 minutes of the arrival of the plane. Only matter of 9 minutes difference.
- Lt. NYGAARD - Actually 18 minutes - 1610 ZT and 1628 ZT.
- Capt. FOGARTY - At least three hours notice given to Air Ops and N'Djili.
- Lt. NYGAARD - Yes. Information gotten from Flight Information Centre, N'Djili, as soon as passed to N'Djili giving time of departure and arrival at N'Djili.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Took action on own initiative?
- Lt. NYGAARD - Own initiative to keep passengers in aircraft. Passengers in aircraft until Security arrived.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - In car when Capt. Fiddes arrived?
- Lt. NYGAARD - About to leave when ANC arrived.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Normally ANC do not show up for UN planes. Do you suppose they got information from Air Traffic Control?
- Lt. NYGAARD - Do not think they had air-passenger list because it was a UN aircraft. Very seldom show up for aircraft arrivals.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Can you tell us the name of the person you informed in Movement Control?
- Lt. NYGAARD - I could not. Usually they open the door - we are next door. If we have time we write it on the board.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Name of NCO?
- Lt. NYGAARD - I think a Swedish Captain on duty, or may be a Lieutenant - quite a new one.
- Capt. FOGARTY - No idea of the importance of this plane?
- Lt. NYGAARD - Just another plane.



- Capt. FOGARTY - Were not warned to be on the lookout especially?
- Lt. NYGAARD - We were, as we always are for VIPs - very often informed about that - several times a week.

SEVENTH WITNESS: Lt. Col. J.J. CASELEY, Military Assistant to FC.

- Col. CASELEY - This morning at 0845 received message from ONUC Stan:- "CIV 679. Reference . . . UN flight 752 on DG4 which is due to arrive at Stan 121015Z and leave 121115Z. The plane will transport the party of VIPs and will arrive N'Djili ETA 121530Z . . . ." (The first message about plane). Brought this to General MacEoin shortly after 0900. He instructed me to give details to Capt. Fiddes, Assistant Provost Marshal. When I rang Captain Fiddes' Office, he was not in. Rang again sometime later, probably around 1000 when I gave him the ETA as being at 1530Z. He informed me then that he intended having an escort at N'Djili at 1500 and all plans for that had been made. Later in the day, after 1430, Captain Fiddes informed me that he had been told that the ETA would be "not earlier" than 1730. Shortly after that, about 1600, Mr. Wiis, Chief Security Officer, rang me to enquire about the ETA of the aircraft from Stanleyville. I gave him the information which Captain Fiddes had given to me and told him to get in touch with Captain Fiddes who said he would keep in contact with Air Ops and Movement Control. At about 1715 LT, I had a 'phone call that the aircraft was on the ground, but that the escort had not arrived. I rang both Security and the Military Police HQ to use their motorola to advise both Mr. Wiis and Captain Fiddes of that fact and to tell them to hurry. At about 1810, Captain Fiddes rang me saying that he was in the VIP apartment in the 'Royal' and had the three VIPs there safely. He also informed me that there were some difficulties at the airfield, but that they had been cleared up and got them away without any injury to anybody and I informed Colonel Quinn, A/COS, who was just outside my office at the time. Colonel Quinn then left the office to see Captain Fiddes in the VIP apartment.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Last time Captain Fiddes rang you he said that the latest ETA was 1730?
- Col. CASELEY - Yes. But I heard afterwards that it landed at 1704.



NINTH WITNESS: Staff Sgt. R. BOISVERT, Military Police.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Have you been present today at the airfield?
- Sgt. BOISVERT - Arrived at 1620, a few minutes before Captain Fiddes.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - When you arrived at the airport, what was the situation?
- Sgt. BOISVERT - The gentlemen had left the plane. Went in staff car; in front was a security vehicle; security guard standing on outside of staff car. The driver from security was standing next to escort vehicle. Mr. Wiis was standing outside the vehicle. A Congolese Sgt. was having a discussion with Mr. Wiis and one of the security men.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Did you know anything about information Military Police received during today concerning this aircraft?
- Sgt. BOISVERT - Instructions given to me by Captain Fiddes were to escort three VIPs from airport to 'Royal' either Sunday or Monday; told to report to airport at 1600. When I got there, reported to security at airport.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Told to report at 1620 at airport?
- Sgt. BOISVERT - Yes. Local Time.
- Capt. FOGARTY - The plane landed at 1718.
- Sgt. BOISVERT - I was not there.
- Capt. FOGARTY - The plane had landed when you arrived?
- Sgt. BOISVERT - Yes. When I arrived, aircraft was ~~was~~ immobilized; crew off aircraft; ramp and equipment away from aircraft.

TENTH WITNESS: Sgt. Kurt NIELSEN, Movement Control.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Were you on duty at the airport between 1400 and 2200.
- Sgt. NIELSEN - Yes.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Did you know anything about plane carrying three important persons coming from Stanleyville?
- Sgt. NIELSEN - No. I was working in the hangar.

ELEVENTH WITNESS: Lt. EYVIND KAARVAAG, Movement Control.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - When were you on duty?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - In charge from 1400 until 2200 this evening.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - What information have you given to the Military Police about the arrival of the plane from Stan?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Gave no information to Military Police.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Give any information to somebody else?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - No.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Did you receive any information when on duty concerning the plane.
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Yes. I got ETA. Received it some minutes before the plane landed.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - First notification you received about that plane?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Yes.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Knew nothing about arrival before receiving that message?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - No.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - You did not know plane was supposed to arrive?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Cannot say. Only thing I remember was that just before plane landed I was told by Base Operations that plane is landing in a few minutes; that there were three important people. First time I heard about it and about the three persons.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Base Operations person stated that about 1400 he got first ETA of this plane in N'Djili at 1628Z and that he conveyed that information to Movement Control next door.
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Changing over of teams then?
- Capt. FOGARTY - This message previous witness gave to Movement Control. Did you receive it?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - In our office we have a board. We write down ETAs. Maybe this aircraft was on the board. It is very likely, but I cannot remember.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Can you give us the name of the person from whom you took over duty at 1400?

- Lt. KAARVAAG - Captain Hookjaer (Danish). Took over duty at 1410 - takes about 10 minutes to settle down.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Base Operations get ETA. What is normal procedure? Does he open the door, or should he come in and write it on the board?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Must come in and inform us.
- Capt. FOGARTY - While on duty between 1400 and the arrival of the plane, did anyone call to ask ETA of this plane?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - No. Captain Fiddes or Military Police did not ring. As long as I was there, no one rang. From 1400 to 1600 I was in the hangar. There was someone else on duty - always someone there.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Are you in charge of Movement Control?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - No. Only in charge of Team "A".
- Capt. FOGARTY - How many on duty with you.
- Lt. KAARVAAG - Five of us. But three or four work in hangar.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Received any previous instructions regarding importance of this particular plane?
- Lt. KAARVAAG - No special instructions. Just before plane landed - one or two minutes - Base Operations told me a plane was landing and that it had three VIPs, take the car and go to plane. The door opened and civilian said nobody to leave plane. As soon as we heard about three civilians, went back to my office to inform Travel Officer - an Italian - there are three, all civilians. I was going to inform him, but when I came back, he had already gone out to the plane.

TWELFTH WITNESS: Sgt. Robert TAMM, Movement Control.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - You were on duty between 1400 and 1600 under command of Norwegian Lieutenant. Any message about this plane carrying passengers?
- Sgt. TAMM - No. Never heard of these people.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Received message shortly before arrival?
- Sgt. TAMM - Was working when plane arrived with mail.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Nothing written on the board?
- Sgt. TAMM - No.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Received no information from the office - Base Operations?
- Sgt. TAMM - Nothing at all. I know nothing.
- Major LINDEBLAD - Nothing written on board concerning this aircraft?
- Sgt. TAMM - Have seen nothing.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Previous witness of Base Operations said that at 1400 got first ETA of this plane and passed that information immediately to Movement Control.
- Sgt. TAMM - It is possible. I cannot say. I am not Team Commander. I would not receive such messages. Have been at N'Djili for two days (just arrived from Sweden) so I am just learning.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Do they (others waiting outside) have the same opinion as you?
- Sgt. TAMM - I think so. When we arrived the three went to the hangar -- had not been to the office.
- Capt. FOGARTY - While in office, did you receive any telephone call asking about ETA of this plane?
- Sgt. TAMM - No.

THIRTEENTH WITNESS: Sgt. Arne ALM (Swedish), Movement Control.  
Sgt. Kar NIELSEN (Danish) " "

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - You have been on duty at the airport between 1400 and 2200?
- Sgts. - Yes.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Did you know anything about a plane coming from Stanleyville carrying three important persons?
- Sgts. - No.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Did you receive any telephone calls?
- Sgts. - No. Working in hangar.

FOURTEENTH WITNESS: Cpl. Halvor KOLSHUS, Base Air Operations.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - What do you know about bringing over of the message yesterday?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - About 1400 LT got first ETA from the Flight Information Centre. They said this plane should be at N'Djili at 1628Z. We telephoned this to

Air Operations and then informed Movement Control. Wrote it on the board there. We had nothing to do with this aircraft until 1610 LT then man 'phoned from Air Operations to see if we had new ETA. I said, "no". It was the same - 1628 ZT. Ten minutes afterwards the man of the Flight Information Centre 'phoned down to tell me the aircraft would be in at 1610Z. I called Air Ops, Capt. Rynning, to say that this aircraft would be in 18 minutes earlier. Lt. Nygaard delivered message to Movement Control. Went and told the man - did not put it on the board. Because there were three hours to wait, I waited for the plane in the restaurant. I knew it was a special flight. When the three men got down, I saw they were black people and was very much surprised.

- Capt. FOGARTY - Why did you think it was a special flight?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Because this man of the Flight Information Centre - a Swede - who always gets the time, 'phones us and delivers a message to us. This man did not deliver the message. A civilian - a Canadian - 'phoned down. It had to be something special because 10 minutes afterwards our man 'phoned down to say we have a change. I said, "Yes, I know."
- Capt. FOGARTY - Did he tell you it was a special flight?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - No, but I 'phoned down so I knew. It was an unusual way to treat this.
- Capt. FOGARTY - In your previous statement you said that at about 1400 you got first information from Flight Information Centre.
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Some minutes after 1400.
- Capt. FOGARTY - You conveyed information to Movement Control and Air Operations here?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Yes.
- Capt. FOGARTY - How did you convey the information to Movement Control?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - We just tell them here, next door. There has been a lot of trouble because Movement Control use LT and we use Z. We write on board in LT.
- Capt. FOGARTY - The procedure for members of Base Operations is to go into Movement Control and write LT on the board. Did you do that?

- Cpl. KOLSHUS - No. A Lieutenant did that.
- Capt. FOGARTY - A previous witness stated that it was not normal for Base Operations when they get an ETA of a plane to 'phone Air Operations and inform them. It is not normal.
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Depends who is on duty.
- Capt. FOGARTY - The reason you informed Air Operations in this instance is because an officer of Air Operations had previously rung you.
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Capt. Carlson (?) rang me up for last ETA.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Is it correct to state that approximately, in your opinion, a little after 1400 the first ETA of that plane was on the board in Movement Control? Are you sure?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - I did not see it.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Whose duty was it to write it?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - The man who gets the information writes it. Lt. Nygaard received the information. This man from Flight Information Centre said he also used to check it up with Movement Control.
- Capt. FOGARTY - The Flight Information Centre is in control tower. Did he come down?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Three Swedes working there for Base Operations. Only thing they do is give us ETA and everything about aircraft. They 'phone us when they have something new. Two or three-hour intervals come down with slips to us, including aircraft from Iuluabourg to Kamina, etc.
- Capt. FOGARTY - This officer came down from the Flight Information Centre and gave this information to Lt. Nygaard. About what time?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - After 1400. Five or ten minutes after. We have a board also in our office and this time, 1628, was written on the board because I checked it afterwards.
- Capt. FOGARTY - The plane did not arrive at 1628 but at 1610.
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - There should be a Travel Officer at N'Djili. His business is to check if there are any passengers.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Was he meeting the plane? UN personnel?
- Cpl. KOLSHUS - Yes. Civilian.

FIFTEENTH WITNESS: Capt. M. HOUKJAER, Movement Control.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Do you belong to Air Operations?
- Capt. HOUKJAER - Movement Control.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - Trouble caused yesterday 12/6 at the airport when the escort arrived too late.
- Capt. HOUKJAER - I just heard about it.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - What do you know about communication between your office and Captain Fiddes?
- Capt. Houkjaer - I must confess that I do not know anything. I left N'Djili at 1400.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - When you were on duty before 1400 you did not receive any message concerning that plane?
- Capt. HOUKJAER - The estimated time on our board was 1628Z. We have about 50 planes a day. No one said this was an important one. If someone had told us we would have paid attention. Many people ask us everyday about planes. As commanding officer from 0700 until 1400 nobody told me anything about this.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Do you recollect Captain Fiddes telephoning Movement Control during your tour of duty inquiring about ETA of plane from Stanleyville?
- Capt. HOUKJAER - We write estimated time on our board.
- Capt. FOGARTY - If anyone rings Base Operations, that is done.
- Capt. HOUKJAER - Sometime Movement Control, sometimes Base Operations. Most people ring Base Operations for information. When people ring us, we must go to Base Operations and inquire.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - You are concerned with passengers and cargo?
- Capt. HOUKJAER - Yes.

SIXTEENTH WITNESS: Capt. Knut RYNNING, Air Operations H Q.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - The General had ordered an escort to be present at the airport when three VIPs from Stanleyville arrived yesterday. The escort turned up too late. We would like to find out why.
- Capt. RYNNING - The first thing I know about the aircraft was, of course, that it was on the way here from Stanleyville. I was told by the man on duty

- before me that they were Parliamentarians. I was not informed then of the importance or anything special to be done with the aircraft. I was on duty yesterday afternoon from 1400 to 2000. First thing that actually happened was a 'phone call from Mr. Pijoulat (188) inquiring about the aircraft - he was the first to ask about it. I told him to wait; then called Base Operations who gave me new ETA which was 1620ZT. I told Mr. Pijoulat that - this was about 1530 - not sure about time. About half an hour later, Base Operations called in again saying they had a new ETA - 1610 ZT. I did not know that anyone else was interested in the aircraft except Mr. Pijoulat. I called him - he was not there so I asked that this latest information be passed on to him. They received new ETA at that office. Nothing else happened, until Base Operations called when aircraft landed. At the same time they told me about a palaver - there was some discussion going on. I intended to call security, but was interrupted by Col. Caseley who called asking about the aircraft - he was the second man to inquire from Headquarters. I told him it had just landed.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - You never knew the airplane contained three VIPs?
- Capt. RYNNING - I was told they were Parliamentarians.
- Col. MOLLERSWARD - From whom do you receive instructions?
- Capt. RYNNING - Base Operations Room, N'Djili. They give arrival times from the control tower and Flight Information Centre which is civilian - ICAO.
- Capt. FOGARTY - A previous witness said that the Base Operations informed him at about 1400 of the first ETA of the plane at N'Djili and he immediately conveyed the information to Movement Control, N'Djili, and Air Operations here.
- Capt. RYNNING - It must have been before I arrived on duty. I came at 1400, then asked them to wait ten minutes for me as I went on an errand.
- Capt. FOGARTY - I presumed he meant about 1400. He said about 5 minutes later conveyed information to Movement Control. He said that a short time later he received the second ETA of the plane - 10 or 15 minutes later - and that he again conveyed this information to Movement Control



and Air Operations.

- Capt. RYNNING - I was on duty. I got first ETA when I called out myself on behalf of Mr. Pijoulat about 1530. It was in good time before aircraft was to arrive. Aircraft arrived at 1728.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Got information two hours ahead?
- Capt. RYNNING - Yes.
- Capt. FOGARTY - If someone wants to meet a plane coming from any part of the Congo, is there a liaison officer whom he can contact?
- Capt. RYNNING - Air Operations - 24-hour duty. Should know about aircraft there. Then duty officer here calls out to field to get timings.
- Capt. FOGARTY - At N'Djili he would check with Base Operations, then pass information to Movement Control.
- Capt. RYNNING - Yes.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Only way of making sure of the situation is for him to contact Base Operations, N'Djili and Air Operations HQ.
- Capt. RYNNING - If you call Air Operations, he has to call Base Operations, so you might as well call Base Operations direct.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Base Operations and Air Operations here had this information at least two hours before plane arrived.
- Capt. RYNNING - No one else interested in this aircraft and I did not know it was necessary to inform anyone.

SEVENTEENTH WITNESS: Sgt. Thorbjorn Bergh, Base Air Operations.

- Col. MOLLERSWARD - You belong to Base Operations?
- Sgt. BERGH - Yes.
- Col MOLLERSWARD - Did Base Operations during your duty yesterday (12/6) receive any message concerning the plane which arrived from Stanleyville carrying three VIPs?
- Sgt. BERGH - Yes, about 1500 LT. We received a message from the control tower. There were about 6 or 7 flights outside Leo and among those flights was this one. I did not know anything particular about that flight until someone called saying to expect security. I do not know where the call came from as I did not take the call.

Later, a fellow rushed in saying something about contacting security - very important people on plane. Also a UN civilian man came in asking me if the VIPs had arrived - then he ran out. Lt. Nygaard told me to remind Base Operations. I was looking out for Security. When I did not see them; I took telex down to Air Operations and asked them again to 'phone Security to hurry up. Security arrived 15 to 20 minutes after plane arrived.

- Capt. FOGARTY - Can you recollect what time you got information of ETA?
- Sgt. BERGH - A slip with name of plane, departure time from Stanleyville, Leo ETA, I received about 1500 from control tower. There was a man who 'phoned up saying very important persons on board.
- Capt. FOGARTY - We were told by a previous witness working in Base Operations that he got this information of ETA of plane at N'Djili about 1400 and he immediately conveyed this information to Movement Control, next door, and also to Air Operations HQ. Is that the proper procedure?
- Sgt. BERGH - Very hard for me to say. It was my first day. I only do what the 1st Lt. tells me to do. There is a big map on the board and, for instance, the slip from the control tower might say that plane is arriving at 1704 but it did not come before 1710 or 1715 so we must make it clear on the board.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Is it a duty of Base Operations, N'Djili, when such information is received from Flight Information Centre that he goes into Movement Control and writes ETA on the board in Movement Control?
- Sgt. BERGH - It has been, but I did not see it written down?
- Capt. FOGARTY - Did you mark it on your board?
- Sgt. BERGH - When it arrived. Just had it on a slip. It is no use for us to put it up until plane has arrived.  
They contact us from the tower.
- Capt. FOGARTY - You do not convey information at that time to Movement Control and not to Air Operations?
- Sgt. BERGH - If they ask us. Not as a matter of procedure. I don't think so.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Air Operations would have to ring Base Operations

N'Djili for information.

- Sgt. BERGH - I think so. They always know it here - half an hour before.
- Capt. FOGARTY - Have you telex communication between Base Operations and Air Operations?
- Sgt. BERGH - I remember the message sent to Air Operations, Capt. Rynning - told him that plane with three important persons just arrived about 5 minutes later.

EIGHTEENTH WITNESS: Sgt. Sven Erk LILJA, Swedish, L/O at Air OPS HQ and Movement Control.

At about 1420 hrs, when he was duty officer in the Air OPS, HQ., a man from the Security Office came and asked for the estimated arrival of this aircraft IAL. Lilja said that the aircraft was one hour delayed on his departure from Leo to Stanleyville. However he called directly the Flight Information Centre at N'Djili and got the information that the estimated time of arrival of this aircraft was 1628 ZT or 1728 LT. When Lilja left his duty afterwards he checked that when the plane was half its way to Leo the Chief Pilot found that, due to good flying conditions, he expected to arrive earlier. He had announced his arrival to 1610 ZT or 1710 LT. This message was delivered to the Air OPS HQ. The flight arrived at 1604 ZT or 1704 LT.

*File*

ONUC  
Leopoldville

30 April 1961

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 121

TO: All ONUC Civilian Personnel (including Field Offices)  
FROM: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer  
SUBJECT: Use of ONUC Aircraft and North Star Flights

This circular is designed to clarify the policy in respect of the allocation of space on UN aircraft and on North Star flights.

(1) ONUC personnel travelling on duty trips will have priority for space on UN aircraft and on North Star flights. Such priority will be lower than that for essential supplies and for ONUC mail.

(2) ONUC international civilian personnel travelling on leave either within the Congo or outside the Congo have no priority for space on UN aircraft and on North Star flights. They can use these aircraft only on a space-if-available basis.

(3) Non-ONUC personnel will NOT be permitted to travel on UN aircraft or on North Star flights unless this has been specifically authorized in writing by the Chief Administrative Officer or by the Force Commander. This applies as well to families of UN international civilian staff.

O N U C  
LEOPOLDVILLE

30 avril 1961

CIRCULAIRE ADMINISTRATIVE n° 121

Destinataires : Tous les membres du personnel civil de l'ONUC  
(y compris les bureaux régionaux)

Origine : S. Habib Ahmed, Chef des Services Administratifs

Objet : Voyages à bord des appareils de l'ONUC et du "NORTH STAR"

Cette circulaire est destinée à clarifier le système appliqué pour les voyages à bord des appareils de l'ONUC et du "NORTH STAR".

- 1) Les membres du personnel de l'ONUC qui se déplacent pour des missions officielles auront la priorité des places à bord des appareils de l'ONU et du "NORTH STAR". Cette priorité sera cependant subordonnée aux exigences du transport des fournitures indispensables et du courrier de l'ONUC.
- 2) Les membres du personnel civil international de l'ONUC qui partent en congé soit à l'intérieur du Congo, soit à l'étranger, ne jouissent pas d'une priorité pour voyager à bord des appareils de l'ONU et du "NORTH STAR". Ils ne pourront effectuer un tel voyage que dans la limite des places disponibles.
- 3) Les personnes étrangères à l'ONUC ne sont pas autorisées à voyager à bord des appareils de l'ONU et du "NORTH STAR", sauf dans le cas où elles sont expressément autorisées par écrit par le Chef des Services Administratifs ou le Commandant de la Force. Cette mesure s'applique également aux familles des membres du personnel civil international.

Col: J. J. Casseley.

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-MOV  
Dated: 20th April 1961

*Act*

To: List A, B, C and D  
ONUC Coquilhatville  
Kamina  
Movement Control detachment Albertville  
Elisabethville  
Goma  
Luluabourgh  
Matadi (Presently at N'Djili)  
N'Djili  
Port Francqui  
Stanleyville

From: Deputy Chief of Staff


Subject: AIRLIFT - NON UN PERSONNEL

Ref: MOV 1136 of 31 December -60

1. In view of the importance that this HQ attaches to the instructions contained in our above quoted reference, it is considered necessary to draw your attention to these once again.
- /, 2. It may please be noted that under no circumstances will non UN personnel repeat NON UN PERSONNEL be allowed air-lift on UN or UN chartered aircraft. This is particularly so in the case of Press Representatives, except ofcourse those who belong to ONUC ie are in uniform and forming part of an ONUC contingent.
- X 3. Non UN personnel may however, under very special circumstances, be permitted by the Force Commander to travel on an UN or UN chartered aircraft. This is an exception rather than the rule.
- X 4. The Force Commander has delegated the Administration of this power of making exceptions to the above general rule to his Military Asstt, who does so in the name of and under the authority of the Force Commander.
5. When ever the Military Asstt approves of a particular journey by a non UN person in an UN aircraft, he must sign and stamp the Movement Order/Travel Authorisation. Failing this signature and stamp, non UN personnel will not repeat not be allowed to board an aircraft.
6. In case of journeys commencing from a station other than Leopoldville, and time permitting, the Movement Order/Travel Authorisation duly signed and stamped as above will be transmitted to the post/station concerned. When time does not permit this, the Military Asstt to the Force Commander will convey to the Chief Movement Control Officer his assent to the journey in writing, who will then cable his Movement Control Detachment or, where none exists, the person discharging those duties. In such cases the Movement Order/Travel Authorisation will then be signed locally and the cable retained as confirmation of the authority.

Continued on page 2

7. All requests from outstations will therefore be communicated to Chief Movement Control for obtaining the necessary sanction of the Military Asstt to the Force Commander. Requests so made will show full itinerary of the person for whom airlift is requested and will be supported with full reasons necessitating/initiating such an action.
8. Officer incharge Movement Control Detachment or where none exists, the person discharging those duties, will be **personally** held responsible for any contravention of the above instructions.
9. The Force Commander directs that the above instructions be reproduced every month in local station orders to ensure that these are not lost sight of. Contravention of these orders will be viewed seriously.
10. Please acknowledge receipt and confirm that the above instructions are understood.

 Col  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
(J. J. QUINN)

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX 1  
TO MIL INFO 5/A/3  
DATED 11 APR 61

SCHEDULE  
FLIGHT NO DE 252  
D - ABEF  
8 APR 61

Schedule:

dep. EDDH 082200 arr EBBR 082345  
dep. EBBR 090200 arr LICC 090905  
dep. LICC 091100 arr FFFT 092025  
dep. FFFT 100100 arr FFFF 100700  
dep. FFFF 100800 arr FCQM 101230  
  
dep. FCQM 111000 arr DNKK 112015  
dep. DNKK 112200 arr IMLI 120540  
dep. IMLI 120700 arr LIMG 121140

Charterer:

Luftsammelfracht, Hamburg

Consignee:

Air Cameroon, Brazzaville

Shipper:

Comme ton Anstall, Zurich

Load:

7600 kos general cargo from Brussels to Kolwezi

Handling Agents:

SABENA Brussels EBBR EBBRSN  
OPEN Katania LICC  
SABENA Fortlami FFFT FFTTSN  
UAT Brazzaville FFFF FFFFUT  
Air Kasai, Kolwezi OPEN FCQM

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

12. The flights are cleared by SABENA (BRUSSELS) with OPEN at CATANIA (ITALY), SABENA at FORT LAMY (CHAD), UAT (BRAZZAVILLE) and AIR KASAI (KOLWEZI).

13. The crew was most cooperative and it appeared that they were NOT involved in this particular deal. The German Ambassador's representative, Mr. HUBER, has been permitted to see them.

↑ //

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 2 -

6. (continued)

At BRUSSELS, the cargo was loaded at the International Airport at night. The cargo manifest was given as freight and dated 9 Apr 61. The flight departed BRUSSELS on schedule. During the flight the crew noticed that boxes were marked in German "POLICE ARMS FOR CONGO REPUBLIQUE". The cargo consisted of 428 pieces. These pieces included wooden boxes (steel strapped), metal boxes (small and large) and large packages wrapped with carton and tied with ropes. As previously stated the boxes were stencilled in German "POLICE ARMS".

7. The flight arrived at KOLWEZI on the 10 Apr 61 at 1242 GMT and departed at 1359 GMT on the 10 Apr 61. At the airport, the cargo was unloaded into vehicles and transactions for the authorities were handled by a woman (white) who spoke French and gave a receipt:

"Recu le 10 Avril 1961 pour GILLET"  
her initials

She added that more cargo was expected from SWITZERLAND.

8. The flight proceeded to KAMINA for refuelling and rest. They rested but were NOT refuelled. They arrived KAMINA at 1504 GMT on the 10 Apr 61 and departed on the 11 Apr 61 at 0753 GMT to arrive at LEO at 1140 GMT on the 11 Apr 61. At LEO (N'DJILI) the aircraft was refuelled (2808 gallons) but did NOT take off on orders from UN authorities. In fact, the Captain did NOT have to come to LEO but could have gone to BRAZZAVILLE as he stated.

9. The shipment is from ZURICH (shipper: COMME TON ANSTALL) and it was consigned to AIR CAMEROON - BRAZZAVILLE.

10. This aircraft was returning from LEO to DALBENGA to pick up flowers and the first half would be unloaded at NURNBERG and the second half at HAMBURG.

11. a. The shipment originated from ZURICH and was despatched to BRUSSELS;

b. SABENA is chartering foreign aircraft to despatch cargos to KATANGA.

.../3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared by Maj O R Monette  
Military Information

*See*  
MIL INFO 5/A/3

12 APR 61

Advise by Capt W Fiddes  
ONUC MP Coy

INTERROGATION REPORT  
FLIGHT NO DE 252  
D-ABEF  
8 APR 61

*in Collier 68 sec*  
*11A*  
*Sum*  
*12/4*

GENERAL

1. At approximately 1700 hrs, 11 Apr 61, Air Operations requested Military Information to investigate with Special Investigation Branch a report that a SABENA chartered aircraft had landed at N'DJILI airport after completing a mission in SOUTH KATANGA. It had been reported that their given mission was to unload a cargo of arms at KOLWEZI - SOUTH KATANGA.

2. We proceeded to N'DJILI airport to investigate. As it was impractical to interrogate at the airport the aircraft captain and aircrew were brought to the office of Military Information under protective custody. The interrogation was carried out and personnel provided with rations and quarters under the authority of DCOS.

INTERROGATION

3. It has been established that the DC4 aircraft, the property of CONTINENTALE AIRWAYS - FUHLSEBUTTEL HAMBURG - GERMANY, was on schedule flight NO DE 252 D-ABEF dated 8 Apr 61 from BRUSSELS to KOLWEZI.

4. SABENA chartered the DC4 aircraft from CONTINENTAL AIRWAYS to proceed from BRUSSELS to KOLWEZI via SICILY (CATANIA) - CHAD (FORTLAMU) - BRAZZAVILLE - KOLWEZI with 7213 kilograms of cargo.

5. The DC4 aircraft left HAMBURG for BRUSSELS and arrived at 0257 GMT on the 9 Apr 61. Attached as Annex 1 is the flight plan of the DC4 flight number DE 252/D-ABEF.

6. On departing from HAMBURG, the Captain and his crew inquired on the type of cargo to be flown. The operations manager of CONTINENTAL AIRWAYS Mr. HORNEI, told them it was normal cargo and did NOT include arms and the flight, like all flights, was authorized by BONN.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

after the landing! Next landing was in Brazzaville and then finally Kolwezi.

He said he and the rest of the crew now flying for ONUC had realized that this weapon flying for Tshombe was a disgusting business. Consequently the crew had decided when rotated back to Europe they would refuse to fly any more of these trips. Because, as he said, the Company wouldn't dare to order us".


Finally he asked me not to give his name as he had his future to think of too. That, I promised. To the best of my memory those are the complete details of my conversation with the Continentale crew.

I found out that BEF was supposed to leave about 1700 hrs and drove to the Headquarters where I reported the main items of the story to Wing Commander Dobbin in Air Ops. Then we both reported to the Air Commander.

A Canadian Security-Major and a Canadian MP/Captain were called in and it was decided that these two and I were to go immediately to the airport and try to examine the crew. Furthermore I instructed my assistants in Base Ops at the airport to report immediately to the Air Ops. if BEF was about to take off. That happened when we were on our way out to the airport, and Wing Comm. Dobbin passed through the message to the Tower Controller at the airport to return to the parking space and that the crew had to report to Base Ops.

When we arrived at the airport the crew was waiting in my office.

What happened from then on is a matter for the UNOC security.

  
(H. Haeroid) Major  
Chief Base Ops.

PS: The acting Base C/o. was not present on the Base when all reported in this letter happened and could not be contacted on the phone. Due to the importance of the matter I then had to report as I did.-

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

12 April 1961

A : Supreme Commander, ONUC Forces

De : Maj Hereid, Chief Base Ops, N'Djili

Objet : Flight by Continentale Aircraft to Katanga

Several times during the last two months, Continentale has had DC4s through Brazzaville Airport. These have not been chartered by ONUC. During the same period the above mentioned company has had one DC4 chartered by ONUC through Sabena.

Whenever the non UN chartered aircraft landed in Brazzaville one of the Commanders on the same company's UN chartered DC4 went over to Brazzaville. In one case the crew member told me that he was to collect aircraft parts, in another case he said that he should meet the Brazzaville crew because they were not too familiar with the conditions down here and later on he told me a different story. One he went over in the afternoon to be there when the aircraft landed at 0400 in the morning. When I asked what they were doing down there, I never got a straight answer.

Yesterday, 11 Apr around 1200, Continentales DC4 BEF landed at N'Djili from Kamina. BEF was chartered by UN up to the 25 of Mar, then BEB of the same company. I asked a crew member on BEB what BEF was doing down here. He then told me with a smile, "Same thing like Seven Seas". "Are they flying for Tshombe" I said. "Well in some way" was the answer. Then I asked why they landed in Kamina and he said they tried to be refuelled there, but they had no fuel there so they came to N'Djili. Why I said didn't they refuel in Elisabethville because it is not normal for non UN aircraft to go to Kamina for refuelling. Then he gave me the story. He said they were flying arms and ammo to Katanga. The cases used to be marched Police Equipment. On each trip they were bringing from either Brussels or Italy between 7 and 8 hours down to Kolwezi in Katanga (no UN troops there). The place in Italy was near a well known weapon factory, something like Lambrella he said (most probably Beretta). He had been on the first trip and he was convinced that this last one was at least the fourth if not the fifth. On the first trip they landed in Malta for refuelling. The customs people were about to check if, but didn't since the load was addressed to Congo, Brazzaville, (but they thought it was a lot of weapon for the police). After that he believed they never have landed in Malta on the way down to Congo. After Malta they landed somewhere in French Equatorial Africa, where the runway was blocked before and

2. Captain Fiddes, on the advice of Colonel Hajeebhoy, Chief of Military Personnel, sought my advice as to whether he and other officers were empowered to make the necessary investigations and interrogate the crew before any further action was taken. In view of the Security Council's resolutions and the Secretary-General's interpretations thereof, it is perfectly clear that, in the circumstances outlined by Captain Fiddes, there was a "prima facie" case for the belief that the aircraft and the crew were involved in bringing in ammunition and military material into the Congo otherwise than through United Nations channels. I therefore gave Captain Fiddes a note authorising him and Major Monnet, and such other officers as they may nominate, to investigate as considered necessary into this matter.

3. Since you were engaged at the moment and since Captain Fiddes was on his way to the airport and considered it very urgent that he have some authority, I took it upon myself to give him an authorising note pending your subsequent approval. As you know, I brought this matter to your personal attention at 5:15 p.m. this afternoon in the presence of the Force Commander and the Deputy Force Commander. I have requested Captain Fiddes to keep me informed of the results of his investigation. But since the Force Commander has now issued instructions to Colonel Mitra, the Chief of Military Operations, I presume that any information and necessary action will be taken by the Military Command. This is submitted for your information as a written report.

*N. Kanakarathne*



BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

11 April 1961

A : Mr. M. Abbas, Acting Special Representative  
De : N. Kanakarathne, Legal Adviser  
Objet :

This afternoon at 4:45 p.m. Capt. W. Fiddes, Deputy Provost Marshal, reported to me the following facts and sought legal advice as to our right to investigate into the matter:

Last night an aircraft belonging to Air Continental, affiliated to Sabena Airlines, landed at Kamina Airport and sought facilities for refuelling for an onward journey to Europe. The personnel at Kamina were led to believe that the aircraft was on charter to ONUC since all its crew wore blue berets and had ONUC arm-bands on their sleeves. The crew was European. In view of the shortage of aircraft fuel at Kamina, the local ONUC personnel had regretted their inability to assist in the refuelling of the aircraft and advised that it come to Leopoldville. The aircraft apparently arrived at N'Djili Airport sometime in the forenoon today. It bore no markings except the letters BEF. The crew were still wearing blue berets and ONUC arm-bands. It was suspected that the aircraft had carried ammunition and military material into Katanga, presumably from Brussels, and was on its return journey. In the aircraft apparently were found some empty cases marked "Police" which could have been cases of ammunition. It was also suspected that among the crew were some of German nationality and some of Belgian nationality. Under the circumstances, the military decided that it would be wise, in view of the suspicious circumstances, to make investigations and to interrogate the crew before permitting the aircraft to leave. The aircraft is still at N'Djili Airport and the crew are presumed to be in the city.

Unless instructions have been received to the contrary prior to the arrival of the flight, the aircraft arriving from abroad, its passengers and the cargo will be inspected and a report submitted to the Force Commander. A guard will be posted at the aircraft until further instructions. Any suspicious cargo for which there is no proper documentation or which does not appear to correspond to the documentation will be retained under U.N. custody until further instructions. The crew of the plane will be invited, and if necessary escorted, <sup>or</sup> for interview by the Commanding Officer who will decide whether the crew should be retained for further interrogation. Under no circumstances will the plane be allowed to depart before permission has been obtained from the U.N. Force Head-Quarters in Leopoldville.

Local representatives of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo ~~in Leopoldville~~ will, if available, be consulted and their co-operation sought in the carrying out of the above actions.

Unoccupied Airfields Frequent recce flights at irregular intervals will be carried out over any airfields at which no U.N. troupes are deployed. A full report will be immediately submitted on any suspicious movements observed during such flights.

Frontier Control United Nations' Forces stationed at or in the vicinity of frontier crossings at which the Central Government at Leopoldville ~~had~~ <sup>have</sup> not



established control posts, will carry out spot checks at irregular intervals and different places to verify whether <sup>any</sup> ~~not~~ introduction of arms, military equipment or supplies is taking place.

To this end, United Nations patrols are authorized to stop vehicles and to visit trains moving on routes designated from time to time by the Force Commander.

## ROUTING SLIP

TO

Major O'Brien

APPROVAL	NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE	YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE	FOR ACTION

Dr Fabry has prepared  
the attached draft instructions  
re control of airports for  
possible issue by F.C. to all  
C.O.'s. Please let me know  
if you agree with them & if  
F.C. feels he wants to issue them.

DATE

29

VIII

FROM



DRAFT

Operational Instructions

Aim.

According to United Nations Resolutions, the Secretary General has to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the introduction of arms, military equipment and supplies into the Congo. The Government of the Republic of the Congo also has asked United Nations assistance in insuring that no ~~military~~ <sup>flights</sup> take place in or out of the Congo except if they were ~~equipment, no arms or supplies, are illegally introduced into~~ <sup>authorized by the Central Government</sup> the Country.

4. Airfield Control. The Officer Commanding <sup>the</sup> ~~of~~ United Nations <sup>unit</sup> ~~on~~ <sup>an</sup> airfield~~s~~ will keep a log-book in which he will enter the arrival and departure of each flight, the registration number of the plane, the provenance or destination of the flight, the number of passengers and, in the extent possible, the nature and amount of cargo.

5. Foreign flights. The Officer Commanding will immediately report, for transmission to the Force Commander, the arrival of any flight originating outside the Republic of the Congo, other than scheduled flights, a list of which will be provided, <sup>or flights</sup> ~~or flight~~ authorized by the Central Government, the arrival of which will be notified in advance.

NOTES FOR COL CAMELEY RE NON-UN PERSONNEL TRAVELLING ON UN A/C

Air

Praenotenda

1. Only UN personnel may travel on UN a/c.
2. An exception to 1 above can only be made on the authority of the Under Secretary of UN. In the case of UN air transport service in the Congo the Under Secretary with the authority to make such an exception is the Force Comdr.
3. The Force Comdr has delegated the administration of this power of making exceptions to the general rule to his Mil Asst, who does so in the name of and by authority of the Force Comdr. When he approves of the particular journey by a non-UN person in a UN a/c he must sign and stamp the Movement Order. Failing this signature and stamp non-UN personnel are not allowed to board a/c in Leo. In the case of journeys commencing from stations other than Leo, if time permits a mov order signed and stamped as above, is transmitted to the post concerned. When time does not permit this the Mil Asst to Force Comdr conveys his assent to the journey in written form to the Chief Mov Control Officer who then cables his Mov Cont detachment or, where none exists, the person discharging those duties, and the Mov Order is then signed locally, the cable being retained as confirmation of the authority.

Precedents

The following are types of cases in which authority has been granted for non-UN personnel to fly in UN a/c:

1. Journalists and representatives of charitable organizations concerned in the Bakwanga Famine Relief

Such permission has been granted only for journeys LEO/BAKWANGA/LEO and in all cases the recommendation of Mr Grün, or in his absence his 2ic, must be endorsed on the Mov Order prior to its signature by the Mil Asst.

2. Visiting civilian or military dignitaries

This refers only to persons whose visit has been properly notified through New York and permission granted by Special Rep in the case of civilians and Force Comdr in the case of military, and only for journeys between LEO and the posts in which troops of their nationality are stationed.

3. Congolese Employees of UN

This applies only when their journey is connected with the work for which they are employed.

4. Congolese Politicians or their families

This applies only when the journey is specially authorised by the Special Rep.

5. Persons under UN protection

This applies only when journeys by commercial aircraft are either not possible or would involve possible danger to the persons concerned.

6. Meroy Cases

Persons in danger of death who need hospitalization and no suitable civil a/c available.

7. Students under UN auspices

In this case clearance from the appropriate organ of the UN is required and 6th floor certifies that ONUC is responsible for cost of travel.

8. Wives and families of ONUC personnel

This applies only when the move in question of these members of the family is a UN financial responsibility or where families are joining the ONUC member at his duty station and no commercial a/c operate.

9. Officers of ANC when the journey is undertaken at UN request.

Examples of Requests Which Have Been Refused

1. Wives and families of ONUC officials on holiday.
2. Members of religious organizations whose organizations are poor.
3. Congolese students not on studentship organised through UN.
4. Journalists other than Bakwanga.
5. Diplomats other than those already mentioned in 2 above.

Underlying Principles

1. We are not in competition with commercial airlines, nor should we take business from them without extremely good cause.
2. Unless the move of the non-UN personnel concerned is specially ordered by UN, If permission be granted for the move the Mov Order should be endorsed "on space available basis and at own risk only".
3. In examining new type case care should always be taken that we do not establish a precedent that could open the way for numerous other applicants.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS  
UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248  
LEOPOLDVILLE  
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO  
CABLE: ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

*File*

Note for Force Commander

1  
Otter light aircraft was ordered yesterday (10 April) to move from Elisabethville to Kabalo. Expected to arrive Kabalo today. There is a fuel problem in Kabalo in relation to light aircraft. Air Ops are trying to arrange airlift of this fuel.

Col Quinn

11 April  
1220 hrs

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 307 B  
ELISABETHVILLE  
CABLE: ONUC, ELISABETHVILLE

*File*  
**SECRET**

From G. Dumontet, Chief ONUC Civilian Officer, Elisabethville *G. Dumontet*  
To Mr. M. Abbas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General,  
Leopoldville  
Subject Airlift of ammunition in Katanga *Am*  
Date 31 March 1961

On Saturday 25 March Seven Seas Airline DC-4 loaded a number of cylinders containing 16 mm mortar shells. The operation took place at night at the E'ville airport and was witnessed by a number of UN personnel. The markings on the cross-section of one of the cylinders were as follows :

60 mm mortar M1 and M2  
SHELL HE M 49 A 2  
LOT 6951 - 35 KOP  
(6 rounds)  
Container 60 mm - M 51.

The side of the cylinders bore the hand painted sign "A'ville".

The loading operation took place next to UN planes and included a number of non-military items, food and otherwise. The DC-4 was painted in white like UN planes but bore no markings except the serial number identifying it as registered in the U.S.

The first results of our investigation on the matter indicated that the mortar shells were brought at night by trucks to the airport. As for the make of the shells, our HQ has asked Stockholm to investigate on the basis of the markings above-mentioned but we have not had the answer yet. We will forward it to you as soon as it reaches us.

Notified of this incident, the U.S. Consul came yesterday to our Office with Earl Drew, Vice-President of the Seven Seas Airline. The Consul informed us of a new ruling of the U.S. Department of Commerce prohibiting the transport by US registered vessels or aircraft from any points of origin to destinations

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in the Congo of (1) arms, ammunition, and implements of war, (2) aircraft engines and parts, (3) trucks, busses and jeeps of military design, and (4) bayonets, except where such items transported under specific authority or licence granted by Department of Commerce.

As for Earl Drew, he acknowledged that the shells had been put by the Katangese in the lot his company was asked to transport on the 26 of March, but said that as soon as he realized that they were ammunition he ordered his men not to carry it. We asked if he had got an order of requisition from the Katangese to load these shells. He answered he did not know but would investigate. He also assured us that the order not to transport the shells had been carried out by his men but agreed nevertheless to check on this point. Drew also acknowledged that under the new ruling of Department of Commerce he could not have operated as he did before and mentioned specifically the importation in Katanga of the Fuga Majister. During all conversation, Drew gave us the impression of being evasive and non-committal.