

LEOPOLDVILLE  
28 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

D-218 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL

Following just received addressed to you from Kasa-Vubu.  
Our comments will follow.

QUOTE

. . . . .

UNQUOTE

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général  
de l'Organisation des Nations  
Unies  
à NEW - YORK (U.S.A.)

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser la réception de la lettre du 14 janvier de votre Représentant Spécial à Léopoldville, répondant au mémorandum en treize points que je vous ai fait parvenir le 7 janvier.

Il n'entre pas dans mes intentions de reprendre point par point les différents problèmes abordés dans cette lettre, dont je me plais à souligner la tendance compréhensive à l'égard de nos thèses. C'est cette tendance qui me pousse à vous faire part aujourd'hui des réactions du Gouvernement de la République devant la façon dont l'O.N.U. envisage sa mission face à la situation qui se développe dans les Provinces Orientales et du Kivu.

Toute l'argumentation développée par cette lettre repose sur une analogie qu'on établit entre la situation des Provinces précitées et celle du Katanga en août 1960; on souligne cette analogie par le rappel du rapport présenté le 6 août 1960 par vous-même au Conseil de Sécurité. Or il ne peut y avoir la moindre comparaison entre les deux situations : le Katanga, lorsqu'il se dressa contre le Gouvernement Central du Congo, était et est toujours dirigé par un gouvernement régulier, issu d'élections régulières et dont personne n'a contesté la légalité. Ses dissensions avec le Gouvernement Central posaient une question de rapports entre autorités également valables et l'arbitrage d'un conflit entre ces deux pouvoirs sortait nettement du cadre de la mission de l'O.N.U. au Congo, surtout que le Gouvernement Central voulait utiliser la Force des Nations Unies pour régler à son avantage un conflit d'attributions juridiques.

.../...



Il en va tout autrement dans le cas de la Province Orientale et du Kivu; les GIZENGA, KASHAMURA et consorts n'ont aucune autorité légale; ils ont supplanté, emprisonné ou fait fuir les Ministres Provinciaux et grâce à des appuis qu'ils ont su se ménager dans certaines garnisons locales, ils ont usurpé le pouvoir et se sont emparé de l'appareil policier et militaire qui leur assure une autorité basée sur la terreur. Grâce à cette usurpation, ils rançonnent, pillent, arrêtent et torturent sans discontinuer. La terreur, la dévastation et la mort règnent dans ces deux Provinces; les bandes armées ont pu y donner un tel libre cours à tous leurs instincts que déjà actuellement leurs chefs ne les contrôlent plus. La dégradation est telle que des représentants diplomatiques nous ont fait part de leurs plus vives inquiétudes et que des délégués de la Croix-Rouge Internationale, de retour à Léopoldville, ont convoqué les chefs de missions diplomatiques pour leur faire part de leurs tragiques constatations.

Devant cette situation, l'O.N.U.C. ne peut rester passive; il ne s'agit pas d'un conflit de compétences entre un Gouvernement Central et un Gouvernement Provincial, mais bien d'une lutte à outrance livrée par des éléments subversifs contre un Pouvoir Central légal. Ces éléments subversifs sèment dans toute la région qu'ils contrôlent, la terreur et la désolation. Or, si la Force des Nations Unies a été envoyée au Congo, c'est pour y assurer le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité; ce n'est pas intervenir dans la politique intérieure du Congo, que d'aider le gouvernement légal à rétablir l'ordre et d'empêcher les tortures, les pillages et les vexations de tous genres, accomplis sous l'égide de quelques pêcheurs en eau trouble qui se prétendent gouvernement.

Lorsque donc le Gouvernement du Congo, régulièrement accrédité auprès des Nations Unies, s'adresse à la Force de l'ONU pour l'aider à extirper ce régime de terreur, il s'adresse à la seule autorité qui peut lui apporter une aide militaire importante et rapide en vertu des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité, et il s'étonne des objections juridiques et autres qu'on fait valoir, alors que la gravité de la situation requerrait des effets immédiats. Il est de la plus haute importance en effet que le gouvernement reçoive cette assistance militaire dans le cadre de l'O.N.U. sans quoi il sera contraint de chercher cette assistance en dehors, malgré les risques évidents d'internationalisation du conflit que cette recherche comportera. Il ne peut en effet admettre plus longtemps que des populations entières souffrant les pires maux, sous le joug d'une dictature qu'elles n'ont certainement pas demandée et dont toutes les couches de la population subissent, terrorisées, les exactions.

.../...



Je demande dès lors avec insistance que les Forces des Nations Unies interviennent au besoin par la force, pour faire cesser les violences et pour rétablir les autorités légales dans leurs attributions, ce qui sera le prélude nécessaire à la restauration de la paix et de la tranquillité du pays. Sans l'appui des Nations Unies, le terrorisme aura encore le temps de faire sentir son poids sur de nombreuses populations et de nombreuses vies humaines auront été perdues, avant que les forces loyales de l'Armée Nationale ne puissent être suffisamment réorganisées pour rétablir l'ordre partout. Et il ne se concevrait pas que des garnisons entières de soldats des Nations Unies restent pendant ce temps l'arme au pied, obligées de contempler ces tableaux de violence, sans exercer leur véritable mission de rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité, alors que tous les pays membres s'imposent de lourds sacrifices pour permettre à cette Force d'être efficace et partout présente.

La presse locale a publié en octobre les photos d'un soldat ghanéen, bras croisés à Léopoldville, contemplant l'agression d'une bande de voyous portant des coups et des blessures au Commissaire Général NDELE; cette photo a fait une profonde impression dans tous les milieux. Si, dans les jours prochains, les contingents des Nations Unies continuent à rester passifs devant les actes de violence les plus graves, cette photo deviendra la représentation la plus exacte de leur attitude dans tous les centres importants des deux Provinces touchées par la subversion. Elle sera l'image de la faillite complète de l'action de l'O.N.U. au Congo.

Personne au Congo ne souhaite cette faillite, personne dans le monde n'est prêt à l'admettre, sauf ceux qui attisent du dehors la subversion. Aussi vous demanderais-je instamment, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, de faire tout ce qu'il est encore temps de faire pour rétablir la paix.

Une correspondance séparée traitera de la question de l'avion de la République Arabe-Unie qui stationne pour le moment à Gemena, après avoir atterri sans autorisation déjà à Lisala.

.../...



- 4 -  
Je saisis cette occasion pour  
renouveler à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général les  
assurances de ma haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

J. KASA-YUBU.-

LE PRESIDENT DU COLLEGE DES COMMISSAIRES GENERAUX,  
COMMISSAIRE GENERAL AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.-

J. BOMBOKO.-



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 28 January 1961  
NO : 0-217

Your 649 and 651 regarding the Bases.

We have done our best to head off any rash attempt to seize the Bases by sending a formal letter to Kasavubu, by a joint meeting with Bomboko, and this morning Rikhye at a farewell meeting with Kasavubu explained the position to him and got an assurance to the effect that force would not be used. Kasavubu however said that the ANC was short of arms and enquired whether the UN could help in the matter.

2. Nevertheless, we are not going to allow ourselves to be taken by surprise and we have asked Kettani to take up the matter with Bomboko and to reinforce the Moroccans at Kitona.

3. The publication of your letter of 21st January to the Belgian Government would be most timely. In their enthusiasm to hand over the Bases, thus stoking the <sup>fires</sup> ~~first~~ of civil war, I hope the Belgians will also realise that only the Secretary-General and the Security Council can interpret their mutual relationship in regard to the matter.



OUTGOING CODE

hmc  
ns  
28/1

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 28 January 1961  
No : D- 216

In view of clarification of position concerning bases contained in your 477-8, points raised in paragraph 6 of my 123-4-5 become relevant. I noted your offer, in last paragraph of your note to Belgian Government of 21 January, to discuss matter of their movable property, other than arms and ammunition. On other hand their note to you of 10 January cabled in your 214 has not been replied to. I am not clear as to what you consider should be next move, and where. Alternatives would appear to be (a) to wait for Belgian reaction to your note of 21 January; or (b) to prepare new note verbale to Belgium presenting position outlined in paragraph 6 of my 123-4-5, which would be at same time follow-up of your note of 21 January and reply to their note of 10 January; or (c) to press this position at local level, i.e. in Kamina and Kitona. Please advise.



OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE  
27 January 1961

UNATIONS  
NEW YORK

D-214 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL

Your 539.

1. 38 persons were arrested in Stanleyville on 19 and 20 January and all have been released. Crabbe and Raes are both free and in good health and spirits.
2. 32 of the Stanleyville detainees were taken to the military camp where, under regulations said to have been enacted under the Belgian administration and to be unfortunately still in force, 30 of them are reported to have received 8 whip strokes, and one person 12 whip strokes. One detainee was left untouched. Amongst those who were whipped 4 were also beaten. 3 of the latter have no traces left but one (M. Champagne) shows marks of beating and is still recovering.
3. A further 10 persons were arrested in Dinjila and 3 in Aketi. All these were released the next day.
4. There is as yet no information from Stanleyville on the 6 Belgians and 2 Swiss said to have been arrested in Kivu and transferred to Stanleyville, but we are still inquiring both in Stanleyville and in Kivu.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 27 January 1961  
NO : 0-213

Charpentier saw me this morning in a very different mood to his two previous rather emotional appearances. He showed full appreciation for what had been and is being done. He felt that the action taken by our people has already produced results and as a result the Belgian Government recommends that while women and children should be withdrawn, the men should remain, regroup themselves as necessary in case of threat so as to be able to avail themselves of UN protection. Those who are not threatened should continue where they are. We have instructed Duran and Miller to convey these instructions to the Consuls concerned and to approach Gizenga to arrange for the evacuation of the women and children. When the figures of the evacuees are known, arrangements to fly them out must be made by the envoys concerned. But if there is objection to Air Congo planes, we could utilize UN aircraft.

2. On 25 January Manzikala announced in Kishwahili over radio Stanleyville that all Belgians over 21 may be asked to pay a tax of 30,000 Congolese francs per head. No executive measures have been taken yet but the successful extortion of 500,000 francs seems to have set a monstrous example.

3. Archbishop Kinsch of Stanleyville informed Duran that all Catholic missionaries will continue their work regardless of the circumstances, and that priests will be sent home only in cases of emergency or at the end of their service. He stated that although it was possible that some outposts near the Equateur frontier may have been evacuated, he thought the measure would be only temporary, due to the actual fighting in the neighbourhood.

4. The Archbishop went on to say that general European evacuation would result in social and economic disaster. It must, therefore, be avoided at all costs. The European population was, he felt, an element of security for the Congolese and that it was only natural that the Congolese would resist an attempt by Europeans to leave en masse. A total evacuation would create panic



which would spread to the Congolese themselves who would then have no alternative but to return to jungle life. Archbishop Kinsch recommended that the evacuation of women, children and the sick be carried out "very slowly and with utmost care".

5. Alfred Larson, missionary in charge of the "unevangelized field missions" in Orientale, doubts that the Baptist missions have had trouble although he has not had any news from them as the attitude of the Congolese towards the missionaries has so far been friendly.

6. Duran has just discussed the evacuation question with Gizenga, who was friendly, moderate and reasonable. He was amenable to the proposal to evacuate women, children and the sick, but stressed that every effort must be made to prevent a repetition of the July panic. The evacuation of women, children and the sick should take place slowly and discreetly. He agreed in principle to establish a permanent UN "centre d'accueil" in Stanleyville, though stated he would have to consult his colleagues.



OUTGOING CODE

*Jm.*

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 27 JANUARY 1961  
NO : D- 210, 211, 212

The following is ONUC weekly report (17-23 January)  
as cabled to civilian affairs officers in the provinces :  
Quote

A. MILITARY AND SECURITY

Equateur

Discontent over salaries .....

.....

was briefly imprisoned at the same time as  
Lumumba supporters were being rounded up.



OUTGOING CODE

To :	MILLER, BUKAVU	BU- 108	(mail)
	VAN DER GOOT, CO. NILHATVILLE	CV- 31	
	BERENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE	EV- 27	
	WRIGHT, KAMINA	KA- 32	(mail)
	VEILLET-LAVALLEE, LULUABOURG	LU- 38	
	DURAN, STANLEYVILLE	SV- 105	
	BRZAK, ALBERTVILLE	AV- 24	(mail)

*ju*

From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 27 January 1961

Weekly Report to the Provinces: 17-23 January 1961

A. MILITARY AND SECURITY

Equateur

Discontent over salaries and political influences have affected the morale of large sections of the ANC and gendarmerie, and their loyalty to the Leopoldville authorities is extremely doubtful at the moment so that military strength along the border of Orientale Province does not afford real security against encroachment by other ANC factions. Perhaps as a result, the Government's attitude towards ONUC forces has taken a turn for the better, although agitation against UAR Battalion is continuing.

Kivu

The security of Europeans continues to be in jeopardy. Reassuring statements were no guarantee that the intentions of those in power could be followed up in view of their lack of control over ANC troops. Reports of maltreatment were, in many cases exaggerated but ONUC forces are too small to protect all Europeans or even send patrols wherever help is requested, especially in outlying districts.

Kasai

The Luluabourg Government has blamed ONUC for not making immediate reconnaissance in the Kabinda area, following reports of crossing of the frontier by Kalonji troops. However, on 19 January, ONUC officials discussed the question with Messrs. Kalonji and Ngalula and the troops have been withdrawn behind undefined de facto frontier.



### Katanga

There have been reports of indiscriminate attacks both by Balubakat and the gendarmerie. The latter announced that, in retaliation for rebel attacks, they burned four villages in the area of Kabondo-Dianda. On the other side, the gendarmes reported that Balubakat burned two villages and a farm north of Albertville and that two women and two children were killed.

The Swedish train escort returning from Bukama reached Luena, but had to take up defensive positions; Baluba are surrounding the area.

The Katanga gendarmerie showed a readiness to return to the pre-January situation at Luena, while demanding the withdrawal of Moroccan troops. UN, in negotiations with gendarmerie, is seeking a definite neutralization of Luena town and of the railway line running north from Lubudi, through Luena and Bukama, to Kabondo-Dianda, as a prerequisite to discussions with Balubakat for re-opening this vital line. Further north, efforts are also being made to re-open the railway; UN is pressing the gendarmerie to repair the Kabale-Kongolo line which they cut in order to stop ANC troops movements. Baluba Chiefs have agreed to help re-open the railway between Nyunzu and Albertville.

The Tshombe Government announced that talks would be held for a military agreement with Leopoldville and Bakwanga.

### B. POLITICAL

#### Equateur

At Coquilhatville, the Conciliation Commission consulted on 19 January with the Provincial President Eketebi, the President of the Provincial Assembly Ekoko and Mr. Thaddée Domba a member of the House of Representatives (PUNA). Mr. Eketebi gave interesting information on the two ethnic Congresses (see Weekly Report 10-16 January). The purpose of the Congresses was to rally tribal support for the two authorized political parties, following the suppression of MEC-Lumumba, which formerly had two national deputies from Equateur, and two Provincial Ministers. Mr. Eketebi told the Commission that each Congress sought the division of the Equateur into two provinces. A strong Lumumba minority was in evidence at the Congresses.



### Kivu

All decisions continued to be taken, either jointly or separately, by two men, Mr. Kashamura, the Provincial President and Mr. Mungul Diaka, the "Commissaire d'Etat" for Kivu. Mr. Kashamura gave assurances as to the re-opening of the frontier with Ruanda-Urundi and denied that any Europeans would be held as hostages; he also acted promptly and effectively to suppress irresponsible youth activities.

### Kasai

As in other Provinces, Mr. Lumumba's transfer has caused some concern, extending to members of the Provincial Government. There have been warnings of outbreaks of violence if he were not released soon.

Relations between the Provincial Government and ONUC are gradually returning to normal after the crisis created by frontier incidents with Kalonji forces (see Military above).

### Katanga

The Government has not relaxed its position with regard to the Baluba leaders and has refused to negotiate in any respect with them. Mr. Tshombe has declined to hold an official meeting with the Conciliation Commission.

There have been such signs of a rapprochement with Leopoldville as is exemplified in the transfer of Mr. Lumumba and his fellow prisoners. The visit of Mr. Delvaux has been an occasion for cordial contacts between Leopoldville and Katanga.

## C. ECONOMIC

### Equateur

At a Press Conference the Provincial Minister of Finance described his efforts for balancing the budget and fighting inflation (see Weekly Report 2-9 January). He said that a sound financial administration including customs, was necessary and that a substantial increase in production must precede any overall increase in salaries and wages. This realistic statement has disappointed the population to whom exaggerated promises had been made during the election period, and pro-Lumumba feelings have been strengthened.



In the Bumba area UNHCR is withdrawing 37 international staff members in view of tension and undue absence from work by Congolese workers, but the thirty-seven may be replaced shortly.

The Provincial Health Minister has appointed a Congolese to replace a Belgian Director of Medical Services; the former Director and another physician sent to replace him are working as Government doctors without the administrative responsibilities formerly held by Belgians. It is reported that anti-Belgian sentiment is running parallel to growing support for Mr. Lumumba.

UN help may be requested in connection with rinderpest epidemic in the area of Libenge on the Congo river. Three essential posts of radio technicians will have to be filled in February, in view of impending departure of three ONUC specialists (Moroccan).

Although the Government's position towards UN technical assistance has changed from the almost entirely negative attitude of the last two months, the Provincial Government still resents the procedure of submitting programmes and other requests through the Central authorities. Political instability and administrative shortcomings in the Provincial Ministries continue to be the main obstacles to UN assistance.

#### Orientale and Kivu

Conditions have further deteriorated, as many Europeans were physically and/or psychologically in no position to proceed with their economic activities.

#### Kasai

Arrangements have been completed for the repatriation of 5,000 Lulua from Kamina next week. Lulua leaders have already left Kamina for principal railway stations in Kasai.

The Government in Luluaubourg is considering stopping all food supplies for Baluba refugees. The reasons are partly political, but also connected with North Kasai internal problems as set forth in last week's report.

#### Katanga

The manufacturing industries are concerned about the cutting of railway communications, and have made representations to UN through the Katangese



Chamber of Commerce. OTRACO has been trying to arrange shipping of copper via Port Francoqui and Matadi, but these arrangements will fall through if the line is not opened.

The Luena coal-mine has ceased to operate and will probably not resume.

Conversion operations appear to have proceeded as far as they will in present circumstances. They were rumors of irregularities. Mr. Van Roey, technical adviser of Katanga "National Bank", was briefly imprisoned at the same time as Lumumba supporters were being rounded up.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 27 JANUARY 1961  
No : D-208

1. Kettani Nwokedi and Berthoud saw Bomboko and Nendaka today to follow up my letter to Kasavubu concerning bases. Point that no unilateral or bilateral Belgo-Congolese action can be taken was strongly impressed upon Bomboko, who conceded that UN should not be shortcut. He expressed disagreement, however, with view that change of status must be referred to Security Council. His approach was that mandate given to UN by Security Council was not only to take provisional custody of bases, but to see to completion of three phases operation consisting in UN provisional custody, negotiations between parties concerned and finally handing over of bases to Congo. Nwokedi stuck to position presented in my letter, and made it clear that there was no chance of getting UN to agree on transfer to Congolese without reference to Security Council. It was finally agreed that if Congolese absolutely insisted on bringing issue to head now, on which Bomboko was very emphatic, only course was for Congo to request that matter be brought Before Council for consideration. Bomboko gave the impression that they would send a demarche along these lines for urgent action.

2. Bomboko during conversation repeatedly reverted to question of material needed by ANC to replace material destroyed or removed by Belgians last July. He objected to my having referred in this context to paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution in my reply of 25 January to his letter of 10 January on the subject, evolving rather interesting theory that occupation of bases and replacement of material to regain previous strength was only restoration of previous situation and thus not repeat not to be considered as military assistance in meaning of paragraph 6.



OUTGOING CODE

h  
27/1

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 27 JANUARY 1961  
No : D-208

Following cable received from one of our officers who happened to be passing through Kano, quote Belgian Airforce DC-6 landed Kano 261830 bound Usumbura reported carrying troops but they did not disembark. Flight schedule Kano shows regular Belgian mil flights to Usumbura 25 and 26 Jan. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ End. Unquote.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : CORDIER, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDOVILLE  
DATE : 27 January 1961  
NO : D-207

Done  
RD  
27/1

Reur 609. We already have outstanding request for Canadian bilingual officers and request that they be made available earliest. A replacement for Colonel Berthiaume is not required.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 26 January 1961  
NO : 0-206

We often receive reports of Belgian troop movements in Ruanda-Urundi, which are sometimes substantiated as in the case of the recent arrival of two fresh Belgian battalions.

2. But there are also reports which it is not possible for us to substantiate. Today for instance, Stanleyville reported that a Belgian plane flew over the city at about 9000 meters allegedly bringing troop reinforcements to Usumbura via Kano. It is not possible for ONUC Bukavu to check these reports and it would be useful if the UN Economic Mission in Usumbura is asked to keep itself informed as to troop movements in the Trust Territory and report its observations through New York to us.

3. Lundula suggests you might notify the Belgian Government that military flights by the Belgian Air Force over Stanleyville at present can only constitute a provocation.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 26 January 1961  
NO : 0-205

The situation in both Stanleyville and Bukavu is, on the surface, somewhat easier. In Stanleyville there are only 21 in the UN protected compound, after a peak of 157. All individual requests for exit permits have been granted and there are no pending cases. Thus the British and French Consuls have not been able to provide any lists of persons whose requests to leave had been definitely rejected. There are of course however many who wish to leave, but who have not yet applied for exit permits fearing retaliation if they do so. The staff of Sedec motors had been instructed by their Head Office in Leo to leave but declined to comply.

2. In Bukavu, UN has organized an escape route by which a trickle of about 50 Europeans and Congolese refugees escape every night. Some Europeans are refusing to leave since the situation has become relatively calmer.

3. However, the crisis is by no means over. Gizenga's hold is anything but secure; he does not control Salamu or MNC jeunesse, and has little hold over the gendarmerie and ANC. He has given assurances of protection to the European population but these are belied by parallel statements from his ministers regarding a so called "de facto state of war with Belgium and associated countries". The same applies to Kashamura in Kivu. Violence could easily break out again, especially if Lumumba came to any harm. In fact, the fate of the European population is bound up with that of Lumumba.

4. In this connection, Lundula has expressed disappointment that whereas the Conciliation Commission was permitted to see Songolo and the other Stanleyville prisoners, Kasavubu and Tshombé prevented the Commission from seeing Lumumba nor has the Commission yet seen Finant in Leo.

5. On the general question, Duran expresses the following views: "Gizenga is well aware that an exodus of the European population would result in economic collapse of the two Provinces. In addition, by holding them as



hostages, he could exert a certain pressure on the other side and it is therefore unlikely that he will agree to free evacuation."

6. UN Forces both in Orientale and Kivu are numerically inferior to the ANC and also lack heavy weapons. Even a minor or local defeat suffered by UN would result in reprisals on the European population. In addition, we would be unable to ensure safety of the refugees at approaches to airports or of planes taking off or landing, therefore evacuation must be negotiated and have prior agreement of the authorities. This policy has the agreement of the French and British Consuls in Stanleyville.

7. We have not yet informed Gizenga or Kashamura of French, Belgian and Swedish intentions to evacuate, pending bringing in Europeans from isolated areas in the interior. In the meantime, we are preparing overall plans for evacuation. Miller and Ironsi went on 25 January to Usumbura to discuss technical details regarding staging centres, use of airports, aircraft servicing etc. We have asked Miller to continue or intensify quiet evacuation. Stanleyville problem is more difficult and will need careful handling.

8. French, Italian, German, Swedish and US Consuls are now in Usumbura and have requested UN obtain entry visas for them to Kivu. I am meeting Charpentier again tomorrow and probably all diplomatic representatives concerned later.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 26 January 1961  
NO : D-203

It appears that Bomboko's visit to Paris was to seek the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Belgium and also military and economic assistance.

2. A visit to ANC Headquarters in Leo showed that considerable activity and planning were in progress. Recruitment of candidates for various technical services and the airforce was in full swing, some of the selected personnel being processed for training abroad, most probably in Belgium. Belgian social welfare workers were in evidence. General Dontier of Belgium is said to be in Leo, coordinating the three commands after attending the Elisabethville military conference.

3. It appears that steps are being taken to reinforce the ANC in Equateur and Kasai from Thysville.

4. Mobutu has proceeded to Boma probably to deal with the agitation among the ANC in Matadi for salary increase but more likely to make arrangements for a possible take over of Kitona after 31st January. Kettani, Nwokedi and Berthoud are seeing Bomboko to warn him against any attempted seizure of the Bases; it is also proposed to send Kettani to Boma to speak to Mobutu and to suitably instruct ONUC troops at Kitona.

5. Mobutu told our liaison officer that on the withdrawal of certain units no replacements would be required as the ANC was fully competent to assure the maintenance of law and order and that he would be addressing a letter to us to this effect through governmental channels.

6. There is an unconfirmed report of military action launched from Orientale against Bumba which is to be countered by reinforcements to be flown in from Leo. We have asked Stanleyville for confirmation.

7. I have suggested to the Chairman and Members of the Conciliation



Commission that having completed their "study" of the situation except for a visit to Lumumba which should be pressed, they should now analyse their impressions and embark on the central task of conciliation. As will be evident from Protitch's reports there are many common factors which should be put together for purposes of negotiation. My talk with Adoula was, in this context, most illuminating. He was greatly worried about the ANC which could negative any political settlement arrived at and its divisions were a constant source of temptation for foreign intervention. He was in favour of a provisional government being set up with a neutral personality and was not very hopeful of the round table approach. Kasavubu was under the influence of evil advisers although he himself was a man of goodwill. We shall continue to cultivate Adoula for he is a sensible man and has access to the President as adviser. We shall also persevere in our efforts to obtain an entrée for Dumontent as adviser to the President.

8. Radio Leo carried a broadcast to the effect that Katanga will soon have Belgian jet fighters, probably manned by Rhodesians. The commentator observes "The declaration by a senior Belgian officer in the Katangan air force underlines how far interference in the Congo by NATO members has gone."



LEOPOLDVILLE  
26 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

*Jim*

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

D- 202 CORDIER FROM NWOKEDI PLEASE CABLE ENGLISH TEXT OF  
KASAVUBU LETTER OF TWENTYFOUR JANUARY AND SECGENS ANSWER OF  
TWENTYSIXTH STOP



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 26 January 1961  
NO : D-201

home  
AD  
26/1

Thanks your 566. I am in somewhat divided mind about holding a press conference, particularly at the present time, as it could put us in the very position of defence which it is our desire to avoid. Also, the initiative would not rest with us as to the nature of subjects raised and we may be faced with heavily loaded questions animated by sensation-mongering or dubious political ends. A lot of time could also be taken up with vexatious questions of detail such as influx of arms, treatment of foreign nationals etc., which could be the subject of distortions, politically motivated. Furthermore, the announced withdrawals of certain units when future perspectives are obscure would make the present time awkward.

2. Therefore I feel that while we should keep the possibility of a press conference very much in mind -- following your example, I have so far refrained from public appearances though I constantly meet individual correspondents -- the question of appropriate timing should determine its actual holding.

3. You mention possibility of a report for specific purpose of briefing the Council; would this be a general situation report or one relating to specific problems? It would be useful to know so that we could collect the necessary raw material and be ready without loss of time when asked.

4. Grateful your reactions.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
26 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

0-200 BUNCHE FROM DAYAL

Cox discharged from hospital yesterday. Will depart Leo Sunday night, stopover two or three days in London, and report to Headquarters Monday 6 February.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 25 JANUARY 1961  
No : D-199

*74.*

*Sent  
AOS*

Words and deeds of Belgians at Kitona would seem to indicate that basic clarification of present position contained in your note to Belgium of 21 January has not yet been passed on to Belgians at bases with instructions to act accordingly. I suggest that you ask Belgium to issue urgently firm instructions to their representatives at bases in conformity with situation resulting from Security Council Resolutions.



OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, MACEOIN, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 25 January 1961  
NO : D-198

Kettani informs us that according to instructions received from Rabat, Moroccan Brigade will cease operating after January 31 till their departure. This would be an intolerable situation and they must continue at their duties until evacuated. Request this matter be taken up urgently with Moroccan Government.



OUTGOING CODE

hmc  
h  
2/1

TO : SEC GEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 25 January 1961  
NO : D-197

The instructions to Duran and Miller repeated in my D-186 were the result of a visit from Charpentier yesterday. Charpentier thinks that other countries might be disposed to act likewise. We feel a sense of relief that a decision to evacuate has been taken, although we are keenly aware of the complexity of the operation. Our military command are drawing up plans which Iyassu will be sent to Stanleyville to supervise, and Ward and Otu to Bukavu. The physical arrangements to be made in the two capitals will necessarily have to vary as travel from Stan will have to be by air (or water if conditions permit) while from Bukavu, by land.

2. Our local representatives who have tried hard to steady the position and to get better treatment for the foreign nationals are naturally, not happy. But we are explaining to them the hard political reasons which have impelled the decision. It will be necessary to reinforce our troops in Kivu, while Iyassu considers the battalion from Bunia should be withdrawn, escorting back evacuees from the interior, till the operation is completed.



OUTGOING CODE

*Inue*  
*ND*  
*25/1*

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 25 January 1961  
NO : D-196-

We are greatly concerned to hear from Kettani today that the Moroccan Brigade will be pulling out; we are also told that the Ghana Brigade may follow suit. With the imminent withdrawal of the UAR, Guinean and Indonesian battalions, we would be left with some ten thousand combat troops, and this at a time when an actual or incipient civil war situation exists in the country. The E'ville, Bakwanga and Leo military axis is developing, and there is a report that at the military talks at E'ville, the Belgian Command from Ruanda-Urundi was also represented.

2. Therefore, at a time when military hostilities may be developing, our effective military strength stands in danger of being practically halved. We could try to meet the blow by pulling out from Equateur and Kasai provinces altogether and reducing our commitments in North Katanga to the minimum. We cannot however afford to weaken our position in Leo beyond a certain point for fear of being overwhelmed by superior ANC force.

3. While we note with satisfaction your approaches to certain countries for replacement troops, I can imagine that several among them might have serious hesitations in filling the breach for political and other reasons, including the campaign of vilification and abuse directed at them. In any case, we hope that measures would be taken to ensure that the existing contingents do not pull out until their replacements arrive, although we can imagine that this would in certain cases be difficult to ensure. It is evident that this operation, should the withdrawals eventuate, would be faced with a crisis of extreme magnitude. To devise measures to meet the situation, we must go to the heart of the matter.

4. The root cause of ONUC's difficulties is foreign intervention which has been largely though not entirely one sided. But for the Belgian



interference backed with the supply of arms etc., and supported directly or indirectly by certain powers, the Kasavubu-Bomboko-Mobutu set-up would not have been thinking in terms of a military decision. The only alternative is to seek means for national reconciliation. So long as the ANC is free to roam at will, the possibility of achieving stable political solutions is minimised. And Mobutu's ANC, Tshombe's Gendarmerie and Kalonji's forces would be more tractable but for Belgian aid. The same now applies to the Gizenga forces who in turn are being helped from outside.

5. The reasons for the threatened withdrawals are of course largely if not entirely, political. There is dissatisfaction in certain quarters, for understandable reasons, at the existing political deterioration, which in the face of the forces at work, we have been unable to prevent.

6. If this operation is to succeed, as it must, the political difficulties must be tackled at the highest level, and the key to a solution is, as in the case of Suez, in the hands of the Americans. Were the new administration disposed to counsel the withdrawing nations to exercise patience, assuring them that there would be loyal cooperation from its side in the implementation of the mandate, together with willingness to discuss the differences with a view to evolving common solutions, we might gain a temporary respite. Concurrently, the US administration must deal firmly with its NATO allies, informing them of its determination to see the operation succeed and warning them against any breaches of the resolutions. At the same time, by a joint effort led by the United States, action could be taken in the Security Council to strengthen your hands. That seems to be the only course which could save this operation from collapse, and the Congo from ruin. But if the new US administration is content to follow the path of expediency and to back certain individuals at the cost of principles, the outlook would be gloomy. If you could throw any light on the situation, it would help to relieve our anxieties.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 25 January 1961  
NO : D-194

Reference your 484.

This statement was made by our spokesman here except that he said quote coldly unquote not repeat not boldly. This was said in the context of questioning about alleged Unations connivance with Lumumbists.

2. As quoted over BBC for example, it underscored difficulty experienced in our efforts to protect Stanleyville population.
3. Fully endorse need for restraint in public utterances; our spokesman attempts to be as discreet as possible but it is sometimes difficult to restrain the exuberance of the press.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLVILLE  
Date : 25 January 1961  
No : D-193

Your 536. Lumumba's letter was received from Kamitatu and shown to you here on 5 January. Following is text:

"A Monsieur Dayal  
Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général de l'ONU  
Léopoldville

Monsieur le Représentant spécial,

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir, le 27 décembre, la visite du Médecin de la Croix Rouge, qui s'est bien occupé de mon sort et de celui des autres parlementaires qui sont détenus avec moi. Je lui avais exposé les conditions peu humaines dans lesquelles nous vivons ici.

Notre situation est brièvement la suivante: Je suis ici avec 7 (sept) autres Parlementaires dont le Président du Sénat, Mr Joseph Okito plus un fonctionnaire et un chauffeur. Nous sommes donc au nombre de 10. Nous sommes enfermés dans des cachots humides depuis le 2 décembre 1960 et il ne nous est jamais permis de sortir dehors. Le repas qu'on nous offre (deux fois par jour) est très mauvais et je fais souvent de 3 à 4 jours sans rien manger, me contentant seulement d'une banane. J'en avais fait part au Médecin de la Croix Rouge que vous avez envoyé et ce, en présence du Colonel de Thysville. J'ai demandé que l'on m'achète des fruits avec mon propre argent, car les aliments que l'on m'offre sont mauvais. Malgré l'autorisation du Médecin, les autorités militaires qui me gardent refusent, prétextant que ce sont les ordres reçus du Chef de l'Etat et du Colonel Mobutu. Le Médecin de Thysville a prescrit pour que je fasse une petite promenade chaque soir et de sortir ainsi un peu de mon cachot, mais le Colonel et le Commissaire de District refusent également. Mes habits que je porte depuis 25 jours ne sont jamais lavés. Il m'est défendu de porter les souliers.



En un mot, nous vivons dans des conditions impossibles qui sont même en contradiction avec les dispositions légales. En outre, je ne reçois aucune nouvelle de mon épouse et je ne sais même pas où elle se trouve. Je devais normalement recevoir sa visite comme le prescrit le régime pénitentiaire congolais.

D'autre part, le code de procédure pénale en application au Congo stipule explicitement qu'une personne arrêtée doit comparaître au plus tard le lendemain devant un Magistrat chargé de l'instruction de l'affaire. Et dans un délai de cinq jours, le prévenu doit comparaître devant un Juge qui décide s'il doit être maintenu en détention préventive ou non. Après quinze jours, il doit comparaître encore devant le même Juge qui examine si le prévenu doit être maintenu en détention préventive ou non. A chaque comparution, le prévenu est assisté de son Avocat.

Le code de procédure pénale dispose que si après 5 jours qui suivent l'arrestation le Juge ne rend pas une ordonnance de la mise en détention préventive, la personne arrêtée est libérée d'office. Il en est de même dans le cas où la première ordonnance (prise après cinq jours qui suivent l'arrestation) n'est pas confirmée après 15 jours.

Depuis notre arrestation en date du 1.12.60 jusqu'à ce jour, nous n'avons subi aucun interrogatoire ni reçu la visite d'un Magistrat. Aucun mandat d'arrêt ne nous a été signifié. Nous sommes simplement gardés dans un camp militaire où nous sommes enfermés depuis 34 jours dans des cachots réservés aux militaires en punition.

Le code de procédure pénale n'est pas respecté.

La législation sur le régime pénitentiaire n'est pas non plus respectée.

Il s'agit d'une détention purement arbitraire. Et à cela, s'ajoute l'immunité parlementaire dont nous sommes couverts.

Telle est la situation que je vous prie de bien vouloir porter à la connaissance de Monsieur le Secrétaire général de l'O.N.U. que je remercie pour son intervention en ma faveur.



Comment saura-t-on restaurer l'ordre et la paix au Congo si l'on ne respecte pas, au départ, la légalité, la dignité humaine et la vie des personnes? Puisqu'on ne nous fait pas comparaître devant un Tribunal légalement constitué, nous sommes donc privés du droit qu'a chaque citoyen de défendre sa cause devant les juridictions du Pays.

Je garde mon sang-froid et espère que l'O.N.U. nous aidera à sortir de cette situation. Je suis pour la réconciliation entre tous les enfants de ce pays.

Je vous écris clandestinement cette lettre sur un mauvais papier.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant spécial, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

P. Lumumba "



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 24 January 1961  
NO : D-192

Gizenga has just replied to the International Red Cross intervention regarding prisoners drawing his attention to article 3 of the Geneva conventions. Gizenga replies as follows: "Monsieur, j'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre du 18 courant dans laquelle vous me faites état de plusieurs points de la belle doctrine dont je vous remercie. Je tiens cependant à vous faire remarquer que les prisonniers de guerre sont traités comme tels. Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée".

2. The report was published over the week-end in Leo that Commandant Pongo had been executed in Stanleyville. We checked with Stanleyville where Lundula told Duran this was untrue and that Pongo was alive and in prison.

3. Duran has now seen Pongo and states that he looks well although at the beginning of his imprisonment he was, he says, subjected to violent treatment, but proper care is now being taken of him. The food he gets is not too good and he complained of receiving only limited amount of drinking water. Lundula promised to put Pongo under medical treatment. Pongo informed Duran that when making his statement of 7 January, he was acting as a free agent ("en libre conscience") and that it reflected his deepest conviction as well as those of his fellow-prisoners.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 24 January 1961  
NO : D-191

Miller reports that Kashamura has stated publicly that he wishes to facilitate return of Belgians to Kivu provided they are not suspect or their presence does not risk unfavourable reaction. He stated his Government has no intention to arrest Europeans as hostages and that his policy is to stop violence and to examine all cases of European arrests, releasing the innocent and expelling those hostile to his regime.

2. These protestations by Kashamura are similar to those made by Gizenga in December, and I place little reliance on Kashamura's latest effort.

3. An unfounded rumour at Bukavu that UN was to disarm the ANC caused considerable alarm on 23 January amongst ANC and gendarmerie which deployed for action. Their officers having been persuaded UN had no such intention, they withdrew but the incident caused a further rumour of pending Belgian paratroop attack.

4. There are said to be only 5 Europeans at present in prison in Bukavu. On the expiry of the Jeunesse ultimatum to arrest Europeans if Lumumba were not released within 24 hours, the Jeunesse started trouble, but was stopped by police and gendarmerie and some arrests were made. This is the first occasion when forces of law and order have actually enforced law and order in Bukavu.

5. UN has evacuated 38 Europeans and 5 Congolese from Bukavu by surreptitious means. 11 other Congolese crossed by their own means.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
24 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEW YORK

D-190      SECGEN from DAYAL

Following from President Kasavubu:

QUOTE

x x x x x

UNQUOTE





MINISTRE DES  
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

(1) N° 12/

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général  
de l'Organisation des Nations  
Unies

A NEW-YORK (U.S.A.)

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre note du 16 janvier, constituant une réponse à ma lettre du 14 janvier.

Je regrette qu'à la suite du week-end et qu'en raison de problèmes techniques, vous ayez reçu ma précitée avec un certain retard.

Je vous signale que si je ne vous ai pas entretenu, lors de votre bref séjour à Léopoldville, le 5 janvier, des faits qui sont présentés dans ma lettre du 14 janvier, c'est que précisément je n'avais pas en possession le 5 janvier les éléments dont je vous ai fait part ultérieurement.

Ce n'est que vers le 5 janvier en effet que les réfugiés de Bukavu ont commencé à affluer à Léopoldville nous apportant des précisions et des renseignements supplémentaires sur l'attitude des responsables de l'ONUC, au sujet de l'arrestation du Président MIRUHO et de ses Ministres. Ce n'est que le 12 janvier que les agences de presse ont annoncé le décès du Ministre de l'Enseignement du Kivu et le 14 janvier à 16 h. l'ONUC n'avait pas encore démenti cette nouvelle.

Vous me faites savoir que ce Ministre est en vie à Stanleyville, je m'en réjouis du fond du cœur et je souhaite que nous pourrions le revoir très bientôt vivant; mais depuis, les agences de presse ont annoncé la mort du MWAMI MPORE Cornaille, des sévices graves et les mutilations dont ont été victimes des Ministres du Gouvernement Provincial, des Commissaires de Police et d'autres membres de l'Administration Provinciale. Là non plus aucun démenti venant de l'ONUC n'est encore intervenu; vous savez quelles difficultés les services de la République rencontrent pour obtenir des renseignements précis dans ces régions troublées. Mais les services de l'ONUC qui disposent d'unités dans toutes les régions du Congo attendent-elles que l'émotion et l'indignation de la population soient portées à leur comble pour démentir ces nouvelles ou les rumeurs à leurs proportions exactes? Encore faudrait-il que le crédit attaché aux informations de l'ONUC ne soit pas entaché par les incidents de la prison de Bukavu auraient fait d'après ces informations, une dizaine de morts parmi les militaires congolais, alors que des

(1) Rapporter dans la réponse la date et le numéro.



témoins oculaires nous certifient qu'il n'y eut que quelques blessés.

Lorsque donc nous avons dit que "les responsables locaux de l'Organisation Internationale sont accusés de complicité dans meurtre", nous n'avons fait que traduire le sentiment de l'entiereté de la population et, à défaut de démenti formel de l'ONUC concernant les faits prérappelés, la même accusation se renouvellera, amplifiée par les dépêches successives qui se taillent jour après jour les sévices et les terreurs commis par GIZENGA, LUNDULA, KASHAMURA et consorts. En vous traduisant cette indignation et en vous demandant des mesures sévères pour empêcher la continuation de ces crimes que l'humanité reprouve, j'ai demandé en même temps le rappel de celui qui est à l'origine de toute cette situation, Monsieur DAYAL, parce qu'à toute situation il y a un responsable et qu'il ne nous appartient pas de savoir si Monsieur DAYAL a participé personnellement ou non aux instructions qui ont permis les résultats déplorable que l'on connaît.

Au moment où j'ai demandé le rappel de l'Ambassadeur DAYAL, je n'ai eu aucune intention de le traiter sur le même pied que les diplomates étrangers accrédités auprès de la République du Congo. Il ne s'agit pas non plus de vouloir donner des instructions ou de chercher à influencer dans l'exécution de sa tâche le Secrétaire Général. Je n'ai guère contesté les pouvoirs qui vous sont conférés par la Charte des Nations Unies.

Ma préoccupation porte au contraire, sur l'efficacité du mandat qui vous a été confié par le Conseil de Sécurité en vertu de sa résolution du 14 juillet 1960, réaffirmé par celles adoptées ultérieurement tant par ledit Conseil que par l'Assemblée Générale.

Dans votre déclaration du 13 juillet 1960, approuvée par la résolution du 14 juillet, vous avez demandé au Conseil de Sécurité "d'autoriser le Secrétaire Général à prendre, en consultation avec le Gouvernement Congolais, les mesures nécessaires pour fournir à ce Gouvernement une assistance militaire durant la période qui s'écoulera avant que, grâce aux efforts du Gouvernement et à l'assistance technique des Nations Unies, les forces de sécurité nationale puissent pleinement faire face à la situation". La résolution prise le 14 juillet au Conseil de Sécurité a autorisé "le Secrétaire Général de prendre en consultation avec le Gouvernement de la République du Congo, les mesures nécessaires en vue de fournir à ce gouvernement l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin et ce, jusqu'au moment où les forces nationales de sécurité, grâce aux efforts du Gouvernement congolais et avec l'assistance technique des Nations Unies, seront à même de l'opinion de ce gouvernement, de remplir entièrement leurs tâches".

Dans votre premier rapport d'activités présenté au Conseil de Sécurité le 18 juillet et approuvé par la résolution du 21 juillet, vous avez défini que l'Organisation des Nations Unies est seule habilitée à décider de la composition des éléments militaires envoyés dans un pays, étant entendu, en même temps, que l'Organisation doit, en décidant de cette composition, tenir le plus grand compte de l'avis du gouvernement hôte comme de l'un des facteurs les plus importants dont il faille s'inspirer pour le recrutement du personnel...".

Le principe de consultation a été clairement défini. Il est inspiré des paragraphes 1 et 7 de l'article 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies. L'assistance technique et militaire a été demandée par la République du Congo, Etat souverain et indépendant. La République du Congo a mainte fois exprimé sa gratitude envers l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour avoir favorablement et promptement répondu à son appel. Mais il



serait difficile de concilier l'abandon du principe de consultation non seulement avec les résolutions précitées mais aussi avec l'article 2 de la Charte.

Je considère que la République du Congo ne doit pas se voir imposer des contingents armés étrangers quels que soient les vœux de l'Organisation Internationale. A plus forte raison, la République du Congo doit pouvoir se faire entendre au sujet des fonctionnaires de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo. Elle ne revendique pas le droit de pouvoir choisir ces personnes, ni de leur donner des instructions ou les influencer. Mais les conditions favorables pour une collaboration nécessaire, impliquent inévitablement qu'une entente existe entre le Secrétaire Général et la République du Congo concernant les hauts fonctionnaires responsables de la mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo.

L'Ambassadeur DAYAL a perdu la confiance du peuple et des autorités congolaises. Sa présence au Congo exclut d'avance la collaboration souhaitable et indispensable pour la réussite des opérations tant civiles que militaires. Certes, la mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo pourra-t-elle continuer, avec les dépenses immenses que cela signifie pour l'Organisation, mais l'efficacité en sera absurde à cause du manque de coopération. La confiance du peuple et des autorités congolaises dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en général, risque elle aussi d'être compromise.

En posant mes objections à l'encontre de l'Ambassadeur DAYAL, je ne veux pas contester son statut de haut fonctionnaire du Secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Mais je considère que la République du Congo, dans laquelle il remplit une mission, peut valablement demander qu'il soit remplacé par quelqu'un dont la personnalité permettra d'atteindre de façon plus certaine les objectifs de la mission de l'ONU au Congo.

Je relève dans votre lettre que vous avez l'intention de saisir le Conseil de Sécurité de ma requête. Le Conseil de Sécurité me paraît peu compétent pour approuver ou désapprouver mon initiative. Il vous a tracé, sur votre proposition, le principe de consultation et lui serait difficile d'outrepasser l'article 2 de la Charte.

Au sujet des bandes rebelles de GIZENGA et LUNDULLA, je vous ferai connaître mon point de vue de façon plus explicite dans une note prochaine.

J'affirme à nouveau ma détermination et celle des autorités de la République du Congo de collaborer étroitement avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo; nous reconnaissons toute l'importance de cette collaboration et toute son impérieuse nécessité, et nous en souhaitons le maintien dans l'intérêt de la paix en Afrique et dans le monde. Mais une vraie coopération ne peut être atteinte qu'avec une personne qui, chargée de l'ensemble des opérations des Nations Unies au Congo, jouit de la confiance du peuple congolais.

../..



Je vous réitère donc instamment ma demande relative au rappel de l'Ambassadeur DAYAL.

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO,

J. KASA-VUBU.-

LE PRESIDENT DU COLLEGE DES COMMISSAIRES  
GENERAUX, LE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL AUX AP-  
FAIRES ETRANGERES.-

J. BOMBOKO.-



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, MacEDIN, LEOPOLVILLE  
Date : 24 January 1961  
No : D-188

Reur 525.

1. We should like to know specifically whether or not the Indonesian Contingent will be replaced.
2. Our records show that the Indonesian Contingent arrived in the Congo on 1 Oct 60 having left Indonesia on 10 Sept 60. According to this, their six months in the Congo would be up on 1 Apr 61. Our contention is that the six months' field duty should not include the journey period and that repatriation should commence anytime from 1 Apr onwards. Please advise.
3. In the meantime we are obtaining the usual information regarding the number of personnel, weight of stores etc, and should be able to let you have these within the next 10 days.

cc: Mr. Dayal  
Commander  
Chief of Staff



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, MacEOIN, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 24 January 1961  
No : D-187

Reur 524.

1. As you know the UAR Battalion is at present deployed in North Equateur. None of the airfields in Equateur is capable of taking either C124 or C130 aircraft. This means that the Battalion will have to be moved to Leopoldville.

2. The bulk of the Battalion will have to be moved by river as, even though we may be able to move the personnel by air, we are not in a position to airlift heavy equipment and vehicles. OTRACO, the river transportation agency, require at least 10 days' notice to position barges at any one point and it is a 7 days' journey from Lisala, the point at which the Battalion will be concentrated, to Leopoldville. Allowing three days for transshipment and handing/taking over of UN stores and equipment, would mean that we shall not be in a position to get the Battalion ready for airlift for 20 days. We suggest therefore that the ETO from Leo should be 14 February 1961.

3. We are in touch with the USAF representative here and, as soon as we have received the details of personnel and weight of stores, etc, we shall pass these on to you as well as to him. This should be possible within the next 48 hours.

cc: Mr. Dayal  
Commander  
Chief of Staff



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 24 January 1961  
NO : D-186

Have sent following instructions to Stanleyville and similar instructions to Bukavu.

"Please convey the following to Honnorat from the French Ambassador:  
1<sup>o</sup> - Veuillez faire savoir aux ressortissants français que j'ai reçu pour instructions de donner l'ordre d'évacuation pour les Français se trouvant en Province Orientale; 2<sup>o</sup> - Le Gouvernement Belge conseille à ses ressortissants d'évacuer."

2. I understand the Belgian Government is also going to convert its advice to an order. The personnel of Unilever also wish to evacuate, also the Swedes.

3. While we much appreciate Micuta's and your efforts as reported in your C-IV-72, we have got to do everything possible to facilitate the carrying out of the above decision. You should contact the Consular representatives concerned and get the lists from them of their nationals for evacuation. Thereafter all necessary measures should be taken to assure their evacuation employing UN troops to facilitate it. Sabena aircraft can be arranged at eight hours notice. We shall await your advice as regards the date when evacuation should begin. Detailed military instructions will follow.

4. This decision has been taken by the Government's concerned in view of the fact that their nationals have been unjustly held as hostages in violation of human rights.

5. Charpentier will transmit a detailed letter to his Consular representative through us.

6. The question of evacuation from outlying places should also be urgently considered before final arrangements are made. At this stage, it would be advisable not to inform the authorities until full preparations have been made."



LEOPOLDVILLE  
24 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

D-185 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL FOLLOWING LETTER DATED 24 JANUARY RECEIVED  
FROM KASAVUBU CLN

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



À Monsieur le Président du Conseil de Sécurité  
Organisation des Nations Unies  
New York.

Monsieur le Président,

Le Gouvernement de la République du Congo a été amené à constater la violation de la souveraineté nationale, et l'immixtion flagrante dans ses affaires intérieures par la République Arabe Unie, constituant une infraction de la part de ce dernier État à la résolution de l'Assemblée Générale, en date du 19 septembre 1960, et à la Charte des Nations Unies.

Vu cette grave situation, qui résulte de l'intervention étrangère dans la République du Congo, et qui présente un danger manifeste pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, je vous prie de bien vouloir réunir le Conseil de sécurité afin d'examiner la situation et d'apporter les mesures appropriées.

En présentant cette question le Gouvernement de la République du Congo invoque, à l'appui de sa demande, les Articles 24 et 34, le paragraphe 1 de l'Article 35, ainsi que l'article 3 du Règlement du Conseil de sécurité.

Bien que l'affaire revête pour nous un caractère urgent, mais en raison de l'organisation de la Table Ronde congolaise, je vous demanderais de fixer la convocation du Conseil à une date que vous pourriez déterminer avec la Délégation de la République du Congo.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE,

Joseph KASA-VUBU,

LE PRÉSIDENT DU COLLÈGE DES COMMISSAIRES GÉNÉRAUX,  
ET COMMISSAIRE GÉNÉRAL AUX AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES,

J. BOMBOKO,



OUTGOING CODE

*hmc*  
*ad*  
*24/1*

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 24 January 1961  
NO : D-183

Since the Second Progress report we have submitted a large number of reports on various incidents and situations which have been published as documents. We are also submitting weekly situation reports based upon reports from the provinces. But no overall report has followed although the situation has been fully presented in your speeches to Secco and Assembly.

2. During this period however, misrepresentation of UNOC's mandate and work and attacks on its personnel have mounted in intensity and virulence. Would this be the time to present a balanced picture of the situation describing UNOC's efforts in various fields, and attempting to answer as factually as possible the various misinformed or malicious criticisms? Such a report could help to restore the correct perspective. It would not cut across whatever report the Conciliation Commission would wish to present as I doubt if they will have much to say before another two or three weeks at the earliest. We would be grateful to have your views about the advisability of a third report, its contents, general presentation and timing.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 23 JANUARY, 1961  
No. : D-180

Reyour 477. Hereafter, for your comments and approval,  
text of letter which I propose to send urgently to Kasa-  
Vubu concerning bases. I shall follow up by personal  
discussion. Quote..... Unquote.



Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre du 9 janvier 1961, relative aux bases militaires de Kamina, de Kitona et de Banane.

Comme vous le savez, l'Organisation des Nations Unies assure l'administration des anciennes bases militaires belges au Congo à titre de mesure provisoire au sens de l'Article 40 de la Charte, dans le cadre des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité relatives au Congo. Une telle mesure provisoire ne préjuge en rien les droits, les prétentions ou la position des parties intéressées. Il a été fait allusion, pour décrire la nature de la fonction dévolue à l'Organisation au sujet des bases, à l'analogie qu'on peut établir avec les principes généraux du droit civil relatifs à la gestion provisoire d'affaires pour autrui. L'administration des Nations Unies tend donc à l'entretien et à la conservation des bases en attendant que des arrangements interviennent pour leur disposition finale. Il ne peut naturellement en découler que l'Organisation doive nécessairement continuer à assurer leur opération comme bases militaires, et que soit maintenu l'usage qui en était fait avant l'indépendance par le Ministère belge de la Défense nationale. Il est exact que l'Organisation des Nations Unies procède à l'heure actuelle à une réduction sensible du nombre des travailleurs congolais qui sont employés dans les bases. Cette réduction est due au fait que l'entretien et la conservation des bases ne requiert qu'une fraction de la main d'oeuvre qui était nécessaire pour assurer leur opération comme bases militaires. Elle s'inspire d'un souci d'administration rationnelle et d'économie, et reflète la diligence dont doit faire preuve l'Organisation en sa qualité d'agent chargé de la gestion temporaire des bases, dans l'intérêt même des parties qui peuvent se prévaloir de droits ou d'intérêts à leur égard.

Votre lettre faisant allusion à la possibilité de négociations entre les autorités congolaises et le Gouvernement belge au sujet de l'occupation des bases par l'Armée Nationale Congolaise, je crois en outre utile de rappeler que l'Organisation des Nations Unies serait nécessairement une partie essentiellement intéressée à de telles négociations, en raison du mandat qu'elle a reçu du Conseil de Sécurité pour l'administration des bases. —————→



La durée de l'administration de l'Organisation doit en effet être déterminée à la lumière des conditions qui ont rendu leur prise en charge nécessaire, et qui elles-mêmes découlent du mandat donné au Secrétaire général par le Conseil de Sécurité dans ses résolutions des 14 et 22 juillet et 9 août 1960. Il doit donc être considéré comme entendu qu'aussi longtemps que l'administration par les Nations Unies demeure nécessaire pour remplir l'objet de ces résolutions, elle doit continuer d'être assurée, sous réserve d'instructions contraires de la part du Conseil de Sécurité.

Le Secrétaire général a examiné cette question tout récemment, à la suite de votre lettre précitée du 9 janvier 1961, dont je lui ai communiqué le texte. Il est parvenu à la conclusion qu'à l'heure actuelle, le transfert des bases à l'Armée Nationale Congolaise dépasserait sa compétence établie par les dispositions des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale. En effet, la compatibilité d'un tel transfert avec les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité est sujette à caution, et cette mesure ne devrait pas être prise sans l'autorisation du Conseil. En expliquant sa position à cet égard, le Secrétaire général s'est référé notamment au paragraphe 6 de la résolution adoptée le 20 septembre 1960 par l'Assemblée générale, aux termes duquel l'Assemblée, "Sans préjudice des droits souverains de la République du Congo, invite tous les Etats à s'abstenir de fournir, directement ou indirectement, des armes ou autre matériel de guerre, du personnel militaire ou autre assistance à des fins militaires au Congo pendant la durée de l'assistance militaire accordée à titre temporaire par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies, sauf si les Nations Unies le demandent, par l'entremise du Secrétaire général, pour atteindre les objectifs de la présente résolution et des résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de Sécurité les 14 et 22 juillet et le 9 août 1960". La Force des Nations Unies doit s'inspirer de cette disposition adoptée par l'Assemblée générale, qui doit être considérée comme précisant davantage les objectifs inhérents aux résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité. Or, il n'est guère douteux que le transfert des bases à l'Armée Nationale Congolaise doive être considéré comme une "assistance à des fins militaires au Congo".



En conséquence, sauf instructions contraires du Conseil de Sécurité, la Force ne peut prendre aucune mesure pendant à la cession et au transfert de ses pouvoirs d'administration sur les bases.

Veillez agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma plus haute considération.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
23 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEW YORK

D-178 SEC GEN from DAYAL

Further to my D-172.

The Indonesian patrol has returned to Goma and reports having extricated the two German Red Cross doctors, (Dr. Benz and Dr. Pelzer) from detention in Lubero, but with great difficulty. They are now in Goma awaiting air passage to Leopoldville.

2. I am sending a strong protest to Kashamura on this latest outrage.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 23 January 1961  
No : D-177

Your 482 and 420 on Red Cross allegations at Kivu and Stanleyville.

1. Hoffman points out two further inaccuracies in letter from French delegation; he spent one, not three days, in Bukavu. In saying that the only Europeans not beaten were the East Germans and Yugoslav doctors, he is referring to Red Cross staff only.
2. Miller reports that Hoffman apparently absorbed and passed on exaggerated information gleaned in surcharged atmosphere at Shangugu, and also that Hoffman gives the impression that the excesses of first days of shooting across the frontier are still continuing. In fact situation Bukavu has greatly calmed down. Miller feels that Hoffman too has failed to understand the ONUC mandate of assisting in maintenance of law and order and expects individual protection for all Europeans. The outbreak of violence was due to Ruanda-based attack of 1 January and Bukavu garrison's suspicion of Belgian complicity which manifested itself in anti-Belgian and anti-European feeling and activities.
3. The ANC being greatly suspicious of Europeans undoubtedly arrested many arbitrarily and without authority. About 12 were seriously ill-treated; the story of the Belgian businessman is probably true, and another Belgian has probably lost sight of one eye. Fischer is painfully recovering from the brutal beating he received.
4. Things quietened down as the new administration took over and arrests became fewer and more legalistic in appearance, the persons arrested being taken either to prison or to Kashamura and suffering lesser physical hardship.



5. However, violence broke out again after the 8 Belgian soldiers were arrested on 13 January at Uvira. The elderly nurse mentioned in French delegation letter, named Mlle Pyceans, was arrested at Uvira that day and ill-treated, although Dr. Kebers who saw her did not observe that her face was badly injured. The French note further states that many Europeans took refuge in various places, particularly the European hospital which was said to be filled with women and children fearing the arrival of drunken soldiers. Miller reports this to be utterly untrue; most Europeans took refuge near UN camp. The maximum number reported and seen at the hospital were 2 families and 2 priests. Although ANC went to the hospital, they were not drunk and made no serious trouble.

6. The allegation that the Nigerian troops suspended evacuation at the insistence of Lumumbist ANC is particularly resented by Miller as being completely false. Over 400 Europeans were enabled to evacuate with the assistance and under the protection of the Nigerian soldiers, and many lives and limbs were saved by their action. The evacuation was suspended only when it was clear that the ANC would use force to stop it which would cause casualties to the very people whom evacuation was intended to serve. The reckless use of force by Nigerians as advocated by some, would have been highly irresponsible.

7. Regarding your 470, the Belgian mission's statement is completely confused. Thudicum requested Gizenga through UN communication channels for permission to visit the 8 Belgian soldiers. This request was forwarded to Gizenga on 18 January; UN has received no reply from Gizenga nor has <sup>any</sup> knowledge of any reply having been received directly by Thudicum. The statement regarding Thudicum's alleged illegal entry into the Congo is incomprehensible; it appears to be a confusion with Hoffman's entry into Bukavu. Hoffman entered Bukavu from Shangugu with UN assistance on 13 January, but without the permission of local authorities. He was seen by the local authorities in the UN camp and he returned to Shangugu the same evening. When application was made by UN for him to be given an entry permit, the local authorities refused on the ground of his alleged illegal entry the previous day



(although he came at UN invitation and with UN assistance) and also on the mistaken ground that the Red Cross had not seen Lumumba (Red Cross had seen Lumumba on 27 December).

8. I trust this is sufficient for you to reply to the French and Belgian delegations.



LEOPOLOVILLE  
23 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

D-176 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL

1. Miller reports ANC officers Bukavu requested McKeown to insist Red Cross doctors visit Lumumba in Elisabethville.
2. Lumumbist youth Bukavu presented Nigerian Commander with a letter to you as follows: "Les jeunesses nationalistes Bukavu JMNC, AJA, PSA demandent libération immédiate Premier congolais Lumumba dans vingt-quatre heures. Sine qua non serons obligés arrêter tous occidentaux impérialistes et partisans fantoches Mobutu, Kase-Vubu, Tshombe, Kalonji. Si Lumumba pas libéré, retiendrons prisonniers et malmènerons tous impérialistes arrêtés. Prions ONU pas (garbled) n'a pas intervenu lors transfert Lumumba à Elisabethville. Condamnons ONU de soutenir manoeuvres impérialistes pour semer troubles et saboter indépendance nationale Congo. Demandons en outre aux pays afro-asiatiques insister pour démission Hammarskjold et tous représentants impérialistes de ONU Congo. Signé: Jeunesses Nationalistes du Kivu."



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 23 January 1961  
NO : D-174-75

I have kept you fully informed of the politico-military trends in the Congo which fill us with grave misgivings in regard to possible future developments.

2. It is evident that the Kasavubu-Mobutu-Bomboko set-up has been crumbling for some time and it is today faced with complete disintegration which might tempt resort to desperate measures. Over the country as a whole the position is as follows. The Leo authorities' writ hardly runs beyond the Bakongo area, as the eastern and southern parts owe allegiance to Kamitatu. In Equateur, Van der Goot reports that the position is shaky with the ANC equally divided and the economic difficulties turning the population towards the Lumumbaists. The tribal congresses of the Bangalas and Mongos, intended to rally northern and eastern Equateur to Leo's support, might result in the two areas breaking away; besides, tribal emotions are not sufficiently strong to resist the rising tide of Lumumbaism. Van der Goot opines that if any military adventure is tried by or against the province, the situation would change catastrophically to the detriment of the Leo authorities. Orientale and Kivu provinces have been irretrievably lost while the Balubakats and the ANC are solidly in position in North Katanga and there have been rumblings in South Katanga as well. Lavallee reports that several members of the Lulua Government of Kasai reflect their tribal sympathies with the Batatela (Lumumba's tribe) and they have warned of grave consequences if Lumumba is not released. The ANC there however is said to be generally pro-Mobutu though the situation could change.

3. The collapse of the hold of the Leo authorities over the greater part of the country has been very ill-taken by their foreign supporters including several embassies here. They regard with open dismay the crumbling before their eyes of the ramshackle structure which they were instrumental in building up towards the end of November.



4. It is in this context that the plight of the hapless Europeans in Kivu and Orientale, dangerous though it is, is being played up for political ends, they being treated as political hostages not only by Gizenga and his friends but also by certain Western missions. In fact the latter are using them as a human bait in an attempt to destroy the man-eating tiger which they proclaim Gizenga to be. How else can one explain the reluctance of these envoys to consider the evacuation of their nationals while they loudly scream about the savageries being perpetrated against them, depicting Gizenga etc., as monsters and blaming the UN for inactivity? In this sordid game, it is regrettable that Hoffmann and Thudicum of the Red Cross have joined.

5. I regard as ominous Charpentier's warnings that the governments concerned may be forced to intervene to prevent the maltreatment of their citizens and in this context the reported arrival of two Belgian battalions in Usumbura is significant.

6. Concurrently, there is evidence of greatly increased Belgian military activity in Katanga where Berendsen reports that some two to three hundred foreign legion type of military adventurers are strutting the streets of E'ville. Six Piper planes have been flown into E'ville recently by Rhodesian pilots. Kalonji is showing a new aggressiveness and his forces have been trying to fan out in a northern and easterly direction. Here in Leo, a large number of Belgian officers are milling around, some in military uniform, and it is said that Mobutu has arranged to get 200 to officer his rabble. The Belgian pressure to turn the military bases over to Tshombe and Mobutu is also part of the same picture. Nachaat warns that after 31st January there might be an attempted seizure of Kitona Base while we have heard that some plans are afoot to take over Kamina on 15th February. All this, combined with rumours that Sabena jet flights are carrying military materiél, indicate that some aggressive action is under way.

7. While a blind eye is turned by certain missions here to these developments, there is extreme watchfulness and wilful exaggeration of what is going on on the other side, although Duran is convinced that whatever help may have arrived, has been limited.

8. Mobutu, who has been promoted to Major-General today, has been



commuting between E'ville, Leo and Bakwanga and there is talk of a joint military command developing. It may be that from all three points a combined attack may be projected, the occasion being seized by certain countries, in the guise of protecting their citizens, to stage a paracommando blitzkrieg against Stan and Bukavu.

9. Were such a situation to develop, there may be opposing foreign intervention and this would inevitably result in a frightful explosion. If there is any such plan as the one outlined above, it must be based upon speed of action in order to face the world with a fait accompli. But in this jet age with the precarious balance of world forces, such plans of mice and men are bound to go awry, with dire consequences to the peace of the world.

10. In this cable I reflect the views of all my colleagues on the basis of lengthy discussions held over the last few days to analyse the present ominous trends, and it is my duty to place our misgivings before you in all candour. The question is in what form the alarm should be sounded before it is too late. Perhaps you might warn the delegations concerned, and if the new US administration are receptive, they could caution their allies against any reckless adventures.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 23 January 1961  
No : D-173

Wright reports that information has been gathered in Kamina "that the Katangese army intends to place one thousand three hundred men in garrison in Kaminaville". We have heard from a British correspondent recently back from E'ville that Tshombe has ordered six Fouga jet planes from a Belgian firm. These, I understand, can be used as fighters, firing rockets. Belgians had Fouga jet trainer aircraft at Kamina which probably were taken to Usumbura. Also overheard by Dumontet at desk of Memling Hotel in Leo following tail end of conversation between two newly arrived European civilians: "Alors le 15 février à Kamina", "Oui mon colonel".



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 23 January 1961  
No : 0-171

Re your 477, 478, 479, 480.

We note serious discrepancy between English and French texts of note verbale to Belgium, in first sentence of second paragraph following quotation from 28 August letter. French reads "dépasserait la compétence du Secrétaire général établie par les dispositions des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale", whereas English reads "would be contrary to the provisions of the Security Council resolutions and detrimental to achieving the purposes which the Council and the General Assembly have adopted". While we would prefer English version, we must assume that note was delivered in French. Please clarify urgently.



OUTGOING CODE

hmc  
14  
23/1

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 23 January 1961  
No : D- 170

Duran informs us that a strong ANC detachment 21 January at 1600 hours encircled Headquarters and camp of the third Ethiopian battalion where more than 100 Europeans have sought asylum. The ANC withdrew however at 1730 hours following personal intervention of Lundula.

2. 68 Europeans including ten children took refuge at UN Headquarters building as of 1700 hours Saturday. Special security measures were taken to protect the building and its accesses.

3. Gizenga said he would make a radio appeal asking for calm and disavowing call to violence made by Salumu in Saturday's issue of Uhuru. Duran will inform whether Gizenga succeeds in restoring some degree of sanity among civilians and military but says tension remains high.

4. It was confirmed meanwhile that all civilians arrested on 19 January were released the following day against a ransom of half million francs most of them ill-treated and some quite brutally but contrary to



previous reports consequences are mainly psychological with no major physical injuries.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 22 January 1961  
NO : D-167

The diplomatic representatives of a dozen European countries and USA came again this morning to discuss situation in Orientale and Kivu provinces. I was assisted by Berthoud, Iyassu, Kelly and Nwokedi.

2. Charpentier, speaking for the large Belgian group and for the French citizens stated they were requesting firmer action by UN (a) to protect those who wished to stay (b) to ensure that those who wanted to leave were enabled to depart, to which Scott added (c) to protect or evacuate foreigners in outlying areas from where UN troops have been withdrawn.
3. We informed them of the latest position in the two provinces and once again explained that we would provide protection only in defined compounds and for limited crisis periods, that the decision whether to evacuate or not was for them to take, that UN would assist in enabling evacuees to depart.
4. We reminded them that UN had organized an evacuation of Europeans from Orientale in July and had been prepared to assist last December. We were now again facing a similar or worse situation and had already created protected compounds in Stanleyville, Bukavu and Goma. The ONUC mandate was to assist the Congolese authorities in maintaining law and order and did not give ONUC sole responsibility for law and order nor could ONUC supplant the local authorities as was suggested. These crises would continue to recur, and it was evident that a lasting solution should be sought, taking into realistic account the hard facts of the situation.
5. It transpired, and was openly said by Greek Consul, that what they really want is for the European population to be enabled to stay on in Orientale and Kivu, and to be granted protection by UN every time the ANC runs amok. The UN would be a ready scapegoat when individual incidents occurred, as was inevitable.
6. We pointed out that any such guarantee was impossible and that it was



for them to decide whether to advise their nationals to evacuate or not. Disarming ANC or taking over the law and order responsibilities in the two provinces as some envoys had suggested, were matters for the Security Council, or for Kasavubu and Manzikala, Gizenga, etc., jointly to request. We reminded them of our mandate, clarified by your recent statements, of which we gave them copies.

7. Some of them, particularly Scott, suggested we disarm the Gizenga ANC, but received coldly the point that, in that case, the Mobutu ANC would also have to be disarmed. Scott then suggested we try to take part of both the Mobutu and the Gizenga ANC under command as ONUC contingents. These ANC contingents, he stated, could then be instructed by UN to refrain from arbitrary arrests in times of political crisis, and if they refused to obey could then legally be placed under arrest and disarmed by UN. This plan although it has many flaws, we promised to study.

8. As many of the countries concerned have consular representatives in Stanleyville, it was agreed that the consuls should be instructed to give Duran lists of all those who wanted to leave but who had been refused exit permits. Duran would then take up these cases again with Gizenga and Manzikala and a point may arrive when force would be required to effect evacuation.

9. The diplomatic representatives were plainly disappointed at our reluctance to take over from them their consular responsibilities. Like the Congolese, they would like to interpret the mandate to suit certain political interests, and are disappointed when faced with the facts. After much talk, all that emerged was the preparation of lists of those desiring evacuation. Meanwhile the question of any large scale evacuation was left in the air and a further meeting was requested after the envoys had pondered over the matter.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
22 JANUARY 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEW YORK

D-166      SECGEN from DAYAL.

Following cabled to Beer:

Quote

.....

Unquote



LEOPOLDVILLE  
22 January 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

LICROSS  
GENEVA

ONUC\_\_\_\_\_ For Dr. BEER from DAYAL and LINNER.

We have learnt with great surprise that the Belgian Mission to the United Nations has informed the Secretary General that the Red Cross had complained of non-cooperation between them and the United Nations personnel in Bukavu and Stanleyville. Specifically, it is stated that Mr. Thudicum who had asked for permission to see the Europeans in Bukavu had not been permitted by the UN to do so. He is also reported to have been refused by Gizenga to visit the eight Belgian prisoners in Stanleyville on the pretext that he had illegally entered the Congo. The UN representative was alleged not to have supported his contention that he was in the Congo on the invitation of the UN and he was therefore refused access to the Belgians.

2. We immediately discussed the matter with Hoffmann and Norredam as the information given to New York came as a surprise to us. Hoffmann categorically denied any lack of cooperation between the UN and Red Cross in Bukavu and Stanleyville and further denied having made any complaint. It was not Thudicum but he who had gone to Bukavu and he repudiates the statement that the UN had not permitted him to visit the Europeans there. Hoffmann also describes as incorrect the allegation that the UN representative did not support his request to visit the eight Belgian soldiers in Stanleyville. The Red Cross request to Gizenga regarding the Belgian soldiers has only just been presented and a reply is awaited.

3. We should add that Hoffmann had on his return from Bukavu addressed a meeting of the diplomatic corps at which he recounted his impressions and the rumours which he had heard, some of which have unfortunately as a result, trickled to the press.

4. We were extremely happy to have had the opportunity of discussing our mutual problems with you and felt assured of complete mutual understanding and cooperation. Our surprise is all the greater therefore to



receive the above complaint which according to Hoffmann himself has no foundation in fact.

5. Regarding the situation of the Europeans and dissident Congolese in Orientale and Kivu provinces, we ourselves are acutely aware of the difficulties and have been in close consultation with the foreign envoys. As you know, our representatives, both military and civil on the spot, have been working day and night to prevent arbitrary arrests and to secure better treatment, and they have so far succeeded in preventing any widespread brutality although individual cases have unfortunately occurred. In view of the highly unstable political situation and the danger to the Europeans who are being treated as hostages, we have suggested to the diplomatic representatives to exercise their responsibility towards their nationals in regard to their evacuation with the assurance of the fullest possible assistance and cooperation of the UN personnel on the spot. As you are probably aware, we have sent strong written protests to the Stanleyville and Bukavu authorities against the restrictions on evacuation and the violation of human rights. We can assure you that we shall continue to do everything possible to uphold the principles for which the UN and the Red Cross equally stand.

6. We hope that we may keep in touch with each other in regard to ~~questions on~~ matters of mutual interest concerning either the safety or the functioning of the Red Cross personnel.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 21 January 1961  
NO : D-164

Further my D-155 concerning Stanleyville.

Thirty arrested were released on evening 20 January after payment of 500.000 Congolese francs by Belgian community. Several had been beaten, including Mr. Champagne of SEDEC, badly.

2. Ethiopians intervened as soon as the arrests were known. However Lundula was unable control ANC who informed Ethiopians that any attempt to approach their camp would result in the death of the prisoners. UN continued its pressure on Gizenga and Lundula all night but the prisoners were eventually released with payment of ransom. Duran reports ANC unapproachable and in vicious and savage mood.

3. Sixty Europeans are in UN camp under UN protection. A constant stream of Belgian visitors is coming to UN office for assistance. Situation remains extremely tense and uncertain. ANC and gendarmerie seem out of hand and unwilling obey orders from either Lundula or Gizenga and are reliably reported to be intending to raid European district today. Duran has advised European community to concentrate in three areas of Stanleyville under protection of strong UN detachments.

4. Police attempted arrest Manzikala and Louis Lumumba, but Gendarmerie struck first blow by arresting all police commissioners. Police commissioners now released but gendarmerie and local police almost came to blows.

5. Conciliation Commission met Lundula, Manzikala and others but Gizenga had a sudden illness and, notwithstanding their strong pleas, could not be seen. However, Senoussi, the Moroccan member had a long private meeting with Gizenga and found him more pliant than he had expected. I had requested Conciliation Commission to intervene regarding the mass arrests and assaults of civilians but it is evident they could do little.



6. The Conciliation Commission were also permitted to see Songolo and the other political prisoners, alone.

7. Copies of your notes to Kasavubu and Tshombe regarding the transfer of Lumumba were shown to Gizenga and Manzikala etc., by Duran. Their attitude was quote alors croyez-vous qu'on peut avoir de l'espoir unquote.

8. In the confusion of the arrival of the Conciliation Commission a plane carrying eighteen Europeans managed to get away from Stanleyville without gendarmerie intervention.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 21 January 1961  
NO : D-163

Re your 470.

Have spoken with Hoffmann, Acting Director of International Red Cross, Leopoldville, in absence Director Thudicum, presently in Geneva, also Norredam, League Red Cross Representative Leopoldville. Hoffmann, not Thudicum, went to Bukavu. Hoffmann categorically denies lack of cooperation between UN and Red Cross in Bukavu and Stanleyville and also denies having complained. He also denies statement that UN had not permitted him to visit Europeans in Bukavu. Red Cross request to Gizenga to see eight Belgian soldiers in Stanleyville has only just been presented and no reply has yet been received. Hoffmann also denies allegation that UN representative did not support his request to visit the eight Belgian soldiers.

2. Hoffmann will be contacting Red Cross Geneva. I have cabled ONUC Bukavu and Stanleyville and will inform you of their comments in this regard as soon as possible.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : CORDIER, NEW YORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
DATE : 21 January 1961  
NO : D-162

Rikhye's illness was fortunately brief and he returned to work in three days. Cox is cheerful and should shed his slight intermittent fever soon; his tests were all negative. He is being well cared for and there is no need for worry.