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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

16 APR – 25 JULY 1993

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'93 JUN 24 -4 :16

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IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB (FOR WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR)
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 23 JUNE 1993
NUMBER: 1212

CODED CABLE

1993 JUN 23 P 9:44

SUBJECT: **Revised peace plan for BiH**

1. Further to Wahlgren's UNPROFOR Z-786 of 19 June, a copy of the Statement of Principles agreed in Sarajevo on 18 March 1992 is attached.

2. If any further information comes to light that might be of value, we shall fax it to you.

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STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

for new constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Hercegovina

A Independence

1. Bosnia and Hercegovina would be a state, composed of three constituent units, based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria.

2. Bosnia and Hercegovina would continue to have its existing borders and neither the government of Bosnia and Hercegovina nor the governments of the constituent units will encourage or support claims to any part of its territory by neighbouring states.

3. Sovereignty resides in the citizens of the Muslim, Serb and Croat nations and other nations and nationalities, who realise it through their civic participation in the constituent units and the central organs of the Republic.

B General Principles

1. Bosnia and Hercegovina and its constituent units would be governed in accordance with the following constitutional principles, as understood and generally practised among the democratic states of Western Europe and as set out in Draft Convention under discussion in the Conference:

a. Respect for human rights at the highest standards as envisaged in the draft Convention, respect for private ownership, the market economy and free enterprise;

b. The general and equal right to vote, free elections and secret voting;

c. Freedom for political and trade union activities;

d. A secular state system with full religious freedom and separation of church and state, separation of powers between the branches of government, the rule of law and a democratic and effective system of control and protection of constitutionality and legality;

e. International control and jurisdiction for the protection of human rights and freedom.

C The Assembly and Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina

1. The Assembly of Bosnia and Hercegovina would be composed of a Chamber of Citizens, which would be directly elected, and a Chamber of Constituent Units in which each of the constituent units would have an equal number of representatives.

2. The Assembly, acting through the Chamber of Citizens and the Chamber of Constituent Units, and the Government, would have competence to legislate, to consider and adjust proposals from the

constituent units and to administer in the following fields: Central Bank and monetary policy, foreign relations, defence 1) general economic policy, economic relations, including, where any of the following affect more than one constituent unit, transport, energy supplies, pipelines and water management, and other items to be decided. Decisions concerning the flag and emblem, higher education, religion, matters concerning defence, macro-economic policy, important or general matters concerning economic policy, decisions concerning relations between Bosnia and Hercegovina and states neighbouring Bosnia and Hercegovina and other items to be decide would be decided in the Chamber of Constituent Units by a majority of four-fifths of the total number of the representatives in it.

Note:()Matter concerning the future armed forces of Bosnia and Hercegovina will be defined in the course of these negotiations. This does not refer to the present army, the question of which will be solved separately.

3. The composition of the civil service and the judiciary of Bosnia and Hercegovina would reflect proportionally the national composition of Bosnia and Hercegovina

4. In order to resolve constitutional questions between the authorities of Bosnia and Hercegovina of the constituent units, a special Tribunal would be established, which would for a period of not less than five years include impartial elements drawn from outside Bosnia and Hercegovina and its neighbouring states. This Tribunal will have one member from each unit and the same number and one more drawn from outside. It takes decisions by simple majority.

D The constituent units

1. Within Bosnia and Hercegovina, constituent units would be established, which are defined in Part E below.

2. The Assembly and the government of the constituent units would have power, subject to any legislation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the limited fields specified above and in accordance with the procedures set out above, to legislate and to administer in matters of concern to the constituent units; namely, the administration of the services and officials of a constituent unit, expropriation of property for public use, land registries, fire prevention, chambers of commerce, supervision of co-operative trading organisations, savings banks and credit institutions, supervision of charitable institutions, social security, sickness insurance, conservation of the historic, artistic and cultural heritage, cultural institutions, such as libraries, institutes and museums, the use of land, environmental controls, housing, markets, roads, emergency services, mining, hunting and fishing, nature reserves, aqueducts, water management, pipelines, transport within the constituent unit, tourism, agriculture and forests, social assistance, education, schools, police, trade and other aspects of economic policy, security at public performances, hygiene, sport an recreation and other items to be decided. Each constituent unit would organise its own institutions. A constituent unit may establish and maintain relations and links with the other Republics and with organisations in them provided that these relations and links are consistent with

the independence and integrity of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

3. All the institutions (the civil service, the judiciary, etc.) established by a constituent unit would reflect proportionally the national composition of the constituent unit.

4. Members of the nations who would be in a minority in a particular constituent unit would receive protection similar to that in Article 2 (3) of the draft Convention.

E Definition of the constituent units

A working group will be established in order to define the territory of the constituent units based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographical and other criteria. A map based on the national absolute or relative majority in each municipality will be the basis of work in the working group, and will be subject only to amendments, justified by the above-mentioned criteria. A copy is annexed to this Statement.

F Transitional Steps

1. Subject to the definition of the constituent units for the purpose of the future arrangements in accordance with Part E of this Statement, a constitutional law to modify the Constitution in order to give effect to these principles will be prepared and submitted to the Assembly as soon as possible, and will have to be confirmed by a referendum of the people under international supervision.

THIS PAPER IS THE BASIS OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Sarajevo
18 March 1992

As agreed by the leaders of SDA, SDS and HDZ parties in the fifth round of the talks on future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Hercegovina under the auspices of the EC Peace Conference

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JNOG Telecomm. Unit Palais des Nations 93 JUN 23 10:18

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

ZAGREB RO'S INITIALS

INFO : STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
BH COMD KISELJAK, ACOS G3
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FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Wahlgren

DATE : 23 June 1993

NUMBER : **UNPROFOR Z- 797**

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SUBJECT : AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

1. Tuesday night, 22 June, my staff received a telephone call from Brig Meassrvy-Whiting, the Military Advisor to Lord Owen. Lord Owen felt that if the parties to the peace talks taking place in Geneva on Wednesday 23 Jun could not reach agreement then he would consider presenting an agreement signed previously. This is contained in Annex IV to the Report of the Secretary-General, S/24479 dated 26 March 1993, titled "Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina". It was signed by Isetbegovic, Karadzic and Boban in January and March 1993.

2. Lord Owen requested that UNPROFOR review the agreement and state whether it is still acceptable as presented or suggested any changes that should be made to it.

3. The general approach taken in this agreement remains valid. However since it was produced many events have occurred not the least of which is the fact that all factions are now fighting each other and a most delicate situation has developed in Central Bosnia. Furthermore numerous MMWG meetings have resulted in agreements and modification to the Blue Routes from or to Sarajevo.

4. My suggestion therefore is to recommend to the concerned parties that a new agreement in the same lines as previously agreed, be produced to match the concept with current realities. A key element would be the requirement for the MMWG to sit permanently from the time the agreement begins to be implemented. Joint Crisis Management Teams would be created to resolve specific issues as they arise.

5. Emphasis must be placed of the need to reestablish the infrastructure of the country otherwise we face a humanitarian disaster next winter. This will require a

2/2

major and well coordinated effort between all humanitarians agencies and the full cooperation of the factions under the initial guidance of UNPROFOR.

6. Control measures on route/corridors and issues of border control will have to be examined in relation to the agreed political settlement. The approach in regards to this quote mini-states unquote will be different than that conceived in support of the original VOPP.

7. Emphasis must also be placed on Sarajevo which must be demilitarized as apposed to the general concept being applied to Safe Area as a whole. The advent of SCR 836 on Safe Areas must be integrated in a revised agreement.

8. Finally it is critical that flexibility of execution be given to UNPROFOR in the wording of a revised agreement. Fixed timings on steps to be implemented must be reconciled with resources available, attitude of the factions and realities on the ground. An unrealistic timetable will raise expectation and any delays, however valid the reason, will be interpreted as a failure and may compromise the whole plan.

9. To summarize, the approach taken in the original agreement remains valid but is must be adapted to events that have occurred and the are occurring. The agreement needs to be completely redone.

10. Best Regards

Mil/ops w Sen

BY FAX

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OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG	DATE/TIME: 23 JUNE 1993
TO: STOLTENBERG ICFY, GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: BRIG. WILSON	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : MAJ J HARJA SO TO MA/SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: REPORTS FOR ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE	

MESSAGE:

SIR,

ATTACHED, PLEASE FIND THE REPORT FROM HQ BH COMMAND FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

ACTION /INFO

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HQ BH COMMAND - KISELJAK

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TO: Gen COT UNPROFOR, ZAGREB	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN:	FILE REF.NO. : 2006 DRAFTER : MAJ PAVLIK TITLE : CHIEF G2 RELEASING OFF.: BRIG HAYES SIGNATURE
INFO : Mr Stoltenberg INTERNAL:	
SUBJECT: REPORTS FOR ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS	

MESSAGE

REFERENCE:

A. Fax from STOLTENBERG, GENEVE dated 21 Jul 93 1633 hrs.

Please find below the information requested in Reference Fax.

a. MOSTAR. Last week was a significant one for the city and the surrounding area. The HVO continued to build up and reorganise their forces, supported in great numbers by the HV, thought to be 41 HV Bde from SPLIT. The presence of these additional troops from the HV will likely shift the balance of power for the HVO.

(1) On 13 Jul, the BiH mounted their own offensive to the South of the city from BLAGAJ (YH 3493) to the area of BUNA (YH 3092) and GUBAVICA (YH 3088). At the same time as this offensive, fighting broke out in many of the villages to the South of MOSTAR in the CAPALJINA / STOLAC area. The BiH made initial gains but the HV/HVO launched a counteroffensive which halted the BiH advance and pushed them back from the NERETVA river so that the confrontation line was believed to run through the village of BUNA.

(2) As of 20 / 21 July, it appeared that the fighting in MOSTAR stabilised with the HVO appearing to have recovered most of the area they lost to the BIH last week. HVO continued to shell BIH positions NE of BUNA (YH 3091) and the HVO stated that they would launch a major infantry attack in the next 24 hrs. The aim of this attack could be to isolate the BLAGAJ (YH 3091) area of MOSTAR which would be bitterly contested by the BIH.

b. GORNI VAKUF. Fighting was intense in the area of the town 19 Jul. BRITBAT patrols came under fire, possibly caught in the crossfire between HVO and BiH. HVO check points have refused access to BRITBAT patrols and deployed mines. Overnight 19/20 Jul fighting continued until the early

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morning, with the BRITBAT base coming under crossfire. BRITBAT assess that the BiH were trying to force HVO to move out of G VAKUF. The day was quieter with only some sniper fire. By 21 Jul, fighting decreased greatly in G VAKUF, with only sporadic small arms and mortar fire. A total of five HVO T55s were reported to be in the PROZOR/G VAKUF area.

c. BUGOJNO. There was a significant outbreak of fighting between HVO and BiH on 19 Jul. Unconfirmed sources said that both sides had mobilised. They were preparing def positions and the HVO were using a T55 from outside the HVO HQ and has an arty unit 4 Km south of the town. Fighting has spread around the town to surrounding villages.

(1) An assessed bn of BSA troops was seen to move from JAJCE XK 1180 towards the KOMAR Feature XJ 9997. BRITBAT comment that they do not yet know what effect the deployment of troops has had on the BSA front line. The movement of the BSA bn could be a rotation of troops, or it may be reinforcement prior to an attack on the Front line. BRITBAT say that the current inter-ethnic fighting is more extensive than previously in this area, and it may not be so easy to contain. There is a risk of escalation and a consequent risk of BSA opportunism to penetrate the front line. The BiH security officer in TRAVNIK also reported the BSA bn moving to TURBE, believed that it would be used to attack BUGOJNO with the HVO.

(2) Fighting continued 20 / 21 Jul at a very high level, with most fighting in the Southern part of the town. BiH say they hold the majority of the town centre and expect to defeat the HVO in the next 48 hrs. The HVO said that they were far from defeated and to give the situation another 7-8 days. BRITBAT assesses that the BiH's bullish attitude reflects their strong position and their determination to carry on until the HVO is defeated. The HVO's reference something happening in the future may be for their reinforcement from PROZOR or intervention by the BSA.

d. IGMAN Mountain. As of reports from 20 Jul, the BSA offensive against IGMAN mountain continued from the direction of HAZDICI (BP 7556) of ILIDIZA (CP8256). The BSA made intensive use of arty fire in support of this offensive, registering over 500 shots. Local sources report that the BiH had some success in defending the area around BOLO BRDO (BP 7854), and that BSA casualties were high - around 70.

(1) According to BiH press 21 Jul, the BiH are firmly holding their positions and have captured many weapons and ammunition. A NGO reported that BiH lost one logistical base on IGMAN. Serb soldiers from KNIN (Sector South) are reported to have reinforced the ROMANIA Corps for this offensive. Using troops from KNIN seems odd given the situation their with the Maslenica Bridge and the Zemunik Airport.

(2) The BiH will go to great lengths in order to defend IGMAN Mountain, as its loss would further isolate SARAJEVO. As such they have been forced to withdraw forces from central and southern BH and hence relieve some of the pressure on the HVO. This was of course one of the BSAs main aims.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen

FAX

PLEASE PASS TO MR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW

TO: **Reginald Bartholomew**

FAX NO: **1-202-647 0555**

FROM: **Thorvald Stoltenberg**

DATE: **21 June 1993**

SUBJECT: **The current stituation in BH**

Attached, as discussed, is a paper describing the current situation on the ground.

Regards.

2/3

18 June 1993

NOTE ON THE DETERIORATING SITUATIONS IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA AND IN THE UNPAs.

INTRODUCTION

The international community is facing worsening crises in Bosnia Herzegovina and in Croatia. Stated summarily, the problems being encountered are the following:

- The risk of resumption of hostilities in the UNPAs.
- Continued fighting in BiH which has now extended to conflicts between Muslims and Croats.
- Worsening conditions in the safe areas.
- Obstruction and attacks upon UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ECMM and other humanitarian agencies.
- The lack of personnel and resources in UNPROFOR to perform the mandates entrusted to it.

I. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

- There is ongoing displacement in Central Bosnia, especially as a result of Muslim-Croat conflicts.
- Central Bosnia has been virtually cut off from humanitarian relief activities.
- The situation in most safe areas is bad to extremely bad in terms of safety and living conditions.
- There is an acute emergency in Mostar, with Muslims cut off on the east bank.
- There are continuing problems of denial of access to relief convoys especially from the Dalmatian coast to Sarajevo and central Bosnia. The sole road between Mostar and Sarajevo has been blocked for several days by HVO forces to all humanitarian convoys. The access of convoys to Gorazde has not yet taken place.
- There has been targeting of humanitarian convoys.
- There are cases of extortion practised against humanitarian convoys.
- Enormous pressure is being exerted on UNHCR to transfer populations.
- Sarajevo airport, which is the only life-line to the city, remains very insecure.

II. THE MILITARY SITUATION

A. CROATIA

- There is still no agreement between the Croatian government and the Knin authorities on a ceasefire pursuant to Resolution 802. On 16 June an interim ceasefire agreement was agreed upon between Military delegations from Zagreb and Knin in a meeting chaired by the Force Commander in Geneva. As it turned out, this interim ceasefire, which took effect at 18.00 on the following day, held in the Pink Zone west of Sector South for only 35 minutes.

B. BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

- The situation in Central Bosnia is out of control. Relations between Croats and Muslims are explosive; total war has been declared. The two areas of concern are:

  Travnik-Vitez-Busovaca-Zenica-Kakanj-Vares.

  Mostar-Jablanica-Konjic.

- The situation for UNMO's and all isolated teams, convoys and agencies has changed dramatically for the worse. It changes fast from hour to hour, and is often unpredictable. It depends often, not on military/political leaders, but on the humour of the local warlords. Freedom of movement is greatly impaired by Croats, Muslims, and Serbs and is sometimes non-existent.

- The referendum on the unification of the Croatian Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs could well provoke the Croatian Government to take military action to protect its territorial integrity.

- Members of UNPROFOR are fired upon several times a day by the different forces and UNPROFOR returns fire. This situation could escalate with serious consequences.

- The danger exists that UNPROFOR personnel could be taken as hostages by one side or the other.

III. RISKS OF EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT

- The danger is ever present of the conflict extending in the south Balkans, keeping in mind the volatile situation in Kosovo and the unstable situation in Macedonia.

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TO: SRSG GENEVA	FROM: HQ UNPROFOR SRSG
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: MAJ KARONEN	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : MAJ J HARJA SO TO MA/SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: WATER, POWER AND GAS SITUATION	
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MESSAGE:

ATTACHED, PLEASE FIND THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE WATER, POWER AND GAS SITUATION IN SARAJEVO AND OTHER SAFE AREAS.

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ELECTRICITY AND WATER IN SARAJEVO as at 14 July.

Utilities situation is the worse SARAJEVO experienced since last winter :

-less than 10% of the water needs,
-no electricity in the area,
-no gas,

from 21 June to 13 July.

The key is electricity. All other utilities need electrical power. Water supply to run the pumps, as well as gas stations and PTT system need electricity. A few megawatts could minimise the current problems.

The hydroelectric power plants in Jablanica area are still not connected to Sarajevo supply grid. The bulk of the power supplied to the city was coming fom there. The fightings between BiH and HVO forces have damaged the power lines in the area Jablanica Konjic and possibly some pylons (tbc), and acces for repair remains impossible.

Sarajevo was also supplied with electicity coming from thermal power plant Kakanj. One generator is producing in Kakanj.

It began to fail during the first week of June and no energy was sent to SARAJEVO during the above mentioned period. Many different explanations were given by SARAJEVO electricity authorities during the month, from lack of coal, possibility to start one additionnal generator, ... None of these information is confirmed or reliable.

From 21 June untill 13 July, no power has been sent from Kakanj to SARAJEVO. It is a deliberate dispatching choice and dispatching in in the hands of Bosnian authorities.

Visegrad power plant could provide partly the area with electricity. On the 13. of june, Serb side proposed to supply all the Serb areas and some Bosnian with electricity from Visegrad. All the energy coming from Kakanj and from Jablanica (if repaired) being left to the city itself. Would one source fail in the future, the remaining supply would be shared fifty-fifty.

After difficult discussions Bosnian side agreed. Of course, further repair missions were necessary to implement this power sharing plan. Contacts, liaisons, escorts were planned and prepared accordingly. Repair teams and escorts have been shot at several times from BiH side. One french officer and one french soldier have been injured. It seemed then that the Bosnian authorities were not interested to have electricity from VISEGRAD.

From a technical point of wiew, the area could be supplied with minimum electricity. Political games unfortunately denied electical supply and therefore water to the city.

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A meeting took place at the Presidency on the 9th of July, between members of the Government and Unprofor Sector Sarajevo Engineer. Again a possible sharing of the power, coming from Kakanj and from Visegrad was discussed.

The Serb proposal was :

1. They accept to receive energy from Kakanj to run Bacevo pumping station and to supply the community of Ilidza.

2. They accept to give 4MW to Velsici (2MW for Sarajevo city, 2MW for Grbavica), after repair of the power line Visegrad/Sokolac/Vogosca, which has been cut by Bosnian shots.

The Bosnian authorities answered that both proposal were unacceptable because :

-the first proposal means that Sarajevo will be partly supplied, when the area under Serb control Will be fully supplied ;

-the second proposal means that the ammunition factory in Vogosca will be supplied.

SARAJEVO HAS BEEN WITHOUT ELECTRICITY AND THEREFORE WITHOUT WATER AS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE POLITICAL CHOICE MADE BY THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.

The agreement signed 12 July by Bosnian and Serb presidents and Mr Kouchner produced a first affect 13 july 1850B. Power was switched on again from Kakanj to Sarajevo, thus showing that the denial of electricity and water to Sarajevo had really been a deliberate political choice.

Power reached Raljevo sub-station,(in the hands of Serbs) ; the Serbs switched on the line to Blazuj substation (in the hands of Serbs) and consequently 3MW could feed Bacevo pupping station (in the hands of Serbs) and run the pumps. Therefore, water is supplied to the western part of the city, including Mojmilo reservoir. Additionnal electricity repairs are necessary to feed Alipasin Most pumping station, in order to boost water in other parts of the city.

Gravity springs are funcionning as well as the brawery (equiped with two 250KVA generators to run the pumps).

Additionnal electricity repair missions are also needed to restore the line Visegrad Vogosca, allowing additionnal power to be delivered to the city.

Electricity repair missions are scheduled to start again on 15 July.

Gas supply has not been reestablished 13 July. The Serbs say they are experiencing technical difficulties but state they will be able to solve them 14 July. It seems that the technical problems are more difficult than expected. Sector engr is trying to get assistance from Sarajevo gas company.

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II. RECENT EVENTS.

1. 12-13 july.

(a). ELECTRICITY

121850B Blazuj transformer station (under Serb control) fed with 3MW from Kakanj (under Bosnian control).
Therefore Bacevo pumping station (1) (under Serb control) can run (2.7MW are required).

(b). WATER.

Water tank Mojmilo fed from Bacevo. West part of the city is supplied.
Other sources (Brus Bistrica(2), Brewery (3)) are functionning.

(C). GAS.

No gas. Tha Serbs are experiencing technical difficulties. They state thast they will be able to solve them 14 July.

2. 13-14 july.

(a). ELECTRICITY

Due to the fact that gas is not reestablished, Bosnian side decides to reduce the amount of power supplied down to 1MW instead of 3MW. This 1MW is reserved for Bacevo.

(b). WATER.

Water is cut off 122100B, probably due to the decrease of the electrical supply.
Other sources (Brus Bistrica, Brewery) are functionning.
Later on, Bacevo pumping station is normaly supplied again and there is water in the Bosnian districts Hrasno, Novi Grad, Dobrinja as wellas in the Serb districts Illidza and Lukavica (see panoramic viw and diagram in annex B).

(C). GAS.

No gas. The Technical problems are always not solved by the Serbs. The French Ambassador is putting pressure on the Serb authorities.

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3. 14-15 july.

(a). ELECTRICITY

Electricity on and off.Cut off from 1300-1700
As at 1800B all the area under serb control south and west of the city is supplied.
For Bosnian side, Hrasnica and sokolovici.

(b). WATER.

Water on and off (except Brus Bistrica and Brewery). water on at 0950. Mojmilo is being filled.Water will be available tomorrow.
Serb side all the area south and west of the city.
Bosnian side Hrasno, Novi Grad, Dobrinja.

(C). GAS.

150950B gas is back. Serious leaks remain. It will certainly be necessary to turn off again in order to repair.
Serb side all the area south and west of the city.
Bosnian side Theoritically all the town (but the leak...).

Doctor Engl assessment.

General policy is to improve the utilities with equality between both sides. It has been decided to proceed in two steps.
a/require from Bosnian side to switch on electricity in Kakanj in order to supply the pumping station in Bacevo. To require from Serb side to turn gas on for Sarajevo.
Success for both has been permitted by the action of the french ambassador on both sides. Theoritically, involvemant of Unprofor was not necessary in this phase. In fact this phase is not finished, due to the real problem (gas fault due to shelling damage) and new other problem (sub-station Kiseljak seems tobe difficult to control by Bosnian side). Gas repair will begin tomorrow under Unprofor protection. Attempts will be made to get information about Kiseljak substation. The conclusion is that there is any confidence between both parties.

b/repair of the two power lines. Line Reljevo Buca Potok for the benefit of the town ; line Sokolovac Vogoska for the benefit of the Serbs. Technically, three days are necessary to make these repairs.
These repairs are a key issue. Interests are not compatible because the Serbs want to have full supply and first priority for the program, and bosnian side refuses to see Vogosca ammunition factory supplied.16 July meeting at the airport. An agreement is necessary before re-starting repairs.

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4. 15-16 july.

A/ELECTRICITY.
Substation Blazuj, supplying water pumping station Bacevo, is standing fed since 0900B. The substation Kiseljak is no longer under control of Sarajevo Electricity Company. It means that Croats are able to overload the line Kakanj-Reljevo and can badly disturb the supply to Sarajevo.

B/WATER.
Water supply is performed at the same time as electrical power. Other sources (Brus, Bistrica and Brewery) are functionning.

C/GAS.
The repair of the gas station in Grbavica begins today. ETC tomorrow if the repair team has not to face an important problem. Gas supply is possible starting from 1700B.

D/REPAIR PROGRAM.
Meeting in the morning about electricity during which a program is agreed. Repair of the line Reljevo-Buca Potok scheduled for Sunday, repair of the line Sokolac-Vogosca scheduled for monday.

4. 16-17 july.

A/ELECTRICITY.
Supply interrupted from 1400B to 1640B. The reason is the same as yesterday : the croats control Kiseljak sub-station and they overload the line Kakanj-Reljevo (4 to 5 MW of the 6 or 7 available. The repair planned for tomorrow will concern the only line which suplies Sarajevo.

B/WATER.

Water supply is performed at the same time as electrical power. Other sources (Brus, Bistrica and Brewery) are functionning.

C/GAS.
The repair of the gas station in Grbavica has beem performed. Gas supply back starting from 1600B, pressure .5 bar. one hour later it was 1.2 bar. Later on, it was .7. Normal pressure should be 8 bar. It seems that pressure is linked with electrcity supply. Serb side give two days to Bosnian side to solve their problem with Kiseljak. If not, they threat to cut gas supply off.

D/REPAIR PROGRAM.

110kv line Reljevo-Buca Potok scheduled 18 July.

20 JUL '93 07:37 UNOG GENEVA +41 22 9170123

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7

5. 17-18 july.

A/ELECTRICITY.
6 MW supplyed today from Kakanj. According to Serb side, Blazuj used only 2 MW, it means that kiseljak consumption is 4 MW.

B/WATER.
Water supply performed "normally". A major improvement due to an escorted mission to Mojmilo reservoir. Valve closed yesterday 1900B, reopened this morning 0700B. A larger area supplied all day long. One part of the old town got water. Other sources (Brus, Bistrica and Brewery) are functionning.

C/GAS.
Gas was cut yesterday evening. According to Lukavica, the cut is upstream from Butila substation.
Every possibility has to be investigated. Even a Bosnian action is possible : from an information sheet issued by Ministry of Energy, dated 17 July : quote "...government of republic of BiH has sent a request to the republic of Hungary to stop the natural gas delivery to the consumers of BiH via Serbian territory" unquote. According to the information given by the Hungarian company for oil and natural gas supply, dated 16 July, the above quoted request has been realised on 14 July at midnight.

D/REPAIR PROGRAM.

110kv line Reljevo-Buca Potok scheduled 18 July postponed 19 July. Serb workers did not show up. They declare that they have been informed too late, despite the 48 hour notice.

6. 18-19 july.

ONE FRENCH OFFICER OF SECTOR ENGINEER BRANCH INJURED BY SNIPER BETWEEN PUMPING STATION AND STUP BRIDGE. MEDEVAC SCHEDULED TO FRANCE BY PLANE TOMORROW.

Fo-1072

(1) BACEVO.

Researches in Sarajevo Field, which started 1954, have shown that there are large and rich reserves of ground water in this area. Ground water here, by its chemical compounds resembles to water from gravity springs. No special measure, except desinfection, are needed for correction of the water quality.

1962 first well pump station and reservoirs started to work, quantity 500l/sec. In the second phase of construction (1972-1974), new wells, transporting water mains and water tank Mojmilo of 20,000m3 were included into the system. The third phase of construction has been made from 1978 to 1982 (new wells by river Bosna).

Daily normal production : 142,000m3.

(2) BRUS BISTRICA.

Belongs to the waterworks "Jahorina". Works started before WWI and Bistrica was included to the system 1917. Gravity fed.

(3) BREWERY.

Three wells with a total capacity of about 40l/sec exist at the beer brewery at the city center. The three wells have been connected to the main distribution system and been put into public service. The Brewery uses two gen-set to pump water and these consume 800l diesel per day. Water tankers are filled there and provide water for the hospital, the bakery, the PTT building and other essential users.

20 JUL '93 07:38 UNOG GENEVA +41 22 9170123

60-1072

Other Safe Areas.

A/Srebrenica.

Electricity.

No electricity, due to the damaged lines between the city and the network in Serb held areas.The Serb must allow technical recces, acces for a workforce as well as for tools and electrical spare-parts.

Water.

the water plant in Zelini Jadar, in serb held area, has been deliberately destroyed and the water intake damaged. As a result of this, the water supply system is not working. Drinking water of 2 liters per person, is collected in the city from small springs and wells.

It is essential that the water intake is repaired and the destroyed water plant by-passed, in order to allow raw water to reach the city. This will provide sanitary water. It will then be possible to increase the amount of dirnkable water available with a contenairised water treatement unit. To achieve this, the Serb must allow technical recces, acces for a workforce as well as for tools and materials.

B/Gorazde.

Electricity.

No electricity.

Water.

According to local sources (water company) the city was receiving the water before the war from Cajnice (CP4424). The water main runs under the road Cajnice Gorazde and ther is a water tank in the viscinity of the city (CP3735).
The tank is in good condition. The water was treated in a purification station between the tank and the city. As the purification station has been destroyed by shelling, the purification could take place in the tank.
In the Bosnian controlled areas, no repairs are needed. Bosnian state that the system is in perfect condition on the other side, and that the Serbs cut the water off in Miljeno (CP4227).
The alternative could be to pump water from the Drina river to the tank - currently they have no pumps and no electricity.
The city only receives water from wells but this is not treated. People are boiling it and using purification tablets.

60-1072

10

C/Zepa.

ELECTRICITY.

No electricity.

WATER.

The only supply is from springs and wells.

D/Tuzla.

ELECTRICITY.

Tuzla thermal power plant is producing about 160 MW. The coal production is a limitting factor. They lack spare parts and fuel. However, this production is dispatched in the area according to the priorities established by the local authorities. According to these priorities, power is cut several hours a day in different areas.
TUZLA power plant seems to be in a situation such as one additionnal generator could be started, thus providing additionnal power to be sent to Sarajevo. The lack of diesel fuel prevents to start this additionnal generator.

WATER.

Tuzla is supplied with water with cuts duirng the day according to the priorities and power supply.

D/BIHAC.

ELECTRICITY.

The supply is at a very low level in the pocket. There are cuts during day in different places in order to rotate the supplied zones. Before war, this area was supplied both from Croatia and from the rest of Bosnia.

WATER.

Bihac local authorities think their situation is very bad. The water supply is not at a high level (200 l/day/capita) but cannot be compared with other pockets. Unicef develops currently a program for water and is rather satisfied. Additionally, with the stopping of all industrial activity, the quality of the water has been improved in the area.

20 JUL '93 02:40 UNOS GENEVA +41 22 9170123 PAGE.10

Fo-1072

11

As already assessed in February, the key for power production remains coal production. As long as coal production will remain low, additionnal power will not be available from thermal power plants. Coal mines need explosives, diesel fuel, spare parts and without a improved aid program, their production will remain low and precarous.

Water is usually more localised. There is no national or regional network for water. Therefore, every city or village is a particular case. Electricity is often necessary for water, even with gravity fed systems, at least to run the purification plants. Generally, these facilities are poorly designed, have been poorly maintained, and require important manpower in regard of their west-european counterparts.

War damages are of course occuring on the electrical networks, transformer station, water sustems. But what is more, all parties are often tempted to use electricity and water supply as weapons.

20 JUL '93 07:40 UNOS GENEVA +41 22 9170123 P.10

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Sendes til Holst - Petersen - Lord Owen -

FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: MR. T. STOLTENBERG
OSLO

FAX NO: 00-47-22-833934 BGR

PAGE 1 OF 7

FROM: B.G. RAMCHARAN
ICFY, Geneva

DATE: 18 June 1993

SUBJECT: **Friday's happenings**

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1. Attached is the text of the paper sent to Mr. Goulding as you approved it. It was faxed at 3.45 p.m. Geneva time (9.45 a.m. New York time), well before the 10.30 deadline requested by the Security Council.

2. Attached, as requested, is a paper on the deterioration of the situations in Croatia and in Bosnia Herzegovina.

3. I contacted Ambassador Bebler, the Slovenian Ambassador Geneva. He has proposed that you visit Ljubljana on the afternoon of June 30th and on 1 July with the following programme:

   The afternoon of 30 June: meeting with the Foreign Minister, followed by dinner.

   - The morning of 1st July: meeting with the President.

   - 1 - 2 p.m.: meeting with the Prime Minister.

   I told Ambassador Bebler that I would relay this to you and would contact him next Monday or Tuesday.

4. The invitations to the meeting with the Presidency of Bosnia Herzegovina next Tuesday and Wednesday have been issued and a separate cable sent to you on this subject.

Best wishes for the weekend.

18 June 1993

NOTE ON THE DETERIORATING SITUATIONS IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA AND IN THE UNPAs.

INTRODUCTION

The international community is facing worsening crises in Bosnia Herzegovina and in Croatia. Stated summarily, the problems being encountered are the following:

- The risk of resumption of hostilities in the UNPAs.
- Continued fighting in BiH which has now extended to conflicts between Muslims and Croats.
- Worsening conditions in the safe areas.
- Obstruction and attacks upon UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ECMM and other humanitarian agencies.
- The lack of personnel and resources in UNPROFOR to perform the mandates entrusted to it.

I. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

- There is ongoing displacement in Central Bosnia, especially as a result of Muslim-Croat conflicts.
- Central Bosnia has been virtually cut off from humanitarian relief activities.
- The situation in most safe areas is bad to extremely bad in terms of safety and living conditions.
- There is an acute emergency in Mostar, with Muslims cut off on the east bank.
- There are continuing problems of denial of access to relief convoys especially from the Dalmatian coast to Sarajevo and central Bosnia. The sole road between Mostar and Sarajevo has been blocked for several days by HVO forces to all humanitarian convoys. The access of convoys to Gorazde has not yet taken place.
- There has been targeting of humanitarian convoys.
- There are cases of extortion practised against humanitarian convoys.
- Enormous pressure is being exerted on UNHCR to transfer populations.
- Sarajevo airport, which is the only life-line to the city, remains very insecure.

II. THE MILITARY SITUATION

A. CROATIA

- There is still no agreement between the Croatian government and the Knin authorities on a ceasefire pursuant to Resolution 802. On 16 June an interim ceasefire agreement was agreed upon between Military delegations from Zagreb and Knin in a meeting chaired by the Force Commander in Geneva. As it turned out, this interim ceasefire, which took effect at 18.00 on the following day, held in the Pink Zone west of Sector South for only 35 minutes.

B. BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

- The situation in Central Bosnia is out of control. Relations between Croats and Muslims are explosive; total war has been declared. The two areas of concern are:

  Travnik-Vitez-Busovaca-Zenica-Kakanj-Vares.

  Mostar-Jablanica-Konjic.

- The situation for UNMO's and all isolated teams, convoys and agencies has changed dramatically for the worse. It changes fast from hour to hour, and is often unpredictable. It depends often, not on military/political leaders, but on the humour of the local warlords. Freedom of movement is greatly impaired by Croats, Muslims, and Serbs and is sometimes non-existent.

- The referendum on the unification of the Croatian Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs could well provoke the Croatian Government to take military action to protect its territorial integrity.

- Members of UNPROFOR are fired upon several times a day by the different forces and UNPROFOR returns fire. This situation could escalate with serious consequences.

- The danger exists that UNPROFOR personnel could be taken as hostages by one side or the other.

III. RISKS OF EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT

- The danger is ever present of the conflict extending in the south Balkans, keeping in mind the volatile situation in Kosovo and the unstable situation in Macedonia.

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'93 JUN 15 17:13

ZAGREB
RO'S INITIALS

TO	:	ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO	:	STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM	:	WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE	:	15 JUNE 1993
NUMBER	:	**UNPROFOR Z- 762**
SUBJECT	:	BH SITUATION

Attached is an update on BH given to the FC this morning. We will advise you of the results of the meeting today in Sarajevo as soon as they are known.

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C2N-787 P2/6

UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCE

HEADQUARTERS
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

G2 BRIEF TO UNPROFOR FC

CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT BiH/HVO CONFLICT IN CENTRAL BOSNIA

1. General. The situation in Central Bosnia is out of control. Relations between Croats and Muslims are explosive; total war has been declared. The two areas of concern are:

* TRAVNIK-VITEZ-BUSOVACA-ZENICA-KAKANJ-VARES

* MOSTAR-JABLANICA-KONJIC areas

The consequences are disastrous from three points of view:

* Military

* Humanitarian

* Economically

2. Military consequences:

a. Warring Factions/Population:

The MUSLIM community is totally isolated. It cannot sustain itself. Its economy and energy supplies have stopped, or are nearly dead. It has no routes in, or out, for commercial traffic or refined fuels. All are blocked by the SERBS (East, North, West) or heavily controlled by the HVO to the South. The BiH has decided to seek its own solution. It will attempt to clear all HVO communities out of the central triangle area TRAVNIK - VAREZ - KISELJAK. This will place the North half of Central Bosnia, with all its industry, in Muslim hands. Three major consequences could arise from this:

(1) The current cooperation between Muslims and Croats in Northern Bosnia will probably collapse: this will undermine and probably destroy the ability of 2 (BiH) Corps to withstand BSA attacks.

(2) The Croats in Southern Bosnia, and South Central Bosnia will probably become even more hostile towards future Muslim convoys attempting to reach

the coast; to Humanitarian convoys destined for the Muslims; and possibly to UNPROFOR convoys. CZR-787 P3/6

(3) The HVO may make agreements with the BSA in the areas of BREZA, VISOKO and TURBE.

The Muslims have realized that control of routes is a key to solving their problem. They will probably attempt to push South to PROZOR from TRAVNIK. They have also realized that control of JABLANICA and KONJIC is critical. They will fight for this and probably also attempt to push NW from JABLANICA. The HVO will resist this. The major consequences of BiH success would be:

(1) The BiH will envelope a significant Croat community.

(2) The Muslims will be able to put pressure on the CROATS to allow free passage of commercial traffic North and South, and to stop holding the Muslim community in MOSTAR hostage.

b. UN Forces Security. The situation for UNMOs, and all isolated teams, convoys and agencies has changed dramatically for the worse. It changes fast from hour to hour, and is often unpredictable. It depends often, not on military/political leaders, but on the humour of the local warlords. Freedom of movement is greatly impaired by Croats, Muslims, and Serbs; and is sometimes non existent.

3. Humanitarian Consequences:

a. Humanitarian Aid/Distribution:

In Central Bosnia, the operations of UNHCR and its partner NGOs are currently suspended for security reasons. UNHCR stocks are very low in Central Bosnia (540 MT in ZENICA) and in TUZLA (200 MT), representing only two days of supply.

The problem of diversions on the supply routes during the past few weeks has already kept the level of UNHCR/NGO activity to a minimum: food deliveries representing only about 30% of the needs. Furthermore, lack of fuel is a major problem for secondary distribution. It will become critical in the next few hours (in the next days).

As a result of the fighting in KAKANJ, movement of Croat displaced persons (DPs) is reported; 275 of them currently hosted by the FRENCH Engineer Battalion in KAKANJ. UNHCR/ZENICA strongly recommend not to move DPs from the area, in order to avoid mass movement of the population. UNHCR is

working on a contingency plan if more DI's arrive in the area.

b. Human Rights: CZN-787 P4/6

Both Croats and Muslims have perpetrated acts which infringe on human rights (Execution, forcible eviction, passive exclusion, destruction of property). This will continue.

Two field officers of the centre of human rights/ZAGREB (Thomas OSORIO and KIRIL ERMICHINE) are in VITEZ investigating on HVO allegation of execution on 8 June of 32 Croats North of TRAVNIK, in MALJINE (YK 1803).

4. Economic Consequences:

a. Electricity:

The current situation is very bad. Fighting in KONJIC area has damaged power lines, including the 220kv line between JABLANICA and KAKANJ. Until now, no repair missions have been possible despite SFABAT efforts and several "agreements". Therefore, power from the JABLANICA power plant is no longer available for Central Bosnia and particularly SARAJEVO.

Power is now only supplied from a power plant in KAKANJ and a power plant TUZLA. Both need coal. KAKANJ gets its coal from VARES, by trucks. This supply by road may be blocked in the coming days. TUZLA power plant has no more than five days coal; because of the diesel fuel shortage in the TUZLA area, further coal supply is doubtful.

The consequence is that in the next few days both power plants will stop. If this happens, no power will be available in either Central, or Northern Bosnia, or in SARAJEVO. Additionally, restarting these power plants in the future will be very difficult.

It is essential that the line in the KONJIC area is repaired. Simultaneously, coal supply from VARES to KAKANJ should be secured, and diesel fuel supplied to TUZLA.

b. Roads:

The road situation is good, despite the destruction of the BIJELA bridge. Major engineer efforts have been deployed during spring and will go on throughout summer.

The MOSTAR bypass is usable by all types of vehicles. A contract is currently being discussed to upgrade the last section. Therefore the road from METKOVIC to KISELJAK is trafficable by all types of vehicles. Route Triangle is being upgraded by BRITFOR ENGRS and by a civilian contractor. Route

triangle is in good condition and a local contractor will begin work when the situation permits it.

On route Acorn, the last bridges have been repaired. Important works have already been performed on Route Skoda, in the MILANKOVICI area, making traffic much easier.

c. Water:

There are three major problems that remain. In SARAJEVO, water supply is linked with electricity. The current amount of power delivered to the city only allows very little water for the city.

In MOSTAR, repairs to problems identified before the latest fighting were not achieved. It is now possible that there has been additional damage to the water distribution system.

In other locations throughout the country, the warring factions are using water as a weapon and cutting it off. The danger of an epidemic is more and more worrying day by day.

5. Gorazde.

Despite accusations by the Presidency of a sizable BSA offensive against GORAZDE city through the enclave area from the direction of FOCA, ZEPA and the DRINA/Serbian border. UNPROFOR can neither confirm nor deny these claims.

Our only sources have been DGOs who have gone into the area, but these have been few and their reports have covered the last several months. In addition, No Fly Zone monitoring aircraft have reported observed burning villages. We have no UNPROFOR presence on the ground.

We can confirm villages destroyed, presumably by artillery (and MLRs), but not in the numbers reported by Presidency (and local) sources. We cannot confirm any presence of signature manoeuvres element signalling an actual ground offensive.

However, the FC has reached an agreement with Gen Mladic today in Sarajevo. The UNMOs are to be given free passage through all check points or defensive positions held by the Bosnian Serb Army or the police force of the Bosnian Serb Republic from 1200 hrs 16 June 93 between Pale and Gorazde and to establish themselves inside and around Gorazde with a team of eight observers.

CZN-787-PC/6

ANNEX A
TO FC'S BRIEFING
DATED 15 JUN 93

BRITBAT - LAST 24 HOURS

The road TRAVNIK - ZENICA is entirely in BiH hands. BiH report fighting between BiH Serbs in TURBE area. Frontline moved, HVO continue to retreat towards VITEZ as fighting continues in TRAVNIK area. Troops from VITEZ (HVO) to NOVI TRAVNIK. HRLs seen in PROZOR area (HVO). G VAKUF or JABLANICA.

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'93 JUN 15 13:51

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MOST IMMEDIATE '93 JUN 15 13:27

ZAGREB
RO'S INITIALS

TO	:	ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO	:	STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA MORILLON, BH COMMAND, SARAJEVO
FROM	:	WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE	:	15 JUNE 1993
NUMBER	:	**UNPROFOR Z-759**
SUBJECT	:	SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS ON BOSNIA
REFERENCE	:	YOUR MSC-1070 14 JUN 93

1. The FC has reached an agreement with Gen Mladic today in Sarajevo concerning Gorazde. The UNMOs are to be given free passage through all check points or defensive positions held by the Bosnian Serb Army or the police force of the Bosnian Serb Republic from 1200 hrs 16 June 93 between Pale and Gorazde and to establish themselves inside and around Gorazde with a team of eight observers.

2. The FC is very concerned about the pressures being applied on the Security Council to rush into the use of air strikes. The point must be made very clear to the Security Council that he will not even consider the use of air strikes until the additional resources foreseen in SCR 836 are in place and fully operational. Furthermore, the Security Council must understand that the first time air strikes are used the Serbs will interpret this action as a declaration of war by UNPROFOR. The FC knows you are aware and share his concerns on this matter as it will definitely bring his mission and that of the UNHCR to an end. It would, of course, also be the cause of high, repeat, high casualties to UN troops. In order to defuse these pressures the FC recommends you:

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a. advise the Security Council of the ongoing negotiations at the Co-Chairmen level in Geneva, and at his level in Belgrade on 12 June and on this date in Sarajevo. The very issues of their concerns are being addressed; and

b. task the military advisor to make a presentation to the Security Council of the consequences of a military confrontation, in particular with the Bosnian Serbs and possibly the Serbs. UNPROFOR has had 21 killed and 245 wounded due to hostile fire to date. Is the Security Council willing to accept that many in a week?

3. WRT the investigation into the shooting death of Lt Jesus Aguilar, you should advise the President of the Council that:

a. an international Board of Inquiry has been convened with an officer of UNCIVPOL as chairman and with local Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim police officers as members; and

b. they are supported by a joint commission composed of an officer from SPABAT, an officer from the HVO and an officer from the ARMIJA.

4. The parties met in Mostar on 14 June under the direction of SPABAT and it will be some time before findings can be determined. The process being driven by SPABAT should reassure the President of the Council that the appropriate urgency is being given to the investigation. At this point the responsibility for the shooting cannot be tied to any faction.

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TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FOR WAHLGREN

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 14 June 1993

NUMBER: MSC-1070

SUBJECT: Security Council deliberations on Bosnia

1. At the Security Council's informal consultations today, the Ambassador of Cape Verde, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Caucus, stressed his extreme concern about the situation in Gorazde and the Caucus' desire to see the air strikes provision of Resolution 836 invoked. The Ambassador of Venezuela spoke in emotional terms about the media reports of killings in Gorazde and underscored the threat to the credibility of the Security Council if 836 were not implemented. Since the Council plans to return to the subject tomorrow, we would be most grateful for the fullest report you can give us by 11:00 hrs NYT Tuesday, 15 June, of conditions in and around Gorazde and of the prospects of UN peace-keepers being able to enter the town to establish the "safe area".

2. It appears likely that pressure from certain States on the Council to move to air strikes will mount in the coming days. Do you think it would be opportune to remove UNMOs from Bosnian Serbs heavy artillery positions near Sarajevo and to cut back other deployments where UNPROFOR personnel would be particularly vulnerable to retaliatory action? It would seem to us that until such measures are taken, the resort to air strikes is not a viable option and the threat of such action will not be taken seriously by the belligerents.

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3. The President of the Council has also called for a thorough investigation by UNPROFOR of the incident leading to the death on 11 June of Lt. Jesus Aguilar near Mostar. He wishes to have the results of the Board of Inquiry as soon as possible. Meanwhile he has asked urgently for UNPROFOR's findings on responsibility for the killing, and appropriate action to protest the outrage to those responsible. Please take the necessary action and advise asap.

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TO : ANNAN, NEWYORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
: OGATA, UNHCR, GENEVA
: ICRC, GENEVA

FROM : STOLTENBERG/WAHLGREN, ZAGREB Wahlgren

DATE : 12 JUNE 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z - 746

SUBJECT : **MEETING WITH GENERAL MLADIC - BELGRADE 12 JUNE 1992**

1. TODAY, IN BELGRADE, ACCOMPANIED BY THORNBERRY AND PELLNAS, I HAD A MEETING WITH GENERAL MLADIC. AFTER A LONG DISCUSSION A NUMBER OF KEY POINTS HAD BEEN RAISED AND WE MANAGED TO COME TO AGREEMENTS ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: -

A. UNHCR CONVOYS, WHICH HAVE BEEN OBSTRUSTED IN THE RECENT DAYS, WILL BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH THE NORMAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE NUMBER OF SUCH CONVOYS WILL NOT BE LIMITED BUT THE UNHCR ARE REQUESTED TO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE RULES AND NOT TO ALLOW ANYONE OTHER THAN UNHCR OFFICIAL DRIVERS,ETC., TO ACCOMPANY THE CONVOYS. JOURNALISTS,ETC., UNDER COVER AS DRIVERS,ETC., WILL NOT BE ALLOWED AND IF THIS IS ATTEMPTED THEN RESTRICTIONS WILL NECESSARILY BE PLACED ON MOVEMENTS. IT WILL ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS FOR HOUSING AND TOILETS INTO SREBRENICA AND MLADIC WAS AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE HYGIENE PROBLEMS.

MLADIC REQUESTED THAT THE BH SERB COMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (MR. LJUBISA VLADUSIC) HAVE A LARGER ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PLANNING OF THE CONVOYS FROM BELGRADE TO ENSURE A GREATER CO-ORDINATION.

B. THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND FILTRATION SYSTEM IN SREBRENICA MAY BE REPAIRED WITH UNPROFOR CO-ORDINATION.

C. THE WATER DISTRIBUTION TO GORNJI VAKUF SHOULD ALSO BE REPAIRED, AS A NECESSITY AND TO SHOW GOODWILL TO THE SERB SIDE.

D. ACCESS TO GORAZDE FOR UNMOs, WHICH HAS BEEN DENIED, WILL BE ALLOWED AS SOON AS THE PARLIAMENT HAS SANCTIONED IT. MLADIC SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT THE PARLIAMENT TODAY AND THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY INTERVENE TO GET THE "GO AHEAD" SOONEST - TO HAVE IT BY TUESDAY FOR THE MEETING AT SARAJEVO.

E. THE HVO WHO SURRENDERED TO THE SERBS THIS WEEK CAN BE VISITED BY THE ICRC - AS CAN ANY PRISONER IN ANY SERB PRISON.

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F. AN EXCHANGE OF ALL PRISONERS WILL BE ORGANISED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MLADIC INDICATED THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 1000 MUSLIM AND 120 CROAT PRISONERS IN SERB PRISONS AT PRESENT.

G. REPAIR OF THE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM IN SREBRENICA - WITH A VIEW TO EXTENDING IT TO THE WHOLE OF THE AREA - WAS DISCUSSED AND WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE. BASICALLY THERE IS A WILL TO ALLOW ELECTRICITY TO THE WHOLE OF BH IF THE SUPPLY TO BANJA LUKA IS ALLOWED TO FLOW FREELY. THE DETAILS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING ON TUESDAY NEXT.

H. THE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SARAJEVO, WHO HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO GO ON A PEACE/MERCY MISSION TO CENTRAL BOSNIA BUT HAS BEEN STOPPED BY THE SERBS, WILL BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE CITY. BH COMMAND/SECTOR SARAJEVO IS TO INFORM THE SERB LIAISON OFFICER AT BH/SECTOR SARAJEVO OF THE DETAILS - NAME,TIMINGS,AND MANNER OF TRANSPORTATION.

2. THE HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY MEETING, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE AT SARAJEVO AIRPORT ON MONDAY 14 JUNE AT 1100HRS, UNDER MY CHAIRMANSHIP, WILL BE POSTPONED FOR 24 HOURS TO 15 JUNE AT 1100 HRS. COMMANDER BH COMMAND IS TO NOTE AND TO INFORM THE PARTIES.

3. THE ISSUE OF NATO FLIGHTS AT LOW LEVEL WAS AGAIN RAISED AND CAUSED MUCH UNREST. IT WILL BE AGAIN FOLLOWED UP WITH NATO.

4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

13 JUN '93 08:29 UNOG GENEVA 41 22 9170123 P.2

UNOG Telecommo Unit
Palais des Nations

FO 368

MSC942/093
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HQ BH COMMAND (MAIN) KISELJAK

'93 JUN 12 14:28

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MOST IMMEDIATE

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OUTGOING FAX NO:	DATE/TIME: 121545B JUN 93
TO: UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB	FROM: BH COMD MAIN KISELJAK COMMANDER BH LGEN P MORILLON SIGNATURE:
FAX NO:	FAX NO: 8731301520/1522(INMARSAT)
ATTN: FC, DCM, STOLTENBERG	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER :LGEN MORILLON
INFO: ICFY GENEVA FOR STOLTENBERG/OWEN FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT CENTRAL BOSNIA	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	

MESSAGE

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A DETAILED REPORT ON THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION.

TUD 1530
VIA

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ASSESSMENT FOR GENERAL MORILLON

CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT BiH/HVO CONFLICT IN CENTRAL BOSNIA

1 General. The situation in Central Bosnia is out of control. Relations between Croats and Muslims are explosive; total war has been declared. The two areas of concern are:

* TRAVNIK-VITEZ-BUSOVACA-ZENICA-KAKANJ-VARES.
* MOSTAR-JABLANICA-KONJIC areas.

The consequences are disastrous from three points of view:

* Military.
* Humanitarian.
* Economically.

2. Military consequences:

a. Warring Factions/Population:

The MUSLIM community is totally isolated. It cannot sustain itself. Its economy and energy supplies have stopped, or are nearly dead. It has no routes in, or out, for commercial traffic or refined fuels. All are blocked by the SERBS (East, North, West) or heavily controlled by the HVO to the South. The BiH has decided to seek its own solution. It will attempt to clear all HVO communities out of the central triangle area TRAVNIK - VAREZ - KISELJAK. This will place the North half of Central Bosnia, with all its industry, in Muslim hands. Three major consequences could arise from this:

(1)The current cooperation between Muslims and Croats in Northern Bosnia will probably collapse: this will undermine and probably destroy the ability of 2 (BiH) Corps to withstand BSA attacks.

(2) The Croats in Southern Bosnia, and South Central Bosnia will probably become even more hostile towards future Muslim convoys attempting to reach the coast; to Humanitarian convoys destined for the Muslims; and possibly to UNPROFOR convoys.

(3) The HVO may make agreements with the BSA in the areas of BREZA, VISOKO and TURBE.

The Muslims have realised that control of routes is a key to solving their problem. They will probably attempt to push South to PROZOR from TRAVNIK. They have also realised that control of JABLANICA and KONJIC is critical. They will

12 JUN '93 15:33 UNOG GENEVA 41 22 9170123

fight for this and probably also attempt to push NW from JABLANICA. The HVO will resist this. The major consequences of BiH success would be:

(1) The BiH will envelope a significant Croat community.

(2) The Muslims will be able to put pressure on the CROATS to allow free passage of commercial traffic North and South, and to stop holding the Muslim community in MOSTAR hostage.

b. UN Forces Security. The situation for UNMOs, and all isolated teams, convoys and agencies has changed dramatically for the worse. It changes fast from hour to hour, and is often unpredictable. It depends often, not on military/political leaders, but on the humour of the local warlords. Freedom of movement is greatly impaired by Croats, Muslims, and Serbs; and is sometimes non existent.

3. Humanitarian Consequences:

a. Humanitarian Aid/Distribution:

In Central Bosnia, the operations of UNHCR and its partner NGOs are currently suspended for security reasons. UNHCR stocks are very low in Central Bosnia (540 MT in ZENICA) and in TUZLA (200 MT), representing only two days of supply.

The problem of diversions on the supply routes during the past few weeks has already kept the level of UNHCR/NGO activity to a minimum: food deliveries representing only about 30% of the needs. Furthermore, lack of fuel is a major problem for secondary distribution. It will become critical in the next few hours (in the next day)s.

As a result of the fighting in KAKANJ, movement of Croat displaced persons (DPs) is reported; 275 of them currently hosted by the FRENCH Engineer Battalion in KAKANJ. UNHCR/ZENICA strongly recommend not to move DPs from the area, in order to avoid mass movement of the population. UNHCR is working on a contigency plan if more DPs arrive in the area.

b. Human Rights:

Both Croats and Muslims have perpetrated acts which infringe on human rights (Execution, forcible eviction, passive exclusion, destruction of property). This will continue.

Two field officers of the centre of human rights/ZAGREB (Thomas OSORIO and Kiril ERMICHINE) are in VITEZ investigating on HVO allegation of execution on 8 June of 32 Croats North of TRAVNIK, in MALJINE (YK 1803).

Fo - 308

4/5

4. Economic Consequenses:

a. Electricity:

The current situation is very bad. Fighting in KONJIC area has damaged power lines, including the 220kv line between JABLANICA and KAKANJ. Until now, no repair missions have been possible despite SPABAT efforts and several "agreements".Therefore, power from the JABLANICA power plant is no longer available for Central Bosnia and particularily SARAJEVO.

Power is now only supplied from power plants in KAKANJ and TUZLA. Both need coal. KAKANJ gets its coal from VARES, by trucks. This supply by road may be blocked in the coming days. TUZLA power plant has no more than five days coal; because of the diesel fuel shortage in the TUZLA area, further coal supply is doubtful.

The consequence is that in the next few days both power plants will stop. If this happens, no power will be available in either Central, or Northern Bosnia, or in SARAJEVO. Additionnally, restarting those power plants in the future will be very difficult.

It is essential that the line in the KONJIC area is repaired.
Simultaneously, coal supply from VARES to KAKANJ should be secured, and diesel fuel supplied to TUZLA.

b. Roads:

The road situation is good, despite the destruction of the BIJELA bridge. Major engineer efforts have been deployed during spring and will go on throughout summer.

The MOSTAR bypass is usable by all types of vehicles. A contract is currently being discussed to upgrade the last section. Therefore the road from METKOVIC to KISELJAK is trafficable by all types of vehicles. Route Triangle is being upgraded by BRITFOR ENGRS and by a civilian contractor. Route triangle is in good condition and a local contractor will begin work when the situation permits it.

On route Acorn, the last bridges have been repaired. Important works have already been performed on Route Skoda, in the MILANKOVICI area, making traffic much easier.

c. Water

There are three major problems remain. In SARAJEVO, water supply is linked with electricity. The current ammount of power delivered to the city only allows very little water for the city.

In MOSTAR, repairs to problems identified before the latest fighting were not achieved. It is now possible that there has been additionnal damage to the water distribution system.

In other locations throughout the country, the warring factions are using water as a weapon and cutting it off. The danger of an epidemic is more and more worrying day by day.

File : BH.

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010/9

IN.152 Page 1 UTC Time: 93-06-04 01:24:37

NL BURUM LES 492041250= ECMM.X 3-JUN-1993 23:22:32 571729

FROM: JEAN-PIERRE THEBAULT

TO: JEREMY BRADF

URGENT

1/ THANK YOU FOR YOUR CAPSAT OF THIS EVENING,

2/ PLEASE FIND ENCLOSE THE REPORT YOU ASKED FOR.
THEY ARE SOME MORE PRECISE ALLEGATIONS ON THE SUBJECT, POINTING ESPECIALLY THE INVOLVEMENT OF 163rd HV BRIGADE IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, OR 114 AND 116th HV BRIGADE IN HERZEGOVINA. BUT NONE OF THEM SEEM TO OPERATE AS CONSTITUDED UNITS IF THEY ARE. THE SUPPORT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE DONE THROUGH TRAINING, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, STAFF AND, SOMETIMES, SPECIAL UNITS (see SLATINA EXAMPLE).
ONE HAS ALSO NOT TO FORGET THAT A PART OF THE HV SUPPORT TO HVO CAN EASILY BE MADE THROUGH "YOUNG IRREGULARS" WHO HAVE BEEN SEEM TO BE MANY IN THE RECENT MOSTAR FIGHTINGS, HEAVILY WEAPONED, COMING IN AND OUT WITHOUT PROBLEM THROUGH THE OPEN BORDER.
FINALLY THE SPABAT INTELLIGENCE STATED SOME DAYS AGO THAT THEY WERE NOW SURE OF TANKS MOVEMENTS BETWEEN CROATIA AND BiH, ESPECIALLY LINKED WITH THE MOVEMENTS OF THE VERY STRONG HVO BRIGADE OF CAPLINA (ABOUT 40 TANKS, MOSTLY T55).

3/ ALL THESE HINTS TOGETHER MAKE A DISTURBING PICTURE, AT LEAST.

WITH MY BEST REGARDS,

JEAN-PIERRE THEBAULT.

Date: 3rd June 1993

Subj: HV INVOLVEMENT IN BH

1. Background

HVO forces have, during the past four months, proved capable of mounting military operations well inside the Bosnian Serb/Croat front-line with a strength and subsequent success which would have been unlikely had they been alone in their struggle.
Indeed, the HVO have been involved in sustained combat with two foes and have managed to make gains against moslem BiH forces while still being able to resist strong, competent and persistant Serb offensives. With such an extended front-line with the Serbs and limited resources in manpower, equipment and munitions their effort has been supreme.
For months, BiH military and civil authorities have openly accused the HVO of having an undeclared pact to further their political and military agenda and increasingly, as they come to realise the misuse of such support, they have condemned the Croatian government for it's military and material support for the HVO.

2. HV Support

The existence and extent of HV involvement has always been difficult to define and the many reports provided by the BiH Armija have seldom been confirmed by ECMM, UNMOs or UNPROFOR.
However, the trickle of confirmed proof and particular circumstances continue to add weight to the knowledge that the HV military have been and are increasingly involved in the conflict between HVO and BiH, or in holding the line against the Serbs while the relieved HVO forces move against Moslem targets.
ECMM interest heightened during the Gornji Vakuf conflict when the HVO initiative to secure the town within their overall plan to seize the towns of Gornji Vakuf and Prozor. At this time, January 1993, BiH resistance halted the HVO move despite the arrival of T55 and M47 tanks and recently manufactured ammunition which the HVO were not thought to possess.

3. Confirmed military involvement

The occasional sightings of HV assets in Bosnia Hercegovina by ECMM and SPABAT include;-

a. troops in Tomislavgrad, Ljubuski and Capljina wearing HV arm badges or pinned on HVO badges.
b. administrative military vehicles including fuel tankers, mobile generators, cargo carrying trucks and saloons, all with current HV registration plates, moving freely across borders between Croatia and Hercegovina.
c. combat troops in Tomislavgrad who admitted to being the Filipovic Brigade from Zagreb and to having taken part in the HVO offensive against Jablanica.
d. the recent forcing down of an ammunition carrying Croatian helicopter in Central Bosnia.

4. HV/HVO Relations

HV connections with Hercegovina are strong for reasons of geography, religion and culture, but beyond being good neighbours with relatively unsecured borders the relationship is cemented by the high political and military offices held in Zagreb by croatians from Hercegovina. The Croat Minister for Defence, Mr Susak, and his chief of staff, General Praljak are both from Hercegovina and the latter has frequently visited Mostar.
Indeed, in many ways Dalmatia and Hercegovina are one. Their people were the first to leave Yugoslavia for work in the west and the first back with Deutschmarks in pocket. With cash they built-up a material culture dependent to some degree upon their close relations with Germany.
The two are as united in practice as they are in culture. They have open borders for their people, manned by police with identical uniforms,and troops with identical uniform and badges of rank. Their forces use the same weaponry, much of it new in design and manufacture from sources worldwide and quite unavailable in Yugoslavia before the conflict. The office of the HVO Minister of Defence, Mr Bruno Stojic, has and is frequented by arms salesmen, many from Germany.

5. Observation and Evidence

It is not in the interests of either party for HV troops to be seen in Bosnia and in practice with good planning there is much that can be done to hide their activity.
The ECMM does not operate by night, which provides much cover for the movement of military units and in those s sightings of convoys made by night it has been extremely difficult to positively identify the units, so similar are they to each other in equipment and dress.
Furthermore, HVO tactics have been to initiate offensive actions at night in areas that can quickly be sealed-off, for the safety of international observers. The classic and most recent case of this is the HVO move against Jablanica from the direction of Prozor. Sympathetic topography enabled the HVO to build up their forces to the north-east of Tomislavgrad in areas that allowed easy access to forces and easy closure to observers. Once the assault force moved down the road from Prozor towards Jablanica in May, the road was closed to all other traffic.
The subsequent offensive was bloody and prolonged with the BiH forces being pushed off the Slatina position back towards Jablanica to the Gradac tunnel. The attack commenced in April, since which time and despite every ECMM and UNPROFOR effort, the road between Prozor and Jablanica remains closed. The HVO offensive action continues and suffers casualties, many said to be Croatian. The moslem forces have beaten back many infantry assaults but cannot retrieve HV/HVO bodies because of the topography and resistance. Equally, early UNMO attempts to move forward were met by croat fire. The croatian forces have something to hide.

6. Continuing Support

Recent events such as the discovery of an ammunition carrying helicopter and quantities of new almost unused Croatian Dinars suggest that HV support, tacit or otherwise continues and when the Government of Croatia declares it's support for a strong HVO resistance to (mythical) moslem aggression such support looks set to continue.
The sympathies of the Croatian people for the HVO stance, fuelled by a government sponsored propaganda program, ensure that support continues at every level. Meanwhile, the HVO have resisted ECMM and UNPROFOR attempts to enter sealed military zones north-east of Tomislavgrad (around Sovici and Doljani) for seven weeks and show no sign of backing down.
Evidence for HV involvement exists. It has had a considerable impact on the military balance in favour of the HVO and shows no sign of ceasing.

Regards C. Beese

IN.152

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UNOG Telecommn. Unit
Palais des Nations

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 93 MAY 26 18:35

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Wahlgren

DATE: 25 May 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-670

Attached, please find a letter from the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for your information.

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CZN-694 P2/2

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

PRESIDENCY

PRESIDENT

Sarajevo, May 22, 1993

H.E. Mr. Yuliy M. Vorontsov
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York

Excellency,

In spite of the agreement on cease-fire and the negotiations of army commanders concerning the realisation of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 824 on proclaming Sarajevo as safe zone, the aggressor's attacks on the city are continuing. Especially they are intensified in the last three days when we numbered 16 dead and 129 wounded civilians, 36 among them children.

Today, when we are marking the anniversary of acceptance of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as equal member of United Nations, its capital is being shelled by all aggressor's posts. Up to 16.00, while I am sending this letter, there are 9 dead and 103 wounded, many of them children. Among the heavy wounded is the Vice Prime Minister dr. Zlatko Lagumdžija.

I ask you forthwith to inform on this the Security Council to stop the killing of innocent civilians.

Please accept the assurances of my deepest considerations.

PRESIDENT
OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

Alija Izetbegović

- UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB
  Gen. WAHLGREN
- UNPROFOR HQ SARAJEVO
  Gen. MORILLON

PHONE: 38 71 61 03 40, 66 49 41; 66 48 97; fax 66 49 42

UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations
'93 MAY 15 16:29

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
U N P R O F O R

OUTGOING FAX

CZN = 654 - OK 16/5/2
CZG = 473

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, NEW YORK

INFO : FLEISCHHAUER, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 15 MAY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFORZZ- 631

SUBJECT: SIGNATURE OF SOFA - BH

PLEASE REFER TO ZACKLIN'S 11 MAY 1993 FAX ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT WHICH WAS COPIED TO YOU.

ATTACHED IS SELF-EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE SIGNING OF THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WHICH TOOK PLACE TODAY. THE DELAY IN THE SIGNATURE WAS DUE TO FURTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THE B-H GOVERNMENT WHICH WERE FORTUNATELY OVERCOME. AS PER TELCON, BENKIRANE/AUGER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT EXPANSIONS OF UNPROFOR MANDATE NOT COVERED IN TEXT OF PARA 1 (A) OF SOFA WOULD BE DEALT WITH THROUGH AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL TEXT WILL BE RETURNED TO OLA ASAP.

ENDALL

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2 of 2

UNPROFOR

TVO 1510
V6

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO:	DATE: 15 15.00 MAY 1993
TO: MR. CEDRIC THORNBERY DCM/DCA HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB	FROM: MR.VICTOR ANDREEV CAC, BH COMMAND SARAJEVO
	DIRECT LINE: 071-460-556 SAT. PH:000r99/1-404-988-2866
ATT: MS. YOLANDA AUGER DDCA, HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB	FILE REF: DRAFTER: DEYAN MIHOV TITLE: SCVAO
COPY: MS. SHANON BOYD, CHIEF PI HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB FC, HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB CIVIL AFFAIRS, BH COMMAND KISSELJAK	
SUBJECT: SIGNING OF SOFA	

MESSAGE

THE CEREMONY OF SIGNING OF THE SOFA TOOK PLACE TODAY AT 12.00H. IN SARAJEVO. ON BEHALF OF THE BH GOVERNEMENT THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC AND ON BEHALF OF UN - BY THE FORCE COMMANDER LT.GEN LARS ERIC WALGREN. THE CEREMONY WAS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, BH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AS WELL AS THE CAC OF UNPROFOR FOR BH, SECTOR COMMANDER OF SECTOR SARAJEVO AND ETC.

IN THEIR STATEMENTS BOTH PARTIES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SIGNED AGREEMENT AND WELCOMED THE FURTHER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BH GOVERNMENT AND UNPROFOR. SPECIAL TRIBUTE WAS PAID BY PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC TO THE EFFORTS BEING GIVEN BY UNPROFOR THROUGHOUT THE MONTHS OF ITS PRESENCE IN BH FOR SAVING LIVES OF CIVILIAN POPULATION AND RELIEVING IT'S SUFFERINGS. HE ALSO PAID TRIBUTE TO THE UNPROFOR SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES IN THE LINE OF DUTY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS MANDATE. GRATITUDE WAS EXPRESSED ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF BH.

Best regards
(O)

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CZN 646 CZG 468

UNPROFOR

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'93 MAY 13 18:09

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ICFY NEW YORK

FROM: for WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

DATE: 13 MAY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFO Z-623

SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT OF UNCIVPOL INTO BH

1. In your MSC 662 of 21 April, you advised that we had a mandate to deploy UNCIVPOL in Srebrenica. We should appreciate it if you would confirm that, following the adoption of resolution 824, we would also have a mandate to deploy UNCIVPOL in other areas of B-H threatened by Serb forces, in particular the towns of Zepa, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Goradze and Bihac which are specifically mentioned in that resolution.

2. At the same time, agreements have been reached or may be reached, under UNPROFOR auspices, between the warring sides in BH for the establishment of demilitarized areas which would require, for their implementation, an UNCIVPOL presence.

3. In this connexion, the 12 May 1993 Mostar agreement between General Halilovic and General Petkovic (copy .... attached), calls in its Article 1 for an UNCIVPOL deployment to assist mixed police units in the performance of their function of control of routes.

4. An agreement is also being negotiated between the

DISTDONE

CZN646, CZG468

2/B

Bihac authorities and the Serb side concerning the Velika Kladusa enclave in the Bihac area. While there is agreement between the two sides concerning the demilitarization of the area, the question of who would exercise police functions in the area remains unsolved. Our advice has been requested as to whether it would be acceptable to have UNCIVPOL police this area for an interim period as a way of bridging the differences between the two sides.

5. With regard to the Mostar agreement, unless you feel that the UNPROFOR presence could be construed as a temporary exercise of our good offices, we should very much appreciate it if Security Council authorization would be sought for such presence under the terms of the above-mentioned agreement.

6. With regard to the prospective Velika Kladusa enclave agreement, we should appreciate receiving your guidance as to whether the idea of an UNCIVPOL presence to police this area for an interim period could be explored with the parties as a means of reaching an agreement to stabilize the situation in this area. There is agreement on its demilitarization but the Serbs who have returned to this area are unwilling to accept Muslim police.

7. The present authorized strength of UNCIVPOL is 688 and its actual strength is 624. Because of the additional requirements now being placed for UNCIVPOL monitors, particularly in the context of the establishment of safe areas in B-H, we should appreciate it if the contributing countries were requested urgently to provide additional UNCIVPOL monitors up to the authorized strength of 688, that is, 64 more monitors. We would suggest, in particular, that the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Russia and Sweden be approached in this respect.

CZN 646, CZG 468

3/6

8. In addition, and to be able to respond expeditiously to the establishment of further safe areas after Srebrenica and Zepa, we should appreciate it if appropriate action were urgently taken to increase the authorized UNCIVPOL strength by 150 additional monitors, that is, from 688 to 838. Please note that should the Vance/Owen plan be implemented there would be very substantial additional requirements, as set out in our working paper on the matter. **Endall.**

CZN 646, CZG 468

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONCLUDED BETWEEN GEN MILIVOJ PETKOVIC AND GEN SEFER HALILOVIC ON 12 MAY 93 IN THE PRESENCE OF LT GEN PHILIPPE MORILLON AND ECMM/HRC JEAN-PIERRE THEBAULT

cc to Cohen

Contracting Parties :

Gen. Sefer Halilovic

and

Gen. Milivoj Petkovic

Reconfirming their will to establish peace within the territory of Bosnia Hercegovina;

Reconfirming that all persons and property should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act;

Reconfirming also that the GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 AND THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 1) are fully applicable in the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

have agreed on the following :

ARTICLE 1

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Absolute freedom of movement to be restored and guaranteed, not onl for UNPROFOR, ECMM and Humanitarian Aid agencies, but also for a logistic supply and support convoys of both parties on all routes a especially on the routes:

1. DOLJANI - MOSTAR - JABLANICA - KONIJC - PAZARIC - TARCIN - KISELJAK VISOKO - TUZLA and
2. POSUSJE - PROZOR - GORNJI VAKUF - TRAVNIK - ZENICA - VITEZ - BUSOVAC

Freedom of movement will also be guaranteed for civilians to tra throughout the country.

Control of routes will be maintained by civilian police only. Ch Points and route patrols will be manned by mixed police units with assistance of UNCIVPOL who, in case of neccesity, will resolve disp between the police of the two sides. Military units will not exercice control.

CZN646, CZG468

On a temporary basis, until the implementation of the Vance Owen Plan, these mixed units will be established in MOSTAR, TRAVNIK and ZENICA after agreement between the existing police forces.

5/6

ARTICLE 2

DEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR

One Company of the Spanish Battalion will be deployed and accommodated in MOSTAR at the airport until more suitable accommodation can be found. The deployment will be on both sides of the NERETVA river. Deployment will begin 1800 hours 12 May 1993.

The Company located in JABLANICA will continue to patrol the routes between JABLANICA-TARCIN, JABLANICA-KOSTAJNICA and start patrolling between OSTROZAC-TRUSINA-SEONICA-VRCI.

The British Battalion will continue to patrol the route JABLANICA-PROZOR-GORNJI VAKUF.

ARTICLE 3

WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FORCES

In MOSTAR, all military units will be withdrawn and confined in their barracks: the BiH Army in the Southern Camp and in Konak Barracks, the HVO units and the HQ of the Operational Zone of South East Herzegovina in the Northern Camp and at the Heliodrom. The withdrawal will take place after the deployment of UNPROFOR and by 1200 hours on 13 May 1993. In the area of KOSTAJNICA and KONJIC, HVO units will be deployed in a few villages in the area marked on the attached map. BH Army will withdraw out of this area to their own villages.

ARTICLE 4

RELEASE OF PRISONERS

Both parties agree to the immediate release of all civilian detainees without any conditions and to be fully completed on 13 May 1993.

This will be followed by an exchange of all Prisoners of War. A list of all Prisoners of War will be presented to the International Committee of the Red Cross no later than 1200 hours 13 May 1993.

ARTICLE 5

RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Both sides will provide all assistance in restoring displaced persons to their own properties or places of residence. Both sides shall guarantee the safety and security of displaced persons.

CZN 646, CZG 468

6/6

ARTICLE 6

All areas of dispute will be solved by negotiations by both parties in the presence of UNPROFOR and ECMM.

signed:

Gen Sefer Halilovic

Gen Milivoj Petkovic

witnessed by:

Lt Gen Philippe Morillon

Representative of UNPROFOR

Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault

Representative of ECMM

12 May 1993

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CNZ 419 CYZ 254 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

STOLTENBERG, NEW YORK

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 11 MAY 1993

NUMBER: MSC-771

SUBJECT: **BH Government's request for withdrawal of UN relief personnel**

'93 MAY 11 P 6:44
UNATIONS

Please find attached a self-explanatory letter from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the above subject. The Council took note of the serious implications of the démarche but did not discuss it at its meeting today.

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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York

May 11, 1993

H.E. Mr. Yuliy M. Vorontsov
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

I have the honor to present to you the attached statement from my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Haris Silajdzic, on the issue of United Nations relief personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

May I ask for kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Muhamed Sacirbey
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

P.O. Box 1806 • New York NY 10163 • Phone (212) 867-6743 • Fax (212) 867-5416

Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Foreign Minister

TO REMOVE FINAL OBSTACLE TO LIFTING OF ARMS EMBARGO
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALLY REQUESTS WITHDRAWAL OF U.N. RELIEF PERSONNEL

Washington, D.C., May 9 - The Foreign Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dr. Haris Silajdzic, today announced the formal request of his government that United Nations relief personnel either depart his country or be reconfigured to ensure their military defensibility. On behalf of his government, Silajdzic released the following statement:

"The presidency and government of Bosnia-Herzegovina hereby officially requests that the United Nations withdraw, as expeditiously as possible, all U.N. personnel deployed on our territory for purposes of delivering humanitarian relief. We do so because concern over the safety of those personnel now constitutes a significant obstacle to the defense of this sovereign nation.

"While deeply grateful for the valor of the many individuals who have served under the auspices of the United Nations on our territory, we find that the U.N. presence on the ground has become an impediment to critical decisions by the international community now urgently needed if our democratic, multiethnic republic is to be permitted the means to defend itself.

"It is our intention today, in requesting the withdrawal of relief personnel, to remove that final obstacle to the lifting of the arms embargo.

"Despite our best efforts, it remains insufficiently understood by international public opinion that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a civil war, but a war of fascist aggression against a multiethnic democratic republic. Our government and our army remain multiethnic, and we remain committed to the goal of preserving the Bosnian republic as a multiethnic democracy with full guarantees of all human rights for all citizens.

"President Clinton understands our commitment and our desperate plight, and we have been encouraged by his efforts to achieve a lifting of the arms embargo so unfairly imposed upon our nation in its hour of need. We believe that the maintenance of the embargo, in the face of a continuing onslaught by fascist Serb forces, is not an act of conscience but of arrogant indifference to the fate of hundreds of thousands of loyal Bosnian citizens, who plead only for the right to defend themselves.

"We regret that world opinion has been beguiled by the image of us as a helpless people. To be sure, we are besieged by a relentless aggressor. But our forces have fought with courage and skill against overwhelming odds created inadvertently by the misguided policies of the United Nations. Our forces and our people remain ready to fight on in defense of their liberty and their principles. Only if they are permitted the means to do so will we attain, within our nation and our region, the balance of power that is the prerequisite to a negotiated settlement that will bring lasting peace and stability.

"Should the United Nations in its wisdom chose to reconfigure U.N. forces on our territory so that they can adequately defend themselves and so that their safety does not dominate international concern, we will welcome that decision. In the meantime, as the fate of our nation hangs in the balance, we beseech the Security Council to cease an arms embargo that has, in practice, constituted an international intervention against our legitimate rights as a Member of the United Nations. It is an intervention that not only undermines our own security but, by its unfairness and perverse result, compromises the principles and future of the United Nations itself."

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ 412 CYZ 247 P1/1

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CODED CABLE

93 MAY 10 P 10:49
UNITED NATIONS

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, NEW YORK
INFO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, NEW YORK

DATE: 10 MAY 1993

NUMBER: MSC-764

SUBJECT: **Bosnian Serb "referendum"**

1. We have statements by Karadzic in the press to the effect that he wishes to have international observation of his "referendum", and in particular the "help" of UNPROFOR. The Serbian Press Agency (CPHA) has faxed one such statement to us here.

2. It is, of course, understood that you will inform us of any requests to this effect by the Bosnian Serb side, and dismiss them out of hand if made directly to you. It must be made amply clear that there can be no question of UNPROFOR providing legitimacy in any manner to this exercise.

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'93 MAY -6 11:51

MOST IMMEDIATE

CODED CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, NEW YORK

FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Wahlgren

DATE: 6 MAY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 590

SUBJECT: ALLEGED SERB ATTACK IN VELIKA KLADUSA

DISTRIBUTION:
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REFERENCE: A. MSC-741 ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 5 MAY 93
B. ANNEX TO DAILY SITREP 051045B MAY 93

1. With respect to the reference document and its attached letter from the representative of the BH Permanent Mission, the allegations of a Serb attack in the area of Velika Kladusa are basically correct. However, the armed conflict took place in an area approximately 12-18 kilometers East of the town of Velika Kladusa.

2. On 27 April 93, Serb forces located in Sector North's AOR violated the Croatian/Bosnia-Hercegovina border by attacking northern settlements in the Bihac pocket. Approximately 300 attacking troops were supported by arty, mortar fire and approximately 10xtanks. The population in this area is sparse and the place names indicated in the reference document are small settlements of a few houses. The conflict continued and eventually met with a response from BiH forces belonging to the V Corps (Muslim).

3. The initial Serb attacks did not originate from the towns of Dvor and Glina. Rather, they are believed to have come from the area of Bojna and Tavani, 1-2 kilometers from the border.

4. The conflict of 4 May 93 originated with a BiH infiltration behind Serb held positions in the Bihac pocket. These forces attacked from the rear; thereby, prompting a counter-attack from Serb forces. This was followed by shelling of the areas as referred to in the letter from the BH Ambassador.

5. Bosanska Bojna has traditionally been populated by Serbs (Serbs 70% and Muslims 28%). The majority Serb population in Bosanska Bojna was expelled from the region after the Muslim attacks in October 1992 (ECMM Population Report 1991). The attackers are believed to be former inhabitants that were attempting to return to their homes.

6. Sector North and FREBAT 3 held separate meetings with the Serb TDF and V Corps (Muslim) respectively with the aim of reaching a cease fire agreement between the fighting groups. At this time the only agreement reached is to exchange POWs and the bodies of members killed in the conflict.

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Page 1 of 1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA
VANCE, ICFY, NEW YORK

FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Wahlgren

DATE: 21 APRIL 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 515

DISTRIBUTION:
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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN CENTRAL BOSNIA

On Friday 16 April 1993 Dr. Ganic asked for a meeting with me at which he expressed his concern over the deteriorating situation in Central Bosnia. He considered that instead of fighting it should be possible to create joint command centres and his intention was to ask the Croats if they would be willing to do just that. He asked for UN support and I offered Gen Pellnas, CMO, to be our representative. Dr Ganic and Pellnas went to Mostar on Sunday where the situation was indeed very bad. Gen Morillon and Gen Halilovic joined the team on Monday evening.

I have received a Preliminary Report that the fighting had spread quickly from Mostar to the area of Central Bosnia and I myself have seen many houses burning. I have given instructions to Morillon to work out an operational concept where the battalions are deployed inside these villages where unrest exists and that this should be a principle for the future. A further report states that the tension has eased somewhat after this deployment and a more detailed report will follow soonest.

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Palais des Nations

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APR 19 P 3:35

TO: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, GENEVA
VANCE, NEW YORK

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 19 APRIL 1993

NUMBER: MSC 618

SUBJECT: **Possible Involvement of FRY Troops in Eastern Bosnia**

1. In an article of the New York Times on Sunday, 18 April 1993, Senator Biden claimed that according to UNPROFOR sources there was evidence of regular troops of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia being involved in cross border shelling as well as in military activity in the vicinity of Bratunac.

2. Please advise whether there is indeed such evidence available to UNPROFOR. You will recall, that in early April we reported to the Security Council that UNPROFOR, at the time, did not have any information to support the alleged involvement.

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APR 13 24

Page 1 of 1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA
VANCE, ICFY, NEW YORK

FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Wahlgren

DATE: 21 APRIL 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 515

DISTRIBUTION:
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

MEMORANDUM

TO: Lord Owen

FROM: John Wilson

DATE: 16 April 1993

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN BH

THE SITUATION

1. The events of the past month have been dominated by the Serb offensive against the Srebrenica pocket. This can largely be viewed as a response to the successful Muslim offensive in the area during December and January. It appears now that the Muslims overextended themselves and made a successful Serb counter-attack possible. As of today, the Serbs have reduced the pocket to the extent that it is no longer a military threat to their lines of communication in Eastern Bosnia. The Serbs may yet have an unfulfilled aim of bringing to justice those Muslims who were responsible for the massacres in Bratunac in December and January.

2. An emerging trend in the past few days has been the break-down of the uneasy truce between HVO and BH Army. There have been reports for a couple of weeks now of tension in the Travnik, Zenica, Kiseljak areas and more recently near Jablanica. The cause of this friction is most probably a Croat determination to establish control over areas intended for Croat administration under the Vance/Owen Plan.

3. The Serbs continue to keep the Northern Corridor open and to pressure the HVO and BH Army positions threatening it. There does not, however, appear to have been a concerted effort by the Serbs to improve their military position in this area. The Muslims and the Croats on the other hand, appear to have been content to maintain the existing situation. It may well be that without the injection of significant fresh forces it is not possible for any side to break the deadlock.

4. The Serbs have continued to fight containing battles around Bihac and Sarajevo.

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OPTIONS FOR SREBRENICA

5. The Serbs having now reduced the Srebrenica pocket to a relatively insignificant military threat, have a number of options available to them: to simply contain what is essentially a concentration of Muslim civilians; to use this civilian population as a bargaining tool to secure the release of Serbs from Sarajevo and Tuzla; and, finally to complete military action against the pocket by capturing the city. It is difficult to judge Mladic's assessment as to whether the risk of further military action might provoke international intervention. He probably assesses that he can complete his strategic aims without the need to actually assault the city. It is assessed that he will contain the pocket and use the population there as a bargaining tool. He is, however, unlikely to agree to any surrender terms including free passage for Muslim soldiers from the pocket.

6. The Muslims have no military options in the case of Srebrenica. They may be prepared to participate in a bargaining process for the release of the population. It is more likely that they will seek to maintain the situation there as an issue in the world media and may do so by proposing terms which are unacceptable to the Serbs..

7. The Croats have no particular role to play in the Srebrenica situation.

OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

8. The big question mark for the Serbs is whether they will now continue cleansing Eastern Bosnia by an attack on the Gorazde Pocket. Gorazde sits on the junction of a number of important roads providing north/south communications and also for routes running through Montenegro. It is accordingly of some military significance. It may well be that it is sufficiently attractive for Mladic to pursue that course of action as his next priority. He must, of course, balance the risk that such action might provoke a strong reaction from the international community.

9. A continuing high priority for the Serbs and for the military in particular, is the Northern Corridor. Sooner or later, Mladic will commit substantial forces to widen the Corridor and secure the safe passage of his traffic. It is debatable whether he will address Gorazde or the Northern Corridor first. But if one must place a bet it would probably be Gorazde. Mladic will probably continue to fight containing battles around the Bihac and Sarajevo Pockets. It would require a significant redeployment of his forces to make significant military gains against either objective. A lesser objective, but one to keep in mind, is a probable Serb objective to secure access to the sea in the area of Cavtat-Prevlaka. It may well be that they will achieve the same at the bargaining table later as part of a Serbian objective to secure access to the naval base in Kotar Bay.

10. It is assessed that the Muslims will attempt to maintain their relative positions with the Croats in Central Bosnia and to maintain whatever pressure they can against the Northern Corridor. Their top priority will be to maintain BH in the world headlines and they will no doubt provoke Serb reaction whenever they consider necessary. It is doubtful that they will seriously contemplate bargaining for a population exchange.

11. The Croats having achieved most of their strategic objectives will maintain a relatively low military profile. They will continue to press the Muslims for control of areas intended for their administration under the Vance/Owen Plan. We can also expect them to maintain pressure in the Northern Corridor. Their strategic priority remains the Krajina.

SANCTIONS

12. There is considerable uncertainty as to how the Serbs will react to the passage of the Sanctions Resolution, if it is ever approved. It may well be bombast but Dr Karadzic has recently threatened that he would force the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and UNHCR from BH should the resolution pass. It is the writer's opinion that the Serbs cannot accept the Vance/Owen Plan as it presently exists and that they will accept the sanctions and pursue their strategic objectives. They will trust that with the passage of time, the effect of the sanctions can be reduced. One should not underestimate the sense of martyrdom that the Serbs feel, and their willingness to stubbornly accept further privations.

13. The imposition of sanctions may also prompt the often suggested union of the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs.