

for 130/1/6

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

ALBERTVILLE	AV-355	CHALEB FROM AHMED
BUKAVU	BU-301	GAVIOLA FROM AHMED
COQUILHATVILLE	CV-265	KAHALE FROM AHMED
ELISABETHVILLE	EV-1225	MATHU FROM AHMED
GOMA	GO-26	WOOD FROM AHMED
KAMINA	KA-264	POSTRA FROM AHMED
KINDU	KD-24	SAMY FROM AHMED
LULUABOURG	LU-380	PACKHAM FROM AHMED
STANLEYVILLE	SV-346	KAUFMAN FROM AHMED

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 20 NOVEMBER

LEOPOLDVILLE

*** SENATE HELD MEETING TODAY WITH 56 MEMBERS PRESENT TO MAKE NECESSARY QUORAM. ANNUAL BUREAU WAS ELECTED AS FOLLOWS: PRESIDENT, ISAAC KALONJI; 1st VICE PRESIDENT, LAURENT MBANIRO; 2ND VP, JOSE-E. SHANGO; FOUR PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARIES WERE EMILE SUMBA, TCHANG OTCHOUDY, RAPHAEL SINGA AND ALBERT MAURICE MBANAKOTO

ALBERTVILLE

KATANGESH BOMBARDMENT IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONTINUED OVER MBUYU AREA 18 AND 19 NOV WITH SIX VILLAGERS DEAD AND FOUR WOUNDED

ELISABETHVILLE

THERE HAS BEEN NO RAIL TRAFFIC BETWEEN ELI AND PORT FRANCOIS SINCE 15 NOVEMBER. THIS BECAUSE OF FIGHTING BETWEEN KAULU TRIBE AND KAMPONDES IN IULU-LUPUTA AREA

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

H. Robertson

H. Ahmed

20 November 1962

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
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LULUABOURG

AAA. FOLLOWING CLASHES REPORTED YESTERDAY ONUC REP WITH RED CROSS DELEGATE
TOMMASINI AND PATROL COMMANDER VISITED LUBANDAIE AND DIBAYA AND FOUND SITUATION NOW
CALM AND MISSIONARIES, WHO ARE ALL AMERICANS, NOT WORRIED

BBB. NIGERIAN POLICE DETACHMENT OF 57 HAS ARRIVED TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE
OF LAW AND ORDER AND ALSO IN THE TRAINING OF CONGOLESE POLICE

CCC. FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ARE BEING IMPOSED ON NON-LULUAS AND PREMIER BOURG-
MASTRE HAS NOW ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT THEY MAY NEITHER RENT NOR BUY PROPERTY IN
LULUABOURG

OTHER STATIONS - N T R

2.500 x 200 - Imp. Plateau 11267

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

M. Robertson

H. Ahmed

20 November 1962

INDICATE
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L T F	S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	X	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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ALBERTVILLE	AV-353	CHALEE FROM GARDINER
BUKAVU	BK-299	CAVIOLA FROM GARDINER
COGUILHATVILLE	CV-263	KAHALE FROM GARDINER
ELISABETHVILLE	EV-1222	MATHE FROM GARDINER
GOMA	GO-24	WOOD FROM GARDINER
KAKINA	KA-262	POSTMA FROM GARDINER
LULUABOURG	LU-377	PACHEAM FROM GARDINER
STANLEYVILLE	SV-344	ENGLUND FROM GARDINER

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 17, 18 NOVEMBER

LEOPOLDVILLE

AAA. OIC IS LEAVING FOR NEW YORK THIS EVENING WHERE HE WILL REPORT TO SECORG AND CONGO ADVISORY COMMITTEE

BBB. PM ADOULA HAS REITERATED TO PRESIDENT TSHOMBE HIS OFFER TO HAVE CONAKAT PARTY PARTICIPATE IN CENTRAL GOVT. LAST JUNE MR TSHOMBE WAS ASKED TO SUBMIT THE NAMES OF THREE CANDIDATES FROM WHOM A CENTRAL GOVT MINISTER WOULD BE CHOSEN

CCC. MILITARY CELEBRATION OF ANG-DAY HAD TO BE POSTPONED FROM 17TH TO 18TH ON ACCOUNT OF RAIN

DDD. CHIEF OF THE BURSE VICTOR NENDEKA HAS BEEN APPOINTED MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE CITY OF LEO IN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES AND COMBAT THE CURRENT WAVE OF BANDITRY.

ALBERTVILLE

AAA. FURTHER BOMBARDMENT IS IN MBUYU AND NORTH KIAMBI AND KATANGUESE GENDARMERIE

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by : N. Robertson
 Authorized : R. Gardiner
 Date : 18 November 1962

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

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HAVE CROSSED RIVER LUKULU AND ADVANCED NORTHWARDS TOWARDS NYUNZU. 26 CIVILIANS ARE REPORTED DEAD AND MANY WOUNDED. ANG CLAIMS TO HAVE SHOT DOWN AIRCRAFT 40 KM SOUTH WEST OF KITEGE.

ELISABETHVILLE

REPLYING TO MR TSHOMBE ADOULA'S OFFER FOR CONAKAT REPRESENTATION IN CENTRAL GOVT, MR TSHOMBE HAS REPLIED TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT UNATIONS PLAN ALLOWED FOR EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF ALL POLITICAL AND PROVINCIAL GROUPS. MR TSHOMBE ASKED HOW MANY POSTS WOULD BE ALLOCATED TO CONAKAT AND WHICH DEPARTMENTS AND HOW GOVT WAS TO BE RESHUFFLED SO AS TO ALLOW FOR EQUAL REPRESENTATION

LULUABOURG

AAA. ANG DAY CELEBRATED WITH PARADE AND TE DEUM ATTENDED BY PRESIDENT LUAKA-BWANGA

BBB. EX-PRES LUBATA HAS OBTAINED RELEASE FROM PRISON OF HIS CHIEF OF CABINET AND OTHERS ARRESTED ON ORDERS OF MIN OF INTERIOR WAPWANA

STANLEYVILLE

AAA. CONGO RIVER ALTHOUGH VERY HIGH IS NOT IN DANGER OF FLOODING AT PRESENT TIME. HOWEVER AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE SECONDARY ROAD PARALLEL TO RIVER LEADING TOWARDS ISANGI IS BEING REPAIRED. LABOUR IS BEING PROVIDED BY ANG

BBB. PAC TEAM HAS LEFT FOR VISIT TO KUNIA, PAULIS AND DISTRICTS

OTHER STATIONS - E T R

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

M. Robertson

R. Gardiner

18 Nov.

c/orig 130/1/6

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

ALBERTVILLE	AV-349	CHALEB FROM GARDINER
BUKAVU	BU-297	GAVIOLA FROM GARDINER
COQUILHATVILLE	CV-261	KAHALE FROM GARDINER
ELISABETHVILLE	EV-1210	MATHU FROM GARDINER
GOMA	GO-22	WOOD FROM GARDINER
KAMINA	KA-260	POSTHA FROM GARDINER
LULUABOURG	LU-374	PACKHAM FROM GARDINER
STANLEYVILLE	SV-342	KAUFMAN FROM GARDINER

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 15 NOVEMBER

LEO-OLDVILLE

IT IS REPORTED THAT SROGEN IN NEW YORK HAS APPEALED TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INCLUDING GREECE, ITALY, PAKISTAN, PHILIPPINES AND SWEDEN TO SEND JET FIGHTER PLANES TO JOIN ONUC FORCES

ELISABETHVILLE

AAA. PRESIDENT TSOROMBE HAS NOW ADMITTED THAT KATANGA AIRCRAFT WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBING ATTACKS IN NORTH KATANGA REPORTED 13 NOVEMBER.

BBB. MR TSOROMBE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A BRIEF VISIT TO SIR ROY WELLESKY IN SALISBURY WHERE THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF SUPPLIES TO KATANGA AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ROAD LINKING TWO SECTIONS OF RHODESIA WHERE IT RUNS THROUGH KATANGA TERRITORY.

BUKAVU

AAA. PROCUREUR D'ETAT IS NOW INVESTIGATING DEATH OF CHIEF LUGALIKA REPORTED

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : Z E. Robertson
Authorized : R. Gardiner
Date : 15 November 1962

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29 OCTOBER

BBB. AMONOO MISSION FLEW TO KINDU AND KASONGO AND RETURN AND CARRIED ONUG PASSENGERS. RETURNING TO LEO 16TH

CCC. BOTH COMEXTRA MOSOKO AND MAJOR MBADU HAVE RETURNED TO BUKA

COQUILHATVILLE

AAA. VICEPRES KKKKK NJOKU RETURNING FROM LUKOLELA SAID THREE VILLAGES WERE VERY HOSTILE TO COUVERT E CENTRALE AND THAT SERIOUS TROUBLE MIGHT DEVELOP WHEN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN. MILINFO COMMITTEE DETAILED FROM LEO ALSO CONFIRMED THAT GENDARMERIE PLATOON SHOULD BE RETAINED IN LUKOLELA FOR TIME BEING

BBB. FORMER CHIEF OF LUKOLELA SECTEUR, AKILI, WHO INSTIGATED BONONGE'S ASSASSINATION (SEE SUMMARY 29 OCT) HAS BEEN ARRESTED. PROV DEPUTY MOPITI FLED TO LEO AND IS REPORTEDLY BOLIKANGO'S HOUSE GUEST. BUREAU PROVASSEMBLY LIFTED HIS IMMUNITY TO CLEAR WAY FOR HIS ARREST

LULUABOURG

AAA. UNESCO TREBENZIO HAS HAD DISCUSSION WITH LULU MIN OF EDUCATION. ALSO PLAN TO VISIT BAKWANGA, GANDJIKA, KABINDA AND LODJA

BBB. RADIO LULU ANNOUNCED THAT CENTRAL GOVT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD DECIDED IN SEPT THAT UNIKAS GOVT SHOULD QUIT TSHIKAPA AND THAT PRES KAMANGA HAD BEEN SO INFORMED

CCC. FORMINIERE HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW THEIR PERSONNEL FROM TSHIKAPA TO LULU AS THERE IS NO WORK. ANC HAVE REMOVED CERTAIN MATERIAL FROM FORMINIERE AND BROKEN OPEN SAFES BUT NO DIAMONS WERE FOUND

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

E. Robertson

R. Gardiner

15 November 1962

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STANLEYVILLE

AAA. MIN OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AKANGAY WHO HAS BEEN UNDER HOUSE ARREST SINCE DISSOLUTION OF LOSALA GOVT HAS COMPLAINED TO ONUC REP OF HIS DETENTION WITHOUT SPECIFIC CHARGES

BBB. DELEGATION OF UNPAID TEACHERS IS TO MEET COMEXTRA IN LAST ATTEMPT TO REGULARIZE THEIR SITUATION. IF THEY DO NOT MEET WITH SATISFACTION THEY ARE LIKELY TO STOP WORKING. SOME OF THEM HAVE NOT BEEN PAID FOR THREE YEARS

OTHER STATIONS - N T R

2,500 x 200 - Imp. Plateau 11267

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

M. Robertson
E. Gardiner

15 November 1962

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
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ALBERTVILLE	AV-346	CHALEB FROM GARDINER
BUKAVU	BU-296	CAVIOLA FROM GARDINER
COQUILHATVILLE	CV-260	KAHALE FROM GARDINER
ELISABETHVILLE	EV-1206	KATHU FROM GARDINER
GOMA	GO-21	WOOD FROM GARDINER
KAHINA	KA-259	POSTRA FROM GARDINER
LULUABOURG	LU-373	PACKHAM FROM GARDINER
STANLEYVILLE	SV-341	ENGUND FROM GARDINER

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 14 NOVEMBER

LEOPOLDVILLE

AAA. OIC HAS ADDRESSED A LETTER TO PRESIDENT TSHOMBE PROTESTING THE AIR OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED IN NORTH KATANGA (SEE YESTERDAY'S SUMMARY) BY KATANGESE AIRCRAFT. AT A TIME WHEN ONUC WAS HOPING TO ARRIVE AT A CONSTRUCTIVE PHASE IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF THE CONGO, THIS GESTURE COULD NOT BUT COMPLICATE THE SITUATION, IT WAS POINTED OUT. OIC ALSO ASKED HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO BELIEVE MR TSHOMBE'S DECLARATION THAT THERE WERE NO MORE MERCENARIES IN KATANGA WHEN MERCENARY PILOTS HAD BEEN USED FOR THE BOMBINGS.

BBB. MR TSHOMBE'S REPLY TO OIC'S LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIM AND PM ADOULA CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF CONGO PLAN (SEE SUMMARY 11 NOVEMBER) HAS BEEN RECEIVED. AMONG OTHER THINGS MR TSHOMBE SAID THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO EXECUTE THE PLAN OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN MANY WAYS SINCE 3 SEPT AND HE ACCUSED MR ADOULA GOVT OF HINDERING THE WORK OF THE COMMISSIONS.

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : M. Robertson

Authorized : R. Gardiner

Date : 14 November 196

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CCC. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES HELD MEETING THIS MORNING AND QUORUM OF TWO-THIRDS OF REPRESENTATIVES (92) WAS OBTAINED. OFFICERS WERE ELECTED WITH MUAMBA BERTIN (BALUBA-KAT) AS PRESIDENT.

DDD. FINANCIAL GRANT BY UNITED KINGDOM TO THE CONGO FOR FINANCING OF IMPORTS WAS FOR TWO MILLION DOLLARS RPT DOLLARS NOT POUNDS AS REPORTED 4 NOVEMBER

BUKAVU

AAA. ANONGO AIR MISSION RETURNED FROM GOMA AND KIROTSHE WHERE INTERESTING TALKS WERE HAD WITH PRESIGOUPO MOLEY AND CABINET. DUE TO BAD WEATHER MISSION UNABLE TO REACH MASISI.

BBB. MAJOR MBADU HAS COME TO STAN. COMEXTRA NOSOKO STILL AWAY AND LACK OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY CREATES ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY.

LULUABOURG

AAA. ONUC REPS VISITED TSHIKAPA AND FOUND SITUATION GENERALLY CALM AND WITH ARRIVAL FURTHER ANG PLATOON ONUC TROOPS SHOULD NOT BE NEEDED

BBB. NINTH TRAIN CROSSED LUBILASH 13 NOVEMBER AND NEXT TRAIN SCHEDULED FOR 15TH.

STANLEYVILLE

AAA. UN REP INAUGURATED ILO TRADE UNION COURSE BUT IT STARTED WITH ONLY 15 PARTICIPANTS AS THOSE EXPECTED FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE DID NOT ARRIVE. TWO ILO EXPERTS WERE PRESENT.

BBB. CONGO RIVER IS MOUNTING AGAIN AND SOME CFL INSTALLATIONS ON LEFT BANK ARE ALREADY FLOODED.

OTHER STATIONS - N T R

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : M. Robertson

Authorized : R. Gardiner

Date : 14 November 1962

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ALBERTVILLE

AV-345

CHALEB FROM GARDINER

BUKAVU

BU-295

GAVIOLA FROM GARDINER

COQUILHATVILLE

CV-258

KHALE FROM GARDINER

ELISABETHVILLE

EV-1202

MATHU FROM GARDINER

GOMA

GO-20

WOOD FROM GARDINER

KAMINA

KA-258

POSTHA FROM GARDINER

LULUABOURG

LU-372

PACKHAM FROM GARDINER

STANLEYVILLE

SV-340

ENGUND FROM GARDINER

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 12, 13 NOVEMBER

LEOPOLVILLE

AAA. ONUC HAS ISSUED PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING BOMBINGS IN NORTH KATANGA, BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM ALBERTVILLE. STATEMENT SAYS THAT ON 10 NOVEMBER KATANGA AIRCRAFT ESTIMATED AS TEN LIGHT PLANES DROPPED BOMBS AT THE ROAD JUNCTION OF KASEYA LUBUNDA AND ALSO IN THE AREA OF MBILA, KITULE, KASEYA AND KABALO. ABOUT 50 BOMBS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE FALLEN NEAR THE BRIDGE ON LUKUGA RIVER NORTH OF NYUNZU. BOMBS HAVE BEEN DROPPED ON HOSPITAL OF NASAMBA BETWEEN KASEYA MAJI AND NYUNZU.

BBB. ONUC AIR FIGHTER UNITS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REACT IMMEDIATELY TO KATANGA AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. A DOCTOR HAS BEEN SENT TO SENTERY TO AID THE WOUNDED SENT THERE AND AN INVESTIGATION GROUP HAS GONE TO KABALO.

CCC. PM ADOULA HAS ASKED SECCEN U THANT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO BRING TO AN END ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY GOVT OF KATANGA.

DDD. UNATIONS HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK HAS COMMENTED ON BOOK QUOTE TO KATANGA AND

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : M. Robertson

Authorized : E. Gardiner

Date : 13 November 1962

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BACK UNQUOTE RECENTLY PUBLISHED BY CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, FORMER UN REP IN KATANGA,

SAYING THAT MUCH OF IT IS TENDENTIOUS BOTH AS TO FACTS AND INTERPRETATION.

ALLEGATION THAT LATE SEGGEN HAD PUT OUT A FALSE OFFICIAL VERSION OF SEPT 1961 EVENTS
AND THAT UNATIONS HAD PLANNED AT THAT TIME TO ~~TO~~ END KATANGA'S SECESSION BY FORCE
IS CATEGORICALLY REFUTED. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT O'BRIEN HIMSELF STANDS ON RECORD
TESTIFYING TO THE CONTRARY.

EEB. DETAILS ARE STILL BEING WORKED OUT CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
TEAM WHICH, UNDER UNATIONS CONTROL, IS TO INSPECT SHIPS BOUND FOR CUBA. OPERATION
CANNOT BE PUT INTO EFFECT UNTIL UUUSSSAAA, SOVIET UNION AND CUBA HAVE AGREED TO IT.

ELISABETHVILLE

AAA. PRESIDENT TSHOMBE HAS FORMALLY DENIED THAT HIS KATANGESE PLANES WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMBINGS MENTIONED ABOVE

EBB. AFTER MEETING OF TRIBAL CHIEFS FROM KATANGA THEY ADDRESSED A LETTER TO
PM ADOULA AND THE HEADS OF VARIOUS ^{OTHER} STATES EXPRESSING THEIR VIEW THAT KATANGA SHOULD
REMAIN QUOTE INDEPENDENT UNQUOTE

ALBERTVILLE

A NUMBER OF CHILDREN WOUNDED IN NORTH KATANGA BOMBINGS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO
AVILLE HOSPITAL. OTHERS ARE REPORTED KILLED IN ATTACK ON MBAYO NEAR NEUYE.

LULUABOURG

PRESIDENT LUABKAWANGA'S PROPOSED TRIP TO TSHIKAPA (SEE SUMMARY 9 NOVEMBER) WAS
CANCELLED IN VIEW OF STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM UNIKAS PRESIDENT KAMANGA

OTHER STATIONS - N T R

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

E. ROBERTSON

E. Gardiner

13 November 1962

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ONUC

LEO ;

16) 1 DAYAL FROM SECGEN REPORT CONTAINED IN YOUR D-656 REPRODUCED
AY DOCUMENT S/4761 ENTITLED QUOTE REPORT DATED 8 MARCH TO THE
SECGEN FROM HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONGO ON THE
EVENTS RELATING TO THE ARMED CLASHES WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN
UNITED NATIONS TROOPS AND CONGOLESE FORCES ;

P2/53/50 ;

AT MOANDA CMA BANANA AND MATADI ON 3 TO 5 MARCH 1961 STOP
UFQUOTE YOUR ANNEXES TWO CMA FOUR AND SIX HAVE BEEN RENUMBERED
ONE CMA TWO AND THREE RESPECTIVELY STOP YOUR REMACNING ANNEXES
ONE CMA THREZ CMA FIVE AND SEVEN HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED IN
DOCUMENTS S/4750/ADD.3 CMA S/4753 ;

P3/34/29 ;

CMA S/4758/ADD.4 AND S/4758/ADD.6 RESPECTIVELY STOP WHERE
REFERENCE IS MADE TO THESE ANNEXES IN YOUR D-656 CMA REFERENCE
IS MADE IN DOCUMENT S/4761 TO THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS STOP END "

COL 1561 D-656 S/4761 8 3 5 1961 S/4750/ADD.3 S/4753

S/4758/ADD.4 S/4758/ADDM6 D-656 S/4761 "

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ALBERTVILLE	AV-335	CHALEB FROM AHMED
BUKAVU	BU-291	CAVIOLA FROM AHMED
COQUILHATVILLE	CV-254	KAHALE FROM GANNINER AHMED
ELISABETHVILLE	EV-1192	MATHU FROM AHMED
OOMA	GO-17	WOOD FROM AHMED
KAMINA	KA-255	POSTMA FROM AHMED
LULUABOURG	LU-367	PACKHAM FROM AHMED
STANLEYVILLE	SV-337	EBGLUND FROM AHMED

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 8 NOVEMBER

LEOPOLDVILLE

AAA. OIC HAS LEFT AGAIN ON SHORT TRIP TO ELISABETHVILLE FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT TSHOMBE, LEAVING CHIEF OF CIVILIAN OPERATIONS IN CHARGE OF THE MISSION.

BBB. EIGHTY-FOUR DEPUTIES ATTENDED MEETING OF CHAMBER TODAY AND SOME NEW MEMBERS WERE ADMITTED ON ^{VERIFICATION} ~~EXAMINATION~~ OF THEIR CREDENTIALS. TWO-THIRDS QUORUM (92) NEEDED FOR ELECTION OF ANNUAL BUREAUX WAS NOT OBTAINED. PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT WAS CHARGED TO CONTACT PRIME MINISTER TO RELEASE DEPUTIES IN PRISON AND GUARANTEE SAFETY OF THOSE IN HIDING S. AS TO ENSURE QUORUM AT NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR WED 14TH.

CCC. FOLLOWING A WAVE OF BANDITRY IN LEO CONGOLESE PARATROOPERS HAVE STARTED PATROLLING ALL MAIN ROADS AND ALL DISTRICTS OF LEO AND ITS IMMEDIATE SURROUNDINGS/ CHECKPOINTS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH ONUC SECURITY FORCES AND NIGERIAN POLICE. IT IS THOUGHT BANDITS MAY BE SOME OF THOSE WHO ESCAPED FROM PRISON TWO MONTHS AGO AND ARE STILL AT LARGE.

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : M. Robertson

Authorized : H, Ahmed

Date : 8 November 1962

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DD. IRISH 38TH BATTALION IS REPLACING 37TH BATTALION SERVING WITH ONUC FORCES. ROTATION IS EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED IN ABOUT A WEEK. NEW TROOPS ARE BRINGING WITH THEM A THOUSAND ^{CARTONS} ~~BARRELS~~ OF BEER - THE GIFT OF AN IRISH BREWERY.

BUKAVU

AAA. AMONOO AIR MISSION GIVEN GREAT WELCOME IN SHABUNDA WITH SCHOOL PARADE AND DANCES. THIS TOWN IS CUT OFF FROM OTHER CENTRES AND ONUC VISITS AND HELP ARE MOST APPRECIATED. MISSION CONTINUING BY ROAD TO UVIRA AND FIZI.

BBB. POLICE ARE CHECKING ON PAYMENT OF TAXES AND SOME HINDU MERCHANTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN THIS CONNECTION.

CCC. JEAN BACK ARRIVED FROM STAN, WHERE HE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN LUNDULA AND PRESIDENT OF ASSOCIATION DES ENTREPRISES DE LA PROVINCE ORIENTALE.

KAMINA

AAA. NEW BASE COMMANDER COL HEDEREN WAS INTRODUCED TO GRAND CHIEF KASONGO NIEMBO WHO WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND HAS AGREED TO SEND 50 WORKERS FOR ONUC FARM. IT HAS ALSO BEEN ARRANGED TO SEND TO BASE EACH WEEK FROM KAMINAVILLE 1,000 CASES OF BEER AND 2,000 KILOS OF FRESH MEAT

BBB. FIVE NORTH KATANGHESE WORKERS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN TRIBAL RIVALRIES HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE BASE AND REPATRIATED TO AVILLE. TENSION AMONG WORKERS HAS NOW EASED.

CCC. PROTEST HAS BEEN LOGED WITH KASONGO NIEMBO THAT SOME ARMED GENDARMES ARE INTERFERING WITH WORK OF ONUC TECHNICIAN ON HIS WEEKLY INSPECTION OF KILUBI POWER STN.

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

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LULUABOURG

AAA. LULUABOURG GOVT IS SETTING UP ADVISRY COLLEGE OF TECHNICIANS CONCERNED WITH FINANCE, AGRICULTURE, PUBLIC WORKS, COMMUNICATIONS, HEALTH AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS. THEY HAVE INVITED UN FISCAL EXPERT AALTONEN TO SERVE IN THIS COLLEGE.

BBB. GASTON FALELE, ADMINISTRATOR AT LUSAMBO, HAS BEEN APPOINTED BY LOMAMI GOVT TO BE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF TERRITORY OF DIMBALENGE.

STANLEYVILLE

AAA. NARZIKALA GOVT HAS REQUESTED LOANS FROM GREEK MERCHANTS IN BUNIA TO PAY ARREARS IN ADMINISTRATION SALARIES. 500,000 FRs HAVE BEEN RECEIVED SO FAR AND CONGOLESE JUDGE IS THREATENING THOSE WHO DO NOT PAY.

BBB. DR DELCOS HAS ARRIVED TO TAKE UP ASSIGNMENT AS WHO REPRESENTATIVE.

OTHER STATIONS - N T R

2,500 x 200 - Imp. Plateau 11267

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : M. Robertson

Authorized : H. Ahmed

Date : 8 November 1962

O. N. U. C.
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3055 IMMEDIATE RINNYE FROM SECOURS. REUR D-1493 FOLLOWING
IS RELEASED TEXT OF REPORT. FRENCH WILL FOLLOW:

THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM HIS ACTING SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, GENERAL RINNYE.

1. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES
THE CHIEF OF STATE ON 4 OCTOBER 1966 ADDRESSED A NOTE TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA DECLARING PERSONAE NON
GRATAE THREE PERSONS DESCRIBED AS MR. AYK DJIN, AMBASSADOR
OF GHANA AT LEOPOLDVILLE, AND MESSRS. M.A. WELBECK AND BOTSIO,
MINISTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA, AND REQUESTING THEIR
RECALL. ACCORDING TO THE SAME INFORMATION, NO REPLY TO THIS
REQUEST WAS EVER RECEIVED. AS NEITHER MR. DJIN NOR MR.
BOTSIO WAS KNOWN TO BE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO AT THE
PRESENT TIME, THE ISSUE OF THE RECALL HAS IN FACT BEEN
CONFINED TO MR. WELBECK, THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

2. ON 15 NOVEMBER 1966, A SECRETARY OF THE AMBASSADOR WAS
ARRESTED BY THE CONGOLESE TROOPS GUARDING THE RESIDENCE OF
MR. PATRICE LUMUMBA AND DETAINED IN A MILITARY CAMP IN LEOPOLD-
VILLE ON CHARGES OF CARRYING DOCUMENTS TO MR. LUMUMBA OF
AN INTERNAL POLITICAL CHARACTER.

3. THE BROADER ALLEGATION WAS MADE THAT THE GHANA EMBASSY
HAD BEEN USING ITS DIPLOMATIC STATUS TO SERVE AS THE MAIN
LINK BETWEEN MR. LUMUMBA AND HIS OUTSIDE CONTACTS. THE
COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF THE INTERIOR WAS REPORTED AS HAVING
STATED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT THE GHANA

3050 IMMEDIATE RINNYE FROM SECOURS. DEUR D-1493 FOLLOWING
IS RELEASED TEXT OF REPORT. FRENCH WILL FOLLOW:

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COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF THE INTERIOR WAS REPORTED AS HAVING
STATED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT THE GHANA
MISSION MUST LEAVE THE COUNTRY. ON 19 NOVEMBER, HE ISSUED
AN ORDINANCE ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
DECLARING THAT THE THREE NAMED INDIVIDUALS WERE PERSONAE
NON GRATAE FOR HAVING COMPROMISED THE SECURITY OF THE TERRITORY,
AND PROCLAIMING THEIR EXPULSION. THEY WERE REQUIRED TO LEAVE
BY DIRECT AIR ROUTE WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

LY

4. ON THE SAME DAY, THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS, AT HIS REQUEST, DISCUSSED WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONUC THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN THE MATTER. HE EMPHASIZED THE INSISTENCE OF THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES THAT ONFI;--413 DAFFAIRES OF GHANA MUST LEAVE THE COUNTRY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE GAVE ASSURANCES THAT IT DID NOT LIE WITHIN THEIR INTENTION TO USE FORCE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

5. THE ONUC REPRESENTATIVE IN TURN GAVE ASSURANCES THAT ONUC DID NOT IN ANY WAY CONTEST THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE CHIEF OF STATE AS TO THE ACCEPTABILITY OR NOT OF ANY DIPLOMAT IN THE CONGO. THIS WAS ENTIRELY A MATTER BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. ONUC STATED THAT THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION WOULD BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CUSTOMARY DIPLOMATIC PROCEDURES.

6. IT WAS ONLY NECESSARY FOR ONUC TO EMPHASIS, IN COUNSELLING AGAINST ANY ACT OF FORCE, THAT IT WOULD NECESSARILY FALL WITHIN ITS MANDATE - IN THE DOMAIN OF THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY - TO PROTECT THE DIPLOMATIC PREMISES AGAINST ANY ASSAULT OR INVASION IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ONUC'S RESPONSIBILITY COULD NOT EXTEND BEYOND PROTECTING THE AMBASSADORIAL RESIDENCE FROM ANY FORCIBLE INCURSION OR FROM AN ACT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

IN A COMMUNIQUE OF 19 NOVEMBER 1960, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THEN CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BREACH OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GHANA.

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWED THAT THERE COULD THEREFORE BE NO DOUBT AS TO THE INVIOABILITY OF THE PREMISES.

7. BY THE COURSE OF 19 NOVEMBER, A NOTICE TO QUIT THE TERRITORY - WITHIN A TIME LIMIT LEFT BLANK - WAS SERVED ON THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BY AN IMMIGRATION OFFICER OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

8. ON 21 NOVEMBER, ONUC LEARNED OF THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL - THAT AFTERNOON - OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GHANIAN ARMY AND A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF GHANA, IN A GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT. ONUC PASSED THIS INFORMATION TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND IN THE EARLY EVENING URGED UPON THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE AND THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF THE INTERIOR THAT THE PRESENCE OF THESE ENVIRONNEMENTS SHOULD BE USED TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM AT ONCE BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, AND THAT NO DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE COULD BE JUSTIFIED WHEN THE OTHER GOVERNMENT CONCERNED WAS NOW PROCEEDING ALONG CUSTOMARY DIPLOMATIC LINES.

9. IN THE MEANTIME, A TENSE SITUATION HAD BEEN BUILDING UP BEFORE THE GHANAIAN PREMISES DURING THE DAY OF 21 NOVEMBER. IN ADDITION TO THE USUAL SIX MEMBERS OF THE GHANA POLICE, TEN GUARDS OF THE TUNISIAN BRIGADE WERE ON DUTY AT 0600 HOURS. WHEN TROOPS OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY PUT IN AN APPEARANCE, HEADQUARTERS MILITARY OPERATIONS REQUESTED THE TUNISIAN BRIGADE TO INCREASE THE GUARD, AT 0700 HOURS, TO ONE PLATOON. AT 1215 HOURS THE CONGOLESE TROOPS WERE REINFORCED TO APPROXIMATELY ONE COMPANY. AT 1700 HOURS THE TUNISIANS WERE INCREASED TO A STRENGTH OF 215. AT 1515 HOURS ONE ARMoured CAR AND FIVE TRUCK-LOADS OF CONGOLESE TROOPS - WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO SOME 100 MEN - WERE REPORTED TO BE STANDING BY AT A DISTANCE OF ONE BLOCK FROM THE GHANA PREMISES.

10. IN THE COURSE OF THE SAME DAY, THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MADE A DIRECT PERSONAL APPEAL TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE ARMY THAT ANY CLASH BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES BE AVOIDED. THE LATTER AGREED TO A DEFERRAL OF THE EXPULSION BY TWENTY-FOUR HOURS BUT COUPLED THIS WITH A STATEMENT THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES COULD OBLIGE THE CONGOLESE TO USE METHODS WHICH THEY WOULD NOT LIKE TO EMPLOY. AT 1400 HOURS THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF THE INTERIOR AND A CAPTAIN ACTING FOR THE SURETE CALLED ON THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND PRESENTED HIM WITH A SABENA AIR TICKET MADE OUT FOR KANO, NIGERIA, FOR DEPARTURE AT 1600 HOURS. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN WARNED THAT HE WOULD BE TAKEN OUT BY FORCE, IF NECESSARY, AND IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE REFUSED TO COMPLY.

11. AT 1940 HOURS ON 21 NOVEMBER 1966, WHEN NO LESS THAN SEVEN COMMISSIONERS WERE IN ONUC HEADQUARTERS DEMANDING THAT THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BE HANDED OVER TO THEM, WHILE THE TWO SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF GHANA WERE STANDING BY FOR DISCUSSIONS, AND WHILE THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS URGING UPON THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE THAT ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THIS FACT TO ASSURE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, FIRING BROKE OUT AT THE GHANA RESIDENCE. THE ACTING PRESIDENT AND THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF THE INTERIOR IMMEDIATELY SET OUT TOGETHER WITH THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE TUNISIAN BRIGADE FOR THE SCENE, WITH THE INTENTION OF SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE, THOUGH WITHOUT SUCCESS.

12. THREE DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS OF THE INCIDENT HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY ONUC HEADQUARTERS, AS FOLLOWS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY HAS STATED TO THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT HIS COMMANDING OFFICER PRESENTED HIMSELF ON THE SCENE, UNARMED, WITH FOUR MEN, ALSO UNARMED, TO ENTER THE PREMISES FOR A DISCUSSION WITH THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, AND THAT THE UNITED NATIONS TROOPS THEREUPON OPENED FIRE.

13. THE LIEUTENANT IN CHARGE OF THE TUNISIAN COMPANY REPORTS HAVING TAKEN UP POSITIONS IN THE EMBASSY GARDENS AT 1640 HOURS, A PLATOON OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (DOSE FORTY MEN) THEN POSTING ITSELF ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE STREET, FACING THE PREMISES, AT 1715 HOURS. THE REPORT STATES THAT A BATTALION SURROUNDED THE PREMISES, TOGETHER WITH TWO HALF-TRUCKS, AT 1800 HOURS, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY THE HOUR OF NIGHTFALL. DISCUSSIONS HELD BETWEEN THE TWO TUNISIAN LIEUTENANTS AND CONGOLESE OFFICERS INDICATED THAT RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS WERE SEEKING SETTLEMENT AT ONUC HEADQUARTERS. AT 1915 HOURS, LT. COL. KOKOLO OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY ARRIVED, ACCOMPANIED BY TWO CIVILIANS. THE REPORT STATES THAT HE DECLARED IN AN ANGRY VOICE THAT HE WOULD ATTACK IN ONE QUARTER OF AN HOUR AND TAKE THE BUILDING BY FORCE. A LITTLE LATER, HE SOUGHT TO ENTER THE PRECINCTS, BUT WAS TOLD BY THE TUNISIAN OFFICER IN CHARGE THAT HE MIGHT DO SO ONLY IF HE ENTERED ALONE AND UNARMED. THEREUPON, THE REPORT CONTINUES, LT. COL. KOKOLO FLATLY REFUSED, STRUCK THE LIEUTENANT WHILE ONE OF THE CIVILIANS HELD THE LIEUTENANT BY THE COLLAR, AND CONGOLESE SOLDIERS KNOCKED HIM DOWN. THE CIVILIAN IS SAID TO HAVE SHOUTED THE ORDER TO FIRE, RESULTING IN SEVERAL VOLLEYS FROM THE CONGOLESE SIDE. THE LIEUTENANT IN COMMAND WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED AND THE OTHER LIEUTENANT SERIOUSLY HIT, FALLING ON THE SPOT. ACCORDINGLY, AT ABOUT 1940 HOURS, TUNISIAN COUNTER-FIRE BEGAN. FOR ABOUT TWO MINUTES THERE WAS HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE IN ALL DIRECTIONS. UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 2215 HOURS FIRING CONTINUED IN SPORADIC AND INTERMITTENT BURSTS. THE TUNISIAN LIEUTENANTS REPORT SPEAKS OF RECEIVING SUCCESSIVE MACHINE GUN, SUB-MACHINE GUN, 37 MM AND SMALL ARMS FIRE, AS WELL AS A CERTAIN NUMBER OF GRENADES. HIS CRIES FOR A CEASEFIRE WERE IN VAIN.

14. A NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES HAVE STATED THAT FIRING BEGAN ON THE ONUC SIDE BUT ONLY IN ANSWER TO A MASS CHARGE FROM THE CONGOLESE SIDE. OPENING FIRE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD MILITARY PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENCE TO PREVENT AN ONUC UNIT OR POSITION FROM BEING OVERWHELMED OR EFFECTIVELY INFILTRATED. THE CHARGE WAS LED BY LT. COL. KOKOLO, WHO WAS KILLED BY A BURST OF SUBMACHINE GUN-FIRE AND DIED INSTANTLY.

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15. DURING THE FIRST LULL IN FIRING THE ONUC MILITARY HOSPITAL SENT OUT AMBULANCE CARS TO COLLECT THE WOUNDED. THE BODIES OF LT. COL. KOKOLO AND ONE TUNISIAN AND FOUR WOUNDED TUNISIANS WERE EVACUATED.

16. IN THE MEANTIME, CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE CONGOLESE CHIEF OF STAFF IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN A CEASE-FIRE. THE LATTER WAS ASKED TO BRING UP HIS LOUD SPEAKER VEHICLES IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF BRINGING ABOUT A CESSATION OF SMALL ARMS FIRE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. A CONGOLESE LIEUTENANT WAS SENT BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO ACCOMPANY THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SCENE AND TO ORDER THE CONGOLESE TROOPS TO WITHHOLD THEIR FIRE. WHEN, THEREFORE, AN APPARENT LULL IN THE FIRING HAD BEEN REACHED, THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDED TO THE AREA IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF GHANA AND THE GHANA FOREIGN MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE, WHO HAD DECIDED TO REMOVE THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO THE AIRPORT FOR IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE. UNFORTUNATELY THE HEADLIGHTS OF THE INDIAN AMBULANCE CAR EVACUATING WOUND CASUALTIES INDUCED HEAVY FIRING ON BOTH SIDES, AND THE GROUP WAS PINNED DOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR.

17. WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE CEASE-FIRE EFFORTS HAD FAILED, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY AGREED WITH THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW AT 0600 HOURS (APPROXIMATE DAYBREAK) ON 23 NOVEMBER. FIRING RECOMMENCED AT 0100 HOURS AND 0430 HOURS BUT WAS SHORT LIVED, ALTHOUGH SPORADIC SHOTS CONTINUED THROUGH THE NIGHT AND EVEN AFTER FIRST LIGHT; THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH CONGOLESE OFFICIALS DURING THE NIGHT.

15. TOTAL ONUC CASUALTIES WERE ONE SOLDIER KILLED, AND ONE OFFICER, TWO NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SIX OTHER RANKS WOUNDED. APART FROM THE ONE CONGOLESE OFFICER KILLED AND ONE CONGOLESE SOLDIER WOUNDED, BOTH EVACUATED BY ONUC, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE AS YET TO ASCERTAIN THE EXTENT OF CONGOLESE CASUALTIES.

16. THE CEASE FIRE WAS EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED AS FROM ABOUT 1730 HOURS ON 22 NOVEMBER. BETWEEN 0730 AND 0800 HOURS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GHANA ARMY PROCEEDED TO THE GHANA RESIDENCE WITH ONUC OFFICERS AND, AS ARRANGED, TWO OFFICERS OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY. THE STAFF WAS EVACUATED AND THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WAS REMOVED TO THE AIRPORT, WHENCE HE DEPARTED BY GHANA AIRCRAFT AT 1030 HOURS.

17. DURING THE NIGHT OF 21 NOVEMBER, AND AGAIN IN THE MORNING OF 22 NOVEMBER, CONGOLESE TROOPS STOPPED NUMEROUS ONUC CARS CARRYING ONUC CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND SUBJECTED THEM TO ARREST AT GUN POINT. SOME TWENTY-EIGHT ONUC PERSONNEL, FROM FIVE OR SIX CARS, WERE DETAINED AND CROWDED INTO A SMALL ROOM FROM 2245 HOURS ON 21 NOVEMBER TO 0630 HOURS ON 22 NOVEMBER. DURING THIS PERIOD THEY WERE REPEATEDLY THREATENED BUT FINALLY RELEASED UNHARMED, AT 0630 HOURS, 22 NOVEMBER. AFTER THIS RELEASE, THEY WERE AGAIN STOPPED BY ANOTHER ARMED PATROL, DETAINED FOR TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES AND AGAIN RELEASED, UNHARMED. IN THE MORNING OF 22 NOVEMBER, ADDITIONAL ONUC PERSONNEL WERE ARRESTED IN SEVERAL PARTS OF LEOPOLDVILLE, A NUMBER OF THEIR CARS CONFISCATED, AND THE PERSONNEL HELD BY CONGOLESE TROOPS FOR SEVERAL HOURS. A GROUP OF FIFTEEN ONUC MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WERE ARRESTED, HELD IN CAMP LEOPOLDVILLE II AND RELEASED ONLY IN THE AFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER, SOME HAVING BEEN HELD OVERNIGHT. THEIR RELEASE WAS ON THE ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AT ONE TIME OF THIS REPORT, NO INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL ARE STILL UNDER DETENTION. HOUSES OF SOME PERSONNEL WERE BROKEN INTO.

18. THROUGHOUT THE DAY CONGOLESE TROOPS ESTABLISHED VARIOUS ROAD-BLOCKS AND SEIZED MANY ONUC MOTOR VEHICLES, SOMETIMES IN CONNECTION WITH INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS OF PERSONNEL, OCCASIONALLY SIMPLY TURNING OUT THE DRIVERS AND OTHERS AT

20. DURING THE NIGHT OF 31 NOVEMBER, AND AGAIN IN THE MORNING OF 22 NOVEMBER, CONGOLESE TROOPS STOPPED NUMEROUS ONUC CARS CARRYING ONUC CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND SUBJECTED THEM TO ARREST AT GUN POINT. SOME TWENTY-EIGHT ONUC PERSONNEL, FROM FIVE OR SIX CARS, WERE DETAINED AND CROWDED INTO A SMALL ROOM FROM 2245 HOURS ON 21 NOVEMBER TO 0630 HOURS ON 22 NOVEMBER. DURING THIS PERIOD THEY WERE REPEATEDLY THREATENED BUT FINALLY RELEASED UNHARMED, AT 0630 HOURS, 22 NOVEMBER. AFTER THIS RELEASE, THEY WERE AGAIN STOPPED BY ANOTHER ARMED PATROL, DETAINED FOR TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES AND AGAIN RELEASED, UNHARMED. IN THE MORNING OF 22 NOVEMBER, ADDITIONAL ONUC PERSONNEL WERE ARRESTED IN SEVERAL PARTS OF LEOPOLDVILLE, A NUMBER OF THEIR CARS CONFISCATED, AND THE PERSONNEL HELD BY CONGOLESE TROOPS FOR SEVERAL HOURS. A GROUP OF FIFTEEN ONUC MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WERE ARRESTED, HELD IN CAMP LEOPOLDVILLE II AND RELEASED ONLY IN THE AFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER, SOME HAVING BEEN HELD OVERNIGHT. THEIR RELEASE WAS ON THE ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AT ONE TIME OF THIS REPORT, NO INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL ARE STILL UNDER DETENTION. HOUSES OF SOME PERSONNEL WERE BROKEN INTO.

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22. WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE GHANA STAFF AND THE CARRYING OUT OF THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENT, OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS PREVENTED REPLACEMENT OF THE GUARD AT THE GHANA RESIDENCE. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE BUILDING HAS BEEN LOOTED. ALTHOUGH CONGOLESE TROOPS HAVE LEFT THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY. THEY HAVE DUG IN ALONG THE NEARBY RIVER-FRONT AND AROUND THE ONUC HOSPITAL, AND CONGOLESE REINFORCEMENTS OF HEAVY VEHICLES AND LIGHT ARMoured CARS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP FROM THYSVILLE.

23. THE ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS APPEALED TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY AND TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS FOR EVERY EFFORT TO BE MADE TO RESTORE DEED DISCIPLINE, QUIET REELS, AND RE-ESTABLISH A SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ONUC AND THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES IN ORDER THAT THE ONUC PROGRAMME FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE MAY BE CARRIED FORWARD.. "

COL 3690 E-1493 "

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Mr Poujoulat

File

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF THIRD PROGRESS REPORT

A third progress report on ONUC operations, covering the events from the submission of the last progress report in October 1960 until 30 June 1961 will have to be submitted to the Secretary-General not later than July 15. It is requested that a first draft be ready not later than June 25, so as to leave time for necessary additions and coordination. The report should cover the following major headings:

1. Introduction (Mr. Linner)
- x 2. Relations between UN and Congolese authorities (Mr. Fabry, Mr. Gardiner assisted by Mr. Poujoulat)
3. Constitutional crisis (Mr. Fabry)
4. Development of new political structures (Mr. Kelly and Mr. Poujoulat)
- x 5. Withdrawal of foreign personnel and reorganization of army (Mr. Gardiner)
- x 6. Convocation of Parliament (Mr. Gardiner)
7. Tribal unrest and civil war threat (Mr. Kelly and Colonel Egge)
8. Organization of the Force (Force Commander)
9. Military Operations (Force Commander)
10. Humanitarian activities (Mr. Kelly)
11. Civilian Operations (Mr. Rossborough)
12. Administrative problems, including financing and supply (Mr. Ahmed).

Leopoldville, 8 June 1961

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REPORT DATED 8 MARCH, 1961 OF THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ARMED
CLASHES IN MOANDA, BANANA AND
MATADI

1. This is a report on the events relating to the armed clashes which took place between UN troops and Congolese forces at Moanda, Banana and Matadi on 3-5 March, 1961.

I. Developments leading to the clashes.

2. Since the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution of 21 February, signs of hostile feeling against the UN, motivated by apprehensions about the purport of the Council's decision, began to appear among the Congolese authorities in Leopoldville. The foray of the Stanleyville troops to the outskirts of Luluabourg on 25 February further increased this tension; on 26 February, the Special Representative was invited to a meeting attended by several members of the Leopoldville Government at the end of which Prime Minister Ileco handed to him a letter, reproduced in Annex I. The following morning President Kasa-Vubu made a broadcast, the text of which is reproduced as Annex II, and the ANC Information Bulletin No. 1 reproduced as Annex to Doc. S/4750 was issued.

3. In the evening of 27 February, the ANC committed several attacks on UN civilian and military personnel in Leopoldville and its vicinity; a summary report on these incidents is reproduced as Annex III. Attempts to disarm and arrest small UN patrols and individual soldiers continued throughout the week, and several members of the UN Force were detained and maltreated by the ANC. One of the captured Tunisian officers is still missing despite repeated efforts to obtain his return.

4. At the same time, pressure on the UN began to mount in the Bakongo territory around the estuary of the River Congo, where the UN position was substantially weakened by the withdrawal of Moroccan troops for which sufficient replacements could not be provided as all the forces at the United Nations disposal in the Congo were tied down either in areas threatened by civil war or in Leopoldville. In the Bakongo area, the UN has the responsibility for the custody of two former Belgian military bases: Kitona, where substantial amounts of war material are stored, and the small naval base of Banana. In addition, a UN unit has been stationed at Matadi.

5. The UN troops deployed in the Bakongo area after the withdrawal of the Moroccans were a Sudanese unit with a total strength of approximately 350 men, including Headquarters personnel. The command of this unit and over one-half of its personnel has been lodged at Kitona base, with one Company of approximately 140 men deployed at Matadi and two sections, numbering approximately 24 men, at Banana base. The ANC in the Bakongo numbered well over 1,000 men, of whom approximately 600 have been stationed at Matadi, some 60 in a camp adjoining Banana Base, and the rest deployed around Boma on the north bank of the Congo River astride the road from Kitona to Matadi.

6. The port of Matadi is the only harbour in the Congo usable for seagoing vessels, and provides the principal point of entry for all sea shipments. The River Congo is not navigable between Matadi and Leopoldville and transportation between those two places is provided by road and rail, both of which pass through the city of Thysville which has a large garrison of Congolese troops, including artillery and armour. Below Leopoldville, there is no bridge over the Congo River and communications between Matadi on its south shore and the Kitona-Banana area are maintained by a ferry boat. Three airfields are located in the Bakongo area: one at Kitona base, one opposite Matadi on the north shore of the river, and one, the Moanda airfield, about half way between Kitona and Banana base. The latter two are used by commercial flights.

7. In the last days of February, the ANC in the Bakongo area suddenly imposed restrictions on UN movements, over-flights or use of airfields. On 28 February, the ONUC civilian administrator of Kitona base and a sergeant-mechanic were arrested by the ANC at Boma on the pretext that they did not possess a valid travel permit; they were detained for six hours and the sergeant's weapon was confiscated.

8. On the morning of 3 March UN troops observed an increase in the number of ANC patrols which were more heavily armed than usual. The same morning two incidents occurred;

a) Two UN helicopters, three members of their crew and a UN civilian expert whom they transported to Goma for rendering assistance in the refloating of a tanker were arrested and detained by the ANC.

b) A UN staff member who arrived in Moanda by a commercial flight to take up his duties as radio officer was arrested upon arrival by the ANC and his luggage seized.

In a subsequent conversation Foreign Minister Bomboko explained that

the reason for this action was the staff members failure to carry a UN identification.

9. These developments and incidents seemed to indicate that something was afoot. UN troops deployed in the area, aware of their vulnerability, took the necessary precautions for their security. One of such measures was a warning to officers not to move outside their camps without an armed escort.

10. It is against this background of rising tension and indications of a hostile attitude of ANC personnel against the UN that the fighting which erupted at Moanda, Banana and Matadi finds its proper perspective.

II. Armed clashes on 3, 4 and 5 March

11. A UN committee of investigation was appointed by the Force Commander to establish the causes and circumstances of the fighting which broke out between UN and Congolese Army units at Moanda, Banana and Matadi. The following summary of events was, except for the section on the Banana incident, drawn up on the basis of evidence so obtained.

A. Moanda Incident

12. At 1315 hours on 3 March, Col. Abdul Hamid, Commander of the Sudanese contingent, was proceeding to Moanda airfield where he intended to board a commercial flight to Leopoldville. He was accompanied by his Second-in-Command and an escort of about a dozen soldiers. At the entrance of the Moanda airstrip, he was wrongfully stopped by an ANC detachment which took up firing positions on both sides of the road. Col. Hamid dismounted together with 6 of his men who were in a jeep behind him. At this moment one shot was fired; it has not yet been possible to establish clearly who fired this shot. The first shot was followed by a series of about five shots, which were fired by the Sudanese into the air. Col. Hamid ordered his men to cease fire, whereupon 4 ANC soldiers dropped their weapons; two surrendered and the rest fled. Col. Hamid instructed his Second-in-Command to return the captured ANC soldiers and arms to their camp in Banana and boarded the plane for Leopoldville as scheduled.

B. Banana Incident

13. A full investigation of this incident could not yet be carried out due to the interruption of flights between Leopoldville and Kitona. The following two paragraphs describe the sequence of events as they

were reported by signal at the time they occurred:

14. The Sudanese convoy which accompanied on 3 March Col. Hamid to Moanda airfield proceeded from there to the ANC camp in Banana in order to return the captured weapons and two soldiers. At the entrance to the ANC camp, the Sudanese convoy stopped and discussion ensued about the return of the two detained soldiers. While this discussion was in progress, a Congolese soldier approached the Sudanese party from the rear and fired two shots in their direction. The Sudanese returned fire, killing the Congolese soldier, and were in turn subjected to fire from the ANC camp. The Sudanese convoy withdrew to their camp, taking along the weapon of the killed soldier. This occurred at about 1600 hours on 3 March.

15. At 1615 hours the ANC opened fire at Banana base. Approximately 12 shells landed inside the UN encampment and one Sudanese was wounded. The small UN detachment returned fire which lasted until about 1700 hours. At 2045 hours the ANC resumed shelling of the base and simultaneously tried to enter Banana by using boats. At 0030 hours on 4 March, the Sudanese troops in Banana were permitted to withdraw to Kitona, both because their position was becoming untenable in view of the numerical superiority of the attacking ANC, and also in order to concentrate troops at the more important Kitona base.

16. The withdrawal from Banana was of course a purely temporary expedient. Arrangements were immediately made for the departure to Banana of the Congolese Acting Chief of Staff, Col. Kiembe, accompanied by a UN Liaison Officer, Major Bouffard, in order to arrange on the spot the procedures for the return of the UN garrison to Banana. Simultaneously, 124 Indonesian troops were flown to Kitona to reinforce that base and to relieve the Sudanese troops who, it was hoped as a result of negotiations, would return to Banana. The carrying out of these plans was, however, prevented by the subsequent events in Matadi.

C. Matadi

17. About two weeks ago, the guard duties over UN installations and stores in Matadi were taken over from Moroccan troops by a much smaller Sudanese unit of about company strength. A Canadian Signals detachment of 9 men and a small Movement Control detachment were also in Matadi: this personnel carried only sidearms. UN premises in

Matadi are widely scattered. The town stretches along the river bank and climbs up the surrounding hills: the ANC camp occupies the top of one such hill at the edge of the city. The Canadian Signals detachment is located in a house about 150 metres from the gate of the ANC camp. The main body of the Sudanese troops was stationed in a lower part of the city, in a building known as the "Cinema", about 1,000 metres from the Signals centre. The Movement Control detachment and some officers quarters were at the Hotel Metropole, located in still another part of the city. In addition, small detachments of Sudanese troops were posted to perform guard duties at the heliport, roughly half way between the ANC camp and the river, at the airstrip, and elsewhere.

18. When the Sudanese first arrived in Matadi, the ANC and the local population appeared to be friendly and well disposed towards them, but very soon there was a complete change of attitude and a state of tension developed for no apparent reason. On 3 March, as the news about the events in Moanda and Banana began to filter through, the ANC gave indications of increased activity. On the evening of that day, the local telephone connections between the Sudanese Company Headquarters and their outposts went out of commission. That night Capt. Belanger, C.O. of the Canadian Signals detachment, was entertained at dinner by the Sudanese officers, who informed him of these developments. Capt. Belanger told the Sudanese C.O. that he would appreciate it if, on news of incipient trouble, the Sudanese Company would assume protection of his premises.

19. On the morning of 4 March, UN personnel who went about their duties in town noticed that the streets were unusually empty and that there was considerable excitement among the population. At approximately 1000 hours that morning, following a warning from the UN Movement Control Officer and receipt of information about suspicious movements of ANC troops indicating an attempt to surround the UN Communications Centre, a small Sudanese guard, consisting of 7 men with one brengun and six 303 rifles, was posted at the Canadian Signals' building.

20. According to the testimony given by Capt. Belanger, he returned to his station from a trip into the city at about 1130 hours and at that time discovered that the ANC had a bren gun about 15 yards outside the building pointing at the front door. Extracts from his testimony follow:

" At about 1140 hours I (Captain Belanger) heard a burst of gunfire: those were the first shots that I heard fired

on that day; from the fact that these shots broke windows in the building occupied by the Signals detachment I can definitely establish that these shots came from the outside and were fired by the ANC. After the first shots were fired the Sudanese fired back immediately. The exchange of small arms fire lasted for about 20 minutes. At about 1200 hours the ANC started firing on the building occupied by the Canadian detachment with 37 mm armour-piercing shells; starting the firing directly at the roof and working down towards the ground floor. These shots were fired from a distance of about 400 yards. Small arms fire continued. At the same time I noticed the sound of mortar being fired from the ANC camp apparently in the direction of the Sudanese detachment guarding the heliport. By the sound of the shots the weapons employed were 3 inch mortar. One Sudanese soldier was wounded by bullets and shrapnel. At approximately 1400 hours a cease fire was arranged through the good offices of the Movement Control Officer, Capt. Fenger. The terms of the cease fire were to stay at our positions, to cease fire and to allow one ANC jeep to go down the hill carrying a white flag and to pass the Canadian building, until further notice was received by telephone. This cease fire was strictly observed by the UN forces. At approximately 1545 hours I stepped out, unarmed, from the front door of the building, in order to verify whether the ANC jeep with white flag was coming. I discovered that the ANC hid in the meanwhile a detachment of approximately 15 men around the back of the Canadian Signals building and another detachment of about 15 men on the side of the building. They had also moved a larger detachment of approximately 30 men coming from the direction of the Sudanese HQ where the Sudanese apparently observed the cease fire as no shots were heard fired from that direction when the ANC detachment approached. Upon stepping out

from the front door I found myself confronted with the ANC detachment which had infiltrated to the side of the building: the ANC pointed their guns at me in a manner which left me no alternative but to move with them in the direction away from the house.

When the group surrounding me moved about 50 yards away fire was opened from the general direction of the Sudanese HQ perhaps in an attempt to permit me to escape. I seized this opportunity and attempted to wrestle a sub-machine gun from the nearest Congolese soldier; although I did not succeed in getting the gun, I managed to flee the group surrounding me in the direction of a small ravine crossing the city between the Canadian Signals house and the Sudanese HQ, where I hid. At this stage general firing resumed in the direction of the Canadian Signals detachment with small arms fire and 37 mm armour piercing guns. This firing lasted for about 2½ hours. At about 1815 hours I heard wild screaming indicating that the Canadian Signals detachment position had been captured. Firing stopped for awhile but resumed in a sporadic manner in the direction of the Sudanese HQ. I found my escape route blocked on all sides by ANC positions and decided to continue hiding in the ravine in a spot about 700 yards distant from the Sudanese HQ."

21. As observed from the Sudanese Headquarters at the Cinema Building, the situation appeared, in the words of the Company Commander, Cpt. Sayed Abdel Hafiz, as follows:

" At about 1130 hours on Saturday, 4th March, I was in the Sudanese camp when firing opened up on the camp and also on the Canadian Signal Station. This firing came from the direction of the ANC camp and also from several directions outside of the camp. This firing consisted of rifle, LMG, HMG, 3-inch mortars, 37 mm anti-tank shots and continued for about 2 hours. From our camp we returned the fire in the general direction from which we thought the firing was coming. Firing stopped at 1330 hours and restarted from the ANC

side after about two hours, i.e. about 1530 hours and continued until about 1800 hours. During the cease fire, I contacted by phone the hotel and discovered that no firing had taken place by Sudanese troops in that area. The same held good for the airstrip. I got no reply from the helicopter strip and in the case of the Canadian Signal Station I was informed that they were subjected to heavy fire. There were two Sudanese wounded and one dead.

During the cease fire, it was discovered that the water supply was cut. During the firing, at about 1730 hours, Capt. Fenger, Movement Control Officer, Matadi, came to our camp in a Volkswagen with a white flag. At this stage the Sudanese had deployed in a perimeter defence around the general area of the camp. He was trying to contact me and was being brought to me by a Lieutenant when the Lieutenant was shot in the arm. Captain Fenger eventually got to me and told me that one of the Platoon Commanders was shot. He (Capt. Fenger) told me that he was trying to organize a cease-fire with the administrator of the ANC. Capt. Fenger then tried to contact the administrator's office but failed. He then remained with us in the camp up to 2200 hours. I do not know how the cease-fire came about and I availed myself of it to check again with the out-stations. I contacted the airstrip and the Metropole Hotel and discovered that there were no casualties and that they had not fired. I could not contact the Canadian Signals Station nor the helicopter station. In the camp at this stage we had one officer and two soldiers wounded. Meantime, during the cease-fire, some of the soldiers who had been on guard at the Canadian radio station filtered back into our camp (three of them). They were seriously wounded. They reported that the Canadian Signal detachment had been taken prisoner. The ANC had attempted to take the

Sudanese prisoners also but they had got away and were fired on when trying to get back to the camp. Three of them had been detained as prisoners leaving behind one dead. With regard to our casualties we had no doctor in the camp and the only medical aide that was available was a corporal. I tried to contact the doctor at the hospital but failed. Our estimate of the situation during the night was that we were surrounded by about 1000, including police and civilians. We decided to hold our area to the best of our ability."

22. According to Captain Belanger, who as noted above, was waiting in a ravine surrounded by ANC personnel and eagerly listening for every sound, "At about 0500 hours on 5 March fire was opened from an ANC machine gun which was in the immediate vicinity of my position." Other witnesses testified that this fire, which continued sporadically from various directions for several hours, was directed mainly at the Sudanese Headquarters building.

23. At approximately 1000 hours on 5 March firing ceased. At about the same time, Colonel Kiembe, the ANC acting Chief of Staff, accompanied by a UN Liaison Officer Major Bouffard, arrived from Kitona at the Matadi air strip and proceeded to the ANC camp, where they were joined by Mr. A. Delvaux, member of the Ileo Government, Major Pwati, Captain Musimbane from ANC Headquarters, the local ANC Commander, Major Ingilla, and local officials. From there, the party moved to the "Veterans Building", located on high ground, about 1000 yards from the ANC camp and about 1200 yards from the Sudanese Headquarters building and affording a good view of both positions, where the meeting to discuss the terms for the cessation of hostilities was to take place. On the UN side this meeting was attended, in addition to Major Bouffard, by the commander of the Sudanese troops in Matadi, Captain Hafiz, and by the UN Movement Control Officer, Capt. Fenger. Red Cross officials were also present. The meeting opened shortly before noon.

24. At exactly 1200 hours, firing started again. Captain Belanger, who was still hiding in a ravine, testified that "I distinctly heard that the first shot in this firing came from a 75 mm recoilless gun, followed by other weapons". UN troops at Matadi had only rifles and light machine guns. According to the testimony of Major Bouffard, who was in a good position to observe the shooting from a point of vantage on high ground, "this concerted fire from various weapons, including heavy mortar and 75 mm recoilless guns, ... consisted mainly of shots against the Sudanese Headquarters. This was clearly visible from the impact smoke and could also be deducted from sound. It is my (Major Bouffard's) considered opinion that the barrage was staged at a pre-arranged time by the ANC in order to influence the negotiations". In the opinion of military experts, such concerted and exactly timed fire from various types of weapons in different positions points to a prearranged firing programme and is inconsistent with an improvised retaliatory shooting in answer to the opening of fire by another party.

25. The duress under which the Commander of the Sudanese troops in Matadi was forced to accept the terms of the agreement/^{for}the cessation of hostilities dictated by the Congolese delegation, emerges clearly from the transcript of his testimony on this point:

"At about 1030 hours on 5 March Major Bouffard, ringing up from the airstrip, instructed me to cease fire and keep our heads down as they were about to negotiate a cease-fire. This we did. At about 1130 hours the Canadian doctor came to me in the inside of the camp and told me that I was wanted by the people from Leo to discuss a cease-fire and that I was to come unarmed. I went to a house on the edge of the town. Just when the conference was ready to commence, firing broke out again, particularly mortar fire. I informed the conference that they should cease fire, that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a cease-fire. The people at the conference merely took cover. The firing appeared to continue for about half an hour. One of the ANC officers who went out came back to the conference and informed us that the firing had come first from the Sudanese camp and the hotel. They all agreed with this although I told them this could not be the case as I had not the type of weapons being used, such as 3" mortars and recoilless weapons. The conference started again

"and Minister Delvaux was speaking French and his words were being interpreted to me by Major Bouffard. Minister Delvaux said the Sudanese must leave Matadi or they would bring reinforcements from Thysville and attack the Sudanese camp. I said that all I wanted was a chance to gather my troops and I was willing to leave Matadi as soon as I could. At this time, I was advised by Major Bouffard that this was the only port available and that I should not leave Matadi unless I had orders from Leo. I said I had no ammunition left and I did not know how many casualties had been inflicted on my men in the camp as a result of the latest heavy firing. I therefore had no option but to get out of Matadi. Major Bouffard said that he was going to negotiate with the Minister about our forces remaining in Matadi but I informed him that under the conditions I could not possibly stay there. Minister Delvaux did not like Major Bouffard's suggestions and he forbade him to continue with the interpretation. The manager of the hotel now became the interpreter between myself and Mr. Delvaux. I came to an agreement with the Minister that we would leave with all our arms and equipment."

26. The terms of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities are attached as Annex IV.

27. After the agreement was signed, Major Bouffard, according to his testimony, "made it clear that as long as UN remained in the Congo, UN troops would have to be deployed in Matadi; to which Mr. Delvaux replied that he realized this fact and that withdrawal was demanded only with respect to the Sudanese troops present in Matadi at that time".

28. In addition to the terms contained in the withdrawal agreement formal assurances were given by Mr. Delvaux that in consideration of the withdrawal of the Sudanese troops, Congolese authorities will assume the responsibility for safeguarding for the UN any military equipment, rations or stores left behind by those troops, so that UN troops coming to relieve them could immediately avail themselves of such stores. The Matadi District Commissioner, who was also present, was entrusted with this task and with providing police protection to the stores, and he agreed to carry out this undertaking.

29. Notwithstanding the provision of the cease-fire agreement that "the Sudanese troops will leave the town of Matadi... taking with them their arms and ammunition and other military material," orders were issued to disarm the Sudanese troops as soon as they left their positions and could no longer defend themselves. Their Commanding Officer was similarly stripped of his weapons, put under armed guard, and together with his troops subjected to vexatious indignities. As the only Leopoldville daily truthfully reported the following day: "L'opération de désarmement fut rondement menée par les militaires congolais: mitrailleuses, fusils, cartouches, casques, tout y passa. Aussi la population kinoise ne fut pas peu surprise ce matin en voyant débarquer d'un train spécial des dizaines de 'casques bleus', tête nue et donc privés de leur signe distinctif!" In addition to their weapons and other equipment on personal issue, including their UN blue helmets, the Sudanese troops at Matadi lost all their heavy equipment, vehicles and stores, which are now also in possession of the ANC.

30. The UN Force's withdrawal from Matadi constitutes a serious blow to the UN operation in the Congo by its psychological effects. This withdrawal also deprives the UN Force of its life line to the sea. The vital importance of this link to the outside world can be judged from the fact that in the next three weeks alone 33 ships with UN supplies are due to berth at Matadi, not counting troop transports. The USS Blatchford, on which the Indonesian Contingent was due to be repatriated from Matadi on 7 March, remains anchored outside the estuary of the Congo River.

31. Without the UN presence at Matadi, arms, ammunition and other war material can enter unchecked into the Congo; this, obviously, can have immeasurable consequences on the development of the civil war situation.

III. Negotiations with Congolese authorities

32. Immediately upon obtaining the news of the shelling of Banana base, the Force Commander contacted the Congolese military authorities in an attempt to restore, in co-operation with them, the status quo ante and to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. As stated in para 16 above, arrangements were made for the immediate departure to the affected area of the Acting Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, accompanied by a UN Liaison Officer. They could not succeed, however, in completing their mission with the desired results.

33. As regards the Matadi situation, attempts to stem by negotiations the trend towards armed clashes were hampered by various, to some extent fortuitous, circumstances: the absence of the Chief of State and other political leaders at the Madagascar Conference; the suspicion and excitement of the ANC fostered by distorted interpretations given by the Leopoldville authorities of the purport of the 21 February resolution of the Security Council; the intransigence and hostility towards the UN of some members of the Leopoldville Government; and the unfortunate sequence of events.

34. On 6 March, the Special Representative visited Foreign Minister Bomboko, who was still convalescing from an operation, in order to deliver to him for transmission to President Kasa-Vubu a letter from the Secretary-General (attached as Annex V), and to discuss measures which would be taken in co-operation with the Leopoldville authorities to restore the UN positions in Matadi and Banana. Mr. Bomboko's reaction was that in the first place the incidents must be fully investigated and the responsibility for them, which Mr. Bomboko claimed to rest with the UN, established. Only after this had been done and the ANC exonerated, could the questions of returning the confiscated weapons and other UN stores, and the conditions under which UN forces could re-enter Matadi and Banana, be discussed.

35. The Special Representative agreed that a thorough investigation of the circumstances and causes of the armed clashes was not only a desirable, but in fact constituted an indispensable step under the circumstances. Such an investigation must however proceed in accordance with the respective military regulations and would necessarily take some time. In view of the vital importance of Matadi for UN operations and of the UN responsibility for the custody of Banana base, the UN could not admit that its control over these two places should be postponed until all the investigations are completed. The Special Representative therefore proposed that simultaneously with the investigations carried out separately by both sides, negotiations should be held for discussing the procedures and modalities under which UN forces would, in co-operation with Congolese authorities, return as speedily as possible to Matadi and Banana. The Special Representative invited the Acting Prime Minister of the Leopoldville Government, Mr. Delvaux, who joined the discussion at a later stage, to discuss these questions with him and the Force Commander later that day or at the latest, the following morning.

36. This meeting was twice postponed by Mr. Delvaux first to 1800 hours on 7 March and then to 0900 hours on 8 March. It eventually took place at 1000 hours in the office of the Acting Prime Minister, Mr. Massa who assumed charge of his office the same morning, Mr. Delvaux having held acting charge of the office of Acting Prime Minister, according to his own statement, for two days.

37. On the afternoon of 7 March, Mr. Delvaux issued to the press a signed communique the text of which is attached as Annex VI.

38. The Special Representative addressed on 7 March to President Kasa-Vubu, who is in Tananarive, a message which is reproduced as Annex VII.

39. At the meeting held on 8 March with Acting Prime Minister Massa, acting Foreign Minister Kasongo and acting Interior Minister Delvaux, the Special Representative reiterated his wish to discuss the procedure for the speediest possible return of the UN Force to its previous stations in Banana and Matadi. The Acting Prime Minister replied that this question could be discussed only after the UN has withdrawn the statement to the effect that it was the Congolese who had opened fire at Matadi. The UN Force Commander pointed out that the inquiries held by a committee of investigation, none of whose members were of either Sudanese or Canadian nationality have fully substantiated the information given to the Secretary-General on which he based his letter to President Kasa-Vubu referred to in paragraph 34 above. Nevertheless, the Acting Prime Minister maintained that no return of the UN Force to Matadi could be discussed so long as the question of responsibility was not settled and he expressed the firm view that it was the UN Sudanese troops which were responsible for the hostilities. If however the UN made this admission, he was ready to agree to the immediate discussion of the return of UN troops to Banana and Matadi. This position was of course quite inadmissible.

40. Upon the Special Representative's request that the Acting Prime Minister should state the position of the Leopoldville authorities with regard to the peaceful restoration of the UN position in Banana and Matadi so that this information could be transmitted to the Secretary-General, the Acting Prime Minister stated that he considered it inadvisable, in view of the existing tension, for the UN to send its troops to Matadi. The question of the Special Representative as to what steps the Congolese authorities were taking to reduce this tension, remained unanswered.

41. Finally the Acting Prime Minister made the following demands as a condition for future cooperation between the UN and the Leopoldville authorities:

- (a) No UN troopships may enter Matadi and river pilots have been forbidden to lend their services to such vessels
- (b) All UN air traffic must be controlled by the Congolese authorities and subject to their permission
- (c) Joint control must be established over all airfields and other strategic points now under the control of UN;
- (d) All permanent movements of UN troops must be subject to the control of the government and UN troops must obtain entry and exit permits;
- (e) All patrolling of UN troops with arms in Leopoldville city must cease.

42. The Special Representative stated that he would convey the above conditions to the Secretary-General immediately, pointing out the inadmissibility of the first four. As regards (e) General MacEoin stated that he had tried since a fortnight to obtain the cooperation of the ANC acting Chief of Staff for the establishment of joint UN-ANC patrols in Leopoldville city, but without result. He would also consider withdrawing existing orders which had to be issued in view of the attacks on UN personnel regarding the carrying of personal arms.

43. The Conference thus ended on this inconclusive note.

LETTER ADDRESSED BY MR. J. ILEO
TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
----- ON 25 FEBRUARY 1961 -----

Le Gouvernement de la République a l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gouvernement Provincial du Kasai et le Commandant de Place de Luluabourg, m'informent de la présence de troupes rebelles à Luluabourg venant de Stanleyville.

La présence de ces troupes et les mouvements qui l'ont précédée, constituent autant d'actes de nature à troubler la Paix et la Sécurité Publique.

Le Gouvernement se pose la question de savoir si ces mouvements de troupes ont échappé aux observateurs du Commandement des Nations Unies.

Le Gouvernement vous prie de bien vouloir prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour que soient refoulés de Luluabourg les soldats venant de Stanleyville.

A défaut de ce faire dans un délai de 6 heures, à partir de ce samedi 25 février, à midi, le Gouvernement se verra dégagé de tout devoir d'avertissement à votre égard et prendra ses responsabilités.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU BROADCAST
ON RADIO LEOPOLDVILLE, FEBRUARY 27, 1961

J'adresse un appel solennel à tous les Congolais, à toutes les Congolaises, comme aussi à toute l'Armée nationale, y compris ceux de Stanleyville, Watsa, Bukavu, Luluabourg et Bakwanga.

Notre pays est menacé d'une mise sous tutelle de l'ONU. On va désarmer notre armée, si nous n'y prenons garde. Nous avons déjà protesté contre les résolutions du malheureux Conseil de sécurité, mais il ne suffit pas de protestations verbales, il faut des actes.

D'autre part, l'ONU est en train de nous trahir. Nous avons encore confiance en l'ONU. Il y a six jours, le Conseil de sécurité manifestait la volonté de l'ONU d'éviter au Congo les déchirements d'une guerre civile. Respectueux de cette volonté, nous stoppions l'avance de l'Armée nationale à travers la Province Orientale, mais lorsqu'il s'agit de l'avance des bandes communistes du rebelle Gizenga, l'ONUC ne voit rien, ne remarque rien. Elle ignore l'avance de ces troupes de Kindu à Luluabourg, soit 750 kilomètres. L'ONUC ne fait semblant de remarquer le mouvement des troupes de Gizenga qu'à leur arrivée près de Luluabourg et elle envoie alors des patrouilles de reconnaissance ou plutôt des patrouilles d'accueil. Ainsi, selon qu'il s'agit des troupes régulières de l'Armée nationale ou des bandes communistes du rebelle Gizenga, l'ONUC adopte une attitude différente.

Congolais, Congolaises, l'ONUC nous trahit. C'est pourquoi nous devons nous ressaisir immédiatement. Le Gouvernement décide de mobiliser toutes les énergies de la Nation.

L'Armée ne sera pas désarmée. Face à la tutelle de l'ONU, je donne à chaque unité et à chaque soldat, trois consignes :

Première consigne : défendre la souveraineté et l'honneur du Congo.

Deuxième consigne : défendre l'honneur de l'Armée.

Troisième consigne : chaque soldat défend son arme.

Mais défendre son honneur signifie aussi pour l'Armée respecter les populations civiles et leurs biens. J'interdis sévèrement à l'Armée de molester les populations civiles, même celles qui ne lui seraient pas favorables. J'interdis à l'Armée de commettre des exactions.

A cette condition, l'Armée aura l'appui total des populations. J'invite solennellement toutes les populations du Congo à appuyer moralement l'Armée nationale.

Pour montrer au monde que le peuple congolais réprouve la mise sous tutelle et est prêt à soutenir l'Armée nationale, le Gouvernement décide de former immédiatement un bataillon de réservistes et fait appel pour l'y aider aux anciens combattants, dont l'esprit civique et patriotique est bien connu et intact.

La situation est extrêmement sérieuse, elle est extrêmement grave. L'Armée nationale exécutera avec fermeté toutes les missions qui vont lui être données. Fini pour l'Armée nationale de palabrer avec les troupes rebelles, chaque unité de l'Armée nationale exécutera immédiatement chaque mission, au besoin par la force. Chaque commandant d'unité fera ouvrir le feu si nécessaire contre quiconque s'oppose à la mission qui lui est ordonnée.

Si par malheur il arrivait qu'une unité de l'Armée nationale n'exécute pas sa mission, s'il arrivait qu'elle maltraite la population civile, s'il arrivait qu'elle pactise avec des bandes rebelles, nous désarmerons nous-mêmes cette unité indisciplinée et nous la chasserons de l'Armée nationale. Nous réorganiserons nous-mêmes l'Armée nationale avec les techniciens que nous nous choisirons, avec ou sans la collaboration de l'ONU.

Nous adressons un ultime et solennel appel à M. Tshombé, Président du Gouvernement du Katanga, pour qu'en face du danger mortel commun, il rallie enfin la République du Congo.

Congolais, Congolaises, soldats de l'Armée nationale, debout, et en avant : que le Léopard, symbole du Congo sorte ses griffes, qu'il fasse entendre sa grosse voix, qu'il bondisse vers l'adversaire.

Vive la République du Congo indépendante. Vive chacun de ses Etats. Vive chacune des populations du Congo !

REPORT DATED 27 FEBRUARY OF THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON LEOPOLDVILLE
INCIDENTS OF 26 AND 27 FEBRUARY 1961

1. The following incidents took place in Leopoldville on 26 and 27 February involving UN personnel.
2. At 15.45 hours on 26 February all vehicular traffic was stopped at a place called Ma Vallée some 10-12 miles from the town. At about 17.45 hours all civilian traffic was allowed to proceed but UN personnel had to wait till about 18.30 hours, when the ANC removed the road block and left for the billets. At this place while the traffic was being held up, five Tunisian soldiers under a sergeant were disarmed by about 40 ANC. The Tunisians did not resist the disarming as it might have resulted in danger to the civilian UN personnel present. The Tunisian soldiers were released at approximately 22.30 hours on 26 February.
3. At about 21.00 hours on 26 February a UN officer and a UN woman secretary were arrested by three ANC paracommandos at gun point. The secretary was raped twice by the ANC soldiers, whilst the Captain was held at gun point and also robbed of his belongings. They were then taken to the ANC camp where they were detained all night and released only at 10.20 hours on 27 February.
4. At 19.00 hours on 26 February a UN employee with two other UN staff members whilst driving to town were stopped by the ANC. They were thrown out of the car and at the point of the bayonet were made to run about 2.50 kilometers. During this time, the ANC kept repeating that the UN would never be able to disarm the Congolese troops and if the UN tried, the ANC would kill every UN person in the Congo. The UN personnel were taken to a military camp and forced into a barrack, where other UN persons were lying on the floor. There were five Scandinavians, one of whom was in UN uniform, two Nigerians and two Italians, a captain and a colonel. The latter was bleeding from a cut on the face. The three were searched and all their property, identity cards, etc.. were removed. At about 19.40 hours, five Tunisian soldiers in uniform accompanied by a sergeant were pushed into the barrack. These soldiers were subjected to heavy beating by the ANC. Eventually at 21.50 hours the same day all the UN personnel were released, and also their vehicles.

5. On 26 February the ANC detained Sir Kerr Bovell, Inspector General of the Nigerian Police in the Congo on an inspection tour of the UN Nigerian police, the Deputy Commissioner of Nigerian Police and other Nigerian Police officers. They were allowed to leave after four hours detention. In another incident, at about 2330 hours, a mixed Nigerian-Congolese Police patrol on its beat was set upon by an ANC officer and a warrant officer, who brandished revolvers at the patrol, as a result of which the Nigerian police are considering whether these joint patrols should not be discontinued.
6. After midnight on 27 February four soldiers of the UN Provost Company went to retrieve an abandoned UN car. They were arrested near the ANC paracommando camp but were released the next morning on UN intervention.
7. At 11.00 hours on 27 February two officers and two soldiers of the Canadian contingent were arrested by the ANC near the Stanley monument. They were beaten with rifle butts and were forced to run barefoot for about half a mile. They were subsequently released on UN intervention. One of the officers is suffering from shock.
8. A vigorous protest has been made by the Force Commander to the ANC Commander and Chief of Staff against these brutal and provocative outrages in the following terms:

"Le Commandement des Nations Unies considère comme extrêmement grave les différents cas d'attaques brutales, d'arrestations arbitraires et d'actes bestiaux commis les 26 et 27 février par la troupe de l'ANC contre le personnel des Nations Unies.

Le Commandement a adressé un ferme avertissement au Commandement de l'ANC, indiquant qu'il ne tolérerait pas une conduite aussi honteuse à l'égard du personnel de l'ONU, civil ou militaire. Le Commandement des Nations Unies fait enquête sur les circonstances de ce soudain déchaînement de violence contre le personnel de l'ONU, en tenant compte particulièrement de certaines menaces qui ont été proférées immédiatement avant ces faits. Si ces violences révoltantes ne sont pas le résultat d'un plan d'ensemble, elles révèlent un manque complet de discipline de la part de la troupe de l'ANC. Le Commandement de l'ONU a averti le Commandement de l'ANC dans les termes les plus clairs qu'il s'opposerait à de telles entreprises avec le maximum de force et que la responsabilité des conséquences incomberait clairement à l'ANC et aux autorités responsables."

TEXT OF WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT
OF SUDANESE TROOPS FROM MATADI
FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF 4/5 MARCH 1961

Kg.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
State of Leopoldville
District of Bas-Congo
Territory of Matadi

ADMINISTRATIVE PROTOCOL

The year nineteen hundred and sixty-one, the fifth day of the month of March,

Following the serious events which occurred Saturday 4 and Sunday 5 March 1961, in the city of Matadi, in particular the firing of 5 March 1961 from 12 h. to 12 h.20, it was agreed between Minister Delvaux, representing the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, and the Sudanese Captain S.A.Hafiz, responsible for UN troops in Matadi, in the presence of Major Bouffard Clément, representing the UN, and the Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army, Kiembe :

1. The Sudanese troops will leave the town of Matadi to-day, by train, for Leopoldville, taking with them their arms and ammunition and other military material,
2. In order to ensure security at the time of departure, the Minister will be present himself, with an officer of the Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army and a UN officer, when the troops embark.
3. The Minister will send a member of the Chief of Staff of the National Army in order to ensure complete security of the troops during transport from Matadi to Leopoldville. In addition, he will personally be in contact with the different units of the National Army in order to ensure security and help during the transportation.
4. Security will be ensured during the transport of the troops from their base to the station - place of embarkation.

The Minister undertakes to make a report to his government on the exact situation of the incidents at Matadi; vice-versa, the Captain of the Sudanese Army will present his report to the United Nations Organization in Leopoldville.

THE SUDANESE CAPTAIN
S.A.HAFIZ

FOR THE CONGOLESE
GOVERNMENT, THE RESIDENT
MINISTER A. DELVAUX
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR,ff.

THE WITNESSES

For U N O
BOUFFARD, Cl.

For THE CONGOLESE ARMY
KIEMBE

P.S. In the event of failure of the Sudanese troops to depart within the above time-limit, the Minister A. Delvaux will take the necessary steps to obtain reinforcements in order to safeguard the population of Matadi by launching a general offensive against the UN troops.

LETTER ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU ON 6 MARCH 1961

Faisant suite à la lettre que je vous ai envoyée le 3 mars 1961, les graves événements des dernières heures m'obligent à vous adresser les protestations les plus énergiques au sujet des actes illégaux que l'ANC, avec l'implication apparente de ministres du régime Iléo, a perpétrés depuis le 3 mars, dans la région du Bas-Congo contre des unités relevant du commandement de l'ONU. Cette évolution pose des questions de principe des plus sérieuses au sujet de l'opération que l'ONU a entreprise comme suite à un appel du Gouvernement de la République, en vertu d'une décision du Conseil de sécurité, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions touchant le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Après les incidents graves à Banana, suivis d'incidents plus graves encore à Matadi, où des soldats de l'ANC ont, sans provocation, attaqué des unités de l'ONU qui vquaient aux activités dont elles étaient chargées, une menace inadmissible d'emploi de force a été faite pour contraindre l'unité soudanaise de l'ONU à évacuer Matadi.

A ce propos, je dois appeler d'urgence votre attention sur les points suivants :

Premièrement, agissant sous un mandat du Conseil de sécurité, les Nations Unies doivent conserver une complète liberté de décision en ce qui concerne le déploiement des contingents nationaux lors de l'exécution de l'opération de l'ONU. Dans l'exercice de leur responsabilité, l'affectation de contingents particuliers aura toujours lieu, bien entendu, compte dûment tenu de toutes les circonstances pertinentes. Il ne faut considérer comme inadmissible toute tentative visant à influencer l'ONUC à cet égard, par la force ou autrement; cela s'applique évidemment à la tentative de poser des conditions quant au choix des unités destinées à Matadi. Je ne peux pas permettre une interprétation du retrait forcé, aujourd'hui, du détachement soudanais de Matadi, comme une dérogation à cette position de principe.

Deuxièmement, la présence de la Force de l'ONU à Matadi est une condition vitale de l'exécution de l'opération de l'ONU au Congo, particulièrement pour ce qui est d'empêcher la guerre civile et d'arrêter les opérations militaires; comme vous le savez, la résolution du Conseil de sécurité autorise à cette fin le recours à la force, si besoin est, en dernier ressort. Ce point s'applique nécessairement, en ce qui concerne l'affectation de contingents particuliers, à la lumière des principes énoncés à l'alinéa qui précède; pour l'application de ces principes l'ONU, de son propre chef, tient compte de tous les facteurs essentiels à l'exécution de la tâche de la Force

Il n'est guère besoin de souligner que les décisions à prendre par les autorités de Léopoldville dans les quelques heures qui suivent seront cruciales si tant est que ces autorités veuillent convaincre le monde qu'elles demeurent engagées, comme vous m'en avez donné l'assurance, à coopérer avec les Nations Unies et non à les défier.

Je vous demande de prendre d'urgence des mesures pour retrouver et faire retourner immédiatement à leurs unités un membre du contingent canadien, un membre du contingent tunisien et les douze soldats soudanais disparus, ainsi que pour faire observer le cessez-le-feu qui a été ordonné. Les quelques heures qui suivent donneront aussi sur ces points aux autorités congolaises une occasion des plus importantes de montrer qu'elles sont disposées à répudier des actes et attitudes déplorables et à reprendre en main, avec la coopération et l'assistance de l'ONU, les éléments indisciplinés et irresponsables (ANC et civils). De toute façon, l'entière responsabilité des événements passés ne pourra que vous incomber, ainsi qu'à ces autorités. En conclusion, je dois souligner de nouveau l'importance des principes posés dans les alinéas qui précèdent. Si contre ma ferme attente, la situation à Matadi n'est pas immédiatement redressée, la question deviendra bien entendu un sujet de préoccupation pressante pour le Conseil de sécurité.

PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY ACTING MINISTER
OF INTERIOR MR. A. DELVAUX ON 7 MARCH 1961

Le but de cette conférence de presse est d'éclairer l'opinion sur les récents incidents survenus à Banane et plus spécialement à Matadi, les trois, quatre et cinq mars écoulés.

Je commencerai par vous donner lecture d'un extrait de la lettre adressée en date du 6 mars 1961 par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies au Président de la République du Congo. Comme vous le verrez, cette lettre rejette la responsabilité des faits sur l'Armée nationale congolaise:

"Excellence,

" Faisant suite à la lettre que je vous ai envoyée le 3 mars 1961, les graves événements des dernières heures m'obligent à vous adresser les protestations les plus énergiques au sujet des actes illégaux que l'ANC, avec l'implication apparente des Ministres du régime Iléo, a perpétrés depuis le 3 mars dans la région du Bas-Congo contre les unités relevant de l'O.N.U. Cette évolution pose des questions de principe des plus sérieuses au sujet de l'opération que l'ONU a entreprise comme suite à un appel du Gouvernement de la République, en vertu d'une décision du Conseil de sécurité, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions touchant le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Après les incidents graves à Banana suivis d'incidents plus graves encore à Matadi, où des soldats de l'ANC ont, sans provocation, attaqué des unités de l'ONU qui vaguaient aux activités dont elles étaient chargées, une menace inadmissible d'emploi de force a été faite pour contraindre l'unité soudanaise de l'ONU à évacuer Matadi".

Je tiens à vous présenter le déroulement des faits tels qu'ils se sont réellement produits.

Dans la nuit du 3 mars, des soldats tunisiens de l'ONU ont mitraillé une maison sise à l'avenue de Kabinda à Léopoldville suite à une discussion survenue avec un tailleur de l'endroit. Bilan de l'opération : un mort congolais.

Le 3 mars, également, nous avons été avisés qu'une opération militaire avait été déclenchée par les soldats soudanais à Moanda où un de nos soldats a été tué. Le tir a été ouvert par les soudanais.

Dans l'après-midi du même jour, ceux-ci ont occupé la plaine de Moanda, les services eau et électricité de la Régideso ont été coupés privant nos troupes de ces premières nécessités. En même temps, les liaisons téléphoniques du Gouvernement ont été coupées. Les Soudanais se sont ensuite dirigés vers Banane en vue d'occuper la base de Kitona.

Le samedi 4 mars, nous avons dépêché sur les lieux le Major KIEMBE de l'Etat-Major de l'ANC accompagné de l'Officier de liaison ONU, le major canadien BOUFFARD.

Nous sommes restés ensuite sans plus aucune nouvelle de Banane, toutes les communications étant coupées.

Le 4 mars également à Matadi, les troupes soudanaises ont ouvert le feu à 11.15 heures. A 13.35 h., l'ONU me faisait savoir à Léopoldville qu'elle avait ordonné le cessez-le-feu tandis qu'à 16 h., Matadi m'avisait d'une reprise des hostilités et me priait de venir au plus vite sur les lieux.

J'ai pris la route pour Matadi à 17.15 h. accompagné du Commandant Pwati et du Capitaine Musimbano de l'ANC. Nous sommes arrivés au Camp Hardy à Thysville à 19.30 h. où nous fut présenté un rapport sur l'évolution de la situation dans le Bas-Congo. Ce rapport faisait état de la reprise des hostilités vers 16.30 heures alors que le Commandant de Place Ingila négociait à Matadi un cessez-le-feu avec le Capitaine Fenger, de l'ONU, canadien. Ce Capitaine s'étant retiré de la salle de réunion n'avait plus reparu; cette absence prolongée inquiéta le Commandant de notre Armée et le Chef du Territoire de Matadi qui l'accompagnaient et qui regagnèrent le camp militaire. En dépit des négociations, la fusillade avait repris une nouvelle fois à 20.30 heures.

Sur base de ces informations reçues à Thysville, j'ai pris immédiatement contact du Camp Hardy avec Léopoldville - Q.G./ONU Léo-; le Commandant Pwati, pour le secteur militaire et moi-même, pour le secteur civil avons enjoint au QG/ONU d'ordonner le cessez-le-feu à défaut de quoi nous prendrions nos responsabilités dès notre arrivée à Matadi.

Nous avons quitté Thysville à 21 heures pour Matadi escortés d'une jeep avec cinq P.M. congolais. Tout le long du parcours, nous avons trouvé nos soldats en état d'alerte. Par ailleurs, un contrôle de tous les véhicules, était effectué sans qu'il soit tenu compte de l'identité et de la race du conducteur.

Nous sommes arrivés à l'Etat-Major de l'ANC à 3 heures du matin, le 5 mars 1961. Nous y avons trouvé 8 Canadiens du groupe de transmission de l'ONU capturés par nos gens et 3 Soudanais faits prisonniers au cours des opérations.

On nous signala que les forces soudanaises avaient pénétré dans le camp de l'ANC à Banana. A Matadi même, les troupes de l'ONU occupaient la Socopétrol, la plaine d'aviation de Tshimpi, l'héliport et le port national.

Je vais reprendre, à présent, le déroulement des opérations à Matadi depuis le début:

Le samedi 4 mars à 9 heures du matin, un certain nombre de soldats soudanais ont pris position à la villa occupée par le groupe de transmission canadien ONU. Cette villa est située à un kilomètre du cantonnement soudanais, à 150 mètres environ de la résidence du Commandant de l'ANC Ingila, ainsi que de notre quartier P.M. et à 50 mètres du logement de l'adjudant Okudju. Devant cette situation insolite, le Commandant de la Place de Matadi dépêcha le Capitaine sur les lieux pour s'enquérir de la raison de ces mouvements inhabituels des troupes soudanaises. L'équipe canadienne n'en était pas informée, c'est du moins ce que prétendit le Capitaine Bélanger.

Lors des pourparlers entre notre capitaine et les Soudanais, ces derniers ouvrirent brusquement le feu en direction de l'habitation du commandant de la place. J'ai relevé personnellement 8 points d'impact sur la façade principale de l'immeuble. Le feu fut dirigé également en direction du quartier P.M. Nos soldats surpris par la soudaineté de cette attaque se regroupèrent immédiatement et se placèrent en position de défense. Après un nouveau tir des Onusiens, nos soldats ripostèrent par un tir d'armes lourdes dirigées sur la villa occupée par les Canadiens d'où venait le feu des Soudanais. Ce tir occasionna des dégâts importants à l'immeuble aussi bien qu'au matériel de transmission. Deux soldats soudanais y trouvèrent la mort tandis que trois autres furent faits prisonniers alors qu'ils abandonnaient sur place une mitrailleuse, deux vignorons et trois fusils.

A 16.30 heures, alors que se déroulaient les pourparlers mentionnés plus haut qui me furent rapportés à Thysville, les troupes onusiennes ouvrirent à nouveau le feu sur notre camp.

A 20.30 heures, le tir reprenait et ceci en dépit des assurances formelles qui m'avaient été données par le Q.G. de l'ONU de Léopoldville.

Lors de l'entrevue qui avait eu lieu à 16.30 h., l'ANC avait exigé le retrait des troupes soudanaises des postes-clés qu'elles occupaient à Matadi et, en attendant ce retrait, rassemblement et regroupement en un seul endroit.

Le 5 mars 1961, alors que nous avions contacté le Capitaine Fenger (ONU) en vue d'une rencontre à 8.30 h. pour trouver une solution au conflit, les soldats soudanais ouvrirent à nouveau le feu. Un tir d'intimidation de deux coups d'une arme lourde de l'ANC mit fin au tir onusien.

Après avoir pu, enfin, prendre contact avec le Capitaine Fenger, je lui ai proposé de suspendre les pourparlers jusqu'à l'arrivée du Major Kiembe de l'ANC et de l'Officier de liaison ONU, le Major Bouffard et d'ordonner un cessez-le-feu aux troupes onusiennes. Cette convention fut admise et respectée jusqu'à 12 h.

L'Administrateur de Territoire dépêcha un mandataire pour accueillir au débarcadère, le Major Kiembe et le Major Bouffard; ces deux officiers furent immédiatement conduits au Quartier Général de notre Armée. Pour prouver notre désir de paix et de collaboration avec l'ONU, nous avons proposé au Major Bouffard une réunion sur un terrain neutre en l'occurrence la salle des anciens combattants située au quartier de Bruxelles-Nord à Matadi. C'est là qu'eut lieu le rendez-vous en présence d'une mission danoise de la Croix-Rouge internationale. Sur proposition du Major Bouffard et de la susdite mission, le Capitaine soudanais A.S. Hafiz fut mandé sur les lieux pour participer aux pourparlers. Cinq minutes après l'arrivée de cet officier, un tir nourri fut à nouveau ouvert par les soudanais en direction de notre camp militaire, ce qui provoqua le plus grand étonnement de la part des participants à la réunion.

Quelques instants plus tard, nos soldats ripostèrent au tir onusien par un tir d'armes lourdes dirigé sur le Ciné Palace, Quartier Général soudanais d'où partaient les coups de feu.

Du lieu de la Conférence, tous les participants purent assister au bombardement du cantonnement onusien. Le tir cessa après vingt minutes. Après quoi, les troupes soudanaises se rendirent; un peloton qui tentait de s'enfuir en direction de l'Hôtel Métropole fut fait prisonnier et désarmé.

A la Salle de réunion des Anciens Combattants, les pourparlers avaient repris. Une question fut posée au Capitaine soudanais:

"Acceptez-vous la responsabilité du tir qui vient d'être effectué par vos hommes?"

Ce dernier inclina la tête en signe d'assentiment.

"Pouvez-vous me dire quel ordre a été donné à vos soldats lors de votre départ?"

Le Capitaine répondit "de ne pas tirer".

Je tiens à souligner ici qu'en l'occurrence, le fait d'ouvrir le feu constituait pour le Gouvernement congolais, une attaque armée de l'ONU et par conséquent une violation de notre droit de souveraineté et de notre indépendance.

Pour clôturer les débats, un accord fut conclu entre moi-même, Ministre représentant le Gouvernement central de la République du Congo et le Capitaine soudanais Hafiz, accord qui fut contresigné par le représentant de l'ONU, le Major Bouffard et par le représentant de l'ANC, le Major Kiembe.

Je vous donne lecture du texte de cet accord.

"L'an mil neuf cent soixante et un, le cinquième jour du mois de mars suite aux événements graves qui se sont déroulés le samedi 4 et dimanche 5 mars 1961 dans la ville de Matadi, spécialement le tir du 5 mars 1961 de 12 heures à 12.20 heures, il a été convenu entre le Ministre Delvaux, représentant le Premier Ministre et le Ministre de l'Intérieur du Gouvernement de la République du Congo, et le Capitaine soudanais, S.A. Hafiz, responsable des troupes de l'ONU à Matadi, en présence du Major Bouffard Clément, représentant de l'ONU et du Chef d'Etat-Major de l'ANC Kiembe;

" 1o/ Les troupes soudanaises quitteront la ville de Matadi, ce jour, par train à destination de Léopoldville emportant avec eux leurs armes et munitions et autre matériel militaire;

" 2o/ Pour assurer la sécurité au moment du départ, le Ministre assistera lui-même avec un officier de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée nationale et un officier de l'ONU à l'embarquement des dites troupes;

" 3o/ Le Ministre dépêchera un membre de l'E.M. de l'Armée nationale pour assurer toute sécurité des troupes pendant le transport de Matadi à Léopoldville.

En outre, il prendra personnellement contact avec les différentes unités de l'armée nationale pour assurer sécurité et aide pendant le transport.

" 4o/ Toute sécurité sera apportée au transport des troupes sur le trajet de leur base à la gare du lieu de leur embarquement.

" Le Ministre se charge de faire rapport à son gouvernement de la situation exacte des incidents de Matadi; vice-versa, le Capitaine de l'Armée soudanaise présentera son rapport à l'Organisation des Nations-Unies de Léopoldville.

Le texte de cet accord a été signé par le capitaine soudanais Hafiz et moi-même pour le Gouvernement congolais. Le Major Bouffard de l'ONU et le Major Kiembe pour l'Armée nationale ont signé en tant que témoins.

Un P.S. a été ajouté au texte de cet accord. Il est libellé comme suit:

" A défaut du départ des troupes soudanaises dans le délai prévu ci-dessus, le
" Ministre Delvaux prendra toutes ses responsabilités pour faire venir des renforts
" afin d'assurer la sécurité des habitants de Matadi en déclenchant une offensive
" générale contre les troupes de l'ONU."

Cet accord sitôt signé, nous en avons immédiatement réalisé les termes et, en ordre principal, avons organisé le départ des troupes soudanaises pour Léopoldville. Un train spécial avec deux voitures pour voyageurs à l'intention des Soudanais fut dirigé sur l'Etat-Major de l'ONU à Léopoldville.

Les armes et munitions ont été déposées à notre E.M. de Matadi; elles y resteront jusqu'à ce qu'un règlement du conflit intervienne entre le Q.G. de l'ONU à Léopoldville et notre Gouvernement.

Nous affirmons solennellement que les Soudanais faits prisonniers ainsi que les 8 membres de la mission de transmission canadienne n'ont été molestés à aucun moment.

Les Canadiens ont été acheminés sur Léopoldville par avion avec un certain nombre de blessés graves des troupes soudanaises. Cet avion avait été spécialement mis à ma disposition par le Gouvernement.

Les Soudanais quittèrent Matadi pour Léopoldville à 18 heures. Ils étaient désarmés et non convoyés.

A l'issue de cette Conférence, je vous montrerai quelques photos témoins de l'embarquement.

Je voudrais, à présent, faire le point de la situation. J'estime personnellement que la responsabilité du tir initial incombe aux soldats soudanais. Je crois qu'ils n'ont fait qu'exécuter les ordres reçus du quartier général de l'ONU à Léopoldville. Il s'agissait d'appliquer la résolution du Conseil de sécurité qui envisage de désarmer les troupes de l'ANC au besoin par la force. Cette mesure constitue une violation flagrante de la souveraineté du Congo et une véritable déclaration de guerre à l'encontre de notre République. L'action des Soudanais m'a paru si bien concertée qu'elle ne pouvait, à mon avis, que résulter des directives venant de Léopoldville. Nous partageons les sentiments d'indignation du peuple soudanais devant l'évolution des événements. Nous avons adressé le lundi 6 mars au matin, à S.E. Le Général Aboud, le télégramme suivant:

"Au nom du Président Kasa-Vubu et populations congolaises exprimons Votre
"Excellence sentiments condoléances pour pertes subies vos forces stationnant Matadi
"lors malheureux incident provoqué par elles journées quatre et cinq courant. Popu-
"lation congolaise les regrette. Connaissant manoeuvres certains représentants ONUC
"pour opposer nos deux peuples amis et frères dénonçons ces manoeuvres. Espérons
"qu'elles échoueront et que nos deux peuples resteront amis pour bonheur Afrique
"entière. Très haute considération". A. Delvaux, Ministre.

Un second télégramme a été également adressé aux autorités de Matadi par le
Cabinet du Chef de l'Etat dont voici, également le texte: "Au nom Président Kasa-
"Vubu, adressons autorités civiles militaires et policières chaleureuses félicitations
"pour bravoure extraordinaire dont elles ont fait preuve lors malheureux incidents
"quatre et cinq courant. Par votre bravoure avez prouvé ce dont peuple congolais est
"capable si injustement attaqué pour défendre son indépendance chèrement acquise.
"Puisse votre exemple servir de leçon tant à toutes nos forces qu'à nos adversaires."

Kini Emmanuel, Cabinet Chef Etat.

Je tiens à mettre en lumière les liens d'amitié qui ont toujours uni et unissent
encore le Congo et le Soudan. Je tiens également à rendre hommage au Soudan pour le
soutien qu'il a toujours apporté au Congo et à son Gouvernement légal dans le dénouement
de la crise que nous traversons. Les déplorables incidents que nous venons de vivre
ne sont que le résultat de manoeuvres en coulisses de certaines personnalités de
l'ONU. Je pense spécialement ici au Représentant spécial de Monsieur "H" à Léopold-
ville, M. Dayal qui cherche à l'heure actuelle à dresser des pays comme le Soudan et
la Tunisie contre le Congo.

Quels sont les remèdes que nous pourrions apporter à la situation? Une colla-
boration parfaite entre l'ONU et le Gouvernement légal installé par le Chef de l'Etat
ne sera pas possible aussi longtemps que l'ONU ne traitera pas loyalement avec cette
autorité et passera outre à ses désidérata. L'obstination de l'ONU l'a conduit directe-
ment à la faillite. Le Congo, quant à lui, est décidé à défendre farouchement sa
souveraineté et son Indépendance acquises au prix d'énormes sacrifices. Il n'acceptera
jamais de tutelle de qui que ce soit et spécialement pas celle de l'ONU après que
celle-ci ait reconnu son indépendance et l'ait admis au sein des Nations Unies. Nous
sommes prêts à envisager une collaboration franche et sincère avec l'ONU à la condition

que celle-ci commence par nous rétrocéder les points stratégiques que
ses troupes occupent sur l'ensemble de notre Territoire national. Nous lui demandons,
en second lieu, que M. Dayal rétracte devant l'Assemblée Générale de l'ONU son
accusation mensongère selon laquelle nos troupes ont, les premières, ouvert le feu
contre les positions ONU à Banane et à Matadi. Une franche et honnête collaboration
ne pourra intervenir que lorsque M. Dayal qui depuis longtemps a perdu la confiance
des Congolais, sera retiré du circuit.

Nous souhaitons vivement voir au Congo un représentant de l'ONU intègre et impartial; une personnalité qui n'apporte pas sur notre territoire les querelles opposant au sein des Nations Unies les deux groupes rivaux sur le plan mondial qui se livrent à la guerre froide entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Nous demandons enfin que l'ONU permette au Congo de décider souverainement quels sont les pays habilités à participer à la restauration de la paix et de la vie économique de notre République.

Je termine en vous signalant que l'officier canadien que la radio signalait comme disparu a été retrouvé et ramené à Léopoldville dans mon avion spécial hier après-midi. Les neuf Soudanais portés manquants se sont rendus hier soir à Matadi, un avion spécial les ramènera aujourd'hui à Léopoldville.

Dans les engagements qui se sont déroulés à Matadi, il y avait en présence, 147 Soudanais et une centaine de soldats de l'ANC.