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04/11/1956-12/09/1957

Political Matters - Hungary - UN Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary - Report

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
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FILE NO.:

12 September 1957

To: The Secretary-General

From: Ahmed S. Bokhari, Under-Secretary
Department of Public Information 

Victor Hoo, Under-Secretary
Department of Conference Services 

Subject: Publication and Distribution of the Report
of the Special Committee on the Problem of
Hungary

1. It is standard procedure to make available reports which are to be discussed at a session of an organ of the United Nations, in the languages specified by the rules of procedure, before the session begins, whenever this is possible. It is also standard procedure to release for publication such reports when they are issued. Some examples are: the reports of the Councils to the General Assembly, the reports of Special Committees established by the General Assembly or other principal organs of the United Nations, the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, the Budget Estimates, the report of the International Law Commission, The World Economic Survey and the reports of the Functional Commissions to the Economic and Social Council, and the reports of the Visiting Missions to the Trusteeship Council. Mimeographed versions of such reports are often issued in advance of the printed document. This applied recently to "The World Economic Survey 1956"; to the report of the Economic and Social Council to the 12th session of the General Assembly, which is being issued in mimeographed form in French, Spanish and Russian; and to the last reports of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. There is nothing exceptional in the procedure followed by the Secretariat as regards the Report on Hungary. This procedure has been followed since the beginning of the United Nations.

2. The press run of United Nations documents and publications is established by taking into account the requirements of:

a) The official (free) distribution, which takes care of the needs of the following authorized recipients: Delegations, Ministries, Depository Libraries, Specialized Agencies, Regional Commissions, Non-Governmental-Organizations, Press, and Secretariat; provision is also made for a reasonable stock in order to meet additional requests by the above-mentioned recipients. (The bulk of the official distribution goes to Governments, either through their delegations or directly. The

delegations indicate for each series of documents the quantities they desire for each language version. A strict limit exists as to the number of copies (30) of printed publications each delegation may receive free of charge. This limit, however, does not apply to printed documents which fall within the Official Records series, i.e. documents which serve as a basis for discussion in a United Nations organ.)

b) The prospective sales through the official sales outlets of the United Nations (The number of copies printed for sales distribution is established by advance evidence of active demand for purchase of the report. Mimeographed copies of reports are not placed on sale.)

3. The procedures applied in the publication of the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary followed the normal practice. The mimeographed text was distributed only to the delegations, and public information media. 3500 copies were mimeographed in English, 1300 in French, 900 in Spanish and 500 in Russian. Of these a total of 670 in all languages were used to meet requests of public information media for copies. The printed versions were treated exactly as other supplements of the Official Records of the General Assembly and were issued in the usual format.

4. The press runs of the various editions were established according to the policies mentioned above. The number of printed copies of the Report on Hungary issued for official distribution corresponds to the average for documents in this series. In accordance with standard procedure, the document was printed first in the three working languages of the General Assembly, English, French and Spanish, to be followed later by printings in the other two official languages, Russian and Chinese. The number of copies in each language for sales distribution was determined by advance orders and other evidence of active demand. The document in English has been printed in 30,000 copies, of which 2,700 were for official distribution and 27,300 for sales distribution. The corresponding figures for the French edition are 1,500 for official distribution and 11,500 for sales distribution; for the Spanish edition 1,500 were for official distribution and 4,500 for sales distribution; for the Russian language edition 800 for official distribution and 3,000 for sales distribution; for the Chinese language edition 600 for official distribution and 500 for sales distribution.

5. No editions of the Report will be printed or distributed by the United Nations in non-official languages. Like all United Nations publications the Report, once issued, is in the public domain. It may, therefore, be translated and printed in non-official languages by governments or publishers at their own expense and upon their own responsibility.

6. No editions of the Report other than those referred to above have been issued by the United Nations. A 14 page reprint of an article summarizing the Report which appeared in the August 1957 edition of the United Nations Review has been issued, primarily for sales distribution, in response to public demand. 21,500 copies for sale at 15 cents each have been printed in English and 5,000 in Spanish. Reprints in pamphlet form of articles in the United Nations Review on United Nations developments of wide public interest are issued frequently by the Department of Public Information under the publications program approved by the General Assembly. From 30 to 60 such reprints are issued annually. The number of copies of each reprint

varies from 1,500 to 100,000 depending on demand.

7. The sales price of all United Nations documents is based on a formula intended to recover to the United Nations from sales revenue more than the cost of printing all copies for sales distribution. The sales price for the Report on Hungary was set at \$2.00 in accordance with this formula. Net revenue to the United Nations from sales of the Report on Hungary is estimated at over \$40,000.00, which will far more than cover the cost of printing the Report.

8. Coverage of the Report on Hungary, as well as the present discussion of it in the General Assembly, by the various media services in the Department of Public Information has followed in all respects the rules long established for such coverage.

Ahmed Roshan

15 February 1957

DRAFT INTERIM REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY

Rapporteur: Mr. K. C. O. Shann

I. ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION

1. The Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, composed of the representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, was established by the General Assembly by resolution 449 of 10 January 1957.

2. The following five representatives were appointed by their respective Governments:

Australia:	Mr. K. C. O. Shann
Ceylon:	Mr. R. S. S. Gunewardena
Denmark:	Mr. Alsing Andersen
Tunisia:	Mr. Mongi Slim
Uruguay:	Professor Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat

3. The Committee held its first meeting at the United Nations Headquarters on 17 January 1957, and elected Mr. Alsing Andersen as Chairman and Mr. K. C. O. Shann as Rapporteur.

II. INITIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE

4. After closed meetings devoted to the initial organization of its work, and after preliminary consideration of the immediately available evidence of a primary character, the Committee decided to hear testimony from certain personalities who had requested a hearing, namely: Miss Anna Kéthly, Minister of State in the Hungarian Government of 3 November under the Premiership of Mr. Imre Nagy; Major-General Béla Király, Military Commander of the City of Budapest, and Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard during the Hungarian uprising; and Mr. Jozsef Kóvago, Mayor of Budapest during the years 1945-47 and again during days from 31 October to 4 November 1956.

5. The three witnesses made detailed statements before the Committee in open meetings, and were later questioned by the members of the Committee in closed meetings. The Committee has also had the opportunity to question certain other witnesses in closed meetings.

6. On the Committee's behalf and at its request, the Secretary-General has sent a Note dated 28 January 1957 to the Permanent Representatives of all Member States to the effect that the Committee would be grateful to receive, as soon as possible, "such information relevant to its task, including testimony and evidence, as is at present in the possession of your Government", and that the Committee would also be glad "to receive suggestions and information as to witnesses who are in a position to provide the Committee with significant and authoritative information based on personal experience regarding the situation in Hungary to which resolution 449 of the General Assembly relates". Replies from the following Member States have been received:

7. The Special Committee has also expressed through the Secretary-General its desire to receive from the Governments of States Members of the United Nations having diplomatic representatives in Budapest at the time of the situation referred to in the resolution, and which may therefore be in possession of special knowledge of value to the Committee, all such information relating to the situation as those Governments are in a position to transmit to the Committee in furtherance of its investigation.

8. The Secretary-General has also communicated, on the Committee's behalf and at its request, with the Permanent Representative of Hungary, requesting that assistance and facilities be extended by his Government to the Special Committee for its work, and especially with regard to the entry of the Committee and its

staff within the territory of Hungary. In his reply of 5 February 1957, the Permanent Representative of Hungary has informed the Secretary-General that, in the opinion of his Government, the Committee "violates, in its function, the Charter of the United Nations", and that, "consequently, the Hungarian Government is not in a position to permit the members of the Special Committee and its staff to enter into the territory of Hungary". The Committee will persevere in its efforts to fulfill the mandate of the General Assembly to obtain information by direct observation in Hungary.

9. The Special Committee has taken note of the observations in the Memorandum of 4 February 1957 transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Hungary.

10. The Committee has received many requests from persons desiring to be heard as witnesses. Certain other witnesses have been proposed by Member States; and others by Miss Anna Kéthly and Major-General Király. The Committee has agreed on its procedures for the selection and hearing of these witnesses with a view to ensuring the representative character of the testimony while expediting to the utmost degree the completion of its final report.

11. It is the intention of the Committee to continue the hearings in New York till the first days of March, when it proposes to proceed to Europe. In Europe, it is intended to conduct the work of the Committee principally in Geneva, in order to enable the Committee to avail itself of the technical facilities of the European Office. Some witnesses whom the Committee decides to hear will be invited to come to Geneva. Others may be heard by the Committee in other countries in Europe.

III. DELIMITATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION

12. The Special Committee has been concerned in the course of these preliminary activities to define the scope of the enquiry which it has been called upon to conduct. Resolution 449 gave it the responsibility for providing the

General Assembly and the Members of the United Nations with the fullest possible information regarding the situation which the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics created in the internal affairs of Hungary, through the use of armed force and other means, as well as regarding developments relating to the various recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject. It is the intention of the Special Committee in the fulfilment of this task to gather by way of direct observation, documentation and testimony, the best information which may be made available to it, and after appropriate study and scrutiny, to report on its findings within the shortest possible time.

13. The primary function of the Committee is to assess the facts, and it is its aim to present these facts with the greatest objectivity.

In the course of its work, the Committee will, therefore, receive and give consideration to all data relevant to the enquiry presented to it from authoritative sources. In this connexion, the Committee wishes to stress once again the importance, for the effective performance of its functions, of the full co-operation and assistance of States to which the General Assembly made an appeal in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 449.

14. Together with the provisions of the General Assembly's resolution of 10 January 1957, the Special Committee will be guided by the applicable paragraphs of Article 2 of the Charter containing the principles of the United Nations and by other relevant provisions of the Charter. The Committee's primary concern is to ascertain the extent and the impact of foreign intervention, by the threat or use of armed force or other means, on the internal affairs and political independence of Hungary and the rights of the Hungarian people. The internal affairs of Hungary, and political and other developments in that country before 1956, are considered by the Committee to be outside the framework of its investigation, save in so far as these developments may have

a direct bearing on the uprising of 23 October 1956, the subsequent interventions of the USSR and the resultant aspects of the continuing situation within Hungary.

15. The Committee has also to consider "developments relating to the recommendations of the General Assembly on the subject". These recommendations, which are contained in various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly as from 4 November 1956, and which culminated in the approval of the Assembly's resolution 424 of 12 December 1956, express, inter alia, the Assembly's concern at the "armed attack on the people of Hungary" by the Government of the USSR, at "any form of intervention, in particular armed intervention, in the affairs of Hungary",^{1/} at "the introduction of additional armed forces into Hungary"^{2/} by the USSR, and for the withdrawal of all such forces "without delay from Hungarian territory";^{3/} for the immediate cessation of actions by the USSR "against the Hungarian population which are in violation of the accepted standards and principles of international law, justice and morality";^{4/} for the facilitation by the Hungarian authorities of, and the non-interference of the USSR with, "the receipt and distribution of food and medical supplies to the Hungarian people";^{5/} for the cessation by the Government of the USSR and the Hungarian authorities of "the deportation of Hungarian citizens" and for the prompt "return . . . to their homes" of "those who have been deported from Hungarian territory";^{6/} for "the right of the Hungarian people to a government responsive to its national aspirations and dedicated to its independence and well-being";^{7/} and for the conduct

^{1/} Resolution 1004 (ES II), A/RESOLUTION 413, A/RESOLUTION/424.

^{2/} Resolution 1004 (ES II).

^{3/} Resolution 1004 (ES II), Resolution 1005 (ES II), A/RESOLUTION/413, A/RESOLUTION/424.

^{4/} Resolution 1006 (ES II), A/RESOLUTION/413.

^{5/} Resolution 1006 (ES II).

^{6/} A/RESOLUTION/407, A/RESOLUTION/413.

^{7/} Resolution 1004 (ES II), A/RESOLUTION/424.

of "free elections" which "should be held in Hungary under United Nations auspices, as soon as law and order have been restored, to enable the people of Hungary to determine for themselves the form of government they wish to establish in their country".^{1/} The Committee will endeavour to throw as much light as possible on the effects which the Assembly's recommendations had on developments in Hungary and the degree of current compliance with these recommendations.

16. The central stress of the Committee's investigation will, however, be directed towards "the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights" -- to cite the terms of the Security Council's resolution of 4 November 1956^{2/} -- and on the precise facts and data regarding the circumstances of the intervention by the USSR in this situation within Hungary through its armed forces and by other means, and on the consequences of this intervention on the evolution of the constitutional, economic, social and political conditions in that country, on its international commitments and on the fulfilment of the wishes of its people. The Committee will attempt in particular to clarify the nature of the relations between the USSR and its representatives in Hungary with the Nagy Government, the origin and significance of the communications addressed by that Government to the United Nations, as well as the role of the USSR in connexion with the removal of that Government and the setting up of the present régime.

17. The Committee has not been in a position within the time available to it to formulate any final findings. It is still in the process of gathering and studying available information and hearing witnesses. A careful collation and scrutiny of the evidence will be necessary in order to ascertain the precise course of events. At this stage, the Committee confines itself, therefore, to the presentation of a brief statement of developments in regard to the salient aspects of its enquiry.

^{1/} Resolution 1005 (ES II).

^{2/} S/3733.

IV. SUMMARY STATEMENT ON THE COURSE OF INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY

18. In the following statement, the Special Committee has endeavoured to set out the main phases in the course of developments subsequent to the uprising of 23 October 1956 in relation to the circumstances and consequences of Soviet intervention by armed force and by other means. In this statement, the Special Committee has sought to avoid observations which may be of a controversial character and to confine itself to certain of the considerations of fact which are central to its inquiry. On certain points in this statement the Committee has already availed itself of testimony given before it by participants in these events.

19. On the afternoon of 23 October 1956, demonstrations were organized in Budapest, around the statues of Sándor Petöfi in Pest and of General Bem across the river in Buda. The second of these demonstrations, organized by students of the universities and colleges, was joined by other elements of the population to the number, it is reported, of some 50,000. Indicative of the objectives of the demonstration was the declaration of the Praesidium of the Writers' Union, which was read out on this occasion. Among the demands set out were: "an independent national policy based on the principles of socialism"; "relations with all countries, and particularly with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Democracies . . . based on the principle of equality"; "true and sincere friendship with our allies - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Democracies . . . on the basis of Leninist principles"; the factories to be run by workers and specialists, and the "humiliating system of wages, working norms and social security conditions" reformed; agricultural policy to be put on a new basis; and "changes of structure and of personnel in the leadership of the Party and the State", notably the removal from political life of the "Rakosi clique"; and election of parliamentary representatives freely and by secret ballot.

20. At 8 p.m.,^{1/} Mr. Ernő Gerő, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party,^{2/} delivered a broadcast address. Mr. Gerő reaffirmed the necessity for the further development of socialist democracy along the lines laid down by the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party of 18-21 July 1956. Mr. Gerő's address is understood to have been regarded by those who participated in the demonstrations as a provocative criticism and condemnation of their attitude. The address was followed by the movement of the demonstrators towards the Central Studio of the Hungarian broadcasting network, where they requested the broadcasting of their demands. At or near the Radio Building, the transition occurred from peaceful demonstration to armed action. The exact circumstances responsible for the initiation of the fighting have yet to be elucidated by the Committee. Fighting was first officially announced at 4.30 a.m. on 24 October.

21. In these circumstances an emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party was summoned. The meeting continued during the night. In the early hours of the morning the outcome of the Central Committee's deliberations were announced. At 9 a.m. on 24 October, Radio Budapest announced that the Government, confronted by the "armed attack of counter-revolutionary gangs", had therefore "applied for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty". In compliance with the Government's request, it was announced, Soviet formations were taking part in the restoration of order.

22. In this connexion, further investigation is called for as to the exact circumstances and timing of the "decision" to invite the assistance of Soviet troops. For, at this meeting of the Central Committee, the Central

^{1/} Time is given in Central European Time.

^{2/} The official title of the Hungarian Communist Party.

23. The intervention of the Soviet forces was not followed by immediate success in the repression of the uprising. Fighting continued in varying degree in Budapest throughout the following four days. Moreover, the uprising spread to the provinces. In the provinces some five main centres of major fighting have been identified by Major-General Király in evidence given before the Committee: the area of Pecs, in the southern part of the country, where the uranium mines are located; the coal mining area near the Czechoslovak frontier, in particular around Miskolc; Csepel Island, south-west of Budapest; in the large villages of the great Hungarian plain around Kecskemet; and the mining area in the Matra Mountains in northern Hungary. Another major area of the uprising was the extensive Gyöer-Sopron-Szombathely area in western and north-western Hungary; however, this area was seemingly not a centre of active fighting. It appears that the action of the population was directed in the first instance against the A.V.H. - the state security police - and, after the intervention, against the Soviet forces.

24. The Hungarian Government, for its part, displayed both coercion and conciliation in its efforts to meet the situation. Martial law was proclaimed on 24 October, but its effective application was postponed. Amnesties were offered with defined time limits, but the time limits were successively extended. Cease-fire orders were issued by the Government; but non-observance necessitated their repetition. The forces behind the uprising appear rather to have consolidated their hold on the country. In this situation, a major factor was the spontaneous emergence around 26 October of Workers' Councils both in Budapest and in the provinces. Negotiations ensued between the delegations of such organizations and the Government. On 28 October the Government ordered a general cease-fire, and by the morning of 30 October, the cease-fire had become effective throughout the country.

25. The changed situation was reflected in changes in the composition of the Government and in other significant political developments. Throughout Mr. Imre Nagy remained Chairman of the Council of Ministers. On 25 October Mr. Ernő Gerő was replaced as First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party by Mr. János Kádár. General István Bata, the Minister of Defence active in combating the uprising in its early stages, was replaced by General Karoly Janza, a former trade union leader, who, in turn, was replaced on 3 November by Colonel Pal Maleter, the defender of the Kilian barracks. On 29 October was announced the abolition of the state security police. No less indicative of the changed situation in Hungary were the successive transformations of Mr. Nagy's Government on three occasions, which on 3 November culminated in the election to Mr. Nagy's National Government, by the Praesidium of the People's Republic, of representatives of the Smallholders' Party, the Petőfi (National Peasant) Party, and the Social Democratic Party, in addition to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The organization of the latter party had just begun: for, on 1 November, Hungarians were informed over the radio by Mr. Kádár of the decision to form "a new party" - the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party - on the basis of national independence, with a view to stabilizing the achievements of the insurrection. The political parties themselves recommenced their activities on 30 October, when the one-party system was abolished by the Government. The National Trade Union Council changed its name on 31 October to the "National Federation of Free Hungarian Trade Unions", and it was announced that the Hungarian trade unions would leave the World Federation of Trade Unions.

26. Concerning the course of these events and the developments of the first four days of November, much information is derived from the announcements of the Government itself broadcast over the Budapest radio. The Radio itself

proclaimed that "for long years past, the radio was an instrument of lies", and that henceforth, as "the mouthpiece of the Hungarian revolution as a whole", it would dedicate itself to the truth. During these days news and views were freely broadcast by the radio stations of the country, and newspapers reappeared with free comment.

27. The termination of military action brought to the forefront the question of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. For, while the aims of the insurgents appear to have varied as regards internal matters, the demands presented to the Government by the delegations of the insurrectionary organizations or formulated in radio broadcasts were in agreement on one point - unwillingness to lay down arms so long as Soviet forces had not withdrawn from Hungarian territory. This problem presented a dual aspect - on the one hand, the immediate problem of securing the cessation of the military movements of Soviet forces and their retirement from Budapest; and, on the other, the long-term problem of revising or abrogating the stipulations of the Warsaw Pact, with a view to the permanent withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country.

28. The prompt retirement of Soviet forces from Budapest had been envisaged in the statement of the Central Committee of 26 October to the effect that Soviet troops would "immediately return to their bases" after the restoration of order. Two days later, Mr. Nagy announced that the Hungarian Government had agreed with the Government of the USSR that the Soviet troops would immediately begin their withdrawal from Budapest and, simultaneously with the establishment of the new security forces, would leave the city's territory. The following day the Ministry of Defence reported that the withdrawal of Soviet units from Budapest would begin twenty-four hours from the handing over of arms; on the morning of 30 October, the Ministry added the information that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was in progress. That afternoon Mr. Nagy appealed to the Hungarian people to contribute

to the withdrawal of Soviet troops by refraining from any provocative or hostile action. On the evening of 30 October, General Janza, Minister of Defence, stated that the withdrawal from Budapest, begun at 5 p.m., would be complete by the dawn of the 31st. The same day the Government of the USSR, in its Statement of 30 October, stated that it had given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this was considered necessary by the Hungarian Government. On 31 October at 8 a.m., Radio Budapest announced that Soviet troops had left the city by daybreak. But later in the morning, it was announced that Soviet tanks were still in the centre of the city. From the provinces reports of Soviet troops movements continued, notably from Miskolc. On 1 November, Mr. Nagy informed the Soviet Ambassador that the Hungarian Government had received authoritative information of the entry into Hungarian territory of fresh Soviet military formations, and demanded that these military formations be withdrawn at once. The following day the Hungarian Government again drew the attention of the Soviet Embassy to the movement of new Soviet formations across the frontier. Soviet troops, it was affirmed, had continued their advance; some units had taken up positions around Budapest, while new Soviet troops had crossed the frontier on 2 November and had occupied railway lines and railway stations on the way.

29. As the arrangements for the cease-fire merged into negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, more especially from Budapest, so these transitional arrangements moved towards the more decisive step of the abrogation of the Warsaw Pact. References were made by Mr. Nagy to negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in his speeches of 28 and 30 October. On the latter date the Government of the USSR issued the "Statement of the Government of the USSR on the Basic Principles of the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States". In this

statement the Soviet Government declared itself prepared "to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary". The following day Mr. Nagy availed himself of the terms of the Statement to inform the Government of the USSR of the wish of the Hungarian People's Republic to engage in immediate negotiations about the withdrawal of Soviet military units from the whole territory of Hungary and to request the Soviet Government to appoint representatives with a view to starting negotiations as soon as possible, and to fix the date and place of negotiations. The assumption by Mr. Nagy of the post of Foreign Minister was announced by Radio Budapest on 1 November as having been made to "implement the new direction of the foreign policy of the Hungarian People's Government".

30. The new foreign policy was indicated in a message which the President of the Council broadcast at 9.59 p.m. on 1 November. In this message, the Hungarian National Government declared the neutrality of the Hungarian People's Republic.

"People of Hungary: The Hungarian National Government, imbued with profound responsibility towards the Hungarian people and history, and giving expression to the undivided will of the Hungarian millions, declares the neutrality of the Hungarian People's Republic. The Hungarian people, on the basis of independence and equality and in accordance with the spirit of the U.N. Charter, wishes to live in true friendship with its neighbours, the Soviet Union and all the peoples of the world. . . ."

31. This position was reaffirmed in accentuated form on 1 and 2 November. On 1 November it was announced that Mr. Nagy, having drawn the attention of the Soviet Ambassador to the continued entry of Soviet troops and having demanded their immediate withdrawal, had declared to the Ambassador that the Hungarian Government was giving immediate notice of termination of the Warsaw Treaty, and had, at the same time, declared the neutrality of Hungary. It was announced that

the Premier had not only informed all the diplomatic missions accredited to Budapest of the substance of his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, but had also transmitted a communication to this effect to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to placing the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly.^{1/} The same day, the text of a telegram by Mr. Nagy to the President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published:

"The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic wishes to undertake immediate negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the entire territory of Hungary. With reference to the latest declaration of the USSR Government, according to which it is ready to negotiate with the Hungarian Government and with the other member States of the Warsaw Treaty about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the Hungarian Government invites the Soviet Government to designate a delegation, so that talks can begin as soon as possible. At the same time it requests the Soviet Government to designate the place and date for these negotiations."

32. This diplomatic activity culminated in three Notes Verbales to the USSR Embassy on 2 November. According to the summary of Radio Budapest, the Hungarian Government recalled that it had denounced the Warsaw Treaty on 1 November 1956 by reason of the continued movement of Soviet troops within Hungary. The Hungarian Government reiterated that immediate negotiations should begin to implement the renunciation of the Warsaw Treaty, with special reference to the withdrawal, without delay, of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. In a second Note, the Hungarian Government proposed that a mixed committee meet forthwith to deal with the military aspects of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Hungarian representatives of the preparatory mixed committee were nominated. At the same time a communication was addressed to the Security Council requesting it to "instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to start negotiations immediately".^{2/}

^{1/} See A/3251.

^{2/} See S/3726.

33. Negotiations for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops were in fact commenced on 3 November in the Parliament building and continued during the night at Soviet headquarters at Tokol on Csepel Island. In a further cable to the United Nations, Mr. Nagy confirmed his previous communications.^{1/} According to the evidence of General Kirdaly, an agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet forces was signed at 6 p.m. and discussions at Soviet headquarters related to technique and timing; contact was maintained with the Hungarian military delegation until just past midnight, when communication was broken off; the Hungarian military delegation, headed by General Pal Maleter, was then placed under arrest. The reported condemnation to death of General Maleter has been the subject of a communication dated 4 February 1957 to the Committee by the Permanent Representative of Cuba. These are developments into which the Special Committee will need to make further inquiries.

34. At 5 a.m. on 4 November, the Hungarian people were informed, in a broadcast announcement probably from Szolnok, that Mr. Ferenc Munnich, Mr. Antal Apro, Mr. Janos Kadar and Mr. Istvan Kossa, convinced that "within the Nagy Government" they "could do nothing against the counter-revolutionary danger", had broken off relations with the Nagy Government on 1 November and had taken the initiative of forming the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government". An hour later Mr. Kadar announced from the same station the composition of the new government formed under his premiership, and listed a fifteen-point programme of policy. On several points it reflected the demands of the insurgents at the time of the uprising; but under point 14 he stated that his Government had requested the Soviet Army Command to help in "smashing the reactionary forces" and to restore order in the country. Forthwith the United Nations was informed that previous requests by Mr. Nagy had no legal force.^{2/}

^{1/} S/3731.

^{2/} S/3739; A/3311.

35. The same morning, at 5.20 a.m., Mr. Imre Nagy announced over Radio Budapest that at daybreak Soviet troops had launched an attack on the capital "with the obvious intent of overthrowing the legal democratic Hungarian Government". "Our troops are in combat", he continued. "The Government is at its post." Till shortly after 8 p.m. the Budapest radio continued announcements on behalf of Mr. Nagy's Government; then it ceased for a time to function.

36. In statements before the Committee stress has been laid on the contention that no government could legally replace the Government of Mr. Nagy without his definite resignation. The constitutional position on this point is a matter of some uncertainty, and the Committee will need to give further attention to the question. It notes, however, that while the members of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government were, as is noted in the Hungarian Memorandum to the General Assembly of 4 February 1957^{1/}, duly sworn in by Mr. István Dobi, President of the Presidential Council, this act appears not to have been performed until 7 November 1956.

37. With the intervention of Soviet troops on 4 November, Mr. Nagy, together with other personalities and members of their families, obtained political asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. The circumstances of his departure from the Embassy on 22 November 1956 have occasioned a controversy between the Governments concerned. The bus in which Mr. Nagy and his companions left the Yugoslav Embassy, in pursuance of an agreement reached between the Hungarian and Yugoslav Governments, was boarded by a Soviet officer; the official Yugoslav representatives were compelled to get off; and the bus was driven away, escorted by Soviet armoured cars, to an unknown destination. The Yugoslav Government has expressed surprise to the Government of the USSR and has protested to

1/ A/3521.

the Government of Hungary regarding this interference by Soviet authorities with the implementation of an agreement between the Hungarian and Yugoslav Governments.

38. On 4 November large-scale fighting took place throughout the day all over the country. The following outline is based on the evidence of General Király, confirmed or supplemented by broadcasts from both Soviet-controlled and other stations within Hungary. The principal objective of the Soviet forces was the capture of Budapest, and the fiercest fighting occurred in the centre of the city and in the suburbs. By the evening, organized armed resistance by the Hungarian Army had been broken, except for groups which continued fighting in the Bakony Mountains in the centre of the Transdanubian area and in the Vértes Mountains - a connecting mountain chain between the Bakony Mountains and Budapest. It would appear that by nightfall all cities within the country, with the exception of the industrial centre of Dunapentele, had come under the provisional administration of the local Soviet Military Command. Armed resistance of smaller groups of army personnel, of members of the National Guard, and of "freedom fighters" continued in the centre of Budapest until 6 November; and for several more days, possibly until 9 November, in the Eighth District of Budapest; in some of the industrial sectors of Greater Budapest; in the mining area around Pécs; in the Szabolcs-Szatmár area, and in the cities of Győr, Kalocsa, Kecskemét and Mohács. In Dunapentele the organized resistance continued for four days and was overcome only after the use of Soviet tanks with the support of Soviet tactical air force.

39. In the early morning of 5 November, the Command of Soviet forces in Hungary addressed the following appeal to the Hungarian people and to officers and men of the Hungarian army:

(a) the events which occurred in Hungary between 24 October and 4 November did not constitute a counter-revolution; (b) that the insurrection was not at the outset directed against the Soviet Union; and (c) that it was not sponsored from outside. Witnesses are equally unanimous, and other evidence supports the view, that during the insurrection there was, and at the present time there is, no desire on the part of the Hungarian people to return to the pre-war economic and social system. They appear to be agreed that Hungary has made great progress since that time. The character of the revolution itself was described in the following terms by Szabad Nép, the official paper of the Hungarian Workers' Party, in its editorial of 28 October 1956, entitled: "Faithful to the Truth":

"We must realize at last that a great national democratic movement has developed in our country which embraces and welds together our people as a whole, a movement which was forced below the surface by the tyranny of the past years but started to burn with high flame when touched by the first breeze of freedom during the past few months. This movement expressed the workers' claim to become genuine masters of the factories . . ."

"The truth is that among the fighting insurgents there were in the beginning a very large number of honest patriots, including Communists. . ."

"The tragic events cannot blunt our judgment to such an extent as to lose sight of the truth. We cannot regard those university students who come from the working, peasant, and intellectual classes and the young workers who formed the bulk of the insurgents as enemies of our People's Democracy. . . ."

Indeed, it is noteworthy that the permanent representative of Hungary, in his Memorandum of 4 February to the Secretary-General, concludes by stressing the widespread discontent caused by mistakes "hampering both the building of socialism and the development of democratic institutions".

40. The period which has passed since the establishment of the Special Committee has been too short to permit the Committee to collect full information or to weigh the continuing consequences of Soviet intervention on the social and political development of Hungary. On several occasions the Government of Hungary has re-affirmed its intention of negotiating with the USSR regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops as soon as the restoration of internal order is assured. This assurance was given by Mr. Kadar to the representatives of Workers' Councils, which continued to include this demand among their principal objectives.

41. With the suppression of the organized insurrectionary forces by the Soviet troops, the immediate problem facing the Hungarian Government was the resumption of work, which had in large measure come to a halt on 24 October. The Government, in the absence of an organized political party, and confronted with the disintegrated machinery of national and local administration, turned to the Workers' Councils which had come into being during the early days of the uprising.

44. The Government's position was that it sincerely desired to abandon the policies pursued previously by the Rákosi régime, and to delegate to the Workers' Councils a substantial measure of authority in the management of the factories and mines to the point in fact where the workers would be "the owners of the factory through their Councils". On the political issues, the Government's approach was that, with the resumption of order and work, the Government would be broadened, and negotiations would commence with the Soviet authorities for the withdrawal of their troops.

45. The Decree Law on Workers' Councils, promulgated on 21 November, made provisions for a substantial transfer of authority to elected representatives of the workers in mines and factories. But the Decree afforded no recognition of regional representation of Workers' Councils. The national conference of Workers' Councils, called for 21 November, was banned by the Government; the Budapest Workers' Council thereupon proclaimed a forty-eight-hour general strike. The general strike arose not only from the dissatisfaction of the workers' representatives regarding the Decree Law, but also, as was stated by the Workers' Council of the Csepel Iron and Metal Works, from the "groundless arrests which have become manifest in the last few days". In a speech delivered on 26 November, Mr. Kadar referred to the "counter-revolutionary forces . . . which . . . by throwing in the most impossible demands, caused the greatest possible economic damage to the country, so that they may launch as a result of economic difficulties, a renewed attack against our people's democratic régime". All regional Workers' Councils, including the powerful Budapest Workers' Council were proscribed on 9 December.

46. Repression has also taken other forms. Following the demonstrations against the Government in Budapest on 4 December, the distribution of leaflets inciting the people to non-obedience and the armed attack against the police at Salgotarján on 8 December, the Government openly took strong measures for the curbing of further opposition. Summary jurisdiction^{was}/established for a number of overt crimes or attempts or incitements to commit such crimes. By a special decree of 9 December, all factory guards were to declare their weapons to the police; those not complying would be subject to trial under summary jurisdiction, which entailed the death penalty for those proven guilty. Many arrests were officially announced during the months of December and January for hiding weapons or for urging workers to strike. On a number of occasions, the Supreme Public Prosecutor and other spokesmen have declared that the number arrested and sentenced under summary jurisdiction procedure has been small. Minister of State Marosan stated on 18 December, however, that small groups of insurgents were still about in the hilly parts of the country.

47. While the trend for the resumption of work has been evident since 15 December, more especially in the collieries, the Committee is not in a position to ascertain whether this is due to the arrest of strike leaders, to deportations, or to other repressive measures taken by the Government, or because of the pressure of growing unemployment. It is noteworthy, however, that the Government, up to the beginning of January, though pursuing a policy of repression against their declared opponents, concurrently showed signs of a conciliatory attitude towards the more prominent popular demands. The Soviet troops withdrew from Budapest into winter quarters in the provinces. Talks were held with representatives of the Petőfi (Peasants') Party, Smallholders Party, and Social Democratic Party, regarding ways and means for the rehabilitation of the Hungarian economy, and negotiations were reported with regard to the "broadening of the basis" of the

Government, with a view to including representatives from parties other than the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. This trend, however, appears to have been reversed in recent weeks. After the calling of a strike at the Tatanbánya mines on 2 January, the resurgence of guerrilla activities in Pécs and Miskolc, and the new turbulent demonstrations of the workers at Csepel on 11 January, the provisions of the martial law were brought to the attention of all Hungarians. Mr. Béla Kovács, leader of the Smallholders Party, declared on 14 February that he was withdrawing from politics; and from the Declaration of the Hungarian Government of 5 January and from later statements, it would appear that the Government was intent upon the suppression of any opposition views regarding the fundamental tenets of the Communist State. The Declaration affirmed "clearly and without ambiguity" that "there is a proletarian dictatorship in Hungary".

48. The continuing situation calls for consideration by the Special Committee in the light of General Assembly resolution 1005 (ES II) of 9 November 1956 which denoted foreign intervention in Hungary as an intolerable "attempt to deny to the Hungarian people . . . the right to a government freely elected and representing their national aspirations". The Committee accordingly considers as one of the questions falling within its purview of examination the question to what extent the Hungarian Government represents the national aspirations of the Hungarian people. In this connexion, the Committee has noted a statement by Prime Minister Kadar made on 14 November, reported by Budapest Radio on the 15th, according to which the Government "may be thoroughly beaten at the elections". In addition Prime Minister Kadar said, on 26 January before the 10th plenary meeting of the National Council of Free Hungarian Trade Unions, that "when we decided to form our Government, I knew very well, although aware that we were right, that our people would not greet us with flowers but that later they would recognize that we were right to stand up to the counter-revolutionary tide and rescue their proletarian dictatorship in Hungary". Thus the head of the Hungarian Government in two statements made over a period of two months has explicitly recognized that it could not at this stage claim the support of the majority of the Hungarian people.

V. OTHER SPECIAL PROBLEMS

49. The Special Committee also desires to record briefly the situation with regard to certain specific problems covered by the General Assembly resolutions referred to in Section III of this report.

50. By resolution 407 of 21 November 1956, the General Assembly urged the Soviet Union and the Hungarian authorities to take immediate steps to cease the deportation of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those who had been deported from Hungarian territory. The Committee is at the present time seeking further information, including both testimony and documentation, on this subject.

51. Regarding "the grave loss of life and widespread bloodshed among the Hungarian people" caused by Soviet intervention, as was noted by the General Assembly in resolution 1004 (ES II) of 4 November 1956, the Committee notes that estimates of the number of casualties resulting from the fighting in Hungary during the period vary. It may be recalled that the Prime Minister of India, speaking in the Upper House of India on 13 December, observed that, while an accurate estimate was difficult to obtain, according to the information received by his Government, it would appear that 25,000 Hungarians had been killed in the fighting in Hungary. Budapest Radio, however, announced on 15 January 1957 that, according to the Central Office of Statistics, about 3,000 people had been killed in the fighting and about 13,000 persons wounded, of whom 11,500 were wounded in Budapest. A further direct consequence of the fighting and the subsequent unrest, including strikes, has been extensive damage to buildings on a war-time scale, the destruction of food supplies and goods, and the virtual cessation of work in many centres. These factors have contributed in no small degree to the grave economic situation of the Hungarian people.

52. The flow of refugees across the borders to neighbouring countries assumed serious dimensions following the events referred to by the General Assembly in resolution 1006 (ES II) of 9 November 1956. Approximately two per cent of the total population have fled to neighbouring States - over 17,000 to Yugoslavia, and more than 170,000 to Austria, whence some 107,000 have been moved to more distant countries of asylum.

For confidential information only.

Memorandum.

The Swedish Foreign Office has received from Göteborg Radio a message picked up by that radio station. The message was received by the Foreign Office at 12.30 GMT 4 November and was immediately cabled to the Secretary-General. The text of the message, as received in New York around 8.30 AM local time (13.30 GMT), is as follows:

"SOS SOS IS HUNGARY IA RELAYING..... ONE OF THE LAST REMAINING STATIONS CALL TO THE UNITED NATIONS. EARLY THIS MORNING THE SOVIET TROOPS LAUNCHED A GENERAL ATTACK ON HUNGARY. WE ARE REQUESTING YOU TO SEND US IMMEDIATE MILITARY AID - IN THE FORM OF PARACHUTE TROOPS OVER THE TRANDANUBIA PROVINCES - SOS SOS SAV. OUR SOULS".

4 November 1956.