

UNAMIR

G3 UNIT - MILITARY INFORMATION

17 SEPT - 25 NOV 1994

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]
RHWG MAY 2009

UNARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-1002</u>
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01 01

25 NOV 94 00 00 UU UU

UNAMIR PAFF

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

UN TAC HQ BUTARE//OPI OP HOMEWARD//
SECTOR 4A HQ GIKONGORO//SECTOR COMD/CO ZAMBAT//
1 CDHSR KIGALI//CO//

INFO: UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//FC/DCOS OPS//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 012

SUBJ: OP HOMEWARD MEDIA VISIT 24 NOV

1. MEDIA WERE EXTREMELY IMPRESSED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL PERS WHO WERE INVOLVED WITH OP HOMEWARD DURING SUBJECT VISIT. PLSE PASS THIS INFORMATION ON TO YOUR TROOPS AND ONCE MORE THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

2. IT IS MY INTENTION TO ORGANISE SUCH A VISIT ON A WEEKLY BASIS AS THIS TYPE OF MEDIA COVERAGE IS WHAT UNAMIR NEEDS TO GAIN AND SUSTAIN CREDIBILITY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD LIKE TO APPLY THE SAME FORMULA FOR FUTURE TRIPS AS IT MAXIMISED TIME ON THE GROUND WITH THE TROOPS.





S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 11123/2052

② G3 Plans 3

FYI

Gr Wd!


DCOS OPS
25.11
OK op?
26.11

01 01 15 NOV 94 00 00 UUUU

UNAMIR PAFF

FROM UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

TO SECTOR 1 HQ BYUMBA//SECTOR COMMANDER/PAFFO//
SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAMA//MALI COY COMD//
SECTOR 4A HQ GIKONGORO//SECTOR COMMANDER//
SECTOR 4B HQ KIBUYE//SECTOR COMMANDER//
SECTOR 4C HQ CYANGUGU//SECTOR COMMANDER//
SECTOR 5 HQ MARERU//SECTOR COMMANDER/MILOB HQ//
SECTOR 6 HQ KIGALI//SECTOR COMMANDER//

INFO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//FC/DCOS OPS/G-3 OPS/G-3 PLANS/AIR
OPS//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 006

SUBJ: UNAMIR PUBLIC AFFAIRS VISIT/PHOTO SHOOT 13 & 14 NOV 94

1. SUBJECT VISIT WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN ACCUMULATING THE NECESSARY PHOT AND VIDEO SUPPORT REQUIRED TO CONDUCT PAFF ACTIVITY. VISIT WAS CARRIED OUT IN SECTORS 1-3B-4B-5.
2. IT IS REGRETFUL THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE IT TO SECTOR 4C. THE HELICOPTER BROKE DOWN APPROXIMATELY 30 KM SOUTH OF KIGALI AND WE HAD TO FLY BACK TO KIGALI. OUR DEPARTURE WAS THEN DELAYED SEVERAL HOURS. I TRUST YOU RECEIVED OUR SIGNAL FROM SECTOR 4B ADVISING YOU.
2. WE WILL ONCE MORE TRAVEL TO SECTORS IN LATE NOVEMBER TO COMPLETE THE PHOTO SHOOT WITH THE CONTINGENTS NOT YET COVERED.
3. THANK YOU FOR ALL THE ASSISTANCE, COOPERATION AND HOSPITALITY.


S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 11123/2052

5000.1/2 (Picus)

5246-1 (PAFF)

01 01

12 NOV 94 00 00 0000

UNAMIR PAFF

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

TAC HQ BUTARE//OPI OP HOMEWARD//

INFO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//FC/DCOS OPS/G-3 OPS/G-3 PLANS/AIR
OPS//

CCIR HQ KIGALI//CO/OPS O/OC D&S//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 005

SUBJ: PUBLIC INFO CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF OP HOMEWARD AMEND #1

REFS: A. UNHCR INFO MEETING 9 NOV 94

B. MEETING CAPT GRENIER/OPI UN RADIO STATION 10 NOV 94

C. MSG UNAMIR PAFF 001 10 NOV 94(NOTAL)

1. IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE RESOURCES I HAVE ADDED A TV CREW TO THIS TRIP.

2. PARA 3 OF REF TO BE AMENDED TO READ THE FOLLOWING. THE PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR THIS COVERAGE IS AS FOLLOWS: I WOULD DEPART KIGALI WITH ONE MILITARY CAMERAMAN ONE UN RADIO JOURNALIST AND TWO GERMAN TV CREW MEMBERS AT 08H00 TUESDAY 15 NOV. WOULD ARRIVE BUTARE AT 08H30 AND PICK UP OPI OP HOMEWARD AND CONFIRM WHAT CAMP IS BEING MOVED BY CANADIANS. BRIEFING IN BUTARE NOT REQUIRED. FLY TO CAMP AND ARRIVE AT APPROX 09H00. REMAIN ON THE GROUND 90 MINUTES MILITARY CAMERAMAN AND GERMAN TV CREW TO FILM OPERATIONS. UN RADIO JOURNALIST REMAINS WITH CONVOY/DP'S WHILE OPI, CAPT GRENIER AND MIL CAMERAMAN RETURN TO BUTARE AND KIGALI. AT APPROX 16H00, HELICOPTER PICK UP OF UN RADIO JOURNALIST EITHER IN BUTARE OR OTHER LOCATION AS SPECIFIED BY TAC HQ DEPENDING ON SITUATION. GERMAN TV CREW MIGHT REMAIN IN BUTARE AND MEET DRIVER THERE FOR ADDITIONAL COVERAGE.

3. WILL REQUIRE LZ AT CAMP AND TRSP TO AND FROM LZ


S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 11123/2052

5000 1/2 Plans

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDDB0001 3100713-UCCV--UCCVDA UCCVDD UCCVDE UCCVVDG.

ZNR UUUUU

P 060713 NOV 94

FM TACHQ BUTARE

TO UCCVDA//UNIMIR HQ KIGALI//CANCON// COL ARP
UCCVDE//SECTOR 4A HQ GIKONGORO//ZAMBATT/GHANBATT/MILOB HQ//
UCCVDD//SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAMA//MILOB HQ//
INFO UCCVDA//UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS/GS PLANS//
UCCVVDG//SECTOR 4C HQ//ETHIOBATT//
UCCVVD//TACHQ BUTARE//MILOBS//ZEN

BT

UNCLAS OPS 220

SUBJ: OP HOMEWARD MONDAY 7 NOV 94

1. SIT: AT MEETING 052000 NOV 94, UNHCR IDENTIFIED MUKO(3840), CYANIKA(5629) AND KIBEHO(5007) AS CAMPS TO BE ACTIONED ON 7 NOV 94. ZAMBATT IS PROVIDING 6 TRUCKS AND CANSIGS 5 TRUCKS WITH COMD AND CONTROL ELEMENT.

2. MSN: IN COORDINATION WITH IOM, MOVE DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM DESIGNATED CAMPS TO HOME COMMUNES.

3. CONCEPT OF OP:

PAGE 2 UCCVVDDB0001 UNCLAS

A. CANSIGS: MOVE 140 PEOPLE FROM KIBEHO TO BUTARE WHERE THEY WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO IOM VEHICLES FOR MOVE TO KIGALI THEN KIBUNGO ON TUE 8 NOV 94.

B. ZAMBATT:

(1) MOVE 200 PEOPLE FROM MUKO TO GITARAMA WHERE THEY WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO IOM VEHICLES FOR MOVE TO KIGALI THEN NGENDA COMMUNE ON TUE 8 NOV 94; AND

(2) PROVIDE SECURITY SECTION UNDER OPCON OF PACKET COMD/MILOB TO ASSIST WITH LOADING AT MUKO AND CYANIKA SHOULD DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO INTERFER;

C. IOM: IN ADDITION TO TASKS AT 3 A AND B ABOVE, MOVE 780 PEOPLE FROM CYANIKA TO KIGALI THEN TO KIBUNGO ON TUE 8 NOV 94.

D. MILOBS:

(1) 4A TO PROVIDE TEAMS TO MUKO AND CYANIKA FOR COMD AND CONTROL DURING LOADING, MOVEMENT AND PASSAGE THROUGH CHECKPOINTS;

(2) 3A TO ACCOMPANY CANSIGS TO KIBEHO FOR

PAGE 3 UCCVVDDB0001 UNCLAS

ASSISTANCE IN ORGANIZING LOADING, MOVEMENT AND PASSAGE THROUGH CHECKPOINTS.

E. GHANBATT: TO PROVIDE SECURITY SECTION UNDER OPCON PACKET COMD TO ASSIST WITH LOADING AT KIBEHO SHOULD DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO INTERFER

4. ORDERS: TO BE ISSUED AT TAC HQ BUTARE AT 062000 NOV 94. 5. ADM:

(1) ZAMBATT VEHICLES TO REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATION (KARAMA 5631) AND MOVE DIRECTLY TO MUKO FOR ETA 070800 NOV 94.

(2) TRANSPORT VEHICLES TO CARRY JERRY CAN OF POTABLE WATER FOR CONSUMPTION BY DISPLACED PEOPLE DURING MOVE.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

2 GS Plans

PLS monitor action.

D COS OPS
6.11

5000 112/0-11
2A00ZYUW UCCVVD0001 3100713-UUUU--UCCVDA UCCVDD UCCVDE UCCVVG.
ZNR UUUUU

060713 NOV 94

FM TACHQ BUTARE

TO UCCVDA//UNIMIR HQ KIGALI//CANCON//

UCCVDE//SECTOR 4A HQ GIKONGORO//ZAMBATT/GHANBATT/MILOB HQ//

UCCVDD//SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAMA//MILOB HQ//

INFO UCCVDA//UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS/GS PLANS//

UCCVVG//SECTOR 4C HQ//ETHIOBATT//

UCCVDB//TACHQ BUTARE//MILOBS//ZES

BT

UNCLAS OPS 220

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PAGE 3 UCCVVD0001 UNCLAS

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E. GHANBATT: TO PROVIDE SECURITY SECTION UNDER

OPCON OF IOM COMD TO ASSIST WITH LOADING AT KIBEHO

AND SHOULD DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO INTERFER

AT 052000 NOV 94 AT 062000

END

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UNAMIR HQ
G3 PLANS
G3 OPS

9300-1 (R Ops O)

1 CDHSR Rwanda
Amahoro Stadium
Kigali, Rwanda

03 November, 1994

Distribution List

1 CDHSR (RWANDA) OP INSTR 02/94
SP TO OP HOMEWARD 06-09 NOV 94

Reference: A. Telecon Col Arp/Maj Springer 02 Nov 94
B. 9300-1 (R Ops O) 021530B Nov 94 - Wng O - OP HOMEWARD
C. Coord Conf 031000B Nov 94

1. Situation. Contingents are being asked to provide resources to UNAMIR so that OP HOMEWARD, the movement of displaced persons (DPs) to their homes within Rwanda, can continue.

2. Mission. 1 CDHSR (Rwanda) will support OP HOMEWARD for the period 06 to 09 Nov 94.

3. Execution.

a. General Outline. 1 CDHSR (Rwanda) will form a packet of five vehs that will move to BUTARE TACHQ before last light on 06 Nov 94. On 07 to 09 Nov 94 this packet will move under control of TACHQ to pick-up DPs at an assigned DP camp, move them to one or two way-stations and ultimately into Sector 2A.

b. Grouping and Tasks.

(1) Sig Sqn. Conduct resup of own dets for week 06-12 Nov 94.

(2) Sp Sqn

(a) Grouping

i. det to under cmd
Sgt I/C from 061200B
Nov 94. - four vehs
- five dvrs

(b) Tasks

i. be prep to provide repair and recovery sp on req;

- ii. provide hard hats and water for packet outlined at para 4;
- iii. be prep to provide up to six pers to cover the stadium front gate. (Note that this also incl elms under admin sp such as engrs, NCCIS, med pl, clks, etc)
- iv. appoint a senior MSE Op to advise Sgt I/C on all aspects of veh loads, safety, etc.

(3) 3 CSG.

- (a) Provide one CUCV to Sgt I/C and one HLVW/MLVW qual dvr; and
- (b) Provide one set of bows and tarps for the Med Pl MLVW.

(4) D & S Pl

(a) Grouping

- i. provide one Sgt I/C;
- ii. provide one sect (seven) as secur/co-dvr; and
- iii. provide two add MLVW or HLVW qual dvr.

(b) Tasks

- i. Sgt I/C will coord all aspects of the task;

(5) Med Pl. Provide one MLVW, less bows and tarps, to Sgt I/C from 061200B. Also ensure that veh has had bows and tarps from 3 CSG installed prior to hand-over to Sgt I/C.

(6) RHQ. Provide one CUCV with VHF comms to Sgt I/C.

c. Coord Instr

(1) Timings

- (a) No move before 061200B Nov 94;

- (b) Packet to be in loc TACHQ BUTARE by last light 04 Nov 94;
 - (c) Packet to be prep to conduct OP HOMEWARD lift as dir by TACHQ beginning 070800B Nov 94; and
 - (d) Tasking expected to last until afternoon 09 Nov 94.
- (2) Routes. For the move to BUTARE by the main route. All other routes as dir by TACHQ.
 - (3) Speeds. As per the UNAMIR speed limits and other limits imposed for OP HOMEWARD.
 - (4) Lights. On whenever veh is in moving.
 - (5) Wpns. Each pers to bring pers wpn.
 - (6) Kit
 - (a) pers to deploy with sufficient kit to remain overnight for up to three nights (a ruck or valise);
 - (b) civilian clothing is not to be taken; and
 - (c) all pers kit will be stored in the two CUCVs for all periods of movement.

4.

Service Support

- a. POL. To be arranged through TACHQ BUTARE and the stadium as nec. All vehs to have min two extra jerry cans.
- b. Ammo. Pers ammo is to be taken.
- c. Water. Auth to draw five days drinking water (bags) plus add jerry cans for cooking as nec;
- d. Rats. Auth to draw four days IMPs;
- e. Med. On call; and
- f. Repair/Recovery. On call.

5.

Command and Signal

a. Command. The OP HOMEWARD packet remains under comd of CO 1 CDHSR throughout. Sgt I/C will be responsive to OP HOMEWARD coordinators.

b. Contacts

- (1) OP HOMEWARD Coord - Maj Lidstone, TACHQ Butare;
- (2) OP HOMEWARD Tn Coord - 2 I/C BRITCON Tn Coy;
- (3) Sgt I/C - appointed by OC D & S Pl; and
- (4) 2 I/C - senior dvr.

c. Comms.

- (1) C/S - CN4; and
- (2) Sgt I/C will maintain comms with OP HOMEWARD comd net if there is one. If not, remain on Force Comd VHF back-up net.
- (3) All significant incidents will be reported to CO 1 CDHSR through C/S CNO.

for *Maj Lidstone*
M.E. Hanrahan
LCol
CO

Distribution List

Internal

List BA

External

Comd CCIR
UNAMIR HQ G3 Plans/G4/G4 Tn
TACHQ BUTARE for Maj Lidstone
BRITCON CO/ 2I/C Transport Company



File No 5000.1.2 (G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Ops

From: G3 Plans 3

to: G3 Plans
Tac HQ
HAC
BRITCON
Information Consultant

Date: 7 Oct 94

Subject: OP HOMEWARD - COMMENTS

Reference To: HQ Op HOMEWARD report dated 29 Sep 94.

GENERAL

1. You asked for comment on Ref A and Op HOMEWARD.
2. The paper reflects accurately the dynamics of Op HOMEWARD and the difficulties which Tac HQ staff have addressed and largely overcome. As an exercise in military C2 and in giving a clear demonstration to NGOs of UNAMIR's commitment, Op HOMEWARD was highly successful, under the circumstances.

COMMENTS

While the aim quoted was to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of DPs, the overarching point of the operation was to encourage many others to walk home. Despite the obstacles, discussed below, it is now clear that the chances of a strategic effect developing from a low-level tactical aim, is little more than wishful thinking. To generate the type of result desired, high-level direction and the coordination of assets at national-strategic level would be required. While it is accepted that there will never be "Unity of Command", much greater coordination of resources, backed by wholehearted UN commitment, will be needed before any real impact can be anticipated. This is a blunt lesson.

4. Timing. The timing of Op HOMEWARD was dictated by the availability of transport, which generated the offer of support to the UNHCR and the NGOs. In retrospect, the timing could not have been more inappropriate. The operation began the week after the rainy season was expected - that it arrived late merely provided a short period in which some progress could be made. It now seems that few people would wish to move home so close to the start of the rainy season. Crop planting is less effective now; the comfort of the camps contrasts sharply with the (many) uncertainties of returning home - this must be a major consideration before the long rainy season.

5. Other Constraints. Other constraints on the success of the operation as originally envisaged were:

a. Staging. Slow RPA clearance procedures, in most areas, coupled with our own constraints on operating at night meant that staging was required, even for relatively short moves. This effectively caused a one day move on occasions to extend to two days, halving the lift capacity. There are two points of interest:

(1). The RPA are clearly not universally supportive of the operation. Their contribution is at best desultory. This lack of commitment is inconsistent, with the UN effort.

(2). The "Concern" Way Station at Butare is inadequate for the task. Either the capacity should be increased or an alternative opened by another NGO. This constraint (coupled to RPA intransigence) can drive the capacity of the whole operation. If a larger operation is ever to succeed, the highest resource priority must be allocated by NGOs to these "bottlenecks".

b. Commodity Distribution. NGO concerns that inadequate reception arrangements were in place limited the number of personnel that UNHCR was prepared to sponsor. That NGOs must shift their emphasis from the camps to the home communes in order to provide reception arrangements - seeds and tools, food, water and medical supplies, is self evident. Equally, it is clear that they have no intention of doing so - it is much easier to service a centralised camp, than to administer an agrarian commune. Changing the NGO perception of this problem has to become a major UN priority, or the UNHCR will never sanction plans to move large numbers of people, by vehicle or on foot.

c. Efficiency. The total system can only sustain a limited throughput. Limitations on UNHCR registration, convoy capacity, RPA checkpoint procedures, and reception arrangements, within daylight and/or staging limitations will inevitably reduce efficiency. Nevertheless, to accomplish even the limited success so far, has been a major achievement.


6. Cooperation. Op HOMEWARD has demonstrated to the civilian agencies the advantages of flexible military C2. That progress has been made here is of immense significance, and to retain the trust of these organisations, a wider plan needs to be developed as soon as possible. We should use the current rainy season to plan a larger operation between December and March.

7. Information Operations. By far the most important lesson arising out of Op HOMEWARD is the control of information. We must foster a proper understanding of the communication mechanisms at work in Rwanda's Oral Society. The development of an

information strategy is the most pressing need, and the support of UNHCR and UNREO will be critical for success. There is universal agreement on this point within UNAMIR and we must capitalise on what we have learnt thus far.

8. Conclusion. Op HOMEWARD, although of limited success, has been very useful. It has provided evidence to the NGOs of UNAMIR's capability to coordinate complex projects. More important, it has demonstrated several areas in which improvements must be made if subsequent operations are to succeed. In summary these are:

- a. Central strategic direction is required if DP repatriation is to be achieved on a large scale.
- b. We should use the rainy season to plan a major effort in the New Year.
- c. ~~Throughput~~ is dependant on the efficiency of certain bottlenecks, which must be improved.
- d. NGO perceptions on their role in the repatriation plan must be changed. Op HOMEWARD has gone some way to developing a relationship in which this point could be driven home.
- e. Understanding and utilising the characteristics of the Oral Society, through information operations is the key to further progress.



T A P MULLARKEY
Maj
G3 Plans 3

*File
OP HomeWARD*

DCOS OPS

*1. G3 PLANS 3 will investigate
para 4 A*

2. Gen Yam info soon

G3 PLANS

22/10

UALZYUW UCCVWDB0006 2942144-0000-UCCWDA
ZNR 00000
P 212124 OCT 94
FM TAC HQ BUTARE
TO UNIMAR HQ KIGALI//G3 PLANS//
UNCLAS OPS 144
SUBJ:SITREP COVERING PERIOD 202200 TO 212200 OCT 94

1. GEN SIT. QUIEW EXCEPT IN SECTOR 4 IT WAS
REPORTED THAT LOCALS BECOMING MORE APPREHENSIVE OF
THE RPA BECAUSE OF THE FORCEFUL MANNER THAT RPA IS
DRIVING DISPLACED PERSONS OUT OF THE CAMPS.

2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. NTR.

3. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES.

4. OWN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

A. OP HOMEWARD: MOVE OF 591 PEOPLE WAS TO HAVE
OCCURRED FROM 2 CAMPS. ZAMBATT VEHICLES HOWEVER
WERE NOT READY TO DEPART KIGALI ON SCHEDULE. ONE
CONVOY OF 20 VEHICLES EVENTUALLY DEPARTED KIGALI AT
1030 HR FOR KADUHA AND THE OTHER 10 VEHICLES FOR
CYANIKA DEPARTED AT SAME TIME HR BUT HAD TO TURN
BACK DUE TO FUEL SHORTAGE. IT WAS DECIDED TO CANCEL

PAGE 2 UCCVWDB0006 UNCLAS
THE CYANIKA CONVOY AS THE LATE START WOULD HAVE
JEOPARDISED THEIR CHANCE OF CLEARING KIZI BEFORE
THIS CHECKPOINT CLOSED. THE CONVOY AT KADHA LOADED
20 VEHICLES WITH ESTIMATED 800 PEOPLE AND
DELIVER THESE PEOPLE TO KIGALI FOR TRANSPORT TO
NGENDA COMMUNE BY 10M VEHICLES ON 22 OCT 94.
RECOMMEND THIS MATTER BE INVESTIGATED AND REQUEST
INFORMATION BY 221200 OCT ABOUT WHY VEHICLES
WERE NOT READY FOR DUTY AS MANY UNITS/AGENCIES WILL LLOK
TO THIS HQ FOR ANSWERS.

B. 211345 OCT, RPA LO TO THIS HQ ADVISED THAT
10 PEOPLE HAD BEEN KILLED AND THREE WOUNDED AT
RAMBA. MILOB TEAM, WITH A CIVPOL MEMBER WHO
HAPPENED TO BE VISITING TAC HQ AND MEMBERS OF TAC
HQ SENT TO SCENE FOR INVESTIGATION. THE REPORTED
INCIDENT WAS CONFIRMED THAT 2 PERSON SUSTAINED SERIOUS
INJURIES WERE EVACUATED TO AUS MED, THERE HAS BEEN OTHER
ATTACKS IN THE VICINITY RAMBA FOR THE PAST WEEK SEVERAL
PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED

PAGE 3 UCCVWDB0006 UNCLAS
5. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. NTR

6. CIVIL AFFAIRS : NTR

7. MISCELLANEOUS : NTR

BT

ZEV 2356

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDB0001 2881017-UUUU--UCCVVDA
ZNR 5UUU.
P#81017 00T 94
FM UCCVVDB/TACHQ BUTARE
TO UCCVVDA/UNAMIR HQ KIGALI /~~15~~/03 P#81017/
UCCVVDA/MILOBHQ KIGALI

BT
UNCLAS OPS 116

SUBJ: OP HOMEWARD - DESTINATION SITUATION

1. THIS HQ ADVISED THAT GASHORA COMMUNE (Sector 2A) AND SECTOR 2B ARE SECURE FOR RETURN OF DISPLACED PEOPLE. UNHCR THIS LOC BELIEVES HOWEVER THAT PEOPLE CANNOT RETURN DIRECTLY TO THE HOMES, BUT RATHER ARE PLACED INTO TRANSIT CAMPS, POSSIBLY RUN BY THE GOVERNMENT.
2. REQUEST MILOB QUERY AND ADVISE IF PEOPLE CAN BE MOVED DIRECTLY INTO HOMES, OR WILL THEY BE PLACED IN TRANSIT CAMPS IF WE MOVE THEM FROM CAMP N SECTOR 4A.I
3. REQUEST RESPONSE SOONEST AS ANSWER EFFECTS PLANNING FOR OP HOMEWARD MOVEMENTS. REQUEST EARLY COPY RESPONSE IN ADDITION TO ANY VERBAL CONFIRMATION

19/10
THAT PEOPLE CANNOT RETURN DIRECTLY TO THE HOMES, BUT RATHER

Sep 94

3000.15 (Plans)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER TO OPERATION ORDER NO 18 - OP HOMEWARD

References:

- A. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 31 Aug 94. (Op Order No 18).
- B. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 31 Aug 94. (FCs Directive on Transportation of Refugees/Displaced Persons).

SITUATION

1. General. As given in Reference A.
2. Specific. UNAMIR remains committed to assisting in the relocation of refugees and displaced persons throughout the AOR. The occupants of some camps in Sector 4A have demonstrated a clear desire to return home to the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures. UNAMIR currently has considerable transport assets available to support such an operation. Op HOMEWARD coordinates UNAMIR support for a movement plan scheduled to begin before the wet season.

MISSION

3. To assist in the transportation of refugees from Sector 4A to the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures.

EXECUTION

4. General Outline. UNAMIR will provide support as follows:

- a. HAC Coordination for the move.
- b. C2 facilities at Tac HQ.
- c. Movement Control.
- d. Transport resources.
- e. MILOB support.

5. Tasks.

- a. HAC.
 - (1). Coordinate NGO requests for transport.
 - (2). Screen refugees/displaced persons in concert with RPA before loading on vehicles.
 - (3). Establish final destinations of refugees/displaced persons and allocate transport

accordingly.

(4). Liaise with RPA for movement through RPA checkpoints in accordance with Reference B.

(5). Establish route planning information and pass to Movement Control.

b. Tac HQ.

(1). Coordinate UNAMIR resources.

(2). Command Op HOMEWARD.

(3). Provide C2 facilities at Butare.

c. BRITCON.

(1). Provide Movement Control Organisation.

(2). Execute movement plan as directed by Tac HQ.

(3). Coordinate UNAMIR transport resources in support of Op HOMEWARD.

(4). Provide BRITCON transport resources as available.

d. ZAMBATT. Provide transport resources as requested by Movement Control.

e. MILOB Comds Sectors 3, 4A and 4B.

(1). Liaise with RPA commanders as arranged by HAC.

(2). Provide escorts to all convoys.

(3). Clear and supervise checkpoint procedures.

(4). Establish communications links from Convoys to Movement Control at Tac HQ.

(2). Liaise with local Prefectures to establish reception arrangements for refugees/displaced persons.

f. G4. Augment transport resource requirements for Op HOMEWARD.

6. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Coordination Meeting. Action addressees are to send a suitable representative to attend a coordination meeting, chaired by HAC at Tac HQ on **Tue 20 Sep 94, at 1000 hrs.**

b. Timings. Not known at this stage. Op HOMEWARD should commence before the wet season begins.

7. Command and Signal. Op HOMEWARD will be commanded by the COO at Tac HQ. C2 will be effected as follows:

- a. HAC to provide direction and civil liaison function.
- b. CO BRITCON to provide OIC Movement Control, to be co-located with COO at Tac HQ.
- c. MILOB HQ to control RPA liaison and UNMO escort requirements. During Op HOMEWARD, authority is granted to cross Sector boundaries.

G C TOUSIGNANT
Maj Gen
Force Comd

Distribution:

External

Action:

Tac HQ
MILOB HQ
BRITCON
ZAMBATT

Information:

GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFATT
MALAWICOY

Internal:

Action:

HAC
G4

Information:

FC
DFC/COS
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
G3 Plans

MONDAY 17 OCT 94

CAMP: KADUHA

LOCATION: 4732

REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: NATASHA @R MASTI

DESTINATION: GASHORA - 523 NGANDA - 523

MEDICAL SCREENING: *checked*

MARSHALLING/START POINT: *Dist Pt at church*

SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED AT KIGALI

MILOB: CRM 1

AT 0800 HOURS

ROUTE INFORMATION:

LEG 1

AGENCY: BRITCON - 16D Cpl MARTIN VEHICLES: 4T NUMBER: 16

ETD: 0800 HOURS

ROUTE: KADUHA - GITARAMA - KIGALI

CRITICAL POINTS: CHECKPOINT GR 5550

ETT: ^{4.5} 2 HOURS

RPA REP: ?

MILOB: CBM ?

WAY STATION: KIGALI

LEG 2 18 OCT 94

START POINT: KIGALI

ETD: 0800 HOURS

ROUTE: TO BE ISSUED - *Joe Fergus.*

AGENCY: BRITCON

VEHICLES:

ADMINISTRATION:

ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU 0A

MALI MED GITARAMA THRU 0A

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON VEHICLES

COMMUNICATIONS:

HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - 0A

BRITCON - 15

MALAWI - MAO

AGENCY + FIRST NAME

MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

MILOB GIKONGORO - CRO

MILOB BUTARE - CBO

HAC BUTARE - MAMA PAPA 4

SECURITY: NIL.

PATROLS: NIL.

MONDAY 17 OCT 94

CAMP: CYANIKA
LOCATION: 5530
REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: *Paul*
DESTINATION: GASHORA - ~~300~~ PEOPLE *500*
MEDICAL SCREENING: UNHCR *Trocans*
MARSHALLING/START POINT:
SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED AT BUTARE

MILOB: CRM 2

AT 0800 HOURS

ROUTE INFORMATION: LEG 1
AGENCY: IOM VEHICLES: TRUCKS NUMBER: 40
ETD: 0900 HOURS
ROUTE: CYANIKA - GIKONGORO - BUTARE
CRITICAL POINTS: KIZI CHECKPOINT

ETT: 1 HR
RPA REP: CONFIRMED
MILOB: CBM 10

WAY STATION: BUTARE

LEG 2 18 OCT 94
START POINT: BUTARE
ETD: 0800 HOURS
ROUTE: BUTARE - KIGALI - DESTINATION
AGENCY: IOM VEHICLES: TRUCKS

ETT: 6 HOURS

ADMINISTRATION:

ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA
MALI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON VEHICLES

COMMUNICATIONS:

HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA
BRITCON - 15 MILOB GIKONGORO - CRO
MALAWI - MAO MILOB BUTARE - CBO
AGENCY + FIRST NAME HAC BUTARE - MAMA PAPA 4
MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

SECURITY: NIL

PATROLS: NIL

MONDAY 17 OCT 94

CAMP: NDAGO
LOCATION: 5102
REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: ~~MASHI~~ - NA
DESTINATION: NGENDA - 468
MEDICAL SCREENING: TBA ~~COAL~~
MARSHALLING/START POINT: ~~ON CAL~~
SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED IN KIGALI ~~OR BUTARE~~

MILOB: CRM 4

AT 0800 HOURS

ROUTE INFORMATION: LEG 1
AGENCY: BRITCON - 16C ~~CR COAL~~ VEHICLES: 4T NUMBER: 14
ETD: 0900
ROUTE: NDAGO - KIBEHO - BUTARE / KIGALI ETT: 8.5 HOURS
CRITICAL POINTS: KIBEHO CHECKPOINT RPA REP: CONFIRMED
MILOB: CBM 7
WAY STATION: KIGALI ~~OR BUTARE~~
LEG 2 18 OCT
START POINT: KIGALI ~~OR BUTARE~~
ETD: 0800
ROUTE: TO BE ISSUED
AGENCY: BRITCON VEHICLES:

ADMINISTRATION:
ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA
MALI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON TRUCKS

COMMUNICATIONS:
HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA
BRITCON - 15 MILOB GIKONGORO - CR0
MALAWI - MA0 MILOB BUTARE - CB0
AGENCY + FIRST NAME HAC BUTARE - MAMA PAPA 4
MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

SECURITY: NIL

PATROLS: NIL



File No 5000.1.2 (G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Ops

From: G3 Plans 3

if

Tac HQ

HAC

BRITCON

Information Consultant

FILE

Date: 7 Oct 94

Subject: OP HOMEWARD - COMMENTS

Reference: Tac HQ Op HOMEWARD report dated 29 Sep 94.

GENERAL

1. You asked for comment on Ref A and Op HOMEWARD.
2. The paper reflects accurately the dynamics of Op HOMEWARD and the difficulties which Tac HQ staff have addressed and largely overcome. As an exercise in military C2 and in giving a clear demonstration to NGOs of UNAMIR's commitment, Op HOMEWARD was highly successful, under the circumstances.

COMMENTS

m. While the aim quoted was to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of DPs, the overarching point of the operation was to encourage many others to walk home. Despite the obstacles, discussed below, it is now clear that the chances of a strategic effect developing from a low-level tactical aim, is little more than wishful thinking. To generate the type of result desired, high-level direction and the coordination of assets at national-strategic level would be required. While it is accepted that there will never be "Unity of Command", much greater coordination of resources, backed by wholehearted UN commitment, will be needed before any real impact can be anticipated. This is a blunt lesson.

4. Timing. The timing of Op HOMEWARD was dictated by the availability of transport, which generated the offer of support to the UNHCR and the NGOs. In retrospect, the timing could not have been more inappropriate. The operation began the week after the rainy season was expected - that it arrived late merely provided a short period in which some progress could be made. It now seems that few people would wish to move home so close to the start of the rainy season. Crop planting is less effective now; the comfort of the camps contrasts sharply with the (many) uncertainties of returning home - this must be a major consideration before the long rainy season.

5. Other Constraints. Other constraints on the success of the operation as originally envisaged were:

a. Staging. Slow RPA clearance procedures, in most areas, coupled with our own constraints on operating at night meant that staging was required, even for relatively short moves. This effectively caused a one day move on occasions to extend to two days, halving the lift capacity. There are two points of interest:

(1). The RPA are clearly not universally supportive of the operation. Their contribution is at best desultory. This lack of commitment is inconsistent, with the UN effort.

(2). The "Concern" Way Station at Butare is inadequate for the task. Either the capacity should be increased or an alternative opened by another NGO. This constraint (coupled to RPA intransigence) can drive the capacity of the whole operation. If a larger operation is ever to succeed, the highest resource priority must be allocated by NGOs to these "bottlenecks".

b. Commodity Distribution. NGO concerns that inadequate reception arrangements were in place limited the number of personnel that UNHCR was prepared to sponsor. That NGOs must shift their emphasis from the camps to the home communes in order to provide reception arrangements - seeds and tools, food, water and medical supplies, is self evident. Equally, it is clear that they have no intention of doing so - it is much easier to service a centralised camp, than to administer an agrarian commune. Changing the NGO perception of this problem has to become a major UN priority, or the UNHCR will never sanction plans to move large numbers of people, by vehicle or on foot.

c. Efficiency. The total system can only sustain a limited throughput. Limitations on UNHCR registration, convoy capacity, RPA checkpoint procedures, and reception arrangements, within daylight and/or staging limitations will inevitably reduce efficiency. Nevertheless, to accomplish even the limited success so far, has been a major achievement.


6. Cooperation. Op HOMEWARD has demonstrated to the civilian agencies the advantages of flexible military C2. That progress has been made here is of immense significance, and to retain the trust of these organisations, a wider plan needs to be developed as soon as possible. We should use the current rainy season to plan a larger operation between December and March.

7. Information Operations. By far the most important lesson arising out of Op HOMEWARD is the control of information. We must foster a proper understanding of the communication mechanisms at work in Rwanda's Oral Society. The development of an

information strategy is the most pressing need, and the support of UNHCR and UNREO will be critical for success. There is universal agreement on this point within UNAMIR and we must capitalise on what we have learnt thus far.



8. Conclusion. Op HOMEWARD, although of limited success, has been very useful. It has provided evidence to the NGOs of UNAMIR's capability to coordinate complex projects. More important, it has demonstrated several areas in which improvements must be made if subsequent operations are to succeed. In summary these are:

- a. Central strategic direction is required if DP repatriation is to be achieved on a large scale.
- b. We should use the rainy season to plan a major effort in the New Year.
- c. Throughput is dependant on the efficiency of certain bottlenecks, which must be improved.
- d. NGO perceptions on their role in the repatriation plan must be changed. Op HOMEWARD has gone some way to developing a relationship in which this point could be driven home.
- e. Understanding and utilising the characteristics of the Oral Society, through information operations is the key to further progress.



T A P MULLARKEY
Maj
G3 Plans 3

IMPORTANT INFORMATION



YOU HAVE A CHOICE

THE RAIN IS COMING. THE ROAD IS BAD. SOON THE AID AGENCIES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THIS CAMP.

EITHER YOU MUST GO HOME OR YOU MUST GO TO ANOTHER CAMP.

IN YOUR HOME COMMUNE IT IS TIME TO PLANT FOR THE NEXT HARVEST. IF YOU WANT TO GO HOME, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL TRY TO HELP YOU AND GIVE FOOD AND SHELTER FOR THE JOURNEY.

IF YOU DO NOT WANT TO GO HOME, YOU CAN GO TO ANOTHER CAMP.

YOU MUST CHOOSE WHERE TO GO.

YOU HAVE A CHOICE

1390/13

HQ BRITCON TAC HQ. Each has new
AMAHORO STADIUM
KIGALI

G3 PLANS 3
A number of these premises
are consistent with those of
the HQ. Each has new


See Distribution

30 Sep 94

OP HOMEWARD
MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM SECTOR 4

1. The problems associated with the movement of DPs from sector 4 are well documented but there are several points which should be actioned if the plan is to succeed. This letter is written to amplify BRITCON observations which have been passed to this HQ from our med assets within sector 4.
2. At a meeting in GIKONGURU on 29 Sep 94, the NGOs present requested that UNAMIR confirm or deny the rumours of human rights violations by the RPA. Without an authoritative answer, the NGOs working within the DPs camps stated that there were not prepared to assist in OP HOMEWARD. Representatives from ICRC and UNHCR stated that it was not their responsibility to persuade DPs to return home; a point which is closely linked to the subject of reassurance about human rights violations.
3. It is suggested that a joint operation with UNAMIR and the NGOs be established which is coordinated with the RPA to reassure these Dps. It is suggested that:
 - a. UNAMIR should brief the NGOs on the facts concerning human rights violations.
 - b. Satisfied returnees be identified to visit camps and confirm conditions.
 - c. Community leaders be allowed to receive their home communes.
 - d. Initiate a psychological operations campaign to counter the RGF radio broadcasts from ZAIRE and BURUNDI.
 - e. Confirm the government's position regarding the DP problem and attempt to involve the RPA as part of the overall plan. This should include reassuring speeches within the camps and better treatment of the returnees at the registration points. It is also suggested that the RPA policy of burning out the DPs is sending the wrong message.
4. If OP HOMEWARD is to be resumed, then it should be noted that attempts to move DPs on market days or food distribution days will result in a poor response. It is suggested that the

plan ties together the issue of food distribution and the transportation of DPs to their home communes. It is hoped that these points are useful so that OP HOMEWARD can be successfully resumed.



A J DUNCAN
Capt
for COMBRITCON

Distr:

External:

Action:

HQ UNAMIR - HAC
G3 OPS
G3 PLANS

Internal:

Info:

21C
23 PFA

160900Z

UNITED NATIONS
UNAMIR II TRANSPORT TASK REQUEST

From MUGURUET Rank RA5 Appointment: G3 PLANS 3 Unit: HQ UNAMIR

Signature OR Date 1/10

Ser	From	Pick Up Date/Time	Destination	Deliver Date/Time	Number of PAX	Load						Remarks
						General Cargo			Dangerous Cargo			
						Item	Weight (Kg)	Volume (M3)	Item	Weight (Kg)	Volume (M3)	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
1	CYANGUHU GR	020800	KIGALI GR	ASP	500							500 DPs with personal baggage. POC AT CYANGUHU IS POC AT KIGALI IS

Steno

ASP / DOP details RBC tonight
may ch to move via Tac HQ for a
briefing.

Overnight stop : Betwe i likely is 2 day
turn over.

Stene

1. PUP / DOP details RBC tonight
 2. ☒ Convey ch to move via Tac HQ for a briefing.
 3. Overnight stop: Butare is likely to 2 day return m.
- OR

Approved/Not Approved Signature:

Rank:

Appointment:

Note: 1. Transport Requests are to be submitted to SO TPT HQ UNAMIR II
48 hours in advance of the required pick up time

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

01 02 241200B SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

016

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

ZAMBATT

INFO BRITCON

CANCON

UNCLAS 016

SUBJ:ALLOCATION OF ZAMBATT VEHS TO OP HOMEWARD

1. UNHCR SCHEDULING HAS HIGHLIGHTED SHORTFALL IN VEHS AVAILABLE FOR OP HOMEWARD. ZAMBATT HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE FIRST LINE SP PENDING ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT. THESE VEHS WILL AUGMENT 13 VEHS AVAILABLE FROM BRITCON.

2. REQUIREMENT IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:

- A. 18 TROOP CARRYING VEHS.
- B. ONE OFFR, ONE SNCO AND DRIVERS FOR ALL VEHS.
- C. SELF CONTAINED FOR RATS AND WATER FOR 5 DAYS.
- D. ALL VEHS TO HAVE ONE FULL WATER JERRICAN FOR REFUGEE USE

DURING TASK.

E. REPORT TO CAPT MUIR (MOVCON) AT TAC HQ BUTARE BY 251800B SEP 94.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

02

UUUU

016

F. ACCOMMODATION WILL BE ON VEHS.

G. RELEASE EXPECTED 291600B SEP 94.

3. OUTCOME OF OPERATION 26-29 SEP WILL DETERMINE REQUESTS FOR FURTHER TASKINGS.

4. EARLY ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT MAY ENTAIL WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT DURING OP HOMEWARD.

DFC
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT
G3 PLANS

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL A D BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS

UNCLASSIFIED

IMPORTANT INFORMATION



YOU HAVE A CHOICE

THE RAIN IS COMING. THE ROAD IS BAD. SOON THE AID AGENCIES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THIS CAMP.

EITHER YOU MUST GO HOME OR YOU MUST GO TO ANOTHER CAMP.

IN YOUR HOME COMMUNE IT IS TIME TO PLANT FOR THE NEXT HARVEST. IF YOU WANT TO GO HOME, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL TRY TO HELP YOU AND GIVE FOOD AND SHELTER FOR THE JOURNEY.

IF YOU DO NOT WANT TO GO HOME, YOU CAN GO TO ANOTHER CAMP.

YOU MUST CHOOSE WHERE TO GO.

YOU HAVE A CHOICE

Nicholas Harman

Second draft: for discussion only

REVISED

Text for distribution in camps:
only for camps that MUST CLOSE

To be translated into Kinyarwanda
local instructions to be given by loudhailer
through interpreters
with show of UN flag or emblem.

DRAFT TEXT FOLLOWS:

[UN logo]

To the people of the camp at

NAME	NAME
NAME	NAME
NAME	NAME

2 THIS CAMP MUST CLOSE

3 YOU HAVE A CHOICE

4 The rain is coming. The road is bad.

5 Soon the United Nations will not be able to
bring food and water to this camp.

6 EITHER you must go home
OR you must go to another camp

7 In your home commune it is time to plant for the next harvest.
If you want to go home, the United Nations will help you
and give you food and shelter for the journey.

8 If you do not want to go home,
you can go to another camp.

9 You must choose where to go

10 THIS CAMP MUST CLOSE

11 YOU HAVE A CHOICE

11079

INYANDIKO YAKABILI

1 KUBATURAGE BATUYE MUNKAMBI YA :

-
-
-

2 IYI NKAMBI IGOMBA GUFUNGWA.

3 MUHITEMO !!!!! MWIHITIREMO !!!

4 IMVURA IGIYE KUGWA. UMUHANDA UMEZE NABI

5 VUBA AHA UMULYANGO WABIBUMBYE NTUZASHOBORA KUGEZA AMAZI
NIBILIBWA MUL'IYINKAMBI.

6 UBWO RERO MUGOMBA GUTAHA
CYANGWA MUKAJYA MUYINDI NKAMBI.

7 MUMAKOMINI YANYU, UBU NIGIHE CYO GUTERA IMBUTO ZUMUSARURO
WUBUTAHA. NIBA MUSHAKA GUTAHA, UMULYANGO WABIBUMBYE
UZABAFASHA UBAHE IBILIBWA NAMAHEMA YURUGENDO.

8 NIBA MUDASHAKA GUTAHA
MUSHOBORA KUJYA MUYINDI NKAMBI

9 MUGOMBA GUHITAMO AHO KUJYA

10 IYINKAMBI IGOMBA GUFUNGWA

11 MWIHITIREMO!! MUHITEMO!!!

41 22 7398386
22/09/94 18:49 UNHCR GUA - PUBLIC INFORMATION NO. 481 P001/001

URGENT - UHC / MCNAMARA

♦ORTR0661 3 OVR 398

BC-RWANDA (SCHEDULED)

0:BC-RWANDA (SCHEDULED)

U.N. team heading to Zaire for talks on refugees

By Manoh Esipisu

KIGALI, Sept 22 (Reuters) - A joint U.N.-Zaire task force to stem worsening insecurity in Rwandan refugee camps and get hordes of Hutus to return home is about to start work, U.N. officials said on Thursday. **11**

U.N. Military Spokesman Major Jean Guy Plante told reporters that a four-member U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) team would leave for Zaire early on Friday.

In the latest violent incident in the camps, a grenade exploded and killed five Rwandan refugees and injured 20 others in the eastern Zaire town of Bukavu on Tuesday, according to the

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Aid workers suspected that the grenade was thrown by one of the refugees.

Camps around Zaire's border towns of Goma and Bukavu hold an estimated 900,000 Hutu refugees -- many of whom fear returning home for fear of reprisals at the hands of victorious Tutsi guerrillas of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).

The Hutus fled after up to a million Tutsis and opposition Hutus were butchered in the aftermath of former president Juvenal Habyarimana's assassination on April 6.

The joint task force was also to decide what to do with nearly 20,000 ex-Rwandan army soldiers who have threatened to start a fresh guerrilla war to win back power.

Plante reported that although relative calm had returned to the Rwandan capital Kigali, an RPF soldier had been found murdered Tuesday night. The soldier had a single bullet wound to the head.

"His death was mysterious. The circumstances are unknown."

Plante said that Zaire had named seven members to the task force, who would be joined by others from U.N. agencies involved in Rwanda. **11**

He did not say when the task force would submit its report.

U.N. under-secretary-general for peacekeeping Kofi Annan, who ended a brief visit to Rwanda on Wednesday, held talks with top government figures and expressed concern that refugees were not coming home. **?? 11**

Aid workers said he was also concerned about reports of revenge killings of returning Hutus by RPF soldiers.

On Wednesday, the U.N. announced an ambitious plan to be launched on Monday to repatriate refugees from Zairean camps. Hundreds of trucks would move up to 4,000 refugees a day.

"It will be the biggest repatriation effort yet. We do hope that many refugees will be encouraged to return," Plante said.

REUTER

0221346 GMT sep 94

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*P.I. phones are ringing
with questions about the discrep-
ancies & contradictions of U.N.*

41 22 7398386
22/09/94 18:49 UNHCR BUA - PUBLIC INFORMATION NO. 481 P001/001

URGENT - UHC / MCNAMARA

♦@RTR0661 3 OVR 398

BC-RWANDA- (SCHEDULED)

0:BC-RWANDA (SCHEDULED)

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REUTER

*221346 GMT sep 94

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Nicholas Harman

Second draft: for discussion only

REVISED

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only for camps that MUST CLOSE

To be translated into Kinyarwanda
local instructions to be given by loudhailer
through interpreters
with show of UN flag or emblem.

DRAFT TEXT FOLLOWS:
=====

[UN logo]

To the people of ?NAME? Camp

Non 1-6

~~THIS CAMP MUST CLOSE~~

YOU HAVE A CHOICE

The rain is coming. The road is bad.
Soon the United Nations will not be able to supply this camp.

^{but if you}
EITHER you must go home
OR you must go to another camp

^{sent me food and fuel}
^{in the morning}

In your home commune it is time to plant for the next harvest.
If you want to go home, the United Nations will help you
and give you food and shelter for the journey.

If you do not want to go home,
you can go to another camp.

You must choose where to go

~~THIS CAMP MUST CLOSE~~

YOU HAVE A CHOICE


Text agreed with

Mr Uvusa

of UNHCR

- Nicholas

**TO THE PEOPLE OF
GITARAMA & BUTARE
YOUR CHANCE TO GO HOME**



**PEACE AND NORMAL LIFE ARE
RETURNING TO RWANDA.**

**NOW IS THE TIME TO PLANT YOUR
CROPS, FOR THE NEXT HARVEST.**

**THE UN OFFERS YOU PROTECTION IN
YOUR HOME COMMUNE. MEDICAL
SERVICES, SEEDS AND TOOLS WILL BE
AVAILABLE THERE.**

**THE UNITED NATIONS WILL HELP YOU
TO GO HOME.**

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDB0003 2662253-UUUU--UCCVVDA
ZNR UUUUU ZYA
P 232253 SEP 94
FM UNAMIR TAC HQ BUTARE
TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS//
UNCLAS TAC 144
SITREP COVERING PERIOD 231400SEP 94 TO 232200SEP 94

B
43hans
24/9

1. GEN SIT. CALM
2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. NTR.
3. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES.
 - A. RPF. NTR
 - B. RGF. NTR
 - C. MILITIA. NTR
4. OWN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
 - A. THE CONFERENCE ON OP HOMEWARD WAS COMPLETED AT 2130hrs. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT THE MEETING WAS POSITIVE. THE FACT THAT UNAMIR IS HERE TO PROVIDE COORDINATION AND OFF ROAD LIFT CAPABILITY WAS STRESSED. THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED:
 - 1) THE RPA WOULD INCREASE THEIR ABILITY TO PROCESS ALL OF THE RETURNEES THROUGH KIZI IN A TIMELY FASHION AS NOT TO CLOW DOWN THE FLOW OF THE DAY.

PAGE 2 UCCVVDB0003 UNCLAS

- 2) UNHCR SAID THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE THE PEOPLE TO BE READY TO BOARD THE TRUCKS AS SOON AS THEY ARRIVE AT THE CAMPS. IN ADDITION THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO REGISTER THE RETURNEES AS QUICKY AS POSSIBLE. BOTH OF THESE EFFORTS WILL MAINTAIN THE QUICK FLOW REQUIRED FOR THE DAY.
 - 3) IOM SAID THEY WOULD HAVE 16 BUSES AVAILABLE TO MOVE THE RETURNEES TO THEIR DESTINATION COMMUNES.
 - 4) THE FOLLOWING APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF RETURNEES (TO BE CONFIRMED ON THE DAY) WILL MOVE ON 26 SEP 94:
- | ORIGINATING CAMP | CAMP NUMBER | NUMBER OF RETURNEES | DESTINATION |
|------------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------|
| COMMUNE | | 101 | MUGASA |
| | | 92 | NTYAZO |
| GIKONGORO CITY | 4A29 | 410 | MUYIRA |
| | | 150 | RUSHITIRA |
| | | 134 | MARABA |
| KARAMBO | 4A18 | 176 | HUYE |
| | | 254 | MARABA |
| CYANIKA | 4A03 | 250 | NYTAZO |

PAGE 3 UCCVVDB0003 UNCLAS

MUKO	4A19	250	NTONENE
------	------	-----	---------

FINALLY, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THERE WOULD BE A WAY STATION SET UP IN BUTARE TO HOLD PEOPLE FOR AN OVERNIGHT STAY FOR THE INITIAL WEEK OF THIS OP.

B. THIS HQ REQUIRES DETAILS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS INTO SECTOR 2. MANY OF THE RETURNEES WISH TO GO TO SECTOR 2 AND NGOS WISH TO KNOW THE SECURITY AVAILABLE IN THE SECTOR.

5. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. NEW HUMANITARIAN OFFICER NOW IN THIS LOC. HE INTRODUCED HIMSELF TO THE VARIOUS NGOS IN BUTARE. HE ALSO ATTENDED THE WEEKLY GENERAL MEETING FOR NGOS AS WELL AS THE OP HOMEWARD COORDINATION MEETING

6. CIVIL AFFAIRS: NTR
7. LOGISTICS: NTR
8. MISC.

May be incomplete, No ETX indicator received!

01 02 241200B SEP '94 RR RR UUUU

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ CRTP

ZAMBATT

INFO BRITCON

CANCON

UNCLAS 016

SUBJ:ALLOCATION OF ZAMBATT VEHS TO OP HOMEWARD

1. UNHCR SCHEDULING HAS HIGHLIGHTED SHORTFALL IN VEHS AVAILABLE FOR OP HOMEWARD. ZAMBATT HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE FIRST LINE SP PENDING ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT. THESE VEHS WILL AUGMENT 13 VEHS AVAILABLE FROM BRITCON.

2. REQUIREMENT IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:

- A. 18 TROOP CARRYING VEHS.
- B. ONE OFFR, ONE SNCO AND DRIVERS FOR ALL VEHS.
- C. SELF CONTAINED FOR RATS AND WATER FOR 5 DAYS.
- D. ALL VEHS TO HAVE ONE FULL WATER JERRICAN FOR REFUGEE USE

DURING TASK.

E. REPORT TO CAPT MUIR (MOVCON) AT TAC HQ BUTARE BY 251800B SEP 94.

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5000.1 (PLANS)

02

UUUU

016

- F. ACCOMMODATION WILL BE ON VEHS.
- G. RELEASE EXPECTED 291600B SEP 94.
3. OUTCOME OF OPERATION 26-29 SEP WILL DETERMINE REQUESTS FOR FURTHER TASKINGS.
4. EARLY ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT MAY ENTAIL WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT DURING OP HOMEWARD.

DFC
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT

~~G3 PLANS~~

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL A D BRIMLOW
G3 PLANS

UNCLASSIFIED



DCOS OPS

TO: Distribution List
FROM: LCol P. Desnoyers *PD* ①
DATE: 16 September 1994
SUBJECT: REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
RETURN HOME

BACKGROUND

1. Numerous quantities have been mentioned with regard to the amount of refugees/displaced Rwandans within and outside Rwanda. Suffice it to say that the exact number is well above one million persons or the equivalent of more than 25,000 vehicle-load of 40 persons per vehicle. Very little movement is currently observed coming from the refugee/displaced persons camps. The camps are themselves contributing to the instability of the country. Many UNAMIR vehicle resources are now available pending the arrival of the main bodies of contingents and the now routine weekly resupply concept adopted for the Force.

AIM

2. To propose a military option to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of the refugees/displaced Rwandans.

FACTORS

3. The following factors are considered in the assessment of options:
- Will to Return Home. The will to return home depends on the following aspects:
 - Security. Will it be safe for them to return home?
 - Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The humanitarian effort has been very successful so far; over one hundred camps have been established and are being resupplied and supported by various relief agencies. Are the refugees/displaced persons becoming dependant on the relief effort itself? Will the rain season permit the continuation of the uninterrupted provisioning of support/relief?
 - (3) A propaganda campaign to reassure and encourage people to return to their home is essential to the success of this task;

② G3 *PD*

1. PLS review & discuss.
2. Need tasking ① to accomplish.

1/4

16.9

Adt
for OP HomeWAS
raised and dist
G3 PLANS
18/9

? Can
DF/COS req
RPA LAs, prefect reps
to simplify
checks, coord
& destination

- b. Health Conditions. The health conditions in these camps are not ideal and, in some cases, contagious diseases could be spread in non-afflicted areas if the sick are not contained and treated first. A medical screening is required prior to moving any refugees/displaced persons;
- c. RPA Verifications. Currently, verifications are conducted at check points which slows down the movement process because of the offloading and loading of personnel on the vehicles. These verifications should be done with the full participation of the authorities, including the receiving prefects, at the initial loading points (at the camps themselves);
- d. Final Destinations. Because almost 90% of the Rwandan population were rural-based, it must be assumed that most of the refugees/displaced persons should not be returned to cities/villages. Close coordination is required with the selected receiving prefectures to ensure that correct moves are made;
- e. Road Conditions. The conditions of the roads are very difficult, either because of hills or dirt surfaces, which limits the selection of the vehicles that are capable of performing the task of moving people. This situation will worsen shortly with the arrival of the rain season. Movement and use of military-type vehicles should be restricted to those areas not accessible to other types;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. Staging is an important step of the return home of refugees/displaced persons. It ensures that they are provided with the essential ingredients to start up in their home as well as ensuring that they arrive at their final destinations during daylight hours. Close coordination is required with the UNHCR/IOM staging areas;
- g. Mass Population Effect. This factor cannot be underestimated following its effect during the war. The more concentrated the relocation effort for refugees/displaced persons the more chances are that all those in the targeted areas will want to return home;
- h. Location of Camps. Camps are located throughout the country but most are concentrated in sector 4 (for those within Rwanda), estimated at well over half a million persons;
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. These agencies have mainly hard surface resources including 50 passenger buses; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Until the arrival of ZAMBATT and TUNBATT and while BRITCON is available, the following assets are available:
 - (1) 50 x Bedford 4T trucks (British and Brown and Root drivers) - 3 have been allocated to sector 5 for the movement of refugees/displaced persons,
 - (2) 50 x DAF trucks (Zambian drivers),

- (3) 10 x ISUZU/MAN trucks (Brown and Root drivers), and
- (4) a transport company/squadron command and control element (BRITCON).

OPTIONS

4. Considering the factors, all the options considered must have the following criteria:

- a. A propaganda campaign sponsored by the government in cooperation with UNAMIR;
Spokesman
 - b. The presence of prefecture, RPA and medical authorities at loading points;
DFC/COS? FMO
 - c. Staging at a UNHCR/IOM base; and
 - d. Coordination with NGOs bringing relief aid to camp to ensure the transfer of the aid is done concurrently with the transfer of persons.
CHAC
CHAC
- Additional security provided by UNAMIR?*

5. Option A - Split the UNAMIR Vehicle Resources under Sector Control.

This option ensures that all sectors get a proportionate quantity of vehicles in accordance with the number of refugees/displaced persons in their sectors. The coordination is difficult as most refugees/displaced persons will have to cross between sectors. *Lack of com*

6. Option B - Retain Centralized Control in KIGALI. This option ensures the broadest view of the situation but enhances the coordination problem of Option A with the involvement of all sectors (5) and prefectures (12).

7. Option C - Focus on One Area which has a High Concentration of Persons.

This option favours one area over the others but provides the following advantages:

- a. Simplifies coordination;
- b. Accelerates the planned movements; and
- c. Provides the potential generator for mass population movement within that area.

CONCLUSION

8. Though UNAMIR has resources available to assist in the relocation of refugees/displaced persons, its number is relatively small compared to the total requirements. Nevertheless, there is a potential impact that a concentrated effort on a selected area could have on the remainder of the population.

RECOMMENDATION

9. Option C in sector 4 A with the following details:
- a. task each sector (1, 4B and 4C) to provide 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons; *(within sector)*
 - b. provide sector 2 with 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons (sector 5 already has 3 x trucks);
 - c. provide all other available trucks (up to 100) for the movement of refugees/displaced persons from sector 4A - the GIKONGORO Prefecture (350,000 in 28 camps) - to sector 3 - the BUTARE and GITARAMA prefectures;
 - d. locate these transport assets in the BUTARE area to be in proximity to the UNHCR/IOM staging base and one of the prefects involved (30 minutes from GIKONGORO and 60 minutes from GITARAMA);
 - e. task BRITCON with the coordination requirements of all parties involved; and
 - f. locate the command and control element of this task in the current TAC HQ location for ease of communication and liaison.
10. This task should be assigned as soon as possible as the rain season is already starting and the main bodies of new contingents are scheduled to arrive shortly.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

CHAC

Information

FC
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
G3 Plans
G4 Log

*Why before rain, now?
Why not after the rain?
Why not the refugees?
How to do know where the road to go etc?*

** Mtg 1000 hrs
20 Sep 94.
at TAC HQ to coord
* Need coord instr
w/ timings.
* Info Tec HQ*

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5000.1 (PLANS)

01 02 241200B SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

016

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

ZAMBATT

INFO BRITCON

CANCON

UNCLAS 016

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C. SELF CONTAINED FOR RATS AND WATER FOR 5 DAYS.

D. ALL VEHS TO HAVE ONE FULL WATER JERRICAN FOR REFUGEE USE DURING TASK.

E. REPORT TO CAPT MUIR (MOVCON) AT TAC HQ BUTARE BY 251800B SEP 94.

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5000.1 (PLANS)

02

UUUU

016

F. ACCOMMODATION WILL BE ON VEHS.

G. RELEASE EXPECTED 291600B SEP 94.

3. OUTCOME OF OPERATION 26-29 SEP WILL DETERMINE REQUESTS FOR FURTHER TASKINGS.

4. EARLY ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT MAY ENTAIL WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT DURING OP HOMEWARD.

DFC
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT
G3 PLANS

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL A D BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS

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UNCLASSIFIED

5000.15 (PLANS)

01 02 221030Z SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

014

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

BRITCON

CANCON

ETHIOBATT

FRAFBATT

GHANBATT

MALAWICOY

ZAMBATT

INFO AUSMED

UNCLAS 014

SUBJ:VEH ALLOCATION FOR OP HOMEWARD.

REF:3000.15 (PLANS) DATED 18 SEP 84.

1. AVAILABILITY OF TPT TO SUPPORT OP HOMEWARD NOW REQUIRES DETAILED PLANNING. LESS TPT MAY NOW BE AVAILABLE THAN WAS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED. TAC HQ IS TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING ACTION:

A. ESTABLISH VEH TO TASK REQUIREMENT IN CONCERT WITH UN AGENCIES AND NGOS

B. ~~PREPARE~~ SUP, MAINT AND RECOVERY PLANS, REQUESTING ADDITIONAL

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5000.15 (PLANS)

02

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014

SP FROM HQ UNAMIR G4 AS REQUIRED.

C. COORDINATE THOSE ASSETS AVAILABLE.

2. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE FOLLOWING TPT WILL BE AVAILABLE:

A. BRITCON - 13 VEHS.

B. BROWN AND ROOT - 8 VEHS.

C. CANCON - 5 VEHS FROM FIRST LINE.

3. FURTHER FIRST LINE ASSETS MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR LIMITED PERIODS.
ETHIOBATT, GHANBATT, TUNBATT AND FRAFBATT ARE ASKED TO PASS DETAILS
OF FIRST LINE AVAILABILITY TO SUPPORT OP HOMEWARD DURING WEEK 26-29
SEP 94 TO TAC HQ FOR COORDINATION.

DFC/COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT
HAC
G3 PLANS

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL AD BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS

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UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (G3PLANS)

01 02 Z SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

013

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

INFO SECTOR COMDS 3, 4A AND 4B

UNCLAS 013

SUBJ:PTS ARISING FOR OP HOMEWARD MEETING 201000B SEP 94.

REFS: A. 3000.15 (PLANS) DATED 18 SEP.

B. 3000.15 (OPS) DATED 31 AUG - FC DIRECTIVE ON MOVEMENT OF DPS.

1. ANSWERS TO YOUR VARIOUS QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE MEETING TODAY, AS FOLLOWS:

A. OPGON OF SECTOR COMDS. REF A GIVES COMD OF OP HOMEWARD TO COO. THIS IS SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR NEEDS.

B. U-KRTTZ. REALLOCATION HAS BEEN JUSTIFIED ON A PRIORITY BASIS. WILL CARRY OUT FURTHER RESEARCH TOMORROW.

C. MILOB VEHS. DFC HAS INSTRUCTED MILOB HQ TO REALLOCATE MILOB VEHS TO MEET THE MISSION. YOU SHOULD CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE PLANS BY DRAWING RESOURCES FROM SECTOR COMDS AS REQUIRED.

D. MILOB ESCORTING OF CONVOYS. UNDER THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF OP HOMEWARD, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO WAIVE THE RULES REGARDING MILOB ESCORTING OF DP CONVOYS. CONVOYS WITH COMMUNICATIONS MAY MOVE

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

02

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013

WITHOUT MILOB ESCORT BETWEEN CAMPS AND CHECKPOINTS, PROVIDED THERE IS
A MILOB PRESENCE AT BOTH LOCATIONS.

E. PSE SUBMIT HELQUESTS FOR OP HOMEWARD ASAP.

F. BRITCON IS DEALING WITH THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO MOVE
BRITCON CONVOYS OFF ROAD BY NIGHT TO OC 63 SQN.


HAC
G3 AIR

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL AD BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS

UNCLASSIFIED

ATTENTION! ATTENTION!



NOW IS THE TIME TO RETURN AND RECLAIM YOUR HOMES. THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WISHES THAT YOU RETURN TO YOUR HOMES NOW BEFORE THEY ARE CLAIMED BY OTHERS.

TO ASSIST YOU IN YOUR RETURN YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH FOOD, WATER AND MEDICINE ON YOUR JOURNEY HOME. LATER, YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH SEEDS AND FARM TOOLS.

AS YOU RETURN YOU WILL BE ASSISTED AND YOUR SAFETY ENSURED BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS.

1390/13

HQ BRITCON
KIGALI
RWANDA

See Distr

17 Sep 94

FRAGO 2/94 : OP PEGASUS RIDE

MOVE OF DISPLAYED PERSONS FROM CAMP 4A21

Reference:

A. Map Series Z723 sheet 30, 31 and 22 1: 50,000.

ALL TIMINGS : BRAVO

1. SITUATION. Att at Annex A is the list of displaced persons (DP) who registered their intention to move home from Camp 4A21. UNHCR sp and assistance has been gained for this move and registration procedures have been discussed with the RPA.

2. MISSION. BRITCON is to move approx 2000 DPs from Camp 4A21 to their home communes/prefectures.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Ops. BRITCON assets are to lift the DPs over the period 19 - 21 Sep 94. The tpt plan for this is at Annex B.

b. Pkts of 8 - 12 vehs, capable of splitting into 2 sects are to leave KIGALI at 2 hrs intervals on Mon 19 Sep 94. The convoys are to follow a pre reccied/tac signed route to camp 4A21 where they will be loaded with DPs, preregistered by UNHCR. Using the 2 RPA registration points at Gd 550505 and 540248, tpt groups of DPs to their home communes via UNHCR way stns in BUTARE and KIGALI as appropriate.

c. The aim is to have a steady stream of vehs traffic through camp 4A21 and onward to the registration points.

d. CONSTRAINTS. The Op is constrained by the following factors:

- (1). No Jt RPA/UNAMIR OPS.
- (2). No BRITCON PAX are to stay out overnight except in predesignated sites.
- (3). Time taken to load refugees.
- (4). Time taken to transit registration points.
- (5). Weather implications.
- (6). The unexpected/breakdown.

Tasks include:

- (1). Provide C2 for move.
 - (2). Provide Pkt Comds.
 - (3). Coord veh assets consisting of 31 vehs split down to 4 Pkts, and Pkts must have sufficient C2 so that it can be split down further on request.
- f. 23 PFA GP.
- (1). Provide comms at grids 521474, 550505 and 540248.
 - (2). Provide Med facilities at grid 521474.
 - (3). Provide CSS assets as req by ES and Log Ops desks, HQ BRITCON.
 - (4). Estb coord of loading DPs.
 - (5). Estb liaison with UNHCR.
- g. 9 PARA Sqn RE. Provide dvrs as O. Provide engr advice on roads and maint as req.
- h. A Coy 2 PWRR. Provide sy at Camp 4A21 from within 23 PFA GP assets as well as convoy escort from assests in KIGALI. Provide dvrs as O.
- i. Sigs Det. Maint comms throughout Op. Provide each convoy with an FFR/320 manpack.
- j. 10 AB Wksp. Coord FRT Sp and Rec estb at BUTARE.
- k. Log Sp Elms. Estb refuel point at BUTARE. Provide C Sups, for approx 80 PAX. 23 PFA Gp to be self sustaining.
1. COORD INSTR.
- (1). Pkt comds route recces to be complete by 181600B Sep 94.
 - (2). All vehs to be prep by 182000BSEP94.
 - (3). No move off tarmac roads during hours of darkness.

FOR COMB-UBRE to be estb at BUTARI.

b. RATS. All pers to deploy with 3 by 24hrs rat packs.


c. WATER. All pers are to deploy with 3 full water bottles. 23 PFA GP is to liaise with UNHCR to provide water for the DPs and provide addl drinking water at BUTARE.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. OC 63 Sqn is Comd of OP PEGASUS RIDE.

b. Comms to be estb at 190315. Control net is to be the Bn Comd HF net. Comms brief to be produced by Sigs Det.

c. Confirmatory O Gp 182000BSEP94.


A J DUNCAN
Capt
for COMBRITCON

Annexes:

A. Numbers of DP registered for mov.

B. Tpt Plan

Distr:

External:

Info:

JHQ SALISBURY
HQ UNAMIR

Internal:

Action:

OC 63 Sqn
Tpt Ops
23 PFA
9 PARA Sqn RE
A COY 2 PWRR
Sigs Det
10 AB Wksp
NSE Coy
Log Ops

Annex A to
1390/13
dated 7 Sep 94

LIST OF DP REGISTERED TO RETURN HOME
OP PEGASUS RIDE

1. KIGALI PREFECTURE

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>TOWN</u>	<u>NO</u>
ALPHA	KIGALI TOWN	67
BRAVO	NGENDA	802
CHARLIE	KANZENZE	86
DELTA	GASHORA	389
ECHO	BICUMBI	29
FOXTROT	RUBINGO	07

2. GITARAMA PREFECTURE

ALPHA	NTONGWE	215
BRAVO	MUKINGI	04
CHARLIE	TAMBWE	21
DELTA	MASONGO	191
ECHO	KIGOMA	08
FOXTROT	MURAMA	12

3. BUTARE PREFECTURE

ALPHA	MUYIRA	26
BRAVO	NTYAZO	14

4. KIBUNGO PREFECTURE

ALPHA	SAKE	110
BRAVO	RUTONDES	31
	(RWAMAGANA)	
CHARLIE	RUSUMO	01

Annex B to
1390/13
dated 17 Sep 94

PKT ONE

TPT PLAN
OP PEGASUS - RIDE

SER	DEP LOC/DTG	ARR LOC/DTG	REMARKS
1	KIGALI 190330	4A21 190830	COLLECT DPs; 215 NTOGWE 21 TAMBWE 8 KIGOMA 4 MUKING 67 KIGALI
2	4A21 191030	KIZI 191200	REGISTRATION POINT EAST OF GIKONGICRA
3	KIZI 191400	NTOGWE 191700	DROP OFF 215 DPs AT GNTOGWE AND OTHERS EN ROUTE.
4	NOTGWE 191730	KIGALI 192000	DROP OFF DPs AT UNHCR WAY STN
5	KIGALI 200330	4A21 200830	COLLECT 389 GASHOMA 86 KANZENZE
6	4A21 201030	KIZI 201200	
7	KIZI 201400	KIGALI 201800	HOLD DPs AT UNHCR WAY STN
8	KIGALI 210400	GASHOMA 211000	
		KANZENZE 211100	
		KIGALI 211800	

ANNEX B TO
1390/13
DATED 7 SEP 94

PKT TWO

TPT PLAN
OP PEGASUS RIDE

SER	DEP LOC/DTG	ARR LOC/DTG	REMARKS
1	KIGALI 190530	4A21 191030	COLLECT 191 MASANGO 12 MURAMA
2	4A21 191230	GD 550505 191300	RPA REGISTRATION POINT
3	GD 550505 191500	MASANGO 191530	ALSO OFF LOAD MURAMA
4	MASANGO 191600	4A21 191630	COLLECT 215 FOR NGENDA
5	4A21 191730	KIZI 191830	
6	KIZI 192030	BUTARE 192100	ACCN BOOKED AT UNHCR WAY STN
7	BUTARE 200330	XP 200800	GRID 950478 OFF LOAD DPs WHO ARE TO CROSS BRIDGE & MOUNT TRUCKS ON THE OTHER SIDE.
8	XP 200900	4A21 201400	COLLECT 215 FOR NGENDA
9	4A21 201600	KIZI 201800	
10	KITI 202000	BUTARE 202030	ACCN BOOKED AT UNHCR WAY STN
11	BUTARE 210330	XP 210800	
12		KIGALI 211700	

ANNEX B TO
1390/13
DATED 17 SEP 94

PKT THREE

TPT PLAN
OP PEGASUS RIDE

SER	DEP LOC/DTG	ARR LOC/DTG	REMARKS
1	KIGALI 190730	4A21 191230	COLLECT 215 FOR NGENDA
2	4A21 191430	KIZI 191600	
3	KIZI 191800	BUTARE 191600	ACCN BOOKED AT WAY STN
4	BUTARE 200400	XP 200830	GRID 950478 OFF LOAD DPs WHO ARE TO CROSS BRIDGE AND MOUNT TRUCKS ON THE OTHER SIDE
5	XP 200930	4A21 201500	COLLECT 215 FOR NGENDA
6	4A21 201700	KIZI 201900	
7	KIZI 202100	BUTARE 202130	ACCN BOOKED AT UNHCR WAY STN
8	BUTARE 210430	XP 210900	
		KIGALI 211800	

ANNEX B TO
1390/13
DATED 7 SEP 94

SHUTTLE RUN

TPT PLAN
OP PEGASUS RIDE

SER	DEP LOC/DTG	ARR LOC/DTG	REMARKS
1	KIGALI 200330	XP 201030	GRID 950478 COLLECT DPs FROM PACKETS 2 & 3 AND FERRY THEM TO NGENDA
2		KIGALI 201900	
3	KIGALI 21 0330	XP 211030	GRID 950478 COLLECT DPs FROM PACKETS 2 & 3 AND FERRY THEM TO NGENDA
		KIGALI 211900	

NL BURUM LES 492400052=SRVS X 24-SEP-1994 05:13:56 103756

TO: UNREO BASE
FROM: UNREO CHARLIE
DATE: 24-9-94
SUBJ: returnees

The number of returnees and their destination for the transport (HCR and UNAMIR) on Monday 26.09.94:

From Gikongoro city:	to Ntyazo	92	3
	to Mugusa	101	3
	to Muyira	410	1
	to Makaba	134	1
	to Rushtira	150	1
From Cyanica Camp:	to Ntyazo	250	1
Com Karambi Camp:	to Huye	176	1
	to Makaba	254	1
From Muko Camp:	to Ntonene	250	1
	(Gitarama)		
Total Number		1817	1



PCVD 240737/SW