

[ 3 CONFIDENTIAL ]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1062

BOX 144

FILE 5

ACC. 1998/0283

# INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO	<i>[initials]</i>	
DCOO	<i>[initials]</i>	<i>note</i>
Sr Duty	<i>[initials]</i>	
Duty Offr		
Engineer		
Info		
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		
x = Final destination		
/ = No need to see		

*file*

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7020/DMZ/A

3 February 1994

See Distribution

'RUN FOR PEACE' PROJECT  
DMZ SECTOR PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. One of the most vital factors to the success of any peace-keeping operation is the ability to win the hearts and minds of the local population. In this regard UNAMIR is no exception. The success of our missions in the DMZ in particular, would depend on how much we are able to cultivate a spirit of cooperation, and understanding between UNAMIR and the local population, especially during subsequent phases of UNAMIR operations. The 'RUN FOR PEACE' project is therefore an idea directed at the attainment of the above objective.

2. In order to speed up the rapport needed in the execution of our mission, it is necessary to pursue vigorously a programme of activities that would involve selected target groups of the local population. However, the type of activities or role to be played by UNAMIR and the parties that would be involved should be entirely determined by the circumstances prevailing in the areas our troops are located.

AIM

3. The aim is to outline in general terms the DMZ Sector plan for "RUN FOR PEACE" project.

SCOPE

4. The following areas are covered:

- a. Target Groups.
- b. Activities.
- c. Role of NGOs
- d. Logistics.
- e. Submission of Programmes.

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DCOO  
Run  
cov  
7/2

3020.2 (2000)  
12-3

TARGET GROUPS

5. School Children. As much as we would like to engage in activities that would involve all sections of the population, logistics and other factors would not permit this. It would therefore be necessary to focus on selected target groups like school children who are very easy to reach. DMZ Sector activities in this area may include:

a. Procurement and distribution of UNAMIR Souvenirs.

b. Rendering material assistance to schools and needy children.

6. Opinion Leaders. Opinion leaders in the society could be most useful in our bid to explain our mission in the host country. Already our troops are currently working in close cooperation with some important personalities in their areas of operation. It would be necessary to continue to identify more of such persons and interact with them often. Some of such persons include teachers, commune leaders, priests and catechists.

ACTIVITIES

7. Though different villages and towns will have different needs, in general The 'RUN FOR PEACE' project should be considered in terms of the following activities:

a. Sports Meetings involving UNAMIR and identifiable youth groups.

b. Regular meetings with community leaders.

c. Medical assistance to communities.

d. Engineer assistance in rehabilitation and re-construction works.

e. Communal labour to improve on the social and health needs of communities.

f. Invitation of important personalities to UNAMIR ceremonial functions or other recreational activities.

g. Distribution of leaflets to explain the mandate and mission of UNAMIR.

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ROLE OF NGOs

8. NGOs in the DMZ could be fully integrated into certain aspects of this project, especially as some of them have been on the ground for a longer time than UNAMIR and are likely to provide more information to us. DMZ Sector units would therefore be expected to inform NGOs operating in their areas about our programmes and solicit their assistance if possible.

LOGISTICS

9. The induction of UNAMIR into the Rwandan theater has not been without logistic problems and these problems may persist for a little while. Every effort is, however, being made to alleviate the current situation.

10. For the programme to make an impact on the population it would be necessary to make some substantial logistic commitment. A wide range of material assistance and labour may be required. This should however, not deter units from embarking on this most noble project with its inherent benefits to UNAMIR. Therefore, while identifying the activities most appropriate to the surrounding communities, all the necessary logistic support required should also be determined and submitted to the DMZ Sector HQ for appropriate action. Units are advised that their requests should be modest and within the current logistics abilities of UNAMIR.

SUBMISSION OF PROGRAMMES

11. The project can best be planned at the levels most in contact with the local population. All units are therefore required to submit a programme of activities most suited to their areas of responsibility for approval. These programmes would eventually form a part of the force plan for the 'RUN FOR PEACE' project.


12. It is important that the project should take off without any delay as the force has been on ground for about three months. Units' plans are therefore to be submitted to DMZ Sector by 28 February 1994. The plan for BYUBATT is to be submitted not later than 15 days on the arrival of the battalion HQ.

CONCLUSION

13. The RUN FOR PEACE project is an entirely humanitarian exercise aimed not only at endearing UNAMIR to the local population, but also to foster a spirit of cooperation between the population and UNAMIR. Such cooperation should make our work much easier and facilitate the accomplishment of the task set by the UN.

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14. The project is certainly not intended to make UNAMIR more popular than the government of the host country. On the contrary it is to assist the locals in regaining confidence in the working machinery of their government. It is envisaged that the project will be taken seriously to make it successful.

  
CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:  
BANGLADESH ENGR COY  
BYUBATT  
TUNISIA PLS  
MILOB TEAMS

Information:

FC  
COO ✓  
CMPO

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# INCOMING MAIL

Ops Branch	Sign	DTG
COO	<i>[Signature]</i>	
DCOO	<i>[Signature]</i>	13/2-94
Sr Duty	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Duty Offr	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Engineer	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Info	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Trg		
Air Ops		
Signals		
Mov Con		
Liaison		
Other		
x = Final destination / = No need to see		



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①

DMZ Sector HQ  
Byumba

10 Jan 94

TO: Force Comd

From: DMZ Sector Comd

Info: COS

CMO

Rigali Sector Comd

*[Handwritten signature]*

②  
Cos  
well done

*[Handwritten signature]*  
10/1

*[Handwritten signature]*  
11/1 AM

*[Handwritten signature]*  
COO/

Subject: ROAD BLOCK ON RIGALI - GATUNA CORRIDOR

1. Reference your file no 3000.9 (ops) dated 5 Jan '94, a meeting was held with NTUYAHAGA Bernard and Maj Ben GASABWE Edouard who are the RGF Sector HQ S1 and S2/S3 respectively on 6 Jan 94. At this meeting above issue was discussed with them and they promised a feed back on 7 Jan 94.
2. On 7 Jan 94 Lt Col NDEREZI (RGF UNAMIR Liaison Officer for Byumba Sector) and Lt Col RUHORAHIZA came to inform the Sector HQ that with effect from 7 Jan 94, mines would not be laid on the road again.
3. On 08 Jan 94 between 1800 to 2030 hrs, Deputy Sector Comd of DMZ Sector along with RGF Bw Comd of Byumba visited Ngondore KM64 to confirm the presence of mine near the check point. Mine was however not found.
4. This is forwarded for your information please.
5. Best Regards.

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3000.2 (DEOS)



UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 06 JAN 94

①

TO: MGEN BARIL, UNNY	FROM: BGEN DALLAIRE FC, UNAMIR
FAX NUMBER: (212)963-4879	FAX NUMBER: 250-84265
ATTN: MAJ MARTIN	ORIGINATOR: LCOL JAMIL. S. CMPO
FAX NUMBER:	
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON RWANDA	
REF: SRSG UNAMIR CODE CABLE MIR 276 DATED 20 DEC 93	
NUMBER OF PAGES: 01	

AA. IN PARAGRAPH 7 AND 16 OF REF CODE CABLE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE MADE FOR ADDITIONAL 48 MILOBS FOR SOUTHERN RWANDA MILOB SECTOR AND AN ADDITIONAL 11 MAN MILITARY POLICE SECTION OF TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED MP INVESTIGATORS FOR ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.

BB. YOUR DECISIONS ON THE ABOVE ARE STILL AWAITING.

CC. REQUEST FOR AN EARLY ACTION.

DD. REGARDS.

②  
Cos  
Not good enough,  
we have to build the  
case strongly. Plse  
implement ASAP.

*[Signature]*  
b/c  
b/1

Para 7, 1b

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-24

201510Z

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: JONAH, USG, DPA, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
ANNAN, USG, DPKO, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *for* BOOH-BOOH, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Mambis*

DATE: 20 DECEMBER 1993

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

NO OF PAGES: 20 (INCLUDING THIS COVER PAGE) *MIR-276*

*107 1550Z*

was reported in the Secretary Generals Report to the Security Council of 15 December 1993.

#### SITUATION

6. Since the creation of UNAMIR three serious and new situational developments have emerged contrary to the aspirations expressed in Resolution 872, which will require additional assets, if the peace process is to continue on its reasonably successful course in Phases Two and Three.

7. Burundi\Rwanda Border The first situation is the unexpected coup in Burundi and the massive influx of refugees into southern Rwanda. This potentially explosive situation on the southern flank of UNAMIR threatens not only the peace process but the regional stability in the area. Refugees from Burundi have been placed into camps along tribal lines and the potential for retaliatory attacks is ever prevalent. In addition, accusations of foreign meddling and cross-border attacks could lead to serious border incidents and have already heightened tensions significantly. The requirement to monitor the southern flank was never anticipated in the recommendations for force structure as at the time of the Technical Report and the Secretary Generals report it was anticipated that there would be a secure southern flank to the operation in Rwanda. Temporarily, military observers from the MILOB Group HQ and the DMZ have been conducting sporadic patrols in the area, but these are largely ineffective in ensuring stability in the area and furthermore have diluted essential assets from their primary tasks thus putting other areas in danger. The urgent requirement to effectively monitor the Rwanda\Burundi border, the refugee camps, and the movement of humanitarian aid will require an additional military observer sector headquarters of 12 UNMOs in the Butare Prefecture and six observer teams of 6 UNMOs each with radios and vehicles. This will assist in ensuring that security can be maintained during the disengagement and demobilization stage when the gendarmerie will be reduced to a mere 1800 personnel to maintain security throughout the country. They will not have the strength to contain or to focus on this potentially dangerous area. The deployment of additional military observers is an essential requirement if the destabilizing influence of the Burundi situation is to be prevented from endangering the peace process in Rwanda. Should signs of the situation stabilize in Burundi, this requirement will of course be cancelled.

8. Subversive Third Force The second threat that has emerged, which was not anticipated when designing the force structure, is the emergence of a well organized subversive third force in the area. A ruthless and well organized, controlled and equipped terrorist force has emerged which to date has killed approximately 60 civilians in and near the Demilitarized Zone. Their aim is to disrupt or destroy the peace process by committing massacres and attempting to attribute them to one of the parties. At least, one of their



UNAMIR/MINUAR  
KIGALI

PROGRAM OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

MONDAY, 3 JANUARY 1994

Version II

1000	Meeting with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana at the Primature.	Rencontre avec le Premier Ministre, Mme. Agathe Uwilingiyimana à la Primature.
1100	Press Conference at Unamir HQ.	Conférence de Presse au siège de la MINUAR.
1230	Meeting with the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe at CND.	Rencontre avec le Président du Front Patriotique Rwandais, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe au CND.
1830	Meeting with the Ambassadors of Western countries lead by the Papal Nuncio, dean of the diplomatic corps at UNAMIR HQ.	Rencontre avec les Ambassadeurs des pays occidentaux dirigée par le Nonce Apostolique, doyen du corps diplomatique au siège de la MINUAR.

Weapons Secure Area, for the movement of the RPF Battalion to Kigali and for the conduct of security tasks within Kigali which will create a climate necessary for the installation and subsequent operation of the BBTG. The lack of translators\interpreters remains a significant handicap to this Headquarters in being able to employ all the staff effectively as half of its staff are unilingual English speaking Bangladesh officers. This has significantly hampered the work of this Headquarters during this most critical time. To sustain its operations will require the deployment of the personnel and equipment originally forecasted in accordance with paragraph 32, 35 and 40 of the Secretary-Generals Report (S26488). In addition, the national commitment of a 800 man self-contained infantry battalion for this phase could not be obtained, but instead two smaller non-contained battalions were deployed. The critical importance of helicopters and wheeled or tracked armoured personnel carriers for deploying the Force reserve has not as yet been met. To make up for the absence of infantry, the engineers and logisticians have been temporarily re-roled into Infantry so that the security climate can be created for the BBTG. This was also due to the fact that the engineers and logisticians were deployed with no equipment to conduct their specialist tasks.

15 . UNCIVPOL The absence UNCIVPOL personnel during this phase has retarded planning in this area and has led to the requirement to employ military observers on UNCIVPOL tasks. UNCIVPOL personnel are critical for the success of Phase Two and Three and must be deployed as soon as possible.

16. Miscellaneous A 50 man, fully equipped Medical Platoon was determined to be required to support UNAMIR in Phase One. To date only 26 medical personnel, without equipment or sufficient quantities of supplies, have been deployed. In addition the absence of the aviation unit has meant no dedicated air casualty evacuation for seriously wounded or ill UNAMIR personnel is in place. Due to the absence of the aviation elements the necessary night and low visibility surveillance of the Uganda\Rwanda border has not been conducted and the necessary means of lifting the mobile company size force reserve has not been available. The timely arrival of the required Aviation and Medical units is an urgent support priority. In addition, road and driving conditions and more than anticipated incidents require the specialist skills of an additional section (11 military policemen) of trained and experienced military police investigators for accident and incident investigation.

#### LOGISTICS

17. The single greatest on-going concern that has, is, and seemingly that will continue to plague this mission in meeting the exceptionally demanding political and operational milestones imposed in the mandate is the acute lack of logistic and budgetary responsiveness to the most urgent

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