

NAMIR

UNAMIR MANDATE

30 NOV 1995 - 6 MAR 1996

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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OUTGOING FAX NO. 558
MIR NO. 284
MISC NO. _____

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TO: MR. SHAHARYAR KHAN SRSG/UNAMIR C/O. UN SECRETARIAT NEW YORK	FROM: WILFRID DE SOUZA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR UNAMIR KIGALI, RWANDA
ATTN: INFO:	DATE: 01 FEBRUARY 1996
FAX NO: 212-963.6460 ✓	PHONE: 212-963-3093 FAX NO: 212-963-3090
ORIGINATOR:	SECTION: OSRSG
SUBJECT: Minutes of meetings with Rwandan Government Officials	

1. As requested yesterday, please find attached three minutes of our meetings with Mr. Dusaidi on 26 September, 17 October and 20 November 1995 respectively. The minutes of the meeting of 10 January 1996 which I am also attaching for ease of reference have not yet been signed by Mr. Dusaidi.

2. Best regards.

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Please keep on hand

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was not part of the available pool. In addition, SRSG repeated that equipment items required by other peace keeping operations were prioritized to leave Rwanda as requested by New York. He reassured Mr. Dusaidi that every effort was being made to allow for flexibility in this matter. He requested Mr. Dusaidi's cooperation in facilitating the exit of equipment brought in by different UNAMIR contingents.

3. The Government of Rwanda's point of view as reflected by Messrs. Dusaidi, Nkusi and Major Kamanzi was that, in spite of communications addressed to the Secretary General and discussions having taken place for over six months, there was no movement. The inevitable conclusion was that the matter was being deliberately delayed by the United Nations. It was clear that United Nations gave a greater priority to United Nations agencies and NGOs than to the Government of Rwanda. It was also clear that the equipment left behind for the Government's use would be of negligible value and possibly of little use to the Government. Mr. Dusaidi wondered whether it was worthwhile continuing discussions on the issue, specially as UNAMIR would withdraw by March 8.

4. SRSG explained that though the process was slow requiring the approvals of the United Nations Controller, the ACABQ, and ultimately the General Assembly, there was no deliberate delay and that the discussion was worth continuing. The Rwandan Government response to the Trust Fund list of loaned equipment was awaited.

5. Mr. Dusaidi requested that a list of equipment which was not available for transfer be provided to the Government. Sometimes the items indicated in packed containers did not correspond to the actual equipment being transferred out of the country. Mr. Nkusi added that equipment which was being packed and shipped out by UNAMIR sometimes contained sensitive items which had not been declared to the Government. Both Messrs. Dusaidi and Nkusi pointed out that the equipment issue was crucial during the negotiations in New York on UNAMIR's new mandate. Mr. Nkusi further inquired from SRSG whether he had requested the Secretary General that priorities in the disposal of UNAMIR's assets be changed in favour of the Rwandese government.

6. Responding to the points made by the Rwandan side, SRSG stated that he could not provide a list of equipment until such time as it had been approved by New York Headquarters. In any case it would be misleading to provide lists that had not been cleared by New York. He added that UNAMIR's recommendations had been communicated to New York and it was evident from New York that they were being given due consideration. He wished to underline that the Secretariat was sympathetic to the request and was doing all it could within existing regulations to expedite. The process was cumbersome but patience was required in a system that had so many checks and balances.

7. Mr. Nkusi suggested that the present Trust Fund ceiling should not be a major constraint as the Government would be amenable to purchasing items in good standing. SRSG took note of this remark and stated that he would inform Headquarters.

8. Mr. Dusaidi then requested SRSG to convey to New York the Government of Rwanda's impatience on the outcome of this matter as well as its skepticism on any positive results being achieved. The Secretary General may be informed, that the Government was counting on his goodwill to find a solution. He also requested that the Secretary General report on his efforts to the Security Council.

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9. It was agreed that a meeting of the working group would be held on Thursday, 11 January at the Ministry of Defence.

Other Business

Repairs

10. SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi on progress regarding repairs to the Amahoro Stadium where contractors and Habitat were proceeding as scheduled. A total of US\$209,000 had been earmarked for the first phase. The Acting CAO also informed Mr. Dusaidi that repairs to the Infantry School used by AUSMED were proceeding. The Government of Rwanda was the executing partner and so far RWFr. 11.3 million had been disbursed. The total estimated cost was RWFr. 20 million.

11. Continuing, SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that the Housing Sub-Committee had met five times and work was proceeding satisfactorily.

Belgian Village

- * 12. In response to a query raised by Mr. Dusaidi at a previous meeting regarding the Belgian Village contract, SRSG informed that the Force Commander Gen. Dallaire and the Belgian Military had concluded an agreement to enable UNAMIR to repair and use the facilities. It was expected that following UNAMIR's withdrawal, other United Nations programmes such as Human Rights and the International Tribunal would wish to take-on the accommodations.
- * 13. Mr. Dusaidi explained that a previous agreement had been concluded between the Rwandese Ministry of Defence and the Government of Belgium. Unfortunately, the Belgian Government had not consulted the Government of Rwanda and any future use of the Belgian Village would have to receive the Rwandan Government's approval.

Sub-contractors

14. SRSG then indicated that he had received instructions from New York Headquarters on taxation of UNAMIR subcontractors and provided Mr. Dusaidi with a Non-Paper containing the main points, copy attached as Annex B. The United Nations Legal Office was of the opinion that since sub-contractors were performing a function which the United Nations could not perform, and were in Rwanda solely for the purpose of assisting the United Nations, they should be considered as part of UNAMIR and therefore not subject to taxation.

15. Mr. Dusaidi replied that his Government categorically rejected such interpretation. Any company's earnings were taxable as they were utilising the Government's facilities and making a profit while in Rwanda. The United Nations had previously taken a clear-cut position stating that the contractors were independent bodies that were not covered by United Nations privileges. The present United Nations's stand that the contractors were part of the United Nations and not liable to tax was not acceptable. In this regard, the activities of the UNAMIR Subcontractors would be suspended. He further requested that the United Nations position be placed in a formal letter. Mr. Nkusi also referred to a precedent which had been established with Brown and Root with regard to the installation of their satellite system in Rwanda. In that case, the United Nations had agreed that Brown and Root should be taxed. He would provide the SRSG with the relevant documentation.

Local Staff in Prisons

16. The SRSG then referred to United Nations local staff members who were in prison. He wished to inform Mr. Dusaidi that the United Nations offices in Rwanda would be retaining the services of a Defence Lawyer. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Ministry of Justice would be informed.


Communications Equipment

17. Mr. Nkusi then referred to fees that the Government of Rwanda would be charging for the use of frequencies and equipment. He also referred to the problem of outstanding bills left by UNAMIR staff specially telephone bills and bills for utility services. SRSG informed Mr. Nkusi that he would shortly be receiving from the United Nations Resident Coordinator an answer on Rwanda's proposals for charges for the use of frequencies and equipment which he believed would be satisfactory to the Government. On the second point, unpaid bills, he explained that a difference existed between United Nations civilian and military staff. In the former instance it was likely that costs could be recuperated. In the latter instance it would be almost impossible. Mr. Nkusi requested UNAMIR's cooperation in the clearance process, prior to departure, to ascertain whether staff had paid all their outstanding bills. The Acting CAO said he would look into the matter.

18. The SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that he would be away on leave and official business until the end of the month.

Claude Dusaidi

Date: -----



For Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 17 January 1996

HE Mr Pacifique MALONGA
Director of Protocol.

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3. Therefore, notwithstanding the Security Council's statement in S/RES/1029, "request[ing] the Secretary-General to examine,...the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment,...for use in Rwanda;..." it will still be necessary to submit UNAMIR's proposals for asset distribution in the context of a separate report of the Secretary-General. In this regard, please also find attached a copy of the asset disposal plan for ONUMOZ, A/49/649/Add.2 which should be used as a template for the UNAMIR submission. (For your information, the aforementioned documentation was also provided to Mr. Michael Haner during his recent visit to New York, should the quality of this facsimile transmission prove inadequate.)

4. In this connection, we wish to emphasize that the current legislative authority for disposal of assets is as follows (in order of priority):

(a) "All equipment that meets the requirements of other United Nations operations and that it is cost-effective to move shall be redeployed to such operations or held in reserve for use by future operations;

(b) Other equipment shall be transferred to United Nations organizations, as well as to national and international non-governmental organizations already operating in [mission area] or in the process of establishing a presence there, upon request and against appropriate credit to the Special Account for the United Nations [Assistance Mission to Rwanda];

(c) Any remaining material that cannot be moved shall be sold commercially on an "as is, where is" basis in accordance with standard United Nations procedures;

(d) Assets or installations that cannot be dismantled, including airfield installations, shall be [donated] to the Government of [Rwanda];..." upon authorization of the General Assembly. (Source: A/RES/49/235 on the Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique.)

5. Consequently, UNAMIR is not authorized to proceed with any disposition of assets to the Rwandan Government until a submission is made to the Controller and subsequently to the ACABQ. While your arguments and indications are fully supported here at Headquarters, we must mention that in the absence of a mandate from the General Assembly we would not be in a position to support your previous requests to transfer assets to the Government of Rwanda.

6. Accordingly, we would appreciate receiving a draft disposal plan in the format of the ONUMOZ report not later than 15 January 1996. Upon receipt this report will be reviewed, finalized and forwarded to printing for submission to the Advisory Committee in mid-February at which time we would expect a decision to be taken regarding those assets recommended by UNAMIR for outright contribution to the Government of Rwanda. In this same report it will also be necessary to present the liquidation budget for UNAMIR for the six-week period after 08 March 1996, for which we would also request your input by 15 January.

Annex B.

UNAMIR operations are run in Rwanda making use of an integrated structure composed of military assets, civilian assets and assets provided by contractors.

Contractors deliver essential goods and services to UNAMIR, which aims to provide assistance to the recovery and rehabilitation of Rwanda. UNAMIR contractors are in Rwanda for the sole purpose of providing goods and services to UNAMIR and they should therefore be considered by the Government as an integral part of the UNAMIR machinery for implementing the Security Council mandate.

In view of the fact that contractors do not operate permanent establishments in Rwanda and in view of the essential support they are offering to UNAMIR in the discharge of its
• mandate, contractors operating in Rwanda should not be requested to pay corporate taxes.
In fact there is no precedent of such companies working with UN peace-keeping operations paying taxes in host countries anywhere else in the world.

Handled over to Dusaily.

End.

Isel.

12.

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 19 DECEMBER 1995**

On 19 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Mr. Musoni James	Ministry of Youth and Cooperatives
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Brig. Shiva Kumar	Deputy Force Commander
Mr. Bill Clive	Acting Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to SRSG
Mr. Ismael Diallo	Spokesman

1. SRSG opened the meeting by stating that the meetings of the Joint Commission had been valuable in clarifying the Government of Rwanda's position on the mandate. He suggested that the meetings continue over the phase-down period and be held twice a month. He informed Mr. Dusaidi that the scaling down of UNAMIR had already begun with the CIVPOL, Military Police and MILOBS. A more precise schedule would emerge in a few days' time. Taking note of UNAMIR's scaling down, Mr. Dusaidi agreed that meetings of the Joint Commission should be held fortnightly starting from Tuesday, 9 January.

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Reçu le 10 JAN. 1996

2. SRSG then referred to the International Tribunal which was beginning its technical work in Kibuye during the present week. UNAMIR would be providing the security required. He assured Mr. Dusaidi that the Tribunal had been informed that as of 8 March 1996, they would have to provide their own security. The Acting Force Commander indicated that the International Tribunal would be sending out forensic experts to Kibuye from Wednesday, 20 December. He asked for cooperation from the Rwandese authorities to assist and facilitate their work. Mr. Dusaidi replied that he would be informing the appropriate authorities.

3. On the issue of equipment, SRSG stated that following Security Council guidelines UNAMIR and UN HQ were examining possibilities on how to move forward. As a separate issue, he urged Mr. Dusaidi to provide a response on the equipment list to be financed from the Trust Fund. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Rwandan Ambassador was pursuing the matter at the United Nations. Regarding the list provided by UNAMIR he indicated that a reply to the Trust Fund list would be forthcoming shortly.

4. On the question of the SOFA, Mr. Dusaidi informed the SRSG that his colleagues were studying UNAMIR's comments and would revert to the matter as soon as they had completed their review. It was noted that the housing/administration sub-Committee had met and would continue its work in the following week.

5. SRSG then explained that a legal interpretation of UNAMIR Sub-contractors terms was expected from New York. He assured Mr. Dusaidi that delays in the discussions with the Sub-contractors was an internal United Nations technical problem and not an unwillingness to negotiate with the Government of Rwanda.


6. Mr. Nkusi reverted to the problem of UNAMIR staff which were departing the mission area and not paying their telephone bills. The SRSG replied that the Administration was in the process of finalizing a list of staff who were departing.

7. Mr. Nkusi pointed out that the equipment list provided by UNAMIR included equipment which was out of service and which needed repair. Mr. Clive, as Acting CAO, reiterated UNAMIR's position to cooperate with the Government of Rwanda in examining the reservations expressed by Mr. Nkusi at the technical working group level. He added that faulty equipment would not be placed against the Trust Fund. It was agreed that technicians from both sides would attempt to evaluate the depreciation of each item.

8. The Acting Force Commander requested that a centralized system of requests for UNAMIR engineering assistance be put in place by the Government of Rwanda. Since requests were received from different Ministries and sources, UNAMIR could not anticipate the Government's priorities. Mr. Dusaidi agreed with the request and promised to follow-up through the Liaison Officer.


9. Mr. Nkusi informed the SRSG that the Government was adhering to the policy that all organizations operating in Rwanda needed to register their communication equipment and follow the frequency guidelines provided by the Government. In addition, NGOs leaving the country needed to declare their communication equipment prior to departure. SRSG requested Mr. Nkusi to provide him with written instructions which he would share with the Heads of UN Agencies and Programmes as well as with NGOs.

10. It was agreed that the next meeting would be held 9 January 1996.



Claude Dusaidi

Date: 5/1/95



Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 20-12-95

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 12 DECEMBER 1995**

On 12 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaldi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Mr. Felix Bagambiki	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Brig. Shiva Kumar	Deputy Force Commander
Mr. Mr. Wilfrid de Souza ✓	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Mathew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to SRSG
Mr. Ismael Diallo	Spokesman
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Officer

1. SRSG opened the meeting by noting that a final decision on the mandate would most likely be taken during the afternoon [12 December] by the Security Council. UNAMIR had all along been ready to implement the decision of the Security Council of which Rwanda was a member. The Secretary-General's report had clearly stated United Nations's position regarding the mandate. He added that the Sub-Committees on SOFA and Property should begin meeting as early as possible in order to finalize all pending matters prior to the holidays.

2. Mr. Dusaldi agreed that the Sub-Committees should start their work during the current week. Referring to the mandate, Mr. Dusaldi recapitulated that security was the exclusive prerogative of Rwanda and that there would be no compromise on this item. He remarked that even numbers were negotiable, but Rwanda would not compromise on the issue of security. He explained that following the Cairo Conference, and because of the views

Recu le 19 DEC. 1995

expressed by friendly countries, the Government of Rwanda had acquiesced in UNAMIR's presence. He was certain that the problem of refugee return was not related to UNAMIR and the real reason for their not returning was that they were being held hostage by the criminals. He regretted that ten days after the conclusion of the Cairo Conference, Zaire appeared to be resiling from its decision to hand back assets which did not augur well for the implementation process.

3. Mr. Dusaidi added that though he understood that the International Tribunal needed protection, Rwanda was ready to provide it. In fact Rwanda shared the Tribunal's objective of bringing genocide criminals to justice and there was no conflict of interest. The Tribunal had known all along that UNAMIR was phasing out and should have made appropriate arrangements. Rwanda was ready to fill the gap by providing security until the Tribunal made its own arrangements.

4. The SRSG recalled that UNAMIR was ready to phase out at the end of the current mandate but the international community felt that its departure might give negative signals to the refugee population. It was also the feeling of the international community that should there be forced repatriation, as in August this year, UNAMIR had the means to provide support for a massive influx. While noting Mr. Dusaidi's statement regarding security for the Tribunal, he emphasized that the International Tribunal had insisted on being protected by an international force, a principle that had been accepted by the Vice-President during his meeting with Judge Goldstone. SRSG stated that Mr. Dusaidi's views would be communicated to New York.

5. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to international contractors associated with UNAMIR who were not fulfilling their financial obligations, some had even left the country without paying their dues. He had asked the contractors to meet with the Ministry of Finance officials to sort out the problems of financial dues and taxes. SRSG explained that the contractors were under the impression that it was up to UNAMIR to meet their financial obligations vis a vis the Rwandese Government. This matter was being studied by New York. However, meetings of contractors with the Government could proceed as planned so that the issue is negotiated in a spirit of understanding and cooperation.

6. Regarding UNAMIR's equipment, Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he was aware that there was a paragraph in the draft Security Council Resolution mentioning Rwanda's request to the Secretary General. SRSG reminded Mr. Dusaidi to provide at the next meeting, the Government's views on the equipment to be acquired through the Trust Fund.


7. Mr. Nkusi then referred to the increasing number of international staff who are leaving without paying their telephone bills. He asked that a list of staff be provided in order to enable the Government to identify the officials against whom dues might be outstanding. SRSG informed him that he had issued an Administrative Instruction asking for all Staff to clear their outstanding telephone bills prior to departing.

8. Referring to the recent eviction of NGOs by the Government, Mr. Nkusi also indicated that all communication equipment leaving Rwanda would have to obtain a clearance. He also remarked that cooperation with UNAMIR staff had recently deteriorated. SRSB replied that he would look into the matter since cooperation between the Government and UNAMIR had always been positive.



Claude Dusaldi

Date: 18/12/95



Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 16-12-95

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 5 DECEMBER 1995**

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On 5 December 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Mr. Bagambiki Felix
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi
Major Kamarade Kayitare

Office of the Vice-President
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Planning
RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan

Major-General Guy Tousignant
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza ✓
Ms. Susan Mathew
Ms. Isel Rivero
Mr. Ismael Diallo

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General
Force Commander
Executive Director
Chief Administrative Officer
Special Assistant to SRSG
Spokesman

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by summarizing the Observations Chapter of the United Nations Secretary General Report to the Security Council. Specifically he drew the attention of Mr. Dusaidi to paragraphs 45 through 51. He recalled that United Nations Peace Keeping Missions were financed from assessed contributions while developmental activities were financed from voluntary contributions through the UNDP and specialized agencies.

2. SRSG also pointed out that the United Nations would respect the views expressed by Rwanda and the Security Council regarding UNAMIR. He added that the Secretary General, having stated his position in the report would respect any decisions taken by the Council.

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3. Mr. Dusaidi thanked the SRSG for his introduction and views on the report. He added that the Government of Rwanda was open to receive any proposals either from the Secretary General or from the Security Council, including the extension of UNAMIR for an additional three months. His Government had already submitted its position which indicated that the modalities for UNAMIR's presence would have to be negotiated.


4. SRSG indicated that the United Nations was not likely to make any proposal or take any initiative. It was now up to the Security Council to discuss options with the Government of Rwanda. He added that he was ready to transmit any views that the Government of Rwanda wished to make to the Council if so requested. The SRSG added that a decision on whether the services of the CIVPOL trainers were required by the Government of Rwanda would have to be made. Otherwise the CIVPOL would leave after December 8. He added that he hoped the Council would make recommendations on the equipment issue.

5. Mr. Dusaidi took note and informed the meeting that the Security Council was holding Informal Consultations at 10:30 a.m. on 4th December.

6. The SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that Messrs. Ncube and Zorrilla would be the UNAMIR representatives in the discussions on SOFA. He then gave Mr. Dusaidi a letter requesting that equipment be released for shipment outside Rwanda. He added that there were three categories of equipment which should be released: a) equipment which belonged to other countries, b) APC's and c) equipment which was required by other peace keeping missions. He recalled that Mr. Dusaidi had agreed to their release.


7. Mr. Dusaidi gave the SRSG a copy of the Finance Minister's report on UNAMIR's contractors. The SRSG suggested that the Government contact the contractors directly since they were not part of the United Nations. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that the Contractors were not cooperative and the Government would be hesitant in carrying out reprisals that would implicate the United Nations. There were four companies that were included in the Finance Minister's report. The SRSG promised to contact their Management in order that discussions would proceed in a cooperative manner.

8. The SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that the Deputy Prosecutor Judge Rakotomanana had been searched at the airport. The Judge had the same privileges and immunities that other United Nations High Officials enjoy. Mr. Dusaidi confirmed that he would look into the matter to avoid a recurrence.



Claude Dusaidi

Date: 27/12/95



Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 6-12-95

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**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 28 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 28 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Ndazero Lazare	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Mr. Higiyo Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi	Ministry of Planning
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liason Officer

UNAMIR

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza ✓	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Mathew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Mr. Ismael A. Diallo	Spokesman
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	Senior Legal Officer

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by indicating that he expected to continue holding the Tuesday meetings since these were useful in expediting pending matters. He then informed Mr. Dusaidi that the Secretary General's report to the Security Council was expected to be circulated by 1 December. The report was also expected to reflect Rwanda Government's view on UNAMIR's mandate as also the views of the G-10. United Nations was ready to implement whatever decision the Council would take.

2. On the equipment issue, a reply had been received from Headquarters. Firstly, the equipment already on loan to the Government of Rwanda could be adjusted through the Trust Fund. Secondly, the United Nations considered that any equipment which

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was too costly to remove, or which was not required by other peace keeping missions or United Nations agencies, would be made available to Rwanda in accordance with General Assembly Resolutions. He provided Mr. Dusaidi with a list of equipment on loan to the Government which indicated a depreciated value of US\$144,000.

3. Referring to the mandate, Mr. Dusaidi stated that the Government's decision was final and could not change. He also added that the Government of Rwanda was always prepared to consider another United Nations mission appropriate to the needs of the country. Mr. Dusaidi welcomed a partial decision on the equipment. He hoped that the General Assembly would respond favorably to Rwanda's request for equipment. He assured the SRSG of his Government's full cooperation in UNAMIR's withdrawal.

4. Mr. Dusaidi continued by saying that he had communicated to the SRSG the names of the Rwandese team which jointly with UNAMIR would look into the damages caused by rental of premises or use of infrastructure. He also wanted a speedy solution to the problem of UNAMIR's subcontractors by preventing legal actions against it, as it had occurred in Somalia.

5. Mr. Nkusi referred to the list of equipment on loan to the Government of Rwanda and stated that he thanked UNAMIR for placing a large generator on the list. However, items listed on pages 2, 3 and 4 were not separate but part of one set of communication equipment. This equipment was not operational, was antiquated and the Government of Rwanda would rather return it. He had approached UNAMIR unsuccessfully to repair the equipment. In addition, the depreciated value was too high. Mr. Nkusi underlined that the Government of Rwanda had not charged UNAMIR for the use of RwandaTel infrastructure and that these charges should offset the cost of the equipment.

6. The SRSG commented that the Government of Rwanda was not obliged to retain the equipment on the list. He welcomed comments also on non-communication equipment. However, he again clarified that any equipment transaction had to be made according to General Assembly Resolutions.

7. Mr. Nkusi pointed out that many UNAMIR staff were leaving without paying their telephone bills which, so far, amounted to over RFr. 2 million.

8. The SRSG replied that the use of Rwanda's infrastructure was regulated by SOFA. He suggested that a communication expert should be added to the names

proposed for the working group which is to review damages inflicted by UNAMIR on Rwanda's property. The suggestion was accepted. The representatives from UNAMIR would be Messrs. Lombardo, Solbek and Anglin. The SRSB also stated that administrative measures would be taken to prevent outstanding telephone bills to remain unpaid by UNAMIR staff.

9. Ms. Mathew requested the names and copies of telephone bills from UNAMIR staff who had not honoured their commitments.


10. The SRSB then provided Mr. Dusaidi with an Aide Memoire on a pending case related to communication equipment being held at the airport. He also provided Mr. Dusaidi with a non-paper on SOFA and suggested that nominations be made for another working group to study the amendments suggested by the Government. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he would secure the release of equipment being held at the airport.

11. Mr. Nkusi explained that the reason why the equipment had been held up was due to UNAMIR's lack of explanation on its intended use. One set contained satellite hardware to boost Radio UNAMIR's transmission. The second set did not even have documentation. If UNAMIR would have provided a reasonable explanation the equipment would have been released.

12. SRSB thanked Mr. Nkusi and pointed out that the equipment intended for Radio UNAMIR had been requested as a fall back position should its transmissions not reach the camps in neighboring countries. However, since the Government of Rwanda had made transmission facilities available, the equipment had not been required. With the cooperation of the Government, this equipment could now be shipped elsewhere.


13. Before closing, the SRSB requested the assistance of the Rwandese Government in issuing visa extensions to UNAMIR staff beyond December 8.

Mr. Dusaidi stated that he saw no problems in complying with this request.



Claude Dusaidi

29/Nov/95



Shaharyar M. Khan

29. November 1995

**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 20 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 20 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi	Ministry of Planning
Major Mushyo Kamanzi	Ministry of Defence
Major Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer
Mr. Higiyo Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Ndazero Lazare	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Reintegration

UNAMIR

Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Maj. Gen. Guy Tousignant	Force Commander
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza ✓	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Mr. Ismaël A. Diallo	Spokesman
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	Senior Legal Officer
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Affairs Officer

1. The SRSG opened the meeting by offering two clarifications. First, that UNAMIR was ready to discuss the SOMA either in Kigali or in New York. Second, that the issue of equipment was not a matter to be decided at the SRSG level but at Headquarters. The Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary General had been brought to the attention of New York Headquarters. The issue was being given urgent attention and should it be completed before 27th November, Mr. Dusaidi would be immediately informed in order to proceed with consultations.

Reçu le - 4 DEC. 1995

2. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Government was also ready to discuss the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He asked SRSG to give him a paper outlining the general position of the United Nations on the Status of Forces Agreement. Regarding equipment, he had prepared a list (copy attached) enumerating the requirements of the Rwandese Government in order to facilitate UNAMIR's task,

3. The SRSG suggested that the letter to the Secretary General referred to before, should be circulated to member states. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that the Rwandan Permanent Representative to the United Nations had been instructed to circulate it among Security Council members.

4. Mr. Dusaidi then stated that the Rwandese Ambassador had been called by Mr. Riza, DPKO, to protest the impounding of UNAMIR APCs by the Rwandan Government. This was not the case, and there had obviously been a misunderstanding. The SRSG replied that he was surprised at the news. The question of APCs had already been discussed with the Government which had taken note of the fact that the equipment was owned by a particular member state who was not agreeable to the equipment being left behind. Both the Force Commander and the CAO agreed and added that only logistical problems were delaying the transport of the APCs and that there had been no disagreement by the Government. The Force Commander also mentioned that as far as the military were concerned, the only outstanding issue was the demolition of Belgian ammunition. New York had been consulted and a reply was still pending.

5. Referring to the transfer out of Rwanda of UNAMIR equipment, SRSG clarified that he would ensure that equipment under negotiation with the Rwandese Government would not be sent out while a decision on the issue was being taken. However these items that were clearly not part of the pool of equipment that could be left behind for Rwanda e.g for Angola (UNAVEM), would be trans-shipped but only after SRSG had himself signed the document. This procedure required his personal clearance to ensure that nothing was moved out of Rwanda that belonged to the pool of items under negotiation. The recent consignment of spare parts and electrical sundries was destined to UNAVEM (ANGOLA) and fell within the first priority category of equipment transfer.

6. Both the SRSG and Mr. Dusaidi agreed that a committee to review repairs and rehabilitation of facilities occupied by UNAMIR should begin its work as early as possible. In this regard, the CAO provided a summary of repairs and rehabilitation work carried out by UNAMIR, to date.

7. Mr. Dusaidi then explained that the UNAMIR's future mandate had been discussed by Rwandan authorities at the highest level. They had authorized him to convey the Rwandan Government's reactions. Mr. Dusaidi continued explaining that when renewing UNAMIR's mandate on 9th June, it had been made very clear that UNAMIR would phase out after the current mandate. In the interim period, the Rwandan Government saw no serious reason to revise its earlier decision. Accordingly, when the mandate was completed on December 8, UNAMIR should phase out.


8. Mr. Dusaidi also stated that in Rwanda's view if the United Nations still had a role to play in the country, it was in the practical field of providing Rwanda the support to bridge the gap created by last year's events in the form of technology, rehabilitation, doctors, agricultural experts, technicians, etc. As these activities could not be part of UNAMIR, it was best for it to close down after December 8.

9. The SRSG thanked Mr. Dusaidi for a concise clarification and indicated that these views would be conveyed to New York Headquarters.

10. Mr. Dusaidi then stated that he wished to put on record the Government's appreciation for the sacrifices and contributions that UNAMIR personnel had made during their tenure in Rwanda. He said that their efforts, often made in difficult conditions, had contributed significantly to Rwanda's reconstruction.


11. The Force Commander added that he had two points to make. First he was thankful to the Government of Rwanda for the words of appreciation. Soldiers were not always aware of the political aspects of their work, and it would give them enormous satisfaction to receive recognition for job well done. Second, he wished to inform the meeting that the withdrawal of UNAMIR would take from 71 to 97 days.

12. Mr. Dusaidi assured the Force Commander of his Government's full cooperation.



Claude Dusaidi

20 November 1995



Shaharyar M. Khan

23 November 1995

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**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995**

On 14 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Mr. Higiro Thaddée
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare

Office of the Vice-President
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Planning
RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan

Col. Shiva Kumar
Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza
Ms. Susan Mathew
Ms. Isel Rivero
Mr. Mtshana Ncube
Mr. Ismael Diallo
Mr. Mamady Condé

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General
Chief of Staff
Principal Officer, DPKO
Executive Director
Chief Administrative Officer
Special Assistant to SRSG
Senior Legal Officer
Spokesman
Senior Political Affairs Officer

1. The SRSG introduced Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer, Principal Officer, DPKO, on mission to Rwanda. The SRSG then referred to the previous meeting and indicated that, at the request of Mr. Dusaidi, he had prepared a non-paper which summarized the points raised by the G-10 and UN Specialized Agencies regarding UNAMIR's Mandate and which had been subject of discussions at the last meeting.
2. Regarding the list of UNAMIR disposable equipment, the SRSG informed Mr. Dusaidi that UN Headquarters had responded that it would be ready by 27 November.
3. Mr. Dusaidi indicated that he would refer the non-paper to higher authorities and that he would provide the SRSG with his Government's views on the Mandate at the forthcoming meeting.

Reçu le 17 NOV. 1995

4. Mr. Dusaidi regretted that the United Nations was not able to finalize the equipment list earlier. He informed the SRSG that the Rwandese Foreign Minister had written a letter to the Secretary-General requesting the transfer of UNAMIR equipment and material to the Rwandese Government. Mr. Dusaidi then added that Rwanda would not be expected to give its response on the UNAMIR's Mandate while the United Nations was delaying its response on the equipment list. He said the two issues went hand-in-hand.

5. Mr. Dusaidi then reiterated his views concerning UNAMIR protection of UN bodies and agencies in Rwanda which could be provided by private services and/or Rwandese Security Forces. He repeated that it was insulting to Rwanda to suggest that it could not handle the security of foreign representatives. He could not accept the 1,800 as a critical mass as if it were a magic number. The truth was that during the genocide the United Nations had reduced its force to 210. Mr. Dusaidi expressed the views that Rwanda needed the rehabilitation of its infrastructure and that it was necessary to have a clear picture of how it was being done. However, in the short-term, he wished to know how the facilities occupied by UNAMIR would be repaired. He suggested that joint visits be undertaken to these sites in order to arrive at a clearer idea on the magnitude of the work to be done prior to UNAMIR's departure.

6. Regarding the rehabilitation of Rwanda's infrastructure and repair of facilities occupied by UNAMIR, SRSG stated that UNAMIR would repair the damage it had caused, due to its own possession of buildings but could not assume for damage caused by the conflict. UNAMIR had undertaken repairs of damaged bridges, roads and even undertaken some demining activities.

7. The CAO enumerated the numerous initiatives taken by UNAMIR in the repair of general infrastructure of Rwanda such as at the Kanombe International Airport where maintenance costs added up to \$23,000 a month. Repairs to the Amahoro stadium, Gikongoro communal offices, Kigali Hospital, Police and Gendarmerie Training Schools, Military Academy, Butare School for Demobilized Children, Tea factory, Amahoro hotel, in addition to the loans of 12 generators, amounted to approximately over a million dollars. There were many other items which were not quantifiable such as disposal of ammunition and explosives, demining, repairs of bridges, roads and helicopters landing pads, construction of septic tanks and their servicing, and finally providing food for two orphanages.

8. The SRSG then turned to the issue of UNAMIR contractors such as Economat and Brown and Root. He clarified that items imported for the use of UNAMIR by the contractors were privileged and tax-exempt. Privileges and immunities were not otherwise extended to these companies. SRSG suggested that meetings be held with the management of those companies at which UNAMIR could attend as observer in order to ascertain their taxation liability. The CAO added that a final legal opinion had been

requested from the United Nations Legal Counsel on the responsibility of contractors under the SOMA. Mr. Dusaidi replied that the Ministry of Finance had been instructed to examine Rwandese Tax Law and its application to international contractors.

9. Mr. Dusaidi then explained how he visualized UNAMIR's role in Rwanda. He said that the term "assistance mission" was particularly important for Rwanda. Tracing the significance of the term he said that the word was accepted after a careful and deliberate consideration. It referred to the need for United Nations to assist in the implementation of the Arusha process which meant financial support for the rehabilitation of refugees, a united army, demining, etc.. The genocide had led to an even greater need for United Nations to assist Rwanda in repairing the shattered infrastructure and helping Rwanda to recover from last year's crisis. In this regard, the Assistance Mission would have to change its Mandate from a peace-keeping role to a civilian role. Rwanda needed material assistance. UNAMIR could not walk out and leave behind a shattered nation. The United Nations had a moral responsibility to provide the country with the equipment it needs to stand on its feet. A level of flexibility in the application of UN rules had to be exercised. Rwanda required special measures. In fact, the world had a responsibility to rebuild Rwanda having stood still during the genocide. Mr. Dusaidi went on to say that Rwanda was examining the feasibility of legal responsibility.

10. The SRSG thanked Mr. Dusaidi for providing the historical context and his own rationalization for the concept of Assistance Mission. He suggested that these views should be raised in the Security Council.

11. Maj. Kamarade interjected that Rwanda needed technology, experts, heavy machinery to improve production. Rwanda needed to achieve food security in order to be able to receive the refugees. Spoon-feeding did not help as people became used to hand-outs. The need for self-sufficiency needed to be included in the Mandate.

12. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that the future mandate needed to reflect these objectives.

13. SRSG indicated that while he understood Rwanda's reasoning, the United Nations had to be understood as a compartmentalized bureaucracy. Peace-keeping did not encompass economic development which was a role played by UNDP and the specialized agencies.

14. Ms. Elizabeth Lindenmayer then added that she would transmit the comments made by Mr. Dusaidi to her superiors in New York. She explained that at the United Nations everyone shared the same eagerness to assist Rwanda, but that it needed to recall that UNAMIR had never ceased to be a Chapter VI Operation and that it did not have a peace-enforcement Mandate under Chapter VII. Regarding the future, she suggested that the

Rwandese Ambassador should clarify Rwanda's position in the Security Council as there was not much time left till the 8 December. At the moment the United Nations did not have the proper instruments to respond to post conflict needs. The requirements indicated by Mr. Dusaidi belonged to unchartered territory which fell outside traditional peace-keeping and peace-making.


15. In the opinion of Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi, the international community should treat Rwanda as a special case and therefore UNAMIR should convert itself into a civilian mission. The Force Commander remarked that it was clear by the remarks made that a concept for a new mission was emerging which fell outside traditional peace-keeping. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that what was needed was a mission with a radically different concept.

16. Mr. Nsengumuzemyi then enquired about United Nations Financial Regulations and Procedures as related to the United Nations Budget. More particularly, he wished to know the mechanisms used by Trust Funds in purchasing equipment.

17. Ms. Lindenmayer provided an extensive reply which included explaining the differences between United Nations Regular Budget and voluntary contributions, the creation of Trust Funds for particular projects and peace-keeping, assessed contributions.


18. Mr. Dusaidi closed the meeting by stating that Rwanda was responsible for rebuilding itself. The Government wanted to be assisted in the priorities it had identified. Sometimes, donor countries and NGOs acted on their own priorities even without consulting the Government.

19. It was decided that the next meeting would be held on **Monday, 20 November** instead of Tuesday, 21 November.



Mr. Claude Dusaidi

Date: 17/11/95



Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 17/11/95

cc : Ms. Raju

JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 7 NOVEMBER 1995

In attendance:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Higiyo Thaddee	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary General
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director ✓
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to SRSG
Col. W. J. Fletcher	Chief of Operations
Mr. Mtshana Nkuba	Senior Legal Officer
Mr. Mamady Conde	Senior Political Affairs Officer

1. The SRSG recalled that, at the last meeting, the Government of Rwanda's position was that after the conclusion of the current mandate, UNAMIR would phase-out and that any changes in this understanding should be proposed by the United Nations and the International Community with convincing rationalisation. In the meantime, the SRSG said, a meeting had been held on Thursday, 2 November in New York attended by the G-10, "interested" countries (i.e. donor and troop contributing countries) to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate at which a consensus had emerged. The SRSG added that in conveying this consensus view, he wished to underline that he was not expressing the opinion of the United Nations on the subject but of the G-10 group of countries. The SRSG added that United Nations Agency Representatives, also meeting in New York, had expressed similar views as adopted by the G-10.
2. The consensus view was that, in the next mandate, UNAMIR's present status quo should be maintained. There should be no reduction in formed troops, milobs, civpol and the civilian support staff. The G-10 group of countries agreed that 1,800 represented a minimum "critical mass" of formed troops.
3. Citing the reasons for the consensus position, the SRSG stated that the predominant factor related to the safe and secure return of 1.5 million refugees. The next few months were seen as critical in persuading the refugees to return home voluntarily because of the ultimatum given by Zaire

Reçu le 16 NOV. 1995

and Tanzania. During this critical period, it was felt that UNAMIR could play a positive role in practical terms as well as in helping to provide stability and confidence building measures that would encourage voluntary return. The SRSG gave examples such as the effective and successful cooperation between UNAMIR and the Government during the forced repatriation of 15,000 Rwandese refugees in August 1995 which had been processed smoothly and efficiently. He also referred to the re-settlement of nearly 1 million IDPS between September 1994 and April 1995 again through effective cooperation between the United Nations and the Government.

4. The SRSG further stated that all neighboring countries and UNHCR were currently engaged in a supreme effort to persuade the refugees to return hom voluntarily. For UNAMIR to walk away at such critical phase would send negative signals to the camps and even to the host countries who could use the withdrawal as an excuse to revert to forced return. The SRSG added that there was no guarantee of success for the return of refugees but it was necessary for all parties concerned to do their utmost to achieve lift-off for voluntary repatriation. In the event of forced repatriation which could lead to a massive influx of refugees, UNAMIR could play a positive role in resettling the returning refugees.

5. Protection of the International Tribunal personnel, the SRSG indicated, was an ancillary responsibility that UNAMIR had undertaken as part of its mandate; however, protection of the Tribunal could not serve as the *raison d'être* for a UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda.

6. As regards the issue of UNAMIR continuing its mandate with a reduced number of formed troops, the SRSG explained that by reducing the number from the current strength of 1,800 would mean that UNAMIR would not be able to perform the essential task of building confidence and stability for returning refugees in the prefectures. UNAMIR would be obliged to withdraw to Kigali and appear essentially to protect itself which was not the role or image that UNAMIR wanted to project. Moreover, a figure below 1,800 would mean that the military contingent would cease to be an operational unit and the practical advantages of having engineering, logistic and communication units would be severely undermined. Accordingly, 1,800 formed troops was seen as the minimum critical mass for the military contingent.

7. The SRSG underlined that should the Government of Rwanda agree to the extension of UNAMIR, the mandate would need to be revised so that UNAMIR military contingent was given relevant and meaningful tasks to perform.

8. The SRSG concluded by saying that the SOMA needed to be finalised because the amendments suggested by the Government of Rwanda indicated a reluctance to allow UNAMIR to continue after 8th December.

9. Mr. Dusaidi responded by stating that he had taken note of the points made by the SRSG and would transmit them to higher authorities. He would then convey their reaction as his Government's considered views on the issue.

10. Making a personal comment based on knowledge of his Government's existing policy, Mr. Dusaidi expressed scepticism about the refugees returning in 6 months. He was not optimistic about their return in 6 months because the issue was complex with many parties and countries pulling in contradictory directions. He did not visualize a return of refugees for one or two years. Rwanda was participating in Tripartite Agreements to ensure the safe and secure conditions for refugee return. President Mobutu's recent statement had also influenced the issue and Rwanda was prepared to cooperate with Zaire, Tanzania, UNHCR and all United Nations agencies to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees. Mr. Dusaidi was of the opinion that UNAMIR's presence should not be related to the refugee situation and should not serve as a basis for its continuation.

11. The SRSB interjected to clarify that the consensus view was not that UNAMIR should continue indefinitely until the return of the last refugee. On the contrary, their recommendation was related to the immediate future in the context of regional states, UNHCR and the international community making a supreme effort for a voluntary return of refugees to gather momentum. There was no guarantee of success but all those who supported this objective needed to maximise their efforts within the short time-frame of about 6 months. UNAMIR's role was seen in this limited time-frame.

12. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to the issue of security and protection which he felt was the exclusive responsibility of a sovereign state. Rwanda was now capable of providing security and protection to United Nations agencies, diplomats, etc., including the Tribunal. Therefore, the insistence on UNAMIR providing protection to the Tribunal could even be seen as a slight against the Government's capability to provide security and protection. He added that Rwanda, the Tribunal and Human Rights Agencies share the same responsibility of investigating genocide and therefore it was in the Government's interest to provide security for these agencies.

13. The SRSB stated that UNAMIR was providing security to the Tribunal as part of its mandate. However, this was an ancillary role for UNAMIR as part of its overall mandate and the security of the Tribunal or of any other United Nations Agencies could not be the sole justification for its presence in Rwanda. It was understood that the Government of Rwanda was responsible for providing security to all diplomatic and United Nations missions. However, the Tribunal's insistence on United Nations or Third Party security related to the need for transparency and justice appearing to be done. It was not a reflection on the Government of Rwanda's capability to provide security. Judge Goldstone would elaborate on these principles himself on his next visit the 23 of November.

14. Mr. Dusaidi then referred to the finalisation of the SOMA and indicated that he was waiting to receive his Ambassador's comments from New York.


15. Under other business, Mr. Dusaidi raised the following issues:

- (a) UNAMIR assets and list of disposable equipment;
- (b) Payment for repairs to installations used by UNAMIR;
- (c) Rwanda's request for unclassified material to be left behind by UNAMIR (e.g. maps, data bases, etc.);
- (d) The status of contracting companies and their financial obligations such as Brown and Root and Economat;
- (e) Information on UNAMIR local employees.

16. The SRSG replied that he would ask Ms. Matthew, the CAO, to respond to these enquiries in detail at the next meeting.

17. In conclusion Mr. Dusaidi asked the SRSG if he would give the points stated on the mandate in writing. The SRSG said that he would do so in a non-paper.

18. The SRSG also informed Mr. Dusaidi that the International Commission of Inquiry into Arms Flow would be arriving in Kigali on Wednesday, 8th November. He also reminded Mr. Dusaidi that no news had so far been received regarding the case of Mr. Mugabo Manase.



Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Date: 13-11-95



Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 13-11-95



**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 1 NOVEMBER 1995**

1. On 1 November 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss UNAMIR's future mandate and other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Higiyo Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Ministry of Transport and Communications
Mr. Mushyo Kamanzi	Ministry of Defence
Lt. Karenzi Karake	Ministry of Defence
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Col. David Kattah	Deputy Chief of Staff - Operations
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Affairs Officer
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Ms. Ladan M. Rafii	Political/Legal Officer

2. The SRSG began the meeting by reviewing issues related to UNAMIR's mandate. He stated that when the current mandate expires on 8 December 1995, UNAMIR was prepared to phase out completely unless indications were received to the contrary, and that UNAMIR was not in Rwanda to perpetrate its presence within the country. He added that in the absence of any agreement, UNAMIR was ready to withdraw and, in fact, the latest indications from New York were that it should be prepared to withdraw after the termination of its current mandate. In the mean time, he stated that it was up to the Security Council and the Government of Rwanda to define the terms of UNAMIR's future mandate. The SRSG emphasized that although UNAMIR was, in conjunction with the Rwandese Government, providing security to United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda, this should be regarded as only an incidental task and not UNAMIR's main role. He stated that he could not envisage the Security Council or the United Nations agreeing to maintain a force in Rwanda solely for the purposes of protecting United Nations staff and installations.

3. With regard to the assistance part of the mission, the SRSG mentioned that what the the Rwandese Government was seeking from UNAMIR was understandable, but he explained that UNAMIR was essentially conceived of as a peace-keeping operation. The assistance portion of UNAMIR's mandate would normally be undertaken by other United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda whose functions were purely civilian in nature.


He stated that he would appreciate an indication from the Government of its envisaged role for UNAMIR beyond 8 December. With respect to the list of all UNAMIR equipment, he expected a response on the matter to be shortly received from United Nations Headquarters in New York (UNNY) indicating the items to be disposed of in Rwanda according to accepted rules and regulations and those to be transferred to other peace-keeping operations.


4. In response, Mr. Dusaidi stated that Rwanda's leadership had not yet decided on its policy regarding UNAMIR's mandate. However, in his Government's view, it was clear under the terms of UNAMIR's present mandate that it would end in December. He added that the onus was on the United Nations to inform the Rwandese Government of the need to change the present assumption. The United Nations would be expected to give reasons for continuing the mandate or for altering it. He agreed with the SRSG that it was unacceptable to many members of the United Nations to allow UNAMIR to remain in Rwanda for the sole purpose of protecting United Nations agencies. He insisted that he still viewed UNAMIR's role as being that of an assistance mission, in addition to the security aspects of its mandate. As regards the requirement, he explained that this request was being made as a matter of principle and not for purposes of hastening UNAMIR's departure from Rwanda. He added that in the absence of a list of UNAMIR equipment, his Government was willing to assist the United Nations by providing a list of its requirements, so that it would not be offered equipment it did not need. In this respect, he stated that his Government would make a request to the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council that some of the United Nations rules be adjusted to meet Rwanda's needs.

5. The SRSG assured the Government representatives that he would convey the message given to New York and that every effort would be made to assist Rwanda's genuine requirements. He added that it appeared there was a common understanding between the United Nations and the Rwandese Government that UNAMIR's mandate would end on the 8 December, but that the Security Council's position had yet to be clarified. The SRSG and Mr. Dusaidi both agreed that it was now up to the Security Council to take the initiative on the issue.

6. The SRSG also expressed his concern over certain instances whereby the Rwandese authorities had been overly zealous vis à vis UNAMIR staff in their efforts to maintain internal security (such as at road barriers near UNAMIR compounds and at the airport). Mr. Dusaidi assured the SRSG that this appeared to be a purely administrative problem and that he would look into the matter.

7. Mr. Dusaidi ended the meeting by inquiring about the modifications to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) proposed by the Rwandese Government. The SRSG responded that there did not appear to be much point in negotiating a new agreement if UNAMIR's mandate would be ending soon, and that some concerns had been raised in UNNY regarding the modifications proposed, but that a final decision had yet to be made. Mr. Dusaidi added that negotiations on the SOMA would be taken up in New York.


Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Date: 7/11/95


Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan
Date: 3.11.95



**JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 17 OCTOBER 1995**

1. On 17 October 1995, a meeting was held between representatives from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss various aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Dr. Emmanuel Ndahiro	Office of the Vice-President
Mr. Mushyo Kamanzi	Ministry of Defence
Mr. Higiro Thaddée	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jean-Marie Byakweli	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration
Mr. Senglo Nsengumuzemyi	Ministry of Planning
Mr. Gérard Rutagengwa	Ministry of Planning
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer

UNAMIR

Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Maj. Gen. Guy Tousignant	Force Commander
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	Executive Director
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Col. Shiva Kumar	Chief of Staff
Ms. Isel Rivero	Special Assistant to the SRSG
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	Administrative/Legal Officer
Ms. Ladan M. Rafii	Political/Legal Officer

2. The SRSG began the meeting by informing the Rwandese Government representatives that UNAMIR had completed and sent to United Nations Headquarters in New York (UNNY) a survey of all its equipment available in Rwanda classified according to particular categories. He stated that it was up to officials at UNNY to decide which items would be needed for future peace-keeping operations and which would be available for disposal at the end of UNAMIR's mandate. The SRSG further added that UNAMIR eagerly awaited the Rwandese Government's response regarding certain basic issues concerning UNAMIR's mandate, and gave assurances that a decision would not be made without input from the Security Council and the Rwandese Government. He also mentioned that the Permanent Representative of Germany to the Security Council had proposed a Presidential Statement which would serve as an indicator of UNAMIR's future mandate and presence in Rwanda.

3. Mr. Dusaidi agreed that the question of UNAMIR's future mandate was for the Security Council to decide and stated that he could not comment more on this issue. He expressed an interest in seeing the catalogue of goods prepared by UNAMIR in order to determine what would be of use to his Government. He added that he would later go into greater detail regarding UNAMIR's assistance role and what the United Nations could do to assist Rwanda in its rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

4. On the question of UNAMIR's mandate, the SRSG stated that he would like to make certain clarifications. He explained that there had been rumours at UNNY that due to the financial crisis being experienced by the United Nations, the Secretary-General would be compelled to propose to the Security Council measures to be taken with regard to UNAMIR's mandate. Although the SRSG acknowledged that the Secretary-General had indeed been considering the adoption of certain measures, it had been decided at high levels in UNNY not to take any precipitate measures in this regard. As a result, the future mandate of UNAMIR would be decided between the Security Council and the Government of Rwanda in the usual manner without regard to financial constraints.

5. With regard to the disposal of UNAMIR's equipment, the SRSG proposed that the matter should be raised with high-level officials in UNNY by the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations, as well as by the President of Rwanda during the course of his forthcoming visit to New York to participate in the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the United Nations. The SRSG stated that due to the necessity of observing regulations governing the disposal of equipment used by United Nations peace-keeping missions throughout the world, a decision at a high level would be required to change existing procedures. He explained that those items perceived as being required for future operations would be stored or sent to another mission; those considered too expensive to be transported, redundant or of little remaining use could be left behind, in which case each item would be valued with United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda being given priority over the Government of Rwanda for purposes of distribution. He added that he fully understood the Government's need for United Nations assistance and its interpretation of an "assistance mission". The SRSG stated that he was urging a response from UNNY on the matter as quickly as possible.


6. Regarding the Status of Mission Agreement, Mr. Dusaidi inquired as to when the legal subcommittee would be established to discuss the modifications proposed by the Rwandese Government. The SRSG replied that a UNAMIR subcommittee had already been set up, and if the Government could provide the names of members of its own subcommittee, discussions on the matter could begin the same week.

7. The meeting ended with Mr. Dusaidi inquiring when his Government could have access to the list of UNAMIR equipment discussed, to which the SRSG replied that the list may be made available by the following week.



Mr. Claude Dusaidi

Date: 20/10/95



Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 19.10.95

CRN-358

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

30 OCT 16

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OUT-GOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 14 October 1995

NO: MIR 3597

NO. OF PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: JOINT CONSULTATIONS HELD BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

-
1. Please find attached a signed copy of the minutes of a meeting held between representatives from UNAMIR and the Government of Rwanda on 3 October 1995 to discuss various aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations.
 2. The next meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, 17th October and, as usual, we will keep you apprised of the meeting's deliberations.
 3. Best regards.

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JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND UNAMIR
HELD ON 3 OCTOBER 1995

1. On 3 October 1995, a meeting was held between senior officials from the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR to discuss the proposed modifications to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) submitted by the Government of Rwanda, as well as other aspects of UNAMIR/Government relations. The following were present:

Government

Mr. Claude Dusaidi	Office of the Vice-President
Lt. Col. Karenzi Karake	Ministry of Defence
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare	RPA Liaison Officer
Mr. Jean-Marie Byakweli	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration
Mr. Higiyo Thaddee	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UNAMIR

Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Maj. Gen. Guy Tousignant	Force Commander (departed early)
Ms. Susan Matthew	Chief Administrative Officer
Col. Shiva Kumar	Chief of Staff
Mr. Mamady Condé	Senior Political Affairs Officer
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	Administrative/Legal Officer
Mr. A.B. Sidique Dao	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
Ms. Ladan M. Rafii	Political/Legal Officer

2. The SRSB began the meeting by thanking the Rwandese Government representatives for agreeing to the minutes of the previous meeting prepared by UNAMIR.

3. Mr. Dusaidi emphasised the role of UNAMIR as an assistance mission and stated that the interpretation of UNAMIR's assistance role should be the subject of the discussions. With regard to the extension of UNAMIR's mandate in Rwanda, he stated that it would be premature to discuss the subject at this point in time, and that such a decision would ultimately rest with the Security Council and the Government of Rwanda. He further stated that his Government was in the process of contacting, directly, Governments which had contributed equipment to the United Nations, including maps, documents and other material which could be of use to the Rwandese Government. He also wished to discuss issues pertaining to UNAMIR local personnel (such as their benefits and the particular sectors in which they are working). Concerning his Government's proposals for modifications to the SOMA, he stated that he expected a response on the part of the United Nations "very soon."

4. With respect to UNAMIR's mandate, the SRSG mentioned that it was important to identify the Government's expectations regarding UNAMIR's role in the period preceding the termination of its current mandate on 8 December 1995. He stated that UNAMIR had carefully complied with Security Council resolution 997 (1995) in reducing its force level to 1,800 by the specified date of 8 October 1995. He recommended that the Government of Rwanda take full advantage of the remaining two months of its term on the Security Council to decide upon UNAMIR's future mandate. Specifically, he stated the need for broad guidelines at a later date on whether UNAMIR should begin phasing out now or whether it should do so immediately after the termination of its current mandate and thereby maintain the current level of troops in the interim period.

5. The SRSG added that by mid-October UNAMIR would be able to present the Government with a list of equipment it has available.

6. On the SOMA, the SRSG acknowledged receipt of a paper from the Office of the President outlining proposed modifications. Although he stated that it was necessary to obtain a response from United Nations Headquarters in New York regarding the proposed changes, he wished to convey UNAMIR's preliminary position on the matter. He stated that the modifications sought by the Rwandese Government fell within three separate categories:

- (1) those which were very difficult to accept because they would result in UNAMIR having fewer privileges and immunities than other peace-keeping missions in the world and other United Nations agencies operating in Rwanda;
- (2) changes which were based on the Government's concern for its sovereignty in which the main difficulty involved a question of language (e.g. identification cards, uniforms, provisions and supplies); and
- (3) other less substantial matters (such as the flying of flags).


The SRSG proposed the formation of a subcommittee of officials charged with legal matters to discuss such issues and finalize the SOMA. He also agreed to prompt action in this respect.

7. With regard to the issue of local UNAMIR personnel, the SRSG assured the Rwandese Government representatives that UNAMIR would cooperate fully in providing them with the information requested by furnishing a list of names of such employees, including their place of work and functions.


8. However, the SRSG expressed concern over the recent disappearance of a local journalist who had been working for UNAMIR, Mr. Manasse Mugabo, and sought the Government's assistance in locating him. He reassured the Government participants that UNAMIR would not prevent the detention of any of its local employees against whom the Government presented clear evidence of complicity in a crime, as had been the case with the other twelve local nationals who had formerly worked for United Nations agencies in Rwanda and who were currently incarcerated. The SRSG added that the media would be asking questions about Mr. Mugabo. Col. Karake demanded information in order to assist in tracing the journalist.

CRN 358
P4/4

9. The meeting ended with a discussion of UNAMIR's assistance role according to its current mandate. Mr. Dusaidi stated that the language in the mandate was quite clear on this issue, namely "UNAMIR will... [s]upport the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining". In response, the SRSG mentioned that although he would personally favour a more active assistance role for UNAMIR, he believed that the language in the mandate implied that UNAMIR should assist other United Nations agencies in the provision of humanitarian assistance, but that it could not assume such a role by providing direct aid itself. Following a discussion of the precise language of resolution 997 and use of the word "faciliter" in the French version of the text, Mr. Dusaidi stated that UNAMIR had the necessary leeway to do more in terms of assistance to Rwanda.


Mr. Claude Dusaidi

Date: 11/10/95


Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan

Date: 11.10.95

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-346

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar Khan*
DATE: 03 OCTOBER 1995
NO.: MIR 3463
NO. OF PAGES: 5
SUBJECT: Relations between UNAMIR and the Government of Rwanda

1. As announced in my MIR.3420 of 28 September on the above subject, please find attached copy of the agreed minutes of the first meeting of the Government Commission with UNAMIR on the relations between UNAMIR and the Government of Rwanda.
2. As agreed, the second meeting took place this morning. The related minutes will be forwarded to you shortly.
3. Best regards.

11-130 96
UNAMIR

SRSG

Note for the File



Minutes of the first Meeting between members of the Government Commission and UNAMIR Delegation held at UNAMIR Headquarters at 10 o'clock on 26 September 1995

1. The meeting was attended by a Government delegation constituted into a Commission and appointed by the Vice-President, Major General Kagame. The Commission members were:

Mr. Claude Dusaidi (leader)	Political Adviser, Vice-Presidents's Office
Maj. Kamarade Kayitare	UNAMIR Liaison Officer
Maj. Joshua Rasana	Army Headquarters
Maj. Kamanzi Mushyo	Army Headquarters
Dr. Ndahiro Emmanuel	Ministry of Defence
Mr. Sam Nkusi	Director, Rwandatel
Mr. Higiro Thaddce	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Antoine Sendama	Ministry of Rehabilitation

UNAMIR was represented by:

Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan (leader)	SRSG
Mr. Wilfrid de Souza	ED
Col. Shiva Kumar	COS
Mr. Sammy Buo	SPA
Mr. Mamady Conde	SPO
Mr. Mtshana Ncube	LO
Mr. Gilles Briere	CMCO
Mr. Abu B.S. Dao	HAO/SA

2. After Ambassador Shaharyar Khan's welcome to the Commission, Mr. Dusaidi, stated in his opening remarks that the Commission was appointed by the Vice President "to look at all aspects and appraise the work of UNAMIR".

Some of the issues that the Commission wanted to focus on were:

- a) A smooth transition 'if there was to be a change in the mandate'.
- b) Staffing of UN presence, if any, after the transition.
- c) Equipment to be left behind.
- d) An evaluation of the UNAMIR role.

3. In response the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, thanked Mr. Dusaidi for the overview on issues of interest to the Commission. He then proposed an agenda for current and future discussions, as follows:

- a) Issues related to the current and future mandate;
- b) Equipment;
- c) Legal aspects of the Mission (i.e. SOMA);
- d) Any other business.

The agenda was agreed by Mr. Dusaidi.

Mandate

4. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan stated that it was important for discussions on the mandate to be held in good time. As stated during the discussions on the present mandate, UNAMIR's mandate would be decided by the Security Council in negotiations with Rwanda. Fortunately, Rwanda would still be a member of the Security Council in December. UNAMIR operated in Rwanda under Chapter VI, and its presence in Rwanda required the consent and cooperation of the sovereign government. UNAMIR would not be imposed on Rwanda.

Mr. Dusaidi stated that with respect to the item on the mandate, it was necessary to examine the genesis of UNAMIR as it had been conceived as an assistance mission. This factor needed to be borne in mind for future discussion on the mandate.

Equipment

5. Explaining the principle under which UN Peace-Keeping equipment was disposed of after completion of missions, SRSG stated that the equipment that was still usable was required to be transferred to other peace-keeping operations or stored at Brindisi for future or other missions. Only material that was to be formally written off was left behind. Some equipment that was in reasonable condition and which would be too costly to transport could also be "sold" to the Government under the UNDP Trust Fund Scheme that had already been signed. Giving further details of the equipment being used by UNAMIR, SRSG elaborated as follows:

- a) Contingent owned equipment. This was owned by the countries which sent contingents (e.g. India) to Rwanda. They would take the equipment back after completing their tenure.
- b) Equipment loaned to contingents (e.g. by Holland to Zambia)
- c) Equipment owned by UN.

6. SRSG explained that for equipment owned by other countries (i.e para. 5 a,b above) it would be necessary to discuss their disposal with the countries concerned. UNAMIR could only discuss equipment owned by UN. This discussion would be relevant once a detailed list was ready showing the status of each item. This list was being prepared and was expected to be ready by mid-October. The final decision on disposal would rest with UN Headquarters in New York.

7. SRSG added that with regard to lethal material e.g. APCs, the discussion would need to be held at a higher level or even with the Security Council. The non-lethal equipment

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CAN-346

could be discussed with UNHQ and decisions conveyed to the Sanctions Committee under Security Council Resolutions 918 (1994) and 1011(1995). Mr. Dusaidi thanked Ambassador Khan for his resume and stated that the promised list of equipment was awaited. He added that UNAMIR, in its role of an assistance mission, should not only leave behind equipment for Rwanda but should hand over information such as maps, data-base, documents etc.


Legal Aspects

8. SRSB stated that the Rwandese Government's view on SOMA had been received only a few minutes before the meeting. The document needed to be studied and comments would be offered later.


Any other business

9. No issues were brought up under this heading.

10. The meeting ended after 1 hour 15 minutes.


.....

Mr. Claude Dusaidi
Political Adviser,
Vice President's Office


.....

Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Rwanda

Dated 2/10/95

Dated 2/10/95

U.N. and Rwanda Agree to Extend Peacekeeping for 3 Months

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 12 — After nearly two weeks of confrontation between the Rwandan Government and the Security Council, the Council today extended for three months a peacekeeping mission the Rwandans say they do not want or need. But the Council agreed to reduce the number of troops and to curtail the tasks they will perform.

Rwanda's representative, Manzi Bakuramutsa, said after agreement was reached that this would be the last extension of the force. He had been holding out for only 800 troops;

the United Nations proposed 1,400.

After missing a renewal deadline last Friday because of prolonged haggling, the two sides compromised today on 1,200 troops and 200 military monitors. There are now 1,800 troops and 300 advisers in Rwanda.

The reduced peacekeeping force will assist in the return of refugees and look after its own security, but it will not be responsible for the protection of other foreigners in Rwanda. The Security Council lost the battle for that during final arguments this morning. Rwanda holds a rotating Security Council seat, and Mr. Bakuramutsa has made the most of it.

The Security Council decision provoked an unusually sharp protest from Canada. Speaking before the vote, Canada's envoy, Robert R. Fowler, warned that the United Nations mission, commended until today by a Canadian, would be seriously compromised. He drew a parallel to the small contingents of troops in Mogadishu during the ill-fated Somalia mission.

"The Government of Rwanda has sought ever more stridently to impose restraints," he said. The United Nations force in Rwanda, he added, "will not be able to do the job it was designed to accomplish."

The acrimony evident in the Council's debate over Rwanda has complex roots. The Security Council, fearful that hard-liners might be gaining the upper hand in the Rwandan Government, which came to power last year, is concerned that revenge attacks against real or perceived supporters of the previous Government are possible, fueling new cycles of violence.

The Council does not want to be seen to be deserting Rwanda for a second time in two years. In April and May of 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, most from the Tutsi minority, were massacred as

the United Nations stood aside.


The present Tutsi-led Government in Kigali still holds the United Nations guilty for failing to stop the genocidal attacks. But the Government also argues that it now has an army capable of defending the Rwandan people — and foreign agencies — and that any military intrusion by the United Nations is a violation of Rwandan sovereignty.

Alison L. DesForges of Human Rights Watch/Africa calls the Rwandan political situation "clearly precarious." In an interview today, she said that there seems to be a struggle going on within the Government, and "it is not certain if the forces of moderation or the forces of extremism are going to predominate."

Human rights groups are concerned by Rwanda's decision to begin expelling private relief organizations. More expulsions, Ms. DesForges said, will raise "the suspicion that the Government is trying to eliminate foreign witnesses" before taking reprisals against those involved in the massacres in 1994.

In Arusha, Tanzania, today, the first indictments were made by an international tribunal for Rwanda created last year by the Security Council. Eight people were charged with genocide in the slaughter of 15,000 Rwandans around Kibuye in 1994, but they were not identified.

Copy:
 DFC
 CA/LO
 S/S/SSG
 Spokesman
 Rakio U.



SRSG FC CAO

Reçu le 14 DEC. 1995



UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 17 October 1995

To: See list attached

From: Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

Shaharyar M. Khan

Subject: Weekly meetings of senior officers

1. As we get closer to the end of this fourth mandate of UNAMIR, I believe it is important that we meet regularly every week to exchange views on the activities of the mission and to prepare contingency plans pending the decision of the Security Council in December.

2. You are therefore invited to join me in a meeting of senior officers to be held every Tuesday and Friday from 9:00 to 9:30 a.m. in conference room 4045.

3. Thank you for your cooperation.

Fax to: UNAMIR NAIROBI FROM DESK 082 #11069 KIGALI
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
Key from: Mr. Alfred PODRITSCH
ALO a.i.

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FC
Copy: ED
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
As discussed on phone **FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION**
THIS MORNING HERE IS LINDENMAYER'S ITINERARY Protocol

TO: Mr. Shaharyar Khan
SRSG
UNAMIR, Kigali

SA/SRSG

FAX #: 3.3090

FROM: S. Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General
for Peace-keeping Operations



Vu
ws

FAX #: 3.6460

DATE: 6 November 1995

PAGE: 1 of 1

UNAMIR
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
8 NOV 1995
RECEIVED

1. As previously discussed, General Van Kappen and Ms. Lindenmayer are due to visit the mission area to discuss questions relating to the possible future mandate of UNAMIR.
2. The details of General Van Kappen's itinerary have already been communicated to you. Ms. Lindenmayer will depart New York on Wednesday, 8 November by British Airways flight number 178, arriving in London at 9 p.m.. She will depart London at 10.20 p.m. on British Airways flight number 69, arriving in Nairobi on Thursday, 9 November at 9.55 a.m.. She will proceed to Kigali on 10 November by UNAMIR flight. Kindly inform UNAMIR Liaison Office in Nairobi and make necessary flight arrangements as well as hotel reservations in Nairobi for the night of Thursday, 9 November. We would also appreciate your assistance in organizing programmes for General Van Kappen and Ms. Lindenmayer's visit to Kigali. The latter will depart the mission on Monday, 13 November at 8.05 p.m. by Sabena Airlines flight number 565 for Brussels.

Best regards.

Let us
coordinate & ensure
any re received
all points
See
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NOTE

*Ed
info.*

Alice,

Kindly prepare a note verbale to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicating the problem of the extension of visas for Brown and Root Personnel.

According to Briere, the Government is refusing to provide them with visas until April 19th, they will only issue visas until March 8.

Secco resolution 1029 operative paragraph 1 states clearly that UNAMIR's mandate is until March 8, however, operative paragraph 5 states that the withdrawal of UNAMIR after the expiry of the present mandate, will take place within a period of 6 weeks.

This should be brought to the attention of the Ministry concerned. Six weeks after March 8 is April 19.

Mr. de Souza has been consulted and he agrees that the Note Verbale be sent.

Thank you for your assistance.

Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG
20 January 1996

*According to Alice
necessary measures are
being taken
25-1-96
WS*

Reçu le 20 JAN. 1996

NOTE

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Mr. Hasekawa,

In a conversation that took place this morning between the SRSG and Mr. Claude Dusaidi, the latter informed the SRSG that the Government is ready to submit a list of equipment to be financed out of the Trust Fund.

The SRSG thinks that it might be advisable to explore with suitable donors whether they would, in good time, be willing to ~~be~~ make additional contributions to the Fund.

The SRSG asked me to inform you.

Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG
12 January 1997

cc. ED ✓

Reçu le 12 JAN, 1998

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

PRESS RELEASE NO. 24

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. ROBERT R. FOWLER
AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL

ON RWANDA

NEW YORK, DECEMBER 12, 1995

SOUS RÉSERVE DE MODIFICATIONS

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE NO. 24

ALLOCUTION DE S.E. M. ROBERT R. FOWLER
AMBASSADEUR ET REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT
DU CANADA AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES

DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

SUR LE RWANDA

NEW YORK, LE 12 DÉCEMBRE 1995

PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

LA MISSION PERMANENTE DU CANADA
AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES

Communiqué

CNR 345

Mr. President,

I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of December, and thank your predecessor, the Permanent representative of Oman, for a successful presidency during the month of November.

As you may know, Mr. President, Canada made its views on the renewal of the mandate of UNAMIR very clearly known to the Security Council during the Troop contributors meeting of December 6. I would now like to express the views of my Government on the draft resolution before you.

Canada welcomes all signs of potential progress in the Great Lakes area, such as those contained in the Cairo Declaration. We remain concerned however that the situation in the area is inherently unstable due, in considerable part, to the presence of 1.6 million refugees around Rwanda's perimeter.

In this context, we would have viewed the renewal of UNAMIR's mandate, with its current strength and composition, as a very modest but minimal and necessary stabilizing presence. We believe that UNAMIR's activities in assisting in confidence-building and in the peaceful and orderly repatriation of refugees still deserve the full support of the Government of Rwanda and of the international community.

The situation in Rwanda is indeed a complex one. The genocide of 1994 is the most recent and the worst of six separate spates of inter-tribal massacres since Rwanda gained its independence in 1962. The prognosis for an end to such vicious events is not bright. A huge proportion of the population of Rwanda has taken refuge outside its national territory. As the Secretary-General has indicated, national reconciliation, essential for stability, will be achieved only when the refugees have come home in dignity and the perpetrators of genocide have been brought to justice.

Since last June however, Mr. President, the Government of Rwanda has indicated a growing reluctance to have a peace-keeping mission on its territory. A number of countries which care deeply about the plight of Rwanda, including my own, have tried to convince the Government in Kigali that it was in their interests to maintain an effective peace-keeping operation in Rwanda for the purposes of confidence-building, national reconciliation and to assist in the safe return of the refugees.

UNAMIR is also the backbone and the rallying element of a large part of the international humanitarian assistance effort in Rwanda; many Non Governmental Organisations depend on it for logistical and other support and, in extremis, for protection. The psychological value of the Force, given the horrendous events of 1994, has been extremely important.

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In this context, we deplore the order given to 38 Non Governmental Organisations, among them some of the most prestigious and internationally recognised, to leave Rwanda. We also continue to be concerned with arbitrary arrests and detention in Rwanda, as well with the conditions of detention of prisoners.

During the discussions between the UN and the Government of Rwanda over the past six months, the Government of Rwanda has tried to dictate the force structure necessary to accomplish the mandate which you, the members of the Security Council, will assign to the Force. It has even refused to accept that UNAMIR should contribute to the safety of international personnel, in case of need. In short, the Government of Rwanda has, ever more stridently, sought to impose unacceptable and unworkable constraints on the continuation of UNAMIR. In June, a troop reduction from 5500 to 1800 was accepted by the Council, which was understood by the members of the Council, the Secretariat and by troop contributors alike to be beyond the bare minimum for a credible mission.

At a force level of 1800 in addition to 300 observers, UNAMIR's presence in the provinces beyond Kigali has, since June, been inadequate to accomplish its mandate. This size Force offered no protection to UN observers in a number of areas and in these areas, few useful observations were made. Notwithstanding these very real shortcomings, UNAMIR played a positive role when the Government of Zaire decided to expel refugees from its territory.

The further reduction of the strength of UNAMIR by one third about to be decided is, we believe, an unfortunate development. It is unfortunate because we have allowed the Government of Rwanda to set its own conditions on the mandate and the structure of the mission, independent of expert advice as to what is required. It is unfortunate, as well, because the Security Council will be compromising the integrity of a peace-keeping mandate and the credibility of the Organization to fulfil the short-term, politically expedient requirement of retaining the Mission in place at all costs. It is particularly unfortunate because UNAMIR will not be able to do the job which it was designed to accomplish.

Mr. President, mandate and force structures do not have separate existences. We should have learned this in the early days in Mogadishu, when UN troops were unable to move beyond the airport while anarchy raged outside their perimeter. Surely we should have also learned from the tragic lessons of the creation of "safe areas" in Bosnia, which we knew we could not keep safe with the forces the Security Council and Member States were prepared to make available. Indeed, we should have learned from our tragic experience of Rwanda in April 1994, when an under-

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manned, ill-equipped mission was unable to deter civil unrest, let alone to confront genocide. Surely we should have learned that politically-motivated "creative ambiguity", the willingness to endlessly compromise essential mission elements, has repeatedly compromised the UN, our peacekeepers, and the people and interests they are meant to protect.

The issue here is not so much whether UNAMIR should have 800, 1200, 1400, 1800 or 5500 troops, but rather whether the force structure as a whole will or will not be able to accomplish the mission you will assign to the Force. UNAMIR will, with one third fewer troops, now be confined, largely in a garrison mode, to Kigali, yet will retain a mandate essentially unchanged from the one it received in June.

The peaceful repatriation of refugees is crucial if we expect to make progress towards peace in the Great Lakes region. Now, Mr. President, will a UNAMIR with a limited presence outside Kigali be able to perform the task of "assisting the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and, to this end, to support the ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks" (operative paragraph 2b)?

How, from Kigali, will the Force acquit the task of "assisting UNHCR and other international agencies in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees" (operative paragraph 2c)?

Is it realistic to presume that such a Force will be able to provide effective support for the Human Rights Field Operations, UN agencies and Non Governmental Organisations? How could the Security Council agree to withdraw, at the request of the government of Rwanda, one crucial element of the mandate, that is UNAMIR's fundamental role of protecting the international personnel, in case of need?

Has the Security Council seriously considered these issues? Has it given sufficient consideration to the military advice that you and that we troop contributors have received on this question?

How can UNAMIR, by withdrawing yet more troops and military observers from the provinces, be able to assist in any significant way in the return of the refugees or in confidence-building in Rwanda? Given the extreme volatility in the region, the UN runs the risk, once again, of witnessing horrible events that it will be powerless to prevent or even influence. In such circumstances the UN Force would be roundly criticised for its inaction and, this time, would merit the international opprobrium it would attract.

By creating false expectations about what UNAMIR can realistically achieve, the Security Council is demonstrating, in our view, that it has not yet fully absorbed lessons learned from the recent past in peace-keeping operations. If we have learned one thing from our experiences in Somalia, the former-Yugoslavia, and Rwanda itself, it is that we must provide to the UN the resources it needs to perform the tasks assigned by Member States; effectively, by members of the Security Council. If we, the Member States, are not prepared to provide adequate resources, the UN should not be involved.

It appears that the Government of Rwanda is not prepared to accept the presence of a UN peace operation with the force structure necessary to accomplish the mandate Rwanda has agreed it should perform. The United Nations must not allow itself to be put in the position of supplicant, of pleading with any Government to receive or retain a peace-keeping operation. In this case, we believe it would have been preferable to withdraw UNAMIR immediately, as the Secretary-General indicated in his report he intended to do.

Given the new force structure of a limited and possibly ineffective operation, Canada will have to consider its options carefully regarding its own participation in UNAMIR.

In closing, Mr. President, I would like to underline Canada's continuing commitment to encouraging stability in the Great Lakes region. We have participated in UNAMIR since its inception, and have buttressed that participation with substantial support to UN agencies working in Rwanda as well as through our bilateral aid program. This support will continue.

Thank you.

Monsieur le président,

Je vous félicite d'assumer la présidence du Conseil pour le mois de décembre, et je remercie votre prédécesseur, le représentant permanent d'Oman, pour le travail fructueux qu'il a accompli durant son mandat de président en novembre.

Comme vous le savez, Monsieur le président, le Canada a fait connaître très clairement au Conseil de sécurité son point de vue sur le renouvellement du mandat de la MINUAR, lors de la réunion des pays fournisseurs de contingents qui s'est tenue le 6 décembre. Je voudrais maintenant faire part du point de vue de mon gouvernement sur le projet de résolution qui est devant vous.

Le Canada se réjouit de toutes indications de progrès potentiels dans la région des Grands lacs, comme celles qui ressortent de la Déclaration du Caire. Toutefois, nous continuons à nous inquiéter de ce que la situation dans la région reste fondamentalement instable à cause, en grande partie, de la présence de 1,6 million de réfugiés autour du Rwanda.

Dans ce contexte, nous aurions considéré le renouvellement du mandat de la MINUAR avec son effectif et sa composition actuels comme modeste, mais ayant un effet stabilisateur minimal et nécessaire. À notre avis, les activités de cette mission qui contribue à l'instauration de la confiance et au rapatriement paisible et ordonné des réfugiés méritent encore le plein appui du gouvernement du Rwanda et de la communauté internationale.

La situation du Rwanda est en effet complexe. Le génocide de 1994 est le plus récent et le pire de six instances séparées de massacres inter-tribaux depuis que le Rwanda est devenu indépendant en 1962. Les perspectives de voir un terme à ces événements vicieux ne sont pas claires. Une proportion immense de la population du Rwanda s'est réfugiée en dehors de son territoire national. Comme l'a indiqué le Secrétaire général, la réconciliation nationale, essentielle pour la stabilité, n'aura lieu que lorsque les réfugiés seront retournés chez eux dans la dignité, et que les responsables du génocide auront été traduits en justice.

Depuis juin cependant, Monsieur le président, le gouvernement du Rwanda a fait preuve d'une réticence grandissante face à l'opération de maintien de la paix sur son territoire. Plusieurs pays qui sont profondément préoccupés du sort du Rwanda, dont le mien, ont tenté de convaincre le gouvernement à Kigali qu'il était dans son intérêt de maintenir une opération de maintien de la paix efficace au Rwanda pour instaurer la confiance, et faciliter la réconciliation nationale et le retour sans risque des réfugiés.

La MINUAR est aussi l'épine dorsale et le point de ralliement d'une grande partie de l'effort international d'aide

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humanitaire au Rwanda; plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales dépendent d'elle pour, entre autres, son appui logistique et, in extremis, pour leur protection. La valeur psychologique de la Force, étant donné les événements horribles de 1994, a été très importante.

Dans ce contexte, nous déplorons l'ordre donné à 38 organisations non gouvernementales, dont certaines des plus prestigieuses et reconnues au niveau international, de quitter le Rwanda. Nous continuons aussi d'être préoccupés par les arrestations et les détentions arbitraires au Rwanda, de même que par les conditions de détention des prisonniers.

Au cours des discussions entre l'ONU et le gouvernement du Rwanda durant les derniers six mois, le gouvernement du Rwanda a tenté de dicter la structure de la force nécessaire pour remplir le mandat que vous, les membres du Conseil de sécurité, aviez confié à la Force. Il a même refusé d'accepter que la MINUAR doive contribuer à la sécurité du personnel international, en cas de besoin. Bref, le gouvernement du Rwanda a, de façon de plus en plus stridente, tenté d'imposer des contraintes inacceptables et inapplicables à la poursuite de la mission de la MINUAR. En juin, une réduction des troupes de 5500 à 1800 a été acceptée par le Conseil, et les membres du Conseil, le Secrétariat et les contributeurs de troupes avaient tous compris que ceci était au-delà du minimum absolu pour une mission crédible.

Avec un effectif de 1800 troupes et 300 observateurs militaires, la présence de la MINUAR dans les provinces au-delà de Kigali a, depuis juin, été inadéquate pour remplir son mandat. La taille de cette Force ne lui a pas permis de fournir de protection aux observateurs de l'ONU dans plusieurs zones et, dans ces zones, peu d'observations utiles ont été faites. Malgré ces limitations, la MINUAR a joué un rôle positif lorsque le gouvernement du Zaïre a décidé de refouler des réfugiés de son territoire.

La réduction dont il est question maintenant, soit une baisse du tiers de l'effectif de la mission est, toutefois, une décision malheureuse. Elle est malheureuse parce que nous avons laissé le gouvernement du Rwanda fixer ses propres conditions quant à la structure et au mandat de la mission, indépendamment de l'avis des experts sur ce qui est requis. Elle est malheureuse également parce que le Conseil de sécurité compromettra l'intégrité d'un mandat de maintien de la paix et la crédibilité de l'organisation, pour remplir les exigences d'un expédient politique à court terme, soit le maintien de la mission sur place à tout prix. Elle est particulièrement malheureuse parce que la MINUAR ne sera pas en mesure de remplir ses fonctions.

Monsieur le président, les mandats et la structure des forces n'ont pas d'existences séparées. Nous aurions dû apprendre

ceci au début du déploiement à Mogadishu, lorsque les troupes de l'ONU ont été incapables de se déplacer plus loin que l'aéroport alors que l'anarchie régnait en dehors de leurs positions. Nous aurions certainement dû apprendre des leçons tragiques de la création de "zones de sécurité" en Bosnie, que nous savions ne pas pouvoir protéger avec les forces que le Conseil de sécurité et les États membres étaient prêts à rendre disponibles. Nous aurions certainement dû apprendre en effet de notre propre expérience tragique au Rwanda en avril 1994, alors qu'une mission en mal d'effectifs et d'équipements a été incapable de décourager les désordres civils, et encore moins d'empêcher un génocide. Nous aurions certainement dû apprendre que l'"ambiguïté créative", soit la volonté de compromettre sans arrêt des éléments essentiels de missions, a mis à plusieurs reprises en péril l'ONU, nos gardiens de la paix, et les gens et intérêts qu'ils sont là pour protéger.

La question n'est pas tellement de savoir si la MINUAR devrait avoir 800, 1200, 1400, 1800 ou 5500 troupes, mais plutôt si la structure de la Force dans son ensemble permettra ou non d'accomplir la mission que vous lui assignerez. La MINUAR sera maintenant, avec un tiers de troupes de moins, largement confinée à une garnison à Kigali, mais conservera un mandat essentiellement inchangé par rapport à celui qu'elle a reçu en juin.

Le rapatriement paisible des réfugiés est crucial si nous nous attendons à faire des progrès vers la paix dans la région des Grands lacs. Comment, Monsieur le président, une MINUAR avec une présence limitée en dehors de Kigali pourra-t-elle aider le gouvernement rwandais à "faciliter le retour volontaire et sans risques des réfugiés et, à cette fin, seconder les efforts actuels visant à instaurer un climat de confiance en assumant des fonctions de surveillance, comme le prescrit le dispositif 2b?

Ou encore, comment, à partir de Kigali, pourra-t-elle aider le Haut Commissariat pour les réfugiés et d'autres agences internationales à fournir un soutien logistique au rapatriement des réfugiés comme il est dit dans le dispositif 2c?

Est-il réaliste de penser qu'elle pourra apporter son soutien à l'opération des Nations unies pour les droits de la personne, aux agences de l'ONU et aux organisations non gouvernementales? Comment le Conseil de sécurité peut-il accepter le retrait, à la demande du gouvernement du Rwanda, d'un élément crucial du mandat, soit le rôle fondamental de la MINUAR de protéger le personnel international, en cas de besoin?

Le Conseil de sécurité a-t-il sérieusement pensé à ces questions? A-t-il étudié de façon suffisamment approfondie les conseils militaires que le Conseil et que nous, les contributeurs de troupes, avons reçus à ce sujet?

Comment la MINUAR, en retirant de nouvelles troupes et de nouveaux observateurs militaires des provinces, peut-elle être en mesure de contribuer grandement au retour des réfugiés ou à l'instauration de la confiance au Rwanda? Étant donné l'extrême volatilité de la région, l'ONU court le risque d'assister, encore une fois, à des événements horribles qu'elle sera impuissante à prévenir ou même à infléchir. Dans de telles circonstances, la Force de l'ONU sera vertement critiquée pour son inaction et, cette fois, mériterait l'opprobre internationale qu'elle recevrait.

En suscitant de faux espoirs sur les capacités véritables de la MINUAR, le Conseil de sécurité démontre, à notre avis, qu'il n'a pas encore pleinement assimilé les enseignements récents des opérations de maintien de la paix. S'il y a une leçon que nous avons tirée de nos expériences en Somalie, dans l'ex-Yougoslavie et au Rwanda même, c'est que nous devons doter l'ONU des ressources nécessaires à l'accomplissement des tâches que lui confient les États membres, en fait, les membres du Conseil de sécurité. Si nous, les États membres, ne sommes pas prêts à lui donner ces ressources, l'Organisation ne devrait pas s'engager.

Il ne semble pas que le gouvernement du Rwanda soit prêt à accepter la présence d'une opération de paix de l'ONU avec la structure nécessaire à l'exécution du mandat qu'il a accepté qu'elle remplisse. Les Nations Unies ne peuvent pas se permettre de se trouver dans le rôle de demandeur, plaidant auprès de gouvernements de recevoir ou de garder une opération de maintien de la paix. Nous croyons donc qu'il aurait été préférable dans ce cas de rappeler immédiatement la MINUAR, comme le Secrétaire général prévoyait de le faire selon son rapport.

Étant donné la nouvelle structure de la Force signifiant une opération limitée et peut-être bien inefficace, le Canada devra examiner attentivement les options à sa disposition quant à sa propre participation à la MINUAR.

Pour terminer, Monsieur le président, je voudrais réitérer la détermination constante du Canada à promouvoir la stabilité dans la région des Grands lacs. Nous avons participé à la MINUAR dès sa constitution et avons étayé cette participation en accordant un soutien important aux agences de l'ONU à l'oeuvre au Rwanda ainsi que par l'intermédiaire de notre programme d'aide bilatérale. Ce soutien sera maintenu.

Merci.



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PRESS RELEASE

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USUN PRESS RELEASE #237--(95)
DECEMBER 12, 1995

Statement by Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Extension of the Mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), in the Security Council, in Explanation of Vote, December 12, 1995

Mr. President,

The situation in Rwanda has changed significantly over the course of UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda. Internal conditions, we are gratified to note, are fairly stable, due to the combined efforts of the Government of Rwanda, the donor community and UNAMIR itself. UNAMIR has been a factor in helping to foster a climate of security within Rwanda.

Unfortunately, the situation in the region of which Rwanda finds itself a part still faces instability, due to the presence of over a million refugees just over Rwanda's borders. As former President Carter, the president of Rwanda and the leaders of Rwanda's neighbors all acknowledged at the Cairo Summit last month, the repatriation of those refugees is a critical element in bringing peace and stability to the region.

We believe UNAMIR can play an important role in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees to their former homes in Rwanda. To that end, the mandate of UNAMIR for the next three months has been refocused on the range of tasks it can perform to help smooth the way for the refugees' repatriation.

Another element in bringing about the return of the refugees and national reconciliation is the work of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. We are heartened that, after a regrettably slow start, the Tribunal is on the verge of having an impact on the culture of impunity which permeates society. It is vitally important that the Tribunal, as an institution and as individuals working in the cause of justice, have the sense of security needed to continue their impartial investigations and prosecutions. Clearly, they cannot do so without the protection and goodwill of the Government of Rwanda. It is equally clear that they need the added guarantee of an impartial third party to ensure their independence. The Tribunal, we understand, is

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arranging for a United Nations presence that would replace UNAMIR in ensuring its independence, and we appreciate the cooperation of the Government of Rwanda in that effort. However, that new presence is not yet in place. We firmly believe that the duties of UNAMIR must continue to include assisting in the protection of the Tribunal's personnel and premises until alternate arrangements are operational.

Mr. President,

✓ UNAMIR has provided invaluable support and assistance to the various UN agencies and humanitarian organizations which have been working to assist the people and government of Rwanda. The presence of the peacekeepers has helped to reassure these international aid personnel as they carry out their tasks in a volatile and unstable environment. We fully expect UNAMIR to continue to assist the humanitarian agencies as the need arises. United Nations forces have the right, indeed the obligation, to come to the aid of other United Nations and other international personnel in times of need.

The resolution we have just adopted renews UNAMIR for a final period of three months. After that time, UNAMIR will be terminated and all its military personnel withdrawn within six weeks. Following the departure of UNAMIR, however, the international community should not abandon Rwanda. The United Nations needs to retain a strong presence in Rwanda to provide the assistance in reconstruction, rehabilitation, justice and political reconciliation that is so sorely needed there. This includes non-governmental organizations, some of whom have been essential in helping UN agencies, such as UNHCR, carry out their work. The expulsion of NGO's is a matter which causes concern for my government.

The last three months of the mandate should be used to put into place a non-military logistics lifeline to sustain the various UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, including the International Tribunal and the Human Rights Field Operations in Rwanda, which have benefitted from the presence of UNAMIR's extensive logistics and communications network.

Mr. President,

UNAMIR has been successful in its mission. I would like to take this opportunity to commend all the men and women who have served with UNAMIR, throughout its difficult tenure in Rwanda, from Special Representative Khan and the force commanders to the support staff. They will continue to rely on the active cooperation of the Government of Rwanda to carry out their mandate and draw their mission to a close.

Peace and security have been restored to Rwanda, after devastating events. We hope they can finally put the horrors of the past behind them and move into a phase of rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation.

* * * *



Office of the Spokesman

**TRANSCRIPT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY MR. CLAUDE DUSAIDI
ADVISOR IN THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S OFFICE**

7 December 1995 during lunch-time news in English

In principle, the Rwanda Government has agreed with former President Carter that we extend the mandate of UNAMIR for three more months, if it can help encourage the refugees to come home.

We have done this not because we believe that actually UNAMIR can assist, because as you remember it has been here for a year and a half and no significant numbers of refugees have come back because of UNAMIR per se.

But we are doing this to satisfy those in the international community who have the perception that UNAMIR can actually assist.

So we feel that three months will be fine, but we also feel that we don't need the 2 000 or so personnel of UNAMIR who are currently here.

We think the mission, if it is to give confidence and to give some logistic support, can be done by fewer numbers and we have suggested to the Security Council that they only leave a force level of 800.

Question

How has the Security Council received this suggestion?

Answer

We are yet to carry out the negotiations; our Ambassador in New York is involved in meetings on the issue. Generally they agree with us; I think they are satisfied with the extension for three months. They may be having problems with the numbers, but we are yet to agree on that and I think they will have to accept our proposal because we have thought about it carefully; we have done our calculations and we feel that for the task we have defined for UNAMIR, the force level of 800 is adequate.

Question

If UNAMIR is to stay for the suggested three months, are we going to have any change in the mandate and responsibilities, or is it just the reduction in the numbers?

Answer

We are going to have change in the mandate. UNAMIR will stay, just to support logistically the UNHCR and other agencies involved in the repatriation of refugees.

It will also be involved in assisting the Rwanda Government through monitoring tasks to give that confidence for the refugees to return.

So we have focussed the mission of UNAMIR on the issue of the repatriation of refugees and we just want to wait and see if it will assist as people claim.

NEWS 7-12-95

Dans un communiqué de la vice-présidence lu à la mi journée sur Radio Rwanda, , le gouvernement rwandais a accepté la prolongation du mandat de la MINUAR comme l'avait souhaité Jimmy carter, l'ex président américain et d'autres pays amis jugeant la présence de la MINUAR nécessaire.

L'effectif de la MINUAR sera toutefois réduit jusqu'à 800 personnes et la mission sera revue.

Ce communiqué vient d'être annoncé par le Conseiller à la Vice - présidence, MR CLAUDE DUSAYIDI.

Il faut noter, que c'est la toute dernière prolongation du mandat de la MINUAR.

Voici ce qui a été diffusé par Radio Rwanda à la mi-journée.

le gouvernement rwandais a demandé à 38 organisations non gouvernementales de cesser leurs activités au Rwanda. Parmi ces organisations, les plus connues sont Medecins Sans Frontières-France et MSF-Suisse, ainsi que Médecins du Monde, Terre des Hommes, Austrian Relief Program et Care Australia.

18 autres ONG doivent suspendre leurs opérations dans l'attente d'une clarification de leurs dossiers. Reste 102 ONG qui ont le droit d'exercer légalement leurs activités au Rwanda.

Ces décisions annoncées hier en fin d'après-midi par le Ministère de la Réhabilitation n'ont pas provoqué de réactions immédiates de la part des ONG. Seul hier soir MSF-France a déclaré avoir appris avec stupeur la decision les concernant.

Les organisations non gouvernementales francaises représentent près de la moitié de la liste des 38 exclus. Ces ONG sont réunies au centre culturel franco rwandais à Kigali cet après-midi.

Le gouvernement rwandais disait hier que ces ONG qui doivent partir n'ont pas respecté les conventions signées avec le gouvernement, ou bien ont eu des problèmes avec les autorités locales, ou encore ont tout simplement mené des activités incompatibles avec leur statut.

4 enfants ont été blessés par l'explosion d'une mine anti-personnel au groupe scolaire Saint André, dans le quartier de Nyamirambo. Cet incident s'est produit lundi dernier. Un enfant a perdu une jambe, les trois autres souffrent de blessures mineures.

186 réfugiés rwandais sont revenus hier dans leur pays. 156 en provenance du Zaïre, 28 de Tanzanie, et 2 d'Ouganda.

L'APR a conduit une opération de sécurité et de recherches dans la ville de Gisenyi, mardi dernier. Les résultats de cette opération

MEMORANDUM

To: List D
From: Force PAO, Lt(N) Page *WJR* *Vu*
Date: 21 Nov 95 *WS*
Subject: Articles Requested For The Third UNAMIR REVIEW

1. Just a friendly reminder that articles for the third issue of the "UNAMIR REVIEW" are due by Monday, 4 December.

2. It is requested that, at the minimum, each company and contingent contribute at least one article for the next issue - the contributions for the last issue helped make it a great success.

3. As this could be the last issue of the UNAMIR REVIEW due to a possible end of the mandate, it is requested that each Contingent/Unit provide a summary of their activities, contributions, important events, etc that have occurred during their tour. This will serve as a great keepsake for everyone to take home with them. Of course, if the mandate is extended, these summaries will also serve as a bookend marking the end of the current mandate

4. Articles should be dropped off by Mon, 4 December, to my office, room 2005, UNAMIR HQ or faxed to me at 11278.

5. Everyone is encouraged to contribute something - all languages welcome (so long as the letters can be found on a standard computer keyboard!) - and it is hoped, of course, that you will do so.

5. In addition to the required contingent/unit summaries, other suggested articles could include:

- a. company/contingent achievements/updates;
- b. personal experiences;
- c. personnel profiles;
- d. humorous articles/antecedotes;
- e. information on your country;
- f. the ever-popular "Top Ten List of ...";
- g. information on the history of your unit;
- h. milobs experiences in the field;
- i. poems;
- j. CO's messages; and,
- k. anything you find of interest which is related to our mission here in Rwanda.

6. Thanks for your support. If you have any questions please call me at 11124.

Reçu le 23 NOV. 1995



Office of the Spokesman

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1995 DEC -4 P 6:52

DATE: 4 December 1995

TO: KHAN UNAMIR Kigali	FROM: KITTANI DPKO New York <i>H. Kittani</i>
FAX NO: 3-3090	FAX NO: (212) 963-4879 ROOM S-3720
SUBJECT: Extension of UNAMIR mandate/New killings	

TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 4

As discussed, please find attached, for your information,
three Reuter reports entitled:

- (a) "Rwanda says UN may stay the troops must go"
(2 December);
- (b) "UN says Rwanda opposes mandated renewal"
(2 December);
- (c) "New killings reported in Rwanda" (4 December).

Regards.

*Vu**ws*

Reçu le - 5 DEC. 1995

SRSG

Rwanda says U.N. may stay but its troops must go

(Adds President Bizimungu's remarks, previous NAIROBI)

KIGALI, Dec 2 (Reuters) - President Pasteur Bizimungu said on Saturday the 1,800 U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda should leave when their mandate expires on December 8, but he was prepared to discuss a modified role for the U.N. mission.

"(The stay of) peacekeepers is not an option. We do not need armed (foreign) soldiers here," he said in a wide-ranging news conference in the capital Kigali.

"We agree on the principle of an extension to the U.N. mission but modalities have to be discussed between Rwanda and the United Nations," Bizimungu said.

Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government blames the U.N. forces for failure to stop the 1994 slaughter of a million Tutsis and allied Hutus. While troops and militia of the previous Hutu-led government carried out the mass killings, the U.N. garrison in Kigali was reduced to a bare minimum.

Western donors including Washington have been negotiating with Rwanda to renew the peacekeeping mandate to help repatriate 1.7 million Hutu refugees who fled to Zaire and Tanzania in fear of reprisals for the Hutus' role in the genocide.

Bizimungu said Rwanda will put forward proposals to the United Nations on the size, duration and the mission of any future U.N. presence. Rwanda wants more doctors and engineers for reconstruction.

Senior Western diplomats say the United Nations is not expected to bargain with the Rwandan government and is unlikely to come up with a new offer before the present mandate expires.

A spokesman for the U.N. Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) said it was awaiting a formal statement from the Rwandan government on its position towards the peacekeepers.

"But, apparently the government's position as far as we know, has not actually changed. UNAMIR's mandate expires on 8th of December and the Rwandan government does not intend to ask for it to be renewed," UNAMIR spokesman Ismail Diallo told Radio France Internationale in an interview monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, mediating a regional peace summit in Cairo this week with leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire, said on Wednesday Rwanda had agreed to his request to extend the U.N. mandate by three months.

"What came out of Cairo was Carter's wishful thinking. We never agreed to automatically extending the present mandate," said a senior government official who asked not to be named.

Bizimungu said no timetable for repatriation of Rwandan refugees in Zaire was discussed in Cairo.
Reut13:51 12-02-95

(Adds U.N. comment, previous KIGALI)

NAIROBI, Dec 2 (Reuters) - The Rwandan government is continuing to oppose renewing the mandate for the 1,800 U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda due to expire next week, a United Nations official said on Saturday.

Ismail Diallo, spokesman for the U.N. Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) told Radio France Internationale: "We are waiting to see an official government document that either reiterates its stated position -- which was that the UNAMIR mandate would not be extended beyond 8th December -- or else informs us of a new position.

"But, apparently the government's position as far as we know, has not actually changed. UNAMIR's mandate expires on 8th of December and the Rwandan government does not intend to ask for it to be renewed."

The interview was monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

Senior government officials said in Kigali on Saturday that Rwanda opposed any extension of UNAMIR's mandate but might consider unspecified changes to its mission.

Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, mediating a regional peace summit in Cairo this week with leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire, said on Wednesday Rwanda had agreed to his request to extend the U.N. mandate by three months.

What came out of Cairo was Carter's wishful thinking. We never agreed to automatically extending the present mandate, said a senior government official who asked not to be named.

The official said Rwanda was open to suggestions from U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on introducing changes to the U.N. mandate in line with its needs for reconstructing the country devastated by last year's genocide and civil war.

"We want more doctors and engineers but we don't want the soldiers. For us, the present U.N. mandate is a useless mandate," said a second senior government official who asked not to be identified.

"All President Pasteur Bizimungu told Carter in Cairo was that he (Rwanda) was ready to consider proposals by Boutros-Ghali," he added.

Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government blames the U.N. forces for failure to stop the 1994 slaughter of a million Tutsis and allied Hutus. While troops and militia of the previous Hutu-led government carried out the mass killings, the U.N. garrison in Kigali was reduced to a bare minimum.

Western donors including Washington have been negotiating with Rwanda to renew the peacekeeping mandate to help repatriate 1.7 million Hutu refugees who fled to Zaire and Tanzania in fear of reprisals for the Hutus' role in the genocide.

New killings reported in Rwanda

KIGALI, Dec 4, (Reuters) - Armed men in uniform killed 20 Rwandans, mostly women and children, in a settlement in the southwestern Nyungwe forest, scene of an extremist Hutu insurgency, U.N. human rights officials said on Monday.

Spokesman Lee Woodyear of the U.N. Human Rights Operation in Rwanda, said the defence ministry was investigating the killings which took place early on November 25.

Human rights observers saw some 20 bodies in the area including nine women and seven children, Woodyear said. There were other bodies dumped in a river and nearby hills according to accounts from witnesses, he added.

The identities of the killers and the motivation behind the attack are not known, Woodyear said.

U.N. officials said the victims appeared to be internally displaced Hutus from the southwestern Kibeho camp where hundreds of refugees were killed in an attack in April by soldiers of Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated army.

Defence ministry spokesman Jean-Marie Jabo said he had no information on the killings.

Areas bordering Zaire in southwestern and northwestern Rwanda are hit by an insurgency campaign by militias of the Hutu majority, based in refugee camps in eastern Zaire.

The Hutu militias and members of Rwanda's defeated former government army were responsible for last year's genocide of up to a million ethnic Tutsis and allied Hutus.

They fled to Zaire and Tanzania together with two million Hutu refugees after Tutsi-led rebels swept to power last July.

The rebels, who in recent months have stepped up their attacks inside Rwanda, were dealt a big blow early in November after the Rwandan army attacked their base on Iwawa, a small island in Rwandan territory on Lake Kivu.

Government soldiers killed several hundred members of the former government army amillias in the raid on Iwawa and uncovered bunkers and new weapons including brand new land mines made in Italy, defence ministry officials said.

Last week, former prime minister Faustin Twagiramungu claimed that the army had killed more than 250,000 Hutus since the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) took power last year.

Independent human rights groups and U.N. personnel say they are concerned at the RPF's behaviour over the last 12 months, but little firm evidence of large-scale atrocities has emerged.
Reut06:28 12-04-95

REULBviaNewsEDGE



NOTE TO THE SRSG

Subject: UNAMIR's mandate - Security Council Resolution 1029 (1995)

1. By concentrating the new mandate on activities aimed at facilitating the voluntary return of the refugees, the Security Council has implicitly given UNAMIR a regional role. Under Security Council resolution 1029 (1995), UNAMIR is expected to "exercise its good offices to assist in achieving the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees within the frame of reference of the recommendations of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region, and in promoting genuine national reconciliation".
2. Such a role of good offices implies not only talking to the Rwandese Government but also discussing with the signatories of the recommendations of the above conference and summit. Furthermore, it calls for some initiatives that may help to persuade the refugees to return.
3. In this connection, unless we are authorized to cross the borders and speak directly to the refugees, Radio UNAMIR would continue to be our only channel of communication with those still in the camps. It is therefore essential that we make the best use of that important tool for the fulfilment of our new and last mandate.
4. To that end, some of the suggestions contained in my note of 11 August 1995 (copy attached), particularly those concerning the preparation, in cooperation with the Rwandese Government, of special and specific programmes for the camps, may be considered.
5. We may also seek clarification from Headquarters as to whether the exercise of our good offices, as recommended in resolution 1029 (1995), includes conducting rounds of consultations with the neighbouring countries to persuade them to implement the decisions of the Bujumbura Conference and the Cairo Summit.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
14 December 1995

CONTRIBUTIONS
POUR UN RENOUVEAU DE RADIO MINUAR
ET L'ADAPTATION DE SES PROGRAMMES AUX EXIGENCES
DU NOUVEAU MANDAT DE LA MINUAR
 (Résolution 997 (1995) du Conseil de Sécurité)

I. OBJECTIF

- i) Aider le Gouvernement Rwandais dans ses efforts de réconciliation nationale;
- ii) Faciliter le retour volontaire des réfugiés et leur réintégration dans leurs communautés d'origine;
- iii) A cet effet aider le Gouvernement à créer un climat de confiance.

II. PROPOSITIONS DE PROGRAMMES

1. Création d'une émission spéciale à l'intention des camps de réfugiés

Cette émission doit porter un titre et avoir son propre indicatif. Le titre pourrait en être "Forum Rwandais".

Durée de l'émission: une heure.

Fréquence: 5 fois par semaine.

Contenu: interviews de personnalités et de réfugiés (ceux des camps et ceux revenus au pays) sur les thèmes de la réconciliation, du retour au pays, des conditions de vie dans les camps, des conditions de sécurité à l'intérieur du Rwanda...le tout entrecoupé de très brèves plages de musique africaine.

2. Création d'une émission sur l'ONU

Cette émission comporterait deux volets:

i) Un volet consacré au 50e anniversaire de l'ONU

Celui-ci serait composé d'une série d'émissions d'une heure chacune retraçant la genèse et l'histoire des Nations Unies, ses idéaux, ses réalisations au cours de ces cinquante dernières années. Ces émissions seraient faites de commentaires éditoriaux, d'interviews de spécialistes, de professeurs, de représentants des agences des Nations Unies au Rwanda...etc. Parmi les réalisations des Nations Unies, une place spéciale serait faite à la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme. Il est proposé que cette émission, qui pourrait être baptisée "ONU-50", commence le 1er septembre et continue jusqu'à la fin de la 50e session de l'Assemblée Générale en Décembre 1995 à raison de 5 émissions par semaine.

ii) Un Volet actualité

Celui-ci serait consacré à la vie de tous les jours à l'ONU: compte-rendu de réunions, examen des décisions importantes des divers organes de l'ONU, interviews de personnalités sur des sujets d'actualité à l'ONU, interviews de membres du Conseil de Sécurité sur les débats concernant le Rwanda ou d'autres sujets (africains notamment) soumis à l'examen du Conseil. Cette émission pourrait se dénommer "ONU-ACTUALITES". Elle serait d'une durée de 30 à 45 minutes, diffusée 3 fois par semaine. Cette émission pourrait commencer avec l'examen par le Conseil de Sécurité du rapport du Secrétaire-Général sur le Rwanda.

III. CONSIDERATIONS D'ORDRE GENERAL ET TECHNIQUE

3. Il semble que les autorités Rwandaises aient maintenant donné leur accord pour le transfert au Mont REBERO de l'antenne principale actuellement au siège. Il faut donc accélérer le processus de ce transfert et installer le plus tôt possible les relais nécessaires devant permettre d'atteindre les camps de réfugiés à GOMA et BUKAVU.
4. Mettre au point un programme à l'intention des camps de réfugiés qui comprendrait, entre autres, des interviews avec des réfugiés et des hommes politiques, est une opération délicate dont le caractère éminemment politique n'échappe à personne. Il est donc recommandé de discuter d'abord l'approche et les grandes lignes du programme avec les autorités compétentes avant de commencer la diffusion. Cela demande aussi, une fois lancé le programme, une vigilance de tous les instants pour éviter les dérapages.
5. On ne gère pas un programme de cette nature sans une surveillance constante de la ligne politique suivie par les émissions. Il est donc proposé de doter notre radio d'un Conseil d'Administration dont le rôle serait, entre autres, de s'assurer que les moyens mis en oeuvre sont conformes aux objectifs politiques à atteindre, d'évaluer l'impact de nos programmes sur les populations-cibles et de prendre des décisions en ce qui concerne la gestion de la radio. Il est proposé que le Conseil d'Administration soit composé comme suit:

Le Représentant Spécial du Secr.-Gén.....Président
 Le Directeur Exécutif.....VicePrésident
 Le Conseiller Politique Spécial.....membre
 Le Conseiller Juridique.....membre
 Le Chef de l'Administration.....membre
 Un représentant des Agences de l'ONU.....membre
 Le Porte-Parole de la MINUAR.....membre ex officio
 Le Chef de l'Unité Radio.....membre ex officio

Le Conseil devrait se réunir une fois par semaine en session ordinaire et, lorsque nécessaire, en session extraordinaire.

6. Il est proposé également que les horaires de diffusion soient réajustés et que la possibilité d'émettre également le matin soit examinée. La vie dans le pays ayant repris un cours quasi normal, peut-être faudrait-il envisager de commencer les émissions du soir à 17 ou 18 heures et en prolonger la durée jusqu'à 22 heures.
7. D'autre part, il paraît souhaitable d'éviter les longues diffusions de musique non-stop. Celle-ci ne devrait en principe pas constituer un programme en elle-même mais servir de lien entre les programmes. A ce sujet, il faudrait, autant que possible, donner la préférence à la musique africaine dans les émissions en langues locales.
8. Signalons enfin que les émissions prévues au paragraphe 2 alinéas i) et ii) ci-dessus supposent une collaboration étroite avec le service radio et video du Département de l'information au siège à New York. Ce service que nous avons contacté nous a laissé entendre que son personnel est prêt à coopérer à ce sujet et qu'il en avait déjà fait l'offre à maintes reprises. On nous a assuré à ce sujet qu'il existe entre le siège et notre service radio les moyens techniques permettant de transmettre instantanément par téléphone enregistreur des interviews ou autres documents sonores de New York pour diffusion par notre radio à Kigali.

IV. CONCLUSION

9. Les suggestions ci-dessus ne sont que quelques idées qui pourraient servir de base de discussions. Elles sont donc loin d'avoir fait le tour de la question. Elles n'ont pas abordé, par exemple, la question des contraintes techniques éventuelles. Ce document ne traite pas non plus des moyens tant en personnel qu'en matériel à mettre en oeuvre pour la réalisation de ces idées. Mais nous avons pensé qu'en définissant d'abord les objectifs et les programmes correspondants, il serait plus facile d'évaluer les moyens de les réaliser.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
11 Août 1995



Mr. W. de Souza

TO: Amb. Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

DATE: 13 December 1995

FROM: Ismaël A. Diallo *Ismaël*
Spokesman, UNAMIR

SUBJECT: Practical Strategies for New Mandate

A. Introduction

1. The opinions expressed in this note were conceived and drafted before December 8, 1995 when the Security Council formally met on Rwanda. UNAMIR's mandate has been since extended for a further period of three months in Resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, 1995.

2. The subsequent reading of that resolution has convinced me more of the imperative need for UNAMIR to take the direction outlined in the following proposals.

B. Background

3. If we accept that the mere presence of UNAMIR has contributed to the normalization of life in Rwanda, we cannot say as much with respect to the desired goal of mass repatriation of refugees in neighbouring countries.

4. We may add, as a corollary to the above, that such a presence for a further period of three months would not achieve much in terms of incentive for massive waves of returning refugees.

5. Undoubtedly, UNAMIR's confidence building role inside Rwanda has had a trickle effect in the camps without, however, registering the desired impact for solving the refugee problem and helping in a major way to achieve national reconciliation.

6. The new mandate, unlike the previous three under UNAMIR II, is totally focussed on the refugee repatriation exercise and calls, therefore, for creative initiatives and practical strategies in order to accomplish the new mission.

C. Proposals

1. Joint Teams

(a) It is imperative to establish joint teams consisting of Government officials from Ministries of Rehabilitation, Internal Affairs and Social Affairs, UNAMIR

officials, both civilian and military, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR officers and local representatives of the population in the communes.

(b) These teams would physically visit the refugee camps in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania and talk to the refugees there in a bid to reassure them of safe repatriation. Host countries will, of course, be advised in advance.

(c) The teams would organize visits of refugee representatives to their respective communes so as to witness the security prevailing there and take back the message of positive information to the camps.

(d) The joint teams would also visit communes across the country, to get first-hand information on the situation there prior to convincing the refugees to return home and would subsequently continue to monitor the reintegration of the returnees.

(e) The members of these teams would be constantly on the move, spending over half their time in the communes and refugee camps during the three-month extension.

2. Radio UNAMIR

(a) A colleague's views

- (i) A colleague in my office, who got close to the Radio Section during my two-month absence, has strong views about the parochial, sectionalist spirit of the Radio management, which is too wrapped into itself to value the great potential of inputs from other UNAMIR sections, especially within the OSRSG.
- (ii) In that self-inflicted isolation, the Radio management does not set any programmes of work, not even weekly schedules, on the basis of which the colleagues in OSRSG can formulate contributions, in a collegial approach that is imperative if the Radio has to function as Radio UNAMIR and not simply as a section of UNAMIR.
- (iii) At the same time, the Radio section remains fragmented within: heads of programmes hold daily meetings and proceed to give assignments to their journalists, who complain of being denied a chance to contribute ideas, as professionals, for the better running of programmes. In fact there are no programmes as such; there are only language units that are called programmes, which is a misnomer.
- (iv) Heads of programmes are in constant touch with external news agencies, giving out information that is sometimes more interpretational than factual, which may lead to the phenomenon of "**uncoordinated troop movement**" with respect to the work of the Spokesman's Office.
- (v) Other colleagues in OSRSG have aired strong criticism about the poor quality of Radio Rwanda News Summary, which is sent to the SRSG without any effort at editing and which reflects badly on the

professionalism within UNAMIR, among the many UN Offices that receive the daily summary.

Note: The above observations come from the Information Officer (UNV) in my office, who stands by every statement made above and requests a review of the whole matter.

(b) New approach

- (i) Whatever the veracity of the above criticism, there is need to formulate a clear strategy for Radio programmes under the new mandate.
- (ii) There is also need to associate more the colleagues in OSRSG in the policy-making exercise aimed at that reorientation.
- (iii) In that connection, weekly or fortnightly plans of work for Radio programmes should be discussed at OSRSG meetings so that colleagues may add their inputs and help boost the impact of Radio UNAMIR.
- (iv) Under the proposed reorientation, Radio UNAMIR should focus more on contacts with the population in the communes to bridge the information gap with the refugee camps.
- (v) That would entail exchange of messages among relatives inside and outside the country (in refugee camps) for a more concrete effort at confidence building and fighting disinformation in refugee camps.
- (vi) Such activities would be more effective than current trends devoted to news coverage of various seminars and visits of personalities, which coverage should be of secondary importance under the new mandate.
- (vii) It would also help if Radio UNAMIR management could establish better working relations with Radio Rwanda, without of course having to compromise its objectivity, and set up structural collaboration with other UN agencies, IOM, ICRC and other major NGOs involved in assisting the refugees and interested in their repatriation.

3. Mandate Commission

(a) In anticipation of further negotiations expected to take place prior to the end of the new mandate on 8 March 1996, the ground-work could start immediately, with the setting up of a Government-UNAMIR Commission as soon as possible.

(b) The Commission would oversee the implementation of the new mandate and iron out differences that tend to undermine cooperation with the Government.

(c) This would help avoid last moment recriminations that have sprung up in discussions just before the end of previous mandates.

(d) More significantly, the Commission would study the nature and functions of the proposed body that will replace UNAMIR after 8 March 1996, with a consensus on the post-UNAMIR cooperation between the Government and the UN.

(e) That Commission should finalize its recommendations in the third week of January 1996, so that they may serve as guidelines for the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 1 February 1996.

4. Inter-Agency Publication

(a) The concerted efforts of UN agencies in the repatriation exercise will require a special publication highlighting the operation, under UNAMIR coordination.

(b) To avoid fragmentation of those efforts, there should be a clear policy setting up a data centre for compilation and processing of information on repatriation and related activities.

(c) In case of financial limitations on the part of UNAMIR, whose budget for public information now stands at only US\$ 10,000, the UN partners could pool together resources for a joint publication.

(d) The project would involve three issues - one by January 10, 1996, one on 15 February and the last before 8 March - to be produced in English, French and Kinyarwanda.

N.B.: The suggestions above have been intentionally made brief to avoid taking too much of your time. Similar views may have been already formulated by your Office. Whatever decisions are taken on what UNAMIR will do to accomplish its mandate during the coming three months, it is worth noting that this is the last opportunity for the Mission to win over its critics and leave Rwanda after 8 March 1996 with confidence and a clear conscience. This would at least avert the prospect of confirming Mr. Dusaidi's assertions that Rwanda has agreed upon the mandate renewal "not because [Rwanda] believes that actually UNAMIR can assist, as it has been here for a year and a half and no significant numbers of refugees have come back because of UNAMIR per se".



Office of the Spokesman

**SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS THE MANDATE OF
UNAMIR UNTIL 12 DECEMBER 1995**

Resolution 1028 (1995) adopted unanimously
8 December 1995

Text of the Resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) of 1 December 1995 (S/1995/1002),

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR for a period expiring on 12 December 1995;
 2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
-