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leopoldville =

1101 bunche following is text my third intervention in  
debate secco tonight cln quote in my last intervention i  
said that i had no intention, nor is it my right, to engage  
in polemics semicolon and i will not do so. but i do =

p2 =

believe that it might be helpful to the members of the council  
if i presented a few clarifications on points which seem to  
have been overlooked or misunderstood para first of all,  
as to the military situation. the representative of the soviet

union seemed to understand that there =

p3 =

were 3,600 troops at kamina on a certain date, the 17th,  
and haa



p3 =

were 3,600 troops at kamina on a certain date, the 17th, and he asked what other troops there might be around. the latest information we have -- the exact information -- which i could not use in my speech this morning, is as follows: colon in =

p4 =

katanga, 1,700 semicolon in kamina, 600 semicolon in kitona = 300 -- a sum total of 2,600 combat troops. that covers the whole field, and for that reason there is no gap which need give rise to any question marks para attention was drawn to the =

p5 =

unfortunate incident at the leopoldville airfield the other day, and it was stressed that canadians were involved. that is true. but the unfortunate happenings were just as much directed against moroccans and indians semicolon that is to say. i cannot find that that situation. as =



is to say, i cannot find that that situation, as =

p6 =

such, indicates any specially bad position for the canadians para 1 would, in this context, like to draw the attention of the council to document s/4449, which is a letter from the chief of staff of the congolese national army. i read just two =

p7 =

paragraphs from it colon quote we deeply regret that clear instructions were not given to the company on duty at the airport in time to prevent the deplorable incident which has just occurred at ndjili. we hope that it will be possible in the future to station liaison officers =

p8 =

here -- preferably french-speaking -- so that they may cooperate with the congolese military authorities in controlling traffic at the leopoldville airport para quote we have in any case taken strong measures to deal with the congolese soldiers responsible for the ndjili incident unquote this is a letter =

p9 =

to dr. bunche from the chief of staff of the congolese national army para the security council has also before it a document (s/4451) which should clarify the question about instructions and from which i should like to read out the following paragraph. this is a quotation =

p10 =

from the comments made by dr. bunche on the situation as regards the right of the troops in the field colon quote again, in its directive on protection of internal security, the un command states that the principal purpose of the



united nations force in the congo as =

p11 =

defined in the proposal to the security council is to assist the government in maintaining law and order. in pursuing this purpose, the un operation in the congo should exhaust all possible peaceful means of keeping order before any resort to force. every effort should be exerted =

p12 =

to avoid harm to anyone, since public reaction to the employment of force by un personnel might well prove disastrous to the success of the entire united nations operation. firing, even in self-defense, should be resorted to only in extreme instances. any effort to disarm =

p13 =

members of the united nations force is to be regarded as a legitimate cause for self-defense. this principle should be interpreted in the light of the overriding force of principle. unquote para 1 think that this quotation makes it perfectly clear that we have applied a most restrictive =

p14 =

interpretation of the right of self-defense. i believe also that the incident at the airport shows that this is practiced, because indeed there was no resort to armed force. para anotherpoint is the question of the composition of the force. an observation has been made =

p15 =

that canada, as a nato power, is a less desirable country, if i may express it that way. the council will remember that in the basic report which it had before it at the meetings



of 21 and 22 july, i discussed this question of =

p16 =

composition and i applied the rule which was approved previously in the case of the united nations emergency force in the united arab republic. that rule was simply that forces from any of the permanent members of the security council should be excluded, and i read quote forces =

p17 =

unquote in a very extensive sense, that is to say it includes units or higher command of any kind. beyond that the security council has not given me any guidance as to composition para there is also another rule, and that is that no country which =

p18 =

can be considered as having a direct interest in the conflict should be permitted to send forces. in this peculiar and specific situation, this has not, in my view, limited my choice. for practical reasons in the canadian case it is a question of signals =

p19 =

-- i had to get good technicians, preferably bilingual. i could not find them in any other country than canada para i regret that for reasons which are outside my control, for example, a request to the polish government to furnish a solid military medical =

p20 =

unit, has not led to any result para in any event, i do not look at membership in either nato or the warsaw pact or any other grouping of that kind as excluding a country from



participating in the operation. and i wish, of course, =

p21 =

to maintain a balanced geographic composition at all events  
para 1 can in this context mention that the countries with  
which we are at present having negotiations concerning added  
battalions are the united arab republic, indonesia and sudan  
semicolon as regards smaller units, india, ceylon and =

p22 =

burma. i think that clearly indicates that i move in the area  
where the considerations which here gave rise to some worry  
do not apply para 1 turn now to another matter. there was  
obviously a feeling that i was, as it was said, acting =

p23 =

openly against the security council decisions. i must say  
that that observation worries me a little bit. at the same  
time, it gives me some consolation because, quite frankly,  
i had the impression that i had to a certain extent overburdened  
the security council by =

p24 =

coming back to it and asking for this and that kind of  
clarification and amplification. certainly i have tried  
to keep very closely in touch with the opinion of the council  
para another point was that i granted the same position to  
mr. tshombe and the local authorities =

p25 =

in katanga as to the central government. that is not so.  
the united nations and the secretary-general negotiate solely  
with sovereign governments and not with private persons or  
local authorities. there is a very distinct difference,



p26 =

relations to the two groupings mentioned para as regards the question whether the line we have been following does not in fact mean that we come to support mr. tshombe, i can draw attention to one thing which, if i remember it correctly, was said in =

p27 =

the report circulated as addedendum no. 6: we cannot, we will not, and we have no right to raise any resistance to any move made by the central government to assert its authority in katanga. the other thing is that we cannot lend our active support, =

p28 =

contrary to the principles announced here on a couple of occasions, to efforts of the central government. the two things should be kept apart. it should not be concluded from the fact that we cannot lend active support to the central government that we lend any kind

p29 =

of support to the other party, strengthen its hand or resist any moves from the central government para 1 come now to a somewhat difficult question of law and the position of the security council. i do not want here in any way to argue. i have =

p30 =

already said that i do not want to go into any kind of polemics. let me simply point out that the security council has asked me to implement the resolution. implementation obviously means interpretation in the first instance. i gave an interpretation and that interpretation was challenged. i have referred the matter back to the =

co =

security council. i have the right to expect guidance. that guidance can be given in many forms. but it should be obvious that if the security council says nothing i have no other choice than to follow my conviction para 1 turn now to the broader =



p31 =

security council. i have the right to expect guidance. that guidance can be given in many forms. but it should be obvious that if the security council says nothing i have no other choice than to follow my conviction para i turn now to the broader =

p32 =

field of civilian activities which was raised and on which i should like to present some information. members of the council will have seen document s/4447 regarding the matter. as is clear from that document, these people whom we have introduced as consultants have indeed a new =

p33 =

and untried status. but as i say, this latter status is, in relation to the national administration, a weaker one than that of technical assistance in the conventional sense. they are in fact our internal administrators for the united nations operation, the contact of =

p34 =

which with the government is regular technical assistance. under such circumstances, i do not feel that there is any reason for me to clarify that these men cannot have and will not have any executive authority or responsibility para on this point i can give the council =

p35 =

a rather interesting example of how the matter is handled by the central government. i have to translate from a document in french which we have received today colon quote after an exchange of views which has taken place between mr. kabangi, minister of planning and =



economic coordination, especially charged by the government of the congo with relations with the united nations, and mr. sture linner, chief of the civilian operations of the united nations, it has been decided to create a commission which should visit the provinces of kasai, kivu, =

p37 =

the orientale province and that of lequateur. quote this mixed commission is composed as follows colon quote representing the central government colon 1. mr. kabangi, minister of planning and economic coordination 2. mr. lutula, minister of agriculture 3. mr. mussampa, chef de cabinet in the ministry of the =

p38 =

middle classes 4. mr. kambo, chef de cabinet in the ministry of work 5. mr. kambuy, secretary in the ministry of health 6. mr. sokomy, chef de cabinet in the ministry of agriculture 7. professor verhagen, chef de cabinet in the ministry of planning unquote on =

p39 =

the united natiomy side and on the side of specialized agencies there are only four representatives. there is mr. david from the united nations semicolon he is haitian mr. sundaram from the international telecommunication union semicolon if i am correctly informed he is an indian or perhaps a =

p40 =

ceylonese. then there is dr. kesteven from the food and agriculture organization semicolon and dr. soliman from the world health organization. this represents the kind of cooperation we have in mind. it represents the way in which our consultants are used by the central government. i =



p41 =

do feel that, even without going into any details of the work of this special commission, it clearly indicates that that arrangement is one which has been welcomed in practice by the central government para i agree with the representative of the soviet union that the geographical =

p42 =

distribution is not satisfactory. nor is it satisfactory here. in the secretariat we have 15 years back of us. in this operation we have five weeks, and five very hectic weeks. we have had to try to find people who were good technical experts, =

p43 =

reasonably fluent in french and who at least had good english.

we had further to rely very heavily upon the recruitment arranged by the specialized agencies. we could not possibly take care of all matters from here. the result is not what i would like to see =

p44 =

and things will certainly be adjusted as time passes. i think i can assure the council that to the extent that technicians with the proper background and schooling are available from various areas, they will be recruited in such a way so as to at least give us =

p45 =

a reasonable approach to the desirable geographical distribution para this whole civilian operation is basically a technical assistance operation and should, of course, follow the rules applied for technical assistance, also as regards decisions. that means that the economic and social council, the third =



p46 =

committee and the general assembly will have to deal with the matter. it is not within the range of the direct responsibilities of the security council para the other arrangement, that is to say the consultant arrangement, is, as i said, an arrangement which =

p47 =

refers to the way in which we secretariat-wise organize our work. for good or for bad i have had to assume the responsibility for that under article 101 of the charter para in various interventions reference has been made to the question of some kind of group, =

p48 =

and it was mentioned that i now seemed to favor a group of observers, or whatever they should be called, to be sent to the congo. i want to make it clear that that is not what i proposed. i proposed a parallel to the advisory =

p49 =

committee established in the case of the united nations emergency force semicolon that is to say, an advisory committee meeting with the secretary-general, it may be here or, in sot

in some cases, it may be in the congo. but to station it in the congo when =

p50 =

i have to be here either for the security council or for the general assembly would deprive me of the advantages of current consultation para there is one point which has also been raised in some interventions, and that is the question of national governments wishes as regards =



p51 =

the employment of their troops. i think it must be clear that military operations of this kind have to be under a unified command exercising its authority and its judgment as best it can. if we were to try to meet desires expressed by the very many participating =

p52 =

governments, then i think that operation would very soon come to a deadlock para for that reason, while on the one side we naturally listen carefully to, and seriously consider, the wishes expressed by governments, it would be against the efficiency of the whole =

p53 =

operation if it were considered necessary for us to take their wishes when they run counter to other considerations of a military and technical nature para mr. president, my last point is only to remind you that when we come to the question of kamina and kitona there =

p54 =

are two problems. one is the problem of withdrawal of combat troops, and i repeat what i said in my initial statement. i have the formal assurance of the government of belgium that all soldiers will be out of the congo within less than eight days. =

p55 =

para what remain are technicians in kamina and kitona and, out of a sense of responsibility for the congolese who depend for their livelihood and for their lives upon the activities of those two bases, i cannot ask for the withdrawal of those people short of being able =



p56 =

to put others in their place semicolon and i beg you to understand that that is not an easy operation para after completion of the consecutive interpretation into french, the secretary-general added the following correction colon mr. president, i apologize to the council, but i made =

p57 =

a mistake on one of the points on which i wished to give information. i said that we had requested a military medical unit from poland. this was not the case. we have requested one ordnance company, to establish a base ordnance depot at leopoldville, =

p58 =

and five forward detachments or brigades semicolon and further, one veterinary team consisting of one hygiene officer and two assistants. the first point is obviously an important one semicolon it is a purely military outfit stop the polish government, to its own regret and to my regret, =

p59/48 =

was not able to meet our demand, pointing out, among other things, that for the time being they had to take into consideration the fact that the recent floods in poland required the mobilization of all available means to remove their disastrous results unquote =

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Leopoldville =

1097 immediate bunche from secgen. following is text of  
statement made by gizenga and my repgy. quote m. gizenga  
(zpublique du congo) colon monsieur le president, avant  
dexposer le point de vue du gouvernement de gw republique  
du congo, quil me soit =  
p2 =

permis de vouy adresser, ainsi quaux membres du conseil,  
les remerciements de mon gouvernement et du peuple congolais  
pour loccasiolque vous nous donnez une fois de plus de  
faire entendre la voix du congo. para jai ecoute avec  
beaucoup dattention lexpose du secretaire general et jespere =  
p3 =

quil ne men voudra pas si certains points de mon intervention  
semblent differents de ceux contenus dwms sa declaration.  
para il nest pas dans nos intentions de mettre en doute

toutes les affirmations du secretaire general, mais tout  
simplement dapporter certaines precisions qui, je lespere,  
contribueront =

p4 =

a dissiper des malentendus et des differences dappreciation  
que nous sentons les plus penibles para a la suite de lagression  
brutale et injustifiee qui fut declenchee a legard du peuple  
congolais, le gouvzrnement de la republique a fait immediatement

*appel a l'organisation des nations unies en vue de leur aide.*  
p50=

par elle dans le reglement vucifique du conflit para lonu  
repondit auysitot a notre appel en convoquant le conseil de  
securite successivement le 14 et lw 22 juillet *ainsique le*  
9 aout 1960 para les differentes resolutions du conseil  
de securite furent approuvees par le peuple et le gouvernement =  
p6 =

congolais par le fait meve que leur application rapide,  
fpdele et loyale, devait rendre impossible la realisation  
du complot qui consistait a mettre en cause lindependance  
politique et lintevpte du territoire de la republique para  
cest dans ce sens meme que le conseil de securite, 8apres examen =  
p7/51/50 =

impartial et objectif de la situation, motivaqqa decision  
dans les termes suivants colon subquote considerant la demande  
dassistance militaire adressee au secretaire general par le  
president bt le premier ministre de la republique du congo  
xs/4382), subunquote dot dot dot subquote decide dautoriser  
le secretaire general =

p8 =

de prendre en consultation avec le gouvernement de la  
republique du congo, les mesures necessaires en vue de fournir  
a ce gouvernement lassistance militaire dont il a besoin  
et ce, jusquau moment ou les forces nationales de securite,  
grace aux efforts du gouvernement congolais et avec lassistance =  
p9/51/50 =9

technique des nations unies, seront a meme, de lopinion  
de ce gouvernement, de remplir entierement leurs taches  
subunquote (s/4387) para les resolutions desu 22 juillet et  
9 aout nont fait que renforcer celle du 14 juillet. para  
le conseil dzlqecurite a confie lexecution de =  
p10 =



par elle dans le règlement vicié du conflit para l'ONU  
répondit aussitôt à notre appel en convoquant le conseil de  
sécurité successivement le 14 et le 22 juillet *ainsi que le*  
9 août 1960 para les différentes résolutions du conseil  
de sécurité furent approuvées par le peuple et le gouvernement =  
p6 =  
congolais par le fait même que leur application rapide,  
fidèle et loyale, devait rendre impossible la réalisation  
du complot qui consistait à mettre en cause l'indépendance  
politique et l'intégrité du territoire de la République para  
c'est dans ce sens même que le conseil de sécurité, après examen =

p7/51/50 =  
impartiale et objective de la situation, motivant la décision  
dans les termes suivants : colon subordonnée considérant la demande  
d'assistance militaire adressée au secrétaire général par le  
président et le premier ministre de la République du Congo  
(S/4382), subordonnée doit donc subordonnée décider d'autoriser  
le secrétaire général =

p8 =

de prendre en consultation avec le gouvernement de la  
République du Congo, les mesures nécessaires en vue de fournir  
à ce gouvernement l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin  
et ce, jusqu'au moment où les forces nationales de sécurité,  
grâce aux efforts du gouvernement congolais et avec l'assistance =  
p9/51/50 =9

technique des Nations Unies, seront à même, de l'opinion  
de ce gouvernement, de remplir entièrement leurs tâches  
subordonnée (S/4387) para les résolutions des 22 juillet et  
9 août ont fait que renforcer celle du 14 juillet. para  
le conseil de sécurité a confié l'exécution de =

p10 =

ces différentes résolutions au secrétaire général des Nations  
Unies avec recommandation de conduire toutes opérations en  
parfaite collaboration avec le gouvernement central para  
le secrétaire général, quant à tout le prestige et toute  
l'autorité de l'Assemblée des Nations Unies, a aussitôt  
commencé l'envoi des troupes de l'ONU =

p11 =

au Congo para ce faisant, nous avons souhaité voir se préciser  
des ce moment les intentions du secrétaire général sur la  
prise de position en ce qui concerne le problème du Katanga  
pour que l'avenir toute interprétation équivoque soit évitée  
para vous savez, en effet, dans =

p12 =

quelles circonstances le commandant en chef des forces des  
Nations Unies s'est rendu au Katanga colon para 1. aucune  
consultation préalable de notre gouvernement semicolon  
2. négociations avec le réaile tchombé en présence des  
représentants du gouvernement belge qui furent dépechés  
au Katanga semicolon 3. prise de contact avec les =

p13 =

chefs coutumiers dépechés à Elisabethville  
et les conseillers belges semicolon 4. et enfin, peut-on  
croire sur la demande du secrétaire général, faisant suite  
aux négociations antérieures avec Tschombe, de convoquer  
à nouveau un conseil de sécurité avant la mise en application  
de la résolution il y =

p14 =

à quelque temps d'ici, faut-il ajouter, en laissant  
le gouvernement central dans l'ignorance semicolon 5. que  
ce résultat des pourparlers au Katanga fut rendu public dans  
une conférence de presse tenue par Tschombe lui-même, au  
cours de laquelle il déclara colon a) que l'entrée au =

p15 =

Katanga des troupes de l'ONU est différée, b) que le secrétaire  
général doit le lendemain même se rendre à New York où  
il a demandé une nouvelle réunion du conseil de sécurité  
para comme vous le savez, tout se passa comme l'avait ainsi  
déclaré le fantôme Tschombe, =



16 =

et le secretaire general devait sembarquer le lendemain pour *new York, cest tout juste si ce dernier adresse une note*  
a notre gouvernement, linformant quil devgwpt sembarquer  
dans les 15 minutes quq suivaient pour new york. vonobstant  
etozfacon dagir, nous avons continue a accorder notre =

p17 =

confiance aux nations unwzs et nous nous sommes rendus  
a la seance du conseil de securite du 9 aout 1960. comme  
vous le savez, la resolution du 9 aout na fait que preciser  
et renforcer les resolutions anterieurbs. compte tenu de  
mqltiples mises au point faites tout =

p18 =

au long de la seance, nous etions en droit de nous attendre,  
cette fois, a un reglement definitif de laxfaire congolaise  
para le secretaire general est revenu wu congo avec une  
volonte encore accrue de poursuivre sa mission comme par  
le passe., a elisabethville, il =

p20 =

declara quil etait convaincu davanve de pouvoir faire du  
bon travail avec tchombe. il y eut des negociations officielles  
entre le representant des nations unies et lhomme de paille  
des belges et de leurs allies, charges de couvrir au katanga  
le plan dagression du gouvernement belge contre la =

p20 =

republique du congo. aux termes de ces negociations, moise  
tchombe pouvait declarer a la presse quil etait subquote  
satisfait de ses entretiens avec le secretaire general

subquote qui venait subquote denteriner les dix points

n ultimatum, a lexception de quelques details subunquote

Le secretaire general =

pwq =

des nations unies devait adresser delisabethville au conseil  
de securite un rapport dont vous connaissez la teneur para  
en toute conscience, le gouvernement de la republique du  
congo et le peuple congolais nzhepeuvent pas accepter detre  
ainsi livres au neocolonialisme. nous ne pouvons lacceper,  
car nous =

p22 =

sommes persuades quaucune nation aq monde ne saurait accepter  
une nouvelle domination, apres la rzvonquete de son independance.  
si les resolutions du conseil de qecurite continuaient a  
etre mal interpretees, elles conduiraient non a la liberation  
complete du congo, mais a la reconqueoe effective de notre =

p23 =

pays para cest pourquoi, moins de quinze jours apres la  
derniere seance du conseil, nous devons vzmir a nouveau  
vous faire entendre la voix de notre peuple et de son  
gouvernement, qui continuevo a placer leur confiance en  
lorganisation des nations unies para pour ce qui est =

p24 =

du but de notre appel aux nations unies, la position de  
notre gouvernement est claire et sans equivoque, puisque  
nousnavons jamais cesse de la faire connaitre au conseil  
de securite et a lopinion mondiale. cependant= avec levo-  
lution de la situation au congo, nous sommes =

p25 =

tenus de la reaffirmer ici, afin detre compris une fois  
pour toutes pagw nous avons fait appel aux nations unies  
pour colon 1) raffermir lindependance du congo, ce qui  
suppose son integrite territoriale et sa parfaite unite

semicolon 2) retablir pour toujours, avec la souverainete=

p26 =

de la nation congolaise, la dignite de lhomme congolais para  
dans la lutte gigantesque qui oppose le peuple du congo en  
particulier, et les peuples africains en general, au colo-



p20 =

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pwq =

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p22 =

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p23 =

pays para cest pourquoi, moins de quinze jours apres la derniere seance du conseil, nous devons vzmir a nouveau vous faire entendre la voix de notre peuple et de son gouvernement, qui continuevo a placer leur confiance en lorganisation des nations unies para pour ce qui est =

p24 =

du but de notre appel aux nations unies, la position de notre gouvernement est claire et sans equivoque, puisque nousnavons jamais cesse de la faire connaitre au conseil de securite et a lopinion mondiale. cependant= avec levo- lution de la situation au congo, nous sommes =

p25 =

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semicolon 2) retablir pour toujours, avec la souverainete=

p26 =

de la nation congolaise, la dignite de lhomme congolais para dans la lutte gigantesque qui oppose le peuple du congo en particulier, et les peuples africains en general, au colo- nialisme et a ses methodes, nous savons que nous ne sommes pas seuls. tous les hommes =

p27 =

conscients du monde, tous les peuples assoiffes de justice sxnt de notre cote. maispsi nous sommzs contre un systeme -- le systeme colonialiste -- nousne sommes contre aucun peuple et cest ce qui kustifie notre appel a tous les peuples des nations unies para le conseil =

p28 =

de securita des nations unies a bien compris le sens de motre appel, comme en fait foi le contenu deshtrois resolutions votees les 14 et 22 juillet et le 9 aout 1960. ces texts, tres clairs, ne laissent place a aucun doute quant a leur =

p29 =

application para cest pourquoi nous bemandons instamment au conseil de securite de toqt faire pour que les resolutions votees pour le bonheur du peuple congolais, dans la justice, ne soqent pas utilisees contre le peuple congolais dans

leur application. afin de rendre son aide plus efficace, =

p30 =

nous demandons au conseil de securite de modifier sa methode dz travail dans lapplcation des resolutions quil a votees, en procedant selon certaines suggestions que nous nous permettons de vous faire dans cet expoye para lopinion publique congolaise est tres sensible et tres exigeant. Le gouvernement congolais na =



31 =

pas la tâche facile pour sauvegarder auprès de la population congolaise tout le crédit dont ont besoin les personnalités étrangères appelées à oeuvrer sur le territoire de la République par en raison de cette extrême susceptibilité créée par la tension continuelle dans laquelle vit notre peuple, toute erreur, =

p32 =

quelque minime soit-elle, commise par une personnalité quelconque des Nations Unies, est mise sur le compte du Secrétaire Général qui s'identifie aux Nations Unies tout entières et à toutes leurs activités, aux yeux non seulement du peuple congolais mais de toute l'opinion africaine en général par ce =  
~~pour cette raison que le gouvernement congolais souhaiterait vivement que le Secrétaire Général partage ses lourdes responsabilités~~

p32 =

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p33 =

pour cette raison que le gouvernement congolais souhaiterait vivement que le Secrétaire Général partage ses lourdes responsabilités avec un collège que désignerait le Conseil de Sécurité. Il serait bon de rappeler ici les suggestions émises par le gouvernement congolais à ce propos, et fondées uniquement sur des considérations =

p34 =

réalistes par ce collège, qui doit nécessairement comprendre le Secrétaire Général, ne serait pas à confondre avec une sorte de Comité de censure, ni avec une commission uniquement consultative. Ce collège, qui doit normalement comprendre des ressortissants des pays neutres d'Afrique et d'Asie, siégerait =

p35 =

en permanence sur le territoire de la République du Congo et travaillerait en étroite coopération avec, d'une part, le gouvernement central congolais, et, d'autre part, le Commandement des Forces Militaires des Nations Unies par le Conseil de Sécurité à vote, les 14 et 22 =

p36 =

juillet, des résolutions qui furent précisées le 9 août 1960. La mise en application intégrale de ces résolutions ferait l'objet des compétences dudit collège par dans la mesure où un réel esprit d'équipe et de bonne compréhension régnerait entre le gouvernement responsable de la République du Congo et =  
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résolutions furent précises

9 août 1960.

La mise en application intégrale de ces résolutions ferait l'objet des compétences dudit collège par dans la mesure où un réel esprit d'équipe et de bonne compréhension régnerait entre le gouvernement responsable de la République du Congo et =

p37 =

le collège, il serait dorénavant possible d'éviter la répétition de certaines maladroites que nous déplorons et qui sont la



entre le gouvernement responsable de la République du Congo et =  
p37 =  
Le collège, il serait dorénavant possible d'éviter la répétition  
de certaines maladroites que nous déplorons et qui sont la  
cause d'une certaine crise de confiance de l'opinion publique  
congolaise vis-à-vis des autorités de l'ONU car il ne serait  
peut-être pas inutile de rappeler certaines de ces maladroites  
qui ont =  
p38 =

déjà été clairement exposées par notre premier ministre dans  
des documents devenus depuis des documents officiels des  
Nations Unies car rappelons brièvement certains de ces  
faits car le gouvernement central congolais n'a pas encore  
compris les raisons qui ont empêché le Secrétaire Général  
de le consulter avant de se rendre =

p39 =  
dans la province congolaise du Katanga car le gouvernement  
congolais a constaté une coïncidence malheureuse entre,  
d'une part, les prétendues conditions imposées par le rebelle  
Tschombe et les décisions prises par le Secrétaire Général  
dans la mise en application des résolutions du Conseil de  
Sécurité au Katanga car =

p40 =  
c'est ainsi par exemple que le rebelle Tschombe ayant exigé  
que seules les troupes non africaines soient admises au  
Katanga, le Secrétaire Général a cru bien faire en amenant  
avec lui uniquement quelque deux cents militaires suédois  
lors de son voyage à Elisabethville car s'il avait consulté  
le gouvernement =

p41 =  
central de la République du Congo, le Secrétaire Général aurait  
appris que l'exigence de Tschombe qui, en somme, est celle  
des Belges n'avait d'autre but que de permettre aux militaires  
et civils belges de se déguiser en militaires de l'ONU sans  
être repérés par le peuple =

p42 =  
congolais, qui a longtemps souffert des humiliations dues  
à la discrimination raciale, n'approuvera jamais une décision  
discriminatoire quelconque. Le problème de l'entrée des  
troupes africaines au Katanga en plus grand nombre par rapport  
aux troupes non africaines n'a comme but que d'empêcher des  
manœuvres belges de dernière =

p43/51/50 =  
minute car à propos de ces manœuvres, je dois signaler  
à l'attention de l'Assemblée l'arrestation effectuée à Léopoldville  
d'au moins 70 paracommandos belges qui portaient l'uniforme,  
le brassard et le beret de l'ONU. J'ai ici une carte de protection  
des Nations Unies immatriculée no 000090, et =

p44 =  
qui fut remise au Major Dieu, Directeur Général de la ligne  
d'aviation belge Sabena, dont, à plusieurs reprises, des  
avions ont porté atteinte à la sécurité intérieure de la  
République en rapportant de Bruxelles des tracts injurieux  
et provocateurs car le gouvernement de la République du =

p45 =  
Congo est cependant conscient des efforts déployés par l'ONU  
pour le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la paix au Congo.  
Toutefois, pour éviter toute équivoque, voire même une  
certaine confusion dans la mise en application des résolutions  
du Conseil de Sécurité, le gouvernement de la République =

p46 =  
du Congo résume comme suit sa position colon car 1. que  
l'action de l'ONU se fait dans le cadre d'une collaboration  
confiante avec le gouvernement central, seul mandataire du  
peuple congolais, et ceci conformément aux résolutions adoptées  
par le Conseil de Sécurité. car 2. que le gouvernement =



centrwl soit regulierement informe des activites des forces  
de lonu afiv quune identite de vue sopere entre le gouvernement  
central et letatmajor des forces xe lonu unquote following  
the second statement by secretary general dag hammarskjold  
before the securite council on 21 august 1960 quote as the  
representative of the =

p48 =

republic of the congo has asked for the right later on to  
be permitted to give a mise au point of this or that statement  
of mine, it may not be considered inappropriate if i myself  
exercise that same right at this stage of the debate. i

shall =

p49 =

not take up the time of the council by such a mise au point  
of all the various points which might call for it in the  
statement of the representative of the republic of the congo,  
as in fact most of them have been covered by what i have =

p50 =

already said myself. however, there are a few points which  
may merit the attention of the council. para it was said  
that the supreme commander of the united nations force  
had gone to katanga under certain conditions which were  
described by the representative of the republic of the =

p51 =9

congo. this obviously refers to the first stage and to dr.  
bunche, who as you know is my personal representative.  
i have already told the council under what circumstances dr.  
bunches contact came about. i have no reason to discuss  
the way in which mr. tshombe =

p52 =

later presented the situation to the press. if he gave  
publicity to the fact that i intended to go to the securite  
council if our entry was not permitted, he certainly dqd not  
reveal anything in his favor. para the representative of  
the republic of the congo also =

p53 =

complained that i brought the matter back to the securite  
council at that stage without consulting his government.  
may i remind him of the fact that the relations between the  
secretarygeneral and the council are not to be interfered  
with by any government. in ohpy case, the =

p54 =

~~criticism seems all the more unnecessary, as i went to the  
security council in the best interest of the centrji  
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p54 =

criticism seems all the more unnecessary, as i went to the security council in the best interest of the central government of the congo para it would be useless to state again that i neither negotiated nor had any agreement with mr. tshombe. in fact, he ver =

p55 =

even presented his so called conditions to the united nations para the representative of the republic of the congo also enumerated certain steps which he qualified as maladdresses.

there are only two which i think merit comment here. first, i can assure the representative that the discipline of =

p56 =

~~the swedish army is such that no people in disguise are able to figure as members of the swedish troops. secondly, if i used two swedish companies as my personal support at the katanga breakthrough while, as he knows, the troops following the vanguard had~~

p56 =

the swedish army is such that no people in disguise are able to figure as members of the swedish troops. secondly, if i used two swedish companies as my personal support at the katanga breakthrough while, as he knows, the troops following the vanguard had an =

p57 =

overwhelming majority of africans, it was simply because i wanted to reduce the risks of a failure of the breakthrough to an absolute minimum by establishing an identity between myself and the troops para it would be tempting to go into the questions of the armbands and on the =

p58 =

identity card of mr. dieu, but i shall abstain because they cannot be considered relevant to the serious matter which is under consideration by the council para naturally,

i reserve my right to ask to speak again not in order to engage in any polemics but in order =

p59/15 =

to avoid that the debate of the security council be deviated by misinformation unquote +

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