

United Nations



Nations Unies

Executive Office of the Secretary-General  
Cabinet du Secrétaire général

Guatemala

To: Mr. Nambiar:

Please find attached for your information, the tenth report of the International Commission against impunity in Guatemala.

The Political Unit has attached the note from DPA to the SG's update for his information. The report was not attached due to its size.

Nicholas Haysom  
2 September 2010

Cc : KWS

10-08366


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
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Note to Mr. Nambiar

**TENTH REPORT OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUATEMALA —  
(CICIG)**

1. I am pleased to transmit, for the Secretary-General's attention, the Tenth Report to the Secretary-General of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), covering the period from 1 February to 30 April 2010. Please note that, although the report was sent to the United Nations by Commissioner Dall'Anese, who took over from Mr. Castresana on 1 August, the latter was still CICIG Commissioner throughout the reporting period.
2. The security and justice situation in Guatemala deteriorated during the reporting period. On 28 February, President Colom dismissed Interior Minister Raúl Velásquez, who had allegedly embezzled and laundered USD 5 million of public funds, and appointed Carlos Menocal Chávez to replace him. CICIG followed closely and provided recommendations in the contentious selection process for the position of Attorney General (following criticism of the process by CICIG, some legislators and civil society, the entire selection procedure was annulled).
3. A powerful criminal group operating within the National Civilian Police (NCP) Anti-narcotics Analysis and Investigation Department (DAIA) was exposed in March, resulting in the arrest of NCP Director Baltazar Gómez Barrios, as well as DAIA's Chief and Head of Investigations, for their alleged involvement in the attempted robbery of large amounts of illegal drugs during a 2009 seizure operation. Additionally, both the NCP and the penitentiary system suffered several violent attacks. Three police officers – assigned to the special unit investigating the murders of bus drivers (146 of which were assassinated in 2009) – were killed on 10 March. In April, several detainees in different prisons rioted simultaneously and took prison guards as hostages.
4. President Colom expressed publicly his support for CICIG and declared that the Commission's mandate should be extended. He also began discussions with his counterparts in El Salvador and Honduras on establishing a subregional mechanism to combat organized crime and impunity in Central America. At the same time, CICIG's relations with Congress have continued to face challenges. Only one of the Commission's five main legal reform proposals was accepted, namely measures on pre-trial procedures in criminal proceedings and anti-corruption cases.
5. On 20 April, DPA, UNDP and the Office of the Resident Coordinator in Guatemala organized a briefing and donor conference on CICIG at UN Headquarters. On 17 March, the Government of Guatemala and CICIG signed an agreement to establish a UNODC office in Guatemala as well as a Centre of Excellence on Organized Crime.

  
B. Lynn Pascoe  
30 August 2010

**Tenth Report of the Commissioner of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala  
(CICIG) to the United Nations Secretary-General**

CONFIDENTIAL

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## I. Executive summary

1. The present report covers CICIG's tenth trimester, from 1 February to 30 April 2010. During the reporting period the Minister of the Interior was replaced when former Minister Raúl Velásquez was dismissed on corruption charges. The overall security and justice situation in the country deteriorated as the National Civilian Police and the Penitentiary System suffered from numerous attacks in which police officers were killed and security guards taken hostage, and the Public Prosecutor's Office and the judiciary did not receive the funding or security required to operate safely and independently. Moreover, the selection process for the new Attorney General demonstrated that there is a lack of will or ability to appoint honourable, competent and independent individuals to important public positions. Despite these challenges, the Special Prosecutor's Office for CICIG (SPO) and the Commission achieved positive results in many of its criminal investigations and prosecutions.

## II. Key political issues

### A. Political and institutional developments

2. On 28 February, President Colom dismissed Minister of the Interior Raúl Velásquez and appointed Carlos Menocal Chávez as the new Minister. *[Minister Menocal is President Colom's fifth Minister of the Interior.]* Minister Velásquez, who was appointed to the Ministry in July 2009, was dismissed after an investigation revealed that he authorized the purchase of approximately US \$ 5 million in gasoline for the National Civilian Police ("PNC"), which was never delivered. The State funds were allegedly embezzled and laundered by the currently fugitive former Minister Velásquez and former Director of the PNC Baltazar Gómez, among other individuals. Despite the fact that the constant changes within the Ministry again significantly disrupted its work plan, the appointment of Carlos Menocal is a positive development. Prior to his appointment he served as the Executive's liaison to CICIG and the Coordinator of the Presidential Commission for the Accompaniment and Support of CICIG. Also in February, President Colom dismissed the Ministers of Education and Agriculture due to alleged irregular practices in the fulfilment of their duties.

3. At the end of the last reporting period, the Constitutional Court accepted various *amparos* (constitutional injunctions) and constitutional challenges that contested the objectivity, publicity and transparency of the selection process for the Director of the Criminal Public Defence Institute ("IDPP"). The Court ordered Congress to accept information from the public regarding the newly elected Director's integrity, evaluate the information and determine whether the elected candidate should remain or be dismissed. On 9 February, after having received information from civil society and CICIG demonstrating that the newly elected IDPP Director lacked integrity, Congress voted to annul the entire selection process *[In accordance with the Constitution, the IDPP Council acts as the Nominating Committee that selects three candidates from which Congress shall elect the IDPP Director. Congress elected the IDPP Director in January. The Guatemalan Constitution requires that the Director of the IDPP (as well as the Judges of the Supreme and Appellate Courts and the Attorney General) possess demonstrated integrity. The new selection process is currently underway.]*

4. The Nominating Committee responsible for selecting six candidates for the new Attorney General received 38 applications in February, nine of which were immediately denied due to noncompliance with formal requirements. The Committee held public interviews with the remaining candidates in April. CICIG observed the interviews and the Committee's working sessions to ensure transparency. CICIG also provided the Nominating Committee with various recommendations—including the recommended profile for the new Attorney General and calling for the candidate to propose a work plan for the Public Prosecutor's Office—as part of the selection process. CICIG urged the Nominating Committee to meticulously review the applications in order to select the best candidates, and called on the public, especially the youth of Guatemala, to participate in the process. When the Nominating Committee published its list of selected candidates on 21 April, Nineth Montenegro, a member of the Encounter for Guatemala political party, and the President of the Congressional Commission on Justice Reform, filed an *amparo* (constitutional injunction) that challenged the Nominating Committee's selection process, asserting that the process was not transparent and the Committee selected the candidates without considering their integrity. On 26 April, the Sixth Civil Court nullified the list of candidates and ordered the Nominating Committee to publicly repeat the analysis and evaluation of the 29 potential candidates. The Nominating Committee appealed to the Constitutional Court.

#### B. Public security

5. A powerful clandestine criminal group operating within the PNC's Anti-narcotics Analysis and Investigation Department ("DAIA") was exposed in March when the PNC Director, Baltazar Gómez Barrios, the DAIA's Chief and the DAIA's Chief of Investigations were arrested for their alleged involvement in the April 2009 attempted robbery of a large quantity of drugs during a search and seizure operation in the city of Amatitlán, approximately 30 kilometres from Guatemala City. *[At the time of the event, in which five DAIA agents and a private security guard were killed, Baltazar Gómez Barrios was the Chief of the DAIA.]* The three arrested individuals are the alleged leaders of the criminal group and are accused of having planned, authorized, coordinated and supervised the attempted robbery. CICIG and the Special Prosecutor's Office for CICIG (SPO) are investigating the case. President Colom announced in January that a Commission for Police Reform would be immediately created and Helen Mack (a renowned human rights defender) appointed as Coordinator. Unfortunately, the Commission for Police Reform has not yet been formed and the appointment of the institution's new Director is still pending.

6. The PNC and the Penitentiary System suffered numerous violent attacks throughout the reporting period. On 10 March, three PNC agents, all of whom were assigned to the PNC's special unit to investigate the murder of bus drivers and their assistants, were killed in two simultaneous attacks in Guatemala City. *[In March 2009, the PNC created the special unit to investigate the growing trend of murdering bus drivers. In 2007, 43 bus drivers and 3 driver's assistants were killed. In 2008, 54 bus drivers and 6 driver's assistants were killed. This figure more than tripled this past year: 146 bus drivers and 60 driver's assistants were murdered. Thus far this year, 39 drivers and 15 driver's assistants were killed. (These figures were gathered from open source reports from the dailies).]* In April, prisoners

detained in the new high security prison and another detention centre simultaneously rioted and took prison guards as hostages. On the same day, a PNC agent was killed when he and other agents were attacked in various locations in and around Guatemala City. Two days later, two other detention centres and two PNC stations were shot at, resulting in another police officer's death.

### III. Relations with national and international counterparts

7. The Commission's relationship with the Executive branch improved. Throughout the reporting period, the President of the Republic publicly expressed his support for CICIG and declared that CICIG's mandate should be renewed. He requested the Commission's recommendations and support on various matters, including the selection of the new Attorney General and the appointment of the new Minister of the Interior. Prior to his nomination, Minister of the Interior Carlos Menocal served as the President's liaison with CICIG and a strong working relationship was formed. Menocal's appointment as Minister has not only resulted in an improved relationship between CICIG and the Ministry of the Interior, but has also strengthened the Commission's relationship with the Executive branch as a whole.

8. CICIG's relationship with Congress continued to face challenges. Although the Commission maintained good communication with the President of Congress and received his verbal support, only one of the Commission's legal reform proposals was accepted by Congress during the reporting period. CICIG was invited to participate as an observer in Congress' Security and Justice Group, which is led by the President of the Congressional Commission on Legislation and Constitutional Issues and includes the President of Congress and the heads of political parties. The National Security Council, which is headed by Francisco Jiménez, who is coordinating the National Agreement for the Advancement of Security and Justice, was also invited to participate in the meeting. In February, the Security and Justice Group agreed on a legislative agenda comprised of nine prioritized legal initiatives, which included eight of CICIG's legal reform proposals. Despite this positive development, the Security and Justice Group's agreed agenda did not transfer to Congress' formal legislative agenda, leaving CICIG's proposals pending.

9. While CICIG's relationship with the President of the Supreme Court continued to be tense and distant, good communication and collaboration was maintained with the President of the Supreme Court's Criminal Chamber. Moreover, CICIG established a relationship with the Supreme Court's Civil Chamber, which informed the Commission of its support and desire to collaborate. CICIG continued to stress the importance of strengthening the SPO by hiring additional prosecutors because the Office is currently unable to efficiently manage the number of high-profile cases assigned to it. Additionally, CICIG urged Attorney General Velásquez Zárate to provide greater security for SPO staff members. Despite the Attorney General's verbal commitment to implement these requests, no action was taken during his term in office.

10. During the period, the Presidents of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala initiated discussions regarding the possibility of establishing CICIG-like commissions in Honduras and El Salvador in order to create a regional-level force to combat organized crime and impunity in Central America. Additionally, they hoped to coordinate efforts to strengthen the justice systems in the three countries known as the

"Northern Triangle." In February, the Commissioner met with El Salvador's President, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President's Private Secretary to provide them with more information about CICIG's mandate and work and to discuss the initiative. In March, the President of Honduras requested a meeting with the Commissioner to discuss his country's desire to establish a similar commission. In these meetings, the Commissioner informed the Presidents **that** they would have to work directly with the United Nations in order to advance this initiative. *[Please note: despite statements made in May by President Colom and the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs regarding the creation of a regional UN entity that mirrors CICIG, no further advancement has been made with respect to this initiative.]*

#### IV. The Special Prosecutor's Office for CICIG (SPO)

11. The Special Prosecutor's Office for CICIG (SPO) obtained numerous important results during the reporting period. With the assistance of PNC officers and CICIG investigators and security personnel, the SPO captured the PNC Director, the Chief of the DAIA and the DAIA's Chief of Investigations (see paragraph 5, above), who were charged with illicit association (conspiracy among three or more persons), arms-trafficking, illegal detention and abuse of authority, among other crimes. On 12 March, as the result of CICIG's and the SPO's coordinated efforts, former President Portillo's Finance Minister, Manuel Maza Castellanos, was arrested in Guatemala City for allegedly participating in the embezzlement of Ministry of Defence funds during Portillo's administration. He will be held without bail until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against him. *[Former President Portillo, former Minister of Defence Eduardo Arévalo Lacs, retired Major General Eduardo Ríos Sosa and five other former Ministry of Defence officials are also charged with participating in the embezzlement scheme.]* In April, as a result of the use of special investigative methods and the scientific evidence gathered by the SPO, four individuals were arrested and accused of forming part of a criminal group that worked in collaboration with the material and intellectual authors of Victor Rivera's murder and hid and destroyed essential evidence related to Victor Rivera's murder. *[Victor Rivera, who was in charge of the Ministry of the Interior's Anti-kidnapping Unit during President Berger's administration, was murdered on 7 April 2008.]*

12. On 26 February, Guatemala's Minister of Foreign Affairs received the United States' formal request to extradite former President Alfonso Portillo, and on 1 March, the formal request was received by the SPO, which is overseeing the extradition process against the former President. Days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subsequently the SPO received official notification from Mexico authorizing Guatemala to extradite Portillo to the United States. With Mexico's authorization, Guatemala could proceed with the extradition process. On 17 March, despite having received death threats against their family members, the Fifth Criminal Court's sentencing judge approved the United States' extradition request. Portillo, however, may not be extradited from Guatemala until the conclusion of his Guatemalan criminal proceedings. *[In October 2008, Portillo was extradited from Mexico to Guatemala to face embezzlement charges. Under the Mexico-Guatemala extradition agreement, Guatemala shall not extradite Portillo to a third country without Mexico's prior authorization. At the same time, Portillo also faces money laundering charges in the United States. Based*

on the United States' preliminary extradition request, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received in January, Portillo was arrested on 26 January 2010.)

#### V. Complementary Prosecutor (*querellante adhesivo*) cases

13. CICIG, acting in its capacity as a complementary prosecutor, also obtained positive results in many of its cases. For example, the sentence against the four convicted defendants in the Mariachi Loco case was modified based on requests from the Public Prosecutor's Office and CICIG, as well as the resulting Third Appellate Court's ruling that all four individuals should be sentenced to 15 years in prison for aggravated robbery, abuse of authority and simulation of a crime. *[CICIG, acting in its capacity as a complementary prosecutor in the case, assisted the Public Prosecutor's Office in obtaining convictions against all four of the defendants on 21 September 2009. The Second Criminal Court originally convicted the four defendants of theft (instead of aggravated robbery), abuse of authority and simulation of a crime and sentenced them to prison for periods ranging between five and eight years.]* Additionally, at the end of April, the Eighth Criminal Court ruled that sufficient evidence existed to advance the case against the former head of the Public Prosecutor's Office's Crimes against Life Unit, Álvaro Matus, to the trial phase of the criminal process. *[Álvaro Matus is charged with conspiracy, obstruction of justice, abuse of authority and breach of duties for allegedly obstructing the Victor Rivera murder investigation.]*

14. In February, CICIG, acting in its capacity as complementary prosecutor in the Guatemalan criminal proceedings against former President Alfonso Portillo, and the SPO requested the Fifth Criminal Court to reverse its 7 October 2008 decision that allowed the former President to be released on bail. *[In Guatemala, Portillo is accused of allegedly embezzling funds from the Ministry of Defence during his Presidency. The Fifth Criminal Court is overseeing the joint case against Portillo and Eduardo Arévalo Lacs, Minister of Defence during Portillo's administration.]* During the hearing, CICIG and the SPO argued that the only way to guarantee that Portillo would be present throughout the entire criminal process against him was to imprison him. The Court ruled in favour of CICIG and the SPO, redacted its previous ruling and ordered the former President to be held without bail until the conclusion of the Guatemalan criminal proceedings against him.

15. During the reporting period, CICIG was accepted as a complementary prosecutor in three cases: the Primavera case, which involves an illegal adoptions network that was working out of an alleged orphanage known as the Primavera House; the Maskana case, in which former Minister of the Interior Raúl Velásquez, former PNC Director Baltazar Gómez Barrios, and other individuals are accused of embezzling and laundering State funds that were designated to pay for gasoline for the PNC (please refer to paragraph 2, above); and the Musa case, which involves the murder of Khalil and Marjorie Musa and is linked to the Rodrigo Rosenberg murder case. *[On 7 May, CICIG was accepted as a complementary prosecutor in the embezzlement case against former President Portillo's Finance Minister, Manuel Maza Castellanos. Consequently, CICIG is currently a complementary prosecutor in 14 cases.]*

## VI. Initiatives to improve investigative techniques

16. CICIG continued to provide technical assistance to the national witness protection program and produced results despite on-going problems related to the lack of State funding and the failure to appoint a Director for the program, which negatively affects the program's administration. *[Although the program's Director resigned in October 2009, his resignation was not accepted until February 2010. The President of the Republic shall assign a new Director from the list of candidates proposed by the witness protection program's Council, which is comprised of the Attorney General, the Ministry of the Interior and the Director of the witness protection program.]* To ensure the physical security of witnesses, CICIG is technically assisting the Ministry of the Interior, specifically the PNC's Personal Protection Directorate (which is in charge of the operative side of the witness protection program), in order to evaluate the risk level of the assigned cases. CICIG is also assisting with the transition process for the individuals who no longer require special protective measures. Moreover, the wire-tapping system produced limited results due to insufficient financial and material resources. Specifically, there are a limited number of lines and insufficient personnel to analyze the calls; thus the system is currently unable to react immediately and respond in a timely manner.

17. In March, the Supreme Court approved the establishment of a specialized Criminal Court. After 5 April, the new chamber began to oversee the cases that had previously been assigned to the judges who were appointed to other specialized courts with expanded jurisdiction to hear high-impact cases. *[As previously reported, the courts' dockets were overloaded with the cases previously assigned to the specialized judges, causing the high-impact cases to suffer serious delays in their proceedings.]* Despite being assigned various high-impact cases, the specialized high-impact courts located in Guatemala City continue to lack resources. Security measures for judges, prosecutors, defendants and victims did not reach the minimum standards required for the courts to function safely and efficiently. *[Three CICIG cases have been transferred to these specialized courts: the Nicaraguan bus case, the Zacapa case and the Rosenberg case.]*

## VII. Legislative reforms

18. During the reporting period, Congress passed the Law on Pre-trial Procedures in Criminal Proceedings and Anti-Corruption Cases, one of CICIG's five main reform proposals. *[CICIG's five main proposals are: procedures for the removal of immunity from public officials, regulation of the Law of Amparo, anti-corruption criminal legislation including illicit enrichment, pre-trial procedures in criminal proceedings and anti-corruption cases, and seizure of illegal assets originating from organized crime.]* Thus far Congress has been slow to approve CICIG's legislative reform proposals. CICIG expects to face more difficulties and delays in this area due to the start of the congressional presidential campaign in the second semester of 2010.

## VIII. Mission operations and support

### A. The UN system

19. On 20 April, CICIG in cooperation with the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the Resident Coordinator of the UN System in Guatemala, organised a briefing and donor conference on CICIG and the fight against impunity in Guatemala. Both events were held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. DPA Americas staff members assisted in the planning, organising and running of those events. The preparations and the follow-up were conducted at Headquarters by both CICIG and DPA Americas staff. ASG Fernandez Taranco signed the letters prepared for this event. The event included the participation of UN member States, CICIG's donors, civil society representatives, a national delegation of representatives from Guatemala's Government and the media. The Guatemalan delegation shared their experiences with CICIG, and the tasks to be achieved in the second term of its mandate in order to optimize CICIG's results. During the donor-briefing, CICIG's donors expressed their continued support and were very positive about the results achieved by CICIG thus far.

20. On 17 March, UNODC and the Government of Guatemala signed an agreement in which both parties agreed to establish a UNODC National Program Office and a Centre of Excellence on Organized Crime. The parties will analyze and research the phenomena of transnational organized crime, assist in strengthening Guatemala's capacity in the areas of criminal justice, police reform, anti-corruption and prison reform, and coordinate cooperation among countries in the Central American Region. On 26 April, CICIG and UNODC signed a Cooperation Agreement with the objective of establishing the parameters of cooperation between the two institutions in their efforts to strengthen Guatemala's security and justice sectors and fight impunity and organized crime. Within this context, the Commission was invited to participate in the development of UNODC's Centre for Excellence work plan and the implementation of part of its technical assistance activities.

21. CICIG de-commissioned the Very Small Aperture Terminal ("VSAT") satellite dish, which had been on loan from MINUSTAH. When the Commission moved and integrated its entire staff into one office during the last reporting period, it was decided to exchange the VSAT satellite for a Virtual Private Network ("VPN") tunnel to Brindisi ("UNLB"), allowing the Commission to keep its replication of Lotus Notes and use of the "un.org" domain for its email system. While both VSAT and VPN devices are able to reliably transfer both video and voice data, UNLB (Brindisi) decided not to support the transfer of voice data through the VPN tunnel for technical reasons. As a result, the Commission has lost the ability to make direct connection calls to UN Headquarters and other UN missions.

### B. Security matters

22. The Commission faced a sophisticated smear campaign aimed at discrediting the Commissioner's and CICIG's work and credibility. The smear campaign came as no surprise as various powerful sectors of clandestine criminal groups affected by CICIG's progress in high-impact cases seek to

find ways of countering the growing strength, credibility and results of the Commission. CICIG established and began to implement a plan to reduce the impact of the smear campaign.

23. The Commission recruited a Security Information Analyst in April 2010, and now has the capability to assess indicators, accelerators and triggers of possible threats and risks faced in Guatemala and the region. The Commission will also now play a proactive role in assessing the impact and consequences of its mandate on the UN family in Guatemala in line with its MoU with DSS UNHQ.

24. Major construction of the Commission's new office facilities was completed to provide internal parking and office facilities for all personnel. Additionally, the fence in front of the Commission's headquarters was raised and lighting throughout the facility was improved. The "one facility" concept for CICIG was implemented during the last reporting period and has demonstrated increased efficiency.

#### **C. Staffing and finance**

25. As of 30 April, CICIG has 178 (86 percent) of its 204 budgeted staff. The Commission's staff represents 23 different nationalities and is made up of 56 (31 percent) women and 122 (69 percent) men. Excluding security personnel, CICIG's staff consists of 43 percent women and 57 percent men.

26. CICIG's financial status as of 30 April 2010 is as follows:

Donor	Received 2008	Received 2009	Received 2010	Total Amount of Donations	Expenditures 2008	Expenditures 2009	Expenditures 2010	Total Expenditures (as of 30 April)	Available as of 30 April 2010
FOSI/ SOROS	\$ 74,973.00			\$ 74,973.00	\$ 74,813.96			\$ 74,813.96	\$ 159.04
Denmark	\$ 558,326.51			\$ 558,326.51	\$ 556,225.34			\$ 556,225.34	\$ 2,101.17
Finland	\$ 215,880.00			\$ 215,880.00	\$ 208,758.93			\$ 208,758.93	\$ 7,121.07
The Netherlands	\$ 1,351,351.35	\$ 2,821,939.59	\$ 1,470,588.24	\$ 5,643,879.18	\$ 1,350,264.25	\$ 3,961,376.42	\$ 8,680.54	\$ 5,320,321.21	\$ 323,557.97
Norway	\$ 360,425.30	\$ 404,010.40	\$ 523,234.02	\$ 1,287,669.72	\$ 359,159.77	\$ 84,063.02	\$ 42,741.16	\$ 485,963.95	\$ 801,705.77
Spain	\$ 4,319,400.00	\$ 4,321,464.00		\$ 8,640,864.00	\$ 4,319,407.57	\$ (134,466.10)	\$ 3,572,695.18	\$ 7,757,636.65	\$ 883,227.35
Switzerland	\$ 434,764.00	\$ 300,000.00		\$ 734,764.00	\$ 421,170.14	\$ (90,588.64)	\$ 259,527.12	\$ 590,108.62	\$ 144,655.38
DFID	\$ 119,284.29			\$ 119,284.29	\$ 114,226.87	\$ 5,007.60		\$ 119,234.47	\$ 49.82
SOROS	\$ 84,990.00			\$ 84,990.00	\$ 84,652.75			\$ 84,652.75	\$ 337.25
USA	\$ 4,000,000.00	\$ 1,000,000.00	\$ 3,000,000.00	\$ 8,000,000.00	\$ 3,753,484.02	\$ 910,023.01	\$ 780,048.50	\$ 5,443,555.53	\$ 2,556,444.47
Germany	\$ 228,182.00	\$ 76,060.67	\$ 101,414.33	\$ 405,657.00	\$ 58,794.50	\$ 121,655.13	\$ 85,625.12	\$ 266,074.75	\$ 139,582.25
Italy	\$ 1,293,661.06			\$ 1,293,661.06	\$ -	\$ 1,285,563.98		\$ 1,285,563.98	\$ 8,097.08
Sweden	\$ 1,769,279.99	\$ 4,885,200.57		\$ 6,654,480.56	\$ -	\$ 5,406,375.06	\$ 1,077,248.04	\$ 6,483,623.10	\$ 170,857.46
European Union	\$ 829,014.54	\$ 230,879.01	\$ 2,308,804.30	\$ 3,368,697.85	\$ -	\$ 1,053,040.61	\$ (8,681.86)	\$ 1,044,358.75	\$ 2,324,339.10
Canada	\$ 3,856,020.49	\$ 504,111.85	\$ 487,022.19	\$ 4,847,154.53	\$ -	\$ 4,275,989.31	\$ (1,353.69)	\$ 4,274,635.62	\$ 572,518.91
Ireland			\$ 145,520.00	\$ 145,520.00	\$ -		\$ 145,519.88	\$ 145,519.88	\$ 0.12
United Kingdom			\$ 77,000.00	\$ 77,000.00					
Guatemalan Gov. / PNUD		\$ 500,000.00		\$ 500,000.00		\$ 450,485.01		\$ 450,485.01	\$ 49,514.99
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$19,495,552.53</b>	<b>\$ 15,043,666.09</b>	<b>\$ 8,113,583.08</b>	<b>\$ 42,652,801.70</b>	<b>\$ 11,300,958.10</b>	<b>\$ 17,328,524.41</b>	<b>\$ 5,962,049.99</b>	<b>\$ 34,591,532.50</b>	<b>\$ 7,984,269.20</b>

## IX. Conclusions

27. The dismissal of the former Minister of the Interior and subsequent appointment of Carlos Menocal was a positive development in the effort to "clean out" questionable Ministry officials and restore the Commission's good working relationship and collaboration with the Ministry. However, the overall security situation deteriorated as the National Civilian Police and the Penitentiary System suffered numerous attacks, likely in retaliation of the State's efforts to fight organized crime. CICIG will continue to assist the Ministry of the Interior in strengthening its capacity and the capacity of the institutions under its control, namely the Police and the Penitentiary System, as well as collaborate in investigations.

28. Despite continued challenges stemming from the lack of funding and State support for the security and justice sectors, CICIG and the Special Prosecutor's Office for CICIG made significant advancements in their criminal investigations and prosecutions and the overall fulfilment of the Commission's mandate. CICIG was accepted as a complementary prosecutor in three additional cases.

29. CICIG is grateful to DPA, the UN Resident Coordinator in Guatemala and UNDP Guatemala for the assistance received in the organisation and execution of the informative events held in New York in April. These events not only informed CICIG's donors, the international community and various civil society organizations about CICIG's work, results and challenges, but energized members of Guatemalan civil society to take up a greater role in the fight against impunity. The discussions that were initiated during the reporting period regarding the replication of the CICIG-model in other Central American countries and other nations is an interesting debate that deserves further consideration. CICIG is hopeful that the challenges it has faced, results obtained and lessons learned can assist in the creation or establishment of any future international investigative commission.



**Note to Mr. Nambiar on the Tenth Report of the International Commission  
Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)**

**Dora Przybylek** to: SGCentral

31/08/2010 12:51 PM

Maria Zaroui, Silva Armani, Sandar Hla, Sebastien Lawson, Naomi  
Cc: Scott-Dunne, Maria Cristina Aquino, Julian Hernandez, Stephen  
Paparo, Lourdes Selaya, Francesco Carella, Carole Davis, Laetitia

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Dear Colleagues,

Grateful if you would please bring the attached to the attention of Mr. Nambiar for the Secretary-General's approval.

Regards,

---

Dora Przybylek  
United Nations  
Office of the Assistant Secretary-General  
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tel. (212) 963-2623  
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