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9 April 1965

I have just returned from Washington and talks with the President on Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. I asked for an appointment with the Secretary-General to talk over the President's proposal for unconditional discussions toward a settlement of the conflict on Viet-Nam. I also sought the Secretary-General's views on the President's proposal for cooperative development in Southeast Asia. We had a most informative preliminary talk.

9 April 1965

TO: SG

F.Y.I. Above was made by Carpenter after Stevenson had seen you.



Ramses Nassif

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
A:*The Secretary General*

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

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FOR INFORMATION

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Sen. McGowan
Sen. Javits.*

*Hand
110*

Date:

28/1x

FROM:

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Polischinski

people, or should try. But we'll have to try, and keep trying. We're spending decades—and \$20 billion—to put a man on the moon. It seems at least as important to help the human race eat.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE] planned to join with some comment on the world food situation at this time, but he is unable to be present because of a prior commitment. He has asked me to insert in the RECORD a brief comment he has prepared on the subject.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the statement of the junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE].

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MONDALE

My distinguished friend, the Senator from South Dakota, has once again performed an invaluable public service in delivering this magnificent speech to the Senate today.

The worldwide war against hunger is without doubt, as he points out, "the most important war." And it is the most urgent war. As the Senator has so clearly demonstrated 3 million children every year are dying from hunger or malnutrition. And if population continues to increase faster than food production—and present indications are that it will, if we do not act—this massive human catastrophe will grow far worse.

I do not believe that we can let it grow worse. I am convinced, just as the junior Senator from South Dakota is convinced, that we must enlarge our efforts, by expanding our food for peace program and giving increased agricultural assistance to agriculture in developing countries. I stated my conclusions at length on the Senate floor last July 29. * * * But the basic truth, it seems to me, is simple. The world needs food, and we in the United States have an unmatched, untapped agricultural potential.

I hope that the day may come when we can concentrate our greatest efforts not on idling acres and storing surpluses, but on feeding hungry peoples instead.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I want to commend the distinguished Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] for his cogent presentation on world food problems.

I share his conviction that the most overwhelming paradox of our times is the fact that we permit half the human race to go hungry while we struggle to cut back on surplus production and to cope with the problem of national obesity.

I also share his conviction that we have paid far too little attention to this problem.

A few months ago, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Economic and Social Policy of the Foreign Relations Committee, I took testimony on this subject from Mr. Tom Ware, chairman of the Freedom From Hunger Foundation.

Mr. Ware also underscored the point that the world's population was growing far more rapidly than the production of food; and he said that the entire situation was further complicated by what he described as "the spread of the Communist incentive desert."

This testimony has recently been published by the Foreign Relations Committee. And I must say that it supports

and confirms in every respect the arguments which the distinguished Senator from South Dakota has so forcefully advanced in his statement today.

I was particularly gratified to note the Senator's statement that our food surpluses are all but gone and that "the United States would scarcely meet our own consumption needs for 6 months if catastrophe should wipe out our crops in a single growing year."

This was a point which I also sought to make in my speech on the floor of the Senate on September 9, questioning the wisdom of large-scale grain shipments to the Communist bloc, in the absence of certain elementary political concessions.

I also argued—although the distinguished Senator has done so much more forcefully and in greater detail than I did—that we should be thinking in terms of expanding our food production to meet the growing world food crisis, rather than in terms of retiring croplands.

I believe it unwise to enter into quickie deals with Communists or any other would-be purchasers, inspired by a false concern over a wheat surplus which would be inadequate to meet a major national emergency, let alone a world emergency.

In this same speech, I expressed the belief that—and here I would like to quote from my own remarks:

Our own Nation and the other three grain-exporting nations of the free world should organize themselves into a consortium for the purpose of planning future grain exports in a manner that most effectively copes with the problem of hunger and which, at the same time, gives maximum political support to the cause of freedom, to our own security, and to the peace of the world.

I wholeheartedly support the objectives of the International Food and Nutrition Act which the very able Senator from South Dakota has introduced.

I agree with him, too, that our own economy would benefit greatly from a doubled food-for-peace program, and that such a program could do much to alleviate the problem of world hunger over the coming critical period.

Mr. President, I believe that, although the Senator and I have approached the problem from different directions, we have arrived at very similar conclusions. To illustrate what I mean by this, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks that portion of my September 9 speech in the Senate which was captioned "The Fallacy of the World Grain Glut."

I commend the Senator again for an outstanding contribution. He deserves the gratitude of all of us.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE FALLACY OF THE WORLD GRAIN GLUT

The second argument advanced in favor of agricultural sales to the Communist bloc is that this is the only serious way in which the major grain producing nations of the free world can relieve themselves of the serious internal problem posed by the heavy grain surpluses of recent years.

This argument, too, is false, because it relates to a situation that may have existed

a decade or so ago, but which no longer exists today.

Over the past decade, more than 400 million people have been added to the world's population. Although much of the world still goes hungry, the increase in population has inevitably resulted in a major increase in grain exports, and this tendency is bound to continue over the coming period.

With a rate of population increase that now stands at some 50 million annually, it would require an additional 10 million tons of food grains each year to maintain the current level of caloric intake.

And the sad fact is that, as of this juncture, the increase in agricultural production is lagging sadly behind the world's increase in population.

This was the subject of some very dramatic testimony which I recently took from Mr. Tom Ware, president of the Freedom From Hunger Foundation, in a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Economic and Social Affairs, over which I presided.

Mr. Ware also made the point that one of the chief factors in the world food crisis is the spread of what he called the Communist incentive desert.

He said that the spreading blight of collectivized agriculture over so much of the world's surface had probably cost the world more in terms of total food output than all the natural calamities put together.

A rational agricultural export policy for the coming period would require that we take inventory of the anticipated food requirements of the so-called hungry nations.

If we did so, I am certain that it would immediately become apparent that the era of undisposable grain surpluses has now come to an end, and that we have entered into a new era characterized by growing food shortages in many parts of the world, Communist and non-Communist alike.

The only countries in the world with sizable surpluses of food grains, at the present juncture and over the foreseeable future, are the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia.

It is my belief that our own Nation and the other three grain-exporting nations of the free world should organize themselves into a consortium for the purpose of planning future grain exports in a manner that most effectively copes with the problem of hunger and which, at the same time, gives maximum political support to the cause of freedom, to our own security, and to the peace of the world.

I believe that it would be possible to get the backing of Canada, Argentina, and Australia for such a consortium if we could provide the governments of these countries with a firm assurance that, if circumstances at any time require that they forego sales to the Communist bloc, they will not be left holding the bag on undisposable grain surpluses.

I believe that a careful setting forth of the facts would help to win support for this proposal.

If Canada, Australia, and Argentina could be persuaded that the era of undisposable gluts has come to an end and that the grain-exporting nations must start thinking in terms of expanding production rather than curtailing production, and if they could be persuaded to expand their storage facilities and to join us in a number of other measures designed to take the pressure off the world market, such a concert of policy would soon produce tangible economic benefits in the form of a more realistic price for wheat in the markets of the world.

It is an anomaly that surpasses understanding that the price of wheat should be \$2 per bushel in the United States and \$2.20 in Europe, while it is only \$1.50 in the world market. It puts the U.S. Government in the

position of subsidizing everyone, friend and foe alike, who buys our wheat.

I would even be prepared to consider committing ourselves to purchase from Canada, Australia, and Argentina any surplus remaining after a period of several years, in consequence of any decision by the consortium to suspend sales to the Communist bloc.

There are some who may object that such an arrangement might cost us hundreds of millions of dollars before we were through. I think this estimate is exaggerated, because ultimately the surplus we purchase would be disposed of, and, because the cost of the program would be largely offset by the increased price of wheat.

But even if it did cost us some hundreds of millions of dollars, this is a very small price to pay compared with the price we are today paying to stem the tide of Communist aggression in southeast Asia, in Latin America, and elsewhere.

The creation of such a free world consortium would enormously enhance our bargaining power with the Communist world, especially in coping with crisis situations like Vietnam.

But this is not the only reason why we must seek to enter into a joint understanding with the three other major grain producing nations.

Even if there were no cold war, such a consortium would be necessary for the purpose of planning the most effective possible distribution to the areas of greatest need.

And the mere existence of the consortium would automatically result in a substantial increase in world grain output by raising the world price of wheat to a more realistic level.

U.N. VICTORY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the achievement of a cease-fire by the United Nations in the Pakistan-India conflict, is a most encouraging victory. This highly dangerous conflict threatened to destroy the peace of the world. Only the careful, courageous intervention of the Secretary General and other U.N. officials brought about a cease-fire. All those nations and peoples of the earth who believe in peace are indebted to the U.N. for this effective action.

I wish to pay special tribute to our great President, Lyndon Johnson, for the magnificent manner in which he has led our Nation throughout this crisis. The dignity, the restraint, and the wisdom manifested by the President was a key factor in making a cease-fire possible. One precipitous or rash action by the leader of the most powerful nation in the world could have converted the Pakistan-India fighting into a much more tragic development. But by firm backing of the U.N. and his brilliant Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, President Johnson contributed mightily to the cessation of hostilities in the Indian subcontinent.

Any lingering doubts that we might have had as to the absolute importance of the U.N. in today's world should be dispelled by this recent victory for peace which is only one of a series of such victories achieved by the United Nations over the years.

Mr. President, the current issue of the New Republic for September 25, 1965, carries four brief articles which I think shed considerable light on the India-Pakistan crisis, including the possible role of Red China in this and other Asiatic crises.

These articles are as follows: "The Opinion in Paris: China Won't Fight," by Philip Ben; "India and Pakistan at War," by Charles Burton Marshall; "If There Is No Cease-Fire Soon," by Stephen Barber, and excerpts from testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 6, 1959, including an interesting colloquy on the part of our colleague, Senator GORE, and former Secretary of Defense McElroy.

I ask unanimous consent that the articles be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE OPINION IN PARIS: CHINA WON'T FIGHT (By Philip Ben)

Few recent diplomatic initiatives have been so misreported as General de Gaulle's probes of Chinese intentions. It has been reported, for instance, that André Malraux, whose trip to Peiping was in connection with a forthcoming Chinese art exhibit, returned appalled by Chinese leaders' lack of realism and by their childish disregard for American power.

I investigated those reports in Paris and found them wholly untrue. Not only Malraux but other Frenchmen recently returned from China report a keen Chinese appreciation of the immensity of U.S. military might and the swiftness with which it can be put in operation at any point on the globe. While they refer publicly to the United States as a "paper tiger," in private Chinese leaders say that they will do everything to avoid a head-on clash with the Americans. While giving aid to North Vietnam and to the Vietcong, so they told Malraux, they are determined not to engage any of their troops there. Moreover, this is hardly necessary, in their judgment, because the Vietnamese are capable of bearing the brunt of the fighting. The Chinese have also made it plain that they are determined not to give the Americans any pretext for air raids on China.

But the Chinese leaders have no interest in the speedy end of the war in Vietnam or in any negotiation. They disparage all would-be mediators—the Soviets, U Thant, Nasser. When offering to mediate say the Chinese, all such parties have only one thing in mind—boosting their own prestige. This may explain why, after Malraux's return to Paris, any idea of French mediation was shelved by De Gaulle.

The French now feel that the Chinese are willing to fight the Vietnamese war up to the last Vietnamese, believing that the longer the war lasts the greater the political reverses for both the United States and Soviet Russia; the United States because it is involved in the fighting, Russia because it is not, though for years it has said it would crush any imperialistic aggressor who dares to raise his hand against any socialist country.

The Chinese leaders have told the French that all problems of southeast Asia will finally have to be thrashed out in bilateral talks between Peiping and Washington, but that a *modus vivendi* between these two powers could be achieved only if the United States agrees to leave Asia. This does not mean that the Chinese foresee the possibility of ending the war in Vietnam by such bilateral negotiation. That war, they hope, will peter out in a year or two, or 5 years. The Americans will then withdraw. Only after such humiliating withdrawal, they think, will the Americans be ready to discuss with Peiping an overall settlement for eastern and southeastern Asia.

I should point out that this view is fully shared by French officials right up to De Gaulle. They know, of course, that the Americans will not be defeated. But they believe that as the war goes on the structure of Vietnamese society, north and south,

will be shattered, leaving in the end only ruins and homeless refugees. The Americans will never be able to revive or run a Vietnamese state. Sooner or later they will leave. Who will move in? The Chinese. The only barrier to that takeover has been the Vietnamese nation and the Vietnamese states, anti-Communist and Communist alike. But they will be no more.

French officials now have an excellent knowledge of what is going on in the minds of the North Vietnamese leaders, who are said to be much closer to Moscow than they were even a few months ago, and who are increasingly irritated by Peiping's unpromising attitude. The reason is simple: lately Soviet aid to North Vietnam has been arriving in serious quantities; not only military aid but also economic. If there is at present no acute starvation in North Vietnam, though shortages are very grave, it is due to Russia. China still gives very little. In addition, the leaders in Hanoi look with mounting concern on the destruction of their country by U.S. air raids. One is told in Paris that most Hanoi leaders now fully accept Moscow's opinion, expressed only in private, that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose from negotiations and a peaceful settlement. But neither Moscow nor Hanoi is yet willing to make the slightest move in that direction, if there is the slightest risk that Peiping will denounce it as a betrayal and a "surrender to American imperialists." Will the time ever come when Hanoi could be induced to disregard Peiping's advice? French officials constantly discuss that question. They are sure whether an affirmative reply is warranted. They ask themselves how Peiping could be induced to give up its virtual veto power over negotiations. China's price is not known. And when it is, who would be willing to pay it? Not the United States in its present mood.

Thus, the French conclude, there is no alternative but for the war to continue. That conclusion is reinforced by the findings of qualified Frenchmen, who have been to China lately and report that conditions are infinitely better than at any time in the last decade. This year's harvest is said to be satisfactory; food supplies are sufficient for the meager diet. And as the Chinese leaders told their French visitors, an outside war for which China's two most powerful foes, the United States and Russia, are paying heavily is the best guarantee that China will be left in peace to pursue her domestic tasks.

French visitors have been struck too by the degree of contempt which the Chinese leaders display towards Soviet Russia; and by their exuberant confidence that the Chinese-Soviet feud has now turned to their benefit. They are determined to continue harassing the Soviet leaders, and they are equally disparaging about India. For them the Indian state is as rotten as Kuomintang China once was. And they forecast that it will have a similar fate. But again the Chinese have not the slightest intention of getting involved in a military adventure against India, though they will relentlessly push their cold war against the southern neighbor that once was their competitor for the title of Asia's first power.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN AT WAR—NEITHER SIDE COULD CONCEDE AND SURVIVE

(By Charles Burton Marshall)

A long and complex past lies behind the subcontinent's new war. In the applicable time scale, Islam is a relative novelty, for its advent dates back a mere twelve and a half centuries to the Arab conquest of Sind. A series of invasions from Afghanistan followed three centuries later. Their eventual and enduring result was the Delhi Sultanate, 1206-1526, during which Afghans subdued Bengal, Islam was carried into the Himalaya and Kashmir conquered, and Muslim outposts were spread into the south. In the

sixteenth century, these positions were over-run by a further Muslim conquest from the northwest—that of the misnamed Moguls.

Islam's adherents, thus deposited widely over India, came to aggregate about a fourth of a population preponderantly Hindu. They were concentrated more in the north and formed majorities only in the northwest and northeast extremes. Great ethnic, lingual, and regional differences divided them.

Besides being heavily outnumbered, Muslims were generally at a competitive disadvantage in important vocations. A main exception was the military profession. The Bengalis aside, Muslims generally did well at soldiery. They also enjoyed the prestige of religious identity with the establishments ruling over large portions of the subcontinent at the Mogulate's zenith and through its long decline. But with the Mogulate's final collapse and the advent of the British raj in 1857, Muslim thought had to meet the problems of a disadvantaged and highly self-conscious minority. The response was to emphasize connections with the great body of Islam outside the subcontinent. Insecurity was redressed by invoking a community, part mystical and part real, epitomized in the caliphate which combined religious with temporal authority in the Turkish sultan.

Humiliation of the caliphate with the defeat of Turkey in World War I and the secular-minded Atatürk's subsequent outright abolition of the institution amounted to a spiritual amputation for the subcontinent's Muslims. A movement developed to restore the caliphate as their anchor of significance. Meanwhile, eventual independence for India, prefigured in Britain's grant of a small measure of self-rule in the 1919 Government of India Act, became a growing prospect. The caliphate movement found a new name as the Muslim League and a new purpose in demands for autonomy, and then for separate statehood for Muslims in the event of independence for India. In dreams spun by this movement, a Muslim state in the subcontinent, as the Islamic world's most numerous and powerful, would be looked to for leadership by Muslims everywhere and would thereby gain an importance rivaling or even excelling India's. But there were secular considerations too. Proponents of Pakistan sought a polity of their own so as to escape political subordination to a majority from which they felt alienated.

Specifically, two factors appear to have been indispensable in the resulting emergence of Pakistan. One was the driving personality of Mohammed Ali Jinnah—a man of no strong religious impulse but of implacable resolve not to be ruled by Hindus. The second was a determination to preserve the professional identity of Muslim officers fearful of being submerged or eliminated when the British Army in India should become the Indian Army.

The new state of Pakistan took form in two territories, with a population differentiated in language, personality, and outlook. A thousand unfriendly Indian miles separated them. A governing apparatus had to be assembled from scratch: Trained talent was woefully short, for much of the Muslim component of the Indian civil service opted for India. The new army was infected by a conspiracy hatched between Communists and hothead officers. The founding father soon died. His lieutenant was assassinated. No unifying figure was at hand. The economy was in a bog. Pakistan's survival through its initial years seemed improbable.

External relations gave no comfort. The anticipated ascendancy among Muslim states proved a pipedream. Pakistan seemed outclassed. Besides its numerical advantage, India had the prestige of an ancient historic name and a world renowned leader, Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan's name was synthetic and unfamiliar, and its leaders were

scarcely notable even at home. The most bedeviling frustration related to a dispute over a former princely state in the Himalayas.

Under agreed principles for dividing up the subcontinent, princely states would adhere to Pakistan or India at their rulers' option—a provision included at the instance of the negotiators for Pakistan-to-be, with an eye to Deccan Hyderabad, with its rich Muslim Nizam in sway over a mostly Hindu populace. They expected to finesse the situation in Kashmir, where for a century a Hindu dynasty had been misruling a mostly Muslim populace. These expectations went awry. The Indians preempted Hyderabad in force. Kashmir's shaky maharaja, who had probably nursed futile dreams of autonomy, summoned India's help against armed intrusions from Pakistan and signed an accession to India, only to be soon displaced for unfitness.

Pakistan and India tottered to a mountain war beyond their means. Then a U.N. commission arranged a cease-fire under continuing international supervision. The outcome left India's Army holding the bulk of the contested area, including the coveted Vale of Kashmir, and Pakistan's forces in the margins. India, as well as Pakistan, agreed or at least said it agreed to a plebiscite rather than force as a means for settlement. For the time being, both states refrained from annexations within their lines. Perhaps India's declared intentions were sincere. Perhaps its design was to delay long enough to predetermine, if possible, a favorable tally. In any event, India soon began to renege, especially after its 1952 elections brought a nationalist upsurge uncompromisingly against any concession to religious identities within India and for annexation in Kashmir. Thereafter India shifted ever more unequivocally to a thesis holding the status of Kashmir to be a domestic concern, a settled issue, no business of Pakistan's. Obviously, Pakistanis felt that they were being patronized and scorned.

A half dozen years after independence, Pakistan's need of something to anchor to outside, of some substitute for the extinct caliphate, was desperate. It was then, in the wake of stalemate in Korea, that the United States began shopping for Asian members for an alliance hopefully designed to ward off further attempted Communist conquests in southeast Asia. Pakistan responded. Its Foreign Minister tried to get the Manila Treaty amended to focus it against India. Secretary of State Dulles said no; the pact would be confined to anti-Communist purposes. Otherwise, the Senate would not concur. Pakistan signed on as a recruit anyway. Its new ally was a big country and a big spender. Pakistan would get aid to quicken its economy and to expand and to update its armed forces. U.S. military aid would be subject to provisos requiring the concurrence of Washington for its use against foreign enemies. The insistent neutrality of the United States on issues of high moment to Pakistan might be modified in time and by persuasion. At least, Pakistan could so hope. It joined another regional pact, sponsored but not adhered to by the United States, and in 1958 the United States came through with a bilateral agreement specifying concern for Pakistan's security. Pakistan's forces made a good showing with the aid they received. In return, the United States was using Pakistani locations for its strategic observations.

Perennially petitioning at the U.N. and elsewhere, Pakistan continued to elicit from others, including its big ally, homilies about negotiation and settlement of its dispute with India—as if the solution depended on trading parcels of territory, distributing waters, and adjusting local anomalies. But Kashmir stood as a classic instance of an unnegotiable issue, because it bears on the very *raison d'être* of both parties.

India is a congeries of faiths—Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Jainist, Parsi, and Sikh, as well as Hindu, and the Hindu system itself is riven into a complex of exclusory castes. India could not exist as a modern state except on a secular basis. India must fight for its national life against ever-latent disintegrative forces. It has small margins. It professes to see a mortal risk in making concessions to the idea of a religious basis for allegiance. But Pakistan's existence rests on religious identity, which compels it to uphold self-determination for Kashmir. Pakistan-to-be was fickle to its own premise in the 1947 gambit on the right of princes to opt for their subjects. In any event, a choice exercised by an unfit, precarious ruler seems a sorry basis on which to foreclose such an issue. Each disputant understands fully, even if it cannot accept, the other side's position. Further parleying became pointless long ago.

Short of being forced into submission, it is hard to see how either could accept terms acceptable to its adversary. Probably neither regime could concede and survive. Pakistan could not possibly back down. It could only trouble the issue along, growing increasingly restive but still unable to break out of a status quo in which India held the advantages. The possibility of an alternative approach, in explicit or tacit conjunction with Red China, was probably long entertained by the Pakistanis. I so surmised on observing the lionizing of Chou En-lai in Karachi in December 1956.

Three years ago India announced with great flourish a decision to oust the Chinese from a disputed zone on her borders. The Chinese responded militarily with shattering effect on a limited front. Without even waiting to get terms signed, the United States began rushing military aid to India. It made no stipulations about Kashmir. One can suppose India would not have budged anyway on Kashmir. Subsequently, a number of visiting U.S. emissaries made ritualistic appeals for the disputants to negotiate some more. India stuck to its position. So did Pakistan.

For Pakistan the United States must have lost all its value as surrogate to the caliphate, at the moment of beginning military aid to India. Pakistan responded by doing the analytically logical thing, warming up to China. Whatever terms, if any, may have been agreed between them, Pakistan now has a partner with whom it is aligned respecting India. Boxed in, India finds it difficult to marshal forces against Pakistan. My impression from afar is that Pakistan's moves in the initial stages of the renewed war have reflected comprehensible military purposes, but that India's have been frantic and feckless, as when bombers were sent against East Pakistan cities, with no probable result except solidifying Pakistan's Bengalis behind a war for which they otherwise might have scant enthusiasm, or when an ill-prepared Indian thrust was made toward Lahore.

Pakistan, economically more of a going concern than formerly, has been doing relatively better than India. It might well make it, militarily preempting the position in Kashmir and forcing India's regime beyond its political resources. The disintegrative effect on India would delight China. The effect on U.S. interests would be deleterious. It would be bad to have it demonstrated that an Asian country, trammelled while aligned with the United States, can score a large success after shifting its alignment to China.

IF THERE IS NO CEASE-FIRE SOON

(By Stephen Barber)

Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani armed forces have the capacity to sustain a long war against the other. Although both have domestic munitions plants, and India has a fledgling aircraft industry, and both have substantial accumulations of American, Brit-

ish, French, and Russian materiel, a point must soon be reached where each side will be forced to husband its resources. Short of some master-stroke, and despite the fact that the Indian army comprises 17 divisions against Pakistan's eight and that in population terms the balance is $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, the regular forces are unlikely to achieve more than a stand-off.

But when that happens, if not before, irregulars may very well keep up the fight; more alarmingly, communal violence is liable to break out on a 1947 scale, when between 500,000 to 1 million perished.

Communalism is the curse of the subcontinent. It is not limited to Hindu-Moslem antagonism. Sikhs in the Indian Punjab, who were driven out of their ancient settlements around Lahore in 1947 almost to the last man, have never got along well with their Punjabi Hindu neighbors. This has led to bloody clashes.

The language issue in India has led to riots again and again—the most recent being in South India this summer where Madrassis objected violently to the imposition of Hindi in place of English as the nation's official language.

New Delhi has run into similar troubles in Assam, and the volatile Bengalis have constantly been rioting about something—whether politics, bread, religion, or language. In caste-ridden India, it has been enough to set off bloody uprisings for an untouchable to draw water from a village well, thus defiling it in the eyes of those higher in the Hindu scale.

As if that were not enough, clashes have regularly taken place between Indians and so-called tribals—primitive hill folk. For years the Indian army and air force has tried and failed to subjugate the Nagas, who demand independence from Delhi. This has soaked up battalions of troops.

India's 50 million Moslems form one-ninth of its population; the Moslem pockets isolated in a Hindu mass are an easy mark. It is hard to say whether they are more vulnerable in the big cities, such as Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, where Moslems are apt to be shopkeepers and artisans and are better off than their Hindu neighbors and on that account alone a target for hatred, or in isolated village communities.

For 17 years the armed forces on both sides have been preparing for this war. If it now ends in a standoff, as I believe it must, what happens to the reputations of the military? Could Field Marshal Ayub Khan survive as President? And if not, what will follow him? Obviously for the moment the armed forces loom large on the New Delhi scene. But they took a nasty knock in terms of popular prestige in the Himalayas when they were put to flight by the Chinese nearly 3 years ago. If they cannot now inflict a clinching

defeat on Pakistan, one wonders what their title to leadership will be.

The longer the war goes on and the more the threat gathers momentum of its degenerating into interreligious knife-play by undisciplined fanatics on a wide scale, the more dangerous the entire picture becomes.

Anyone who has mixed with educated Pakistanis and Indians over the age of 40, soldiers or civilians, notes that they rub along amicably enough together just so long as Kashmir is not mentioned. They are products of the same school, figuratively and often literally. The tragedy is that so many of these folk now stand a very good chance of being swept aside.

There is going to be a well-nigh irresistible tendency in both camps, of course, to blame Britain and America for the entire calamity. It may be academically interesting for military experts to see whether the U.S. Patton is really a better tank than the British Centurion or the Hawker Hunter more maneuverable than the Lockheed Lightning, but you can take it for certain that the West will catch it in the neck either way.

The chorus will be: "You let us down."

Attempts by the American Congress to apply pressure by cutting off civilian aid along with military to both sides, which was voted down on President Johnson's say-so, will certainly be remembered as attempted blackmail. Aid to both has been frozen.

For all these reasons, then, I foresee the upshot of this war as being the emergence of a new India-Pakistan. New leaders will appear, and unless we are very lucky, careful or both, the prospect is that they will be an even more prickly lot to deal with.

The odds look to me about even as between military dictatorship and a Marxist-based takeover. The only thing that can stop this, and save the existing power elite in both countries, is to agree on a cease-fire while each enjoys sufficient domestic prestige to hang on. But at this writing the chances of such a recourse to reason and self-interest do not look good.

THE USES OF MILITARY AID

(Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 6, 1959)

Senator GORE. I find it difficult to defend giving a vast amount of military assistance to Pakistan and then providing economic aid to India with which she buys Canberra bombers. We are paying the bill on both sides.

Secretary of Defense McELROY. This defense, of course, is not against India. This is allocated to Pakistan for defense against Russia and China.

Senator GORE. Well, that may be your purpose, but our official who is there with the program day to day says that insofar

as the Pakistanis are concerned, they want it as armament against India.

Secretary McELROY. Well, we don't agree with them.

Senator GORE. But you give it to them, nevertheless, and they are the ones who will use it, not you.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10871) making appropriations for foreign assistance and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I yield myself whatever time may be necessary to make an opening statement on the bill.

Mr. President, the foreign aid and related agencies appropriation bill for fiscal year 1966, which is now before the Senate, recommends appropriations of new obligatory authority in the amount of \$3,907,188,000. This amount is \$281,735,000 under the budget estimates and \$94,265,000 under the amount allowed by the House.

In reporting this bill to the Senate, the committee took into consideration the will of the Senate when it acted upon the authorization bill in the first instance and approved the sum of \$3.243 billion for title I of that bill, relating to economic and military assistance. In comparison with the ceiling of \$3.243 billion in the authorization act as it passed the Senate, the committee total for title I is \$3.193 billion, or \$50 million below the Senate authorization ceiling. This recommendation of \$3.193 billion for title I, "Economic and military assistance," is \$92 million below the House allowance and \$266,470,000 under the amounts requested in the budget.

A summary of the bill, printed on page 2 of the committee report, sets out the comparisons of the three titles of the bill, including the budget estimates, the bill as it passed the House, and the amounts recommended by the Senate committee. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have this table printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Summary of the bill

Title	Item	Budget estimates (amended)	Bill as it passed House	Recommended by Senate committee	Increase (+) or decrease (—), Senate bill compared with—	
					Budget estimate	Bill as it passed House
I	Foreign assistance.....	\$3,459,470,000	\$3,285,000,000	\$3,193,000,000	—\$266,470,000	—\$92,000,000
II	Foreign assistance (other).....	729,453,000	716,453,000	714,188,000	—15,265,000	—2,265,000
III	Export-Import Bank of Washington (limitations).....	(1,190,172,000)	(1,190,172,000)	(1,190,172,000)	—	—
	Total.....	4,188,923,000	4,001,453,000	3,907,188,000	—281,735,000	—94,265,000

Mr. PASTORE. For "Technical cooperation and development grants" under title I, the committee has concurred with the House recommendation of \$202,355,000, which is \$16,645,000 under the budget request. The funds provided hereunder will be used principally to hire experts and technicians to help less-de-

veloped nations help themselves in such fields as education, health and sanitation, communications, transportation, and public administration. These funds also finance ocean freight charges on relief shipments by approved American nonprofit voluntary agencies.

The appropriation item, "American

schools and hospitals abroad," has been recommended at the budget figure of \$7 million, which is the same as the House allowance. This is a reduction of \$9,800,000 under the 1965 appropriation, occasioned largely by the completion of financing for the new medical center at the American University at Beirut.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended, so as to read: "An Act to amend the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 724; 20 U.S.C. 79-79e), so as to increase the amount authorized to be appropriated to the Smithsonian Institution for use in carrying out its functions under said Act, and for other purposes."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 771), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXPLANATION

The purpose of H.R. 7059 as referred is to remove an outmoded \$10,000 limitation on the annual appropriations authorized for the Canal Zone Biological Area at Barro Colorado Island on Gatun Lake in the Canal Zone.

The facility there, for the past 19 years under the Smithsonian auspices, is the only tropical biological research area under the U.S. flag in the Latin American tropics, and was established in 1940. In 1946, the functions of this facility, together with the original statutory limitation on the funding involved, were transferred to the Smithsonian Institution under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of that year.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

While the Committee on Rules and Administration concurs in the general purpose of H.R. 7059, to repeal the obsolete \$10,000 limitation on annual appropriations for the Canal Zone Biological Area, it believes, however, that a reasonable financial limitation should be placed upon this activity. Consequently, the committee has amended H.R. 7059 to limit the authorization for the purpose to \$350,000 per annum. That figure is considered realistic and appropriate by the committee on the basis of testimony it received from Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. The title of the bill has been amended also, to reflect the committee action.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

On July 23, 1964, after favorable report from the Committee on Rules and Administration, the Senate passed S. 808, similar in concept to H.R. 7059. The measure, however, failed of House approval during the 88th Congress.

S. 808 was introduced by Senator LEVERETT SALTONSTALL (for himself and Senator CLINTON P. ANDERSON and Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT); and in the 89th Congress a bill (S. 1294), identical to H.R. 7059, was introduced by Senator SALTONSTALL with the same cosponsors. All three Senators serve as Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

H.R. 7059 was passed by the House of Representatives on May 10, 1965. In view of the House action, the committee reports favorably on this measure.

Senate Report No. 1231, accompanying S. 808, demonstrated that the research activities of the Smithsonian in the Canal Zone have been increased since 1946, and that sums in excess of the statutory limitation have been budgeted and approved since 1951.

The legislation is needed so that a point of order may be avoided on this item in the Smithsonian's annual budget, and so that the important research activities of the Smithsonian in the Canal Zone can be conducted and administered in conformance with current procedures.

DEPARTMENTAL REPORTS

In his report to Senator CLAIBORNE PELL, chairman of the Subcommittee on the Smithsonian Institution of the Committee on Rules and Administration, Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, stated in part:

"The act of July 2, 1940, established the Canal Zone Biological Area as an independent Government entity with its own Board of Trustees and an annual appropriations limitation of \$10,000. In 1946, the functions and authority of the independent Board were transferred as a whole to the Smithsonian Institution by Reorganization Plan No. 3, and the Canal Zone Biological Area became an integral part of and an important center for the Smithsonian's programs in tropical biology. Although it was not the intent or effect of this transfer to place a \$10,000 limitation on the Smithsonian's expenditures for tropical biology, it was not possible, using the Reorganization Act power, to remove this inappropriate portion of the original legislation. Consequently, at the request of the Board of Regents, S. 1294 is proposed for the purpose of removing this limitation and making clear that the appropriations authority for Smithsonian activities associated with Barro Colorado Island is the same basic authority underlying appropriations for other longstanding Smithsonian research programs * * *."

"The Bureau of the Budget advises that there is no objection to the presentation of this report from the standpoint of the administrations' program."

The report (H. Rept. No. 280) from the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries accompanying H.R. 7059 contains the following pertinent statement from a departmental report of the Panama Canal Company, relating to H.R. 7059, and signed by W. M. Whitman, the Company's secretary.

"The act of July 2, 1940, is administered by the Smithsonian Institution pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946 and neither the Panama Canal Company nor the Canal Zone Government has any function or responsibility for the operation of Barro Colorado Island. Neither agency of the canal enterprise, however, has any objection to the enactment of H.R. 7059 which relates solely to the program carried on by the Smithsonian Institution in the Canal Zone."

"The Bureau of the Budget advises that there is no objection to the submission of this report."

THE BRITISH LEAP FORWARD

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I want to call to the attention of my colleagues a very thoughtful and perceptive editorial, written by Walter Lippmann, which appeared in today's Washington Post.

In the editorial Mr. Lippmann makes a sober appraisal of the newly issued British 5-year plan and the problems it attempts to deal with in the British economy.

He expresses doubt whether any British Government—whether led by Labor or the Conservatives—could make this plan workable. He makes this statement not on the grounds that the plan is ineffective or too ambitious or out of tune with the times but because Britain's special situation—its global military responsibilities and the international reserve currency role of the pound sterling—which makes its domestic economic problems vastly different from that of other European nations. Because of these special factors and the simultaneous need to modernize the British econ-

omy Britain has not been able to play an effective role as our ally. Mr. Lippmann takes the position that it is essential for us to have Britain as a strong ally and that for this reason the British situation should be of serious concern to the United States.

I share Mr. Lippmann's concern over Britain and on August 12 I addressed myself to analyzing Britain's economic situation on the floor of the Senate and made several recommendations how the United States in cooperation with continental Europe can assist Britain to help itself. I am pleased that Mr. Lippmann sees Britain's situation very much the same way as I do and I hope that the United States will take the lead in marshaling economic support for Britain so that Britain can take the necessary steps to modernize its economy and thereby continue to play its very constructive economic and military role in the world. And as a close ally of the United States.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Lippmann's editorial be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE BRITISH LEAP FORWARD

(By Walter Lippmann)

Although the large volume published in London last week is called "The National Plan," Americans who read it will have to bear in mind that it is less an announcement of government policy than a statement of intentions and hopes. The plan is in effect a theoretical consensus, put together by expert civil servants after extensive study of the economy and questioning of managers and labor leaders. The plan is a national estimate of what could be done in the course of the next 10 years to modernize the British economy. It carries with it the commitment of the Government to take such measures as will help, will prod, pull, and compel managers, labor leaders, investors, bankers, and public servants to carry out the plan.

Compared with the customary behavior of British industry since World War II, the plan seems very ambitious. For example, it proposes a 25-percent increase in the national output before 1970. This means that the rate of output of each worker must rise by 3.4 percent per year instead of by 3 percent as it now may be rising. Though the difference looks small, it would in fact require a great leap forward in technology and habits of work. While no one is in a position to say that the leap forward cannot be made, it is not at all certain that Britain has in the present Labor government, or could have now in a Conservative government, the kind of government which is strong enough to make the national plan workable.

As against this, it can be said that the principles of the plan have in fact been carried out successfully in France, originally under the leadership of M. Jean Monnet, and that the French recovery and reconstruction which began in the pre-Gaullist years has been carried on under General de Gaulle too. In fact, it would be fair to say that this kind of planning in what the French call the "concerted economy" belongs to advanced, highly developed economies in democratic societies, and that variants of it, in greater or lesser degree, have in the modern world replaced socialism as a method of reforming the abuses and the weaknesses of laissez faire capitalism.

The plan is, one might say in tune with the times. But, applied in Britain, there are certain special conditions which must give us pause. Britain has difficulties which are not shared by the great West European powers. Thus, as a matter of fact, all the West European countries, except Portugal, have liquidated their prewar empires; none has the kind of global responsibility which Britain still bears from Aden to Singapore. It is a very serious question whether the British Isles can provide the economic basis to support this remnant of the old imperial system.

Britain differs also from the flourishing West European states in another important respect. The Europeans do not have the burden, as well as the benefits, of having a currency which is an international reserve asset.

To carry on the remainder of empire in Asia and to keep the pound sterling as an international reserve currency the combination of these two enormous commitments makes the reconstruction and recovery of Britain different in kind as well as in degree from that of France, Germany, Italy, and the rest.

Yet, it is this very combination which concerns us in America very deeply. Britain today is not filling, is not able to fill, the role of a first-class power. The British Government has felt itself to be so weak at home and abroad that it has not been able to play the part of a true ally. A true ally has to be an independent friend and supporter. The problem of working out the relations between the Western World and the Asian Continent cannot be done by American military and economic power alone. For it is beyond the experience and wisdom of any one power to play so great a part. President Johnson has had little or none of the kind of help that a true ally, especially an old and experienced one like Britain, can and should give him.

More than that, just beyond the horizon lies the possibility that if Britain cannot play her role in the East, we shall be called upon to provide the replacement.

Thus, we have a positive interest in British recovery and reconstruction, and we must insist on hoping that what France, Germany, and Italy have done, the British people will find a way to do also.

THE UNITED NATIONS' FINEST HOUR

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest that the United Nations, as Ambassador Goldberg has said, saw its finest hour when it arranged the cease-fire between India and Pakistan which went into effect yesterday. The United Nations played the essential role in bringing under control a conflict that could, if it had not been checked through the efforts of that body, been a disaster for Asia and the world. The United States was indeed wise to put its full weight behind the U.N. cease-fire efforts. The U.N. and the diplomats who through that organization brought about the cease-fire have done a truly spectacular job for which the world has cause to be very grateful. The settlement is proof that the U.N., whose vitality had so recently been called into doubt in some quarters, is still very much alive, and remains an essential instrument of peace.

Now that the U.N. has surmounted this test—which is certainly one of the most rigorous it has ever had to face—it must undertake the further task of settling the underlying dispute over

Kashmir. Let no one be blinded by the cease-fire into believing that the trouble is over—the resolution of the Kashmir problem confronts the U.N. now with an even more severe test. Our full energies must be devoted to assisting the U.N. to meet that test too, through the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the dispute, so that the two great nations of the subcontinent may not feel called upon to turn to armed conflict once again.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the RECORD the unedited text of my column, "Main Stream," which appeared in the September 9, 1965 edition of the New York Journal American; an editorial from yesterday's Washington Evening Star; an article and an editorial from today's Washington Post; and an editorial from today's New York Post.

There being no objection, the column, articles, and editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VITAL TEST FOR U.N. IN KASHMIR WAR (By Senator JACOB K. JAVITS)

The India-Pakistan fighting has presented the United Nations with a severe test as well as an opportunity to confirm its usefulness as a peacekeeping organization. It has also underlined the necessity of the United Nations as the prime international agency for peacemaking.

The United Nations has taken a leading role in the attempt to stop the fighting at a time when its viability as an effective international peacekeeper is still being questioned as a result of the hassle over who should pay for past peacekeeping operations. The international body is again in the middle of a difficult and possibly catastrophic confrontation which the weight of world opinion wants settled immediately. It has become involved—as it should—in an issue which almost every power in the world—except the leading enemies of world peace, the Communist Chinese—would like to see resolved without further bloodshed and without further escalation.

The question is: Can the United Nations succeed in ending the fighting and then in fashioning the means necessary to maintain peace on the Asian subcontinent? Can the United Nations, so recently beleaguered, again prove its usefulness as a force for peace in the world?

The questions are not academic, and the answers will be written in history in a painfully short time. For India, Pakistan and the world, the stakes are just too high to allow a continuation or escalation of the fighting that could ultimately lead to the destruction of one or both of the adversaries and virtually invite Communist China to interfere in a major way in the affairs of the subcontinent.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have chosen to work through the United Nations to bring this conflict under control, without taking sides on the substance of the dispute. The Security Council has twice voted unanimously to call for a cease-fire, and has sent Secretary-General U Thant to the scene in an attempt to obtain it. The very fact that the United Nations has intimately involved itself in efforts to end this fighting is a sign that it is very much alive. The interests of the United States and the U.S.S.R. coincide in this case, creating unanimity in the Security Council and giving the United Nations an opportunity to move strongly, if need be, to restore peace. The individual and collective efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, of SEATO and CEN-TO—in fact, every available resource—must

be brought to bear to effect a cease-fire. But the main responsibility properly belongs in the first instance to the United Nations.

The main lesson of this conflict so far is that the United Nations, to be effective, must not only be able to put out fires after they start, but must also have the ability to prevent them. Kashmir has been a point of contention between India and Pakistan since the partition of the subcontinent 18 years ago. Attempts to bring about a final settlement have been fruitless, even though it was obvious that grievances—whether real or illusory—were not disappearing with the passage of time and showed no inclination to disappear in the future.

Yet the United Nations and the world seemed unable to do anything but watch and wait until the explosion came and tanks and planes crossed national frontiers.

Now the United Nations must not only be able to halt the fighting, but must evolve some mechanism to prevent explosive pressure from building again along the Indian-Pakistan border. This will mean increased emphasis on methods of adjusting disputes before they erupt into violence. That is what the United Nations was designed to do, and it is significant that Great Britain has recently proposed a broad study of the methods and machinery which might be used by the United Nations in achieving the peaceful settlement of disputes before the parties try to solve them by force.

The next few weeks will be difficult ones for the United Nations. It deserves and needs full backing from the United States and every other peacekeeping nation. But a decisive United Nations victory in this critical confrontation would give new hope to the millions who like us feel that the United Nations is still the best hope for peace in an imperfect world.

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 22, 1965]

THE CEASE-FIRE

The cease-fire in the Indian-Pakistan conflict, scheduled to begin at 6 o'clock this evening, is undoubtedly the most dramatic example to date of the United Nations' ability to stabilize a spreading crisis. Coming as it does during the U.N.'s 20th anniversary—when so many internal problems bedevil the world organization—the truce is a good omen.

The acceptance of a cease-fire by the warring parties came in part because of economic and political pressures brought to bear by the United States and the Soviet Union. But it is obvious that both New Delhi and Rawalpindi were forced to a belated realization of the enormous dangers inherent in a drawn-out war over a disputed territory.

These dangers were compounded by Red China's threatened intrusion into the conflict—a threat which also is now eased by a Chinese assertion that India has dismantled military installations it supposedly was maintaining on the Tibet side of the Sikkim border.

The truce itself may be nothing more than a breather. But it does indicate that neither India nor Pakistan can envision, at this point, a victory sufficient to overshadow the mounting war losses and the combined pressures of those powers anxious to end the crisis.

Now begins the more difficult task of finding an equitable solution to the problem of Kashmir. In his acceptance of the cease-fire order, Pakistan's Ayub Khan threatened to withdraw from the United Nations altogether unless the U.N. can come up with a "fair and honorable settlement" of the Kashmir question. But the mere fact that Pakistan—and, inferentially, India—has decided to shift the responsibility for such a solution to the U.N. itself is some cause for optimism.

U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg said this morning that "the Security Council has ad-

ressed itself to perhaps the gravest problem in U.N. history." And it addressed itself with authority and dispatch. The basic limitation on the powers of the U.N. is that it must find a consensus among the major powers on any specific peace-keeping mission. But when it has such a consensus, it can function. Hopefully, its demonstrated ability to function in this difficult case will build new confidence in the future of the world organization.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1965]

U.N. MAKES PEACE IN ITS FINEST HOUR

(By Louis B. Fleming)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., September 22.—There was a glow of satisfaction and the return of a long-lost sense of confidence at the United Nations today following the early morning agreement on a cease-fire between India and Pakistan.

The United Nations had made peace. And so had Arthur J. Goldberg. Corridors buzzed about both.

Only a handful of hearty diplomats had been on hand in the Council chamber at 3 a.m. to hear Pakistan Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto read the cease-fire agreement.

Only eight reporters had stood in the corridors an hour later to hear U.S. Ambassador Goldberg say: "This is a great moment in the history of the United Nations."

CLOSE SHAVE FOR PEACE

And only a few persons knew how close to disaster the path to peace had come in the tense hours between 1:45 a.m. Monday, when the council demanded a cease-fire, and 3 a.m. Wednesday, when Bhutto agreed.

There was almost universal agreement among diplomats that this was the Security Council's finest hour. The threat of this war, with the backstage role of Communist China, had an importance that most thought greater than earlier council peace actions.

Most of the delegates agreed that much of the credit belonged to Goldberg, even though he had risked a mutiny by some of the members, and even though the final agreement was threatened by a walkout of some of the same angry members early today.

Goldberg himself was convinced that the agreement early Monday morning was the fruit of continuous negotiations he had demanded as Council president.

SIX THREATENED TO QUIT

At the crucial moment in these negotiations Monday, the six nonpermanent members of the Council handed Goldberg a letter threatening to walk out and challenging his extended talks alone with France, the Soviet Union and Britain while they cooled their heels outside. Fortunately, he had just won agreement from the Big Four on a resolution almost identical to one he had negotiated earlier in the day with the six.

Their mutiny was abandoned and the Council adopted the resolution.

Council members themselves were kept in a state of suspense by Pakistan until Bhutto read the agreement of his government at the exact hour set for the cease-fire in the Council's Monday resolution.

At 2:36 a.m. Goldberg invited Bhutto to address the Council. At this point, no one on the Council yet knew what the Pakistani would do.

BITTER CHARGES.

For 20 minutes, the Foreign Minister gave a traditional Kashmir dispute speech, ringing oratory, bitter charges against India, protests of absolute innocence on the part of Pakistan, a threat to fight for 1,000 years if necessary to defend the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir.

But he kept looking at the clock. Just at 3 a.m., the hour of the cease-fire deadline, he

halted his speech, pulled out a piece of paper, and carefully read the following message from Pakistani President Ayub Khan: "Pakistan considers Security Council resolution 211 of September 20 as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of international peace and in order to enable the Security Council to evolve a self-executing procedure which will lead to an honorable settlement of the root cause of the present conflict, namely the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, I have issued the following order to the Pakistan armed forces * * *"

Pakistan would stop shooting in 5 minutes, he informed the Council.

Council members recessed to draft their acceptance. The final cease-fire deadline was postponed for 15 hours to give both armies time for implementation.

Elation over the peace agreement was tempered with a realization that, as Goldberg said, the cease-fire was just the beginning. Pakistan obviously was dead serious when it said it would quit the United Nations if the Council allows the question of Kashmir to drift as it has for 16 years.

But it was impossible to exaggerate the achievement in terms of revived prestige for the organization. It was a credit to Secretary General U Thant, whose 9-day peace mission to India and Pakistan laid the foundation for the cease-fire agreement.

And for the Council, it was a moment particularly significant for the unity of the big four that succeeded in isolating the conflict from the opportunism of Peiping.

[The U.N. General Assembly's steering committee recommended—without taking a formal vote—that the Assembly again take up the issue of a seat for Red China, Associated Press reported. U.S. Ambassador Charles Y. Yost said the United States had no objection to full-scale Assembly debate, but added that in the light of recent events he believed the debate "would serve no useful purpose." The steering committee also overrode Communist objections and recommended that the Assembly again take up the Tibet issue.]

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1965]

THE FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE

Peace prospects have taken a dramatic upward turn with Indian and Pakistani agreement to a cease-fire and the easing of Chinese pressure on New Delhi. For the halt to the fighting great credit is due the United Nations Security Council and Secretary General U Thant personally. Here is an encouraging demonstration that the international machinery can work when both the Soviet Union and the United States cooperate to keep the matter out of the cold war.

That there was a tacit understanding on this point is evident from what happened, even though for ideological reasons Moscow cannot publicly proclaim a common interest with the United States. Both countries were careful to work through the U.N. and not to impede its efforts. Soviet Premier Kosygin refrained from taking sides over Kashmir but made clear his country's concern with halting the fighting. President Johnson is known to have exchanged personal letters with both Indian Premier Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub while focusing on the U.N.

No doubt all of this had its influence in Peiping, where the significance of the unwritten Soviet-American cooperation to forestall Chinese intervention must have been fully understood. If China now wants to proclaim that India backed down on the border dispute about which the Peiping Government had been so blustery, this sort of facesaving is inexpensive.

Indeed, the Indian Government appears to have played its cards skillfully. It appears to have yielded no point of much substance respecting the border. But in view of its conciliatory attitude, the Chinese would have

looked both sinister and ridiculous if they had pressed a military action for the return of 59 yaks. Of course the Chinese aim of degrading India and encouraging political fractionalization remains, but this time the Indians are in a much stronger position than during the humiliation of 1962.

This relative success of India tends to make the outlook for Pakistan more troubled. The Pakistani guerrilla activity and the later military thrusts plainly failed to achieve their objective of forcing a Kashmir settlement. To whatever extent Pakistan relied on a diversion by China it had no very great success either, although the Chinese threat may have made a cease-fire seem more urgent to New Delhi. For Pakistan, with its goal unfilled, the acceptance of a cease-fire unquestionably was difficult even if necessary. All the same, Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto was foolish to threaten withdrawal from the U.N. if no Kashmir solution is found. Incidentally, some diplomats believe that President Ayub may have sent his firebrand foreign minister to New York in order to get him out of Rawalpindi while important decisions were being made.

Irrespective of any nationalist considerations, it ought now to be apparent in both countries that the bloodshed will have been in vain unless there is a harmonization—which means some sort of Kashmir accommodation. The Security Council formula for further talks is very vague. Much will now depend upon the reasonableness of both parties, especially India. There can be no patience with any all-or-nothing formula on either side.

For India to concede anything about Kashmir, in view of the fear of communal disorders and the state of feeling against Pakistan, would take a large measure of statesmanship. But India can either face a continually frustrated neighbor or help build stability in Pakistan by acknowledging the merit of at least some of the Pakistani case in Kashmir. Much again will depend upon how well the United States and the Soviet Union, each with an eye on China, can continue working together privately and through the United Nations to emphasize that this time a Kashmir solution is imperative.

[From the New York Post, Sept. 23, 1965]

REPRIEVE IN ASIA

Mankind has won another reprieve. Thanks to the U.N. and skillful great-power diplomacy in support of its effort, the danger of a great Asian conflagration has been at least temporarily averted.

But the silencing of the guns brings no automatic guarantee that the voice of reason will begin to be heard on the subcontinent. The postwar diplomatic agenda is littered with cease-fires that have not been converted into permanent settlements. The Kashmir time bomb has been ticking away since 1947, when the U.N. arranged its first cease-fire. The full explosion did not come this time, but the fuse is still lit.

The cease-fire command of the Security Council to which India and Pakistan deferred recognizes the peril of allowing the Kashmir question to revert to the agenda status of an old chestnut. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution envisage a truce as the first step toward the settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict. U Thant is requested to exert every possible effort to give effect to the whole resolution.

President Johnson's expression of pleasure over the cease-fire noted the precariousness of the truce.

"The job of the U.N. has just begun," he said, adding that the United States would "fully support it every step of the way by our actions and our words."

President Johnson rightly paid tribute to U Thant's fairness and firmness in the service of peace, as well as to the role of America's U.N. team, headed by Ambassador Goldberg.

The tributes were merited, but it must also be underscored that the U.N. was effective in this crisis, because member states, and especially the great powers, resolutely backed up its commands.

The U.N. never showed itself more indispensable than at this moment when voices in many capitals were writing it off as a failure. India and Pakistan, especially the latter, were able to yield to a cease-fire order from the U.N., which they would have been unable to accept from any single nation or group of nations.

The great powers, especially the United States, Russia, and Britain, were able to unite their cease-fire efforts through the U.N. in a fashion that might have been impossible.

If this cooperation continues, if the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Britain now support U Thant's conciliation moves with the same vigor they manifested in bolstering his cease-fire efforts, there may be some hope of a permanent settlement.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on September 21, 1965, the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE] made a statement on the floor of the Senate explaining the conference report on the Water Quality Act of 1965, S. 4. There are errors in two paragraphs of that statement as it appears in the RECORD on page 23671.

On behalf of the Senator from Maine, I ask unanimous consent that the paragraph beginning "Violations of standards" on page 23671 be corrected in the permanent RECORD to read as follows:

Violations of standards under the provisions of this act are subject to Federal abatement action. If the Secretary finds such violation he must notify the violator and interested parties, giving the violator 6 months within which to comply with the standards. If, at the end of that period, the violator has not complied, the Secretary is authorized to bring suit, with the consent of the Governor of the affected State in the case of intrastate pollution, through the Attorney General of the United States under section 10(g) (1) or (2) of the amended Water Pollution Control Act.

Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent, on behalf of the Senator from Maine, that the second paragraph in the middle column of page 23671, beginning "Measures contained", be corrected in the permanent RECORD to read as follows:

Measures contained in both versions were: a 10-percent bonus in sewage treatment plant grants for those projects carried out in accordance with an area-wide plan; a 4-year, \$20 million per year research and development program for new and improved methods of controlling the discharge of inadequately treated combined storm and sanitary sewage; authorization for the Secretary to initiate enforcement proceedings in cases where he finds substantial economic injury results from the inability to market shellfish or shellfish products as a result of water pollution; recordkeeping and audit provisions; authority for the Secretary of Labor to set labor standards on projects financed through this act under Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950; and an additional Assistant Secretary in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

TRIBUTE TO HON. EUGENE M. ZUCKERT

Mr. STENNIS. On September 30 the Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert will retire as Secretary of the Air Force and return to private life. He then will have served continuously as Secretary for more than 4½ years, longer than any man in history.

Mr. Zuckert, at the age of 54, has already had a long and distinguished career, most of it devoted to public service. He has served as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force under our distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, and in various other positions of trust and responsibility. The honors and assignments which have come his way were in just recognition of his talent, ability, and dedication.

I have come to know Mr. Zuckert well during his tenure as Secretary of the Air Force. We have worked together on many important defense matters involving the security of this country and, while we have not always agreed upon the means, we have always shared the mutual goal of enhancing the national defense posture of this country. I have nothing but respect for his achievements, his ability, his zeal, and his devotion to the public welfare. It was under his guidance that the Air Force missile program came from almost nothing to its present overwhelming might and power.

I am delighted to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to commend Mr. Zuckert for his outstanding service and to wish him well in all of his future endeavors.

A SOLDIER'S VIEW: JUSTICE IS A NEW GI BILL

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, with the conclusion of open hearings on cold war GI bill proposals by the House Veterans' Affairs Committee the House could act upon this worthy legislation this year. Time is of the essence in this matter, for there are at present hundreds of thousands of young men and women emerging from 2 to 4 or more years of military service who are in desperate need of educational readjustment assistance, as pointed out in Lieutenant Ford's letter; privates in the Army get less pay than a Job Corps trainee.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from Lt. William T. Ford, of Leesville, La., dated September 13, 1965, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HON. RALPH W. YARBOROUGH,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

YOUR HONOR: This letter is written from deep in the boondocks and bayous of Fort Polk, La., and it is rather dusty and hot.

The purpose of this letter is to indicate my approval of the GI cold war bill.

As one who is a soldier at the present time, I would like to offer you a soldier's view of this bill.

We in the service are rapidly falling behind our civilian counterparts in both education and longevity in our careers. Many of the men with whom I graduated in college are now graduating with a master's degree. For one who plans a career of teaching, it means that I am already a year behind my colleagues in my graduate studies and I still have a year of service left.

What about the privates of this Army? Many of these young kids—and they are kids of 17 and 18—are making less than they would in the Job Corps. This hardly seems like justice.

Few of us here like the Army but we do feel a sense of duty to our country. It would seem that the country could afford to give us a little help to catch up with our peers when we terminate our enlistments.

In closing, I would like to say that there are a lot of future college students, graduate and undergraduate, out here with our fingers crossed that the bill will pass and Senator, there are also a lot of soldiers in Vietnam hoping that it will pass.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM T. FORD,
Second Lieutenant, Infantry.

THE BOBBY BAKER CASE

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an editorial entitled "The Baker Coverup Continues," published in today's issue of the Chicago Tribune.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE BAKER COVERUP CONTINUES

The Johnson administration has committed two wrongs in order to make what it considers one right; namely, the prevention of any further embarrassing disclosures in the Bobby Baker case.

The first wrong was the appointment of David Bress, a former lawyer for Baker's Serv-U Corp., as U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia. This is the office which would normally handle the prosecution of Baker, if he is indicted in connection with his various influence-peddling schemes. The proceedings would be public, and a good many influential brows might perspire.

Senators WILLIAMS of Delaware and MILLER of Iowa, both Republicans, objected to the nomination of Bress, pointing out that as an erstwhile lawyer for Baker it would be unethical for him to make available all of his knowledge of Baker's affairs and that this would prevent him from properly carrying out his duties.

Instead of withdrawing the nomination, Attorney General Katzenbach came up with a neat alternative—one which looks suspiciously like what the White House intended to do all along. Mr. Katzenbach told the Senate committee considering the appointment that there was no need to worry: Bress wouldn't have to handle the Baker case. The Justice Department would bypass him and handle the case in its own criminal division. Here, needless to say, it would be directly under the watchful eye of the administration. The lid could be clamped down quickly whenever any unpleasant information threatened to arise linking the Johnson clique with Baker's affairs.

We have to admire the ingenuity of the administration troubleshooters in devising means of keeping the Baker case out of public sight, but it's getting a little tedious. We shudder to think how bad the truth must be to warrant all this hocus-pocus. Senator

ingness to stand up and be counted when he feels it's required of him.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Communications Satellite Act—these and other legislative milestones are in many ways monuments to the long hours Katzenbach spent in Capitol Hill, conciliating the sharply divergent views of lawmakers as the bills ground through Congress. As a result, it is easy to find responsible officials in Congress and the administration who feel, as one government lawyer of 25 years put it, that "Nick Katzenbach was the civil rights bill."

"If I had to name my own skills," Katzenbach admits, "I'd have to list first my ability to get people to agree to something."

On 2 consecutive days, Nick Katzenbach stood up when the could have played it cozy by staying away.

He fully backed the appointment of James P. Coleman, a Mississippi segregationist with whom he had been in sharp opposition, as a Federal judge in the South. Without Katzenbach, Coleman would have had to go it alone in convincing the Senate he would adhere to the law in his decisions as a judge.

Katzenbach also strongly defended Internal Revenue Service agents who had been caught with their wiretaps showing. His own department wasn't directly involved, but the IRS has contributed mightily to the Justice Department's drive on organized crime, and Katzenbach wasn't forgetting it. "I could have told you he'd do that," says Katzenbach's wife, Lydia. She contends she can accurately predict his reaction to any given situation.

"He feels that a person operates from an inner core that develops and solidifies as he grows older," she explains. "And so he feels that when he's confronted with a difficult choice, he really, deep within himself, doesn't have much choice."

He also has a reputation as being slow to anger.

"I guess I get mad only when I feel my honor has been impugned, or if I been had," he says. On one occasion, a business group hinted it would bring high-level political pressure to bear on him if he opposed a merger important to the group.

"If I decide to go ahead with this suit," he says he told them "political pull won't do you any good unless another Attorney General is in this office." He later went ahead with the suit.

He has also demonstrated he can keep cool in the most trying of circumstances. Millions of TV viewers were bystanders when Katzenbach had his famous confrontation with Alabama Gov. George Wallace at the door to the University of Alabama in 1963. In a fascinating 13-minute scene, Katzenbach told the Governor that under the Constitution two Negroes seeking entrance had every right to enroll in the university. Then Governor Wallace responded with a long statement in which he said State law would prevail. The Negroes were denied entrance then, but the school has since been integrated.

Later when Katzenbach spotted Wallace at an inaugural ball for President Johnson, he murmured to a companion, "I've got a mad urge to go over and say, 'Governor, I'm Nick Katzenbach. I don't think we've ever been formally introduced.'"

"As a result of that confrontation," says Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the NAACP, "and his general conduct in office, the Negro community has complete confidence in his understanding of its problems and his attitude toward them."

By the yardstick, Nicholas Katzenbach measures 6 feet 2 inches, but he gives the appearance of being much larger. He weighs 232 pounds, has brawny shoulders, a thick and powerful neck and large hands. One might expect a booming, thundering voice, but instead it is soft and soothing.

His suits are forever rumpled, although his wife insists he spends good money on clothes and would like—in the rare moments when he gives it any thought—to look neat. His garish, unmatched ties have become a trademark. His shirts, with few exceptions, are out at the elbows. His shoes rarely show a shine, and the fringe of light brown hair surrounding his bald dome often approaches his frayed collar.

Even among those who are closest to Katzenbach, there are few who have noticed—or know why—the right elbow of his shirts wears out first. Or why he chain-smokes his king-size filter cigarettes with an awkward, half bending of the right arm.

To grasp that elbow is to feel solid, swollen bone. Katzenbach is a victim of Page's disease—"Osteitis deformans"—a painful bone condition that usually attacks older men and results in an enlargement and deformity of the affected bones. The ailment—which was discovered in 1959 and frequently causes him intense discomfort—seems to be localized—although there's another touch of it in one hip.

Characteristically, he dismisses the ailment with: "It's a mess. But I don't think about it much."

Katzenbach suffers acute discomfort when he feels he is trapped in a crowd. Sometimes, says Lydia Katzenbach, he feels close to fainting.

During the President's state of the Union address to Congress last January Katzenbach sat in the front row with the Cabinet. Bathed in television lights, surrounded by sweltering human beings, he was so distressed that he made it through the evening only by a mental game in which he fixed in his mind the precise location of every exit from the House Chamber.

INDEPENDENCE DAY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALI

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, today is the Independence Day of the Republic of Mali. It is the fifth anniversary of the day when French Soudan became the Republic of Mali and withdrew from the French community.

I know other Senators join me in wishing Mali well at this time of celebration in that West African country. Mali's relations with its neighbors have been strengthened as time has passed, and we all hope that, under the administration of President Keita, Mali will continue to grow and develop successfully.

I hope, too, that Mali can continue to have relations with the United States which are as friendly as possible within the framework of Mali's policy of non-alignment in world affairs.

On this Independence Day, then, I know that other Senators join me in wishing to see Mali achieve its aspirations in harmony with the other developing nations of Africa.

THE GOVERNMENT BOND MARKET

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the Government bond market is not only a critical and massive component of the complex of capital markets which have developed in the United States. The Government bond market has also historically been a crucial leading indicator of fundamental economic trends. In a special article on the front page of the August 30 Wall Street Journal, George

Shea has provided precise documentation of the way in which the behavior of the Government bond market has called the turn on the business cycle during the past 10 years. In each case—1956-58, 1959-60, and 1961-62—a downturn in the Government bond market has been followed by a decline in stock prices and, finally, by a general turn toward recession.

As Mr. Shea points out, the Government bond market has shown marked weakness during the summer months of this year. On the one hand, this cannot be taken as any sort of clear signal that serious trouble is ahead for the U.S. economy; in the past, downturns in the market for Governments have gone on for many months before the economy has suffered. But, on the other hand, we must be constantly vigilant and aware of any and every indication of weakness amidst the general, unprecedented strength of our economy.

I ask unanimous consent that the Wall Street Journal article by George Shea be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS IN BUSINESS AND FINANCE

(By George Shea)

Since the final week of July the bond market, led by prices of U.S. Government bonds, has been declining almost every day. The significance of such a decline, if it persists, is that it often, though not always, precedes a decline in stock prices, followed by a downturn in general business.

This sequence of events is well established in both economic theory and in the economic records. The late Leonard P. Ayres more than 30 years ago wrote a book in which he traced this sequence in the business and financial cycles of the previous 100 years. And Arthur F. Burns, president of the non-profit National Bureau of Economic Research, in 1950 wrote a description of the typical business cycle—a description used again with minor revisions in a 1961 bureau publication—from which the following relevant sentences are quoted:

"Let us then take our stand at the bottom of a depression and watch events as they unfold. Production characteristically rises in the first segment of expansion. Indeed, every (economic) series moves upward except bond yields and bankruptcies. In the second stage the broad advance continues, though it is checked at one point—the bond market where trading begins to decline. Bond prices join bond sales in the next stage; in other words, long-term interest rates—which fell during the first half of the expansion—begin to rise. In the final stretch of expansion, declines become fairly general in the financial sector. Share trading and stock prices move downward.

"These adverse developments soon engulf the economic system as a whole, and the next stage of the business cycle is the first stage of contraction."

Within the past 10 years, furthermore, the sequence of downturns in bonds, then stocks, then business has been repeated more than once. Instances of it took place in 1956-58, 1959-60, and to a partial extent 1961-62.

In the 1956-58 case, U.S. Government bond prices began to slip off in the first half of 1956, edged down further in the second half and lost ground steadily after February 1957. Stock prices turned down in the second half of 1956, recovered in the first half of 1957 to about the 1956 high—reaching 521 for the Dow-Jones industrial average in July—then

fell 100 points as measured by that average in 3 months. Business started losing ground in August 1957 and declined until April 1958.

In the 1958-60 business expansion Government bond prices declined pretty steadily throughout, thus not conforming to the standard pattern of rising bond prices in the first stage of a business expansion. But otherwise the pattern was normal. The fall in bond prices continued until January 1960, and in that very month stock prices started their decline, which lasted into October, falling nearly 120 points from a top of about 685 as measured by the industrial average. Business turned down after May 1960, bottoming out in February 1961.

The 1961-62 experience differed in that although the bond-stock sequence was the usual one business didn't follow with a downturn only leveling off from spring to fall in 1962. Government bond prices fell from May 1961 to February 1962; and stock prices skidded from December 1961 to June 1962, with the industrial average losing 200 points from a top of 735.

Obviously, a decline lasting 1 month in bond prices, such as the one since late July, cannot be compared by itself with these previous instances when bond prices fell for months on end. However, the latest decline doesn't stand by itself; it can be regarded as an extension of mild downturns which have taken place in the past couple of years.

These downturns can be identified as having started with the year 1963, following the recovery in bond prices that came after the bond-stock decline of 1961-62. The monthly average yield of U.S. Government bonds with maturities of 10 years or more has been going up, with substantial interruptions, since December 1962.

At the top of the 1962 bond price recovery, in December, this monthly average yield was 3.87 percent. From there the yield rose slowly to an April 1964 high of 4.20 percent, after which it receded to 4.12 percent last November. Then it rose again to 4.16 percent in February this year, after which it held just below that figure through July. Since late that month it has gone up again, with the daily average reaching 4.21 percent at the end of last week.

That this trend may persist is suggested by several factors in the general economic background. Capital-spending plans of American industry, the rising expenses of the Vietnam war, and the normal rising trend of State and local government outlays all suggest that demand for credit is likely to continue strong, putting upward pressure on the cost of borrowing money.

How the credit resources of the Nation are being strained is reflected in banking statistics. In the year ended August 18 the banks that report weekly to the Federal Reserve System sold \$3.2 billion of U.S. Government securities in order to obtain the money to make loans and other investments.

If the various forces pressing on the credit supply continue to cause bond prices to fall and yields to rise, this trend will have to be recognized as one of the same general magnitude as those which preceded stock and business declines of the past. Up to the present the rise in yields cannot yet be regarded as having definitely gone above the 4.20 percent average for the whole month of April 1964, as the figure of 4.21 percent late last week reflected the closing prices of only 1 day.

Furthermore, the problem of timing is difficult. There is no standard duration for the bond-price drops that foreshadow stock and business declines. The 16-month rise in bond yields to April 1964 was not followed by any general decline in stock prices or business. Quite the contrary, the industrial average continued to move up with only minor interruptions for a year, and business has continued rising through July of this

year. Still, the warning being given by the direction in which bond prices and yields are moving is worth keeping in mind.

THE U.N. TRIUMPH

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, this is a day to count our blessings. A cease-fire has been achieved in the dangerous war between India and Pakistan, thanks to the effective work of the United Nations.

Congratulations are due Secretary-General U Thant for his determined efforts to arrange a truce, and to the Security Council for the vital role it played in bringing about a cessation of the hostilities. We can be proud also of the contribution made by Mr. Arthur Goldberg, our distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations.

From the beginning, President Johnson directed American policy in an astute and skillful manner. His decision to refrain from provocative declarations, his insistence that the United States observe a neutral posture, and his refusal to intervene directly in the war, are welcome indications that our diplomacy was tempered with discretion and restraint.

Most of all, we have reason to be thankful that the United Nations retains the vitality to do such great work in the cause of peace. The hands of the clock which were moving toward general war have again been stopped. A halt to the conflict, so imperative to world peace, has been achieved by the one organization to which all nations can repair.

In this country, there has been far too much tendency to deplore the failures of the United Nations, as though we had some right to expect miracles. By demanding too much from the U.N., we have often given it credit for too little.

President Johnson and U.N. Ambassador Goldberg, however, have never made the mistake of underestimating the importance of the world organization. They have continued to give strong U.S. support to the United Nations. Understanding the important role of the U.N. in the maintenance of world peace, the administration cooled down the simmering article 19 crisis earlier this summer, and thus helped to keep the U.N. intact.

Because the U.N. had been getting too little credit in our country, I introduced, in June of this year, a resolution in the Senate—Senate Concurrent Resolution 36—which reaffirmed American support of the U.N. Joining me in sponsoring this resolution were Senators FULBRIGHT, HICKENLOOPER, CLARK, AIKEN, and COOPER. This resolution passed both Houses of Congress before the President journeyed to San Francisco to address the U.N.'s 20th anniversary celebration. The expression of congressional support contained in the resolution has been rewarded well.

The United Nations has a history of extensive accomplishment in damping brushfires which might have led to bigger wars. In helping mediate various crises such as Berlin in 1948 and Cuba in 1962, the U.N. has also helped avert possible war between the great powers. In its role in the Korean war of 1950, the

Suez crisis of 1956, and in the conflicts in the Congo and Cyprus in this decade, the U.N. has played a vital part in the restoration of peace.

Now, in its 20th anniversary year, the United Nations may well have achieved its most important peacekeeping success on the subcontinent of Asia. In doing so, it gives even greater validity to Beardsley Ruml's famous 1945 prediction:

At the end of 5 years you will think the U.N. is the greatest vision ever realized by man.

At the end of 10 years, you will find doubts within yourself and all through the world.

At the end of 15 years, you will believe the U.N. cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds are against its ultimate life and success. It will only be when the U.N. is 20 years old that you will reverse and laud the dedication of those who devote their energies to it throughout its turbulent course. For then we will know that the U.N. is the only alternative to the demolition of the world.

The course of the United Nations will continue to be turbulent, but we should pause today to pay tribute to those who have devoted their energies to its maintenance. The necessity for a United Nations has never been clearer than in the early morning hours today when the cease-fire was arranged between India and Pakistan. A tense world can now pause to breathe at least a momentary sigh of relief.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] without losing my right to the floor.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1966

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 693, H.R. 10871.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 10871) making appropriations for foreign assistance and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

FOREIGN AID AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, the concern of Senators regarding U.S. balance of payments is proper. But to judge whether foreign aid is justified by looking at its balance-of-payments impact is like determining the necessity of an operation by measuring its probable pain. Of course, there will be some balance-of-payments outflow from foreign aid, but the necessity of the program in terms of U.S. security and long-term U.S. interests is sufficient justification for its costs—both in terms of dollar appropriations and balance of payments.

From Amb. Yosp

10.45 A.M.

15/11/65

1. REVISED RESPONSE ON ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING FALL OF 1964:

"With regard to this specific allegation, the United States has commented on several similar stories in the past. The facts remain the same. Numerous third party contacts with North Vietnam were reported to us throughout this period. ~~[None of these gave us any indication that there was any desire on the Communist side to discuss any subject except on their own unacceptable terms.]~~ On the basis of the total evidence available to us, we did not believe at any time that North Vietnam was prepared for serious peace talks."

2. REVISED RESPONSE CONCERNING "CEASE - FIRE" DISCUSSIONS:

"Throughout this period Ambassador Stevenson had a number of confidential discussions with the Secretary General on possibilities of working toward a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. This was as it should be and it would be highly inappropriate to comment on the specific proposals that were discussed. However, it is not true that U Thant at any time said that he would accept any formulation concerning 'cease-fire' that the United States might propose," *though he did transmit his own text regarding a cease fire to the U.S. for comment.*

3. In making these responses, the spokesman would add the following:

"The Secretary of Defense did not participate in the U.S. Government's handling of either of these matters."

14 February 1966

Dear Senator Kennedy,

Thank you for your kind letter of 9 February.

I also appreciated the opportunity to meet you and to discuss with you some of your ideas on the subject of refugee work in South Viet-Nam. Your detailed suggestions in this regard, which I hope you will be good enough to send me through Ambassador Goldberg, will receive the urgent and earnest attention of my colleagues and myself.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Senator Edward M. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. Lemieux

XERO COPY
Edward M. Kennedy
Massachusetts



XERO COPY
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United States Senate

February 9, 1966

U Thant
The Secretary General
The United Nations
New York, New York

Sir:

It was a great privilege to have an opportunity to discuss with you some of my ideas concerning an expanded role for United Nations agencies in the refugee work in South Vietnam.

I also appreciated your helpful suggestions and insight into some of the overall problems of Southeast Asia. I am planning to forward to you within the next few days detailed suggestions of needed programs which would fall within the sphere of some of the United Nations agencies, and would welcome your further comments.

Again, my sincere thanks for your cordial and most helpful consultation.

Sincerely,

Ed Kennedy

Edward M. Kennedy

ALD/ksn

7 March 1966

Dear Mr. Bingham,

I thank you very much for your kind letter of 1 March 1966, sending me a statement on Viet-Nam which you delivered on 2 March before the House of Representatives. I have read it with great attention, and I sincerely appreciate your friendly invitation to comment on it.

As you know, I have often stated my views on Viet-Nam, which, briefly summarized, are independence, neutrality, non-intervention and a return to the Geneva Agreements. They are no doubt already familiar to you. I have always tried to formulate them in a manner which would avoid my open involvement in internal political issues. For this reason, it would not seem appropriate for me to take a position, even indirectly, in the political debate on Viet-Nam which is taking place in your country at the present time and of which your statement is a significant part.

I am sure, therefore, that you will understand my hesitation to comment on the substance of your statement as I have explained to you on Saturday. Nevertheless, you may be assured that the discussions on Viet-Nam among the representatives and the leaders of the American people, so important for the future peace of the world, are followed here with the closest interest.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

U Thant

The Honourable
Jonathan B. Bingham
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc: Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry

XERO COPY
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM
23D DISTRICT, NEW YORK

XERO COPY
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

XERO COPY
DISTRICT OFFICE:
305 EAST KINGSBRIDGE ROAD
BRONX, NEW YORK 10458
TELEPHONE WE 3-2310

March 1, 1966

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General of the
United Nations
New York, New York 10017

Dear U Thant:


I enclose herewith a statement I am making on Vietnam tomorrow, which I hope you will find of interest.

I thought of suggesting that the study I propose on pages 7 and 8 might be undertaken by the United Nations Institute but I came to the conclusion that the political problem involved is probably too delicate for such a fledgling institute to undertake.

I am writing to Mac Bundy, now of the Ford Foundation, Joe Johnson of the Carnegie Endowment, and George Franklin of the Council on Foreign Relations, in the hope that one of these organizations might be interested in sponsoring or conducting such a study.

I would be most interested in your comments, on a confidential basis.

Sincerely,



Jonathan B. Bingham
Member of Congress

JBB:mu
Enclosure

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE JONATHAN B. BINGHAM FOR DELIVERY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 1966

Mr. Speaker:

I rise at this time to submit to the House certain observations with regard to the situation in Vietnam, to discuss some of the implications of the ideas suggested in recent days by the distinguished junior Senator from New York, and to make a proposal which I believe logically follows from Senator Kennedy's contribution.

To start with, let me emphasize once again that, agonizing as the conflict is in Vietnam, I am in agreement with President Johnson that we cannot withdraw from Vietnam and let the Communists take over. I also salute the President for continuing to resist the pressure of those who would expand and escalate the war. I believe that, in pursuing a middle course between these two extremes, the President has the support, as the polls continue to show, of the great majority of the people of this country. The differences that exist among us are concerned for the most part with the question of what course to follow between withdrawal and an all-out effort to achieve a military solution, come what may. The President has repeatedly stated that he will continue to seek a peaceful settlement, and I am convinced of his profound desire to achieve that end. Nevertheless, I respectfully submit that, in spite of all the much publicized "peace offensive" of last December and January, the Administration has not yet been sufficiently resourceful or flexible in its efforts to get negotiations started. In fact, recent developments create the impression that the Administration is no longer giving much thought to the question of how to achieve a negotiated settlement.

In considering this matter, it seems pertinent first of all to examine the following crucial question: Why, in spite of all the efforts that have been made since last April to get discussions started, has Hanoi steadfastly refused to respond?

The question is the more puzzling because Hanoi has been under some pressure from non-aligned states, and presumably also from some communist states, to agree to talks, and because the toll of the conflict on North Vietnam, as well as on the Vietcong, must be considerable. Peking has every reason to prefer the continuance of the conflict, but the same cannot be said of Hanoi.

Why then the intransigence?

The first answer, which is obvious but nevertheless needs explicit recognition in these days of sloganeering, is that the Hanoi government has concluded that its interests would not be served by agreeing to talks, or, to put it another way, that the disadvantages of agreeing to talks outweigh the advantages.

Such an answer of course leads directly to the next question, why has the Hanoi regime arrived at that conclusion?

Here what evidence we have is scanty and unreliable (for even what leaders in Hanoi have told reporters and foreign diplomats may well not be the truth). But what does an analysis of the objective facts suggest?

One theory is that Hanoi chooses to continue the conflict because that is what Peking wants and Hanoi is afraid of Peking. While granting the truth of both premises, I cannot credit the theory. There is nothing Peking could reasonably do to Hanoi (other than public castigation), if Hanoi were to agree to negotiations. Indeed, Hanoi would have far more to fear from Peking if Hanoi were devastated by a protracted and perhaps intensified war and thereby rendered hopelessly dependent on Peking.

Another theory is that Hanoi is afraid it could not control the Vietcong if it were to agree to a cease-fire, especially since the Vietcong and its supporters would be afraid of being cut to bits by a vengeful Saigon government. Two comments are pertinent here: first, without support from Hanoi the Vietcong could not effectively keep fighting for long; second, Hanoi could agree to talk and at the same time refuse to stop fighting until effective arrangements had been made, presumably under international control, for protection of the communists in the South from violent retribution.

The principal theory that Administration spokesmen advance for Hanoi's intransigence is that Hanoi feels eventually the U. S. will get tired and quit just as France did, and that therefore time is on Hanoi's side. The Administration says Hanoi is encouraged in this view by the anti-war demonstrations in the U. S. and by the criticism of U. S. policies expressed by prominent members of the Legislative Branch and others. It is hard to see how Hanoi could be so misled, in the face of the repeated commitments of the Administration, the massive and continued build-up of our forces in South Vietnam, the lack of support for withdrawal shown in the U. S. public opinion polls, and the overwhelming support in Congress for money bills, such as the one passed by the House yesterday.

Nevertheless, there may be something to the theory. Being a totalitarian state, Hanoi may overestimate the importance of expressed dissent in the U. S. Moreover, Hanoi may not distinguish between those who favor abandoning the struggle -- a tiny minority -- and those who believe we have not done enough to get peace talks started -- still probably a minority, but a much larger one. (Parenthetically, I must say that some writers and some Administration officials have contributed to this confusion by their tendency to lump all the critics together and by careless use of terms such as "the appeasers".)

In any event, whatever the significance of this factor, it seems clear that debate and dissent cannot be shut off. If we were to have a formal declaration of war, the situation might be different, but I know of no responsible person who wants such a declaration. I do believe the situation could be ameliorated if those groups and individuals who are most critical of the Administration's policies should make it clear in public statements that they do not approve Hanoi's refusal to agree to peace talks. As matters stand, these organizations, having totally refrained from any criticism of Hanoi, have allowed that regime to believe that they approve of its intransigence. (A welcome contrast has been provided by the World Council of Churches, which addressed its criticism and its pleas to both sides.)

Perhaps in this situation we do pay a price for our freedoms, especially for the intensely public airing of the issues which took place in the nationally televised Senate hearings. But it is a price we must pay or lose the essence of the very ideas we are fighting to preserve and protect. The Senate hearings were themselves a stunning example of democracy in action, and served to underline the fact that the differences are more on matters of tactics than of principle or national purpose.

I have no doubt that the Administration is doing what it can to convey to Hanoi through all available communication channels the evidence that the U. S. is not going to get tired and quit. The evidence is there, in terms of historical examples of our staying power, and in terms of U. S. public opinion, as reflected in the Congress and otherwise. And Hanoi should get the message too (not in terms of a threat but in terms of a cool appraisal of the likely trend of American thinking) that, if there is to be a change in the present policy of limited military action, it is more likely to be in the direction of more drastic action than in the direction of withdrawal. (The pressures on the President today are

probably stronger from the "hawks" than from the "doves".) I would myself be strongly opposed to any expansion of the bombing of North Vietnam, especially of the cities, and I do not believe it would achieve our objectives, but in the process North Vietnam would suffer incalculable damage.

In our efforts, public and private, to convince Hanoi that we will not withdraw, that we will stay for years if necessary, we may be aided by the fact that so far Hanoi's "hawks" have been proved wrong, just as our "hawks" have been. Perhaps it is in the nature of hawks to overestimate the effectiveness of their own military strategy, and to underestimate the determination of the people on the other side.

So much for what Hanoi may see as the disadvantages of entering into negotiations.

Now, let us look at the other side of the coin, i.e., the possible advantages, from Hanoi's point of view, of starting negotiations. The question Ho Chi Minh and his advisers must ask themselves is: What would it be reasonable for them to expect they might be able to achieve through negotiations?

The quick answer is: not much. On the public record, what we have offered them, in essence, is economic aid for North Vietnam and the opportunity to contest elections in the South. So far as the offer of economic aid is concerned (though I believe it is a sophisticated and indeed statesmanlike thing to do), it cannot be much of an inducement. It could be distorted to look very much like a kind of bribe, the acceptance of which would be virtually a humiliation, especially for a state which has been consistently trumpeting the superiority of communism. Moreover, Hanoi could not know how much such aid would amount to or how long it would last.

As to the attractiveness of elections in the South, even assuming international supervision would be provided, we need ask ourselves just one question: Would we be willing to accept the result of elections held in the North by the government of Hanoi, even under international supervision? Of course not. Then why should we expect Hanoi to see the problem differently, if elections were to be held in the South by the Saigon government, even under international supervision?

It is in this area -- the need for providing Hanoi with a good reason for coming to the negotiating table -- that I feel the Administration's policy has tended to be sterile and unimaginative. And it is in precisely this area that I believe Senator Robert F. Kennedy, in his statement of February 19 and subsequent

His statement has been violently -- and predictably -- attacked in some quarters. In others, it has been dismissed with hasty and glib cliches that compare most unfavorably with the calm and well-reasoned quality of the statement itself. (I would not have expected the Administration to endorse the statement. That might well have been construed as giving away too much before the bargaining has even started. But I should have thought the Administration might well have said, as Ambassador Goldberg and Mr. Moyers reportedly did, that these are all matters which would be subjects for discussion at the negotiating table.) In still other quarters, Senator Kennedy's statement has been misconstrued, deliberately or otherwise, and there has been confusion about what he actually said. Many commentators, I feel sure, never read the full text of his original statement.

In essence, Senator Kennedy's basic position is threefold:

- 1) U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam is unthinkable;
- 2) A military victory in Vietnam is not out of the question but presents staggering difficulties and dangers;
- 3) If we mean what we say about wanting to get negotiations started, we must be prepared to give up something: We must be willing to accept the possibility that negotiations might result in some form of governmental arrangement in South Vietnam in which the dissident elements there would have "a share of power and responsibility." This result might "come about through a single conference or many meetings, or by a slow undramatic process of gradual accommodation."

Senator Kennedy fully recognized that there are risks involved in any system of shared power but he suggested that the risks could be made acceptable if we bring to bear sufficient "skill and political wisdom to find the point at which participation [by the dissident elements in South Vietnam] does not bring domination or internal conquest" and if the agreement arrived at is backed up by "international guarantees".

He did not propose any specific or detailed arrangements. He never mentioned the word "coalition". He certainly did not speak of any attempt by us to impose a solution on the government or the people of South Vietnam. He stated: "We must be willing to face the uncertainties of election, and the possibility of an eventual vote on reunification," and again "we must insist that the political process go forward under the rigorous supervision of a trusted international body." Thus it seems clear that the kind of system of shared power and responsibility he was talking about would be an interim arrangement, pending elections and the further development of "the political process."

He fully recognized that the United States "cannot proclaim in advance the precise terms of an acceptable political settlement" and that we could not start the bargaining process by revealing all the concessions we might be prepared to make.

The key to Senator Kennedy's whole statement, it seems to me, is his recognition of the fact that, if we are to persuade Hanoi to start discussions looking toward a peaceful settlement, we must be prepared "to eliminate any reasonable fear that we ask them to talk only to demand their surrender."

Who can contest that thesis?

If others have ideas of how to make our proposal of "unconditional talks" appear more attractive to Hanoi, let them come forward and state them.

In the meantime, let us look carefully at what Senator Kennedy has had to say on the merits, and not in terms of invective or cliches.

Shared power is not a new concept in our dealings with the communist world. On a geographical or partition basis, we agreed to it for Germany and Korea. We shared authority with the Soviets in Austria and in Berlin; one arrangement was ended by a peace treaty, the other broke down and was followed by the Berlin wall, but neither arrangement ended with a Communist take-over. The same inconclusive result occurred in Laos; while the tripartite government there did not work; it did not end in disaster. In fact, the net result has been that the neutralist faction which started out pro-communist has ended up pro-western.

True, no government cabinet which included communists has proved stable. Czechoslovakia is the classic case, to which all point, of a total communist take-over, but that take-over had the Red Army behind it. In other cases, the collapse of coalition governments has not always favored the communists. France, Italy and Finland have all survived such periods. And recently in Indonesia, where communists were playing a major role and apparently attempted a coup, the result has been a violent reaction against them.

I know -- and I am sure Senator Kennedy knows -- that the communists in Peking and Hanoi would look upon any system of shared power as a device to enable them ultimately to seize total power. But does anyone think Hanoi and Peking will give up their hopes of taking over South Vietnam if they are successfully driven out by force of arms?

Any course that we take involves risks, as Senator Kennedy pointed out. And nothing that we could do -- literally nothing, not even a nuclear flattening of every Chinese and North Vietnamese city -- could guarantee for the long run the elimination of the Communist threat in the Far East and Southeast Asia. So let us soberly and calmly analyze the alternatives that lie before us, and see whether the risks involved in the most promising feasible course can be made manageable.

It seems to me important -- and I specifically propose -- that the best brains in this country and elsewhere in the free world be mobilized to seek answers to the following questions:

1. What kind of governmental structure could be devised for South Vietnam that would permit the various dissident elements to play an appropriate role in the government and political life of the country, under a system of safeguards and checks and balances that would prevent one side or the other from seizing total control?
2. What form of international supervision and guarantees would be most effective? (Since the U. N. does not include either North or South Vietnam in its membership, a beefed-up International Control Commission might serve the purpose.)
3. What form of interim government could be established for the conduct of elections with sufficient impartiality to command the confidence and cooperation of all elements?
4. What should be the nature of the elections and of the government to follow so as to provide the best chance of political stability in the future? (My own guess is that only some kind of parliamentary government, with provision for proportional representation, would have a chance of being viable in a country such as South Vietnam which has never known democracy. The kind of winner-take-all two-sided contest which is characteristic of our own Presidential elections would be likely, it seems to me, to represent an impossibly explosive setup. It takes a rare strength of tradition for the losers in such a situation to accept the result peacefully. To my knowledge no new nation has yet succeeded in achieving this level of political maturity. Like dangers would arise in any proposed referendum or other voting procedure in which the people would be expected to abide by the results -- which might be close -- of a once-for-all vote

Such a study, it seems to me, should be carried out now, so that its results would be available in the event negotiations do get under way. The very fact that the study was in process might well be a factor to help induce Hanoi to start talking.

I am not suggesting that the U. S. Government should itself undertake the study, or even sponsor it. This might be construed as a commitment in advance to accept the recommendations.

Instead, I believe a private organization, such as the Ford Foundation, should undertake the work, either directly or through some other agency.

The participants in the study should include experts from other countries, such as Finland, India and Italy, where communists have played an active part in the political life of the country, and experts on Southeast Asia and on the post-war history of Czechoslovakia. Quite possibly, actual responsibility for convening the experts and conducting the study should be left to an international institute or a university of international renown.

In proposing this study, I am well aware that the whole idea may be repugnant to the government of South Vietnam. That government, whether led by Premier Ky or another, will no doubt continue to press for total control of South Vietnam for itself, and will bitterly oppose settling for less. That the Saigon leaders clearly do not have the power to obtain this for themselves, even with unlimited aid from us in the form of equipment, materiel, supplies, etc., will not deter them. Saigon will hope, and indeed demand, that the U. S. assign whatever forces are needed to the task of accomplishing this objective.

While this desire on the part of Saigon is certainly understandable, that we should feel obligated to give effect to it seems to me fantastic. By no stretch of the imagination could our past commitments be so construed.

Essentially, our position vis-a-vis Saigon is an unassailably strong one. At any point that they do not want to agree to what we believe it necessary and desirable to do, we can always return to the system of aid which we followed for so long with Saigon, and which was sufficient in the case of Greece and Turkey in the crucial days after World War II, aid limited to supplies, materiel, and military advisers.

It is encouraging that we apparently have succeeded in persuading the Ky Government of the importance of the non-military side of our joint efforts.

especially the persistence of systems of special privilege which the existing government has been reluctant to abandon. We have given far too little attention to these matters before now, and the various statements comprising the Honolulu Declaration are a good augury. The more successful these efforts are, the easier we will find it to hold fast the areas under Saigon's control and to expand those areas, and the stronger our position will be when negotiations start.

I know, also, that many Americans who are directly engaged in the bitter struggle in South Vietnam have developed such a profound hatred for the Vietcong, because of their cruelty and terrorist tactics, that they cannot conceive of negotiating with them or of according them any role in the future political processes of the country. But existing U. S. policy is one of desire to deal with Hanoi, and even to grant Hanoi economic aid after the conflict is over. Is Hanoi any less responsible for the horrors of the communist tactics in the South than the officers and men of the Vietcong?

This is a case, it seems to me, where those who bear the brunt of the conflict cannot be expected to view in perspective the question of how best to achieve the totality of American objectives in Southeast Asia. They may well, under the stress of hardship, danger and ever-present tragedy, lose sight of what is in fact our goal.

I know that President Johnson wants to end the conflict, wants it deeply and fervently. I believe he would be eager to follow a new approach to achieve that end through a settlement that might be less than perfect for either side, but would achieve our essential objects: to bring the conflict to an end, provide stability in the area, and preserve the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people.

File

TO: THE SECRETARY - GENERAL

Thanks,

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FOR A.M. RELEASE
MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1966

STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
March 7, 1966

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

Speaking of China, United Nations Secretary General U Thant recently made the point that "When a country is obsessed with fear and suspicion, all sorts of tensions are likely to develop, all sorts of unreasonable reactions are likely to come forth." "Countries, like individuals," he said, "have nervous breakdowns," and it is the duty of the community to try to understand and find some remedy. The Secretary General pointed out that "China is going through a difficult stage of development and," he said, "in such a delicate stage, countries will show certain emotions, certain strong reactions, certain rigidities, and even certain arrogance." 1.

The Secretary General's words are supported by modern knowledge of human behavior. "Frightened, hostile individuals tend to behave in ways which aggravate their difficulties instead of resolving them," says the distinguished psychiatrist Dr. Jerome D. Frank, "and frightened, hostile nations seem to behave similarly." 2. A nation, like an individual, Dr. Frank suggests, is likely to respond to a feared rival by breaking off communications, by provocative behavior, or by taking measures which promise immediate relief, regardless of their ultimate consequences.

Fearful and hostile behavior is not rational but neither is it uncommon, either to individuals or to nations, including our own. In retrospect most Americans would agree that our national behavior was unduly fearful and irrational during the McCarthy period of the early fifties and the "red scare" after World War I. And just about all of us would agree that our nation suffered something worse than a "nervous breakdown" just over a hundred years ago.

Perhaps we Southerners have a sensitivity to this sort of thing that other Americans cannot fully share. We -- or our forebears -- experienced both the hot-headed romanticism that led to Fort Sumter and the bitter humiliation of defeat and a vindictive Reconstruction. The indignities suffered by the South during that era have burdened not just the South but the entire nation with a legacy of bitterness far more durable and, in retrospect, more damaging than the physical destruction wrought by the war itself. Even today, although the South has long since recovered its political rights and has begun at last to share in the nation's economic prosperity, the very word "Yankee" still awakens in Southern minds historical memories of defeat and humiliation, of the burning of Atlanta and Sherman's march to the sea, or of an ancestral farmhouse burned by Cantrell's raiders, or a family fortune lost and never recovered, or of arrogant carpetbaggers and the helpless rage of the people they dispossessed.

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1. The Washington Post, January 21, 1966.
 2. Letter from Dr. Frank to Senator Fulbright, September 13, 1960.

These memories are irrational but not irrelevant. They are pertinent because they persist and, by persisting, continue to work a baleful influence on our national life. They may be pertinent as well in helping us to understand the bitterness and anger and unreason in the behavior of other peoples who once were great but then were struck down and finally rose again only after a long era of degradation at the hands of foreigners.

I am thinking about China. Not being an expert in such matters, I cannot claim with anything approaching certainty that the indignities suffered by China in the nineteenth century have had human consequences comparable to those of the injustices suffered by the American South in the wake of the Civil War. It may be, however, that there is a similarity. Unless we are to believe that there is a "Chinese nature" which is entirely different from the "American nature," unless we believe that there is no such thing as a common human nature, it would seem to me logical to suppose that, national differences -- great as they are -- notwithstanding, the people of one nation are likely to respond to success and to humiliation, to victory and to defeat, in about the same way as the people of another nation.

China has experienced very little except humiliation and defeat in its relations with the West, including Russia and, to some degree, America. One of our leading Chinese scholars, Professor John K. Fairbank, who is the Director of the East Asian Research Center of Harvard University, believes that the rapacious behavior of Europeans in China in past centuries has a great deal to do with the irrationality and hostile behavior of China's current leaders.

"The sources of China's revolutionary militancy," writes Professor Fairbank, "are plain enough in Chinese history. The Chinese Communist regime is only the latest phase in a process of decline and fall followed by rebirth and reassertion of national power. China's humiliation under the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century lasted for a hundred years. An empire that had traditionally been superior to all others in its world was not only humbled but threatened with extinction. Inevitably, China's great tradition of unity, as the world's greatest state in size and continuity, was reasserted." 3.

Words like "extraterritoriality" and "unequal treaties" are far too antiseptic, too bland, to describe China's humiliation by Western imperialism. In human terms, the coming of Western civilization to China in the nineteenth century meant the plundering of China's wealth by foreigners and the reduction of most of the Chinese to an inferior status in their own country. Missionaries were immune from Chinese law and treated the Chinese as heathen, except of course for the converts who also claimed immunity from Chinese law and used the power conferred by their foreign association to intimidate their fellow citizens. Foreign goods were exempted by treaty from internal toll taxes imposed by the Manchu Dynasty to pay for the Taiping rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century, with the result that Western companies destroyed their Chinese competitors in the sale of such products as timber, oil, tobacco and, of course, opium. Each of China's disastrous nineteenth century wars with the West was followed by the levy of a huge indemnity or some further incursion on the economic life of the country.

The first of these wars, the opium war of 1839 to 1842, came about when the Chinese government tried to end the traffic in opium. The destructive narcotic was destroying the health and the lives of alarming numbers of Chinese addicts but it was also a source of great profit to foreign and Chinese opium merchants.

3. John K. Fairbank, "How to Deal with the Chinese Revolution," The New York Review of Books, February 17, 1966.

British businessmen were the major foreign dealers in opium but Americans, French and others also participated; opium became an important factor in the trade balance between some Western countries and China. When the Chinese government tried to ban the import of opium in 1839, the British refused to pledge their compliance, whereupon a number of incidents occurred culminating in war between China and England. The British won easily and under the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 China was forced to cede Hong Kong to Britain, open five treaty ports for British trade, accept tariffs that could not be changed without Britain's consent, and, in addition, pay an indemnity to compensate the British for lost opium and for expenses incurred in the war.

Following the British example, other powers exacted concessions from China through persuasion and the threat of force. The United States, for example, signed a treaty with China in 1844 under which the United States acquired trading privileges and extraterritoriality for both civil and criminal cases.

The opium war and the Treaty of Nanking exposed China's vulnerability and opened the way to extensive exploitation by foreign powers. In the eighteen-fifties the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston judged that "The time is fast approaching when we shall be obliged to strike another blow in China." In Palmerston's words, "these half-civilized governments such as those of China, Portugal, Spanish America . . . require a dressing down every eight or ten years to keep them in order."

The Chinese got many a "dressing down" in the years that followed. The British and French fought another war with China in 1856. Under the treaties of Tientsin new concessions were granted and old ones enlarged. The European powers acquired new trading ports and additional authority over Chinese tariffs as well as other privileges. The Chinese were required to pay indemnities, and there was also an article guaranteeing the protection of missionaries since, in the words of the treaty, "the Christian religion, as professed by Protestants and Roman Catholics, inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches man to do as he would be done by."

The Chinese refused to ratify these treaties. Hostilities were renewed and the British burned the emperor's summer palace in Peking. Under the Peking Convention of 1860 more ports were opened, more indemnities were paid and the Chinese were compelled to cede Kowloon to England.

The treaties of 1842 and 1844 and of 1858 and 1860, known for fairly obvious reasons as the "unequal treaties," formed the basis of China's relations with the West until the Second World War.

The Chinese also had their difficulties with the Russians. In 1858, while the Chinese were beset with British and French attacks from the sea and the Taiping rebellion in the interior, the Russians presented the Chinese with certain territorial demands. The Chinese were forced thereupon to cede to Russia all of the hitherto Chinese territories north of the Amur River. In 1860 the Russians demanded and received additional territory on the Pacific coast, including the area at which the port of Vladivostok was subsequently established. Under these two treaties Russia deprived China of a territory larger than Texas.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century Japan joined the Western powers in their depredations against China. Japan attacked China in 1894 and under the treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended that war, Japan exacted large cessions of territory as well as extensive commercial privileges. Pressure by the European powers forced the Japanese to withdraw some of their demands, notably for Port Arthur on the Liaotung peninsula, but Japan acquired the island of Taiwan and extensive trade privileges, and of course China was compelled to pay an indemnity.

Having joined with the powers in forcing Japan to return the Liaotung peninsula to China, Germany now demanded a "reward." The Chinese failed to see the equity of this claim but were brought around when the Germans landed troops. China was thereupon forced to lease the port and bay of Kiaochow to Germany for ninety-nine years and was also forced to yield commercial privileges on the Shantung peninsula.

The other powers also sought "rewards." Russia demanded and received the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the right to build a railroad across Manchuria. France, which had forced China to recognize French authority in Indochina in the eighteenthies, demanded and received in 1898 an extensive sphere of influence in South China, including the lease of Kwangchow Bay for ninety-nine years. The British, not to be outdone, now demanded and acquired control of the Chinese maritime customs, lease of a naval station at Weihaiwei, and the extension of the lease of Kowloon to ninety-nine years.

China had become a virtual colony with many masters. "Yet," said Sun Yat-sen, then a rising revolutionary, "none of the masters feels responsible for its welfare."

The Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, better known as the Boxers, was a secret organization composed largely of poverty stricken peasants. Their grievances might well have been directed against the Manchu rulers of China, but government officials had no great difficulty in persuading the Boxers that the foreigners were the cause of the misery of the people. With great savagery, the Boxers fell upon foreigners and their Chinese cohorts in 1900; they were especially merciless toward missionaries and their Chinese converts. The Boxers went on a rampage against the foreigners in Peking, besieging the foreign legations.

An international rescue force made up of Japanese, Russians, British, Germans, French and Americans was sent to relieve the legations. The commander of the allied force, Field Marshal Count Von Waldersee, was under instructions from the Kaiser "to give no quarter and to take no prisoners," so that "no Chinese will ever again dare to look askance at a German."

The allies proved the equal of the Boxers in their ferocity. The defeated Chinese were now compelled to sign a new treaty under which the foreign powers received the right to station troops in their legation sites, a new Chinese tariff system was imposed, an indemnity of \$333 million was to be paid, and the Chinese were obliged to punish "war criminals."

The United States returned a large part of the \$25 million which was its share of the Boxer indemnity with the provision that the fund be used to educate Chinese students in the United States. Many Americans have regarded this as an act of extraordinary philanthropy.

The United States thereafter announced its Open Door policy toward China. The Open Door policy purported to preserve the territorial integrity of China and to safeguard for all nations equal commercial access to China. Limited and ineffective as it was, the Open Door policy induced the Chinese to think of the United States as the only major foreign power which might be thought of as their friend and possible protector. The Open Door remained the basis of American policy toward China until the Communists came to power in 1949 and closed China's door.

Political history hardly begins to convey the human effects of Western imperialism on the Chinese people. Something of the meaning of life in China under the impact of Western imperialism is conveyed by a Chinese engineer's account of his return to China in 1913 with his Belgian wife and son. He wrote as follows:

"In Shanghai it was agony, for there it was only too plain that in my own country I was nothing but an inferior, despised being. There were parks and restaurants and hotels I could not enter, although she could. I had no rights on the soil of a Chinese city which did not belong to the Chinese; she had rights by reason of something called skin.

"We boarded the English steamer from Shanghai to Hankow; the first class was for Europeans only, and there was no other steamer. Marguerite leaned her arms on the railings and stared at the river. She was in first class, with our son. I went second class. I had insisted it should be so. 'It is too hot for you here below.'"

Some years earlier as a student in Shanghai the young man had written to his brother about his inability to understand the Europeans: "They always bewilder me," he wrote. "At once most ruthless in the pursuit of their interests, caring nothing for the wholesale misery they bring, at the same time their papers are full of verbiage of their nobility, rightness and the good they do. They become indignant at our public executions, and our cruelty to dogs. Yet the record of their lootings and killings in our country shows no such correct compassion."

The humiliations to which the Chinese were subjected would be difficult for any people to endure. Consider how shocking they must have been to a nation with a far longer and in many ways more illustrious history than that of any nation in the West, to a people who have always -- and not without some justification -- regarded their civilization as superior to any other. Before the time of Christ the Chinese had developed the principles and methods which were to hold together their empire until the twentieth century. In science and technology as well as government, China was well ahead of Europe by the time Marco Polo visited China in the thirteenth century. China became the center of civilization in eastern Asia and it became the model for smaller states, such as Korea and Vietnam, whose rulers accepted the obligation of tribute to the Chinese Emperor as their suzerain.

When European merchants and missionaries and buccaneers first came to China, they did not come to a land of primitives and pagans. They came upon a rich and ancient civilization, but one which had fallen behind in its technology, especially its military technology, with the result that it was thrown open to exploitation by foreigners whose power vastly exceeded their wisdom. "It is a regrettable fact," writes C.P. Fitzgerald, Professor of Far Eastern History in the Australian National University, "that the value of a nation's contribution to civilization, her place in the world, tends to be judged, from age to age, by the strength or weakness of her military power. When China under K'ang Hsi or Ch'ien Lung was manifestly too strong for any European encroachment to succeed, the real and serious weaknesses of the government and economy were not regarded; the achievements in art and literature were much respected. When China fell behind Europe, her military power becoming negligible, encroachment was continual, and the value of Chinese civilization fell sharply in Western eyes." 4.

The Chinese revolutions of the twentieth century were in part spawned by the ravages of the West. Finding themselves militarily inferior to the West, but unshaken in their faith in the superiority of their own civilization, the Chinese undertook, first through the unsuccessful democratic revolution of Sun Yat-sen, then through the successful Communist revolution of Mao Tse-tung, to acquire those Western techniques of science and

4. C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 34-35.

technology, of political organization and military power, which would make it possible to expel the West from China. It is ironic and significant that the Western political doctrine that China finally adopted was the one which the West itself had repudiated.

It is of great importance that we try to learn something more about the strange and fascinating Chinese nation, about its past and its present, about the aims of its leaders and the aspirations of its people. Before we can make wise political -- and perhaps military -- decisions pertaining to China, there are many questions to be asked and, hopefully, answered: what kind of people are the Chinese? to what extent are they motivated by national feeling? to what extent by ideology? why are the Chinese Communist leaders so hostile to the United States and why do they advocate violent revolution against most of the world's governments? to what extent is their view of the world distorted by isolation and the memory of ancient grievances? and to what extent, and with what effect on their government, do the Chinese people share with us and with all other peoples what Aldous Huxley has called the "simple human preference for life and peace?"

We need to ask these questions because China and America may be heading toward war with each other and it is essential that we do all that can be done to prevent that calamity, starting with a concerted effort to understand the Chinese people and their leaders.

The danger of war is real. It is real because China is ruled by ideological dogmatists who will soon have nuclear weapons at their disposal and who, though far more ferocious in words than in actions, nonetheless are intensely hostile to the United States. In the short run the danger of war between China and America is real because an "open-ended" war in Vietnam can bring the two great powers into conflict with each other, by accident or by design, at almost any time. Some of our military experts are confident that China will not enter the war in Vietnam; their confidence would be more reassuring if it did not bring to mind the predictions of military experts in 1950 that China would not enter the Korean War, as well as more recent predictions about an early victory in Vietnam. In fact, it is the view of certain China experts in our government that the Chinese leaders themselves expect to be at war with the United States within a year, and it is clear that some of our own officials also expect a war with China.

The expectation of war, even though it is not desired, makes war more likely. "The crux of the matter," writes social psychologist Gordon Allport, "lies in the fact that while most people deplore war, they nonetheless expect it to continue. And what people expect determines their behavior. . . . the indispensable condition of war," says Professor Allport, "is that people must expect war and must prepare for war, before under war-minded leadership, they make war. "It is in this sense that 'wars begin in the minds of men.'" 5.

The first vital step toward altering the fatal expectancy of war is the acquisition of some understanding of our prospective adversary. Most of us know very little about Communist China, partly for lack of qualified observers in China and partly because there are so few China experts in our own government and universities. At present, I am told, there are only about six full-time analysts of Chinese affairs in the Department of State. Some of the most knowledgeable "Old China hands" were driven out of the State Department by the McCarthy investigations and there are now few if any well-known and influential "sinologists" at

5. Gordon W. Allport, "The Role of Expectancy," Hadley Cantril, Ed., Tensions That Cause Wars (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950), pp. 43, 48.

the highest level of government comparable to such Soviet experts as George Kennan and Llewellyn Thompson. There are some highly competent China specialists below the top levels of government but they are not exerting a major influence on policy. Some of these experts, according to James Reston, do not subscribe to the view that the war in Vietnam can be enlarged without drawing China into the conflict. 6.

We must acquire knowledge not only of China but of the Chinese. To most of us China is a strange, distant and dangerous nation, not a society made up of 700 million individual human beings but a kind of menacing abstraction. When Chinese soldiers are described, for example, as "hordes of Chinese coolies," it is clear that they are being thought of not as people but as something terrifying and abstract, or as something inanimate like the flow of lava from a volcano.

Both China and America seem to think of each other as abstractions: to the Chinese we are not a society of individual people but the embodiment of an evil idea, the idea of "imperialist capitalism;" and to most of us China represents not people but an evil and frightening idea, the idea of "aggressive communism." Man's capacity for decent behavior seems to vary directly with his perception of others as individual humans with human motives and feelings, whereas his capacity for barbarous behavior seems to increase with his perception of an adversary in abstract terms. This is the only explanation I can think of for the fact that the very same good and decent citizens who would never fail to feed a hungry child or comfort a sick friend or drop a coin in the church collection basket celebrated the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and can now contemplate with equanimity, or indeed even advocate, the use of nuclear weapons against the "hordes of Chinese coolies." I feel sure that this apparent insensitivity to the incineration of thousands of millions of our fellow human beings is not the result of feelings of savage inhumanity toward foreigners; it is the result of not thinking of them as humans at all but rather as the embodiment of doctrines that we consider evil such as fascism and communism. "If you want war," wrote William Graham Sumner, "nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's reason and betray him against himself. Civilized men have done their fiercest fighting for doctrines." 7.

For these reasons it is important that Americans and Chinese come to know each other in human terms. There is no easy way for us to make ourselves known to the Chinese as the decent and honorable people we really are, and it is not likely that the dogmatic men who rule in Peking will soon remove the blinders of ideology and look at the world in realistic and human terms. This makes it all the more important for Americans to be open-minded and inquisitive, to set aside ideological preconceptions and try to learn all that we can about the Chinese and their behavior and attitudes, and especially to try to find out why exactly the Chinese are so hostile to the West and what if anything can be done to eliminate that hostility.

In the hope of making some contribution to a better understanding of China the Committee on Foreign Relations will begin on Tuesday, March 8, a series of public hearings on China and on American attitudes toward China. The immediate purpose of the inquiry will be educational rather than political. It seems to me that at this stage the best contribution the Committee can make is to provide a forum through which recognized experts and scholars can help increase Congressional and public knowledge of China. Whether and in what way the inquiry will influence

6. "The New China Experts," New York Times, February 16, 1966.

7. "War" (1903).

American foreign policy will depend upon the value of the information provided and the attentiveness and open-mindedness with which it is received.

Our ultimate objective must of course be political: the prevention of war between China and America. At present there appears to be a growing expectation of war in both countries and, as Professor Allport points out, "what people expect determines their behavior." Perhaps a concerted effort to increase our understanding of China and the Chinese would alter that fatal expectancy, and perhaps if our expectations were altered theirs too would change. It is anything but a sure thing but, considering the stakes and considering the alternative, it seems worth a try.

The Chinese today, like Americans a hundred years ago, are in an agitated and abnormal state of mind. It is not only within our means but, as a great and mature nation, it is our responsibility, as U Thant so wisely pointed out, to try to understand the causes of China's agitation and to try to find some remedy.

On November 14, 1860, Alexander Hamilton Stephens, who subsequently became Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, delivered an address to the Georgia Legislature in which he appealed to his colleagues to delay the secession of Georgia from the Union. "It may be," he said, "that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous, but I am candid and sincere in telling you that I fear if we yield to passion and without sufficient cause shall take that step, that instead of becoming greater or more peaceful, prosperous and happy -- instead of becoming Gods, we will become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting one another's throats. This is my apprehension. Let us, therefore, whatever we do, meet these difficulties, great as they are, like wise and sensible men, and consider them in the light of all the consequences which may attend our action." 8.

What a tragedy it is that the South did not accept Stephens' advice in 1860. What a blessing it would be if, faced with the danger of a war with China, we did accept it today.

8. Alexander Hamilton Stephens, "Secession," in Modern Eloquence (New York: P.F. Collier & Sons, 1928), Vol. II, p.203.

CVN/mpd

17 May 1966

Dear Senator McGovern,

Thank you for your very kind letter of 14 May. I am most grateful to you for your kind words about the meeting we had the other night. I am also grateful to you for your good wishes.

For my part, I greatly enjoyed meeting you and your wife.

With best wishes to you both,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

The Honourable George McGovern
The United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. Lemieux ✓

GEORGE MCGOVERN
SOUTH DAKOTA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 14, 1966


Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

Mrs. McGovern and I thoroughly enjoyed our discussion with you last night. It was most kind of you to receive us. We appreciated the candor with which you discussed the issues in which we share a common interest.

With many, many other Americans, I deeply appreciate your initiatives for peace. It seems to me that we are in the midst of one of those periods when the fate of mankind is in the balance.

I do wish you Godspeed in your efforts to resolve some of the dilemmas that face us.

Sincerely yours,



George McGovern

Honorable U Thant
The Secretary General
of the United Nations
United Nations, New York

Max Fingers gave it to Joe on a confidential basis.

Please keep.

Hamm.

(H) July 16, 1966

COPY OF LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR AT LARGE W. AVERELL
HARRIMAN TO PRESIDENT GONARD OF THE ICRC

Dear Mr. Gonard:

The people of the United States are gravely concerned over reports that North Viet Nam may soon subject American prisoners of war to reprisals in the guise of prosecutions for alleged war crimes. The United States Government respects the special position of the International Committee in relation to the humanitarian system established by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. We recognize the importance the Committee attaches to maintaining acceptable relations with all the parties on both sides of any conflict. But the special position of the International Committee also carries with it a basic responsibility to speak out when this is necessary to defend the integrity of these humanitarian conventions. That necessity will be presented if the North Vietnamese authorities announce that they are adding reprisals, in the guise of "trials", to the already long list of actions and statements by which they have repudiated their obligations under the Conventions.

On June 11, 1965, Mr. Jacques Freymond, Vice President of the Committee, wrote Secretary Rusk saying: "The hostilities at the present time in Viet Nam -- both North and South of the 17th parallel -- have assumed such proportions recently that there can be no doubt that they constitute an armed conflict to which the regulations of humanitarian law as a whole should be applied." As you know, both the Government of the United States and the Government of South Viet Nam have declared their agreement with these views. I am enclosing a legal memorandum which sets forth in detail the reasons why American airmen held in North Viet Nam are entitled to prisoner of war treatment. But, in truth, I think a legal memorandum is hardly necessary. There cannot be honest doubt about the applicability of the Conventions to this conflict. It is an armed conflict between two or more parties to the Conventions, and the American airmen held in the North are uniformed military personnel of a party to the conflict.

The clarity of its obligations under the Geneva Conventions has not deterred North Viet Nam from violating those obligations.

North Viet Nam has failed to comply with the most fundamental procedural safeguards established by the Convention. It has refused to identify the prisoners of war under its control; it has refused to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the prisoners and to investigate the conditions under which they are held; it has refused to allow any neutral state to act as protecting power to safeguard the interests of the prisoners; and it has ignored the request of the International Committee to assume the humanitarian functions normally performed by a protecting power. All of these actions violate basic provisions of the Convention. Together with North Vietnam's statements that the Conventions do not apply to United States personnel, these flagrant violations repudiate the Convention as a whole and the humanitarian system which it embraces.

The Committee's restraint in not criticizing these failures publicly has not lessened the intransigence of North Vietnamese authorities in regard to the application of the Geneva Conventions. Continued silence in the face of war crimes trials would cast doubt for all nations upon the effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions as a humanitarian protection to those helpless in the hands of the enemy in time of war.

The writers of the Convention knew of the risk of reprisals that lay in the notion of "war crimes trials". The Conventions embody a series of procedural protections that must be accorded any prisoner of war subjected to a trial by the detaining power. The Convention further requires that the prisoners have the benefit of a protecting power before and during trial to guarantee many of the fundamental rights of the accused. If prisoners are denied the benefit of a protecting power, trials cannot be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. Any prosecution initiated under these conditions would be wholly illegitimate.

Beyond these procedures is the over-all scheme of the Convention designed to maintain the human dignity of a prisoner while he is held by an enemy. Without this protection of the prisoner's dignity, fair trials are, of course, impossible. The North Vietnamese threat to hold war crimes trials is written against a background of complete disregard of every protection accorded by the Conventions. Paraded through streets thronged with incited mobs and denied all access to the outside world in violation of the provisions dealing with mail, the visitorial rights of the International Committee of

the Red Cross, and the rights of protecting powers, our prisoners are in no position to testify freely in their own behalf. They cannot expect fair procedures nor an unbiased tribunal.

The United States Government has been very careful to limit its air strikes to military targets related to North Viet Nam's aggression against the South, and United States airmen have committed no "war crimes" of any character. Although the neutral position of the International Committee of the Red Cross may prevent it from speaking out on these basic issues, the Government of the United States believes that the Committee must speak out against any trials held in a context of unlawful isolation and intimidation of prisoners of war. It must speak out against any trials held without the protections granted by the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the guarantees provided by a protecting power. It should declare that war crimes trials should not be held during the continuance of hostilities because the atmosphere of war makes it impossible for the prisoners to have a fair trial and an adequate defense. Trials in these circumstances would make a mockery of the humanitarian law relied upon by so many nations. The silence of the Committee would deprive the Conventions of their only sanction -- the moral force of world public opinion.

Accordingly the Government of the United States believes that the Committee should take two actions when and if war crimes trials are announced. First, it should state publicly that, without reference to the merits of the charges, such trials cannot lawfully be held without the protections explicitly granted by the Convention, particularly the provision for a protecting power, and against the background of isolation and intimidation of prisoners of war. (The ICRC already has reminded the DRV Red Cross that "even if the prisoners will become subject to penal prosecution, they must be allowed to benefit from all guarantees foreseen on their behalf by this Convention.") Second, if the Committee's voice is unheeded, the Committee must announce publicly that trials that disregard the procedural rights of prisoners, which are set out in detail in the Convention, are unlawful under the humanitarian Conventions to which the North Vietnamese authorities have adhered.

I have confidence that the Committee is no less concerned than the Government of the United States about the integrity of the Geneva Conventions and recognizes, as we do, that the only force which can protect this integrity is the moral force of public declarations by the neutral body which has unique responsibilities respecting the Conventions. To this concern for the role of law must be added our deep concern for the welfare of American prisoners and our fear of the inflammatory effects that any "war crimes trials" would have in the already tragic circumstances of the conflict in Viet Nam. If you believe it would be useful we would be happy to discuss these points with you in Geneva.

Please be assured of our respect and appreciation for the truly humanitarian work of the Committee,

Sincerely yours,

W. Averell Harriman
Ambassador at Law

NYR604
EXHARRIS
VIETNAM - PLAN

WASHINGTON, SEPT. 20, REUTER - SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD, THE SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER, PROPOSED TODAY THAT U THANT, THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, SHOULD DRAW UP A TIMETABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SETTLE THE VIETNAM WAR.

HE TOLD THE SENATE U THANT HAD ALREADY SUGGESTED THREE STEPS LEADING TO A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT.

"THERE IS, IN MY JUDGEMENT, NOTHING IN THOSE POINTS WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS INDICATED HE IS PREPARED TO DO IN THE SEARCH FOR A JUST PEACE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS," HE SAID.

U THANT HAS CALLED FOR AN END TO THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, A CEASE-FIRE IN THE GROUND FIGHTING, AND A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF ALL SIDES TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS "WITH ALL WHO ARE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN THE FIGHTING" -- MEANING THE VIET CONG.

MORE

333P

NYR605
VIETNAM - PLAN 2 WASHINGTON

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID THAT IT WANTS TO HAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL STOP OR AT LEAST DECREASE INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM INTO THE SOUTH IN RETURN FOR HALTING THE BOMBINGS.

IT HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO U THANT'S SECOND POINT AND HAS ITSELF PROPOSED A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

ON THE THIRD POINT, WHICH IMPLIES THAT THE VIET CONG SHOULD BE A DIRECT PARTNER IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, WASHINGTON HAS NOT TAKEN A CLEAR STAND. IT HAS SAID THAT THE VIET CONG WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN HAVING THEIR VIEWS REPRESENTED, BUT IT HAS STOPPED SHORT OF SAYING THAT THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTED AS AN INDEPENDENT PARTY AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

MORE

335P

NYR607
VIETNAM - PLAN 3 WASHINGTON

SENATOR MANSFIELD SAID HE HOPED THAT U THANT, NOW THAT HE HAD AGREED TO REMAIN AS SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE DURATION OF THIS YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY, "WILL GO BEYOND THE SIMPLE ARTICULATION OF THESE THREE POINTS AND TO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED."

"IN SHORT, I WOULD URGE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SET FORTH A TIMETABLE AND A STEP BY STEP PROCEDURE FOR THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND REQUEST THIS NATION AND ALL OTHERS INVOLVED IN VIETNAM TO FOLLOW IT," THE SENATOR ADDED.

HE SAID THAT RECENTLY THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF RENEWED PEACE APPEALS, QUOTING POPE PAUL'S MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY.

THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM, THE SENATOR ADDED, "OUGHT TO BE SEEN IN TERMS OF THE ENORMOUS AND BLOODY HUMAN PAIN WHICH IS BEING INFLICTED ON COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS IN VIETNAM, RATHER THAN IN THE PAINLESS AND SANITIZED DETACHMENT OF A FOOTBALL FIELD ON WHICH TWO IDEOLOGIES CLASH."

THE SENATOR SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL "THAT THERE BE A RENEWED EFFORT TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH WHOMEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO BRING THE ACTUAL FIGHTING TO A HALT."

REUTER 339P

5 Oct. 66

my colleagues very much honored... We did not have a detailed discussion of any particular subject but we had a very pleasant occasion. In our exchange of toasts I reiterated the dedication of the US to the UN and recalled a passion which some of us feel for the UN because when we were young we found ourselves moving into a great catastrophe because the govts. of the world were not able to org. the peace. The UN represents the lessons learned from that failure, the lessons learned from world war II, and the best chance we have of preventing a recurrence again.

Partial pause in bombing? I believe that it was indicated in Wash. this am that we have not been bombing in the eastern portion of the demilitarized zone in an effort to co-operate with the ICC, in working toward the full demilitarization of that zone. As far as the US is concerned we would like to see that zone completely demilitarized and if the North Vietnamese would stop using that zone for purposes for which it was not intended then at least there could be a buffer strip in which there could be a little peace and there could be some ~~insurance~~ insurance against the possible escalation of this conflict..

No talk Thant activities

Bombing pause to extend general pause?

Well, no decision has been made in that direction. We have repeatedly indicated that we would be interested in knowing what would happen if the bombing were stopped; what else would stop? Would there be a move toward peace, would there be a reduction of hostilities conducted by north vietnam against the south? Would any of their troops go home? What would happen? Thus far we have had no indication or any suggestion as to what the result might be

Hanoi still open (to Goldberg)?

Well, they've made a public comment, but we would hope very much that they would think very hard about the statement that Amb. Gold made to the GA. It was a very constructive statement, it made it clear that as far as we are concerned we're very much interested in a peaceful solution and a prompt peaceful solution. There are many ways in which more considered judgments can be passed back and forth, in private, as to which you people would not necessarily be privy. My guess is that private channels would be more productive than channels with which you are familiar; so we would hope to have a more deliberate response.

Had any response? Well if they were private I wouldn't be able to comment on it.

SC
F.Y.I.

transcript
of remarks
by Mr. Rusk
on leaving
the building
Rusk

on
5/60

28 December 1966

Dear Congressman Fogarty,

I acknowledge your kind letter of December 19 and the enclosure thereto. I do hope you will understand my inability to comment on the suggestions made by the Reverend Robert H. Schacht in the enclosure to your letter.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

The Honourable John E. Fogarty
Member of Congress
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. L. Lemieux

JOHN E. FOGARTY
2D DISTRICT, RHODE ISLAND

ROOM 1235
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

RHODE ISLAND OFFICE
CUSTOMHOUSE
PROVIDENCE 3, R.I.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

COMMITTEE:
APPROPRIATIONS

(13)

DEC 21 1966
December 19, 1966

His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations,
New York

10 240 PE

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

T.	Mr. [Signature]
1	
2	21 Dec 1966
3	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Action Completed	
<input type="checkbox"/> Acknowledged	
<input type="checkbox"/> No Action Required	
FBI FILE COPY FILED	

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I have received from the Reverend Roberth H. Schacht which I think his self-explanatory.

Please be kind enough to furnish me with the benefit of your opinion on this proposal.

With every best wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

John Fogarty
John E. Fogarty
Member of Congress

3/66 RES.

November 29, 1966

The Honorable John E. Fogarty
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Fogarty:

There is no doubt but that internationally--let alone with internal problems--we are caught in some mighty difficult if not plainly vicious dilemmas. As a member of the Secretariat observed here on October 24, many see our U.N. as a body of "collective impotence." There are governments represented therein which have primary faith in violence, and some with faith primarily in "peaceful change." There is no precedent nor machinery for handling "wars of liberation." More said would only be further descriptive of a sad and dangerous situation within our U.N., and in relation to world problems not entrusted to it, especially our involvement in Viet Nam.

The current protests over our tragic involvement in Viet Nam, with all the human misery and destructiveness this involves, have not yet become positive by suggesting a viable, positive plan which might work, not only in the forever "power politics" aspects of any international problem, but in the equally needful "moral power" of an honestly inspired humanitarian, democratic schema of ends and means. With the United States already a leader among the nations because of its power, is it going to become simply a facade-altered practitioner of former "imperialism," or provide a truly new, democratic, inspirational leadership which can pave the way toward a more cooperative international life for the peoples of the world?

To the above end I suggest a positive plan: That the United States call on U Thant to form a group of "Trustees" out of the nation resources within the U.N., and perhaps some outside it, who he judges can respond to the arduous and complicated task of taking over the impartial supervision of affairs in all of Viet Nam, while that region seeks fresh social, economic, political and educational ways of life which can suitably end the current vicious, civil war situation. These Trustees (representing perhaps about fifteen different nations) should then be backed by a sizeable financial sum, particularly from the United States, for the next two years--some generous percentage of the two billion a month we are now told the

war is costing us--as well as the U.N. There should also be a suitable, international police force supplied by the U.N.

Such a plan could not only retain the services of U Thant, but also help the U.N. to find fresh ways of being a "peace building" body such as the world so sorely needs. It might serve wonderfully to break the devastating stalemate both within the U.N. and beyond it, and thus open up honest, aboveboard, exploratory tools by which the disturbed countries and peoples of the world may learn constructive, "problem-solving" ways available to man, over against the dreadful arbitrament of war.

By so stepping aside and giving this power to U Thant and the U.N., it could not only encourage him--so discouraged now--to exert the wise leadership to which we sense he is capable, but give some small nations the opportunity to grow in the art of international statesmanship. Such learning is desperately needed.

Man does not live by bread alone. The things of the spirit, his capacity and longing for fair play and decent justice, are a living part of his makeup, too. Anything we can do to release this latent longing and guide it into constructive channels, is a necessity for human existence.

I hope we don't miss this opportunity to share this best in our American tradition of "liberty and justice for all" with the nations of the world. To fail to do so, is to go back on our birthright, and to turn our backs on basic needs of the Family of Man on this planet.

Sincerely yours,

Robert H. Schacht

Same letter to:

The President of the United States
The Secretary General of the United Nations
The Ambassador to the United Nations
The Honorable John O. Pastore
The Honorable Claiborne Pell
The Honorable Fernand J. St. Germain

13-I-67

S.G.

Herewith Congressman Rivers
statement.

Jose.

Thurs.
8/14/67

The following is an excerpt from the Congressional Record telephoned by the Director of Washington UNIC, Mr. Tamayo. It is part of a speech yesterday by Congressman Mendel Rivers (D., South Carolina), Chairman, House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Speaker:

In my maiden speech for this session I want to lament the fact that the so-called Secretary-General of the so-called United Nations, really the modern "Tower of Babel", has thrown whatever weight and whatever worth his position had and this Organization had against this country in our bombing of North Vietnam. This is regrettable. If the press accounts and radio accounts are accurate, Mr. Speaker, the Secretary-General, by making his position public on Vietnam, is giving credence and lending dignity to those so-called Americans who have gone over to Hanoi and lambasted America from the fountainhead of our enemy. It is disgraceful, it is regrettable, and it is deplorable, Mr. Speaker, that the President of the United States should have his position undercut after he, the President of the United States, did what he did to get the so-called Secretary-General's tenure of office extended for another five years.

Mr. Speaker, if America must stand alone fighting for the freedom of Vietnam and for the right of another nation to live, we should know it now. If we are to be deserted by our so-called allies, if we are to be stabbed in the back by an Organization we created, we should know it now. Then it is high time to re-appraise our position in the United Nations. We should certainly consider discontinuing financing the actions of an Organization which is cutting the position of America every day in South East Asia.

13 January 1967

*News from* JEAN ENNIS**RANDOM HOUSE, INC.** 457 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N.Y.HOLD FOR RELEASE JANUARY 23rdSENATOR FULBRIGHT, IN FORTHCOMING BOOK, OFFERS EIGHT-POINTPROGRAM FOR PEACE IN VIETNAMFulbright's THE ARROGANCE OF POWER to Be Published by Random House on
January 23rd*SE*
*F.Y.I.**Thanks. William 20 Jan 67*

In a new book entitled *THE ARROGANCE OF POWER*, to be published by Random House on January 23rd, Senator J. William Fulbright presents for the first time an eight-point program for the eventual restoration of peace in Vietnam. The book, which assesses America's role as the most powerful nation in the world, with particular emphasis on the war in Vietnam, is both critical and constructive.

"Power has a way of undermining judgment, of planting delusions of grandeur in the minds of otherwise sensible people and otherwise sensible nations," Senator Fulbright says in *THE ARROGANCE OF POWER*. "...the idea of being responsible for the whole world seems to have dazzled us, giving rise to what I call the arrogance of power."

In addition to his peace program for Vietnam, the 11-chapter book is an exposition of Senator Fulbright's views on the diminishing power of the Senate in relation to the Executive, illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis, the Dominican intervention, and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. He also spells out the steps for peace the United States might take to improve relations with China; and explains why he believes the reunification of Germany is essential to world stability.

Most significantly, Senator Fulbright advocates strongly the neutralization not only of Vietnam but of all of Southeast Asia, a thesis he develops at some length, citing outstanding contemporary examples of accommodation by neutralization, such as Switzerland, Belgium and Austria.

The eight points of Senator Fulbright's program for the resolution of the conflict in Vietnam are as follows:

- 1) The South Vietnamese government should seek peace negotiations with the National Liberation Front.
- 2) At the same time that the Saigon government makes direct overtures to the National Liberation Front, the United States and South Vietnam together should propose negotiations for a cease-fire among military representatives of four separate

*9/20/67**MORE*
6/26/69

negotiating parties: the United States and South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front.

3) The United States should terminate its bombing of North Vietnam, add no additional forces in South Vietnam, and reduce the scale of military operations to the maximum extent consistent with the security of American forces while peace initiatives are under way.

4) The United States should pledge the eventual removal of American military forces from Vietnam.

5) Negotiations among the four principal belligerents -- the United States and South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front -- should be directed toward a cease-fire and plans for self-determination in South Vietnam.

6) After the principal belligerents have agreed on a cease-fire and plans for self-determination in South Vietnam, an international conference of all interested states should be convened to guarantee the arrangements made by the belligerents and to plan a future referendum on the reunification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

7) In addition to guaranteeing arrangements for self-determination in South Vietnam and planning a referendum on the reunification of North and South Vietnam, the international conference should neutralize South Vietnam and undertake to negotiate a multilateral agreement for the general neutralization of Southeast Asia.

8) If for any reason an agreement ending the Vietnamese war cannot be reached, the United States should consolidate its forces in highly fortified defensible areas in South Vietnam and keep them there indefinitely.

Senator Fulbright believes the Vietnamese war is having a most deleterious effect on American policy both at home and throughout the world. It has distracted both money and leadership from the Great Society program; it has damaged our relations with allies and neutrals; and it has put a virtual end to the "building of bridges" to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. "We should not have supported France's colonial war in Indochina from 1950 to 1954; we should not have supported Ngo Dinh Diem in his violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954; we should not have built up the unpopular Diem regime as our military and political protégé in the late fifties and early sixties; we should not have sent increasing numbers of military advisers to bolster the flagging South Vietnamese army; and above all we should not have sent a large American army to take over the war when the South Vietnamese army was on the verge of collapse in early 1965."

Senator Fulbright offers some specific steps which he believes the United States might take to improve relations with China. "American hostility is probably prolonging the extremist phase of the Chinese revolution; my hope is that one day soon we will moderate our hostility and offer to China the hand of friendship, knowing full well that it is almost certain to be rejected but knowing as well that honest and repeated offers of friendship may weaken the Chinese image of a hostile America and hasten the day of China's Thermidor.

"If we can bring ourselves to act toward China with understanding and generosity, we will be on the way to a solution of the great problems that beset us in Eastern Asia."

1-9-67

20 March 1967

Dear Mr. Congressman,

Thank you for your very kind letter of 17 March 1967. So far as my efforts to promote a peaceful solution of the Viet Nam conflict are concerned, I have come to the conclusion that it would be best for me to act in my personal capacity rather than as Secretary-General of the United Nations. I am also equally firmly convinced that any such efforts will have a chance of success only if they are pursued in the realm of quiet diplomacy. This explains the "restraint" which you have observed in regard to my public pronouncements on the subject of Viet Nam.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

The Honorable Joe L. Brown, M.C.
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry

JOE L. EVINS
FOURTH DISTRICT
TENNESSEE

MEMBER:
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

CHAIRMAN:
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

15 March 1967

The Honorable U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations Organization
United Nations Building
New York, New York

Mr. Thant

18/5

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

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UN, per CC

News reports indicate that in the past you have felt somewhat handcuffed or restrained in pressing for peace in Viet Nam because of some restraint which you seem to feel is imposed upon the Secretary General.

As the chosen top official of the United Nations Organization, it would appear that you could and should use your good offices constructively and consistently to bring about an honorable peace and settlement of the Viet Nam conflict. May I suggest a greater use of your esteemed personal influence -- a more effective exploitation of the prestige and power of the great Office you occupy so honorably. I know of no restraining influence that should prevent you from promoting peace and taking any action to bring about a settlement of this conflict.

When the battle of life has ended, will the historians record that Secretary U Thant did his best to protect a peoples' right to seek self-determination without being subjected to a reign of terror in reprisal; will historians say that you sided with the Communists or with the people of the Free World? Why not let the record show clearly that you stopped this conflict and memorialized forever the United Nations -- that you acted while time and opportunity permitted.

Let me say that you have my best wishes and the best wishes of countless others in your efforts to achieve a peaceful world.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Joe L. Evins
JOE L. EVINS, M. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. George Janeczek, Director
A: External Relations Division, OPI

DATE: 30 March 1967

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: _____

FROM: Marcial Tamayo, Director
DE: UNIC, Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Secretary General's Peace Proposal
OBJET: _____

U Thant's peace proposal was received with mixed feelings in the Nation's Capital. The rapid sampling of Congressional sentiment (Congress is in recess until 3 April), showed support of the Secretary General's latest efforts. Last night at the inaugural meeting of the newly formed United Nations Association Information Corps, a group of legislators attending the event, summed up the feelings in this fashion:

(1) U Thant's proposal appears to have been carefully seasoned to make the formulas more palatable to the United States government.

(2) Although the proposal does nothing to immediately change the United States government's attitude, its wording suggests that President Johnson will be allowed a more comfortable position vis-à-vis the United Nations and implicitly with the world opinion.

(3) In any event, U Thant once more, presents himself as totally committed to the search for peace in Viet Nam and thus demonstrates that it is his duty to explore all possible solutions to that effect, no matter towards whose side he appears to be leaning.

(4) One can safely assume that time will determine very soon, which side is to be blamed for stubbornly opposing the peace overtures advance by the Secretary General.

The preceding were reactions from men who are always very careful in advancing any comments on international affairs and who tend to be ambiguous when it comes to expressing opinions on matters of the importance with which they were dealing. The fact is, on the other hand, that the Centre received, during the day, several "complaints" from people working with the NGO's involved in the so-called "peace struggle". They felt (The Friends Committee on National Legislation, the League of Women Voters, The United World Federalists, The Council of Churches) that the Secretary General's proposal, shows a change in attitude and in some ways favours the United States government position, which they, the "peace groups", in turn have been consistently contending. Their two main arguments were:

(1) The Liberation Front, particularly, and the South Viet Nameese people in general, have been left out, in the proposal, of the preparation of an eventual agenda for discussion.

(2) In the course of the press conference held by the Secretary General, he said "... As you know, the Mekong Project is very much affected by the war

in Viet Nam to the extent that one of the principle parties involved, Cambodia, is still reluctant to participate wholeheartedly in the project..." Miss Frances Neely of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, interviewed on radio last night, repeated what she had expressed earlier to me on behalf of her group and other people: "that everybody knows the Cambodians were justified in not attending the Mekong Coordination Committee as a consequence of the United States action banning aid to so-called 'friendly countries', and this should have been at least insinuated by the Secretary General."

Other arguments raised were irrelevant and later withdrawn from circulation. We were able to detect, in any case, a strange reaction among "peace-seekers" - they didn't expect the United States government would accept the Secretary General's proposal and when it did accept, they were caught off-balance. It is obvious that an element of internal politics is playing a role in all this.

Press commentaries were scant and the Washington Post and Evening Star editorials, commenting on the proposal, were so ambiguous as to deserve no special reference.

CC: Mr. Norman Ho

Meeting was in his office behind the South Chamber.

The following are, in the main part, direct quotes:

He said this was a horrible, mean war that simply bothers him terribly.

He said the war will never be won militarily because escalating it in the north to the winning point would lead to a confrontation that could not even be contemplated. But he is hopeful that the war can be 'dried up'---and done so by early 1968---via the political route. He thinks that few people realize the significance of the recent free elections, but the fact that they are free is the important point.

He says there will be a step-up of terrorizing and bombardment by the Viet Cong between now and the national elections in South Vietnam for President and Parliament in September and October.

After these elections, about which he is quite hopeful, he expects mass defections from the north. You will be surprised how big these defections will be, he said.

He said there will not be any real end of the war by 1968, but he hopes, and he admits that it is just a hope, that it will be de-escalated enough so that it will be off the front pages by convention time. He concedes that Johnson is in very real trouble politically in many states because of the war, and he, too, is totally fatalistic about his own

Windsch

Confidential

future. He says the Administration is putting great effort into stepping up the political effort. He says they have the very best political team in Saigon they can find. Bunker is a superb peace soothsayer, Robert Komer of the White House will spend more and more time in Vietnam on the pacification program, and they are pulling from Berlin a man named Dechrau whom they feel is a very good officer in our Foreign Service.

He says, in a way, getting the north and South Vietnamese together is a little like getting East and West Berlin together. I.E., it is a long, long process of increasing contact between the people on both sides of the wall.

He said he never expected Ho Chi Minh would want to come to the peace table, and from Ho's point of view, it makes sense. Why should he? He won't get any better deal at the peace table whether he comes now or later. He can always retreat, and the war is good employment for his people.

Most interesting, he said he was against the bombing of Haiphong which was done, transcribed during the interview.

He said he preferred the idea of a demilitarized corridor, and he personally favored confining bombing to the south, to the infiltration routes, and declaring northern points out-of-bounds for our bombers.

You certainly got the feeling that he wasn't entirely in sympathy with the most recent escalation that has begun.

On the other hand he is thoroughly loyal to the President and the conduct of the war in his public discussions. He spent the week talking in a similar way to other editors of papers who have raised some doubts about the conduct of the war. These papers are the New York Times, Detroit Free Press, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Minneapolis Star Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle and the Boston Globe.

* * *

Before we got onto Vietnam, he talked heatedly about a problem of our business that also bothers me. It is the age-old tendency of playing up the big drama, the conflict in a situation, to the extent that it distorts the true picture. He ran into this problem in his trip to Europe. He said he personally got a marvelous press; his wife, Muriel, got a better one. But America got a stinking one. He said TV is most guilty of it. In those nightly shows TV would much rather have a 45-second spot showing a couple of kids throwing eggs in Brussels than 5,000 women mobbing him five minutes later in the same city.

He said that the Pope spoke to him at length about how troubled he was over America's image in Europe. He said the Pope understood our motives, but said the European citizen would never know our fine motives from the way we are portrayed in the world press.

Pl. keep.

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Second, there are two different categories of infiltration figures which sometimes become merged into one. The first category is what is called *confirmed* and *probable* infiltrators, now known as *accepted*. The second category is what is known as *possible*. Over a period of time, there is some movement from the *possible* category into the *accepted* category.

In the figures that you are referring to, I believe that the accepted and possible are added together to get to the 7,000 or 8,000 per month, and I think that overstates the level of infiltration. The best guess I could give you at the moment is that for 9 months, infiltration ran something on the order of 5,300 a month, but I would not want to certify that as having any great accuracy, for another 2 or 3 months.

BOMBING EFFECT ON INFILTRATIONS AND NORTH VIETNAM WAR-WAGING ABILITY

Senator ALLOTT. Just what effect do you think our increased bombing, and I want to get this too in the north, has had on the infiltration, and also the ability of the North Vietnamese to wage war? I want to refer particularly to your statements on page 19. You say: "For those who thought that air attacks on North Vietnam would end the aggression in South Vietnam"—now, I do not know personally of any people on this committee who thought that way, and so I want to disclaim that, but many of us took a very strong position last year, as you will recall, that a stepped-up bombing in the North could actually slow down the ability of the North Vietnamese to put men in there, and also to supply them, and also to supply the Vietcong. What effect do you think the increased bombing has had on this?

Secretary McNAMARA. Just as in the case of World War II, it took a strategic bombing survey after the war to determine really the results of the bombing. So here, too, I think that during the war it is impossible for us to be certain of the real impact of the bombing.

I will give you my opinion. My opinion is based on the best available analysis within the Government.

I think it is very clear that the bombings have forced the diversion of major resources from other parts of the economy to support of the lines of communication. I do not know exactly how many men or women have been moved from other jobs to that, but I would think on the order of 200,000 to 300,000, and this is a very large number, indeed, in an economy of that size.

The bombings have not reduced the petroleum supplies below about a [deleted] day level at the present time. The bombings appear to have had some adverse effect on public morale, but there is no evidence that to date they have weakened the resolve of the political leaders to continue the war.

Undoubtedly the bombings do limit the capability of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate men and equipment into the south. I think just *a priori* one could arrive at that conclusion. But it is not clear that the limit that results is below the level that the North Vietnamese planned on, and in any event, it is not below the level necessary to support the force in the south at the present time.

SUPPLY PERCENTAGE IMPORTED THROUGH PORT OF HAIPHONG

Senator ALLOTT. In your statement, Mr. Secretary, you say that

lives we are losing in the South, and the main battle is being carried on in the South. This has been our theory right from the start.

When we began the bombing we said, and we have said many, many times since then, that we didn't believe the bombing was a substitute for the operations in the South. We do believe it's an added penalty to the North, and when they see they can't win in the South, that added penalty should be one of the factors inducing them to cease their operations or negotiate a termination of the conflict, and that remains the theory today.

Senator CANNON. But it is simply a penalty and not a restriction?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe it is a penalty and not a restriction in the sense that I don't believe that the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, the actual flow of men and materiel to the South.

Senator CANNON. Do the military advisers agree with you on that question?

Secretary McNAMARA. I think General Wheeler should answer that question.

BOMBING IN NORTH HAS REDUCED FLOW

General WHEELER. As I have said, I believe that our bombing in the North has reduced the flow. I do not discount the effect to the extent that some other people do.

Now, when we start talking about whether it will reduce it below a certain level and a fairly small level, this is another thing, and I can't give you a judgment on that except, looking at the tempo of combat operations and the manner in which the enemy uses its troops, I have a distinct impression—in fact, it amounts to a conviction—that our bombing operations have reduced the flow to an extent which limits the number of people that they can deploy into South Vietnam.

A question was asked this morning as to why they don't put more than 48,000 or 45,000 North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. I think they probably have just about as many people there, Vietcong and North Vietnamese, as they can support logistically at the present time. I could be wrong on this, but this is my judgment.

Senator CANNON. You, Mr. Secretary, have emphasized the POL quite a bit. There have been many references to the POL supplies. Is this an essential factor in the support of these troops in South Vietnam? There isn't too much movement that involves POL down there, is there?

EFFECT OF BOMBING POL SUPPLIES

Secretary McNAMARA. There is considerable movement within North Vietnam to the borders involving POL, and I mentioned this because last year in my appearance before this committee, one of the major subjects was the north's petroleum supplies and why we didn't bomb them. I said then what I have said today—that I didn't believe, and I don't believe now, that bombing of the POL supplies will so reduce the availability of petroleum as to reduce significantly the flow of men and materiel to the south.

There is no question but what petroleum in the north is an essential material for the movement, under present circumstances, of men and equipment to their borders. But neither is there any doubt that

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comes has to suffer too; secondly, to force them to the negotiation table; and third, to interdict the supplies from north to south. And then I hear the very good description of the problems of bombing the rail lines in the north, [deleted] and the statements about the great difficulties of airpower bombardment.

I am left with the impression that the air bombardment hasn't been effective in interdicting supplies and men to the south. This is Senator Miller's question. This is why I have supported the administration's position on bombing the north. Can you help me now?

As General Wheeler indicated, he has real conviction about the success of bombing in the north.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH SUCCESSFUL

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe that the campaign against the north has been successful, and I say that for two reasons. First, because the objectives were just exactly what you say has been accomplished, to increase the morale of the south [deleted].

Senator PEARSON. Has that occurred?

Secretary McNAMARA. Definitely. Everybody will agree to that. Second, to increase the cost to the north of infiltration to the south.

Senator PEARSON. Has that—

Secretary McNAMARA. Definitely. Roughly 200,000 to 300,000 people in the north have been diverted from other activities to, in effect, repairing the damage to the lines of communication caused by our bombing. So the cost to infiltrate these limited quantities of men and equipment to the south has increased dramatically.

Third, to raise the political price paid by the north to continue the campaign in the south, and as you pointed out, that has definitely been done. So I would say those were the stated objectives we had in mind and we have accomplished them.

The second reason I say it's a success is that there isn't anything they would like to get rid of more at the moment, that I can tell, than the bombing [deleted]. So for both of those reasons I think it has been a success. But I never believed in the past, and I don't believe today, that air bombardment on any acceptable scale will stop or significantly reduce the movement of such small numbers of men and such small quantities of material as are being sent from the north to the south.

Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McIntyre.

ADVANTAGES OF SKY RAIDER

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wheeler, can you tell me so I can hear it myself, I have heard a lot of criticism of the A-1E airplane which I assume is presently being used in Vietnam and is obsolete—"not nearly as good a weapon as we could have to do the job." How do we justify our decision to use this Sky Raider?

General WHEELER. As a matter of fact, I asked some of the pilots using these aircraft out there, both the Air Force pilots and some of the Navy pilots, whether this was just on the basis of "every cowboy loves his horse," but they said they like it. They pointed to the advantages of this aircraft. It is very sturdy. It has a long loiter time;

President Johnson, mixing Humpty Dumpty with Vietnam, is reported have told a luncheon of farmers yesterday that: "We've reached a point where all the king's horses and all the king's men are not going to move us out of our position."

Unfortunately, United States policies toward Vietnam seem to be becoming as mixed up as Mr. Johnson's metaphor. The publication yesterday of excerpts from Secretary of Defense McNamara's testimony before two Senate committees in January indicated that the bombing of North Vietnam is producing less than impressive results in halting Communist troop and supply movements. In addition, he gave the Senators a version of American demands on Hanoi that differed from Secretary of State Rusk's.

"I don't believe that bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, the actual flow of men and matériel to the south," said Mr. McNamara.

He also assured the Senators that the United States would be willing to stop the bombing of North Vietnam "without any action on their part preceding it, with no firm guarantee as to what they would do, but with just some general indication of how they would act."

Yet, in his news conference on Feb. 9, Secretary Rusk said that the United States was not prepared to end the bombing in exchange for some "formless" possibility of talks. Before we stopped, said Mr. Rusk, "we must know the military consequences . . . we cannot stop our military actions involving bombing while they continue their military actions involving invasion."

Despite the gulf between the two declarations, a Pentagon spokesman issued a translation last night calculated to make Mr. McNamara's words sound exactly like those of Mr. Rusk. Perhaps it is the unabashedness with which Washington turns black into white into gray that makes the world wonder what our position really is on getting to the peace table or on the necessity for keeping up the bombing.

The advantages of the air attacks, according to Mr. McNamara, are to boost the morale of the South Vietnamese, to complicate the problems of infiltration and to raise the cost to North Vietnam. These gains are more than offset by the lack of decisive military results and the political and moral losses in the eyes of the rest of the world.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, Prof. Henry Steele Commager of Amherst challenged the United States contention that "reciprocity" demands North Vietnam promise to halt its infiltration first. The Americans, he remarked, are doing their own infiltrating, "although we do not call it that." Why not, he asked, stop the bombing and then seek de-escalation by both sides?

President Johnson stands fast; Secretary McNamara has one version of our policy and Secretary Rusk another. Meanwhile, the war in Vietnam goes on. The McNamara testimony strengthened the case for believing that there is little to lose by a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. There is everything to lose by escalation.

President Again Rejects One-Sided Bombing Halt

21 FEB 1967 By ROY REED

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20—President Johnson reiterated today in strong terms his refusal to stop the bombing of North Vietnam without some reciprocal reduction of military action by the North Vietnamese.

George Christian, the President's press secretary, said the President had told a group of a hundred farm leaders at the White House that to stop the bombing without reciprocal action would be like "unloading your gun" and inviting the other side to shoot.

[In Peking, the Chinese Communist party newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao published an article opposing any negotiations in return for a cessation of United States bombing of North Vietnam. Such an approach has been proposed by Hanoi and rejected by the United States.]

No 'Signal' Is Seen

A farmer who took notes as the President spoke privately to the farm leaders quoted the President as having said that he had not seen any peace "signal" or "one single indication" that the Government of North Vietnam was willing to negotiate or talk peace.

The farmer also quoted the President as having said:

"We've reached a point where all the king's horses and all the king's men are not going to move us out of our position."

Several others in the group confirmed that quotation. They interpreted the President's remark to refer to the general situation in Vietnam rather than to the bombing.

Mr. Christian, who was present at the President's luncheon for the farmers, said he had not heard the remark about "all the king's men."

Mr. Christian said the President had repeated his desire for peace, but had added that the

Continued on Page 9, Column 1.

JOHNSON ADAMANT IN BOMBING STAND

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

United States had tried bombing pauses without results.

Congressional testimony made public today quoted Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as having said that the United States had made it clear that it would be willing to stop the bombing "without any action on their part preceding it, with no firm guarantee as to what they would do, but with just some general indication of how they would act."

A Defense Department spokesman later said that by the phrase "general indication" Mr. McNamara meant an indication through military action. The spokesman added:

"Secretary McNamara believes, without any question whatever, that the bombing should not be stopped for talks unless there is compensatory military action by the North Vietnamese."

In his testimony, Mr. McNamara added: "We have never received any indication that they [the North Vietnamese] would respond favorably."

He told a closed-door joint session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee in January that it was his guess—"and it is only a guess," he said—that infiltration from North Vietnam had dropped from about 5,300 a month during the first nine months of 1966 to about 2,100 a month during the final quarter of the year.

He added: "I don't believe any amount of bombing, within practical limits, of North Vietnam would have substantially reduced whatever the actual infiltration was."

At another point, Mr. McNamara said:

"Undoubtedly, the bombing does limit the capability of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate men and equipment into the South. But it is not clear that the limit that results is below the level that the North Vietnamese planned on and, in any event, it is not below the level necessary to support the force in the South at the present."

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24—
 Following is the text of a statement today by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before television and radio newsmen and of questions and answers that followed his statement:

Opening Statement

I've noted in the press reports of an apparent difference of opinion between Secretary Rusk and me, for example, on the subject of bombing of military targets in North Vietnam.

In one sense this is amusing to me because, in looking back over two years of recommendations to the President on the bombing of military operations in North Vietnam, I can't recall a single instance when the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have differed on bombing policy and not a single instance when their recommendations have differed on particular bombing targets.

I think the apparent divergence of opinion is a reflection of the fact that each of us testifies before different groups of the Congress and meets different groups of the public. There are two opinions in our nation, of course, in respect to bombing of the North; two extremes, I should say—one group believing we should bomb more heavily, the other group believing we should stop the bombing altogether. And I think each of these groups fails to recognize both our political objective in South Vietnam and the way in which our bombing program against military targets in the North relates to that political objective. So let me take a moment on each of these.

'Very Limited Objective'

We have a very limited objective in Southeast Asia today—very, very limited. We are not seeking to destroy the Government of North Vietnam and certainly we are not seeking bases from which we can carry out attacks on Red China. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with South Vietnam in terms of which they will be our military ally, or terms of which they will provide for us permanent military bases on the land mass of Southeast Asia.

None of these are our objectives. Our objective is limited to assuring for the people of South Vietnam, the right to shape their own destiny, their right to choose the form of the political and economic institutions under which to do so without the threat, the pressure from external powers.

Now, since that is a limited objective, we should seek to accomplish it at the lowest possible cost to this nation, not the lowest cost in terms of dollars, but the lowest cost in

terms of lives. That, of course, means we should take steps to avoid widening the war, to minimize the risk of increasing the conflict and thereby increasing the cost to us in terms of American lives. And this is the foundation of our bombing policy.

Now since that is our objective, we sought to accomplish three things by the bombing. First, to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese. You will recall that at the time the bombing of North Vietnam began just two years ago this month, South Vietnam was in danger of being cut in two at the narrow waist of the country, between Pleiku and Quinhon. Its armed forces were in danger of severe defeat, and the bombing against the military targets in the North were in part started to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese military, to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese political leaders, and to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese people—to let them know that we did stand behind them, that they could be assured of additional support from this nation.

The Second Objective

A second objective was to either reduce the level of infiltration of men and equipment from North to South or to increase the cost of that infiltration. I say either to reduce the level or to increase the cost because we didn't know then whether we could actually reduce the level of infiltration by airpower. But, we were certain we could increase the cost, and we have done so. The North Vietnamese have diverted about 300,000 men from other occupations to the job of repairing the lines of communications that we've attacked, lines of communication that are the foundation of the infiltration of their men and equipment from North to South.

The third objective, of course, was to make clear to the political leaders of the North that they would pay a price so long as they continued to carry on in their aggression of the South. We didn't believe then and we don't believe now that that bombing by itself, no matter how extensive within practical limits, could force them to change their course of action. The primary pressure must be placed upon the Vietcong and

the North Vietnamese in the South; the bombing of the North is a supplement, not a substitute, for that pressure.

So, I think when you appraise the results of the bombing program, you must appraise these results in terms of its objectives. In our opinion it's been very successful in those terms.

Questions and Answers

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the floor of the Senate today, Senator Jackson is urging that there be a selective widening of targets of our bombing attacks. Could you address yourself to that?

A. I have only read the wire reports of Senator Jackson's speech, but I think that he was expressing our policy very clearly and ably when he said that he recommended a course of moderation. He specifically recommended against, according to the wire reports I read, the unrestricted bombing of the North. He recommended it be limited to military targets. As time goes by we have, as you well know, over the last two years added to the military targets that our crews were authorized to attack, and we may well add additional targets in the future as the value of specific targets shifts.

When we direct our attention to one target system such as the roads, for example, they may shift to the use of railroads, and we then must redirect our military efforts to the new system. Or, as we address the land routes of communications, attack those, they move to inland waterways; and when that happens, we must shift to the inland waterways. When we begin to attack those, they may shift their traffic movements from North to South to the coastal waterways; and in that case, we may have to address those.

Recently, for example, as you know, we have been attacking coastal waterways by naval fire in addition to bombing them for exactly this reason. So I think you can look forward to shifts in our bombing pattern as the enemy shifts his routes of communication and the use of those routes of communication from North to South.

Q. What about the SAM sites, Mr. Secretary?

A. Our commanders are authorized to attack surface-to-air missile sites when these interfere with our operations. There is a balance, of course, that they must always strike between the danger to our crews from attacking the SAMs vs. the danger from not attacking them. This is a field judgment that the commanders in the field are authorized to make. I should tell you that, as you probably know, the loss of U. S. aircraft to surface-to-air missiles has been very, very low over the past two years.

Objective Not Achieved

Q. Mr. Secretary, you concede that the heavy bombing attacks or the increase in bombing has not stopped infiltration from the North to the South.

A. I not only concede it, I report it.

Q. Oh, you report it, sir? Do you think that the other objective, that of damaging the morale and the will to go on in this war of the North Vietnamese people, is being achieved? Is there any evidence to that effect?

A. I emphasized to you that our third objective in initiating the bombing was to make clear to the political leaders of the North that they would continue to pay a price so long as they carried on their attempt to subvert the political institutions of South Vietnam. I think that is very clear to them, and the success of our efforts to make that clear to them is evidenced by their strong campaign, a worldwide campaign, to try to force us to stop that bombing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what would we consider some kind of sign that the enemy was, in fact, going along with what we say we want them to do? Would it be a week without trucks, or something like that?

A. We have said that we would stop the bombing in return for an appropriate de-escalation of military actions by the North Vietnamese, and that could take many, many forms.

*de Gaulle's Press Conference
of 3 January 1967*

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*(after France's assumption
of diplomatic relations with China)*

peoples whom a dictatorship similar to its own had subordinated to it, intended to keep China under its rule and thereby dominate Asia. But the illusion has been dispelled. Doubtless there still remains, between the regimes in power in Moscow and in Peking, a certain doctrinal solidarity that may be manifested in the world rivalry of ideologies. Yet under a cloak that is torn a little more every day, appears the inevitable difference in national policies. The least we can say in this regard is that in Asia, where the frontier between the two States, from the Hindu Kush to Vladivostok, is the longest that exists in the world, Russia's interest, which is to conserve and to maintain, and China's, which is to grow and to acquire, cannot be considered identical. As a result, the attitude and the action of a nation of 700 million inhabitants are effectively settled only by its own government.

Given the fact that for fifteen years almost the whole of China is gathered under a government which imposes its laws, and that externally China has shown herself to be a sovereign and independent power, France has been disposed to enter into regular relations with Peking. Doubtless certain economic and cultural exchanges already existed. Doubtless the force of circumstances had led us, as it had led America, England, the Soviet Union, India and other States, to negotiate with the Chinese representatives, when in 1954 the Geneva Conference decided the fate of Indochina or when in 1962, under the same form and in the same city, the situation in Laos was somewhat defined. But the weight of evidence and of reason increasing day by day, the French Republic estimated, for its part, that the time had come to place its relations with the People's Republic of China on a normal, in other words a diplomatic basis. We have met with an identical intention in Peking, and therefore on this point, former Premier Edgar Faure, requested to make an unofficial sounding on the spot, returned to Paris with positive indications. It was then that the two States arrived at an official agreement to carry out the measures necessary.

I have referred to the weight of evidence and of reason. In fact, there is in Asia no political reality, notably with regard to Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, or to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, or to Korea or Soviet Russia or Japan, etc., which does not concern or affect China. There is, in particular, neither a war nor a peace imaginable on this continent without China's being implicated in it. Thus it would be absolutely impossible to envision, without China, a possible neutrality agreement relating to the South-east Asian States, in which States for so many reasons, we French feel a very particular and cordial interest—a neutrality which, by definition, must be accepted by all, guaranteed on the international level, and which would exclude both armed agitations supported by any one among them in one or another of the States, and the various forms of external intervention; a neutrality that, indeed, seems, at the present time, to be the only situation compatible with the peaceful existence and progress of the peoples concerned. But further, China's own mass, her value and her present needs, the scope of her future, cause her to reveal herself increasingly to the interests and concerns of the entire world. For all these reasons, it is clear that France must be able to listen to China directly, and also to make herself heard.

29 May 1967

Dear Senator Fell,

✓ Thank you for your kind letter of 23 May; I have read your statement with great interest. I regret that I am unable to comment in writing on the proposals on page two of your letter. I hope you will appreciate my difficulty in this regard.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

The Honorable Clairborne Pell
Senator
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. Marasimhan
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry

CLAIBORNE PELL
RHODE ISLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 23, 1967


Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I hope my enclosed speech on
Vietnam may interest and be considered
by you.

I would be very grateful for any
reaction, public or private, on your part
to my proposals on page 2.

With every good wish, I am

Ever sincerely,



Claiborne Pell

Enclosure

His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary General of the United Nations
United Nations, New York

14 June 1967

Dear Senator Hartke,

Thank you for your letter of 26 May 1967, concerning the question of the admission to the United Nations of North and South Korea and of North and South Viet-Nam.

As you will recall, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the admission of a State to the Organization "will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council". This presupposes an affirmative recommendation for admission by the Security Council before the General Assembly can admit an applicant State to membership. The General Assembly has, however, in the past considered the general question of membership and has recommended to the Council that it reconsider certain applications on which it had failed to act affirmatively.

Applications for membership from North and South Korea have been before the Security Council since early 1949, and from North and South Viet-Nam since December 1951. However, the Council, which has considered these applications on a number of occasions, has failed to act affirmatively upon them. The last instance of substantive consideration by the Council appears to have been in December 1958, on which occasion the Council submitted a special report to the General Assembly. That report states, inter alia, as follows:

"France, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted a joint draft resolution (S/4129/Rev.1) recommending the admission of the Republic of Korea to membership.

The Honourable Vance Hartke
United States Senator
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted amendments (S/4132) to the joint draft resolution, providing for the simultaneous admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to membership. At the 343rd meeting, on the same date, the Security Council voted on the joint draft resolution (S/4129/Rev.1) and the USSR amendments were rejected by 8 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions. The vote on the joint draft resolution (S/4129/Rev.1) was 9 in favour, 1 against, with 1 abstention. The negative vote being that of a permanent member, the draft resolution was not adopted.

"France, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted another joint draft resolution (S.4130/Rev.1) recommending the admission of Viet-Nam to membership. Also at the 343rd meeting, this draft resolution received 8 votes in favour, 1 against, with 2 abstention, and was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council."

This special report, insofar as it related to the applications here in question, was not the subject of specific action by the General Assembly.

In your letter you refer to action by the Assembly at its eleventh session in early 1957, on the applications in question. On that occasion, the Assembly, on the recommendation of its Special Political Committee, requested the Security Council to reconsider the applications of South Korea and of South Viet-Nam. The Special Political Committee, however, rejected the USSR proposal that simultaneous reconsideration should be given by the Council to the applications of North Korea and North Viet-Nam. At its twelfth session, towards the end of 1957, the Assembly once more reaffirmed that South Korea and South Viet-Nam were fully qualified for and should be admitted to membership in the United Nations (General Assembly resolutions 1144 A and B (XII) of 23 October 1957), but made no recommendation concerning the other two applications ~~were~~ involved. It was these recommendations of the Assembly which gave rise to the Special Report of the Security Council in December 1958, which has been quoted above. They appear to be the most recent recommendations by the Assembly on this matter.

As the Security Council remains seized of an item on admission of new members to the United Nations, and as the applications of North and South Korea and North and South Viet-Nam are still formally before the Council under this item, the only action required to reactivate their consideration by the Council would be a request by a member of the Council for a meeting to take up the applications once again.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

cc - Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Stavropoulos
Mr. Lemieux ✓
Registry

RUSSELL B. LONG, LA., CHAIRMAN

GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA. JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.
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LEE METCALF, MONT.
FRED R. HARRIS, OKLA.

TOM VAIL, CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

May 26, 1967

ACTION

TO: *Mr. Karasimhan*

1 _____
2 _____
3 _____

MAY 29 1967

☐ - Action Completed
☒ - Acknowledged
☐ - No Action Required

INITIALS *per file*

OR 210(1) PP

The Honorable U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Secretary General:

It is my understanding that membership applications from South Vietnam, dated December 17, 1951, and from North Vietnam dated December 27, 1951, are still pending before the United Nations. I have seen a copy of what appears to be the last action involving them, in January, 1957, when Russia offered a draft resolution in the Special Political Committee for recommendation by the General Assembly. That proposal was in the nature of a request by the General Assembly for the Security Council to consider these applications, together with those of the two Koreas, "with a view to recommending the simultaneous admission of all these states to membership..." The recorded vote in the Committee was 45-12 against, with 18 abstentions. So far as I have been able to determine, there has been no further action on these applications.

Is the information correct that the North and South Vietnam applications are still "pending"? If so, what is the meaning of the term and what would be required to secure further consideration of them? Would

cont'd...

The Honorable U Thant

May 26, 1967

Page 2

the procedure be that which was followed in 1957, that is, consideration of a resolution in the Special Political Committee followed by action of recommendation in the General Assembly and then consideration on the Security Council agenda?

This inquiry is for the purpose of understanding the procedures exactly. I will appreciate the specific information in whatever detail you feel would be helpful. It might also be useful to me if you could trace the history of the successive considerations given to these two applications, including confirmation of the fact that no consideration has been given since 1957. But the heart of my concern is the question whether these applications, and those of the two Koreas, could be brought up for further consideration and, if so, what the procedure involved would entail.

Faithfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Vance Hartke".

Vance Hartke
United States Senator

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: Mr. Nassif

A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	X	POUR INFORMATION

Please pass this on to the Secretary-General.

Thank you.

SG

Thanks.
19/7

F.Y.I.

17 July 67 *Rance*

Date:
14 July 1967

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

Norman Ho, OPI

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Norman Ho, Chief
A: Briefing Section, ER^D/OPI

DATE: 12 July 1967

REFERENCE: 77

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Marcial Tamayo, Director
DE: UNIC, Washington, D.C. *7/12/67*

SUBJECT: Senator Mike Mansfield's Speech
OBJET: _____

....

We are enclosing herewith, the complete text of the speech delivered by Senate Democratic Leader, Mike Mansfield 11 July, on the floor. This is, as you know, the second time in one week that the Senator has expressed his views on the situation in Viet Nam and other international matters with direct reference to the role he envisages for the U.N.

We would be grateful to you if you would pass this to the Secretary-General.

VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yesterday a thoughtful, considered speech was made by our colleague, the distinguished Senator from New Jersey [Mr. CASE]. The subject was Vietnam. One does not have to agree with every thought contained in that speech to recognize it as constructive and helpful. It showed a facing up to the realities in the situation in that unhappy country. It was the work of a concerned, responsible American carrying out his responsibilities as an elected Member of the Senate. It was an expression of an effort to be helpful to our country by advancing ways and means which might provide a way around the impasse in which we find ourselves in Vietnam.

Our distinguished colleague from New Jersey [Mr. CASE] is to be commended for the sense of sober responsibility which he has shown. I would hope that what I have to say will be useful in the same sense.

The most difficult subject to talk on today is the question of Vietnam. Regardless of how one feels about it, it is an issue which is in the mind of everyone. It is an issue which overshadows all else.

For several weeks, events in the Middle East have held the attention of this Nation and the United Nations. It is not surprising that interest in the situation there is high. What transpires at the crossroads of Asia, Europe, and Africa has long been of many-sided concern to the world.

It is time to note, however, that for the most part the guns are silent in Sinai and along the other frontiers of Israel. All the while, though, they continue to shatter the stillness at the 17th parallel in Vietnam. Even as the last of the fallen from the recent desert war are counted, the dead continue to pile up in Vietnam. If the plight of the refugees from less than a week of conflict in the Middle East weighs heavily on the human conscience, what is to be said of the immense accumulation of the uprooted and homeless after years of war in Vietnam?

It does not minimize the recent clash in the Middle East to point out that a reasonably effective cease-fire has been achieved and the central concern is now the design of a peace which will inhibit another outbreak of war. That is a far cry from the situation in Vietnam. In that tortured nation, the beginnings of the beginning of peace are not yet in sight. There is not even a glimmer of the end.

To be sure there is a continuing danger of a third world war emerging from the local war in the Middle East. The birth of a conflict among the great powers will remain a possibility in the absence of a durable settlement among the small powers of that region. Who will say, however, that a third world war is not already incubating in the ever-deepening and expanding struggle in Southeast Asia?

It seems to me that whatever the angle from which these two situations are viewed, Vietnam remains the most serious disruption in the well-being of this Nation and it constitutes for the United

Nations, the most urgent threat of a third world war. That appears to me to be the reality and it would be well to keep in touch with it.

The need is especially acute at this time when, once again, we are apparently approaching a fork in the road in Vietnam. The harbingers of significant decision have emerged in the form of obscure "official" rumblings, rumors, and revelations concerning Vietnam. The search, it is said, is being renewed for a "more effective and extensive" use of airpower against North Vietnam which, may I say, is probably another way of asking why Hanoi and Haiphong are not bombed into extinction. There is talk of again lifting the American manpower commitment in Vietnam—not much, it is said, just another 100,000 or 2 in the next few months—to add to the more than half million or more men presently engaged in and around Southeast Asia. Ironically, this talk of the need for more men comes at a time when it is revealed that only one-sixth or one-seventh of the U.S. troops already in Vietnam are actually involved in combat.

The inference of these rumblings, rumors, and revelations is that one further step in military escalation will carry us over the top. The implication is that one additional reach of American military power deeper into Southeast Asia will bring the sun of final victory out from behind the restraining clouds.

And once again, Mr. President, the Secretary of Defense has gone to Saigon to make a firsthand evaluation of the situation. According to the press he has heard and accepted the most encouraging reports of "progress" toward our "objectives" in Vietnam. While I do not in any sense question the accuracy or the objectivity of the evaluations which he has received, it must be asked in all frankness what is meant by "progress" toward our "objectives" in the context of the present situation in Vietnam? In all frankness, it must be said that these generalizations of progress would be more reassuring if they had not been heard from American leaders in Vietnam at many other times, stretching years into the past. Indeed, I know of no American leader, military or civilian, in Vietnam during the past decade or more who has contended that we were doing anything else except making "progress" toward our "objectives."

The fact is that reports of progress are strewn, like burned out tanks, all along the road which has led this Nation ever more deeply into Vietnam and southeast Asia during the past decade and a half.

They were present when the sole function of American military personnel in Vietnam was that of aid suppliers to the French-commanded Vietnamese loyalist forces. They were present when our military functions in Vietnam evolved into that of trainers and advisers of the South Vietnamese forces, to that of air transporters and supporters, to that of combat bulwarks and, finally, to that of combat substitutes for the South Vietnamese forces.

The generalization on progress, in short, is the ever-present beat which is to be heard throughout the transition of the American military role from the most

remote and invisible rear to the most forward and conspicuous front of the Vietnamese war. It has been present, this promise of progress, as the casualties in our forces in dead and wounded have increased from less than 10 a year, to 10 a month, to 10 a week, to 10 a day, to 10 an hour of every hour of every day. It has been present as the estimated expenditures of the Federal Government for Vietnam have increased from a few hundred million a year, to \$2 billion, to \$12 billion, to the current level of probably not less than \$25 billion a year.

May I say that I have remarked on these overlooked and negative aspects of the Vietnamese situation, not in criticism of our leaders in Vietnam or of the Secretary of Defense, or the President. These men have carried the immense responsibilities of the war with integrity and personal dedication. I have raised them, rather, in the hope of introducing a measure of historic perspective into the consideration of the question of Vietnam as we approach, apparently, another point of significant decision. And may I add that there are other aspects of the question which should be raised in order that the problem of Vietnam may be also seen in the full scope of its worldwide ramifications.

Yes, Mr. President, we can put another 100,000 men into Vietnam or, I suppose, 200,000 or even more; there are a lot of young Americans, even though the supply is not unlimited. Yes, we can mine the harbor of Haiphong as we have already mined the rivers of North Vietnam; we have most effective mines and the best sowing techniques. Yes, we can level the city of Hanoi as we have leveled its power plants; we have the ordinance, as the circumlocution for bombs now puts it.

It is to be hoped, however, that before we embark on this course of expansion toward total war in Vietnam, we will pause for a long and sober think. Before we take another significant step deeper into Vietnam, it is to be hoped that we will have asked ourselves at what point we intend to increase taxes, apply the wage and price controls, tighten the draft exemptions, call up the Reserves, and make the countless other adjustments in our national life which are implicit in further extensions of the American involvement.

It is to be hoped that we will have asked ourselves, too, Mr. President, at what point in this ever-increasing infusion of American men and power into South Vietnam we reduce the present Vietnamese politico-military structure which is based on Saigon to a final irrelevancy.

It is to be hoped that we will have asked ourselves what indiscriminate bombing in North Vietnam may have in common with any objectives of the United States anywhere in Vietnam or Southeast Asia. It is to be hoped that we will have asked ourselves what interests of the Vietnamese people—in whose interests we were prompted to go into Vietnam in the first place—will be served by the bombing of combatant and non-combatant, in Hanoi and Haiphong?

And it is to be hoped that we will have asked ourselves about the next step

beyond the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong if that, too, should fail, as every other escalation to date has failed to bring this conflict to a conclusion.

We have the power, Mr. President, to bomb the Vietnamese back into the Stone Age. And if that power is unsheathed once in error, we had better be prepared to move back into the caves, along with the Vietnamese, and the rest of the world.

It is to be hoped that before plunging deeper we will have asked ourselves at what point that which began as limited U.S. aid to the South Vietnamese military becomes wholly an American war against all Vietnam, becomes a war in Korea, becomes a war in the Formosan Straits, becomes a war with China. And while we are asking we had better ask ourselves, finally, at what point in this ever-widening compass of conflict—at what point along the road to World War III—the Sino-Soviet breach is finally healed? And, thereafter, at what point a new eruption occurs at Berlin or some other pressure point of potential universal conflict?

These are questions, Mr. President, which General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker are not equipped and ought not to be required to answer from Vietnam. They are questions which Secretary McNamara ought not to be expected to answer on the basis of a visit to Saigon. Yet, they are questions of great relevance, along with reports of "progress" toward our "objectives," in any decisions involving Vietnam. They are questions for all of us.

Quite apart from the answers, may I say, the very pertinence of the questions suggests to me the need for the greatest restraint in any further increases in the American involvement in South Vietnam or in any expansion of that conflict beyond its present geographic dimensions. Indeed, the very pertinence of these questions urges a renewed effort to reduce the present level of American involvement. In this connection, I would refer once again to the recent proposal of the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] to limit bombing in the north to areas of immediate relevance to the infiltration of supplies and men across the 17th parallel into the south. I would refer once again to the proposal to concentrate a military effort on the construction of a defensive barrier just south of the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel across Laos to the border of Thailand which can be held by South Vietnamese forces. And I would refer once again to the suggestion that this Nation move to have the U.N. Security Council regard the situation in Vietnam at least with the equivalent concern which it shows for the Middle East. We owe it to the Americans whom we have sent to Vietnam, to ourselves, to the Vietnamese, and to the world, to try to bring about a face-to-face confrontation of all involved in Vietnam at the U.N. Security Council.

We need to continue this initiative, based on the U.S. resolution before the U.N. Security Council since January 1966, so that the world may know what kind of peace is sought and by whom. We need to continue this initiative in order

that no stone may be left unturned in the effort to bring about a cease-fire and honorable settlement of this ugly war.

We cannot and should not withdraw. We should not and, I hope, will not enlarge the war in Vietnam against the north. The most important question which confronts this Nation at this point is not the Middle East. It is not domestic policies. It is the situation in Vietnam. That will continue to be the case and all else will be subordinate until this conflict can be ended in a fashion which preserves the integrity of political choice of the people of South Vietnam.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I have listened very carefully, but without any great degree of optimism, to the remarks of the majority leader of the Senate.

It is unfortunate, Mr. President, that the advice of the majority leader has not been accepted by the administration to the same degree as the advice of certain military leaders who have far more knowledge of weapons than they have of people.

I have no particular use for Monday morning quarterbacks, although I recognize there is a great opportunity for their talents in consideration of the situation in Vietnam. I am getting letters now from people who once thought that a short foray into North Vietnam by our planes would bring the war to an early close. Their excuse for not winning the war is that it has not been wide enough, it has not been intense enough, and now they go so far as to say we should, if necessary, destroy all of North Vietnam's resources. What they apparently mean is that we should use the atom bomb.

I do not know whether they have thought through well enough the effect of such action; whether they have considered that our position in history, if we used the atom bomb in North Vietnam, would be more glorious or not, assuming that history is permitted to continue—and it can be destroyed. But I do hope that they are considering the cost. When you talk of dollars and cents, they really understand that.

I suppose Secretary McNamara will be back very shortly from his trip to South Vietnam. I expect that he will recommend intensification and probably some increase in armed services personnel in that part of the world. But before expanding—whether he recommends expansion or not—we should consider whether we are willing to pay the cost.

Senator MANSFIELD and I were told by the highest military authorities what we have in Vietnam, that it takes 10 regulars to cope with one guerrilla. I do not know how much of the opposition over there is in organized units and how much is in the form of guerrillas. I think it is safe to say there are 50,000 or 100,000 who would qualify as guerrillas still operating in Vietnam. Multiply that by 10 and you find that no insignificant number of our forces can cope with them. Even half a million cannot cope with them. Probably a million might be able to control the situation and restore a semblance of order in South Vietnam itself.

We hear that the administration now

says we must have a tax increase to meet these additional costs. They have already moved around figures relating to the financial condition of our Government until they really cannot move any further without a tax increase. They talk about a 6-percent increase. More recently we heard it might go to 10 percent. People who know Government financing say it will require an 18- to 20-percent surtax on the income taxes of this country to meet the additional costs which have been incurred over in Southeastern Asia.

I would like to ask these people who are so free with their advice as to what we should do over there, and who suggest exterminating North Vietnam, whether they would be willing to impose the additional taxes needed, whether they would be willing to remove their own tax benefits, particularly those who are making untold millions of dollars out of furnishing supplies and operations for our wars. Are they willing to have wage and price controls imposed, which, if we are to have an increase in the war effort, must come?

They talk about inflation, about only a 2- to 3-percent inflation over the past year or so, or maybe 3 or 4 percent. The inflation has come in the things which the people have to have, and the only reason why the percentage is held down is that included in that estimate of the inflationary gain—or loss, I would call it—are all the things they do not have to have. But if you are sick today, if you have a child needing an education, if you need a home, you will find the cost has gone up 20 percent, rather than 2 percent, the last year or so.

I have no advice to give the administration. They would not take it if I gave it. So what is the use of wasting my breath?

I do not think it was a smart move that we made in Africa. I was very much interested that on this floor statements were made in which they got good advice from people far better advised in military tactics than I am. I hope they will use reason.

I would like to see someone in our Government admit making a mistake. It would make him a big person. I have often thought that anyone in a high position in Government ought to make one mistake so he can admit it and gain or regain the respect of the people.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont for his frankness as well as his kind remarks.

May I express the hope that we will continue to ask ourselves questions, be aware of the potentials and the possibilities involved in that area of the world, and compare them with our own vital interests.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we may proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I respectfully commend the able senior

Senator from Montana, our majority leader, for his thought-provoking talk this morning. With most of it I agree; with some I do not.

It is unfortunate to hear the casual way people often discuss indiscriminate bombing. The concept of air power, as recommended, is against meaningful military targets only, and does not involve destruction of towns. The basic idea behind those who believe in Air Force and naval air is that the more artillery and guns destroyed by the Air Force and the Navy in North Vietnam, the fewer Americans will be killed in South Vietnam.

I was saddened to hear the Senator from Vermont, in discussing this matter a few moments ago, talk about the fact people who do not believe in turning this entire war over to ground forces could be people who want to drop the atom bomb in Vietnam. I have heard no military man, at any time, recommend the dropping of the atom bomb in this Vietnamese war.

What we are becoming steadily more involved in today is a major ground war in Asia. If we would utilize—on military targets only—our airpower and seapower, we would have far better results than we are having, or would have if we turned the entire war over to ground forces.

Nobody has greater respect for the Army and Marine Corps than I. On the other hand, it has been proved by the history of past wars that have been successful—far more successful than any results we have achieved to date in Vietnam—that a team of land, sea, and air is far more effective in modern engagement than employing ground forces alone.

Let those who apparently have no faith in airpower, used only on military targets, bear with me in the telling of just one story.

In December 1965, at a U.S. base, a bird colonel said to me, "I am a Regular, proud to fight for my country. But I don't see why I do it under all these restrictions. Several times a week I fly in a multimillion-dollar airplane, in order to bomb an empty barracks or an empty bus."

One year later, I was back at that same base, and asked, "How is my friend Colonel Nelson? Has he gone home, or is he still here?"

The reply was, "No, he got his on his 77th mission, attacking one truck."

It is unfortunate that some people do not realize, if you attack, say, a powerplant in North Vietnam, the casualties to the North Vietnamese would be very few—probably not more than a half dozen people.

Anyone who understands a powerplant operation knows that to be true. But the attack might save many American lives in South Vietnam.

On the other hand, for a great many months, pilots of the Navy and Air Force have been allowed to conduct armed reconnaissance. They can go up a road where a bus is moving and destroy it. They have no idea, of course, whether in that bus are soldiers or schoolchildren.

Rules and regulations governing the action of a single pilot in a single-engine

airplane have run as long as seven pages listing what he cannot do. The whole concept of the proper utilization of airpower and seapower, at times, I am sure, inadvertently, is being misstated and becoming misty. We are getting away from any team concept of land, sea, and air, and asking the ground forces to do it all. Mr. President, as stated before, no one has greater respect for the Army and Marine Corps than I, but even if we had a million men in South Vietnam, instead of the half million we approximate today, we would get no further than we have pursuing these unfortunate policies. The trouble is not in North Vietnam; the trouble is primarily with the people in South Vietnam.

Therefore, Mr. President, I hope we do not make this war from here out only a major ground war on the mainland of Asia, which the great military—such as Marshall and MacArthur—have warned against during all this century. It would be far more logical with that premise, to turn it all over to the South Vietnamese Army, not the U.S. Army. But what I do not understand is why anybody would think the poor South Vietnamese would fight any better behind this proposed Maginot line below the demilitarized zone than they have in the rest of their country.

Why not face it? From here out it is the American forces that must do a steadily increasing amount of the fighting if the present South Vietnam Government is to survive.

I thank my beloved friend, the majority leader, for yielding.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Missouri for his frank remarks, to which I have listened with interest. It is evident that there are some matters upon which we disagree, but that is one of the strengths of a democracy, and one of the strengths of the Senate, as I see it, as an institution.

I may some day go into further detail about this barrier below the 17th parallel, because I certainly am in disagreement, to put it mildly, with the thesis advanced by the Senator from Missouri this morning. But it gives us something to think about.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would only say that perhaps there are things about this proposed barrier which the Senator from Montana knows that I do not know.

For 15 years I have been a member of the Committee on Armed Services; and for many years a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. There has been no testimony before either committee with respect to any such "barrier." All I know about it is what I read in the newspapers. One gets a bit tired of obtaining military information from the newspapers instead of even in executive sessions with the proper persons from the Department of Defense and State as witnesses.

I know the able majority leader agrees with me on that, and am glad that on many other subjects, such as reduction of our troops in Europe, we are together. It is always a privilege to be together with him in any matter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I may say to the

Senator from Missouri that my information comes only from the public prints; I have no inside "dope."

CVN/cc

cc: Mr. Narasimhan
✓ Mr. Lemieux
Registry

20 December 1967

Dear Mr. Gruening,

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 16 October 1967 to which was attached the text of a speech concerning Viet-Nam delivered by you in the United States Senate. I thank you for having sent me this documentation.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

The Honourable Ernest Gruening
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

ENCLOSURE

ERNEST GRUENING
ALASKA

HOME ADDRESS:
Box 1001
JUNEAU, ALASKA

GEORGE SUNDBORG
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

HERBERT W. BEASER
DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 16, 1967

mm *Dangcard*
cm

18/XII/67

Dear Friend:

I am sending you, as one deeply interested in ending the war in Vietnam, a reprint from the CONGRESSIONAL record for September 26, 1967. In it there appears an analysis, prepared by Mr. Alfred Hassler, Executive Secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, of the peace sentiment among the South Vietnamese, as revealed by the recent elections.

In a forthcoming book entitled "Vietnam Folly", co-authored by my Legislative Director, Herb Beaser, and myself, the story of how the United States became involved in Vietnam is fully documented and a "third alternative" for peace in Vietnam is proposed.

This proposal for a "third alternative" is now buttressed by the enclosed election analysis and by the continuing protests in South Vietnam against both the elections and the perpetuation of the war-endorsing Thieu-Ky government. The recently announced alliance between the Buddhists, the six defeated presidential "peace" candidates, and the demonstrating students and intellectuals indicate not only the intensity of the Vietnamese peoples' desire for peace but also point to a reasonable way for the United States to withdraw from continued involvement in the war.

If the bombing of North Vietnam were stopped and the inhibiting effects of United States over-whelming military power were withdrawn, the South Vietnamese would very quickly replace the Thieu-Ky government with a government more representative of their desires for peace. Such a government could then call for an immediate cease-fire and negotiate a peace with the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese. The new civilian government would negotiate for an immediate United States military withdrawal, since there would be no further need for a United States police presence.

The enclosed reprint is sent to you because, as a community leader, you can help build public support for this "third alternative" for peace in Vietnam. Such public support is essential if our government is to be moved in this direction.

With all best wishes, I am

Cordially yours,

Ernest Gruening
ERNEST GRUENING, U.S.S.

(Not printed at Government expense)

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

The Fraudulent South Vietnam Election

SPEECH

OF

HON. ERNEST GRUENING

OF ALASKA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, September 26, 1967

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the much publicized South Vietnamese election of September 3, 1967, should be carefully scrutinized.

The news of the arrest of former Finance Minister Au Truong Thanh merely because he had requested permission to leave the country only serves to point out once again how undemocratic is the regime in Saigon. Thanh had twice served as Minister of Economy and Finance under Generals Thieu and Ky, but had been denied a place on the September 3, 1967, ballot because he wanted to run as a peace candidate. It is still a crime in South Vietnam to advocate peace or neutrality.

The foundation for the September 3, 1967, elections for president, vice president, and members of the Senate was laid in the Declaration of Honolulu of February 8, 1966, in which the so-called Government of South Vietnam pledged "to formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including an electoral law; to take that constitution to our people for discussion and modification; "to seek its ratification by secret ballot; to create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government."

In the months that followed, the first three pledges were quietly dropped. Instead, it was determined to elect a con-

stituent assembly which, in turn, would adopt a constitution subject to veto by the military junta governing South Vietnam—or at least that part of South Vietnam not controlled by the Vietcong.

Those permitted to run for membership in the Constituent Assembly were handpicked by the military junta. In an excellent analysis of the recent elections in South Vietnam by Mr. Alfred Hassler, able executive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the election of members of the Constituent Assembly is described as follows:

Rules for the elections were set up by the Constituent Assembly, which in turn was elected in September, 1966. That election was so characterized by manipulation and fraud that the Buddhist leadership, whose actions had forced the elections to be held, publicly called for an election boycott. Here, too, public figures known to stand for peace or neutralism, as well as NLF supporters, were barred from becoming candidates, and American reporters noted that campaign speeches made no references to the war and government corruption, the two principal issues in the public mind.

Thus the Constituent Assembly was composed of members none of whom were permitted to advocate peace or neutrality and who were elected by a constituency from which potential voters with similar ideas were excluded.

Under the watchful eyes of the military junta, the Constituent Assembly drafted a Constitution from which all mention of land reform was excluded.

The Constitution was never submitted even to the limited electorate for discussion, modification, and its ratification by secret ballot—as was promised at

Honolulu. Certain decisions by the Constituent Assembly with respect to the September 3 election assured the election of the Thieu-Ky ticket.

First, the election of the President and Vice President was to be by a mere plurality and not by a majority of the votes cast, thus obviating any possibility of a runoff. Second, two strong peace candidates who wanted to run were ruled off the ballot, in obedience to the wishes of the military junta.

Before the elections, it was announced in Saigon, with much fanfare, that censorship of the press had ceased. However, analysis of the actions taken indicated that actually the penalties for printing news displeasing to the military junta were increased: instead of deleting offensive material before publication, the newspapers published on pain of having the entire issue destroyed. A few days before the elections, the publication of one newspaper deemed unfriendly to the Thieu-Ky government was suspended completely.

The election—thus rigged in advance—took place on September 3, 1967. Mr. Alfred Hassler's analysis of the election results, already referred to, shows clearly that—

The people of South Vietnam, against immense obstacles, have shown unmistakably that they favor the end of the war through a cease-fire and negotiations with the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that the thoughtful analysis of the South Vietnamese elections, prepared by Mr. Alfred Hassler, executive secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the analysis was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PEACE AND THE VIETNAM ELECTIONS

The September 3 elections, though characterized by extensive manipulation and fraud, revealed the overwhelming desire for peace

on the part of the South Vietnamese population.

On September 3 the voters of South Vietnam elected a President, a Vice-President, and a Senate, under their new constitution. Both the Constitution and the elections were a response to the insistent agitation of the "militant" Buddhists of South Vietnam, who have long made plain their dissatisfaction with the governing military junta and their longing for an end to the war.

General Nguyen Van Thieu, the present chairman of the military junta, was elected President, and General Nguyen Gao Ky, the present premier, Vice President. Spokesmen for the Johnson administration have hailed the elections as a significant step toward democratic self-government.

The elections were highly significant, but not in the terms that the Administration would like us to believe. What they demonstrated, against enormous obstacles, was the overwhelming desire on the part of the Vietnamese people for an end to the war. Any Americans who still believe that the United States is fighting on behalf of the South Vietnamese people should find in the results of the elections reasons for sober rethinking.

The Results

There were eleven sets of candidates for the Presidential and Vice Presidential offices: one military and ten civilian. The results were as follows:

Ticket	Total vote	Percent
Nguyen Van Thieu-Nguyen Gao Ky.....	1,638,902	35
Truong Dinh Dzu-Tran Van Chieu.....	800,285	17
Phan Khac Suu-Phan Quang Dan.....	502,732	11
Tran Van Huong-Mai Tho Truyen.....	464,638	10
Ha Thuc Ky-Nguyen Van Dinh.....	346,573	7
Nguyen Dinh Quat-Tran Cuu Chan.....	315,329	7
Nguyen Van Hiep-Nguyen The Truyen.....	158,498	3
Vu Hong Khanh-Duong Trung Dong.....	148,652	3
Hoang Co Binh-Lieu Quang Khinh.....	129,429	3
Pham Huy Co-Ly Quoc Sinh.....	106,388	2
Tran Van Ly-Huynh-Cong Duong.....	91,887	2
Total.....	4,703,313	100

WERE THE ELECTIONS FAIR?

The South Vietnamese government invited numerous "observers" to witness the elections and attest to their honesty. Some were individuals; some were representatives of governments. Of some 63 observers, 22 constituted a team sent by President Johnson, headed by former ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. (Lodge had already, during his incum-

bency in Vietnam, demonstrated his objectivity by calling for the election of the generals.)

The American observers reported to the President that the elections had been "reasonably fair." They pointed to the fact that 83% of the registered voters had actually voted, as compared with 63% in the last Presidential election in this country. One observer said that the absence of fraud had been demonstrated by General Thieu's failure to get more than 34.8% of the vote: fraud, he said, would have produced a much larger total. (Mr. Dzu, who came in second, said that without fraud Thieu would have got only 10%.)

The report of the observers is virtually meaningless. Few, if any, of them, spoke Vietnamese, so that they were dependent on government-provided interpreters. Visits anywhere outside the city of Saigon are dependent on the army and government officials, which allows for any necessary advance "arrangements" to be made easily.

Vietnamese opposed to the Ky-Thieu government warned before the elections that observers would not see the frauds, and that the only purpose they would serve would be to validate an invalid election. An election official declared to a reporter from the *National Catholic Reporter*: "That he expected to cheat, and that 'you could send 10,000 observers—they never know... In the villages soldiers will fire guns in the air one kilometer away. They will say VC attack. People will not come to vote. The official, he will correct their vote anyway. He will count 1-2-3-4-41-42-43-56...'"

He went on to explain that the report of the balloting is written up in the evening by the senior election official (a Ky appointee), and the ballots then destroyed.

But even if the balloting had been scrupulously honest, the fact would be largely irrelevant. So much had been done before the balloting to assure victory for the Thieu-Ky ticket that fraud on election day may not have been needed.

WHO VOTED?

The 83% who reportedly voted were 83% of the registered voters, not of the population. Excluded were (1) all those living in "insecure" areas, which means areas con-

trolled by the National Liberation Front (Vietcong), and (2) all voters who were considered "unreliable," which in South Vietnam means people believed to be supporters of the NLF, or to stand for peace or neutralism, which are considered to be synonymous with communism. Novak reported that in a random sampling of Saigon students he found that three out of eight families had been disqualified and not allowed to vote. Thus the enormous "peace vote" becomes even more significant, since the government had already tried to exclude those most likely to vote in this manner. By the American government's own figures (W. P. Bundy, *New York Times*, 9/8/67), 70% of South Vietnam's potential electorate were registered, so that approximately 56% voted. But this really means that the number of ballots reported amounted to 56% of the number of citizens of voting age. (This must be considered against the pre-election charge—and admission—that many soldiers had been given two voting cards each, that some civilian candidates charged that registration had leaped upward in certain remote regions just before elections, and that Mr. Dzu, who came in second, reported that only 10% of the voters in one district had come to the polls but a 90% vote had been recorded.) Thus, even if the balloting itself was strictly honest, Generals Thieu and Ky were elected by the votes of 34% of 56% of the electorate, or a total of 19% of South Vietnam's citizens of voting age.

ELECTED BY PLURALITY

Rules for the elections were set up by the Constituent Assembly, which in turn was elected in September, 1966. That election was so characterized by manipulation and fraud that the Buddhist leadership, whose actions had forced the elections to be held, publicly called for an election boycott. Here, too, public figures known to stand for peace or neutralism, as well as NLF supporters, were barred from becoming candidates, and American reporters noted that campaign speeches made no references to the war and government corruption, the two principal issues in the public mind.

Shortly after that election, a member of the Assembly widely considered to be a possible leader of peace sentiment, Tran Van Van, was assassinated. The government arrested and immediately executed a young

¹ Michael Novak, September 6, 1967.

man charged with being the assassin, and reported that he had been a Viet Cong terrorist. Shortly after, the government suspended publication of the *Vietnam Guardian*, an influential English-language Saigon newspaper, for reporting the widespread belief that the assassin actually had been a government agent.

The Assembly therefore, despite occasional flashes of independence, has been subservient to the government.

Its first major demonstration of that subservience was the agreement that the Presidential election would be decided by plurality (more votes than any other candidate's) rather than by majority (more than half the votes cast), and that therefore no run-off election need be held.

This decision was followed by a proliferation of civilian candidates, reportedly encouraged by the government and pressure by the military junta on General Ky (then a Presidential candidate) to take the Vice Presidential nomination under Thieu so that there would be only one military ticket to contest the election with a number of civilian tickets.

CANDIDATES OFF THE BALLOT

The second demonstration of subservience came with the Assembly's ruling off the ballot, in late July, the two candidates most likely to give the generals real trouble. These were General Duong Van Minh and Mr. Au Truong Thanh.

General Minh, though living in exile in Thailand, is one of South Vietnam's most popular figures. He announced his candidacy, and in its first vote the Assembly approved it. But General Ky refused to permit Minh to return to Vietnam to campaign, and in its second meeting the Assembly obediently removed him from the ballot.

Au Truong Thanh, a highly respected economist, had served in three South Vietnam cabinets, including General Ky's, from which he had resigned in protest this past spring. He announced his candidacy on a straight peace platform, with a crossed-out bomb as his symbol and "cease-fire" as his slogan. He, too, was first approved and then removed from the ballot by the Assembly, after the Ky police had announced that Thanh was a "Communist".

At the same time, the Assembly meekly revoked a ruling of its own committee deny-

ing Thieu and Ky a place on the ballot because they had refused to resign their government positions as required of all candidates by the Constitution, and had even refused to appear before the committee to defend themselves. The Assembly, acutely conscious of the loud and heavily armed presence of national police head General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, voted to put Thieu and Ky on the ballot.

CENSORSHIP

It is a truism that free elections are not possible in the absence of freedom of speech and of the press. In South Vietnam, censorship of the press has been so blatant as to have embarrassed even the U.S. Embassy, which reportedly brought heavy pressure on the Ky government to eliminate at least its most obvious manifestations: large white spaces appearing regularly on the pages of Vietnamese newspapers where the censor had bodily removed whole articles found offensive to the government. Other newspapers were suspended, and General Ky warned that any criticism of his government would be regarded as support for the enemy.

Shortly before the elections, the Thieu-Ky government announced the end of censorship; then, on the day before the election, General Thieu announced the suspension "for an indefinite period" of *Than Chung*, one of Saigon's most widely circulated newspapers and very much pro-peace, and a smaller paper, *Sang*. General Thieu explained that "even in a democracy one has a right to suspend newspapers that support totalitarians"—a charge that the publisher emphatically denied.

Even without the overt censorship, however, the press has literally taken its life in its hands with even the mildest criticism of the government or support of opposition to it. Allocation of newsprint is determined by the government, and newspaper publishers tempted to get "out of line" know how easily their businesses can be closed.

Thus very little appeared in the press about the positions or even identity of opposition candidates, while the papers were constantly filled with the statements and activities of the existing government.

CAMPAIGNING

The "rules" provided that candidates could not begin campaigning before August 1, General Ky, insisting that other candidates ad-

here rigidly to this rule, himself began campaigning openly and vigorously in June. Civilian candidates complained even after August 1 of continued harassment; most of them were not able even to visit many areas where the generals had organizations operating; Thieu-Ky posters blanketed the villages. Many Vietnamese did not even know who was running, much less what they stood for.

THE PEACE ISSUE

I have reported before (Congressional Record of May 4, 1967, p. 4) that my visits last winter to South Vietnam had convinced me of the truth of the assertions by Thich Nhat Hanh in his book² and elsewhere: (1) that the overwhelming desire of the South Vietnamese people is for peace, and (2) that there is a significant and vital peace movement coalesced around the Buddhist LaBoi and Catholic Song Dao movements. Their position is that it is only American military and economic pressure that keeps the Ky-Thieu government in power and the war continuing. Left to themselves, they say, they would form a genuinely representative government that would proceed at once to end the bombing, call for a cease-fire and proceed to negotiations for peace with the NLF and the North Vietnamese, and for military withdrawal with the United States.

The elections testify to the reality of this sentiment:

(1) The Thieu-Ky ticket was expected to get at least 40-50% of the vote, and probably more than half. General Thieu himself had said it would be difficult to govern with a vote of less than 40%. He actually received, in spite of all the advantages he had, 34.8%. *Even to get this, Thieu was compelled by the peace statements of other candidates to say, as campaigning was drawing to an end, that if elected he would initiate a bombing pause and negotiations with representatives of the NLF.*

(2) The three candidates next in order (Dzu, Suu and Huong) all had announced for peace. Together they polled 38% of the vote.

(3) Only one of the civilian tickets (Co-Sinh) supported the war and called for invasion of the north. It came in next to last,

with a total of only 106,000 out of 4,700,000 votes cast. Thus the total anti-Thieu vote on the peace issue was approximately 2 to 1.

(4) With General Minh and Au Truong Thanh out, the experts had expected Tran Van Huong to run second to the generals, with Phan Khac Suu a possible close third. Both Huong and Suu are fairly well known, both having served as premier since the days of President Diem. Both men came out for peace in their platforms, but without much in the way of specifics.

But actually in second place, with 800,000 votes, was a Saigon lawyer, Truong Dinh Dzu, whose candidacy had been regarded as a joke by the experts. A Saigon lawyer, he had no national reputation except for having been jailed during the Diem regime for allegedly passing a bad check. But Dzu took a flat-footed peace stand not unlike that formerly taken by Au Truong Thanh, and criticized the Thieu-Ky government caustically for its prosecution of the war and for the corruption it had tolerated.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The people of South Vietnam, against immense obstacles, have shown unmistakably that they favor the end of the war through a cease-fire and negotiations with the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam. Even U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker declared: "It represents the desire of the country, of everyone, for peace."

2. If there were provision for a run-off election among the top winners, it is beyond doubt that they would elect a government that would end the war.

3. It is the United States that has maintained and presumably will maintain the Thieu-Ky government in power, and will continue the war.

4. The peace issue has been brought out in the open to such an extent that the Thieu-Ky government, with American support, may be expected to make some "peace moves", possibly including a new bombing "pause". But a "pause" is not the same thing as a "halt." Stop the bombing unconditionally, have said UN Secretary-General U Thant and the heads of the Soviet Union, and peace talks will begin shortly. But a pause, with resumption of the bombing and explicit or implicit threat, becomes an ultimatum, and warring powers do not accept ultimatums.

² "Vietnam: Lotus In A Sea of Fire", Hill & Wang, 1967. \$1.50.

In this and other ways, the "peace moves" of the new government are almost certain to be put in terms that will be unacceptable to the other side.

This will then make it possible for the Thieu-Ky-Johnson axis to announce piously that it has made every effort to end the war, but that the other side is unwilling to cooperate. This, in turn, will become the rationalization for continuation and escalation of the war.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

There is no easy way out of the impasse the United States is in, but more of the same promises only further tragedy. Responsibility of Americans is first to recognize the facts, and second to insist that our government act according to those facts.

Both supporters of American policy and its opponents insist on their desire that the Vietnamese be allowed to determine their own destiny. The elections reveal what that determination would be: peace. Those who are the spokesmen of the peace movement insist that only the total, unqualified support by the United States of the Thieu-Ky government prevents its replacement.

Therefore the United States must say that it stands for the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese, including their right to replace the Thieu-Ky government: that the elections reveal that an overwhelming majority want a different government; and that American military and economic support will be discontinued unless an opportunity is given for the honest and full expression of that will.

Then let the Vietnamese take it from there.

ADDED NOTE—THE SENATE

The news that the new 60-member Senate will be dominated by 35 Catholic members—though Catholics number only 10% of the population—may seem to cast doubt on the foregoing analysis. It does not in fact. The Senate election was a monstrosity of complexity, that lent itself partly to the "lottery" description given it by Premier Ky, and partly to management by a disciplined minority.

It was the latter that triumphed for the Catholics. With 60 members to elect, each voter was given 48 cards, each with a slate of 10 names on it—a total of 480 candidates, most of them not known, all of them unread-

able to the large number of illiterate voters. The Catholic Church, dominated in Saigon by the large northern refugee group, chose six slates; each pastor instructed his congregation which to vote for. Contributing to the effectiveness of this strategy was the fact that the three Senatorial slates supported by the Buddhists had been removed from the ballot, so that there was no coherent counterpressure from the Buddhists, who make up the vast majority of the population.

The danger here is that this domination of the Senate by representatives of the minority Catholics will renew the harsh hostilities between Catholics and Buddhists, which thoughtful leaders on both sides had been patiently reducing during the past two years. The situation is worsened—and made to look more sinister—by the release from prison by the Ky government of most of the imprisoned Diemist leaders just before the election. This action filled the Buddhists with apprehension, which is not likely to be reduced by the presence of some of these men in the Senate.

Must American Boys Continue To Die To Keep Saigon Police State in Power?

SPEECH

OF

HON. ERNEST GRUENING

OF ALASKA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Monday, September 25, 1967

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the leading editorial of the Washington Post this morning is entitled "Retrogression in Saigon." In it, the comment is made that the recent midnight raid and subsequent arrest and detention of former Finance Minister Thanh for 18 hours "did not quite jibe with that glowing firsthand report of the President's special commission gave us of democracy burgeoning bravely in a war-torn land."

There has been no retrogression in Saigon.

The Government of South Vietnam was a police state before the rigged elections of September 3, 1967.

The rigged elections changed nothing. Many of us pointed that out here on the floor on August 11, 1967.

The stage was set well before September 3 with the props all in place—the strictly controlled press, the careful screening of candidates, with the complete elimination from participation of popular candidates who posed too great a threat to the military junta—the eligible electorate screened with equal care—duplicate ballots given to the military. Then the curtain was drawn and the President's commission was permitted to watch where, and when only to the extent permitted by the military junta.

The surprise of the Washington Post that with such careful rigging of the election in South Vietnam "instant democracy" did not result from the September 3 elections is really what is surprising.

What else could be expected?

It is to be hoped that the Washington Post will call its editorial to the attention of some of its columnists who seem to be living in a "never-never" land, oblivious to the facts of life.

The Washington Post expresses the hope that the Government in Saigon "continue to try to advance, rather than retard, some measure of political reform." It warns that without such reforms, "the generals should be on notice that our war effort may suffer, in turn, from an erosion of popular support at home."

I agree with that warning but must point out that all signs indicate that the tide of that erosion grows stronger daily. The question may well be asked: "Must American boys continue to die for that Saigon gang?"

Well, I am asking it. More than 13,000 have already been killed in combat, and 100,000 wounded, many of them crippled for life—blinded, armless, legless, paralyzed. It is positively disgraceful that we continue to pretend we are instilling

democracy down there, and sacrificing our boys wantonly for that illicit purpose.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the *RECORD* the editorial entitled "Retrogression in Saigon," published in the Washington Post of September 25, 1967.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAMMAGE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

RETROGRESSION IN SAIGON

That was some sample, the other day, of the new look in South Vietnamese politics that was supposed to have been ushered in by the presidential elections early this month. Gun-toting policemen rampaging through the home of former Finance Minister Thanh and terrifying his small children, knocks on the door at midnight and summary arrests on the street, newsmen roughed up and cameramen robbed of their film—somehow it didn't quite jibe with that glowing first-hand report the President's special commission gave us of democracy burgeoning bravely in a war-torn land. Apparently the ruling military clique now believes that with this clean bill in hand on their conduct of the actual voting, anything goes.

They should be told, in no uncertain terms, that it does not. The release of Mr. Thanh after 18 hours of detention on charges of "Communist connections" cannot erase the record of systematic, strong-arm tactics against a man who many responsible American officials have pronounced to be one of the ablest and most effective leaders in all of South Vietnam. It was bad enough to bar him from candidacy in the election as a "neutralist" or "pro-Communist" in the first place. His release from custody confirms the strong impression that this was always a trumped-up case. This outrage is only compounded by his recent manhandling which must also be read in the context of the swift jailing, on corruption charges, of Mr. Du, the "peace" candidate, who was allowed to run in the election and had the audacity to give the winner, General Thieu, an uncomfortably close race.

Perhaps the Administration should have been a touch more restrained in its effusive efforts to pronounce the vote as something

of a triumph for representative government, for the findings of the President's study group could not have been expected to take into account the effects of police-state rough stuff which preceded the vote, of the press censorship, of the backstage manipulations to determine who could and could not run. Already press censorship is tightening again. The spirit of "reconciliation," which was so much a part of the winners' campaign oratory, does not seem to be much in evidence now.

It would be quite unreasonable, of course, to expect the generals to mend their ways in a month. And it was never realistic to

think that one election could transform the character of Vietnamese politics or alter a power structure which inevitably makes the military much the most potent single force.

But is it not too much to expect that the newly elected government continue to try to advance, rather than retard, some measure of political reform. Our war effort depends in no small part on the new Saigon government's efforts to establish a strong, popular base. If these South Vietnamese efforts are not forthcoming, the generals should be on notice that our war effort may suffer, in turn, from an erosion of popular support at home.

278-718-9812

11 January 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 8 January with which you sent a copy of the summary of evidence concerning Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory which was presented to the Cambodian Government in conjunction with the United States note of December 4, 1967. I appreciate your having sent me this information. I note that this summary has not been made public.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. William B. Buffum
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States
to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

cc: Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Lemieux ✓

THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

January 8, 1968


His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary General
of the United Nations
New York

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I understand from Ambassador Pedersen that you indicated an interest in seeing the summary of evidence concerning Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory which was presented to the Cambodian Government in conjunction with the United States note of December 4, 1967.

I am, therefore, enclosing a copy of that summary for your information. I believe that Ambassador Pedersen already mentioned to you that this summary has not been made public.

Sincerely yours,



William B. Buffum
Ambassador

UN-3418/116

6 March 1968

Dear Mr. Tamayo,

The Secretary-General has asked me to thank you for sending him Senator Gore's address at the University of Idaho, Senators Mansfield's and Long's statements and the final version of the "Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents". He has read them with interest.

Yours sincerely,

Estella Mira
Secretary to the
Secretary-General

Mr. Marcial Tamayo, Director
United Nations Information Centre
1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Information Centre, Washington, D.C., 20006

1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

296-5370

28 February 1968

Dear Mrs. Mira:

.... In compliance with Mr. Narasimhan's request, I am sending you herewith, the official transcript of Senator Gore's address delivered at the University of Idaho, as ordered to be printed in the Congressional Record upon the request of Senator Church.

.... I am also enclosing, for the Secretary-General's information, copies of Senators Mansfield's and Long's statements as an aftermath of the Secretary-General's visit to Washington.

.... A final version of the "Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 // Kupt. Incidents" is also enclosed.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "M. Tamayo".

Marcial Tamayo, Director
United Nations Information Centre
Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Estella Mira, Secretary
to the Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, New York 10017

*Read with thanks.
Pl. ack. mission.
5/2/68*

he and his fellow committeemen were expected to come up with a plan by Dec. 31, which is the date the CIA expects to cut off its covert subsidies. "But I guess," said Fulbright yesterday, "that deadline has been dropped."

DEADLOCK REPORTED

A third explanation for the position in which the committee finds itself at Christmastime is that it is hopelessly deadlocked over what should be done.

This is denied by Rose, Eisenhower and men in the Administration who prefer anonymity. Fulbright, however, reports that there are rather substantial disagreements and Young has heard rumors to the same effect.

One faction, "highly oriented toward the military," as Fulbright puts it, is represented by three House members on the committee—George Mahon (D-Texas), L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), and Frank Bow (R-Ohio). They favor the inexpensive Plan 1 (about \$5 million a year) which would be administered by State.

Fulbright, Eisenhower and Rose favor the more ambitious Plan 4 which would involve new funds of about \$25 million a year, would extend subsidies to groups presently unsubsidized, and would take over some of the cultural and information programs presently administered by State, USIA, and AID.

Schultze, presumably speaking for the President and Rusk, favors Plan 3, and does not favor taking any programs away from existing agencies.

Plan 3 would be cheaper than Plan 4 and for that reason Rose is willing to go along with it "in view of the budget squeeze."

In reply, the Administration says money is no problem.

The panel, in any case has come to no decision which means that some of the CIA's secret beneficiaries may begin the New Year with pinched budgets.

"But there's no real problem," says Dr. Rose. "All we have to do is sit down and come to a conclusion."

That effort will be made again in January.

THE FIVE OUTSTANDING YOUNG MEN OF MARYLAND

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, each year, junior chamber of commerce chapters throughout Maryland select the five outstanding young men of the year. Each of these men is the recipient of the outstanding young man or distinguished service award in his own community.

Selection is based on achievements in his business or profession as well as service to his community. The quality of these accomplishments is demonstrated in the sketches of each nominee contained in the program of the final awards banquet.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the descriptive sketches of the five outstanding young men of Maryland be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the sketches were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Thomas E. Embree, Greater Elkton, age 21, Instructor, Service School Command, USNCTC, Bainbridge. In addition to his military duties, this young man finds time to serve his community and state. He is currently President of the Cecil County Council of P.T.A.s and has served as a member of the State Board of Managers of the Maryland Congress of Parents and Teachers. He was a member of the Policy Advisory Committee for the Headstart Project of the Cecil County Board of Education. He is a former vice president and international director of the Maryland Jay-

cees and was selected for inclusion in the 1968 edition of "Outstanding Young Men of America."

Werner H. Fornos, Annapolis, Age 34, Management Consultant, Werner Fornos and Associates. This newly elected representative in the Maryland House of Delegates ended his freshman session as a guiding force in the General Assembly. His work in the Ways and Means Committee and his political knowledge led to his appointment to the Legislative Council's Committee on Legislative Organization. He was selected as a delegate to the Maryland Constitutional Convention from Anne Arundel County and was cited as being among the progressive leaders of the Convention. He is finance chairman for the Committee for a Beautiful Annapolis, Chairman of the Promotion's Committee of the Annapolis Fine Arts Festival and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Davidsonville Methodist Church. In 1966, he was awarded the Distinguished Citizen's Award by the Governor of Maryland.

Michael P. Goodrich, Severna Park, Age 32, General Agent, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. The youngest general agent ever appointed by his company, Mike has many accomplishments to his credit in his young career. He is a member of the Million Dollar Roundtable for the fifth consecutive year and his company honors include the "Top Twenty" in production for the past two years. He received his CLU degree in 1967. Active in community life, he is the author of a five year development plan for the Pasadena Methodist Church. He holds a Local Minister designation in the Methodist Church. Mike is the president of the Folger McKinsey School P.T.A. and was the charter treasurer of the Severna Park Jaycees.

William D. Greene, Jr., Crescent Cities, Age 26, Supervisor, Program Planning Control Data Corporation. While keeping pace with his position and furthering his education, Bill is active in community service. He is a member of the Crescent City Jaycees and his performance has won for him every competitive award within the Jaycee organization. He is chairman of a building project to construct a 2½ million dollar sports park for the Boys' Clubs of Prince Georges County. The project won the Maryland Jaycee Community Development Award for 1967. Bill is president of the Prince George's Coordinating Council of Jaycee Chapters and in a short time has turned an almost defunct organization into an effective instrument of Jaycee activity. He is a supervisor of a group responsible for the Polaris training planning and has achieved status as one of the leaders in his career field.

Robert M. Lawrence, Salisbury, Age 35, President, Lawrence Volkswagen, Inc. A quiet, unassuming young man, Bob is one of the most active individuals in his community. In 1967, he conceived, coordinated, and underwrote the expense of a program to stimulate business in the community. Entitled "Business is Great in Salisbury," the program was very successful. It became a household phrase and boosted morale in the community. Bob was chairman of the 1967 Cancer Crusade in the county, chairman of the Industrial Development Committee of the Chamber of Commerce and a Director of the Delmarva YMCA. Active in the Faith Lutheran Church, Bob was chairman of the Building Fund Committee, and through his efforts and initiative, the church has a new building. He teaches in the Sunday School and is a member of the Church Council. In 1964, he purchased control of Lawrence Volkswagen, Inc. and was the youngest franchise operator in the United States.

FREE PRESS, FAIR TRIAL

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, yesterday, the American Bar Association,

meeting in Chicago, adopted new rules of conduct for lawyers and new procedures for judges designed to restrict the release of crime news to the press.

As a lawyer, and as a subcommittee chairman concerned not only with legal problems but also information problems, I feel compelled to urge a note of caution on this subject. The problem of balancing the first amendment—which guarantees a free press and free access to information—and the sixth amendment—which guarantees a fair trial—is certainly not an easy one. But neither is the problem a new one. The very same American Bar Association which yesterday adopted the new guidelines, many years earlier considered identical issues as a result of the famous Bruno Hauptmann-Lindbergh kidnaping case. Thus, as lawyers, we have lived with the delicate balance problem for a long time.

According to an article which appeared in this morning's New York Times, written by Fred P. Graham, the distinguished law editor of the Times:

The impact of (the ABA's) action will not be immediately apparent to newspaper readers across the country, because it amended only the rules of ethics of the national bar group and not those of state bar associations, which handle most lawyer discipline matters.

But, Mr. Graham suggests that the ABA approval is "expected to touch off a wave of similar actions by State bar associations."

Mr. President, a strong plea was raised by responsible representatives of the newspaper industry at yesterday's ABA meeting, to delay any action for 1 year. This request for delay, in my opinion, was not a dilatory tactic. Rather, it was based on a number of factors.

First, this country is experiencing a tragic and increasing crime wave. The function of a free press to inform the public of such a crime wave not only alerts us to the many dangers, but also keeps the responsible law enforcement officers on their toes. Additionally, often the report of capture of a heinous criminal relieves community tensions and dispels community fears.

Second, the American Newspaper Publishers Association is presently conducting a study of the effects of publicity on juries, and it would have been desirable for the results of this study to be available to the bar association members considering the current action.

A third valid reason for delaying the ABA action, in my opinion, is the fact that voluntary agreements have been worked out in several States by bar and press groups on the subject of pretrial and trial publicity. From what I understand, these agreements have been successful.

Accordingly, I can only express the hope that the State bar associations across this country, including my own bar association of the State of Missouri, will heed the pleas of the newspaper profession, and will not jump on the bandwagon of arbitrarily curtailing crime news.

At the Federal level, we have yet another aspect to this problem. On July 4, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Freedom of Information Act. As chairman of the Subcommittee on

Administrative Practice and Procedure, charged with legislative oversight of this act, I intend to continue to encourage Federal Government agencies to abide both by the spirit and letter of this Freedom of Information Act. Accordingly, I do not feel that it would be in the best interests of the American public at this time to adopt the ABA guidelines as the policy of the Federal Government. The Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure will hold hearings shortly to review the operations of the FOI Act. At that time, we will also consider the American Bar Association guidelines.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert, at this point in the RECORD, the article by Fred Graham.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NATIONAL BAR ADOPTS STANDARDS TO
CURB RELEASE OF CRIME NEWS
(By Fred P. Graham)

CHICAGO, February 19.—The American Bar Association approved today new rules of conduct for lawyers and new procedures for judges designed to restrict the release of crime news to the press.

It acted over the objections of news media officials who had warned that the move would hinder nonprejudicial press coverage and could prevent full public discussion of rising crime patterns.

The action was taken by the bar association's policy-making body, the House of Delegates, which today opened its two-day mid-winter meeting at the Palmer House here.

The House of Delegates voted overwhelmingly to adopt the recommendations of the controversial "Reardon Report."

The report is the product of a three-year study by the association's Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, headed by Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. It sets out detailed rules aimed at sharply curtailing the flow of information about arrested persons that is made available to the press in most communities.

The report was approved by a strong voice vote—only a few noes were heard—after the group voted 176 to 68 against a proposal by the news media to delay any action for a year.

The impact of today's action will not be immediately apparent to newspaper readers across the country, because it amended only the rules of ethics of the national bar group and not those of state bar organizations, which handle most lawyer discipline matters.

However, the approval is expected to touch off a wave of similar actions by state bar associations, which would mean that lawyers in these states could be disbarred if they gave the press more information than the new standards allow.

Also, much of the Reardon report consists of suggested rules for judges to follow in preventing the police and lawyers from giving what might be considered prejudicial information to the press, and in barring newsmen from certain hearings.

In most states, trial judges can adopt these rules on their own volition. Some have already done so, and now that the American Bar Association has given the rules its blessing, many more local judges are expected to put the news restrictions into effect despite opposition from local news media.

Today's action accomplishes four basic results.

First, it amends the Bar Association's canons of ethics, subject to the formality of drafting the exact wording, to declare it unethical for any prosecutor or defense lawyer to tell the press anything about a pending case except basic identifying facts about the

defendant and the circumstances surrounding the arrest.

Lawyers are specifically forbidden to mention a defendant's prior record of arrests or convictions, to say whether he made a confession, to divulge the results of any tests or the identity of witnesses, or to make any other suggestions about the possible guilt of the accused.

THE POLICE EXHORTED

Second, the report urges police departments to impose similar restrictions on their members, and calls upon judges to use their contempt powers to enforce the restrictions on both lawyers and the police, if necessary.

Third, it calls upon courts to adopt the report's judicial standards, which would make it easier for defendants to get trial delays or transfers to other communities and to keep potentially prejudiced jurors off jury panels.

These standards would also bar the press and the public from pre-trial hearings and from any part of a trial held outside the presence of the jury, if the defense lawyer or the judge felt that coverage might prevent a fair trial.

Fourth, it gives judges the power to punish newsmen for contempt if they publish articles during the course of a trial that are willfully designed to affect the outcome.

In many communities now, the police disclose the conviction or arrest records of arrested persons and give such information as the apparent motive. This pattern of disclosure would not be permitted in any jurisdiction that adopts the new standards.

FINAL PLEAS HEARD

Before the vote today the bar delegates heard final pleas for a delay from D. Tennant Bryan, publisher of The Richmond Times-Dispatch and The Richmond News Leaders, who was a spokesman for the American Newspaper Publishers Association; Michael J. Ogden, executive director of The Providence Journal and The Providence Bulletin, who is president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors; and Theodore Koop, a vice president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, who is chairman of a committee that represents eight more news media groups.

They said there was a need for full public scrutiny of the phenomenon of rising crime and added that voluntary agreements between bar and press groups in a half-dozen states had been successful.

They also pointed out that the American Newspaper Publishers Association was conducting a study of the effects of publicity on juries, and argued that the lawyers should not act on the Reardon report before all the evidence was in.

However, many leaders of the association spoke out for an immediate decision.

They included Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, who heads the parent committee that sponsored the Reardon study; William T. Gossett of Detroit, the president-elect of the bar association; Earl F. Morris of Columbus, Ohio, the incumbent president; and two former bar presidents, Lewis F. Powell of Richmond and Ross L. Malone of New York.

OTHER REPORTS APPROVED

The 190-member House of Delegates also approved five other reports from subcommittees of Judge Lumbard's Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice.

Four of these were approved with little debate. They urge states to adopt post-conviction review procedures as a normal part of the criminal process; endorse the theory of plea-bargaining between prosecutor and defense lawyers for guilty pleas, under proper safeguards; call for the outright dismissal of charges when a speedy trial is denied; and ask for free lawyers for poor defendants in all cases that might result in jail sentences.

The delegates voted to change a fifth re-

port, which had urged that appellate judges be given the power to reduce harsh prison sentences. The delegates instead approved a rule that would permit appeal judges also to raise sentences that they found too lenient.

SENATOR ALBERT GORE AD-
DRESSES BORAH FOUNDATION

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] recently delivered an address of unusual importance at the University of Idaho, which was the climax of a 3-day conference on American foreign policy, conducted under the auspices of the Borah Foundation.

The address is an eloquent expression of the frustration and futility which inevitably accompanies the frantic effort we are now making to adapt the world to the realities of our current foreign policy, rather than adapting our foreign policy to the realities of the world.

I commend the address to the thoughtful consideration of Senators and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS OF SENATOR ALBERT GORE, BORAH
FOUNDATION SYMPOSIUM ON VIETNAM, UNI-
VERSITY OF IDAHO, MOSCOW, IDAHO, FEBRU-
ARY 17, 1968

The receipt of your invitation to participate in this symposium with such distinguished and eminent Americans on the subject of Vietnam was exhilarating. The moment of my participation is far more sobering than exhilarating. Indeed, I venture my views somewhat timidly, but in the hope that a searching public analysis and debate of the present, such as you have had, may possibly be of some assistance in shaping the momentous decisions in the days and months ahead.

It is with regret and disappointment that I note the absence of an incisive public dialogue between the President and the Senate, through their selected agents, in particular the Secretary of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The most vital thing to a democracy, without which a democracy cannot function or survive, is an informed, enlightened, alert, and interested public opinion. A nation, its government, and its policies can be only so wise, only so sound, only so progressive, and only so secure as the people are informed on and interested in public issues. Our form of self government, in my view, requires the maximum public dialogue between the executives of our government and the elected representatives of the people. The President and the Senate, in my view, share equally the responsibility to conduct an informed and incisive examination of foreign policy so that the people can understand our policies and the objectives of policy, form an opinion as to whether these objectives are reasonable and attainable at acceptable risks and costs, assess the probable consequences and possible alternatives. There is no justification for a lack of public dialogue at this crucial hour. Unless a policy can withstand the light of public examination, then a change in policy is indicated.

Free debate is necessary for a free society; for it is through debate that the truth is distilled and the truth shall make a nation free.

True, the President is our nation's leader in foreign policy, but he cannot lead very far where the elected representatives of the people will not follow. The Constitution places the Congress, more particularly the Senate, and the President in a position of

limited partnership, so to speak, for the formulation and conduct of the nation's foreign policy. Each has power and responsibility. The whole Congress has the power of the purse with respect to both revenue and expenditure. Moreover, it has the specific power to raise or not to raise, to support or not to support, an Army. In addition, the advise and consent clause of the Constitution places upon the Senate a special responsibility. All too many times, and with all too many people, assent after the fact is regarded as a sufficient discharge of the Senate's constitutional responsibility. I do not agree.

What is needed at this critical time is the best that can come from cooperative teamwork. And I am reminded of an old Idaho adage that two heads are better than one even though one be a sheep's head.

We have the word now from Secretary McNamara that the executive team unanimously recommended the Bay of Pigs operation to the late President Kennedy. There was, in fact, one and only one voice at the table of this crucial conference which firmly advised against it. This sole adverse advice came firmly but clearly from Senator Fulbright. Several Senators strongly and urgently advised against the commitment of combat troops to Vietnam.

A number of mistakes could have been averted had the advice of the Senate been heeded. This is not to say, nor do I mean in any respect to imply, that the advice of the Senate has always been correct. On the other hand, I do not wish to impute infallibility to the Executive Branch.

What is needed, I repeat, is the best that can come from the teamwork our forefathers, wisely in my view, ordained. Nothing less than this is justified by the criticality of our time.

In the course of this symposium, the relationship of Vietnam to United States security has been in question. That is now and should have always been the central issue. It is precisely on this level that our policies, particularly our future policies, should be examined.

In this connection, perhaps it should be said that there is some distinction between the interest of the United States and the security of the United States. Moreover, it might be well to note that the security of the United States cannot be measured alone by military stratagems or theories, material values, and political dogmas, but must be viewed in a broader context that includes geopolitical realities, human, cultural and moral values in the broad sweep of history.

The security of the United States with respect to our involvement in the Vietnam war is quite a different question today than it was at the time President Johnson decided to commit combat troops to the conflict. It was and still is my view that our vital interests were not involved in the outcome of the insurgency, the revolution, or the civil war, however one may wish to characterize the conflict, under way in Vietnam before our combat involvement. I think most experts on Vietnam would concur in the view that North Vietnam was then far from being an actual, let alone willing, Chinese puppet or satellite. Two thousand years of Vietnamese-Chinese relations had left the Vietnamese with feelings toward the Chinese which one eminent author has described as "like those of the Irish for the English of Oliver Cromwell's day."

I challenge the validity of the notion that somehow the United States was, or ever would have been, placed in mortal peril by the ultimate nature of the government of Vietnam, by the unification of Vietnam into one country or the severing of the country into two, or by the manner of government that may have ultimately prevailed in either one Vietnam or in both Vietnams.

Surely it is in our interest to have peace in the world everywhere. Surely it is in our

interest to have a less militant brand of "Asian communism." Surely a government friendly to the United States in Vietnam, as elsewhere, is in the interest of the United States. But these statements are virtual tautologies.

However desirable our interest in a pro-Western government in South Vietnam, this interest falls far short of involving our national security. And yet it was precisely upon this premise that President Johnson sought to justify United States use of force in Vietnam in his San Antonio speech of September 29, 1967.

A portion of this speech has somehow come to be known as "The San Antonio Formula". One passage of this speech in which the President referred to conditions under which the United States would be willing to stop the bombing of North Vietnam has been most often quoted. In this passage he said,

"As we have told Hanoi time and time and time again, the heart of the matter really is this: The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

In the same speech, the President also said,

"But the key to all we have done is really our own security. At times of crisis, before asking Americans to fight and die to resist aggression in a foreign land, every American President has finally had to answer this question:

"Is the aggression a threat not only to the immediate victim but to the United States of America and to the peace and security of the entire world of which we in America are a very vital part?"

The President then proceeded in a variety of ways to answer this question in the affirmative, and he proceeded to quote former President Eisenhower, former President Kennedy, the President of the Philippines, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, the Prime Minister of Australia, the President of South Korea, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, and the Prime Minister of Singapore, in remarks which the President interpreted as indicating they had reached the same conclusion.

I do not know whether the term "San Antonio Formula" refers to the entire speech of President Johnson in San Antonio or only to a part thereof. It would be interesting to know if the so-called domino theory is also a part of the "San Antonio Formula". I say this because in that speech the President clearly endorsed the domino theory by saying,

"I would rather stand in Vietnam in our time and by meeting this danger now and facing up to it, thereby reduce the danger for our children and for our grandchildren."

If the entire speech made in San Antonio on September 29, 1967, constitutes the "San Antonio Formula", then I must interpret that formula to be a pledge to resist, at whatever cost, the spread of communist influence in Southeast Asia. Apparently, it is a pledge to resist the spread of communist influence even though a majority of people in the area may prefer communism. It would appear to me that this would be the logical conclusion that one must reach if one follows the thesis stated by President Johnson in his San Antonio speech. He said,

"We cherish freedom—yes. We cherish self-determination for all people—yes. . . ."

"But the key to all we have done is really our own security. . . ."

So in my considered view, the "San Antonio Formula" is an Alamo complex in a nuclear age.

Though, as I have said, I did not then believe and do not now believe that the happenings in Vietnam before the commitment

of combat troops in this ground war in Asia involved our vital national security, I have come to the firm conviction that our National security is now, in fact, involved.

The question is how will that national security be best served. Is it served or dis-served by present policies in Vietnam?

We have stumbled into a morass in Vietnam. We must decide to negotiate ourselves out of it. This will truly serve our National security. We must decide—decide definitely and irrevocably—to negotiate disengagement from Vietnam, not from Asia but from Vietnam, honorably and honestly, which means, in my opinion, on condition that Vietnam be neutralized.

Having lost our innocence in Vietnam, can we retain our honor? I believe that we can because of the common interests—if we and they can but see them through the smoke and fire of war—that exists even between the North Vietnamese and the people of the United States. Even between antagonists there are common interests—common interests that are forgotten in the heat of war where the first casualty is always truth and the second might be said to be objectivity.

The first common interest we share is a desire and need to end the war. American lives are being lost and American treasure spent, but the North Vietnamese are losing far more. By ending the war, we could save our lives and our precious material resources. But they could save their country.

Of course, if our vital national security demands that South Vietnam be a U.S. satellite, we should not try to negotiate neutralization or anything else. But, in my view, such is not the case.

Even taking the administration's case at face value—which I do not, except for purposes of argument—if the war in Vietnam is a confrontation between "Asian communism" and the free world, a confrontation that will determine not only the future of Asia but also the future of the United States—the battle is being fought in the worst possible place and at a place and under conditions of the enemy's choosing. And to carry this argument to its logical conclusion, if our real enemy is Communist China why do we not strike at the root of the problem? Are we unwilling to face up to the logical consequences of our policy or do we suspect that there is a logical flaw in our argument?

I believe our leaders are mesmerized by mirages in Vietnam and that as a result they see national interests there where none exist. But this is only part of the tragedy of this quagmire war. The other part of the tragedy is that, mesmerized by mirages, we are unable to see where our real national interests lie.

It seems clear to me—it has for some time—that in the long run our real national interests lie in our present and future relations with the two other great powers in this world, the Soviet Union and China. What is the war in Vietnam doing to this fundamental national interest, to our relations with these two great powers?

Some believe that the war is bringing China and the Soviet Union closer together. The more sophisticated opinion is that the ideological differences between these two countries are so great that even an attack on a fellow Communist country has not been able to heal the breach—at least not yet, although I must say we seem to be working hard at it. But, unquestionably, the war in Vietnam is worsening our relations with both the Soviet Union and Communist China, and, I might add, with most of the rest of the world.

Let us debate our involvement in Vietnam, then, on a more rational basis than has thus far been the case, and perhaps we can then come to some national conclusion and true consensus as to just what we ought to do. Once we know what we ought to do and what we want to do, I, for one, believe our

country has sufficient genius to find an honorable conclusion to this bloody war.

I have said that I am not persuaded that we have a "real" national interest in Vietnam; that the visions of containing Chinese expansion and deterring wars of national liberation are just that: visions, dreams. In any event, I do not believe we are containing Chinese military expansion in Vietnam. How could we be when we are fighting against 50,000 North Vietnamese and 250,000 South Vietnamese Vietcong—a task the 700,000 South Vietnamese forces are apparently unable to undertake. Are we teaching China a lesson for the future when 100,000 American boys have been killed or wounded but not one Chinese has been scratched? Will this inhibit China from any desire to "overrun" her neighbors, as Secretary Rusk has suggested? And, for that matter is China now "overrunning" her neighbor, North Vietnam?

We are destroying the country we profess to be saving. We are damaging our relations with most other nations of the world. We are destroying any basis for cooperation with the two other major powers upon which the future of world peace depends—the Soviet Union and China. We contaminate ourselves by embracing a corrupt regime in Saigon. And the further tragedy is that we are also seriously damaging, if we are not in danger of destroying, ourselves.

I say this not only because we are running our relations with the other nations which inhabit this rapidly shrinking globe, not only because of our identification with a corrupt governmental clique, not only because we are diverting resources so critically needed to preserve in America the traditional American way of life, not only because we are squandering this nation's resources including the most precious resource of all, the lives of our young men, and our country's position in the free world economy, but also because we risk transforming the American dream into a nightmare.

We have been the symbol of many admirable qualities for all mankind—liberty and justice, tolerance, restraint and wisdom, idealism and altruism. We are surely not perfect, and often we have fallen short in the practice of what we have preached, but we have remained generally true to our principles, which means that we have remained true to ourselves.

We have now become obsessed and driven not by idealism but by fear, not by righteousness but by self-righteousness; not by wisdom but by folly; not by altruism but by fancied self-interest.

These are strong words, I know. They are words that can be read often, yes, I know, abroad as well as at home, and words that can be heard often, not only abroad but at home. These are the words of an American who is disturbed about what is happening to the American dream.

AMERICAN CIVILIAN FIELD REPRESENTATIVES—UNsung HEROES OF VIETNAM WAR

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, the Washington Post, in an editorial published on February 15 paid tribute to what it called the unsung American heroes of the war in Vietnam—the civilian field representatives of the U.S. Information Agency, AID, the State Department, and such voluntary groups as the International Voluntary Service. They live among the people of Vietnam. They know the people. They know the enemy. They are caught in the war. Indeed, as the Post editorial points out, not a few have been casualties of the recent enemy offensive, which is, at present, commanding so much of our attention.

As the Post editorial says, however:

Sooner or later, it is all going to come down, once again, to the people and their security and to the question of how to counter terror with the appeal of a strong and active Saigon government. This is the part of the struggle nobody thinks enough about until the AID men and USIA officials and young Foreign Service Officers who are waging it, and trying to get the South Vietnamese to wage it more vigorously, are caught up in the conventional fighting and become casualties of war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post editorial, entitled "The Unsung Americans," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE UNSUNG AMERICANS

It is one of the many anomalies of Vietnam that the richest lode of expertise and first-hand experience in all the complexities of a war against insurgency lies buried beneath layers of bureaucracy, beyond the reach of the men who make the policy. It is to be found in the far reaches of the countryside, among the hundreds of civilian field representatives of such assorted agencies as the USIA, AID, and the State Department. In other wars, those with the lowest rank could be faulted for seeing only a slice of the battlefield. In this war, the underlings, work among the people and see it all because the people, who are the same everywhere, are what the war is all about. The average "pacification" worker, whatever agency he works for, is likely to speak Vietnamese and to be as knowledgeable in stringing barbed wire defenses as in well-digging or dealing diplomatically with a hamlet chief. He is also likely to be living dangerously amidst an unseen enemy.

Just how dangerously is all too vividly dramatized in the latest casualty reports on the Vietcong offensive of the past two weeks. In that span, at least eight civilian officials were killed; two were captured, including the U.S. provincial representative in Hue; eleven are missing; and ten were wounded, six of them seriously. Five young members of the International Voluntary Service, a private "Peace Corps" under contract to AID, are also missing. This is a small tally, all but lost alongside the military casualty reports, but it speaks volumes about the Vietnam war.

It tells of a struggle in which civilian officials are as much combatants as men in uniform—for these are only the worst, not the first civilian casualties. It offers a measure, too, of the damage inflicted by the latest Vietcong offensive, however impermanent the enemy's military gains. For if this many American "pacification" workers were caught up in the fighting, a much larger number of their South Vietnamese coworkers must be casualties, too. Whole programs, it is reckoned, must now be patiently reassembled and reinstalled.

Perhaps most important, these casualties among civilian workers are a sharp reminder of where the ultimate problem lies. Our attention now is riveted to the ebb and flow of military battle; official reassurances rest on "the best military advice"; by the body count, we are told, enemy forces are "failing" everywhere. Sooner or later, however, it is all going to come down, once again, to the people and their security and to the question of how to counter terror with the appeal of a strong and active Saigon government. This is the part of the struggle nobody thinks enough about until the AID men and USIA officials and young Foreign Service Officers who are waging it, and trying to get the South Vietnamese to wage it more vigorously, are caught up in the conventional fighting and become casualties of war.

"TO THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER"— POEM BY JAMES R. HOWARD

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, James R. Howard was one of the two students from Utah who were chosen to come to Washington for the Senate Youth Conference sponsored by the William Randolph Hearst Foundation. Mr. Howard is a senior student at Granite High School and a finalist in the merit scholar competition. His leadership activities in high school have been very many. While James Howard was in Washington, he had the opportunity to visit the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington Cemetery. As a result of this experience he has written a poem, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD.

The poem speaks for itself. In my opinion, the perception and depth of feeling of this young man and his ability to express it are both inspiring.

There being no objection, the poem was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TO THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

(By James R. Howard)

You lie in your cold grave—triumphant in death because you defeated tyranny, peaceful in death because you died a free man.

And I wonder what tribute can I pay to you—A patriot who loved freedom and country enough to forfeit life and name on a foreign battle field?

I would thank you—but words of thanks cannot penetrate the grave.

I would weep for you—but tears can neither stir your silent body nor warm your still heart.

I would laugh for you but laughter would disintegrate against the walls of your joyless tomb.

I would comfort you as a brother,—but brotherhood cannot surmount the obstacle of eternity.

I would show you the free land you helped to save—but your vision is blocked by the curtain of death.

So I will offer you the one tribute which makes your death meaningful and my life worthwhile. I will honor your memory by pledging myself to the perpetuation of those ideals for which you fought and died—the defense of freedom, the love of liberty and a peaceful future.

Thus will your death enrich my life thus will my actions honor your unknown name.

THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, nearly 200 years ago the fires of freedom were ignited on this continent and have burned brightly ever since. In our brief history as a nation our freedom has been threatened from time to time but never demolished. It is perhaps the fortune of geography which has made this possible for us since 3,000 miles of water separate our shores from those whose greed and avarice might lead them to venture against us. It is also, unquestionably, our own vigorous defense of freedom here at home and our desire to maintain freedom for others abroad which have dampened the enthusiasm of any would-be tyrant for a military adventure our way.

There are many nations less fortunate than ours in that geography places them

In reviewing S. 2932, I have endeavored to pinpoint possible shortcomings or omissions in the legislation with a view toward proposing remedial amendments if found necessary. I am convinced that S. 2932 represents the right approach in providing for Federal-State cooperation while at the same time not compromising the interests of the consumer.

I submit today for proper reference and printing two amendments which will further insure the American consumer that the poultry products he or she eats is wholesome. These amendments are in keeping with the approach taken in the Wholesome Meat Act. I believe that the need for these amendments should be obvious and their merits unquestioned.

Amendment No. 537 insures that the Secretary of Agriculture shall report at least annually to the appropriate committees of Congress with respect to the effectiveness of the poultry inspection and enforcement programs within all the States whether such programs are Federal and/or State programs. The Congress shall thus be apprised at all times on any failings in the protection which is or should be provided to the consumer.

Amendment No. 538 merely insures that the "ante-" and "post-mortem" inspection laws which a State must provide to be eligible for Federal financial and technical assistance must call for "mandatory" "ante-" and "post-mortem" inspection. The purpose of a lot-by-lot mandatory ante-mortem inspection is to alert inspection personnel and plant management to the general health condition of a given lot of poultry to be processed. Also, in the event of certain infectious diseases such as "Ornithosis" being detected, plant employees as well as inspectors would be protected because the flock would be quarantined. A bird-by-bird mandatory post-mortem examination must be required since this is the only positive means of assuring that each and every carcass and its parts are wholesome and not adulterated.

Mr. President, I shall continue to review this proposed legislation as well as make every attempt to discuss it with interested and affected individuals and organizations in an effort to provide for the best possible protection for our consumers in the shortest possible time.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of these amendments be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendments will be received, printed, and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendments (Nos. 537 and 538) were referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, as follows:

AMENDMENT 537

On page 19, beginning with line 16, strike out all down through line 22, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"(4) The Secretary shall promptly upon enactment of the Wholesome Poultry Products Act, and periodically thereafter, but at least annually, review the requirements, including the enforcement thereof, of the several States not designated under this paragraph (c), with respect to the slaughter of poultry, and the processing, storage, handling, and distribution of poultry prod-

ucts, and inspection of such operations, and annually report thereon to the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry of the Senate."

AMENDMENT 538

On page 14, line 8, insert "mandatory" immediately before "ante-".

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Banking and Currency Committee will begin hearings on March 5, 1968, on the President's 1968 housing proposals and other bills pending before the subcommittee. The hearings, expected to last 2 weeks, from March 5 through March 15, will be held in room 5302, New Senate Office Building and will commence at 10 a.m. each day.

Persons wishing to testify on pending bills, should contact Miss Doris I. Thomas, Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee, room 5226, New Senate Office Building, telephone 225-6348.

A list of the bills presently pending is as follows: S. 2228, S. 2229, S. 2343, S. 2376, S. 2466, S. 2498, S. 2508, S. 2625, S. 2631, S. 2680, S. 2681, S. 2800, S. 2801, and S. 2802.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary will conduct hearings on March 26, 27, and 28, and April 1, 2, 8, and 9, on the relationship of the administrative agencies to Congress. Additional days may be scheduled later in the session. Hearings will be in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, and will begin at 10 a.m., unless otherwise announced.

These hearings begin the second stage of the subcommittee's inquiry into the division of powers between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government. We shall focus on the administrative agency's role in the governmental structure because, whether we like it or not, the administrative agency has come to be a primary instrument of government in our country. The most dramatic periods of growth of this institution occurred during the second and fourth decades of the 20th century, when most of the seven major independent administrative agencies were created. But the creation of new, if less celebrated, administrative agencies has continued undiminished since that period, and there are now perhaps hundreds of administrative boards of every type and description within the executive branch. The exercise of their power directly or indirectly affects every citizen, and the work product of these administrative agencies constitutes the largest source of "law" in our country, far exceeding the decisions of the courts and the legislation of the Congress. The Founding

Fathers did not anticipate the creation of an institution such as the administrative agency—an institution different from each of the traditional branches of government and one exercising a combination of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For a time, this new institution had difficulty in gaining acceptance, but we have now grown accustomed to the fact that executive, legislative, and judicial powers are exercised by a body which is neither a legislature nor a court, and yet still independent of the executive branch.

Although the Nation now accepts the administrative agency as a normal and constitutional part of government, there still remains the problem of assuring that the independent administrative agencies faithfully execute the laws entrusted to them by Congress.

This is more than a theoretical question of concern only to lawyers. It is important to every citizen, and especially to those whose lives and livelihood are subject to the jurisdiction of an administrative agency. The will of the people operates through the policy decisions of Congress. If our representational form of government is to have any meaning, then we must insure that the laws which are executed by these agencies are the laws which Congress enacted. Constitutional law and representative government cannot exist if officials of the executive branch, commissioners and board members of the agencies, or the judges on the courts, have the power to modify, repeal, or ignore the will of Congress as expressed in statutes.

The hearings will be devoted to analyzing the performance of the agencies against this constitutional standard. We will seek also to devise the means by which Congress can insure more faithful administration of the laws in the future.

The National Labor Relations Board has been selected as the agency the subcommittee will first examine. The Board has been chosen for two reasons. First and perhaps most important, the NLRB is primarily responsible for a segment of public affairs which affects every employer and every workingman. How well the Board administers the Nation's labor policy as expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act and other labor laws is the concern of every citizen.

Second, of all the major administrative agencies, the Board has been the subject of the most persistent criticism. Some of this is inevitable—the Board deals in an area of controversial and complex problems, and it can be expected that those who are disappointed with its decisions will object. But this explanation does not account for all the criticism leveled at the Board. Ever since its creation, the Board has been taken to task by friends as well as foes—by the courts, the Congress, by labor and management, and by its own members. The accusation that the Board has usurped congressional functions, that it applies its own view of what is desirable labor policy instead of Congress, comes so often, from so many directions, and in so many contexts, that it is the subcommittee's responsibility to determine the validity of these charges and to discover,

if we can, how Congress and the courts, and the Board itself, can better review and control its operations.

In the area of labor law, and as respects the Board's role in it, every man may be a partisan. But I hope that these hearings will be received in the same impartial spirit in which they will be conducted. This is an opportunity to criticize honestly where criticism is warranted, and to praise where praise is deserved. Our objective is to do what we can to improve the operations of the NLRB, administrative agencies in general, and the Government as a whole. We shall rely upon witnesses not only to analyze the role of the Board in terms of the policies established by Congress, but also to suggest practical methods by which congressional and judicial oversight of this administrative agency and the others can be improved.

The subcommittee has invited a number of scholars and other experts in administrative law and labor relations to testify at the hearings. In addition, we shall hear from representatives of management, labor, and the Board itself. Among those who are presently scheduled to testify or present statements are Profs. Derek Bok and Louis Jaffe of the Harvard Law School, Prof. Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School and formerly Solicitor General of the United States, Prof. Howard Leisnick of the University of Pennsylvania, Prof. Harry H. Wellington of Yale Law School, and Prof. Cornelius J. Peck of the University of Washington, Seattle.

Because of the widespread interest in these hearings it may not be possible to hear every person who wishes to testify. However, the subcommittee will make every effort to accommodate those who wish to submit statements for the record. All persons desiring to present testimony or submit written statements should contact the subcommittee office, room 1403, New Senate Office Building.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON PROPOSED INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1968

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I want to give notice that open public hearings on the proposed new Internal Security Act of 1968—S. 2988—will begin at 10:30 a.m. on February 27, and will continue through a period of several weeks thereafter. Any person wishing to testify on this bill should communicate with the clerk on the Committee on the Judiciary, Mr. John Holloman, or the chief counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee, Mr. Jay Sourwine. Anyone wishing to present a prepared statement should submit a copy of the statement to the subcommittee at least 24 hours before the date scheduled for his appearance. Written statements for inclusion in the record, but not intended to be presented orally, may be submitted at any time during the course of the hearings, and will be admitted to the hearing record if found pertinent and not excessive in length.

The hearing on Tuesday, February 27, will be held in room 3304 in the New Senate Office Building.

ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, February 26, 1968, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 269) to authorize an exchange of lands at Acadia National Park, Maine.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if no one wishes to speak at this moment, I should like to speak for about 5 minutes if I may.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Montana is recognized, although the Chair has a request from the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, may we have order in the Chamber?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Senator from Montana withhold for just one moment. The Chair must insist that the Chamber be in order and that the galleries be quiet. The Senator from Montana seeks recognition.

The Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for several additional minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last week, U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, met for an hour with President Johnson at the White House. It is safe to assume that the subject matter discussed was the possibility of negotiations covering a cessation of hostilities or an ending of the war in Vietnam. What came out of that meeting in the way of consensus or agreement, I do not know but, again, I think it is safe to assume that both men expressed a desire for peace and covered, in their discussion, various ways, means, and possibilities for achieving it.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the Senate still is not in order.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's position is well taken. The Senator from Montana will suspend. The Chair must ask the doorkeepers to see that order is maintained in the galleries when the Senate is in session.

The Senate will please be in order.

The Senator from Montana may proceed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, over the weekend, U Thant held a press conference in which he stated what seems to me to be the reasonable belief that talks could begin shortly after the United States calls off the bombing of North Vietnam.

Over the weekend also, there have been, more and more, speculative stories coming out of Saigon, Bangkok, and Washington to the effect that the President would soon ask for an increase of anywhere up to 100,000 men in Vietnam. It is anticipated—again, according to speculation—that when Gen. Earl Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, returns to Washington this week, he will make a recommendation

that our forces be increased in Vietnam beyond the present ceiling of 525,000 men by July 1.

Therefore, it appears to me that this country may be facing, on the one hand, a pressure to increase its commitment of military personnel in Vietnam again and perhaps again, and again; and, on the other, the need to make further and more intensive efforts to reach the negotiating table on the basis of views such as those advanced by U Thant. It is my hope that more attention would be given to what U Thant has proposed than seems to have been the case up to this time. His views are entitled to the most deliberate consideration not so much because of the immediate situation in Vietnam, but because of the difficulties and dilemmas which have been present since the very beginning of the conflict.

Even though it appears to present military questions, I believe that U Thant's proposal to halt the bombing of North Vietnam can be given consideration for a number of reasons: First, there are very few significant targets left in North Vietnam; second, the bombing has not halted the infiltration of men and supplies in South Vietnam; and third, the bombing has failed to bring Hanoi to the conference table.

A halt to the bombing of the North would not, and should not weaken the air support of the U.S. forces along the 17th parallel and most particularly at Khe Sanh. These ground forces, without question, must continue to have all possible air support not only along the 17th parallel in Vietnam itself but across the infiltration routes which extend through Laos. Wherever else in is needed in conjunction with ground-force operations, air support must be forthcoming.

It is my belief, however, that U Thant's suggestion makes sense because a way around the impasse which confronts us in Vietnam will not be found by military means but will have to be brought about through negotiations. If on the one hand the Soviet Union and China are to continue ad infinitum to supply North Vietnam with the most sophisticated weapons and other forms of assistance, and if we are to continue the same policy in relation to South Vietnam, then I think there lies ahead, not only for this country but also for the rest of the world, far more troublous days than has been the case to date.

Therefore, I would hope, Mr. President, that, instead of an obsessive pursuit of a solution by a continual escalation of manpower commitments, we would think about escalating our peace efforts in an effort to find an honorable settlement—irrespective of considerations of face.

No one can say that to halt the bombing of the north, as U Thant has proposed, will bring about fruitful negotiations, but it is a proposal worth trying as a step toward peace. Indeed, it may well have more merit than going another rung of military escalation in the hope that it will end the bloodshed, especially since every previous step-up has produced, not peace, but simply a more open ended, more destructive, and more devastating war.

I refer once again, too, to the proposal made by our distinguished colleague, the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] that we confine the bombing to the 17th parallel and to the Ho Chi Minh trails in Laos and that we concentrate and consolidate our effort and forces within South Vietnam. Finally, I would refer, once again, to the unanimous resolution of the Senate which calls for an open initiative in the United Nations Security Council in an effort to delineate a path toward peace—an initiative which has yet to be taken. These suggestions interrelate with the suggestion of U Thant which, I repeat, is deserving of our most careful and immediate consideration.

In one way or another, it seems to me, that it is preferable to make a try for negotiations than to continue to heed the insatiable calls for more and more men as the war spreads and intensifies. To make this try, to me, is preferable to going back to the past to find out how we got into this barbarous war. To me, it is preferable to concentrate on today and to plan for tomorrow in an effort to find an honorable conclusion to the war in Vietnam before it gets completely out of hand.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the text of U Thant's statement, published in the New York Times on yesterday.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TEXT OF THANT'S STATEMENT ON TALKS ABOUT VIETNAM

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., February 24.—Various questions have been raised, and different interpretations have been given, following recent talks in certain capitals. Indeed, it is for me a great advantage in the discharge of my responsibilities as Secretary General of the United Nations to be able to meet at intervals with leaders of governments and to exchange views with them.

Obviously, in the present circumstances, the war in Vietnam has taken precedence over all other subjects in the discussions, simply as a result of the increasing concern at this war causes the world over.

Although it is for the parties directly involved, ultimately—and, I hope, soon—to take the steps and establish the contacts necessary for negotiations, which they know must take place if this war is ever to be brought to an end. The Vietnam conflict has repercussions which extend far beyond the parties themselves. That is why I feel it would be useful to present this account of what happened during these recent meetings.

TRAVEL DETAILS GIVEN

Some of the details of my travel have already been made public on a day-to-day basis by the United Nations headquarters. Nevertheless, as I feel it relevant to what I wish to state today, I will record them again in the order in which they took place.

As is known, I took the opportunity during a brief visit to New Delhi in connection with the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to meet the Consul General of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam], Mr. Nguyen Hoa, on Feb. 8, and to discuss with him the question of Vietnam.

The consul general affirmed that his government "would hold talks with Washington on all relevant matters at an appropriate time after the unconditional cessation of bombing and of all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

He drew my attention to the statement that had been made on this subject the day before [Feb. 7] by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in an interview with a press agency, which said, in particular, that talks will begin as soon as the United States has proved that it has really unconditionally stopped the bombing. I then put to him some questions which he promised to transmit to his Government, assuring me that it would reply to these questions as soon as possible.

FLEW ON TO MOSCOW

While in New Delhi, I called on the President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain, and had several meetings with the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

From there I flew to Moscow where I was received by the secretary general of the Communist party, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev; the chairman of the council of ministers, Premier Aleksei Kosygin, President Nikolai V. Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

In London, I was received by Prime Minister Harold Wilson and had discussions with him, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson; the Minister of State, Lord Chalfont, and the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath.

While in London, on Feb. 13, I was informed that the delegate general of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in France, Mr. Mai Van Bo, had just received a message from his Government for transmittal to me. This was the reply to the questions I had submitted in New Delhi. I left for Paris on the 14th and saw Mr. Mai Van Bo, who conveyed to me the reply from his Government, dated Feb. 13, to my questions.

In this message, there was a further clarification of Hanoi's position concerning discussions with Washington. I was told that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would hold talks with the United States at the appropriate time, that is, as soon as the unconditional cessation of bombing and of all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam became effective.

ANY TOPIC ADMISSIBLE

I was further informed that, at the talks, the United States could bring up any matters for discussion in the same way as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam could bring up any other. In reply to my query, Mr. Mai Van Bo stated that the question of the reduction in the fighting in South Vietnam, the question of the reconvening of the Geneva Conference and any other question could be brought up at the talks.

On the same day, I was received by President Charles de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. Upon my return to New York Feb. 15, I informed Ambassador Arthur Goldberg of the substance of my discussions on Vietnam during my visit to various countries. On Feb. 16, I conferred with the permanent observer of the Republic of Vietnam [South Vietnam], Mr. Nguyen Huu Chi.

On Feb. 21, I was received by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington. The President reaffirmed his continued desire to achieve a peaceful settlement and the continued validity of the San Antonio formula. Both the President and the Secretary of State stressed the no-military-advantage provision of that formula.

CONVICTION REINFORCED

My talks in various capitals have reinforced my conviction, which I have repeatedly expressed in my public statements on the issue of Vietnam for the past three years, namely, that the question is essentially a political problem which cannot be solved through the application of military force.

In the light of my talks, I reaffirm all that I have said in the past concerning my assessment of the Vietnam problem and my ap-

proach to it. If the Vietnam question is seen as a contest of unyielding will, there can be no solution.

In the broader context it appears, indeed, that both the United States and the Soviet Union are firmly determined to prevent the defeat of the side which each supports. If such a trend continues, the conclusion is inescapable that there will be continued intensification and escalation of the conflict, resulting in unforeseeable developments with dire consequences.

EARLY TALKS EXPECTED

On the other hand, my recent contacts have confirmed my view that, if essential steps are taken, they will lead to a chain of events which, in the end, can bring about a just solution to the problem, and which will save both South Vietnam and North Vietnam from devastation and virtual destruction and will offer a chance for the people of Vietnam to regain a sense of national identity and to reconstruct their war-torn country.

Everywhere I found a genuine desire to bring this tragic conflict to an end. The increased intensity of the hostilities during the past few weeks should not lead to the conclusion that the door is closed for negotiations.

In my view, the indispensable first step of ending all bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should be taken and could be taken without too great a military risk. If such a step were to be taken, I am more than ever convinced that meaningful talks will take place much earlier than is generally supposed, even perhaps within a matter of a few days.

As for the questions concerning the conduct of the fighting after the unconditional cessation of the bombing, particularly in the demilitarized zone and across the frontiers, it can reasonably be assumed that these will be dealt with in good faith. The parties themselves should solve this problem in order to allow for the larger negotiations to take place, with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

ATMOSPHERE POISONED

The Vietnam war has already poisoned the atmosphere and strained international relations. This strain is keenly felt in the United Nations, whose effective functioning has been impaired as a result. We are witnessing more and more the unfortunate and undesirable repercussions of this war in other parts of the world.

Inasmuch as the United Nations remains humanity's main hope for peace it is my duty, regardless of all criticisms, to try to reflect the consensus of international public opinion and the deep concern which has expressed itself through the forum of the General Assembly.

Indeed, the world is anguished and sickened by the continued intensity and savagery of the war. It is heart-rending to witness the agony of the innocent civilians who cannot possibly know what it is all about. Also the military casualties steadily mount. The ugliness of the war is matched only by its futility. There can be no victory, no defeat, only more, suffering, more death and more destruction. The very survival of Vietnam is at stake. It is time to call a halt.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I am glad that the Senator from Montana, the majority leader, has spoken out as he has. I do not know, and neither does anyone else here know for sure, whether to stop the bombing of North Vietnam would bring the war to a conclusion in that area.

But we should know that the addition of 100,000 men to our fighting forces in

Southeast Asia will not go very far toward bringing any war to a successful military conclusion.

I believe it was in the late summer of 1963 that we were told that adding 6,000 or 7,000 men to the forces that were then in South Vietnam, bringing that total to 17,000, would be adequate to restore stability to that country at an early date. In fact, it was about that time that the Secretary of Defense predicted that we would be bringing our forces home by Christmas.

Next thing we knew, we had 35,000 men there. Then the increase went on from there.

Two years ago we had 160,000 or 170,000 men in Vietnam, and we were told if the number were doubled—I think at that time General Westmoreland asked to have the number doubled, making 340,000—that would be adequate. Then we were told it would take 500,000. Then it went up to 525,000. Now it is up to probably 625,000.

In my opinion, the addition of 100,000 men is only a drop in the bucket if it is the determination of the President and the administration to bring about a military victory in Southeast Asia. One just has to read the news items to see how the perimeter of the war is expanding. The news this morning states that three cities in Laos have been taken by the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong—I do not know which it is—but this is only a start in that direction. We owe something to the defense of Laos if we do to other countries in Southeast Asia, because Laos, in fact, has been on our team to the fullest extent—that is, Souvanna Phouma has, anyway, even though he controls only about half of that country. So we may just as well be prepared.

As I said on the floor a couple of years ago, if we are going to fight an all-out war in Asia, we must adopt those rules and regulations that go with all-out war. That means universal conscription. It means a big increase in taxes. It means wage and price controls.

The President is inadvertently responsible for the escalation in prices and wages, because every time he asks labor not to ask for more money, and every time he tells industry not to raise its prices, implying we will have wage and price controls if they do, it is an open invitation to raising wages and raising prices in order to get them as high as possible before the freeze sets in.

So I hope nobody is going to be fooled by the request for 100,000 more men in Asia if we have the idea of a complete military victory in our minds. I would suggest that, instead of 100,000, perhaps another cipher be added to that figure—and not before the "1."

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield, on my own time? I have 3 minutes.

I would like to ask one question. First, I certainly concur in what my colleagues have said. Second, not only is the perimeter of the war expanding, but also its Americanization. This deeply concerns the American people. It is more and more our war.

I would like to ask the Senator, with respect to the cessation of bombings as a basis for beginning negotiations, I

think we "missed the boat" in January 1967, when the Pope, joined by U Thant, and many others, asked that the bombing be stopped.

I would like to ask the Senator, who is very knowledgeable in this field, in addition to being majority leader, if he does not believe it would be a challenge to American diplomacy, on which this Government ought to concentrate, to recreate the diplomatic conditions of February 1967. In the postwar world, we have seen that it takes the two super powers working together to get anything done of this nature. If the Soviet Union joined the call for a bombing cessation as a basis for beginning negotiations, along the lines of our San Antonio formula, that would represent a situation in which the Soviet Union's prestige is on the line just as much as ours.

It seems to me that this is a key challenge facing the administration; this is the basic idea on which I would like to get the opinion of the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I say that Mr. Kosygin on a number of occasions has indicated that the step that could bring about negotiations would be a cessation of the bombing of the north.

Frankly, I would not care what countries were involved if we could find our way to the negotiating table, and so I would not be at all averse to encompassing all directly and indirectly involved, including the NLF, China, and the Soviet Union. After all, two of those are signatories to the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962.

I can understand the reticence of the administration, but we have had suggestions from the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Pope. U Thant has just made a trip, at which time he discussed with various countries the possibility of peace—in New Delhi, in Paris, where he talked with Mal Van Bo, Mr. de Gaulle, Mr. Couve de Murville. He has come here and talked to the President and has indicated—he could very well have been too optimistic—that it would bring about negotiations within several days.

I cannot see what is to be lost when we may have a choice between having negotiations or the sending of additional tens of thousands of our troops to Vietnam.

Now, it is all speculation so far. Nobody knows if additional troops are going to be sent, but all indications are that that is being considered, as a result of a series of recent events triggered by North Vietnam, as a result of incidents that have taken place in 36 provincial capitals and in other cities and hamlets as well.

We have Marines entrenched in Khe Sanh. Both sides are ready to jump into battle. I do not know whether a battle is going to occur in Khe Sanh or not, even though all the evidence points to it. I would not obviate the possibility, nevertheless, that Giap, or whoever is responsible for the situation in the northwest corner of South Vietnam, may be pinning down large numbers of our troops in that area for the purpose of carrying on activities up and down the peninsula and up and down the 38th parallel.

We have difficulties. We do not know how we got into the box of Vietnam. But that is a moot question. It is too late to

decide how we got into it. The important question is, how do we get out and how do we get out under honorable circumstances?

Mr. AIKEN. If the Senator will yield for another moment, I want to reiterate that I do not know, and I do not know of anyone else who knows, whether a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would result in peace efforts within a reasonable time or not; but we should know that if the bombing ceases, in view of what other countries have said, and there is no honest move toward peace on the part of Russia, China, or Vietnam, then we could really expect a change in world opinion, which up to now has largely held the United States responsible for the wartime conditions which have existed in that part of the world.

It would at least prove whether the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, and their prime supporters, Russia and China, really want peace in that area or not. We tried, with a resolution, to get Russia to stand up and be counted at the United Nations, but the administration has not seen fit to push the issue.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that the sense of the Senate resolution should be used, embarrassment or not, win, lose, or draw, because, after all, it did pass this body unanimously, and it did express the sense of the Senate. The President, I know, has attempted to lay the groundwork for it, but other events have intervened, and up to now, no specific action has been taken. But I certainly hope, as does the Senator from Vermont and every other member of this body, regardless of how he is classified, that the members of the United Nations will try to do as a body what its Secretary General, U Thant, has tried to do on his own. I hope that those nations which talk peace will try to do something to bring it about.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Montana has 3 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In view, particularly, of the statement of the Senator from Vermont about the necessity of radical changes in the way we do our business if the administration is going to put another 100,000 or perhaps 500,000 men in Vietnam, I ask whether the majority leader knows or can find out for the Senate whether or not the administration intends to consult Congress and allow it at least to discuss the matter, in view of the very dubious basis for the so-called Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

I wonder whether the administration is contemplating a declaration of war upon which would be based the kind of regulations which the Senator from Vermont just mentioned. It seems to me, the administration is going now to undertake a vast new escalation, Congress should at least be consulted and have an opportunity to express itself.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I say that what I have said is based on speculation and rumors; stories which have appeared in the press; a trip last week by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, to Saigon; a statement issued from Bangkok yesterday

day that it was thought more men would be needed; a statement given in an interview by General Westmoreland to one of the press associations to the effect that it was thought he would need more men.

I would feel that as far as the President is concerned, he will discuss matters of this sort. I know he is very anxious to meet with members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, for example, to discuss matters of mutual interest.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I understand that the majority leader is saying that the President has not discussed with him such matters as sending another 100,000 men to Vietnam, nor has he discussed with him his plans in this connection?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No, nor do I think he is in a position where, at this time, he can discuss them, because I assume he is waiting for information, and on the basis of the information and the recommendations which will be made, then he will be face to face with a decision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If he has not discussed it with the majority leader, I take it he has discussed it with no Member of this body. Certainly we have no information in the Committee on Foreign Relations about these plans.

It would seem, in view of the disastrous situation in which we find ourselves, that the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate should be informed about the President's plans before a decision is made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am sure a decision will be made, and if and when it is made, I am sure the Senate will be informed at that time. I have no doubt that it will.

FALSEHOOD, FAILURE, AND FUTILITY—THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the vents of the past few weeks have demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt the utter collapse of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

Facts now coming to light concerning the Tonkin Gulf episodes of August 2 and 3, 1964, further widen the so-called credibility gap. The able and distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has stated that Secretary McNamara's statement before that committee, as released by Secretary McNamara, is "a classic example of selective declassification of security material."

He said further:

Everything related to the Tonkin incidents "secret" except that which the Pentagon seems should be made public. This deceives the American public.

I agree.

I have read the so-called top secret carefully compiled report of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the transcript of the hearing held before that committee on February 20. A review of both these documents makes it clear that Secretary McNamara did not tell the whole truth, either, when he testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in August 1964 or when he testified before it on February of this year.

Nothing in the staff report could be remotely considered as endangering the security of the United States, especially 3½ years after the events. Surely the North Vietnamese know by now what happened—even if it has been withheld from the American people.

The American people, who are paying the cost in lives, blood, and money, have a right to know.

Secretary McNamara should immediately declassify all of the material in the staff report and in the Tonkin Gulf hearing on August 6, 1964. Failing such action on the part of the Secretary, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should come before the Senate to declassify the staff report.

Meanwhile, events in South Vietnam attest to the utter futility of U.S. policies there.

As the Wall Street Journal stated in its leading editorial on February 23, 1968:

We think the American people should be getting ready to accept, if they haven't already, the prospect that the whole Vietnam effort may be doomed; it may be falling apart beneath our feet.

Casualty figures published last week show that more American fighting men were killed in action during the preceding week—543—than in any other week of the war. In the 41 days that had elapsed during 1968 when the report was made, 2,242 American fighting men have been killed in Vietnam. This is at a rate of over 20,000 deaths a year.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONTROYA in the chair). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. GRUENING. I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 10 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. The events of the last 2 weeks have shown conclusively that the repeatedly optimistic reports of General Westmoreland and other high administration officials are, as they have been for the past 4 years, entirely baseless.

Militarily the United States has lost the initiative.

Those opposed to the Saigon regime have shown conclusively that there can be no safety in the streets of any South Vietnamese street, including those of the nation's Capital—Saigon.

Meantime, we have permitted 5,000 marines to become besieged in the north in an area becoming increasingly indefensible.

And now the call has come from General Westmoreland in Saigon for more American troops.

To what end?

The time has come—

The New York Times stated in its leading editorial on February 25, 1968—

for Americans and their leaders to recognize that the policy itself is illogical; that it entraps the United States in a war without visible limits, despite all official optimism; that it will continue to make insatiable demands on American manpower, resources and energy far beyond the worth of any conceivable gains. The only sound policy is to move from the battlefield to the negotiating table with fullest speed.

The much vaunted pacification program to "win the hearts and minds" of

the rural population has collapsed as the pacification teams have been drawn in to defend the very cities on which their own security depended.

In September, with a loud fanfare, the administration, based on rigged elections and the adoption of a high sounding constitution, announced that democracy had come to South Vietnam.

That so-called democracy there has been rapidly deteriorating the last few days.

The constitution has been suspended.

The corrupt military junta is jailing the leading opponents in the last election—"protective custody" is what it is called, a term highly reminiscent of the same term used in Fascist and Communist countries. It is not surprising that such term is used in a country, one of the dominant figures of whom is General Ky, whose greatest hero is Adolph Hitler.

In a moving advertisement in the New York Times on February 25, 1968, headed "In the Name of God, Let's Stop It Now," inserted by the International Committee of Conscience on Vietnam of the Fellowship of Reconciliation pointed out that—

First. The Venerable Thich Tri Quang, "widely revered South Vietnamese Buddhist monk" has been placed in "protective custody";

Second. The peace candidates in the September elections, Au Truong Thanh and Truong Dinh Dzue, have been placed in "protective custody";

Third. Many of the 65 Saigon University professors who signed an appeal for a cease-fire and negotiations have been arrested and the others threatened with arrest;

Fourth. Seventeen leaders of South Vietnamese student organizations have been arrested for appealing for a cease-fire and negotiations;

Fifth. The Roman Catholic Bishops of South Vietnam have appealed to both sides for a cease-fire and the end of hostilities and negotiations.

Strict censorship of the press has been imposed in South Vietnam.

As Flora Lewis, writing from Saigon in the Washington Post states:

The newspapers here are censored to a point that sometimes leaves more white space than black. Discouraging remarks are not printed.

Thus the American efforts to bring democracy to South Vietnam are recorded in falsehood, failure, and futility.

ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM DILEMMA

Recommendations for extrication of the United States from its Vietnamese folly are not the responsibility of those who for years have dissented from United States policy in Vietnam. It is the responsibility of those who got us into the Southeast Asia mess.

However, if President Johnson really wants to get the United States out of the morass in Vietnam, and save us from ever-mounting and ever-deepening disaster and the increasing slaughter of the flower of our youth and of thousands of Vietnamese noncombatants, his opportunity is here and now.

He could go on nationwide radio and television and, in effect, say to the American people:

"My fellow citizens, I have tried for 4 years and my predecessors have tried for

a decade previously to bring a semblance of self-government and democracy to the people of South Vietnam. It has become clear beyond peradventure that it is not their desire, and that the United States, despite its prodigious efforts in manpower and money, and the sacrifice of thousands of American lives, cannot achieve these desired results for them.

"I have today ordered the unconditional cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam and of all offensive operations in South Vietnam. In addition, I have directed there be an immediate in-place cease-fire in South Vietnam on the part of United States and have requested the South Vietnamese Armed Forces to do likewise, with only defensive action authorized. I have called upon the forces of the National Liberation Front and of North Vietnam in South Vietnam to do the same. It is my purpose, which I now declare, to initiate a phased military withdrawal which should be completed within a year. In the meantime, behind the shield of American military forces with the leverage afforded by U.S. military and economic aid, U.S. representatives in South Vietnam will insist that the Thieu-Ky government broaden the base of its Government to include their non-Communist opponents, represented in large measure by those whom they have now jailed and put in protective custody, and that this broadened South Vietnamese Government begin immediate negotiations with the National Liberation Front so that all these Vietnamese components can work out their own destinies.

"In addition, I have directed our Ambassador to the United Nations to work with other nations there to find places of refuge in other lands for those who would not want to live in South Vietnam under the new regime which will be formed and I will ask the Congress for such additional authority as may be needed to admit such refugees to the United States and to assist in their resettlement elsewhere.

"Further, I have instructed our Ambassadors to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada, India, and Poland to propose a greatly strengthened International Control Commission to supervise any elections to be held in South Vietnam to obtain an expression of the peoples' will.

"The United States will assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the burned villages, destroyed buildings and defoliated fields, and give suitable fiscal assistance to economic development. But our military efforts will cease. We will make every effort to assist the people of both North and South Vietnam to establish whatever form of government they can develop."

Here lies a solution which both Americans and Vietnamese, I am confident, will welcome.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks the editorial entitled "Escalation—To What End" from the New York Times of February 25, 1968, the advertisement entitled "In the Name of God, Let's Stop It Now," signed by the International Committee of Conscience of the Fellowship of Reconcilia-

tion, and the communique issued by the Catholic Bishops of Vietnam.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1968]

ESCALATION: TO WHAT END?

Three years ago the first American combat units were dispatched to Vietnam, with the announced purpose of defending United States bases. Their arrival boosted the number of American military personnel in Vietnam to 27,000.

By the end of that year—1965—the United States had 185,000 troops in Vietnam, and they had taken over the brunt of the fighting from the South Vietnamese.

Nearly two years and 300,000 additional American fighting men later, Gen. William C. Westmoreland came home from Saigon last fall to report that the enemy was on the run and that he expected the United States to begin to "phase out" its operation in Vietnam within two years. He expressed himself as content with the ceiling of 525,000 troops President Johnson promised him by next June.

This weekend the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, is in Vietnam to review the most critical situation the United States has faced in that ravaged land. He is being pressed for more troops, well beyond the 525,000 limit, to shore up thinly spread allied forces. In anticipation of that call, the Joint Chiefs are reported drawing up plans for partial mobilization of National Guard and Reserve ground forces.

Given the precarious predicament of the American forces now in Southeast Asia and the dangerous deterioration of the strategic ready reserve at home, both the dispatched of more troops to Vietnam and the mobilization of reserves are inescapable. Such is the grim compulsion of a policy that has mired this country ever deeper in a land war in Asia against long-standing expert military advice.

The time has come for Americans and their leaders to recognize that the policy itself is illogical; that it entraps the United States in a war without visible limits, despite all official optimism; that it will continue to make insatiable demands on American manpower, resources and energy far beyond the worth of any conceivable gains. The only sound policy is to move from the battlefield to the negotiating table with fullest speed.

The search for a road to a negotiated settlement must start with a bombing halt. The risks in such a pause are obviously far less than those in the boundless escalation on which Washington is embarked, especially since United Nations Secretary General Thant reported yesterday his belief that meaningful negotiations would begin "perhaps within a few days" if American planes stopped bombing North Vietnam.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1968]

IN THE NAME OF GOD, LET'S STOP IT NOW

The rapid political deterioration of the Saigon regime is marked by acts of suppression and terror so naked that religious conscience is forced to condemn. We are moved to speak as well out of our personal commitment to our religious and intellectual counterparts in Saigon who are now in prison for the crime of calling for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations to end the war.

Four days ago the Venerable Thich Tri Quang, widely revered South Vietnamese Buddhist monk, was arrested in Saigon and put in prison in "protective custody" by the Thieu-Ky government.

The same day, Messrs. Au Truong Thanh and Truong Dinh Dzu, were similarly imprisoned. Both were "peace candidates" in the recent South Vietnamese elections. (Thanh,

a minister in three cabinets, was excluded from the ballot; Dzu, a lawyer, placed second with a strong peace platform. Both have been under house arrest at various times since the election.) Literally thousands of non-Communist "political prisoners," including hundreds of Buddhist monks, are believed to be in South Vietnamese prisons.

Sixty-five Saigon University professors who in January signed an appeal for a cease-fire and negotiations were immediately threatened with arrest and, according to private reports received from Saigon, many have been arrested.

This is the January 16 Statement for which 65 University Professors were threatened with arrest. Many have been arrested since:

"Considering the critical situation that may be decisive for the future of the country, we, a number of university teachers, feel we have the responsibility to make public the following statement:

"1. The present conflict is seriously endangering the very existence of the Vietnamese people from both material and moral standpoints. Therefore every Vietnamese has the duty to contribute to the finding of a suitable way out for his fatherland. As educators we are all the more convinced of this obligation because there is nothing more harmful to education than violence, destruction, killing, deprivation and corruption bred by war.

"2. In view of the horror of an ever-expanding war as well as the nascent hope for an ever-elusive peace we cannot but appeal to all Vietnamese who have the responsibilities of this land not to forfeit this precious opportunity, because opportunity is quite rare in history, to sit together, to recognize one another as Vietnamese in order to find a formula for peace based on the supreme interest of the nation.

"3. The complex differences between the official positions require subtle solutions that can only be reached after long deliberations and drawn-out negotiations.

"In order to create a suitable atmosphere for such an open-hearted discussion between the belligerent parties and above all to save thousands of people from death and suffering, while a peaceful settlement is being sought, we appeal to all the belligerent parties to extend indefinitely the tet cease fire and to negotiate immediately a peaceful settlement."

"SAIGON, January 16, 1968."

Seventeen leaders of student organization of South Vietnamese universities were arrested after appealing late last year for cease-fire and forming the Inter-University Student Committee struggling for Democracy. Two contracted tuberculosis in prison; the others were forced into the armed forces after they had gone on a hunger strike. This plea came from 17 student leaders who have been arrested.

"We appeal to you from the Lam Son dra center, in Nha Trang, where we have been fasting since our arrest more than a week ago. We are seventeen student leaders of South Vietnam's universities, who were arrested and ordered to be drafted into the South Vietnamese army because of our activities in demonstrating against the undemocratic and unrepresentative elections of September and October.

"We know how much some of you have struggled to ease the sufferings of our country, and we thank you for your efforts. Yet the disaster continues and can only be ended when we of South Vietnam are free to choose a government that will genuinely represent our aspirations. To deny us the right to such a government, as the present Saigon government has done with the help of the United States, is to deny democracy.

"We appeal to you for your support in our efforts, for your intervention on our behalf and for your continued solidarity with our

efforts for the well-being of our tormented country.

"Ho HUU NHUT,
"Chairman, Student Council,
Saigon University
for the Committee."

The Roman Catholic bishops of South Vietnam have appealed to both sides for a cease-fire and the end of hostilities and negotiations.

Buddhists, Catholics and other Vietnamese have cried, as have we, "In the name of God, stop this slaughter." Yet our government continues to support a regime in Saigon which makes of this plea of religious conscience a criminal offense.

Let us stop this horror that we are inflicting on helpless people; let us stop sending our own young men to kill and be killed; let us stop laying on their consciences the memory that their country commanded them to murder civilians and destroy their homes.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF CONSCIENCE ON VIETNAM OF
THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION,
ROBERT W. MOON,
National Chairman.
ALFRED HASSLER,
Executive Secretary.
NYACK, N.Y.

OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE OF BISHOPS OF VIETNAM ISSUED ON JANUARY 8, 1968

In order to respond in all sincerity and respectful gratitude to the efforts of our Holy Father Pope Paul VI, who has worked untiringly in the search for an equitable peace in Viet-Nam, ravaged by war for more than twenty years, we, the bishops, devoutly wish to communicate the following to all the Catholic faithful of Viet-Nam:

Peace indeed has always been the object of mankind's deepest longing, but in these times the people of Viet-Nam long for it more than anyone else.

Yet, in our country's present situation, does the opportunity to build peace truly exist? For as Pope Paul VI has said, "The firm foundations of peace are honesty, justice, and love in relations between states, within each nation, between citizens themselves and with governments; and the freedom of individuals and peoples . . . otherwise it is not peace that will result" (Day of Peace Message).

Therefore, building peace means first restoring order among persons and thereby within society. The building of peace is the duty of each and every one of us.

We Catholics, members of a community which is both earthly and spiritual, must at all times and in all things respect the truth. Never may anyone falsify it or deceive in one's self interest, or the interest of a party, one's country, or religion itself.

At all cost, we must show respect for justice. Any attack on the material goods or moral welfare of another, whosoever he may be, is a sin which cries out for reparation.

With all our soul, we must safeguard the freedom of our fellow man, as much as our own: Freedom of conscience, complete freedom of speech, and let "no one fear to give his life in the service of his country or his brethren when they are engaged in the defense of justice and freedom" (Day of Peace Message).

Above all, let us live a life of active charity, loving our neighbor as ourselves, because in our neighbor is the image of God: We love God by loving Him in man, and especially in the person of those who suffer, who are hungry, forsaken, sick, exiled, imprisoned, and oppressed.

How shall we have peace if those in whom responsibility at any level is vested content

themselves with "a false rhetoric of words" (day of peace message), if their actions betray sloth, untruth, covetousness, speculation, and theft?

How shall we have peace if citizens no longer believe in their just cause and do not trust one another?

There is no one at this time who is not aware of our country's extremely grave condition.

That is why, dearly beloved, we must, in order to cooperate in the common task of our country's future, build unity amongst all, and thus, live intensely, as true Christians, in truth, justice, and charity—the sole foundations of peace.

Would to God that every Christian would agree to live in austerity, putting aside all excess and luxury on the occasion of the coming Tet (for example, the use of firecrackers, feasting, excessive spending . . .), and be willing to set aside his savings to succor those who are in need.

To that end, we urge all priests who have the cure of souls to: organize a campaign of prayer and sacrifice for peace, because none but God can vouchsafe us peace and none but he can change hearts so that peace may enter therein.

Organize lectures or talks in every parish for all groups of the faithful, in accordance with the message of Pope Paul VI on the day of peace and with this communique, so that each may see his duty, present and future, towards church and homeland.

Frequently consider whether what has been taught in this communique has been put into practice, and to persevere in prayer until peace is restored.

"Peace is part of the essence of the Christian religion, because a Christian, in proclaiming peace, proclaims Jesus Christ: He is our peace" (Eph. 2:14).

His gospel is the "gospel of peace" (Eph. 6:15). Through his sacrifice on the cross, He has brought about universal reconciliation and we, his disciples, are called to be "peacemakers" (Mt. 5:9) (Day of Peace message).

We hereby venture on appeal in friendship to all our brother compatriots who are members of other faiths to join their efforts to ours in the search for peace for our country, a genuine peace in truth, justice, liberty, and charity.

Lastly, with all our might, we appeal to the good will of the governments of both South and North Viet-Nam to build peace together. "In the name of the Lord, we cry out: Stop! You must meet, you must come to the conference table and negotiate in all honesty. The time to settle the conflicts is now, even if it is with some drawbacks and some disadvantages, because later they must be settled, with perhaps widespread injury and disaster the horror of which no one for the moment can imagine" (Enc. Matri Christi).

We conclude by repeating the words of his Holiness Pope Paul VI in his message of May 2, 1967: "Therefore, the bombings of the territory of the north must cease and the infiltrations of arms and war materiel into the south must cease at the same time . . ."

THE CRITICAL COPPER SITUATION

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, the Nation can no longer suffer the injurious situation that continues to prevail in the nationwide copper strike now in its eighth month. I month. I would like to call the attention of the Senate to several new developments in this mammoth labor dispute so that we may all evaluate the seriousness of the situation facing us and properly insist on action by the White House.

First, I think it necessary to call the attention of the Nation to the fact that

by his inaction and refusal to initiate emergency legal provisions that could at least put the mines back in operation for 80 days, the President is playing into the hands of international Communist interests.

That, of course, is a serious charge to make, but there can be no other conclusion. There is only so much copper production available in the world. With the American producers shut down, we have had to turn to other sources. One of these sources has been the London Metal Exchange.

Last Tuesday, I placed in the Record, on pages S1488, S1489, and S1490, a detailed letter from Mr. B. H. Gerwin, assistant to the director, State of Arizona Department of Mineral Resources. Mr. Gerwin goes into great detail as to the origination of these copper replacements to the London Metal Exchange. He points out that while we are technically correct in not trading with Iron Curtain countries, still the effect is the same. I read from an Associated Press dispatch dated London, carried in the Arizona Republic on February 7, page 25, which says:

British and Continental Europe operations have been buying substantial tonnages of copper from East Germany and the Soviet Union to replace supplies they have shipped to the United States to take advantage of high copper prices there during its 7-month copper strike—

And that—

United States consumers are prohibited from buying metal directly from East European countries.

Mr. President, while this part of our copper imports is relatively small in comparison with the amounts purchased from South American and other sources, still I ask: How can the President seek the Nation's full support of the war effort in Vietnam without taking remedial steps that would clear up this strike and stop this aid to our international opponents? By his continued refusal to invoke emergency provisions of existing labor law, we have a situation where we are actually aiding Communist nations in their efforts to overtake us. Certainly it is inconsistent for the President to be fighting communism in Vietnam and assisting it in Europe.

Anyone wishing further substantiation of this information can refer to the material I inserted in the Record last Tuesday, and I have some additional technical tables in my office.

This most serious situation, in addition to being questionable and detrimental psychologically, has the very serious practical effect of continuing to "leave the spigot running," as my distinguished friend from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] expressed it here on the Senate floor the other day. It makes our balance-of-payments situation worse and worse as the strike continues. Even if the strike were settled today there will be a considerable timelag before these shipments already ordered and in the pipeline can be shut off. And it will take some time, of course, for the domestic producers to get production rolling again.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may have an additional 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FANNIN. On top of all these problems the International Longshoremen's Association announced last Thursday, February 22, that they will boycott the handling of copper imports. Mr. President, this is preposterous.

Besides flying in the face of labor's announced support of the Nation's war effort, it is blatantly illegal.

Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act specifically forbids this kind of secondary boycott. Not only would this action by the ILA be in violation of the law, but also, it would have an immediate effect upon the preparation of shell casings and other strategic war materials supporting our fighting men, like the marines at Khe Sanh.

I have a telegram from the president of the Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., in New Brunswick, N.J. I will place the entire telegram in the Record at the end of my remarks, but may I just quote briefly from his wire:

With the intended call to active duty of some 50,000 reservists there arises an important question: what are these men going to use to fire their weapons if all copper is cut off? Surely if there ever was a moment of crisis for Presidential action that moment is now—

A former resident of Arizona, now living in Louisiana, has written to the President about his continued inaction and says, "Our country cannot tolerate this condition any longer."

The Washington Post this morning carried an editorial strongly critical of the inaction besetting the White House, and concluded:

With the ILA disposed to throw its weight around in reckless disregard of the national interest, Taft-Hartley may well be the only feasible answer.

Mr. President, all these statements merely echo what some of my fellow Senators and I have been stating in this room for months and months. The time is long past for the President to take action in the national interest.

General Cable Corp. had scheduled cut in production in more than 40 plants across the country.

On Saturday, the Commerce Department ordered refiners to accept only defense orders and to withhold delivery on orders to all other users. That order still stands. Westinghouse and Western Electric have had to curtail plant activity.

What other evidence does the President need to convince him that a national emergency exists?

I know that the ILA stated Saturday that it had imposed the boycott by a clerical error and was suspending it "temporarily." I suspect their legal department told them they were conducting a "schoolboy case" in the illegal use of secondary boycotts.

But be that as it may, the threat to national security still exists. The sword hangs over the Nation's head by the slenderest of threads. This abuse of union power points to the need for new laws to deal with a new degree of irresponsibility on the part of union leaders.

I say the President must take action today.

This is not the only instance that has prevailed so far. Other Government agencies charged with settling labor problems have been dragging their feet. The evidence is strong that they have been dragging their feet with at least tacit support from the White House.

One of the major producers of copper, Kennecott, which has substantial production in my State, filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board on October 18, 1967. Case No. 27-CB-453 filed in Salt Lake City, Utah. In this particular case the company charged the unions with two specific unfair labor practices under section 8(b) (3) of Taft-Hartley which makes it an unfair labor practice for unions to refuse to bargain.

First, they said the unions are seeking to unilaterally change the bargaining unit. For example, management may not simply say, "I will no longer bargain with all the workers in my machine shop, I will just bargain with the lathe operators." Doing something like that could constitute an unfair labor practice for an employer where the union has been certified by the Board.

Second, the company said the unions' insistence upon companywide bargaining, even though it was a nonmandatory condition, constituted a refusal to bargain. If it is a refusal to bargain, then the union is guilty of an unfair labor practice.

Normally, the investigation of such a complaint takes about 60 days. During this time the NLRB as General Counsel either dismisses the case or files a complaint before the Board. Four months have elapsed, and the General Counsel's office is still "studying" the case.

Mr. President, I submit that such an exhaustive "study" would not be required if this were a complaint against a company, or if the President did not have a personal interest in the case on the side of the unions.

Why do I say he has such a personal interest? Listen to these words uttered by AFL-CIO President George Meany last week in Bal Harbour, Fla.:

The President's record is, and I quote, "equal to or better than the first four years of the Roosevelt Administration." Frankly, I consider it even better for us.

It is clear to even the most unsophisticated observer that the President has done everything in his power to ball out the big unions—and he is still following that course even to the detriment of the Nation. Mr. Meany's effusive praise of the President indicates that our Chief Executive is locked in with big labor, at least until after the elections.

If the NLRB had handled this case within its normal pattern, we well might have had a settlement by this time. I think the President should take his retraining hand off the NLRB and at least let us have a decision. Perhaps some progress can then be made.

Mr. President, the temper of the Nation is rising. An outpouring of public indignation is about to come to pass, in connection with this labor stoppage, that has heretofore been unparalleled. And the public has every reason to be mad.

When will the administration wake up to this naked abuse of union power that threatens to undermine the very foundation of liberty?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following letters, telegrams, articles, and editorials to which I have referred be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

ILA CALLS BOYCOTT OF COPPER IMPORTS

MIAMI BEACH, FLA., February 22.—A longshoremen's boycott against multimillion dollar imports of foreign copper was announced today in a mounting AFL-CIO campaign to aid 60,000 U.S. copper strikers.

At the same time, AFL-CIO president George Meany announced a major financial campaign among all 63,000 affiliated locals to "adopt a copper striker." It is the first such effort to enlist virtually the entire labor movement in a strike in some 40 years, Meany said.

The pledge to boycott all copper shipments was made in a telegram to copper strike leader Joseph P. Molony.

"The International Longshoremen have decided in the interest of helping their fellow trade unionists on strike against the copper companies to refuse to handle all imports and exports of copper in the United States and Canada," said president Thomas W. Gleason of the International Longshoremen's Association.

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, here to talk with AFL-CIO leaders, said earlier that copper imports amount to \$2 million to \$3 million a day since the seven-month-old strike halted most U.S. production.

[The strike, now shaping up as the biggest labor-management confrontation of the decade, has brought domestic copper production to a standstill. Substantial supplies have been imported, including some from foreign subsidiaries of American firms, but it costs twice as much. The inclusion of Canada in the ILA restriction apparently was designed to prevent U.S. importers from bringing copper in from Canada.]

Gleason, in a boycott against shipment of U.S. wheat to Russia several years ago, showed the power of his union to halt the loading or unloading of any cargo at East and Gulf coast ports.

Most copper imports have been coming into U.S. ports from South America.

Wirtz earlier said the Federal Government planned no further intervention in the bitter copper strike, but a boycott that shut off foreign supplies might force the Johnson Administration's hand.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1968]

COPPER EMERGENCY?

The Government cannot stand by and allow the International Longshoremen's Association to embargo shipments of copper in order to aid the strikers who have kept the domestic copper industry idle for seven months. It is true that 40,000 tons of refined copper are being imported monthly to relieve the sharp draw-down of the American stockpile. But this seems to be essential to avoid a dangerous shortage in time of war. It is not the prerogative of the ILA or any other labor union to tell the Government that it may not import necessities in times of emergency. Indeed, it is not the right of organized labor to set Government trade policies in the best of times.

If the situation is not yet critical, it is not far from being so. The national objective is a copper supply of 775,000 tons on hand and in the stockpile. At present the stockpile is down to 284,000 tons, and some of this must be released to the mints. Because of the

In fact, this great Government, even at present, has had some examples of some corruption somewhere. We constantly accuse one another even in this Congress of improper conduct or someone making something that he may not be entitled to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have an additional 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. So it is a matter of degree. We have had scandals and exposures and suggestions, even during this session of Congress, that someone may have obtained an unfair advantage, either in getting a Government loan or in obtaining a contract, or one thing or another, that may have inured to his benefit.

The important thing is that when American boys have gone somewhere in years gone by, they have gone there with the support of their Government. Whenever this Nation has committed its men to the battlefield, it has supported them and it has never let them down.

If the commander in Vietnam should tell us he needs more troops and needs more men to meet aggression from North Vietnam—and greater effort is being made from the north—we should give that courageous fighting man and those we have sent to that field of battle all the support that commander requests and beseeches of this country. The enemy is making a greater effort, and we should make a greater effort.

I have been dismayed to hear some of the statements made on the Senate floor against a friend in arms, one who is willing to take his chances on our side and fight and die resisting Communist aggression, by people who seem to find no time to criticize our enemy.

For instance, I have heard statements that the South Vietnamese will not fight. I notice that in the Tet offensive, which was directed mostly against cities where the South Vietnamese are in charge of holding those places as a part of the pacification program, and against their police force, that the casualties suffered by the South Vietnamese were greater than those suffered by men from this country. The last time I looked at the figures, they had lost about 1,100 men and we had lost about 800 men. That may not sound like a disproportionate loss until one considers the fact that the little Government of South Vietnam had available to them only about 10 million people.

We have a nation of 200 million people. So if it is only able to rely upon 10 million people to support that Government, then a loss of 1,100 men there would be the same as a loss of 25,000 men by the United States of America, in relative terms. That would be parallel to the loss we have sustained in the entire time we have been there.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. I, too, have heard the complaints about the fact that the South Vietnamese were inferior fighters, or

that they were not making a full effort, and that the Americans were holding the frontline.

Actually, during my trip there, it was explained to me that this was done by actual design, because the South Vietnamese had much greater chance of being able to tell who is and who is not a Vietcong. Therefore, in the allocation of the areas for defense, the matter was settled on the basis; the Americans in I Corps were not set up on a conventional war line, and the Vietnamese were handling the rest.

I am glad to hear the Senator point out the discrepancy in reaction of many people, including some of our fellow Senators. I can recall, before we left in order to view the Vietnamese elections at the request of the President, some Senators, one at least, said the entire election was a fraud. This was 2 weeks before we left, 3 weeks before the election.

I said then that if the Senator had information we did not have or the President did not have, I thought he should give him that information; but, on the other hand, if he had no information, but that he apologize to the representatives of the South Vietnamese Government who were trying to put on what I consider to have been as fair, honest, and decent an election as I have ever seen.

I never heard the apology. No more was said about it. But that is an example of the inconsistency that the distinguished Senator from Louisiana points out. Nobody has complained about the more than 1,000 people killed during the 3 days before the election, in order to frighten the voters from the polls and to terrorize the people from voting. We did not hear about that, I assure the Senator it happened.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, those people did the best they could to hold the best election they could. This Nation certainly used its best efforts to assure that the election represented the will of the people. The Communists did everything they could to prevent the election from being held at all.

We invited observers to go there. I do not know of anyone who observed any irregularity that occurred in the election; but let me say, Mr. President, that if there had been, it would not be too surprising, for that is a very young nation over there, trying to sustain itself against the Communist effort to destroy it.

Our own Nation has known what it is to experience corruption, even in a state of maturity or semimaturity, as the case may be. In my own experience, I can recall some ballot boxes which I felt never did have a proper count, where I either got too many votes or did not get enough.

I was critical about that to a man who had something to do with it, and he said, "The first time those votes went to you."

I said, "I know they did; and I think you stole them that time, too."

I always doubted that there has ever been a proper count in some particular boxes.

In spite of such matters, this Nation has made great headway; but we are a mature nation, whereas others whose state of maturity leaves much to be desired have greater problems.

What kind of elections do the Communists have? In a Communist country, either you go to the polls and vote the one ticket—there is only one to vote for—or else they send you off to a labor camp. If you do not vote for the government they either shoot you or put you in slave labor. Somebody taps on your door at night, and that is the last that is seen of you in that community.

So those who may find some fault with the election process might keep in mind that the one thing that the Communists do not want is any election at all if it is to represent the free, un intimidated will of the people.

Mr. President, there has been some talk about the will or the desire of the South Vietnamese to maintain their own defense. When the Geneva Accord was signed, those who wanted to go south could go south, and those who wanted to go north could go north. Many did. By overwhelming numbers, they moved to the south—people preferring not to live under the Communist regime that controls North Vietnam. That is an indication of how the people felt.

Furthermore, Mr. President, the sacrifices made by that small nation have been very great indeed. It is simply amazing how some people, Senators as well as others, seem to find ways to criticize friends rather than thank the merciful Lord that we do have some people on our side in this world. They should be, I suggest, finding fault with the enemy, and with the atrocities and the vicious means the enemy has resorted to, rather than with our friends.

For example, something was said about the fact that the South Vietnamese are not drafting 18-year-olds. They are extending their draft age down to draft 18-year-olds. It is my understanding that the executive wanted to draft 18-year-olds, but his parliamentary body did not want to go along with that. Now I understand the program is being put into effect to draft 19-year-olds, and then 18-year-olds.

Let us make a comparison for a moment, to see whether those people are making a fair contribution. They have an army of 600,000 people, bearing the brunt of battle, suffering more casualties in the Tet offensive than we have suffered thus far. That is 600,000 people out of a potential of 10 million men, women, and children. A 600,000-man army, under those circumstances, in a nation one-twentieth the size of the United States, would compare to an army of more than 10 million people in the United States. In other words, we would have to raise an army of at least 10 million to have as big an army compared to population, as the army of South Vietnam.

We only have an army of 3 million, and of our 3 million, only 500,000 of them are in Vietnam, where they are subject to the danger that exists there. Those people have an army of 600,000.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for such length of time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Those people have an army of 600,000, which, as I say, would mean, compared to population, an army of 10 million if we were putting that big an army into the field. That army is all theirs. So they are making, relatively speaking, 20 times the effort in terms of men on the fighting line—and they are there, and not just for a year or two, but for the whole duration. If they lose, they are subject to being exterminated because they did lose. Just look at what has happened to their village chieftains, when those Communists have come in, taken over, and chopped their heads off, destroyed the villages, and killed the women and children because they dared express some sympathy for our side, rather than sympathy for the other side.

So, Mr. President, the sacrifices the South Vietnamese have made clearly indicate that they do not want to be under Communist control.

Let us keep in mind, there are about an equal number of people in South Vietnam and in North Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Government has under its control only about 64 percent of its people; about one-third of its people are supporting the other side. Perhaps the figures are somewhat more favorable than that, but let us assume that that represents about the division that exists at the moment.

If we add the numbers in South Vietnam supporting the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to those in North Vietnam, then they outnumber the people of South Vietnam by about 2 to 1. So if that little nation is to maintain its independence against all the efforts being made against it by ruthless Communist tactics and methods, then they are going to require some assistance in the struggle that is going on at present.

We have been giving that nation some help. We have been giving it assistance. We have put a half million men there. I do not agree, Mr. President, with the assessment of those who say this Tet offensive was a great success for the Communists. Our indications are that our side lost about 2,000 killed, about half of those being Americans.

The Communists lost about 40,000. The ratio of their loss when compared to ours was about 20 to 1. Someone said those figures are too high. Let us reduce them and assume that it was half that much.

The American figures are obtained by body count, by actually counting the bodies and the captured weapons. However, if we reduce our figures by one-half, we would still have to say that they had 20,000 killed.

Mr. President, that is a very heavy loss for an enemy making an attack. If we were to lose 20,000 against a loss of 2,000 on the other side of the battle, that would be an extremely heavy loss.

I do not know how we will win these wars except by fighting them. As much as I hate to see a single American boy killed in battle, when the Nation's honor

and very survival and the survival of those nations friendly to us are at stake, someone must fight. Someone must be hurt. Someone must make the sacrifice to hold the frontline. The young men of my generation did it. And young men of this generation are doing it now. However, if we are to prevail in any struggle, we will have to fight. And I would think that if the enemy sees fit to make his assault on the cities and winds up with a loss of 10,000 or 20,000 to 1 when compared to our losses, that would be a better way for us to do the job than by digging them out of foxholes one by one. If we were to dig them out of the foxholes, our ratio of loss would be much greater than it has been in this instance.

I ask of the Senators who think that the Communists have won a great victory by their Tet offensive: Suppose we knew we could count on 60,000 or 80,000 people rising against the Castro government in Cuba on the call of our Government and suppose we called on those people to start their major offensive and suppose those people had attacked the cities and had been utterly defeated in every city within a week, having been holed up in one place for 3 weeks and then being left holding nothing, but having lost 40,000 people who had been killed and having killed only 2,000 of the Castro troops, what do the Senators think would happen with regard to the American President who called upon those people to engage in an uprising? I know what would happen. We would want to impeach him. We would say to him, "Why would you sacrifice all of those lives in a charge of the lost brigade? You lost 20 men to get one. Why would you sacrifice those people in that way?" We would want to impeach such a President if he were to call on people to make any such assault.

It utterly amazes me to hear some Senator talking about the Communist success and victory. They destroyed a lot of buildings, and there will be a lot of property damaged by the time we overwhelm the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. However, that is part of warfare. Our forebears in the South knew what it was when the South suffered a great deal of destruction in warfare.

Our courageous friends and allies who stood by our side in years gone by, the British and others, made tremendous sacrifices. They never regretted it because they wanted their own governments to prevail.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I was interested in the reference of the Senator to the city of Hue. I was in Hue. I went through the city, and I was amazed to hear the story of the old palace located there. I have not pointed out before what was told me when I was there.

The palace of Hue was overrun by the Vietcong 4 years ago. It was overrun three times.

There was nobody in the palace when I was there. Nobody was living there. The palace was absolutely empty. I have photographs in my office which I took. The only people present there were some youngsters, little urchins, that were down

in one of the moats where there was a mud puddle. They were playing in a little puddle of water down below. No one lived in that ancient palace.

One of the reasons why the attack took so long is that that palace was old. It was highly regarded. The palace had been the summer home of ancient Chinese who used to go to Hue as their summer resort. We therefore took a lot of time in that battle so as to avoid the destruction of the palace.

The newspapers, however, proclaim that that palace was a regularly operating palace. I assure the Senator that there is nothing there. And there had not been anything there for some time. The Vietcong had overrun it three times the last 4 years.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, someone will sooner or later recognize that what is happening is part of a global struggle in which either we will prevail or the other side will prevail.

Mr. MURPHY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. At some point we will reach a detente or a modus vivendi where the two powers will agree on a location to draw a line and then say to one another: "You will not cross this line. And if you cross the line, we will fight you until you go back where you come from."

We recognize that we will not cross the line into the other man's territory.

If one looks at it in those terms, he must recognize that people are very important commodities—about the most important thing there is on this side of heaven.

When the Communist powers have under their control 94 percent of the people on this planet, we will not prevail or successfully resist with the other 6 percent.

While some do not regard communism as being all that great a threat to us, we saw the Communists increase the number of people held under a Communist form of government by about threefold when Red China became part of the Communist orbit. If we are going to withdraw from South Vietnam, we will never have the support of our people to go back to that part of the world, and the people there would not want us back. People would see the new order emerging and would be fearful to stand against it. We would see all of Asia eventually controlled and dominated by the Communists. That would mean about 900 million to 1 billion people more than they presently have. That would double the number of people under their control.

Then, when the Communists have control of that many people, is the United States really going to fight to hold the Near East when the Communists move in that direction? I doubt it.

I have seen the polls concerning how the people felt when the war broke out in the Near East between the Israeli and the Arabs. The polls were overwhelmingly against sending U.S. troops over there because the people had noticed the cost in money and lives of sustaining our commitments in Vietnam.

If the Communists have all of Asia and practically all of Europe, how far will we go toward protecting Africa? I doubt that we would want to send any army there at that point.

They would be leapfrogging then into Latin America.

If we are to be the kind of people who blanch at the sight of blood, if we do not have the fortitude to see it through when we have an ally standing shoulder to shoulder with us, seeking to maintain his own independence, I doubt that this Nation would be willing to fight in other areas of the world.

I know that when we had witnessed the Communist takeover underway in the Dominican Republic, a great many of those who want us to withdraw from South Vietnam then wanted us to stay out of the Dominican Republic. They said we had no right to go there, although we had all sorts of evidence indicating that this was a Communist takeover.

If we had not acted then, we would have been confronted with, not one, but two Communist powers in this hemisphere.

The costs are great and the stakes are enormous. In my judgment, this Nation cannot afford to accept defeat as an answer in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I suppose I would be criticized by even those who support the President because I have wanted to do more than we are doing.

I have felt that the Port of Haiphong, in North Vietnam, should be closed. I have felt that we should do some things that entail greater risk, knowing that to fail to do them would mean that the enemy could move in more equipment.

The general feeling of the American people from the very beginning has been that we have to support this Government, from the time we began sending large numbers of troops to South Vietnam, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The overwhelming majority of the people would say that they do not understand how we came to be there; that they are rather confused about how we became so deeply committed to begin with, but that we are there and we should see it through.

But I will say that the American people—those who support the war—are getting more and more dissatisfied and disgusted with the proposal of another pause or of pulling our punches while the enemy is slugging our boys with everything he has.

The idea of leaving that port open, with those ships coming in day after day, bringing supplies and the latest type of equipment to use against the Americans, is repugnant to the average American, who is willing to make his fair share of the sacrifice for victory. But the idea of having another bombing pause, in the hope that the enemy might negotiate, would be a very bad mistake. It would outrage the people who are supporting this Government, the people who are for defeating Communists, the people who are for fighting for freedom, the people who are willing to make great sacrifice, even though it might come close to home, and who do not regret standing by their Nation in a time of need and standing by

our national honor and our national commitments. It would make them resentful and outraged, that this Nation, in the midst of a fight, when the enemy was not asking for any talks or negotiations, would simply stop fighting, pull its punches, and let them slug us while we stand there and fail to use the means available to us to hurt the enemy and to make it difficult for him to bring in supplies and equipment to be used against us.

If the President should yield to those who want us to have another pause, who want us to restrain our fighting men while the other fellow slugs them, remember what happened when we quit fighting for about 12 hours during Tet. Look at what they did then in complete violation of their word.

The only way I know to fight a war is to fight until the enemy feels he has been hurt badly enough so that he is ready to quit or to settle for something less than victory. We have made it clear that we are willing to negotiate, we are willing to talk peace, but that we are not willing to settle for anything less than an honorable peace.

Any pause or any other device to keep Americans from using the power of this great Nation to prevail in the struggle in which we are engaged, will prove to be a great mistake. It will prove to be a Communist trap, laid and baited all over the world for America to fall into.

Mr. President, in view of the fact that Mr. U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has suggested this, I believe I should say, as one who has served at the United Nations—at least, during one of its sessions—that I have been very disappointed in the performance of that organization. It brings to our notice the fact that the United Nations is not what it was intended to be and it is not capable of doing what it was intended to do, and the sooner we recognize this, the better off we will be. When the United Nations was organized, it was thought that it would be an organization of peace-loving peoples seeking to work together for peace. The Communist powers are not in that category. Just look at article I of the United Nations Charter.

As was so well pointed out to me on one occasion by former Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes, those Communist powers are not interested in working together for peace. They are interested in destroying our institutions, destroying our form of government, and enslaving everyone, until freedom as we know it does not exist anywhere.

When the United Nations was organized, the question was asked, What happens if the five big powers cannot together? That was the answer to the \$64 question. What happens if one power vetoes every resolution passed by the Security Council to resist aggression, maintain peace, and mutual security? The answer given was that if the five big powers could not work together, nothing could be achieved. Mr. President, what the United Nations has achieved and nothing are just about the same.

Some might say that we had some help from the United Nations when we decided to resist aggression in Korea. What

little help we got there we paid for more dearly than it was worth by letting so-called friendly nations know what we were getting ready to do. Many of those nations were so infiltrated with Communist spies in their security operations that the information leaked to our enemy within a matter of hours before troops could be moved, that we were going to make an attack at one place or another, that we were going to retreat at one place or another, or that we had a strategic plan of one type or another.

Do not take my word for it. Take the word of General MacArthur. I heard him testify before the Committee on Armed Services when he returned. I was a member of the committee at that time. He said that any time he told the United Nations anything he was planning to do, the enemy knew it almost before he could move.

You need not stop there. Read the reports that are now available. Consider the case of the British spies Burgess, McLean, and Philby, Burgess and McLean were at the desks dealing with relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. They were employed in sensitive positions by Great Britain. At that time, this country had an understanding with Clement Atlee's government that we would not use atomic weapons without consulting them and giving them a chance to express themselves on the matter.

A man named Philby had infiltrated the British intelligence to the point that he was at the head of the Soviet desk in intelligence. He was also a spy for the Soviet Union. So the spies in Great Britain alone were enough to get them any information they needed so long as General MacArthur was compelled to act as a commander for the United Nations. While we put up 90 percent of the troops and paid for much of the expenses of the remainder, the United Nations mantle made it possible for our adversary to know what he needed to know to make his most important decisions.

If the Chinese Communists came into that struggle in Korea, they were well in position to know that they would be warned in advance in the event the United States saw fit to use the appropriate weapon against the hordes of Chinese Communists—that is, atomic weapons. At that time Red China did not have atomic weapons. Red China was the aggressor. Red China was not a part of the United Nations. The United Nations had voted to resist aggression—the one time that the Security Council could act because the Russians were boycotting—were vetoing the Security Council at the time. The Communist powers were in a position to know, through the spies they had in the British Government, that this Nation was going to use atomic weapons and that they would have time to get out of there if we did decide to use such weapons.

People in the British Government, such as Philby, Burgess, and McLean, would be in a position to warn the Red Chinese aggressors well in advance before the United States could resort to the use of atomic weapons. Knowledge that we would not use atomic weapons was

what the Communist powers needed to assure the Chinese Communists success when they came into North Korea.

So that what we might have gained by having the United Nations with us in Korea, we lost many times over by the fact that Red China could enter the war, knowing that they had available to them the spies who had infiltrated many friendly nations of the United Nations, to warn them what we were planning to do and what we might do in reaction to their offense, and the burden of coming to terms with countries which were not going to send anything more than an ambulance to Korea, they were trying to hold back the United States and keep us from using our power to win the war in the event that we decided to use our great power to defeat the Communists.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. As a student of these matters, it was even worse than the question of the use of atomic weapons. It is clear that the MacArthur policy to withdraw, cut off Chinese supply lines, and cut off bridges on the Yalu River could have been done with 10 aircraft and with the loss of no personnel whatever, and this was not permitted. The order was countermanded in Washington.

It is a great deal the same as the condition we find today where Army targets are selected in Washington by civilians. I feel, as many other people feel, and as they have expressed to me, the time has not only come but has passed when military decisions in South Vietnam should be made by military experts and not by civilians; and that the time has come where we do not have a choice of withdrawing or settling on Communist terms, but the third option should be permitted, the choice of winning.

We have not begun to use American fire power in many areas. There have been restraints, and it has gotten to the point where it is a national scandal.

I agree with the Senator that we dare not attempt to or give up that bastion that is the left flank of our entire protection. The manner in which the military have been restrained in the way the war is being fought has contributed to unnecessary lengthening of the war.

I know military experts who said 2 years ago we should do the same thing they wanted to do in Korea: Cut off enemy supply lines and make it impossible for them to fight and it will be over. This is not escalation or the use of atomic weapons; it is deescalation. The military experts have begged to do this.

Now we are faced with a situation, as the Senator has described, where a small group is surrounded by a large group of 40,000 troops. Why do we permit this grouping and permit them to select the time to move? Why do we permit them the sanctuary when it is not in our best interest?

I know the Senator agrees with me when I say that no one in this Chamber is in favor of war. I know every Senator

here would like to find a solution to this matter and achieve peace; but, and God help us, once we are in a war and forced to be involved in it, I think that good sense, propriety, and national honor demand that we fight hard, that we win as quickly as we can, and that we get it over as quickly as possible, and thereby cut down the miserable loss of life and goods.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the Senator from California.

The point I sought to make with respect to the United Nations is that today the United Nations is an impediment to the United States organizing something to be what the United Nations is not and never will be: an effective mutual security organization for world peace.

One of these days we should tell those whom we permit ourselves to aid in their defense that they are going to have to do their share to help defend their neighbors and to help defend themselves, and that unless and until they do make their share of the sacrifice and do their part, we will not defend them.

If we cannot obtain enough takers in Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world, if we cannot obtain enough friends and allies to stand with us on that basis of all for one and one for all, to stand against aggression, eventually we would be wise to retire behind these two big oceans and take the attitude that we will defend the land we hold and the area that comprises the Western Hemisphere and let those other people suffer whatever fate may befall them.

Otherwise we are in for a trend toward neutralism with everyone saying, "Let Uncle Sam do it," with no one standing beside us or coming to our assistance when we fight to defend a country which is willing to defend its own frontiers but not willing to help defend its neighbors, to the extent that we would be constantly confronted with a growing Communist bloc which is a billion people now and will be more than a billion people in the future.

When atomic weapons are generally available, the probability is that we will never fight an atomic war because of the tremendous devastation of atomic weapons, with both sides realizing it would not be to their advantage. If such a struggle of this Nation against Communist powers took place without atomic weapons the fact that we are outnumbered 5 to 1 almost assures that we could not prevail in the absence of atomic weapons, and to use them would be suicidal for both sides.

However, we could, even when confronted with such numbers, defend our Nation and defend the countries of this hemisphere behind these two great oceans if we moved in time to hold this hemisphere secure from them.

Mr. President, I very much hope that General Westmoreland will be provided with whatever troops he requests and that the Congress will do whatever is necessary to sustain our fighting men and fulfill the commitment this Nation has made to a small nation which is fighting to resist Communist aggression.

INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2516) to prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NEW HAMPSHIRE—AN INDUSTRIAL STATE AS WELL AS A FAMOUS VACATIONLAND

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, as the networks, wire services, and newspapers have put the State of New Hampshire under their journalistic microscopes, they have reported that the Granite State is the second most industrialized State in the Union.

This apparently surprised several of our colleagues.

They have said to me, in effect, New Hampshire is justly famous as a vacationland, but is it true that industry is such a large factor in the economy of your State?

My answer is that of course it is true, and quite logically so.

The development of land and air transportation routes has put New Hampshire next door to the commercial centers of the Nation.

This alone would have stimulated industrial development.

But, in addition, New Hampshire has been fortunate in becoming the home of industries whose success depends upon creative and inventive managements and staffs working in a stimulating atmosphere.

The State's largest employer, Sanders Associates, Inc., of Nashua, N.H., illustrates, very clearly, this type of industrial growth.

Statistics of the usual indicators trace Sanders' growth since its foundation in 1951—but they do not tell the whole story.

For example, Sanders' income rose steadily from less than \$10 million in 1958 to more than \$67 million in 1966, and spurred to just under \$140 million in fiscal 1967. There are 400,000 square feet of facilities under construction which will bring the total to 1,900,000 square feet. Although much of this is in New Hampshire, this rapidly expanding firm also has plants in Massachusetts, Maine, New York, and Virginia. Total employment grew in the last fiscal year from 5,400 to over 9,100 and by the end of February 1968, it had passed the 10,000 mark.

Today Sanders is a leading Government supplier; the 27th largest research and development contractor for the Department of Defense, the 50th largest Department of Defense contractor, overall, and the 51st largest contractor to NASA. Industry and civilian arms of

ALD/tm

Mrs. Mira

Mr. Narasimhan
Mr. Rolz-Bennett
Mr. Kittani
Mr. Lemieux
Registry

21 March 1968

Dear Mr. Stark,

I thank you very much for your letter of 8 March 1968 concerning Viet-Nam to which was attached the text of a statement which you made on 10 March on this subject. I have read your suggestions with interest and wish to let you know how much I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending them to me.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Mr. Abe Stark
President of the Borough of Brooklyn
Borough Hall
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201



ABE STARK
PRESIDENT

PRESIDENT OF THE BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN
CITY OF NEW YORK

ACTION

March 8, 1968

TO:	MR. NARASIMHAN
1	
2	
3	
<input type="checkbox"/> - Action Completed	
<input type="checkbox"/> - Action Pending	
<input type="checkbox"/> - No Action Required	
INITIALS	

PO 240 PI

Honorable U Thant
Office of the Secretary General
United Nations
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

The terrible toll of human life taken by the tragic war in Vietnam continues to be a source of grievous concern to all mankind.

The many efforts you have made to halt this dreadful conflict are known throughout the world.

There are many who share the regret I know you feel over the fact that the belligerents have failed to respond to the many efforts which have been exerted heretofore to bring about a cessation of the hostilities.

In the hope that a new method may be found to bring about meaningful peace negotiations I have just recently communicated my views to President Lyndon B. Johnson and am providing the print and electronic news media with a statement of the views I have expressed.

Herewith I am taking the liberty of forwarding to you a copy of this statement in the event that the same may be of interest to you.

With my personal respects, I am

Sincerely yours,

Encl.

President

Abe Stark

Read into it.
Pl. ask him
with thanks.
m
18/1
Jon

NEWS

BOROUGH OF BROOKLYN

OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
PRESIDENT, BOROUGH OF BROOKLYN
BOROUGH HALL, BROOKLYN, N. Y. 11201
Phone: 643-2088-2089

ABE STARK, President

FOR RELEASE:

P.M., SUNDAY, MARCH 10, 1968

A.M., MONDAY, 11

BOROUGH PRESIDENT STARK, IN APPEAL TO L.B.J., ASKS "OPEN-DOOR" PARLEY ON VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE

Brooklyn Borough President Abe Stark voiced his belief today (SUN) that "the terrible loss of life" suffered by both sides in the tragic Vietnam war makes it essential for the belligerent powers and non-aligned nations to embrace a wholly new peace formula that would bring about a complete cease-fire.

Declaring the world would more fully understand and realize the sincerity of America's own commitment to the goal of peace if it led the way in sponsoring such a policy, Mr. Stark revealed that he has sent a personal letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson urging its consideration by his administration.

In essence, the Brooklyn official's proposal calls for an "open-door" international conference in which the participants would include all the forces directly or indirectly embroiled in the conflict; a group of non-aligned peace-minded nations; Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations, and representatives accredited to the Vatican in recognition of Pope Paul's own "long and prayerful search for peace."

With the statement that his suggestion was being offered "in a spirit of helpfulness," Mr. Stark's letter to the President stated, in part:

(MORE)

"It is my complete conviction that world opinion would hail and welcome a conference such as this, provided it proved to be agreeable to your Administration and the six Allied Nations which, like our own, are committed to ending aggression against South Vietnam and in other parts of Southeast Asia.

"The attention of all nations and, most notably, the Asian-Western Pacific countries would be focused upon this conference and the impetus it would provide toward meaningful peace negotiations.

"The world at large would more fully understand and realize the sincerity of America's commitment to the goal of peace.

"But, most of all, in my opinion, it would offer a reborn hope of bringing to an end at last the terrible loss of life which has marked the intensification of the war."

Mr. Stark said his letter was sent to the White House only a few days ago and just 24 hours before the United States Command's announcement in Saigon that a near-record total of 542 American troops had been killed in combat, only one less than the highest GI weekly toll of the entire war.

The Borough President's letter emphasized the war's toll of human life was constantly "worsening" and that "as the struggle becomes fiercer more lives are being lost during each passing week."

Mr. Stark cited estimates showing that, from the beginning of 1964 to December, 1967, the Vietcong and North Vietnam had lost 188,000 men killed in action and that during the same period the Allied countries consisting of the United States, South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines had lost nearly 55,000 slain in combat.

(MORE)

"Not including the toll taken when the bloodiest attacks of the war were launched in the midst of the Tet New Year holiday truce only a few weeks ago," the letter said, "it seems clear that the toll of lives lost approached nearly one-fourth of a million men, and that it has gone considerably higher since the beginning of the more recent Communist offensives.

"Yet no one, I am sure, can find any solace whatever in these losses, and especially in the countless innocent and helpless civilians who have lost their lives either as a result of bombing errors or because of the ruthless policy of assassination and execution carried on by the Vietcong terror squads. It is always to be remembered that the killing of these innocent adults and children and the consequent anguish to their families are all closely related to the tragedy Vietnam has become.

"In these circumstances it would now appear that a large segment of our population, including this largest residential center of New York City, have come to the conclusion that the search for a negotiated peace must be pursued even more vigorously than heretofore and must begin with a significant cessation of the bombing raids on North Vietnam."

A substantial part of the letter was devoted to a listing of times in 1965, 1966 and 1967 when U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam were suspended without producing a response from Hanoi toward peace negotiations. Mr. Stark said these cessations of bombing raids were often overlooked or forgotten. He also pointed out that during truce periods the cease-fire conditions "were frequently and deceitfully violated by the Vietcong."

These facts, Mr. Stark noted, were some of the more salient parts of the record "as the United States itself and many additional peace-minded nations of the world have pursued the search for peace."

"Second to none in these efforts," he said, "have been the Secretary General of the United Nations and His Holiness Pope Paul VI. In particular, every effort of your own has been exerted in the spirit of America's traditional commitment to the cause of world peace. In all these efforts you have made it abundantly clear that America's goal is peace and, as you have explicitly stated, "peace at the earliest moment."

Specifically, Mr. Stark noted the San Antonio formula proclaimed by the President in his speech of September 29, 1967.

He said that to date each and every effort to reconvene the Geneva Conference had failed and that, in addition, there had been no response to a proposal for an enlarged Geneva meeting at which the United States would be prepared to accept participation by the National Liberation Front as the political arm of the Vietcong.

Inasmuch as there now appeared to be no other available forum for peace discussions, Mr. Stark said it was time to invoke a new approach. He suggested Manila could be chosen again, but

(MORE)

with an altogether different agenda than the original Manila Conference of 1966 when the allied powers adopted a four-point "Declaration of Peace" not only for war-torn Vietnam, but for all Asia.

"Instead of being limited to the United States and its allies," he wrote, "it is my suggestion that invitations to become participants in the conference should be extended to the major powers, Red China included; to Hanoi, and to the National Liberation Front. In addition, it is my firm belief that the Secretary General of the United Nations and a group of non-allied countries should be participants, and that the Vatican itself should be accredited in view of Pope Paul's long and prayerful search for peace.

"With an open-door policy such as this it would be my hope that the agenda of the conference be confined solely to political discussion, intended to bring about a complete ceasefire and the disengagement of all armed personnel throughout North and South Vietnam at an agreed-upon date.

"Actually, and it is to be greatly emphasized, this would be in the spirit of the draft resolution which Ambassador Goldberg hopefully prepared in November 1967 for presentation to the Security Council of the United Nations. This resolution clearly emphasized that a solution to the Vietnam problem was to be found through political and not military means and that a peaceful solution should be reached through negotiation, considering that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 constitute a workable basis for peace in Southeast Asia."

#

7
CWI/CC

cc: Mr. Lemieux

27 May 1968

Dear Congressman Talcott,

On behalf of the Secretary-General I acknowledge your letter to him dated 22 May with which you enclosed an editorial from the Las Angeles Times of 16 May, sent to you by one of your constituents. I have brought your communication to the attention of the Secretary-General.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet

The Honourable Burt L. Talcott
Congressman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

BURT L. TALCOTT
CALIFORNIA, 12TH DISTRICT

COUNTIES
KINGS, MONTEREY, SAN BENITO,
SAN LUIS OBISPO AND SANTA CRUZ

DISTRICT OFFICE
44 WEST ALISAL STREET
SALINAS, CALIFORNIA 93901
408-424-6447

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.
May 22, 1968

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

REGIONAL MINORITY WHIP

WASHINGTON OFFICE
LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202-225-2861

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is an editorial from the May 16th. issue of the Los Angeles Times charging that the Secretary General uses a double standard in reference to the Vietnam War.

One of my constituents who believes the editorial states the situation accurately, has asked me to forward it to your office.

Sincerely,

Burt L. Talcott
BURT L. TALCOTT
U. S. Congressman

The Office of the Honorable U Thant
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York City, New York

Enclosure

Los Angeles Times

LIBERTY UNDER THE LAW

TRUE INDUSTRIAL FREEDOM

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HARRY CHANDLER, 1917-1944

NORMAN CHANDLER

Chairman & Chief Executive, Times Mirror Company

OTIS CHANDLER

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COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

REGIONAL MINORITY WHIP

WASHINGTON OFFICE

LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

202-225-2861

4-Part II

THURSDAY MORNING, MAY 16, 1968

The Times' official position on issues is expressed only in the two columns below. Other material on this and the next page is the opinion of the individual writer or cartoonist, and does not necessarily reflect that of The Times, unless otherwise indicated.

U Thant: The Double Standard

We do not doubt U Thant's sincerity in wanting peace for Southeast Asia. Neither do we doubt that the U.N. secretary general would very much like to claim a major share of credit for ending the Vietnam fighting. His peacemaking career up to now has not, after all, been particularly distinguished, and each setback has fed the need for personal vindication.

Such ambition is not of itself bad. U Thant's wish for a settlement in Vietnam is shared by millions, and certainly from the position he occupies he has the duty to do everything in his power to encourage the cause of peace, anywhere in the world.

But given that position, how he goes about doing this is of special importance.

Unfortunately, a review of the secretary general's public statements on Vietnam reveals a progressive one-sidedness in his position on the war. Perhaps out of desperation with the inflexible attitude of the Communist side—not an unfamiliar response—perhaps for other reasons, U Thant, along with others, has sought more and more to place the responsibility for the war almost entirely on the United States.

In the process he has increasingly and disingenuously overlooked even the most outrageous Communist transgressions.

The latest manifestation of U Thant's selective indignation came in a speech in Canada this week. Once more he implied that the "savage war" in Vietnam could be ended if only the United States halted fully and unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam—as if the bombing were in fact the central issue of the conflict! Once more he reserved virtually all of his anguish for the victims of "bombs, napalm and rockets."

As an expression of moral fervor this may read very well. But such fervency, divorced from political and human reality, in the end emerges as rather crude propaganda. To perpetuate half-truths is to give support, willing or not, to lies.

Consider: on Tuesday, in Paris, Hanoi's spokesman once more said it was a "slander" that North Vietnamese troops are fighting in South Vietnam. The Hanoi spokesman was simply lying. The limited bombing of the north now going on, which U Thant condemns, is a direct response to the continued Communist infiltration.

Did U Thant denounce this lie, thereby at least putting the Communists on notice that "world opinion" is not theirs to command? No.

Consider a second example: last month the bodies of about 1,000 civilians murdered in cold blood by the Communists were found in mass graves around Hue. The physical and eyewitness evidence of these atrocities was abundant.

Can one recall the secretary general, or those who generally echo his views, deploring these crimes against humanity with even a fraction of the ardor they devote to damning U.S. bombing? Their silence was thunderous.

This double standard of morality involves more than a dubious political commitment, and this is the greater tragedy. By casting a blind eye on the crimes, the lies and the duplicity of the Communists, U Thant and other such one-sided opponents of the war offer an encouragement to them to remain as unyielding as ever in the search for peace.

It is a signal Hanoi has read loud and clear.

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CVN/mpd

18 July 1968

Dear Senator Brooke,

On my return to New York I have read with great interest the remarks made by you on the subject of Viet-Nam, which you were kind enough to bring to my attention in your letter of 28 June. My views on the war in Viet-Nam are well known, and I have no doubt you are aware of them.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

The Honourable Edward W. Brooke
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. Lemieux

✓
1 November 1968

The following statement by Ambassador Wiggins was read to correspondents at 12:50 p.m. by John Stuart, Jr., US Delegation Press Officer:

"We are pleased to note that the Secretary-General shares the gratification, which has been so widely demonstrated, that the United States has now found it possible to halt the bombardment of North Viet Nam."

Mr. Stuart said that the United States delegation had had a number of direct communications from other delegations and expressions in committees and other bodies. "We are gratified by that response," he said.

5/16

TO: THE SECRETARY - GENERAL

For you.

F-

has
10/15

THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

May 16, 1969

Dr. Ralph Bunche
United Nations

Dear Ralph:

I thought the Secretary General would like
to see the text of Ambassador Lodge's
statement in Paris which we have just re-
ceived.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill", written in dark ink.

William B. Buffum

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U.S. OPENING STATEMENT
DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE
AT THE SEVENTEENTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE
PARIS MEETINGS ON VIET-NAM

MAY 16, 1969

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

LAST WEDNESDAY EVENING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MADE A
PROPOSAL FOR PEACE -- A PROPOSAL WHICH CAN END THE FIGHTING IN
VIET-NAM AND ESTABLISH PEACE ON A JUST AND DURABLE BASIS.

PRESIDENT NIXON STATED THE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
IN CLEAR AND SIMPLE TERMS. WE SEEK THE OPPORTUNITY, HE SAID, FOR
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL
FUTURE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

SEVERAL OTHER POINTS ARE CLEAR. IN THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS, AND
I QUOTE:

"-- WE SEEK NO BASES IN VIET-NAM.

"-- WE INSIST ON NO MILITARY TIES.

"-- WE ARE WILLING TO AGREE TO NEUTRALITY IF THAT IS WHAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FREELY CHOOSE.

"--WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM BY ALL POLITICAL ELEMENTS THAT ARE PREPARED TO DO SO WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE OR INTIMIDATION.

"-- WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM THAT RESULTS FROM THE FREE CHOICE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

"-- WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF IMPOSING ANY FORM OF GOVERNMENT UPON THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, NOR WILL WE BE A PARTY TO SUCH COERCION.

"-- WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO REUNIFICATION, IF THAT TURNS OUT TO BE WHAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND NORTH VIET-NAM WANT; WE ASK ONLY THAT THE DECISION REFLECT THE FREE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED."

LET ME NOW SUM UP PRESIDENT NIXON'S FURTHER WORDS, AS FOLLOWS:

IN PURSUING THIS LIMITED OBJECTIVE, WE INSIST ON NO RIGID DIPLOMATIC FORMULA. PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED BY A FORMAL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. OR IT COULD BE ACHIEVED BY AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING, PROVIDED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING IS CLEAR AND THAT THERE ARE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE OBSERVED. AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, "PEACE ON PAPER IS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS PEACE IN FACT."

A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL PERMIT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE FREELY THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE MUST BE BASED ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES. FIRST, SUCH A SETTLEMENT WILL REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM. SECOND, IT WILL REQUIRE PROCEDURES FOR POLITICAL CHOICE THAT GIVE EACH SIGNIFICANT GROUP IN SOUTH VIET-NAM A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE NATION.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT POLITICAL ISSUES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ALONG WITH MILITARY ISSUES AND THAT THERE MUST BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

PRESIDENT THIEU OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM HAS GONE FAR, PRESIDENT NIXON SAID, TOWARD OPENING THE WAY TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE HAS PUBLICLY DECLARED HIS GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND HAS OFFERED FREE ELECTIONS. IT WAS A REASONABLE OFFER THAT COULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT. AS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS OFFERED TO TALK WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR SIDE SHOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO TALK WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS.

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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM RECOGNIZES, AS WE DO, THAT A SETTLEMENT MUST PERMIT ALL PERSONS AND GROUPS THAT ARE PREPARED TO RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE TO PARTICIPATE FREELY IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A PROCESS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR CHOICE, A GUARANTEE THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD BE FAIR.

WE DO NOT INSIST ON A PARTICULAR FORM OF GUARANTEE. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT GUARANTEES SHOULD HAVE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE BROAD ENOUGH AND STRONG ENOUGH TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL MAJOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE GROUPS.

THIS, THEN, IS THE OUTLINE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT WE SEEK TO NEGOTIATE AT THESE PARIS MEETINGS. ITS BASIC TERMS ARE SIMPLE: MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM, AND FREE CHOICE FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, I NOW PRESENT THE FOLLOWING MEASURES, WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF ALL THE PARTIES. THESE PROPOSALS ARE MADE ON THE BASIS OF FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM.

PROPOSALS FOR PEACE

"-- AS SOON AS AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED, ALL NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WOULD BEGIN WITHDRAWALS FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM.

"-- OVER A PERIOD OF TWELVE MONTHS, BY AGREED UPON STATES, THE MAJOR PORTIONS OF ALL UNITED STATES, ALLIED AND OTHER NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. AT THE END OF THIS TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD, THE REMAINING UNITED STATES, ALLIED AND OTHER NON-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WOULD MOVE INTO DESIGNATED BASE AREAS AND WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS.

"-- THE REMAINING U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES WOULD MOVE TO COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWALS AS THE REMAINING NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN AND RETURNED TO NORTH VIET-NAM.

"-- AN INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY BODY, ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, WOULD BE CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING WITHDRAWALS, AND FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

"-- THIS INTERNATIONAL BODY WOULD BEGIN OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREED TIMETABLE AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ARRANGING

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SUPERVISED CEASE-FIRES.

"-- AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL BODY WAS FUNCTIONING, ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD UNDER AGREED PROCEDURES AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY.

"-- ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR ON BOTH SIDES.

"-- ALL PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO OBSERVE THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 REGARDING VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA AND THE LAOS ACCORDS OF 1962."

PRESIDENT NIXON FURTHER DECLARED THAT WE BELIEVE THIS PROPOSAL FOR PEACE IS REALISTIC AND TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT THIEU'S SIX POINTS. IT CAN ACCOMMODATE VARIOUS PROGRAMS PUT FORTH BY YOUR SIDE. WE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT IN DETAIL WITH YOUR SIDE. WE ARE NOT OFFERING THESE PROPOSALS ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS. WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER OTHER APPROACHES CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES. WE ARE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT ANYBODY'S PROGRAM--HANOI'S FOUR POINTS, THE NLF'S TEN POINTS--PROVIDED IT CAN BE MADE CONSISTENT WITH THE FEW BASIC PRINCIPLES WE HAVE SET FORTH.

THE PRESIDENT STATED IN ADDITION THAT DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENT WITH SEVERAL OF ITS POINTS, WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE NLF HAS PUT FORWARD ITS FIRST COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM. WE ARE CONTINUING TO STUDY IT CLOSELY, IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES. IN FUTURE MEETINGS, WE EXPECT TO ADDRESS THE 10 POINTS AND TO COMMENT UPON EACH INDIVIDUAL ISSUE, JUST AS WE HOPE YOU WILL ADDRESS THE ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION. WITH REGARD TO THE INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE 10 POINTS, WE SUGGEST THAT YOU ENTER INTO CLOSE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, AS PRESIDENT THIEU OFFERED TO DO IN MARCH THIS YEAR.

BUT, WE CANNOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER YOUR SIDE MADE THIS OFFER, YOU STEPPED UP THE SCALE OF YOUR MILITARY ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. YOU CARRIED OUT SYSTEMATIC ACTS OF TERRORISM IN A NUMBER OF CITIES, CAUSING INDISCRIMINATE AND SENSELESS KILLING AND WOUNDING OF CIVILIANS. AND, AS I POINTED OUT AT OUR SIXTEENTH PLENARY SESSION, WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT PLANS ARE LAID AND PREPARATIONS UNDER WAY FOR FURTHER INCREASES IN MILITARY AND TERRORIST OPERATIONS BY YOUR SIDE.

IF YOUR SIDE WANTS PEACE, THAT IS NOT THE WAY TO GET IT.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS SET FORTH PROPOSALS FOR PEACE WHICH ARE GENEROUS IN THEIR TERMS. WE

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HAVE INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER OTHER PROPOSALS. WE ARE BEING FLEXIBLE AND REASONABLE. BUT, AS PRESIDENT NIXON SAID ON MAY 14, "NO GREATER MISTAKE COULD BE MADE THAN TO CONFUSE FLEXIBILITY WITH WEAKNESS OR BEING REASONABLE WITH LACK OF RESOLUTION."

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, DELAY SERVES NO ONE'S INTEREST. LET US ACT NOW TO BRING THE WAR IN VIET-NAM TO AN END.

WE ASK YOU NOT TO ANSWER HASTILY AND TO THINK OVER OUR PROPOSAL JUST AS WE ARE THINKING ABOUT YOURS.

LODGE

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

A: The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

I am sending herewith, for your information, a paper entitled Comparison of President Nixon's Peace Proposal with the Previous Position of the United States.

Pl. keep.
8/11/70

Date:

8 October 1970

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

L. Kutakov
 L. Kutakov

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Leonid N. Kutakov
A: Under-Secretary-General, PSCA

DATE: 8 October 1970

REFERENCE: _____

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: John G. Stoessinger
DE: Acting Director, PADS

SUBJECT: Note: COMPARISON OF NIXON'S PEACE
OBJET: PROPOSAL WITH THE PREVIOUS POSITION
OF THE UNITED STATES

I herewith transmit a Note on COMPARISON OF
PRESIDENT NIXON'S PEACE PROPOSAL WITH THE PREVIOUS
POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES.

enc. 2

JGS:pmm

COMPARISON OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S PEACE PROPOSAL WITH THE
PREVIOUS POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

1. The new peace proposal put forward by President Nixon in his address on 7 October 1970 is a package which contains some new elements, some old elements which have been somewhat refurbished, and an essentially unaltered core. The key issue on which the current negotiations on Viet-Nam are now bogged down is the question of the composition of the present South Vietnamese Government. On this issue, which President Nixon dealt with in the fourth of his five points, the American position remains unaltered, and seems in fact to have been stiffened, if anything, in President Nixon's newest reformulation of it. On this point, the key passage of his address seems the following:

"Let there be no mistake about one essential point: the other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities. They want to dismantle the organized non-communist forces and insure the takeover by one party, and they demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government. "This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable."

2. Since the American position remains unchanged on the key issue, it seems fair to conclude that the new proposal represents primarily a repackaging effort. However, because it does contain some new elements, it can also be regarded as an effort, secondarily, to move the negotiations forward by exploring the possibility of finding areas of agreement on peripheral issues. This seems true of the second and fifth of President Nixon's five points. The proposal for an Indochina peace conference (the second point) represents the public adoption by the United States of a proposal which it had hitherto only expressed interest in.

The proposal, which constitutes Nixon's fifth point, for an immediate exchange of all prisoners of war, seems to represent the most explicit effort in the entire package to reach immediate agreement on a peripheral issue (but one which the United States has lately been emphasizing in the Paris negotiations) and thus perhaps clear the ground for further progress.

3. The third part of President Nixon's proposal, dealing with the withdrawal of United States forces from South Viet-Nam, also seems to represent an effort to promote further agreement by softening the American stand, although it makes no new concession of substance. In the past the United States position on withdrawal has been to divide it into two stages, and to make the second stage of complete withdrawal of American troops dependent on the concomitant withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops from South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. President Nixon's new formulation of the point, while again accepting the principle of complete American withdrawal, does not divide it into two stages and does not make it conditional on North Vietnamese withdrawal.

4. The one entirely new element in President Nixon's plan is the proposal, embodied in his first point, for a "cease-fire-in-place" throughout Indochina. In the present circumstances of the war, this cannot be regarded as a concession by the United States and its allies, since its effect would be to freeze an actual military situation which they regard as unprecedentedly favorable. However, if the offer is maintained through the next six to nine months it may prove to be an important element in achieving a workable settlement of the conflict.

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LETTER DATED 8 OCTOBER 1970 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honor to transmit a statement by President Nixon on
7 October 1970 in which he set forth major new United States proposals for a
negotiated settlement in Indochina. I request that this letter and its
enclosure be circulated as an official document of the Security Council to
all members.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Charles W. YOST

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON
ON INDOCHINA

October 7, 1970

Tonight I would like to talk to you about a major new initiative for peace.

When I authorized operations against the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last April, I also directed that an intensive effort be launched to develop new approaches for peace in Indochina.

In Ireland on Sunday, I met with the Chiefs of our Delegation to the Paris talks. This meeting marked the culmination of the government-wide effort begun last spring on the negotiation front. After considering the recommendations of all my principal advisors, I am tonight announcing new proposals for peace in Indochina.

This new peace initiative has been discussed with the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It has their full support. It has been made possible in large part by the remarkable success of the Vietnamization policy over the last 18 months. Tonight I want to tell you what these proposals are and what they mean.

First, I propose that all armed forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold. This would be a "ceasefire-in-place." It would not in itself be an end to the conflict, but it would accomplish one goal all of us have been working toward: an end to the killing.

I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining a ceasefire in a guerrilla war where there are no front lines, but an unconventional war may require an unconventional truce; our side is ready to stand still and cease firing.

I ask that this proposal for a ceasefire-in-place be the subject for immediate negotiation. My hope is that it will break the logjam in all the negotiations.

This ceasefire proposal is put forth without preconditions. The general principles that should apply are these:

A ceasefire must be effectively supervised by international observers, as well as by the parties themselves. Without effective supervision a ceasefire runs the constant risk of breaking down. All concerned must be confident that the ceasefire will be maintained and any local breaches of it quickly and fairly repaired.

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A ceasefire should not be the means by which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina.

A ceasefire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror.

A ceasefire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we seek is to widen the peace.

Finally, a ceasefire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina.

A ceasefire-in-place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance, but it has always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations.

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters.

The second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

I propose an Indochina peace conference. At the Paris talks today, we are talking about Vietnam, but North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders and establishing bases in South Vietnam -- they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well.

An International Conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. This war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak.

The essential elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. We shall accept the results of agreements reached between those states.

While we pursue the convening of an Indochina Peace Conference, we will continue negotiations in Paris. Our proposal for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as through other diplomatic channels.

The Paris talks will remain our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement until such time as a broader international conference produces serious negotiations.

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The third part of our peace initiative has to do with United States forces in South Vietnam.

In the past twenty months, I have reduced our troop ceilings in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year these withdrawals will total more than 260,000 men -- about one-half the number in South Vietnam when I took office.

As the American combat role and presence have decreased, so have American casualties. Their level since the completion of the Cambodian operations was the lowest for a comparable period in the last four and one half years.

We are ready to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an overall settlement. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight.

Fourth, I ask the other side to join in a search for a political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese.

Three principles govern our approach:

- We seek a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people.
- A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces.
- We will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Let there be no mistake about one essential point: the other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities. They want to dismantle the organized non-communist forces and insure the takeover by one party, and they demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government.

This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable.

As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters, but we stand firm for the right of all the South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want.

We have no intention of seeking any settlement at the conference table other than one which fairly meets the reasonable concerns of both sides. We know that when the conflict ends, the other side will still be there. The only kind of settlement that will endure is one both sides have an interest in preserving.

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Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.

War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much.

I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception and without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice.

I propose that all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well.

The immediate release of all prisoners of war would be a simple act of humanity.

But it could even be more. It could serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus improve the prospects for negotiation.

We are prepared to discuss specific procedures to complete the speedy release of all prisoners.

The five proposals which I have made tonight can open the door to an enduring peace in Indochina.

Ambassador Bruce will present these proposals formally to the other side in Paris tomorrow. He will be joined in that presentation by Ambassador Lam representing South Vietnam.

Let us consider for a moment what the acceptance of these proposals would mean.

Since the end of World War II, there has always been a war going on somewhere in the world. The guns have never stopped firing. By achieving a ceasefire in Indochina, and holding firmly to the ceasefire in the Middle East, we could hear the welcome sound of peace throughout the world for the first time in a generation.

We would have some reason to hope that we had reached the beginning of the end of war in this century. We might then be on the threshold of a generation of peace.

The proposals I have made tonight are designed to end the fighting throughout Indochina and to end the impasse in negotiations in Paris. Nobody has anything to gain by delay and only lives to lose.

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There are many nations involved in the fighting in Indochina tonight. All those nations but one announce their readiness to agree to a ceasefire. The time has come for the Government of North Vietnam to join its neighbors in a proposal to quit making war and to start making peace.

As you know, I have just returned from a trip which took me to Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, England and Ireland.

Hundreds of thousands of people cheered as I drove through the major cities in these countries.

They were not cheering for me as an individual. They were cheering for the country that I was proud to represent -- the United States of America. For millions of people in the free world, the non-aligned world and the communist world, America is a land of freedom, of opportunity, of progress.

I believe there is another reason they welcomed me so warmly in every country I visited despite their wide differences in political systems and national backgrounds.

In my talks with leaders all over the world I find that there are those who may not agree with all of our policies. But no world leader to whom I have talked fears that the United States will use its power to dominate another country or destroy its independence. We can be proud that this is the cornerstone of America's foreign policy.

There is no goal to which this nation is more dedicated, and to which I am more dedicated than to build a new structure of peace in the world where every nation including North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam can be free and independent with no fear of foreign aggression or domination.

I believe every American deeply believes in his heart that the proudest legacy the United States can leave during this period when we are the strongest nation in the world is that our power was used to defend freedom, not to destroy it; to preserve the peace, not to break the peace.

It is in that spirit that I make this proposal for a just peace in Vietnam and in Indochina.

I ask that the leaders in Hanoi respond to this proposal in the same spirit.

Let us give our children what we have not had during this century -- a chance to enjoy a generation of peace.