

INCOMING CLEAR

To : BAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEGEN, NEWYORK

Le 10 décembre 1960

No : 4094

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le Comité consultatif des Nations Unies pour le Congo, à une réunion extraordinaire tenue aujourd'hui, a examiné les lettres des 6 et 7 décembre 1960 que vous m'avez adressées au sujet de l'arrivée de la Commission de Conciliation à Léopoldville.

Le Comité m'a prié de vous faire connaître qu'il a maintenant demandé aux représentants de l'Ethiopie, de la Fédération de Malaisie et de la Nigéria de se rendre à Léopoldville en attendant la venue de la Commission de Conciliation; ces trois représentants doivent quitter New York le mardi 13 décembre. Je suis sûr qu'ils vous rendront visite dès qu'ils le pourront dans le courant de la semaine prochaine et qu'ils vous informeront de la nature de la tâche que, aux termes du mandat qui vous a déjà été communiqué, la Commission aurait à entreprendre, une fois qu'elle sera prête à arriver dans la République du Congo.

Permettez-moi, Monsieur le Président, d'exprimer mon très sincère espoir que vous jugerez utile de recevoir ces délégations et que vous leur accorderez votre entier concours.

En réponse à la question que vous posiez dans votre lettre du 6 décembre au sujet de la Commission de Conciliation constituée par le Comité consultatif, je tiens à vous faire connaître qu'à l'origine, cette Commission se composait des Etats suivants: Ethiopie, Fédération de Malaisie, Ghana, Guinée, Inde, Indonésie, Libéria, Mali, Maroc, Nigéria, Pakistan, République Arabe Unie, Sénégal, Soudan et Tunisie. Par la suite, cependant, les représentants de la Guinée, du Mali et de la République Arabe Unie ont fait connaître au Comité qu'ils ne souhaitent plus participer aux travaux de la Commission de Conciliation et, en conséquence, ils s'en sont retirés.

Je crois aussi utile de vous signaler que les dépenses des commissions de l'ONU sont à la charge de l'Organisation, et non du pays hôte.

Son Excellence
Monsieur Joseph Kasu-Vubu
Président de la République du Congo
Léopoldville

Au nom du Comité consultatif comme en mon nom propre, permettez-moi de vous exprimer l'espoir que, dans l'intérêt de l'ensemble du peuple congolais, vous userez de toute votre influence pour empêcher une nouvelle détérioration de la situation politique qui contrarierait les efforts en vue de trouver une solution au grave problème politique auquel le Congo doit faire face.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secrétaire général
des Nations Unies

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 9 December 1960
Number : 4089

pd
9/12

Reur B-1644 and B-1646 .

I agree that you should be holding up letter to President pending further developments there . I too am waiting for further developments .

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4082

Reference our 3231 and B 1381. Situation with regard to procurement of aircraft, following intensive quest, follows:

1. Undertaking purchase of four DC 3 - C 47's from USA at \$83,500 each including reconditioning and positioning; and three from Canada at \$50,000 each including reconditioning but not positioning.
2. In addition to above, Avianca of Colombia offers five DC 3's which will be inspected as to satisfactory condition before any purchase step.
3. To fill gap until above planes become operational through delivery and recruitment of crews, immediate efforts being exerted to charter on short term basis commercial carriers from European and other airlines.
4. South American countries, including Argentina, Brazil and Peru being approached for necessary crews and technicians, in accordance, to extent feasible, with Leopoldville's desire for air teams on homogeneous ethnic lines.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4081

Reference B-1634 - 1635.

2. Appreciate this thorough assessment of Kamina situation and policy, which clearly requires review in light of recent developments. Your recommendations and questions are being studied and our comments will be forthcoming in due time.

2. However, we immediately concur in your recommendations in III of B 1634 affecting C-119's and will explore possibility of implementation.

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INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: Von Horn
FROM: Bunche, New York
DATE: 9 December 1960
NUMBER: 4080

Reference ONUC 3121.

1. Submitting immediately request to USA for airlift of 145 Moroccan instructors Leo to Rabat. Will advise when US response received. Is any equipment to be lifted?
2. Incidentally, if these men were not included in original contingent, under what circumstances were they added to the Force and when and how did they come to Leo? If specialized personnel, of what kind are they?

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4076

We note from various tickers that Rikhye has apparently made fairly strong statement concerning Otraco affair. We have not been informed and would be pleased to get details regarding where situation stands at present.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4073, 4074

Reur 1637, 1639, and 1642.

1. Entirely approve of intended measures regarding Europeans and their protection in Stanleyville.
2. Attach greatest importance to Iyassou's presence in Stanleyville so that he can take personal command of Ethiopians who may of course easily get into trouble.
3. Consider it necessary on one side to make sharp formal protest to whatever authorities can be addressed in Stanleyville; suggested text follows.
4. Consider it also necessary to present by tomorrow report on threats to Secco. As we are not fully aware of status of reports from Ethiopian Brigade, and through other channels, which you have cabled to us, and also for reasons of proper form, I would suggest that you cable us in clear short report on (a) ultimatum received and its substance, (b) your protective measures, (c) the carrying out of formal protest action on my behalf in accordance with text below (which you may of course adjust if your knowledge of facts would call for amendments).
5. We suppose that protest should be transmitted to "Provincial Government", although ambiguity as regards its status makes it

desirable to avoid addressing them in way which involves any recognition of status.

6. We suggest following text of protest:

"On behalf on SecGen, acting under the mandate of the Secco of the UN, I have to bring the following to your urgent attention:

a) The SecGen vigorously protests the threatened actions of reprisal perpetrated against people who should enjoy the normal protection given to all residents of the country;

b) He further protests the ultimative form in which the UN has been informed about the intended reprisals linked to the release of Mr. Lumumba;

c) The SecGen draws to the attention of the authorities that the release of Mr. Lumumba is not repeat not at present within the mandate or jurisdiction of the UN, that the matter is under current consideration by the Secco and that its authority should be respected and no action of pressure taken on the Council, in anticipation of its stand or in other ways detrimental to its authority;

d) The intentions about which the UN has been advised and against which this protest is directed will be brought to the notice of the Secco;

e) In accordance with its mandate as established by the Secco, the UN Force will resist all acts of violence against individuals, who request protection of the UN. The necessary instructions to this effect have been communicated to the units of the Force at present in Stanleyville;

...../..

f) The SecGen finds it necessary on this occasion to draw again the urgent attention of the authorities to the continued detention of Mr. Songolo and a number of other parliamentarians, insisting on full application of the rules of due process of law to these persons and repeating his request that the UN be permitted to visit the persons detained and to ascertain their treatment through representatives of the Red Cross; the stand of the authorities regarding Mr. Lumumba is obviously put in serious jeopardy by the refusal of the authorities to accede to these requests as regards the persons to which reference has here been made."

My
L. B. King
D

INCOMING CODE

TO : Dayal, Von Horn
FROM : Bunche
Date : 9 Dec. 60
NO. : 4059

Reference my 3802.

In further talks with Liberian Mission here they have agreed to 3 "first week in January" as time for rotation of Liberian contingent. How does this fit in with general plan for rotations?

c.c. Gen. Von Horn.

INCOMING CODE

Handwritten:
9/12

TO : ONUC
FROM : FIELDSERVICE
DATE : 9 Dec. 60
NO. : 4057.

Reur ONUC 3065 pistols 9MM assist letter
CAN/ONUC/60-29 covering requisition LEO/O-2467 being
sent Canada requesting delivery by air earliest

C;c. Mr. Olver.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
No : 4035

Le 8 décembre 1960

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre en réponse à mon message du 7 décembre. Votre télégramme d'hier sur le calendrier et vos plans pour la visite de la Commission est arrivé après la prise de position du Comité consultatif dont je vous ai fait rapport. J'ai fait part aux membres du Comité de ce télégramme dans lequel vous indiquez le 26 décembre comme une date opportune et posez aussi quelques questions desquelles vous désirez avoir une clarification de la part du Comité. Je vais leur communiquer sans délai aussi la réponse maintenant reçue, et je compte avoir une réunion avec le Comité aussitôt que possible sur la base de vos deux communications. Les membres du Comité désireront certainement étudier vos propositions et les questions posées avec toute l'attention qu'elles méritent. Je vous enverrai leur réaction dès que je serai en position de le faire.

Acceptez, Monsieur le Président, les expressions de ma considération respectueuse.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secrétaire général

Son Excellence
Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu
Président de la République du Congo
Léopoldville

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
No : 4035

Le 8 décembre 1960

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre en réponse à mes messages des 3 et 5 décembre vous faisant part des réactions qu'un grand nombre de délégués m'avaient prié de vous communiquer. Comme vous le savez sans doute, mes messages à vous ont été circulés pour l'information des membres de l'Organisation. Comme un addendum au rapport dont ces deux messages ont fait partie, je vais faire circuler aux membres aussi la réponse aux messages que vous avez bien voulu m'envoyer. Vos observations seront de cette manière communiquées à tous les membres de l'Organisation à temps pour leur information avant que le débat du Conseil de Sécurité sur la situation actuelle au Congo ne continue.

Acceptez, Monsieur le Président, les expressions de ma considération respectueuse.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secrétaire général

Son Excellence
Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu
Président de la République du Congo
Leopoldville

INCOMING CODE

9/12
~~for 2014 call~~
8/12

TO : DAYAL
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 8 December 1960.
NO. : 4034.

Reur 1627.

Para 2: No objection.

Para 3: Also no objection to change involving Coquialtville, but we would like to give a bit further thought to question of EEE Ville.

3 copies. Mr. Dayal only.

INCOMING CODE

TO : Dayal
FROM : SECCO
DATE : 8 December 1960

NO. : 4033.

Reur 1618, 1619, 1620.

Studied your observations with greatest interest.

Sorry they did not repeat not arrive in time for my writing of SECCO speech today.

Speech already in distribution stage when eye got your observations from which I would have profited. However, I find striking parallelism of thought, although for natural reasons I have placed myself one line further away than you from total withdrawal.

INCOMING CODE

PS
for 2001-01-01
h
8/12

TO : DAYAL
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 8 December 1960.
NO. : 4031.

Communications received on 7th from missions of
Ceylon and Yugoslavia informing of decisions their Governments
to withdraw their personnel from the U.N. Force in the Congo

INCOMING CLEAR

*Seen. Circulate
Ad
8/12*

To : **J**ANKOWSKI, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : OMNIPRESS, NEW YORK
Date : 7 December 1960
No : 4013

Security Council meeting Wednesday morning at the request of the USSR to consider "urgent measures in connection with the latest events in the Congo", adopted after a lengthy discussion a reworded agenda proposed by Egidio Ortona of Italy and amended by Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon. The Council will reconvene at 5 p.m. to-day to begin the substantive discussion of the item on its agenda.

The agenda as adopted reads as follows:

"On adoption of the agenda. Two letters dated 13 July 1960 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council /Document S-4381/. / This is the letter by which the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo for United Nations assistance./

Urgent measures in connection with the latest events in the Congo;

Note by the Secretary-General /Document S-4571/;

Statement dated 6 December 1960 by the Government of the USSR /Document S-4573/."

The provisional agenda as submitted to the Council by its current President, Valerian Zorin /USSR/, listed as the first item "Urgent measures in connection with the latest events in the Congo: Statement dated 6 December 1960 by the Government of the USSR concerning the situation in the Congo /Document S-4573/", and in second place the "Note by the Secretary-General /Document S-4571/."

Armand Bérard /France/, Ortona /Italy/ and Sir Patrick Dean /UK/ opposed the inclusion of a reference to the statement of the Soviet Government because of what they said was its "violent language" and the "insulting terms" it used to characterize the President of the Republic of the Congo, the Secretary-General and the United Nations Force in the Congo. Because of this, they argued, this Soviet document could not form the basis for the Council's discussion.

The amended agenda wording was finally approved without objection.

Two draft resolutions were circulated, but not introduced in the Security Council this morning. The first draft resolution was sponsored jointly by Argentina, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. The second proposal was submitted by the USSR.

The four-Power resolution /Document S-4578/ would have the Council express its deep concern over the continuation of "unsettled conditions" in various parts of the Congo which had led to "acts of violence" against Congolese and non-Congolese.

Under this draft resolution, the Security Council would declare that any violation of human rights in the Congo was inconsistent with the guiding purposes of the United Nations and would state that it expected that no measures contrary to recognized rules of law and order would be taken by anyone against ^{any} persons held prisoner anywhere in the Congo.

The resolution would further have the Council express the hope that the International Committee of the Red Cross would be "allowed to examine detained persons" throughout the Congo and "their places and conditions of detention and otherwise to obtain the necessary assurances for their safety."

Finally, the Council would be asked to request the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to assist the Congo in the restoration of law and order throughout the country and in ensuring respect for the human dignity of all persons.

The Soviet draft resolution Document S-4579 would have the Council "resolutely condemn" the continuing interference by Belgium and other colonial powers in the domestic affairs of the Congo and call upon the Secretary-General to secure the immediate release of Patrice Lumumba and others who were detained with him, and to take "all the necessary steps to ensure the resumption of the activities of the lawful Government and Parliament" of the Congo.

It would also have the Council request the UN Command in the Congo immediately to disarm "the terrorist bands of Mobutu" and call upon Belgium immediately to withdraw Belgian military, para-military and civil personnel from the Congo.

Also before the Council are requests to be invited to participate in its discussion on the Congo from Mali Document S-4574, Guinea Document S-4575, Congo - Leopoldville Document S-4576 and Indonesia document S-4577.

Yugoslav Mission to United Nations announced that Yugoslav Permanent Representative Dobrivoje Vidic delivered to the Secretary-General from Yugoslav Government text of which is made public in full in press release issued by Yugoslav Mission. The Government in this memorandum states that most recent developments confirm that United Nations decisions have not been implemented in the Congo and that "role and activity of the organs and troops of the United Nations in the Congo have come into sharp contradiction with the aims and terms of reference given to them." Memorandum claims that Congolese authorities carried out activities "with the inexplicably tolerant attitude of the Command of the United Nations Force and other United Nations organs in the Congo.... the prestige and the authority of the United Nations have suffered the greatest blow so far.... and continuation of United Nations activity could lead to even graver consequences....for peace.... and for the United Nations." Yugoslav Government therefore does not wish to bear or share in any way the responsibility for what is taking place in the Congo and has therefore decided to withdraw forthwith its diplomatic mission from Leopoldville and

to recall its pilots and all other personnel now in the Congo at the request of the United Nations. The Yugoslav Government asks liberation of Lumumba and others.

OMNIPRESS NEWYORK

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Brigitte
Reply in the
sp

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Mr. Cordier
No. : 4009 (most immediate)
Date : 7 December 1960

United Kingdom Delegation has drawn attention to difficulties recently encountered by R.A.F. Hastings aircraft used in support of Ghana contingent. On several occasions Congolese security and military authorities refused to accept that these aircraft operating under U.N. auspices. In Brazzaville also, an aircraft landing on 30 November was ordered to leave at once. As result, aircraft service in support of Ghana contingent has been suspended temporarily.

Difficulties at Leo apparently have been settled for time being but before resuming service U.K. authorities request confirmation that Brazzaville can be used as alternate airport.

Would be grateful if you would make formal approach to Brazzaville government requesting their confirmation that any aircraft on U.N. mission landing at Brazzaville as alternate airport would be given all necessary facilities and assistance. We could address request through Delegation here, but since overflight and air control matters for Congo (Brazzaville) still being handled through French commune, direct approach from you on specific question use of Brazza airport would seem more appropriate.

Could you also confirm that Hastings R.A.F. aircraft used in support of Ghana contingent will receive same facilities and protection at Leo as all other aircraft taking part in ONUC operation.

Grateful for early reply.

*Reps due
8/12
d*

INCOMING CODE

TO : DAYAL, VON HORN.
FROM : BUNCHE.
DATE : 7 December 1960;
NO. : 4008

Reference our 3869. Awaiting advice as to security of aircraft and airfields to be used by USAF and also special UN contact officers in Goma and Stanleyville.

c.c; Gen. Von Horn.

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 7 December 1960
Number : 4003-4004

Please transmit urgently to President Kasavubu following message :

Trans m.
NS
7/12 ✓
" The advisory committee on the United Nations Operation in the Congo met today for the second time after the expiration of the time within which you had promised to give it your opinion on the stage of preparation reached in the Congo for the work of the Conciliation Commission; It was noted with regret and disappointment that no communication had as yet been received from you. In view of the increasing seriousness of the situation and the grave concern felt, especially because of the latest developments, the committee found that it could no longer delay its decision on the departure of the Conciliation Commission.

In the circumstances the Advisory Committee confirmed its decision, as already communicated to you, that, in implementation of General Assembly resolution of 20 September 1960, operative paragraph three, the Conciliation Committee should proceed to the Congo. In confirming its decision the Committee reiterated that, as noted by yourself, the Conciliation Commission should be regarded as part of the United Nations assistance programme in the Congo which was organized at the request of the Congo Government. The Committee recalled the reactions you expressed to it regarding the possible usefulness of the Committee and your further observation that its usefulness would depend on the degree of preparation. Deciding on the departure of the Commission without having received your comments on the degree of preparation, the Committee noted that it took the risk that the Commission might arrive when the preparations were not yet concluded.

It was decided that at least the Chairman, the two other presiding Officers and such other members of the Commission as could leave what day should count on departing Tuesday 13 December on the mission assigned to the Commission and that pending the arrival of the other members who should go as early as possible, they should take stock of the situation facing the United Nations in the Congo in preparation of the work of the Commission.

The Committee expressed the expectation that all necessary arrangements regarding security and similar matters would be taken care of in the way indicated by the position and responsibilities of the members of the Commission.

It was the firm hope of the members of the Advisory Committee that no action would be taken that could reduce the chances of reconciliation and of the creation of such national unity as yourself have declared to be your aim.

The Committee had taken note of my two messages to you regarding the arrest and detention of Mr. Lumumba. They hoped that these messages would receive an early and satisfactory reply in view of the importance of the matter in various respects of concern to the United Nations "

For your information: Presiding Officers are from Nigeria, Malaya and Ethiopia; Guinea, Ghana and Mali do not intend to go.

SV-46

*We shall call
gish to Brazale & ask for
immediate report on all points raised -
Rd 6/2*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
No : 3977
Date : 6 December 1960

British and American representatives saw us independently this afternoon to express concern regarding situation Stanleyville. They presented picture of complete chaos and mob rule at airport and throughout the city. British pointed to maltreatment their personnel recently on arrival Stanleyville and indicated that such U.N. troops as were present limited themselves to safeguarding one U.N. person alighting from plane.

Americans indicated that A.N.C. and mob elements generally were carousing around the airfields, streets and buildings, maltreating the population, especially Europeans and exacting bribes. Immunity from maltreatment can be purchased for equivalent of sixty American dollars but this presumably for very limited period of time. A.N.C. riding streets in Volks-wagons and other cars stolen from U.N. troops and Europeans.

As in previous situations reports are sometimes colored but it would be helpful to have best possible report from our own source on situation there and an indication of possible steps that might be taken to improve situation.

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 6 December 1960
Number : 3973

Reur 1600 , 1601 . Shocked in particular by story paragraph 4 . We could ourselves on the basis of your reports make summary ^{of} acts of hostility by Congolese authorities against United Nations but your ^{papers} (people) may be more complete and I would ask you therefore to give us commented list of such acts . I am shocked in particular by this latest case as it aims at one of the United Nations lifelines and as Belgian backstopping or collusion or inspiration is obvious to anybody who cares to see . With the suggested list in my hand I would like first of all to alert Washington and London . I do not believe that Kasavubu - Mobutu - bomboko trio would be impressed by our threats to react as clearly indicated by these acts of hostility , but I do believe that their supporters , apart perhaps from Belgium , may be a bit worried if we threatened to take the ~~lin~~cloth away . For that reason I think first action should be , with proper documentation , to denounce in key Western Capitals what is going on . I would rather prefer that kind of first approach to what you suggest in paragraph 5 , it being difficult to accept canadian aircraft and probably rather costly for us to work with

civilian charters .

du ref
Reference paragraph 6 we are agreed regarding need for re-appraisal of our technical assistance but when it comes to personnel we fear that the threat might be somewhat hollow as large number of technicians are in Leopoldville and rather important to ourselves (Communications , etc .) . It is another matter to put brakes on purely financial operation as, for example , the three million one , regarding which the transfer has been stopped in light of your observations (undoubtedly it will prove possible for Congolese to get the necessary money because purveyors are there ; from that point of view all we might do is to smoke out the fact that they have such purveyors)

We are giving most serious thought to the policy line and will give you our considered reaction as requested in paragraph 11 after some further discussion . I would stress what I said in a cable of yesterday , that all this would have to be treated as part and parcel of one consistent policy and that improvisations on any one point are unwise unless we know how we want to play the total game . Atmosphere here among African delegations is tense and it is easy to tip the scales in extreme directions which may prove irresponsible . I am willing to be very tough but only provided that we have an agreed line indicating what will be the second and third steps after the first . I regret that basically some preliminary plain talk is likely to be necessary with those without whom our Congolese friends would be nothing . Will revert to these various matters soonest .

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 6 December 1960
Number : 3972

Reference 1606 . I observe in paragraph 6 that by now 200 Officers have been sent for training to Belgium . Could you give me exact information verified so that I could use it in relation to Brussels ? If so , I would like to have it urgently as I would use it for a new note verbale to Brussels - the previous one on the same subject never received any reply - which I would circulate as document . Certain people tend to get away with too much and I have to resort to publicity which is unpalatable but on the whole effective too .

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 6 December 1960
Number: 3971

Reur B-1597 Advisory committee discussed (starts inter alia stops) the despatch of the three officers of the conciliation commission . The committee was divided on the advisability of sending the office bearers now preparatory to the sending of the whole commission . I summed up the consensus in the committee starts inter alia stops :

" ... I noted that there are very strong misgivings in various quarters about the wisdom of despatching the bureau alone , without a clear-cut line also on the commission in general . It was said that , if the bureau preceded the commission by some two or three days , or something like that , that might be all right ; but , if there was a possibility that the bureau was a kind of agent , and that there would not repeat not be any follow-up , that might put us in a very embarrassing position and those sent themselves in a rather awkward kind of situation ... I am sure however that I register correctly the situation in the committee if I say that there is a strong feeling indeed that , irrespective of the reaction from Kasavubu , we must proceed with the commission . We do not repeat not know what will happen if we announce such a decision in the Congo -- that is another matter . We should not repeat not vacillate on that point ... I said at the beginning that I

felt that all of you and certainly I myself might like to think over the matter overnight , because it is a somewhat momentous decision . There is the other fact that , if this information which we have received through Mr. BOMBOKO concerning the sending of a reply is correct , we should have that reply within twentyfour hours ... "

The committee will meet again tomorrow .

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INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 6 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 3970

Reference B-1599.

1. Note heavy burden on Force and risks involved through almost one third of it being widely scattered. Realize necessity that arose in early days of operation to extend UN protection to Belgians, their plantations and installations, to missionary stations, etc, in outlying places. In light of recent developments and attitudes however, we accept advisability of a change in this policy. Therefore, I concur in proposed regrouping of troops, involving withdrawal of UN protection from plantations and installations. Such action will no doubt evoke anguished cries from Belgian sources, but they will have to learn to face realities of a situation largely of their own making. Have earnest misgivings, however, about abandoning any economically essential installations, research and mission stations to an unknown fate, quite apart from bad public relations angle, but realize that troop concentration may require this. Whenever possible, undamaging exceptions might be made.

2. Deeply concerned about assessment in para 3 of relative fire power of the two forces and will await your following cable

...../..

- 2 -

on details of how you would redress the balance. But as a first reaction I must say that we cannot look with favor on an arms race or consider it as offering a solution to anything.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 3946, 3947, 3948

I feel we have come to a point where in view of possible drift towards military dictatorship, difficulties with the "government", noises here and our own need to know what we are really doing we should engage in some urgent stocktaking in order to know where we are and where we go. We are only in the first stages of what I would call a good hard look at the UN operation in the Congo but want to bring you into the picture now so as to have a full coordination of views and maximum advantage of your thinking before any steps are taken or I am forced out into the open in some debate here. Following annotations are only by way of attempt to systematize points for consideration in private tentative agenda.

(a) In the field: 1. Discontinued protection, specifically of Kasavubu. We feel on the one side that Mobutu's and Kasavubu's bragging re ANC would be perfectly valid reason for withdrawal of protection; on the other hand it might be regarded as mean ~~xxx~~ sanction. Anyway, it seems obvious to us that interpretation from outside would be such as to make it necessary to be able to justify withdrawal as part of our total policy regarding UN

...../...

action in the Congo.

2. ANC training. Disappointment with results so far might well lead to conclusion that time is ripe for liquidation. I am anything but certain of wisdom of such a conclusion. We can eliminate extremes viz. integration of ANC in ONUC or complete withdrawal. I would like us all to give thought to return to my original concept to the effect that our efforts should be concentrated on building up ANC, small unit after small unit, using reliable soldiers and getting best possible officers, thereafter agreeing with Congo Military Command that these units are put in for ONUC functions, but outside UN Command, relieving our battalions which *pari passu* should be withdrawn. Such an approach would have value of creating rational basis for reduction of ONUC and playing on ANC pride without taking undue risk. Wholesale approach to ANC problem seems to me sterile. We still feel rather lacking in information about what really has been done and what 200 Moroccans are doing.

3. Question of reduction of ONUC may come up because of request for withdrawal from three or four nations, or similar request with serious pressure from Congolese side or, finally, of course, by proposal from our side which, however, at present in my view would be premature and irresponsible (see 2 above). In order to be able to treat this question in responsible terms we must have re-evaluation of why we are at

...../..

various points with the specific strength allocated to those points. Obviously reasons vary, for example, as between north Katanga, Stanleyville and Leo. What would we do and what would impact be in case of withdrawal of certain national contingents?

4. Previous question leads straight on to the problem of general policy of gradual withdrawal to which I have registered my reaction above; however, also some financial difficulties come into play and we should have a policy line which obviously should be predicated by conclusions as to ONUC functions.

5. In civilian field what does UN operation mean in experts and in money? I have asked MacFarquhar to prepare text for possible report with stock-taking re technicians and disposal of available funds, marking that with our means, "this is it" and that remaining gaps would have to be filled by other means (which as you know are unacceptable to the majority of the Assembly). It would be helpful to have your and Linner's cold-headed evaluation of same problem in same terms. You may wish in this context to consider sending Linner here about a week from now for discussions and personal contacts also with Delegations.

6. There still remain diplomatic and political problems so well illustrated in recent cables regarding Kasavubu's behaviour to Duran, Mobutu's declarations, attitudes of western

diplomats, etc, all of which will require patient and intelligent action to adjust stands and actions to policy line which may be derived from discussion of previous five points.

(b) On this side of the Atlantic. I foresee lively discussion tomorrow in Advisory Committee and later on possible discussion re financing in Fifth Committee and the Congo policy in general in the Assembly. All this must be well prepared.

1. In Advisory Committee I intend to take lead in proposing that presiding officers of Conciliation Committee proceed to the Congo without waiting for President's letter which the good lord only knows when we may receive. I would also like to give short factual comments on points (a) 6 and 5 and 2, adding your factual information on present Belgian setup and on Mobutu's most recent declarations re take-over after end of 1960. However, discussion in Committee likely to concentrate on Lumumba's situation. 2. Fifth Committee and General Assembly. In Fifth Committee I would have to pursue harsh lines that either they take policy decision on winding up or they provide the necessary advances of money. I would, however, hope that I could reserve discussion of policies for Assembly where I would try to bring out on record why we went in in the first place, to what extent objectives, as first conceived, have been fulfilled (and that is practically to the full), how "new" objectives have developed due to internal Congo developments, how those objectives have been handled, the effect a withdrawal would have in the

prevailing situation and finally the reasons for continuing. Could this be done reasonably well, we may have stabilized the UN Congo front from the time of the recess to reopening of the session, presumably in February. This latter presentation is only indirectly your concern but I would anyway appreciate your advice and comments.

Anything you may bring to our notice by way of comments, analyses and conclusions regarding this internal agenda, specifically part (a) would be highly appreciated and would facilitate the framing of an active policy which would give us again a lead after the most recent eruptions and their deplorable consequences also for UN.

IMMEDIATE

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 3944, 3945

Your proposal most helpful but in view of psychological circumstances we feel some adjustment to be indicated. In order to avoid confusion we cable revised text of personal message from me to Mr. Kasa-Vubu. Grateful to have it delivered to Bomboko Monday morning so that I can use it same day. You may feel our amendments to represent weakening of text but we believe that psychological impact all sides remains the same while avoiding certain points which may give rise to sterile debate. Text follows:

"I should like to refer to my letter to you on 3 December 1960 and to the approaches made to me on behalf of numerous Delegations to the General Assembly of the United Nations, including the entire group of Afro-Asian Delegations, expressing their grave concern at reports which have figured in the world press concerning the arrest and detention of Mr. Patrice Lumumba.

As I stressed in my previous letter, it is obviously not for me to seek to influence in any way the solution of any internal problem of the Republic of the Congo. However, I know you would wish me to elaborate on the points which have given rise to

...../...

special disquiet at a time when the attention of the world is so strongly focused upon the Congo and upon the scope of the effort which the international community, in the first place your African sister nations, can furnish by way of further assistance.

I am sure you will already have given your closest examination to the effect upon world opinion of any departure from the observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter concerning "le respect des droits de l'homme et liberte fondamentale pour tous". This respect is reflected in the provisions of the fundamental law on the structures of the Congo and on public liberties in the Congo, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In this connexion may I be permitted to note that Mr. Lumumba and others who recently have been seized and are now detained are members of one of the other Chamber of Parliament. According to available information, persons in that position may not be prosecuted or arrested in any penal matter without prior compliance with the parliamentary procedures provided in article 66 of the fundamental law on the structures of the Congo. You will in this context, regarding the exception made in that article for arrest in "le cas de flagrant delit", note the interpretation given to that formula according to universal principles of law. Inasmuch as the principle of parliamentary immunity exists throughout the world as a means of protecting not the private interests of the individual but rather the
...../..

structure of parliamentary democracy, world ~~public~~ opinion will be certain ^{to} ~~to~~ give ~~to~~ this point great attention, without regard to the political positions of the various personages detained.

It has been widely noted with appreciation that you have pronounced yourself in favour of an amicable and nationwide settlement of the Congolese political crisis, to embrace all the leading political figures including, according to reported public statements by you, Mr. Lumumba. I am sure that you are in a better position than I am to evaluate the significance for such a solution of any action taken in the present case.

Approaching you again, I wish to invite your attention also to the reports of a number of independent eye-witnesses which give ground for fearing that the detainees, in particular Mr. Lumumba, have suffered physical violence and degrading treatment. In making various efforts to use its good offices for the freeing from illegal detention of Mr. Songolo and other parliamentarians, to our great regret still held in Stanleyville, the United Nations has suggested that the International Red Cross be asked to examine the detained persons and their places and conditions of detention and otherwise to obtain the necessary assurances for their safety. It is natural for me to propose for your serious and urgent consideration that immediate recourse should be had to the same procedure in the case of Mr. Lumumba and the other detainees.

In my previous letter, representing the immediate and serious

...../..

reaction of myself and the great number of delegates who had approached me regarding the matter, I made a strong appeal for application of due process of law, as generally understood in law. I felt sure that it was your own wish and intention to apply the rules of such due process which, as you know, applies to every stage of police action or legal action, including arrest and detention. Of special importance in this context, is the concept of due process of law as developed in general recognized law and the fundamental law of public liberties. I refer in particular to the questions of the necessity for and legality of the warrant of arrest, the requirements that the detainees be informed, with ⁱⁿ 24 hours at ^{the} latest, of the reasons for his arrest and of the formal charges in detail entered against him, that he shall not be prosecuted except in the cases provided for by legislation and in accordance with the procedures in force at the time when the offence was ~~perpetrated~~, that he may have counsel of his own choice, and further, that he shall be entitled ~~to~~ in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal charges against him."

File -

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 5 December 1960.
Number : 3943 .

Reference B-1590 .

Requisition of arms to avoid their being turned over to ANC really involves large expenditures by U.N. to counter-act intended folly of other parties. I plan to take a stronger line and approach on this one by high level talk with Washington on monday, if possible. Pending further word from me, therefore, suspend action on this matter beyond maintaining status quo.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

pr

To : Dayal.
From : Secretary-General.
Number : 3941.
Date : 4. December 1960.

Reur 1585. This regrettable part of the picture has at once been brought to attention of UK and US Delegations with appropriate comments. Hope it may help.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
Date : 4 December 1960
No : 3940

At end this night's Security Council meeting Soviet Delegate as President expressed hope that members of Council would receive as early as possible, in form I consider appropriate, available information on latest developments in the Congo especially as regards "legitimate government and its chief". I promised to request you forthwith to send report with "summary of facts as known to you" to which I might add information regarding steps I had taken in this context.

Obviously the report can be quite short. I would hope that we could have it Monday morning for circulation same day.

HAMMARSKJOLD

To : Dayal

From : Secretary-General

Date : 4 December 1960

Number : 3939

1 . Is it a correct assumption that " armoured cars and guard " at your house , referred to in paragraph six B-*1580, as ANC ? If so , why were they there , by whose order are they stationed there and since when ?

2 . To which congolese officials do we continue to provide United Nations protection by stationing guards ?

3 . In the light of most recent developments and attitudes taken toward United-Nations , is it in your view necessary or advisable to continue to provide protection to any of such officials , including Kasavubu and Ileo ? We gather that Mobutu no longer receives such protection , in any case .

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Number : 3937
Date : 4 December 1960.

By taking " Due process of law " , combined with general Charter principles and elements of Lumumbas status, as my basis for demarche to Kasavubu I went as far as I dared without closer study of possibilities, and specifically of legal situation. The terminology was such that it left door open to a follow up by suggestions or requests, not excluding request for release.

We have the precedent that you exercised a right to disapprove of the previous warrant of arrest. We have also the precedent of our intercession for the release of Songolo and other parliamentarians who enjoy the form of immunity recognized for members of parliament. Neither precedent, however, is decisive in present situation. Of course we cannot afford initiatives countered by accusations of interference in domestic affairs. However, we must do whatever we can, and we should see to it that what we do does not represent any weakening in relation to stands previously taken on the warrent of arrest or in the Songolo case.

Here we are not quite aware of what arguments may have been based regarding Songolo et al*** .

**** et al; four letters corrupted.

P.T.O.

If the immunity argument was used we have, of course, to use it with equal force regarding Lumumba. If other arguments were used, they should likewise apply. We can not expose ourselves to justified complaints of anything but best efforts to straighten matters out.

In the circumstances it would be most helpful if you, together with Cox, Berthoud and others, submitted to most urgent study all possibilities to follow up message to Kasavubu by demarche taking into account above observations. Thus, it must be strictly legal and within terms of due process as used in the message; further it must avoid interference; finally, it should go to the utter limit of effort on Lumumbas behalf, possible and in order under these conditions.

Matter may well blow up seriously here tonight. Then I may tide it over, but if clash develops regarding our Lumumba policy on Monday I should, at least, by that time have taken all such further action as may be found possible and in order.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : General C. von Horn.
From : Bunche.
No : 3928 (Immediate).
Date : 3 December 1960.

Reference ONUC 3006. At my direction, shipment to Leo of the large quantity of medals and ribbons ready at Pisa was being held up awaiting delivery of our order for the bars which, in pursuance of ONUC 2795 are of bronze with an oak leaf motif over which word "Congo" is inscribed. Bars are affixed to ribbon by attached pins. In view your message, however, we are asking Pisa to send to Leo by earliest available transport the medals and ribbons held there. Expect to be able to pouch a considerable quantity of the bars from here by end of next week.

c.c. Mr. R. Dayal.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, Leopoldville
From : SEC GEN, New York
Date : 3 December 1960
No : 3926

Soviet yesterday night published following statement:

"Statement of the Soviet Delegation in connection with the illegal detention of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Prime-Minister of the Congo.

As became known from different reports, troops which are at the service of the irresponsible Mobutu group seized forcibly Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Prime-Minister of the Government of the Republic of the Congo on December 2. Thus, an act of flagrant arbitrariness has been committed against the lawful Congolese Government and personally against its Head which by far surpasses anything that happened up till now in the Congo. An act of open violence has been committed against the Prime-Minister of the Government of the Congo at the time when there are forces in the Congo which have been sent there by the Security Council decision for the purpose of assisting this very Government at its own request. The provocative nature of the action against Mr. Lumumba is emphasized by the fact that it has been committed by those whose mastering in the country became possible only as a result of connivance and, in fact, complicity on the part of the UN Command. The Soviet Delegation has more than once drawn the attention of the delegates at the XV session of the General Assembly and the UN Secretary-General to the danger accruing from the policy of appeasing the illegal dictatorial Mobutu regime in the Congo. This danger assumes ever growing sinister nature in connection with the assault on the Prime-Minister of the lawful government of that country. Now one can see how well grounded were the warnings voiced recently at the session by a number of delegations to the effect that the approval

of the credentials of the one-sided delegation from the Congo would prove a direct encouragement to the illegal activities being carried out in the Congo in the interests of the colonial powers. It is beyond doubt that the recent developments in the Congo are but one link of the long chain of crimes committed in the Congo by the Belgian aggressors and their NATO allies with the help of those in the Congo who have embarked on the path of subservience to foreign masters and taken up the role of the direct executors of the dirty schemes of the colonialists. The Soviet Delegation declares in all determination that the UN Secretary-General and the UN Command in the Congo first of all, are directly responsible for the safety and the lives of the members of the Congolese Government. The United Nations cannot pass by this challenge thrown to it by the colonialists and their masters. The General Assembly which has on its agenda the item on the situation in the Republic of the Congo should immediately have the exhaustive information from the UN Secretary-General about the situation with regard to the Prime-Minister of the lawful government of the Congo and about the steps taken by the UN Command to ensure his safety."

To : Linner

From : Macfarquhar

Date : 3 December 1960

Number : 3925

Reference in our threeninetwotwo (3922)
should read ONUC 2985 instead of 2983 .

cc : Dayal

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Mr. R. Dayal.
From : Secretary General
No : 3924.
Date : 3 December 1960

Most Immediate

Your 1575. Refer yesterdays personal message from me to Kasavubu and following cable re unanimous support from Afro-Asian group. Whatever channel you may find you should insist on my message getting through to Kasavubu. Approach from us cannot wait until his return after weekend.

New subject. If he has left without meeting his promise to advisory committee I hope he realizes what that will mean for trust in him also among those who voted in his favour. Personally I am now strongly in favour of conciliation group going with aye vanguard of three presiding officers proceeding to Leo without delay and the others to follow in due time.

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 2 December 1960
Number : 3921 Most urgent

Reference previous cable on Lumumba's arrest . After Qondigit I received formal call from chairman (Cameroun !) and two delegates of Afro-Asian group (INCL Liberia !) expressing great concern of group and wishing me to transmit it in appropriate form to Kasavubu . Telling them that I had already sent message, they expressed their full support for my demarche (appreciating the reasons why I had made it " personal "). Contacting Kasavubu I think you should bring out Afro-Asian support , without any dissent , in this very form as endorsement of my approach and not as basis .

Incoming Code Cable

To : Mr. R. Dayal and Gen. C. Von Horn
From : Mr. Bunche
No : 3869
Date : 2 Dec 60

Reference B1553 and our 3843.

Airlift of Austrian hospital to Stanleyville has been postponed until further notice from you.

In light of previous experiences, US requests that special measures be taken to secure aircraft and airfields used by US. They also request that special UN officers be named as contact men at Goma and Stanleyville. Please advise.

c.c. Gen. Von Horn

Incoming Code Cable

To : Mr. R. Dayal and Gen. C. Von Horn
From : Mr. Bunche
No : 3861
Date : 1 Dec 60

Tunisian mission advises that it is wish of tunisian government that bodies of all tunisian contingent fatalities in Congo, including those who died in kasai, be returned to Tunisia. They do not stress urgency as regards time-factor and would find return by sea or air acceptable. Please advise when necessary arrangements are made.

c.c. Gen. C. Von Horn

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INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
Date : 1 December 1960
No : 3855

Agence France Presse carries following story on which I want your comments:

"Léopoldville, 30 nov. Les six passagers et le pilote d'un appareil ghanéen qui avait atterri, ont été arrêtés et emprisonnés au Camp Kokolo (l'ancien camp Léopold). Un "Héron" de la "Ghanean Airlines", piloté par un Irlandais, atterrissait, hier, à la nuit tombante, sur la piste de l'aérodrome de N'Djili, près de Léopoldville. Il était immédiatement entouré par des soldats congolais, qui intimèrent l'ordre aux six passagers de l'appareil et aux deux membres de l'équipage (le pilote et un navigateur britannique) de rester à leur place. Ils y demeurèrent toute la nuit et ne furent autorisés à quitter leurs fauteuils qu'aujourd'hui à midi. Mis en état d'arrestation en mettant pied à terre, les six passagers et le pilote ont été envoyés au Camp Kokolo. Des poursuites judiciaires seront engagées contre eux, déclare-t-on de bonne source congolaise. Selon des indications non confirmées, les six passagers constituaient une mission diplomatique, venue d'Accra pour négocier le remplacement de M. Nathaniel Welbeck, Chargé d'affaires du Ghana à Léopoldville, qui a été récemment expulsé."

OUTGOING CODE

To: SECGEN, NEW YORK
From: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 31 December 1960
No: B-1782

Have separately cabled latest report received from Bukavu en clair. There are plenty of rumours of troop movements but nothing has been tracked down. This evening Charpentier told me that troops were moving but he could give no details. It seems that the Belgians are responsible for this war of nerves which might unfortunately recoil on their own nationals. You might consider directing the Unations office in Usumbura to keep you and us regularly informed of Belgian military and air movements, and any activities concerning the Congo based on that Trust territory.

2. Van der Goot reports that Unations air traffic controller informed him on basis of a message received by Coq airport telegraphist from his colleague in Lisala that an Egyptian aircraft landed there this morning and that ONUC troops prevented Lisala aerodrome staff from contacting crew and aircraft of which flight schedule was unknown. We are asking for further details. Iyassu returned from his tour of UAR troops today after spending a day in Stanleyville. At Lisala and Gemena, he noticed nothing unusual during his brief visit.

3. Kasavubu flew to Bakwanga this evening but refused to leave the aircraft as Congolese flag was not flying. After a discussion between the President's ADC and Kalonji who with his "Ministers" was present, Kalonji left the airfield in anger. The situation became tense and it was thought that the plane would leave but after further discussion, Kasavubu emerged and set off on foot towards the town refusing to travel in a car flying South Kasai flag. He apparently completed his journey by car to Kalonji's house. Kasavubu has a New Year's party tomorrow and one wonders if he will return in time.

LEOPOLDVILLE
31 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

B-1781 SECGEN from DAYAL

Following from Bukavu:

Quote. From Miller Ironsi. We have contacted all senior ANC officers in Bukavu including Comdt Ngoy and Comd Bangala newly arrived from Stan. They are as mystified as we are by all present rumours. They know nothing about arrival of any emissaries from Mobutu let alone about their arrest. They are quite concerned about all these rumours because they think any visit from Mobutu's troops can only be intended to arrest them. They say they are determined to resist. While believing it impossible for Mobutu troops to come by road without being stopped by their own soldiers at Kindu, they fear possibility of Belgians allowing entry through Ruanda Urundi. I tried convince them of unlikelihood of Belgians risking international incident but they feel little grounds for trusting Belgians. In our presence they were informed that light aircraft coloured blue had just flown over country surrounding Bukavu dropping leaflets in Lingala. We saw mimeographed leaflet in which Mobutu announced arrival of his troops and said they had no political motive. This and other evidence such as constant flow of fantastic rumours and broadcast from outside is leading us to believe whole affair may be designed to frighten Kivu ANC into rebelling against their officers. Also seems clear that many of Congolese in no doubt that Belgians are fishing in troubled waters for example. First. Leaflet aircraft can only come from Ruanda Urundi. Second. Our telecom people in post office report telephone line to Usumbura was cut by Belgian paras on their side. Third. The most irresponsible reporting of rumours and false news is coming from radio stations controlled by European/namely Katanga, Brazza, Usumbura and even Brussels. We suggest you invite Secretary General to insist Belgian Government to warn its nationals not to mix into this affair. Unquote

OUTGOING CODE

To: SECGEN NEW YORK

From: DAYAL LEOPOLDVILLE

Date: 31 December 1960

No. B- 1779-80

1. Situation Kivu continues confused STOP Mobutu has requisitioned all available aircraft amounting to fifteen, but aircraft on charter to UN not affected STOP Defence Commissioner Kazadi has requested press not to publish information on ANC troop movements, but stated they did not intend to use force against Bukavu unless other methods failed STOP Also stated they had sent emissaries Bukavu to discuss the position STOP However later reports say emissaries were arrested on arrival STOP I have asked Miller to enquire and report.

2. Reports concerning Mobutu allegedly flying ANC to Usumbura conflicting STOP One report says five hundred men flown from Leopoldville, and Lundula says over one thousand STOP Only definite information is that two DC'4s at least one with 40 ANC flew from Luluabourg Friday in general direction Bukavu/ Usumbura STOP Miller and Ironsi have just reported that reliable sources Ruanda Urundi insist no such landings would be permitted STOP We are sending emissary from Bukavu to Usumbura to check, but I doubt if any substantial troop movements have taken place.

3. In any case have instructed Miller and Ironsi to prevent entry of troops from Ruanda Urundi into Congo and to keep general alert.

4. Kivu Minister of Interior Mutambula told Miller Stanleyville had sent him unsigned cable appointing him President but he declined as Justice Minister

Rukengezi is Vice President STOP He accuses UN of standing by during abduction of Miruho and Singha STOP He was very worried lest personal disturbances cause Europeans, whom they cannot do without, to leave. Also he feared flight of foreign capital and complained that ANC troops disobey their officers' orders not to molest Europeans STOP He confirmed that all administrative offices closed and there is no Government STOP He said he would do everything possible to prevent a Stanleyville regime in Kivu STOP He thought Mobutu would enter Kivu and disarm Stanleyville ANC there without a fight.

5. There is also an unconfirmed report, repeated by Mutambula that Kashamura has arrived in Kindu and intends to take over control of Kivu on behalf of Gizenga.

6. Other news from Kivu is:

a. Bukavu

(1) Numerous cases of violence and arrests of Europeans were reported, some of them by the victims themselves. Some were exaggerated but 4 cases where Europeans were made to walk on their knees, were confirmed. ANC troops established check points and scrutinized documents of drivers.

(2) All administrative offices, shops and banks closed since Wednesday in protest against the "illegal arrest and abduction of President Miruho and Commandant Singha". Streets deserted.

(3) The Provincial Ministers of Justice, of the Interior, in constant fear of arrest and under UN protection. The ANC from Stanleyville causing great concern to the European Community.

(4) The ANC in control of Bukavu Radio Station, and demanding all carry MNC-L cards on pain of arrest. MNC-L propaganda amongst ANC reported to be considerable.

(5) There were rumours among the ANC that Col. Mobutu, Belgian and Congolese paratroopers would disarm them.

(6) An ANC soldier was apprehended across the border which resulted in a tense situation arose at Shangugu Bridge, two or three shots being fired. ANC and Belgian paracommandos took up positions facing each other.

(7) UN troops now guard the Bridge, the Post Office as well as patrol in the town.

b. Kindu

(1) Unfriendly attitude of ANC and gendarmerie towards ONUC continues. Arrests of Belgians and Europeans continue, but they are generally released after suffering small humiliations.

c. Goma

(1) Acts of violence by ANC troops continue. The UN Commander had informal talk with the ANC Commander and hopes that a proper conference will follow after the ANC Commander has consulted his soldiers.

(2) Joint ONUC-ANC patrols are to commence. ANC demand the withdrawal of British officers as "black and white harmony is only on the piano".

OUTGOING CODE

To: SEC GEN NEW YORK
From: DAYAL LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 31 December 1960
No. B- 1778

The following is information relating to Katanga:

1. Arrangements had been made for the Baluba Chief Kasongo Nyembo, who supports Tshombe, to meet on twentyfour December at Kamina Base with twenty of the anti Tshombe Balubakat leaders STOP It had been hoped that this meeting might lead to peace in North Katanga STOP However two of the twenty Balubakat leaders opposed all contact with representatives of Tshombe and managed to convince the other eighteen to do likewise STOP Thus, although Kasongo Nyembo came to Kamina the twenty anti Tshombe leaders failed to turn up STOP
2. I have already informed you of Tshombe's refusal to Rikhye to meet Sendwe STOP This decision of the twenty Balubakat leaders makes such a meeting still more difficult to bring about, since Sendwe would have to do what the twenty Balubakat leaders refused to do if he were to meet Tshombe.
3. Tumba Ferdinand-Galliera, political Director of the Balubakat has made a statement in Leopoldville attacking Tshombe's secession policy STOP He put the disturbances in North Katanga down to Balubakat opposition to secession and said that one thousand Balubakat had been killed by the Katanga repressive measures STOP He went on that Sendwe wished to meet the Katanga authorities before the Round Table Conference to discuss these repressive measures STOP He stated that the Cartel Katangais would participate in any Central Government provided it stood for the integrity of the territory of the Congo STOP Finally the Balubakat are to raise funds by issuing party membership cards at fifty francs each STOP It is to be hoped that the Balubakat party cards are not sold through the same means of force and threats

as are the Aboko MNC-L etc party cards STOP

4. Sendwe has written to Bomboko with copies to Kasa-Vubu and Ilebo about the "Comité spécial du Katanga" set up before independence STOP He called Tshombe a traitor and stated that Kibwe's mission to Brussels was for cession of the property of the "Comité spécial du Katanga" to Katanga alone instead of to the whole Congo STOP

5. Katanga authorities released a story on twentynine December that Baluba attacked three hundred Balubakat on train at Bukama killing at least twenty STOP It was said only forty of the three hundred reached their destination at Kamina STOP This story was a gross exaggeration and we issued a corrective press release thirty December.

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B- 1776 For Secgen from Dayal. Following is latest information on Kasai:

1. Anaclet Katombe, Political Director of MNC-K has made a statement in Leopoldville denying that MNC-K had broken with Ileo. He went on, intransigently, "they refused reconciliation with the Lulua but denied they were separatist." He ended by saying they wanted a "confederation like the USA" and continue to recognise Kasa-Vubu and the Ileo Government.
2. Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko left for Luluabourg preceded by loyal ANC detachments from Leopoldville and the ANC band. It is said they may also go to Bakwanga.
3. Agence Congolaise de Presse gives story on Kasai, of which summary follows: "Torn apart by a civil war which has thrown Kasai into mourning for over a year, Luluabourg has now become calm. The province is divided into two: the north under the government at Luluabourg, and the south under a government not recognised by the central authorities, formed by the Baluba expelled from the Lulua territories. Luluabourg has made up the great loss of Europeans and Baluba, which it suffered last July, by the arrival of Lulua from the interior or as expellees from the Baluba territories. The economy of Luluabourg and of the province is greatly depressed. Many European shops have closed, or will shortly close, not for lack of security, but because of the lack of trade in the city. Baluba market gardeners have left for South Kasai. In Luluabourg alone

T. O. R.

BY:

Room 632

Drafted by : J.D.R. Kelly

Authorized :

Date : 31.12.60

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there are only 50 Balubas left out of 20,000. The European sawmills have closed, and in the meantime Rhodesia, the principal market, has found other sources of supply. The Forminière diamond mines at Tshikapa are working, but since the Bakwanga authorities refused to pay the mining profits to Leopoldville, Forminière is beginning to send the diamonds up to Luluabourg instead of to Bakwanga.

There is now no trade between the two regions. Thus, in spite of food existing near Bakwanga, the Balubas prefer to starve rather than to seek food from the Lulus. The Luluabourg authorities have suggested that the Central Government use its good offices to reconcile the two groups, but South Kasai has become even more secessionist. The Bakwanga authorities complain that Leopoldville has never done anything for them, still less for their refugees. Ngalula, South Kasai Prime Minister, hopes Kasa-Vubu will visit Bakwanga when he is in Kasai. The authorities both of Luluabourg and of Bakwanga complain of the lack of contact from Leopoldville to the two cities."

Alga 5684 - 100,000 - 26/10/60

T. O. R.

BY: Room 632

Drafted by: J.D.R. Kelly

T. O. D.

Authorized:

Date: 31.12.60

OUTGOING CODE

TO: Secgen
FROM: Dayal
DATE: 31 December 1960
NUMBER: B-1775

nd
31/12 ✓

Re your 4550.

We are arranging for Alice Lalande to accompany you to Pretoria for code operation and general secretarial assistance. Arrangements should of course be made for you to bring double set of normal and top secret codes you wish to use during this period.

OUTGOING CODE

To : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

From : DAYAL, KETTANI

Date : 30 December 1960

No : B-1774

1. Your 4513. It is confirmed that difficulties continue to be experienced in getting clearance for the landing of RAF aircraft on loan to the Ghana Government for transporting supplies, etc. for its Contingent in the Congo.

2. Several members of the Congolese Central authority have from time to time given their consent to these flights subject to certain conditions, such as prior intimation of flight manifest and the right to check aircraft loads against these manifests. Despite our adhering to these conditions quite often when the time comes for an aircraft to land, someone or other at a lower level seemingly exercises his right of veto on a chance whim and returns the aircraft. This is perhaps inevitable in the absence of any properly constituted government and where so-called responsible persons act independently of each other and often over-ride each other's decisions. Moreover, we have been unable sufficiently to impress upon them that such action on their part not only could endanger the aircraft itself but could also lead to considerable monetary loss to the Ghana Government. Another difficulty is that the aircraft is not directly under UN command, nor can it since it is a British RAF plane.

3. We are now preparing a detailed written procedure for the benefit of the local authorities. We intend to discuss this procedure, point by point and, after an agreed solution has been resolved, to get the various commissaires concerned to sign the document if possible and thereafter give it a wide distribution. We are also trying to explain to the Congolese authorities that the load of the aircraft is not sponsored by the Ghana Government as such but is planned exclusively by the Ghana Army Headquarters

purely for the purpose of supporting the Ghana Contingent in the Congo and its future replacements, for which we understand new units are presently being formed in Ghana.

4. We hope the New Year will bring about an improvement in the regularity of these flights which we are recommending should be on a pre-arranged schedule of two flights a week.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 30 December 1960
No : 8-1773

Your 4486. Rikhye has returned from Bukavu and reports that the situation of Europeans in the City and the Province, though difficult, is not alarming. The ANC placed a guard on the Post Office to check the despatch of telegrams only after a number of requests by telegram had been sent by Europeans to Usumbura for intervention by Belgian para-commandos. Only one case of beating occurred, although there were some instances where Europeans were humiliated. Immediate preventive action was taken by UN troops.

The leaders of the European community met Rikhye to ask for protection if the need arose. There are about 1800 in Bukavu and some 200 in the rest of the Province. They did not think it was necessary at this stage to evacuate the Province or to concentrate Europeans in any particular area in the City. Rikhye at a meeting with the ANC impressed the need to maintain law and order. He was given assurances to that effect, and this meeting ended with promises of co-operation.

On his return journey to Leo, Rikhye had to pass through Usumbura for refuelling, where he was met by Tardeur, Secretary-General to the Ruanda-Urundi Government. He received assurances that the Belgian army will not provoke the ANC.

In view of the above it was thought that a plan for the protection of Europeans at this stage is not necessary. However, Ironsi and Miller were given necessary advice in making such arrangements if the need arose.

Latest information from Luluebourg is that an Air Congo DC4 with 40 ANC left at 1530 hours today believed heading for Bukavu and another due to leave shortly.

OUTGOING CLEAR

To: SECGEN NEWYORK
From: DAYAL LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 30 December 1960
No. B- 1772

ND
30/12

Following Press Release issued here to-day on Bukama train reports "There have been reports concerning alleged attacks on a train in Bukama, Katanga, on 27 December. These reports are grossly exaggerated. There was no attack on the train, no aggressor was allowed to board the train, and there were neither protests or any indication that any passenger was forced to get off the train against his will at Bukama.

The train left Lubudi for Kamina on 26 December. It was held up at Mukulakulu for one hour on 26 December, due to a damaged rail. The train remained at Luena for the night 26/27 December. It is reported that a Baluba injured a Katangese soldier in civilian clothing and that three others were taken off the train at Luena, but no wounded man could be found on the train. A civilian with head wounds boarded the train at Luena and was given medical attention by the UN Irish escort medical staff and brought to Kamina. Four coaches of Balubakat passengers were added to the train at Luena.

The train left Luena for Bukama on the morning of 27 December. At Bukama the Irish escorts, assisted by six Moroccan soldiers, took up positions and the passengers dismounted, apparently of their own free will, and made their way to the village in small groups without any interference by the Baluba. However, a small group of the remaining passengers were shouted at by the Baluba but no attempt was made by the Baluba to pass through the escort. Probably induced to get off the train through fear, some 15 passengers climbed out of the windows on the off side of the train, two of whom fled into the bush. The remainder reboarded the train. The train then started for Kamina but had to return to Bukama owing to faulty brakes. Again a small group of the passengers were threatened by the Baluba who held back

from the train. There was NO attack on the train, NO one was allowed to board the train and there were neither protests nor any indication that any passenger was forced to get off the train against his will at Bukama.

Of the passengers who voluntarily left the train at Bukama 25 were arrested and screened by the Balubakat in Bukama town about 1 km from the railway station. Thirteen of those arrested are at present in prison accused of being Konikats. UN is negotiating for their release. They are reported to be well and the Balubas say that they will be released if 50 Luena Balubas arrested some time ago are brought to Elisabethville and released.

The train reached its destination, Kamina, without further incident."

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 30 December 1960
No : B-1771

Following cable sent to ONUC Bukavu today:

"To Ironsi Miller from Dayal Kettani. Sabena believed to have provided two DC4s to Mobutu's men for ferrying troops from Leo to Usumbura. Unconfirmed report that two loads of troops left Leo yesterday in these planes. It is further reported that these two planes will carry out two trips per day to lift troops from Luluabourg to Usumbura. The two DC3s available in Usumbura may be used for further ferrying to Kamembe. If this news is correct, Mobutu may have up to 500 men in Ruanda-Urundi. However, it is difficult to believe that the Belgians would allow transit facilities through UN Trust Territory to Mobutu for aggressive purposes. This would indeed be the most serious violation so far on the part of the Belgian Government, and would be tantamount to providing use of UN Trust Territory for purposes of war, which would have most serious consequences.

It is necessary to be vigilant. You should take all necessary steps possible to prevent entry of these troops from the direction of Ruanda-Urundi into the territory of the Congo. You should also immediately contact the authorities in Ruanda-Urundi and demand accurate information. Alert your troops elsewhere also, as Mobutu may be using other airfields in Kivu."

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: SECGEN, NEW YORK
From: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 30 December 1960
No: B-1770

hwy
30/12

The following message said to have been intercepted by the Stanleyville authorities has been passed on to us by Duran:

Quote. TM' Chef Etat-Colonel Mobutu-PresCommiGen Bomboko tous Luluabourg.

GOUSUR No. 929 du 29/2/60. Vous communique texte de télégramme à envoyer d'urgence par Chef d'Etat et Ministère Affaires Etrangères (AMBABELGE?) à Brazzaville. En cas expédition télégramme accord être donné par autorités belges.

CITATION Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, J'ai l'honneur de vous signaler que dans le cadre d'une opération de relève urgente de troupes à Bukavu certains contingents de l'Armée nationale congolaise seront envoyés ce jour par avion au Kuvu. Il serait indispensable qu'à cette fin le transit de ces contingents puisse être autorisé à l'aérodrome d'Usumbura la plaine de Kamembe ne pouvant recevoir d'appareils d'un type supérieur au DC3. Je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir demander d'urgence au Gouvernement belge les autorisations nécessaires façon que toutes dispositions soient prises pour permettre un déroulement normal des opérations de transit. Je vous remercie de votre bonne obligeance et vous prie d'agréer Monsieur l'Ambassadeur sur l'urgence de ce télégramme avion Air Congo. Unquote

2. I have just seen Charpentier about this matter who confirms that such a request has been made by Kasavubu-Mobutu to the Belgian Ambassador in Brazzaville.

3. Yesterday, all Air Congo planes were grounded by the Leo authorities, and there is a rumour that they were requisitioned to deal with the Kivu situation. The danger therefore is very real and calls for immediate corrective action which could best be taken at your end.

4. Apart from such movement of troops fomenting civil war in the country, it would be extremely improper to use the UN Trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi for such a purpose. We would also be justified in blocking the departure of planes for purposes of civil strife under our order of September 12 which is still in force.

5. Last night, Timberlake telephoned to convey certain information on the basis of an intercepted message. I accordingly sent the following most immediate telegram to Iyassu and Duran:

Quote. Have just been informed that eight Ilyushin planes ready to take off from Khartoum for Stanleyville, nationality and cargoes unknown. Such a flight seems highly suspicious and every effort must be made to prevent landings compatible with our resources. ICAO personnel must be maintained in control tower, landing permission should be refused and every attempt made to block runways. If the information is correct, there is serious danger of armed conflict, as counter preparations are being made by Leopoldville authorities. Please keep us closely informed of developments. Unquote

6. Action has been taken to alert the airport and a watch is being kept on all other airports guarded by the UN in Orientale. The Sudanese Colonel last night however told us that his Government would not grant permission for such flights on Sudan territory; indeed, they had even objected to the request for landing at Khartoum to a UAR Ilyushin plane carrying technical personnel for the salvage of instruments etc., from the crashed Ilyushin at Lisala. Nevertheless, as we did not wish to take any chances, we alerted Iyassu etc.

OUTGOING CODE

*True
Ad
3/12*

To: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
From: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 29 December 1960
No: B-1769

I have received letters from the Austrian Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs through Col. Foltin, head of the medical unit, who has just returned from Vienna after making a report on the Kivu incident. The Federal Government have decided to maintain the unit in the Congo at the disposal of ONUC, and they have also conveyed their gratitude to the Nigerians for their gallantry in protection of the team.

2. As the original plan regarding the setting up of ONUC hospitals in Stanleyville and Bukavu must be abandoned for evident reasons, we feel that the needs of the Bakwanga refugees could claim the services of the Austrian unit. There are however problems of organisation which may present some difficulty as the unit cannot be split up into more than two parts whereas the refugees are scattered over a wide area. The answer may be to locate the unit in two nearby areas to form a nucleus for rendering medical assistance to the refugees supplemented by movable Red Cross teams.

3. From the point of view of better care of the refugees and reduction of our organisational difficulties, it might be advisable when adequate transport is obtainable, to concentrate them in a few selected areas. Emergency accommodation could be provided by constructing bamboo and straw huts. One such place could be Miabi which I visited and where there are some 45,000 refugees. The Congolese hospital there intended for some 150 patients now houses a thousand with very poor medical facilities. Perhaps the Austrians could take this over, the displaced Congolese hospital personnel being employed with the mobile Red Cross teams. For the Austrians, tented accommodation would be necessary and provision of a UN guard. The other half of the unit could perhaps be set up at Bakwanga dealing with more serious medical cases which could be transported there by truck or ambulance.

4. Some agreement with the Kalonji authorities would be essential to prevent incidents and to ensure security.

5. An Austrian reconnaissance party accompanied by one of our medical staff officers is proceeding to the area to examine the possibilities. It would indeed be a great pity if we were unable to utilise the services of this excellent team as its substitution by a civilian Austrian team would mean much loss of time and effort.

OUTGOING CODE

To: SECGEN, NEW YORK
From: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 29 December 1960
No: B-1768

The bureau of the Commission is beginning to get into stride and their persistence has opened the door to the arrival of the whole Commission. They are beginning to establish contacts outside Kasavubu's circle.

2. Sendwe saw me yesterday and spoke of his conversation with Kasavubu and recent meeting held by Ileo and the politicians with the Commissioners. The latter are digging in their toes and Sendwe complained of Kasavubu's indecisiveness. Sendwe said that unitarist leaders like Kamitatu were prepared to join the new government and were prepared to bring Gizenga back to the fold. Sendwe thought that Mobutu was further losing control of the ANC and the Bukavu affair had set a bad precedent. The position in Kasai was uncertain.

3. Rikhye met at Bukavu the Provincial Assembly President, UN Congo delegate and spokesman of Belgian business and mining interests etc. The Belgian interests wanted more UN troops in mining areas and in Bukavu for their protection, and urged disarming of the ANC as final solution of the Congo problem. The Congolese officials, contrary to demands for UN's withdrawal made so recently, asked UN to protect legal institutions and civilian population. Incidentally, Stanleyville authorities disclaim all responsibility for the Kivu abductions for which they blame the ANC which acted without consultation or orders.

4. On Rikhye's return, shall reply to your 4486.

5. Although the Commissioner-General for Transport had told us that the ban on movements to Stanleyville had been lifted on 21st December, Bomboko tells us that his colleagues had spoken out of turn as the matter is still under consideration.

6. Iyassu left on a tour of the UAR contingent and Stanleyville today.

OUTGOING CODE

To : Secgen New York
From : Dayal Leo
Date : 29 Dec. 1960
No. : B-1767

With the repatriation of Congolese workers reported in my cable B-I760, there are now at the Base I79 UN troops, 85 permanent Congolese workers for support and maintenance, 5 UN Civilian Administration Staff and three UN technicians. In addition there are I25 Congolese workers temporarily employed on daily basis till final withdrawal of Belgians. UN Administration Staff will be reduced to one after withdrawal of Belgians.

I propose reopening question of removal of arms and ammunition from the Base with you during your visit. Your cables 3943 and 4276 refer. Substantial reduction of Security Force could be achieved through such removal, and consequently some reduction of number of Congolese workers.

Present labour is minimum required for simple maintenance of Base for the next eight to twelve months, after which it will be necessary to incur some additional costs for essential repairs to houses, roads and equipment.

Till the final departure of Belgians two accounts will be maintained, i.e. (a) amounts debitable to the Government of Belgium relating to custody and movement of their stores and support and evacuation of their personnel; and (b) amounts relating to maintenance of base. After departure of Belgians, second of these accounts only will be maintained.

We presume the question of final responsibility for reimbursement of sums debited to this account should be that of either Government of Belgium or Government of Congo. Your memorandum of 25 September 1960 refers.

mu.

OUTGOING CODE

To: SECGEN, NEW YORK
From: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date: 29 December 1960
No: B-1766

Ad
29/12

Your 4499. Kanza left the Royal for an unknown destination for fear of arrest about December 15. I now hear he has reached Paris.

LEOPOLDVILLE
29 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

*hme
R
29/12*

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

B-1765 SECRETARY GENERAL from DAYAL

On behalf of all ONUC civilian and military personnel, may I offer you our cordial greetings for the Season and for the New Year? We are most grateful for the understanding, support and guidance that we have constantly received from headquarters. For our part we have given and shall continue to give of our best to carry out diligently and loyally the responsibilities entrusted to us. May I assure you that our trials and difficulties have only served to spur us to even greater efforts. We feel deeply honoured to have ~~had~~ the opportunity to serve the cause of peace and international understanding under your inspiring leadership.