INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 15 January 1961

No : 323

We do not have here original text of letter 7 January from Kasa-Vubu with attached memorandum. We have text memorandum as it appeared in Courier d'Afrique. Is this full and exact? If not please cable corrections or if necessary full text. Likewise please cable text Kasa-Vubu letter.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 14 January 1961

No : 318

Text of my statement in Secco morning 14th follows:

"The Secretary-General: Although, in the documents now under consideration by the Security Council and in statements to the Council, some of the most violent attacks so far on the United Nations Operations in the Congo and on the Secretary-General and his integrity have been made, there is no reason for me to take much of the Council's time for explanations, corrections or defence. The greatly disturbing but limited incident at Bukavu on New Year's Day provoked, as the Council knows, immediate and sharp counteraction from my side and from the United Nations representatives. However, in statements by the Soviet Union, especially in a press statement issued as document S/4622, sharp accusations have been levelled against the way in which we treated the incident. I have nothing to add to the documents which I have placed before the Council since, to any reader of those documents, which are simple and clear, it is immediately obvious how groundless are the accusations against the United Nations and its agents. In the circumstances, it is difficult indeed to believe that they are addressed to this Council or to others who have access to the documents or who know the facts. Why, then, have the accusations been made? I think that the substance of the line now taken by the USSR makes it clear. By trying to give the impression that the Secretariat and its representatives, in particular the Secretary-General, are inspired by racial prejudice, one wants to drive a wedge into the collaboration, based on confidence, which has been established between the African States and the Secretariat

in this operation. Why this is tried needs no explanation. I believe that the effort will be in vain, because I trust that the African representatives are well informed through their own first-hand observations and that they know how to regard with equally sober realism flattery and efforts to win them by sowing hate and distrust. The Representative of the Republic of the Congo, in his intervention a few moments ago, raised several points of a highly controversial nature. He imputed intentions to the United Nations Operation which certainly are not justified, accused the Operation of omissions, and he gave advice on what we should do. I believe that those various points could best be discussed directly between the Delegation and the Secretariat. And I am strengthened in that belief by the fact that quite recently I had the opportunity to discuss similar matters, and in detail, with President Kasa-Vubu whose accent was a different one. There were also statements of fact in the intervention to which I feel it may be reasonable to revert in documents to be submitted to the Council. As I thus see no reason to go into the substance of these most recent attacks on the United Nations Operation in the Congo, I can limit myself to directing your attention to a point which I find of considerable immediate importance. On 5 January the Conciliation Commission, established by the Advisory Committee on the Congo under the General Assembly resolution of 20 September, arrived in Leopoldville. I had the privilege to meet with them; and I had repeated talks with the Chairman, Mr. Wachuku, who, together with the other presiding officers, had already spent some few weeks in the Congo. It is my impression that this Commission -- the third arm of the United Nations Operation in assistance to the Republic, the third arm together with the military and civilian operation -- has got off to a promising start and may render great service in the direction of political stabilization. This task, as is well known, has been outside the mandate and the competence of the civilian and military operations. However, the work of the Commission is highly delicate. It requires tact, understanding, modesty and wisdom.

It cannot succeed unless it is given a fair chance to do so both by the leaders in the Congo and by the United Nations itself, including all the Member States. It should be obvious that the presence of the Conciliation Commission in the Congo and the need to assure all possible success for its work should be very much in the mind of all here at Headquarters when the affairs of the Congo are being discussed and decisions passed. It would seem to me that this should apply specifically to those whose interest in the Conciliation Commission at an earlier stage was so great that they used the Commission as an added argument against the Secretary-General who was alleged not to have shown the proper energy in getting its work off the ground. Certainly, nobody would now wish to give the African States the impression that they, or the Conciliation Commission in which they have nine members in Leopoldville, are regarded only as pawns to be moved to the right or to the left, or perhaps sacrificed, depending upon whether their activities seem to serve this or that external interest or this or that specific personality in the Congo. Thus, in view of the task pursued by the United Nations in the Congo, for the sake of the country and the Organization, and also so as to help towards the success of its work in the country, in accordance with the target set, I appeal to members to do what is in their power in order to protect and support the efforts now pursued through the Conciliation Commission. If that appeal is heeded, I believe that the very negative aspects in part apparent in the present meetings of the Security Council may not have done too much harm."

INCOMING CODE

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEW YORK

Date : 14 January 1961

No : 316

Your D-65 and D-67 on protection of Central Bank. Concur in suggestion of military protection against acts of violence to all central bank offices throughout country, to the extent military resources permit. Such protection however should not repeat not be conditional either on request or endorsement by provincial authorities or on clearance by Mobutu. ONUC civilian officers should use good offices to negotiate provincial cooperation, basing themselves on Kasavubu's directive to central bank. Fully realise, of course, difficulties of application in Stanleyville, Bukavu and possibly elsewhere. Desirable that working arrangements with Mobutu in this area derive from a presidential instruction to him. Kasa-Vubu should also be advised to direct central bank to conduct its provincial operations on strictly banking considerations without political motives.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Dayal Mckeown

From : Bunche

Date : 14 January 1961

Number : 313 IMMEDIATE .

Further to my 22, USA prepared to transport Guinea battalion from Matadi to Conakry, on their Naval craft which will be available in area only for short time. Latest ETD from Matadi would have to be about 20 January. Cost of sea transport approximately fifty thousand dollars as against three hundred and fifty thousand for airlift. We have therefore agreed to sea lift. Assume it possible for Guinea battalion to be in Matadi about 20 January. Three messages now received from President Touré, each requesting repatriation before 20 January. Space on board US ships is limited and some of stores may therefore have to be shipped later. Naval craft however will take all they can. Information requested my 220 now urgently needed :

Total strength, Composition, Breakdown and Weight of stores, not including seventwo (72) pounds of personal equipment for each man. Clearance for US naval craft to enter port of Matadi for this specific purpose also needed. Please advise.

cc: Mckeown.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Dayal

From : Cordier

Date : 14 January 1961

Number : 312

Reur D-56.

Fully agree with satisfactory solution of staff problems.

Reur D-77. Will attempt to meet your desire to retain Martin for another two or three months. Will take up matter with Deseynes as soon as he returns and confirm.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

From : CORDIER, NEWYORK

Date : 14 January 1961

No : 308

Your D-73. Regret absence French translation because time of night here. Probably more expeditious you translate there. Please proceed and send text here.

Incoming Code Cable

To. Mr.R. Dayal.

From. Abbas, New York.

No. 307

Date. 14th January 1961.

Reur D 49. Following note verbale transmitted to permanent representative UAR January 11th: "The Secretary General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic and has the honour to inform him that information received from Leopoldville indicates that there is tension between the ANC and the local authorities on the one hand and the United Arab Republic contingent on the other hand at Lisala in equateur province concerning a United Arab Republic Ilyushi plane which landad there on one January1961 and which is still there.

The Secretary General requests that measures be taken by the United Arab Republic contingent to avoid any incident which might lead to increased tension or conflict in that area in these difficult times.

United Nations headquarters in Leopoldville has been informed by the United Arab Republic battalion Commander that the Ilyushi brought in crew repair for the Ilyushin wrecked earlier and new Year gifts. Since the purpose of sending this Ilyushin must have been accomplished, the Secretary General believes that this airplane should return to the United Arab Republic without delay.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, McKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 13 January 1961

No : 285

A. Para 2 ONUC 3633 and paras 1 and 6 our 49. Italian Government has accepted responsibility for C119 second line maintenance and also has agreed to provide all C119 personnel necessary in Congo. Assume technical details will be worked out between air staff and Italian Liaison Officer. Please advise names of 18 Italian maintenance personnel to be repatriated.

B. Para 5 our 49. Argentine not repeat not able to provide additional DC3 personnel. No reply as yet received from Brazil, Chile, Peru and Greece. Follow-up action has been taken with above countries.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, MCKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 13 January 1961

No : 283

Our 202. Sudan Mission informs to-day, 13 January, that new Sudanese Battalion will not repeat not include MMG and 3-inch mortar section. Total strength will therefore be 380 all ranks.

Incoming Code Cable.

To. Mr. Linner,

From. Macfarquhar.

No. 280

Date. 13th January 1961.

Our cable 61 and letter COCA # 89 Rossborough. ILO Agree to further 6 months secondment to start with, subject to Unations reimbursement for salary and allowances which controller has agreed.

c.c. Mr. Dayal.

Rd

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To. J. Olver, C.AO. Leo.

From. Hamilton, New York.

No. 277

Date. 13th January 1961.

Your 183 No objection Ruedas take over duties temporarily on acting basis but owing scope and level of responsibilities seeking alternate suitably senior candidate for Rossborough post. Reemphasize this no reflection on Patricio who we regard as promising officer.
Is Brzak a possibility for top job query.

c.c. Mr. Dayal

PS
I reply
PD

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Mr. Cordier, New York

Date : 13 January 1961

No. : 252

Owing to Kafkas resignation Jean Pierre Martin required by ESA around 15 February. Can you conveniently release him ?

INCOMING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

To: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: CORDIER, NEW YORK

Date: 12 January 1961

No: 243

Secgen suggests you reserve room at airport for discussions during plane-stop.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

TO : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : UNATIONS NEW YORK

NO. : 241

DATE : 12 January 1961

FOR DAYAL FROM ABBAS

Have received following note from Belgian Mission:

"Le Représentant permanant de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et, se référant à l'obligation qui est faite à l'ONUC de veiller à la sécurité des vies humaines et des biens matériels dans la Province du Kivu commes dans les autres territoires du Congo, a l'honneur de l'informer que le Gouvernement belge s'est étonné des déclarations faites par le Représentant de l'ONUC à Bukavu à un Représentant officiel de la Belgique à Shangugu et dont il résulte que l'organisation, dans les circonstances présentes, se désinteresserait du sort des populations belges. Le Gouvernement belge veut croire qu'il s'agit là de déclarations qui ne corréspondent pas aux vues de l'ONUC. Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique serait reconnaissant à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des informations qu'il voudra bien lui fournir à cet égard et saisit cette occasion de lui renouveler les assuramces de sa plus haute consideration."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : CORDIER, NEWYORK

Date : 12 January 1961

No : 240

Have received following note from Belgian Mission which is being circulated as Security Council document.

"Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et a l'honneur de se référer à ses notes du 30 décembre 1960 et des ler et 2 Janiver 1961 relatives au passage de troupes de l'Armée nationale congolaise par Usumbura. Dans sa réponse du 31 décembre 1960, le Représentant permanent de la Belgique avait indiqué à Monsieur le Secrétaire général les circonstances dans lesquelles les troupes de l'Armée nationale congolaise avaient atterri à Usumbura et été reconduites à la frontière. Complémentairement à ces indications et en réponse aux notes récentes de Monsieur le Secrétaire général, le Représentant permanent de la Belgique, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, attire l'attention de Monsieur le Secrétaire général sur les points suivants: Lorsque le contingent de l'Armée nationale congolaise atterrit à Usumbura, son chef était porteur de la photocopie d'un télégramme adressé à l'Ambassade de Belgique à Brazzaville par le Président de la République du Congo et qui n'était pas encore parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement belge à ce moment (le texte de ce télégramme a été reproduit dans le document S/4606, annexe 3). Il contenait une demande formelle du Chef de l'Etat congolais dont l'autorité a été solennellement constatée par l'Assemblée générale de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pendant sa session de novembre 1960. Le paragraphe 6 de la résolution de l'Assemblée générale réserve d'ailleurs expressément les droits souverains de la République du Congo dont le Chef de l'Etat a fait usage en la circonstance. Placées dans de telles circonstances, les

autorités belges ont traité avec correction à la plaine d'Usumbura le contingent de l'Armée nationale congolaise et l'ont fait transporter immédiatement à la frontière de la République du Congo. En agissant ainsi à l'égard de soldats congolais, les autorités belges n'ont pas contrevenu au paragraphe 6 de la résolution du 20 septembre 1960.
Il y a lieu d'observer que toute autre attitude aurait comporté de graves conséquences. L'autre parti en effet pour les autorités belges aurait consisté à désarmer et à faire prisonnières à Usumbura les troupes régulières de l'Armée nationale congolaise et cela au besoin par la force. Un tel comportement aurait fait courir à la paix et à la sécurité internationale des risques beaucoup plus sérieux que le fait de reconduire le contingent sur le territoire de la République du Congo. Il aurait été en contradiction avec la résolution du Conseil de sécurité du 22 juillet qui prie tous les Etats de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait tendre à empêcher le rétablissement de l'ordre public et l'exercice de son autorité par le Gouvernement congolais. Le Gouvernement belge déclare par ailleurs qu'il n'y a plus de soldats congolais actuellement au Ruanda-Urundi. Il donne des instructions aux autorités locales de s'opposer à l'avenir à tout passage non autorisé. Il n'a pas l'intention d'autoriser un nouveau passage. Le Gouvernement belge n'a jamais eu l'intention d'utiliser les troupes belges qui assurent l'ordre public dans le territoire sous tutelle à des opérations en dehors des frontières de ce territoire. Il tient à répéter de façon solennelle que ces troupes n'interviendront en aucun cas en dehors du territoire du Ruanda-Urundi. Il attire néanmoins une fois de plus l'attention de Monsieur le Secrétaire général sur l'obligation qui est faite à l'ONUC de veiller à la sécurité des vies humaines et des biens matériels dans la province du Kivu comme dans les autres territoires du Congo. Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique saisit cette occasion de renouveler à Monsieur le Secrétaire général les assurances de sa très haute considération.

New York, le 11 janvier 1961 "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Mr. Bunche, New York

Date : 12 January 1961

No. : 223

Nigerian mission informally cited recent pro-Lumumba demonstrations in Nigeria which were "strong but not violent" as cause of anxiety to his government and as a basis for hope that Nigerian contingent would not become involved in any factional conflict in Katanga.

INCOMING CODE

To : OLVER, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : FIELD SERVICE, NEW YORK

Date : 12 January 1961

No : 222

Your 127. Request you arrange exchange tickets in possession travelers for Leopoldville Naples tickets and pouch remaining coupons soonest to Headquarters for credit tickets Naples New York. Am reserving two first class adjoining cabins with bath Cristoforo Colombo Naples to New York 9 February. Authorisations as follows:

Husband PT8 60-1997 issued 30 August 1960 round trip, Spouse PT8 60-2310 issued 19 October 1960 round trip, two boys PT8 61-133 issued 9 January 1961 one way Leopoldville Rome Naples New York only.

Dist:- 2 copies - Mr. J. Olver
1 copy - Mr. R. Dayal

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal and Mr. J. Olver

From : Mr. Bunche, New York

Date : 12 January 1961

No. : 221

Reference ONUC 189. Field Service will comment more fully on this message but I wish to convey my view about one aspect of it in particular. This relates to suggestion that Sabena might be given a controlling position with regard to charter air contracts as indicated by statement that Seven Seas might "in same way be affiliated with Sabena". This was also position taken today by Baron de Wykerslooth of Sabena in his talks here, in which he asserted that he was reflecting Chapman's view.

I feel strongly that while as much centralization and homogeneity as possible should be sought in our aerial chartering, it will be a serious mistake to find ourselves again exclusively reliant on Sabena or Air Congo, whose facilities in their entirety may at any time be requisitioned by Congolese authorities and whose policies and operations may also be subject to direction from Brussels. For these and other reasons, I feel that while we should make broadest use of Sabena facilities, we should not associate other contracts with them, thus giving them a dominant position vis a vis our aerial transport. I agree, however, that there is merit in suggestion that Sabena contract be taken as standard.

Dist.: 2 copies - Mr. R. Dayal
1 copy - Mr. J. Olver

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal, General McKeown

From : Mr. Bunche, New York

Date : 12 January 1961

No. : 220

Guinea has requested withdrawal of their battalion in the Congo by 20 January in cable from Toure to Secretary-General. However, no commitments have been made by us as to a precise date for repatriation. Consulting U.S. informally about possible airlift. For planning purposes following information is needed:

1. Total strength of contingent.
2. Total weight of stores, not including 72 lbs. of personal equipment for each man.
3. Time needed for readiness to depart.
4. Point of departure, which we assume would be Leopoldville.

It may be, of course, that this latest demand, like others, will not finally materialize into action. But we must be prepared for implementation.

Dist.: 2 copies - Mr. R. Dayal
1 copy - Gen. McKeown

INCOMING CLEAR

To : ONUC LEO

From : FIELDSERV, NEWYORK

Date : 11 January 1961

No : 210

ICAO agreed release on secondment as Berthoud replacement Mankiewicz, French national, legal officer, P-4 on ICAO staff since 1947. Has endorsement of Stavropoulos. Could report OVO (3rd ?) January. Please cable reaction.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL MCKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 11 January 1961

No: 206

Further our 195. US Mission has informed today, 11 January, that an additional C124 maintenance aircraft will take part in airlift of Irish contingents. Flight schedule as follows: ETA Leopoldville 16 January 103 hours, ETD Leopoldville 16 January 1200 hours, ETA Kamina 16 January 1500 hours, ETD Kamina 17 January 0630 hours, ETA Leopoldville 17 January 1000 hours, ETD Leopoldville 17 January 1200 hours.

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

FROM : UNATIONS NEW YORK

TO : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

NO. : 205

DATE : 11 January 1961

DAYAL MCKEOWN FROM BUNCHE

Ref our 49 and ONUC 99 and 151 from Air Commodore Chapman. You will be advised separately on chartered aircraft arrangements. Concerning aircraft and personnel for UN Air Force in the Congo see our 49. In order to avoid delay in obtaining the aircraft and personnel mentioned, your immediate comments would be appreciated.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL MCKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 11 January 1961

No: 204

Re ONUC 4361 and ONUC 96. In ONUC 96 you inform that outgoing Liberian Battalion has 23,400 lbs of stores to be airlifted in addition to 72 lbs of personal equipment for each man. Justification and breakdown is needed urgently.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, MCKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 11 January 1961

No: 202

Our 64. Sudan mission informs as follows:

"Total strength of new Sudanese Battalion 419 personnel, including one MMG and one three inch mortar section. Total weight of stores 113860 lbs. Ready for departure from Khartoum February 1st".

In ONUC 3461 you confirmed our assumption that heavy equipment would be handed over from contingent to contingent. In ONUC 96 you informed that outgoing Sudanese Battalion will have 60000 lbs of heavy equipment to be airlifted to Sudan. As Ustates is reluctant to undertake airlift of stores, a proper justification and breakdown of the 60000 lbs is urgently needed.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : McKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 17 January 1961

No : 201

Further to our 3119 Danish Mission informs that Danish military police personnel for Kamina will be at United Nations service until 30 April 1961.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : McKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 11 January 1961

No : 198

ONUC 2315 and our 49.

Brazilian Government informs that six Flight Sergeants radio operators, OC3 personnel, are ready for departure to Congo. In view recent revision air personnel organization, are the six Sergeants still needed? Argentina not repeat not able to provide six radio operators also requested in ONUC 2315.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, MCKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 11 January 1961

No: 195

Ref our 32 and 70. Ustates has now agreed to airlift new Irish contingent consisting of 650 personnel with 72 lbs of personal equipment each and 147,000 lbs of stores. They have also agreed to airlift outgoing contingent consisting of 1400 personnel with 72 lbs of personal equipment each and 13,000 lbs of stores. 19 aircraft are involved. Flight schedules as follows:

1. One C124 for maintenance -- ETA Leo 10 January 0800 hours, ETD Leo 10 January 0930 hours, ETA Kamina 10 January 1300 hours.

2. One C124 for maintenance - ETA Leo 10 January 1915 hours.

3. One C124 -- ETA Leo 10 January 0900 hours, ETD Leo 10 January 1030 hours, ETA Kamina 10 January 1400 hours ETD Kamina 13 January 0430 hours, ETA Leo 13 January 0815 hours, ETD Leo 13 January 1015 hours ETA Dublin Fifteen January 1500 hours.

4. Three C124s -- ETA Leo 11 January 2245 hours, ETD Leo 12 January 0045 hours, ETA Kamina 12 January 0430 hours, ETD Kamina 13 January 0900 hours, ETA Leo 13 January 1245 hours, ETD Leo 13 January 1445 hours, ETA Dublin 15 January timing refers to first aircraft. The other two follow with sixty minute intervals.

5. Two C124s -- ETA Leo 12 January 0615 hours, ETD 12 January 0815 hours, ETA Kamina 12 January 1200 hours, ETD Kamina 13 January 1300 hours, ETA Leo 13 January 1645 hours, ETD Leo 13 January 1845 hours, ETA Dublin 15 January 2200 hours. Timing refers to first aircraft. Second follows with sixty minutes interval.

6. Three C124s -- ETA Leo 13 January 0615 hours, ETD Leo 13

January 0815 hours, ETA Kamina 13 January 1200 hours, ETD Kamina 1300 hours on 14 January, ETA Leo 14 January 1645 hours, ETD Leo 14 January 1845 hours, ETA Dublin 16 January 2200 hours. Timing refers to first aircraft. The others follow with sixty minute interval.

7. Two C124s -- ETA Leo Thirteen January 0855 hours, ETD 14 January 0515 hours, ETA Kamina 14 January 0900 hours, ETD Kamina 14 January 1300 hours, ETA Leo 14 January 1645 hours, ETD Leo 15 January 0745 hours, ETA Dublin 16 January 2400 hours. Timing refers to first aircraft. Second follows with sixty minute interval.

8. Four C124s -- ETA Leo 13 January 2045 hours, ETD Leo 15 January 0045 hours, ETA Kamina 15 January 0430 hours, ETD Kamina 15 January 0830 hours, ETA Leo 15 January 1215 hours, ETD Leo 16 January 0300 hours, ETA Dublin 17 January 1915 hours. Timing refers to first aircraft. The others follow at sixty minute intervals.

9. Two C124s -- ETA Leo 14 January 2045 hours, ETD Leo 16 January 0045 hours, ETA Kamina 16 January 0430 hours, ETD Kamina 16 January 0830 hours, ETA Leo 16 January 1215 hours, ETD Leo 17 January 0300 hours, ETA Dublin 18 January 1915 hours. Timing refers to first aircraft. Second follows with sixty minute interval. All times are Zebra.

10. Above mentioned flight plan information regarding Irish airlift, received from US in the late afternoon of 10 January. Contrary to established United Nations policy, it calls for servicing stops for US aircraft at Leo. In view of fact that some aircraft were already airborne when information was received, there is no practical alternative to acquiescence in arrangements.

C3
We may discuss - perhaps also obtain Ahmed's views
RD
11/1

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL

FROM: CORDIER, NEW YORK

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER: 180

Since Wright has taken over post as Base Administrator Kamina suggest use of Bloch as Chief of General Services Leopoldville and Dharman to replace de Angelis. Since French is so necessary in local contacts in de Angelis shop and since Bloch's mother tongue is French feel that he would be good choice for Chief of General Services. Dharman is senior to Bloch and therefore could logically and ~~xxx~~ satisfactorily replace de Angelis. Bloch, of course, is on staff of TAB and TAB definitely has him in mind for eventual assignment but Guinea situation is not yet clear and whole UN role there is in state of suspense. Alternatively our people here regard Caprario at Kamina qualified for either post. We leave this rearrangement to your discretion in meeting needs as you see fit. We would appreciate knowing when Ahmed arrives Leo and when Olver and de Angelis will leave Leopoldville.

Sum → Amb Dayal's secretary

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To discuss DL SR
JRD
11/1

TO: DAYAL, LINNER

FROM: ABBAS, NEW YORK and MACFARQUHAR

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER: 179

ref pl.

Refugee relief. We have been somewhat concerned this last few days about possibility of loss of effectiveness attending redistribution of functions. Some of our misgivings were expressed in our queries on cable 103 about rather formalistic arrangements with FAO. Unity of command in field and continuity and coordination of effort are essential to out success in defeating famine and doubtless have your constant attention.

Distribution; Mr. Linner

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

FROM : UNATIONS NEW YORK

TO : UNOC LEOPOLDVILLE

NO. : 177

DATE : 11 January 1961

FOR DAYAL FROM ABBAS

Two communications received to-day from Belgian Mission. They have been informed that these are being transmitted to you and that we will advise them of qny further information which you can make available. Texts read: S46 "New York le 9 janvier 1961: La Mission Permanente de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et, d'ordre de son gouvernement, a l'honneur d'attirer son attention sur la situation suivante qui affecte les exploitations de la Sucraf au Sud de Bukavu. Par suite du blocage de la route et du delta par l'ANC, l'approvisionnement de la région est coupé et la situation est désespérée para La Mission Permanente de la Belgique y ait redonnaissante à Monsieur le Secrétaire général s'il pouvait: 1) Envoyer un petit détachement de l'ONU dans la région ou se trouvent les exploitation de la Sucraf et dans celle d'Uvira; 2) Assurer l'évacutation de 24 femmes et de 16 enfants résidant sur les concessions de la Sucraf para La Mission permanente de la Belgique saisit cette occasion pour présenter à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies les assurances très haute considération. Unquote S51 Quote La Mission Permanente présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies para Se Référant à sa note S.46 du 9 janvier elle a l'honneur en raison de l'extrème gravité de la situation de solliciter l'intervention urgente de

Monsieur le Secrétaire général aux fins de faire libérer deux membres du personnel dirigeant de la Sucraf à Uvira-Kivu et de faire restituer à cette entreprise un poste de radio lui permettant de communiquer avec le monde extérieur para La Mission Permanent saisit cette occasion de réiterer à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies les assurances de sa très haute considération unquote.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, MCKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 11 January 1961

No: 166

ONUC 144. Ireland requested accordingly.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL

FROM: ABBAS, NEW YORK

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER: 156

— 20 letters with Amb. Chakravartii yesterday

Reference your D-39 please clarify paragraph 4.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

In reply
NO
10/1

TO: DAYAL

FROM: CORDIER, NEW YORK

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER: ~~148~~ 144

President has just announced Secco meeting for Thursday morning 10-3o. This gives you still more time for possible report.

Possibly SecGen has informed you, after reading your last report appearing as annex 7, of his reactions. He stated "Text confirms my assumption and explodes case for Secco meeting -- especially urgent meeting. In the circumstances I feel added Dayal report may do Soviet allegations too much honour if it goes beyond flatly noting that there is nothing to add. This could even be stated orally through President. My reaction obviously based on hope there will be no new developments."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL IMMEDIATE

FROM: ABBAS, NEW YORK

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1961

NUMBER: 142

For your information Tshombe sources here report penetration into Katanga and inform us that unless UN intends to effect withdrawal by midnight 10 January Katanga forces will act to defend territory.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Mr. Cordier, New York

Date : 8 January 1961

No. : 136

Although no decision has been made, President Loufti has in mind meeting of Council not earlier than Wednesday afternoon. Will inform you immediately when final decision is made.

Recd at CCLO by
Rgy
9/1/61

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To. R. Dayal, Leopoldville.

From. Cordier, New York.

No. 134

Date. 8th January 1961.

Seegen telephoned me from johannesbourg to discuss plan for SECO Meeting on Zorin request. He asked me to inform members of council that he was returning to Newyork because of this matter but did not wish any postponment of Council because of his return schedule. I reserved return space on param no. 151 Leaving Johannesbourg at 1600Hrs. Thursday. I understand the plane stops for some 45 minutes in Leopoldville. It arrives New York 6:55 Friday morning.

In sight Seegens views and other considerations it appears meeting SECO will be held Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday with possible further meeting after his return. In this connexion Seegen asked me to ask you for an additional report for circulation to Council by tuesday noon.

Assume there is not very much to add to your report of 5th January.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Mr. Cordier, New York

Date : 8 January 1961

No. : 131

(Continuation of 130)

4. On Belgian-U.N. relations, in particular Belgian aid to Congo.

I found in official circles very considerable measure of misunderstanding of U.N. action and objectives, suspicion of our motives and I believe among responsible officials concern and genuine desire for resumption of constructive contact. Distrust seems to originate still in letter of 8 October to Tshombe and meaning which was given in Brussels to elimination of "Belgian factor". It is still widely believed in Brussels actual policy pursued by U.N. in Leopoldville and to lesser extent in New York is to eliminate all Belgians from Congo. As long as this feeling prevails it seems difficult find agreed solution to outstanding problems of Belgian bilateral aid as compared to possible aid through U.N., question of "policy makers", Belgian contribution to Special Fund etc. First step necessary for breaking present deadlock appears generally in Brussels to be a resumption conversation between representatives Belgian government and Secretary-General to recreate mutual confidence on all outstanding questions and with view finding methods of constructive cooperation. Concern and surprise is expressed at absence of Secretary-General reaction to suggestions by Belgian parliament for such meeting in spite of interventions by friendly governments. Impression I gathered is that two groups exist in ruling circles which might roughly divided into those having personal financial interest in Katanga or elsewhere in Congo and others. Among latter is group of permanent high officials in Ministry Foreign Affairs consisting in particular Secretary-General Vandenbosch, Rotschild, Director General

/Political Affairs....

No. 131 - 8 January 1961

Political Affairs Holvoes. These have more firmness, independence from political contingencies than politicians and probably more influence with the King and other ruling elements. As one of them said "we cannot prevent others from talking. We can stop them from acting." Their desire to explain their attitude to me in long conversations struck me as an indication of genuine willingness to resume contact and arrive at constructive cooperation in practical terms.

Vandenbosch in particular recalled his cooperation with Bunche in Leopoldville and stressed advantages of solving current disputes and difficulties over staffing and controversies among experts by personal daily contacts rather than exchanges of correspondence. He seems to have open mind as to nature of actual arrangements which might include presence authoritative Belgian in Leopoldville either as member of U.N. team or being there with adhoc status pending resumption of diplomatic relations with Congo. Another formula would consist of a Belgian participating in joint aid committee possibly on lines of one set-up with the French, the Belgian representative having sufficient stature to have decisions implemented in Brussels including those of removal of undesirable Belgians from Congo. I found constructive Vandenbosch's willingness not to formalize or necessarily publicize either the meeting of Belgian representative with Secretary-General on future Belgian-U.N. machinery of cooperation which he said might take place if desired on an adhoc non formalized basis as he said "according to English methods". He expressed his own willingness to meet the Secretary-General any time without special notice being even required and I assume any place. There are I believe distinct advantages to Vandenbosch himself undertaking this mission as he is most likely to make any arrival arrangements stick in Brussels.

5. Upon returning to Paris I was informed that Bomboko was coming here on Monday for 48 hours for conversations with a

/Belgian government.....

No. 131 - 8 January 1961

Belgian government representative possibly on future round table conference.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Mr. Cordier, New York

Date : 8 January 1961

No. : 130

Received following report from Schreiber following are main impressions and information gathered during four day visit to Brussels in course of which I had informal talks on personal basis with key officials Foreign Ministry, few well informed Belgian Diplomats, some politicians and newspaper editors. Additional information being pouched today.

1. On Belgian strikes and effect on internal political situation.

Strikes were imposed on socialist leaders by mass primarily of municipal employees joined later in few industrial areas by factory workers concerned by effects of proposed economic fiscal and social security bill. Strike not joined by Catholic union nor receiving nationwide support is most likely to end in failure with some minor face saving concessions to socialists. Political consequence is that short time act strongly anticipated overthrow of Eysken's government which is still generally unpopular and without prestige and its replacement by socialist and left wing Catholic cabinet in which Foreign Affairs post would have been held by Socialist favourable to full and frank U.N. cooperation is excluded for immediate future. Best guess is present cabinet continuing until Easter to take unpopular internal measures then new election taking place with sizeable socialist losses if present trend continues.

2. On crossing by Mobutu force to Ruanda Urundi and failure of attack on Bukavu.

Belgian Officials apparently knew of Mobutu plan through Kasavubu-Bomboko request 48 hours before Usumbura landing. They decided not to interfere with requisitioning of Sabena planes in order not to endanger Sabena's future position in Congo. They decided not to oppose landing nor disarming of contingent which might

/have involved.....

No. 130 - 8 January 1961

have involved fighting between Belgian and Mobutu soldiers, in order not to endanger Belgian-Kasavubu relations. This "calculated risk" failed miserably Mobutu crack troops instead of fighting the Bukavu garrison as expected began to talk to them which some of them apparently still doing with the object of ascertaining who would pay them more - Stanleyville or Leopoldville. Same Belgian Officials are somewhat dismayed and may be revising their political evaluations.

3. On support for Congolese leaders.

Failure of Bukavu operation as well as refusal of Tshombe to participate in Kasavubu's round table conference seems to have deeply shaken responsible officials'confidence primarily in Mobutu but generally in all other Congolese leaders who might be called pro Belgian. Confidence also shaken in chance success present Belgian political lines of policy including role agents of that policy in Congo. As to Mobutu they say they have helped him the same way they would have helped any friendly Congolese leader although apparently they have refused number of his requests in particular when these were contrary to U.N. resolutions as they understood them. As to Tshombe it appears that during his recent visit to Brussels Wigny strongly urged him orally and in writing to find by negotiation structures providing for Katanga remaining in Congo Republic and warning that there would no support by Belgian for Katanga independence and threatening even that should advice not be followed there would be serious consequences as to maintenance Belgian aid. As a result apparently Tshombe at that time wrote to Kasavubu accepting to participate in conference.

(to be continued in 131)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Dayal
From : Cordier
Date : 8 January 1961
Number : 129

Assume Secretary-General told you that word " Supreme" before "Commander" is no longer used.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: CORDIER, NEW YORK

Date: 8 January 1961

No: 128

Following sent Secgen. I transmit herewith official translation letter received seventeen thirty hours today from USSR requesting meeting SECCO on Congo. Further message follows:

"New York 7 January to President SECCO.

According to reports arriving from the Republic of the Congo, fresh acts of aggression by Belgium against the Congo have occurred in recent days, in which the Belgian Government, acting in flagrant defiance of the international status of the United Nations Trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, is making use of the Trust territory to organize military operations by Mobutu's armed gangs against units of the Congolese National Army in Kivu Province which support the legal government of the Republic of the Congo. As in further confirmed by the information contained in the note by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and in the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Dayal, (S/4606 and Add.1), the Belgian authorities have taken a direct part in organizing an attack by Mobutu's armed gangs from the Trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, making available to these gangs their aircraft, military and service personnel and trucks, and permitting them to use the territory of Ruanda-Urundi to move these troops to the rear of Congolese National Army detachments loyal to the legal Government of the Congo. These actions, which constitute open armed aggression by Belgium against the Republic of the Congo and a flagrant violation of the international status of the Trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, gave rise to serious armed clashes in the Bukavu region and firing across the border between Ruanda-Urundi and the Congo, as a result of which human lives were lost. In my letter of 4 January I had the honour to draw your attention, Mr. PRESIDENT, to the extreme danger of the situation that has developed in connexion with the use of the Trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi by the

Belgian Government for aggressive actions against the Republic of the Congo and to the necessity of receiving from the Secretary-General of the United Nations detailed information on the actual situation, as well as to the necessity of requesting the Belgian Government forthwith to furnish a full explanation with regard to this matter. To date, however, the members of the Security Council have not received the necessary explanation from the Government of Belgium. At the same time, reports arriving from the Congo indicate that the aggressive actions of Belgium against the Congo have not ceased and that the situation continues to deteriorate, thus still further increasing the threat to peace and security in this region. In this connexion, upon theinstructions of the Soviet Government I request you, Mr. President, to convene a meeting of the Security Council as quickly as possible to examine the serious threat to peace and security created as a result of the fresh acts of Belgian aggression against the Congo and the flagrant violation of the international status of the United Nations Trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Respectfully, V. Zorin, Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations. Unquote.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : ABBAS, NEWYORK

Date : 7 January 1961

No : 126

We received following note from Belgian Mission which I transmit for such action as you can take.

"New York, le 4 janvier 1961

La Mission belge auprès des Nations Unies se référant à ses communications antérieures au sujet de la protection des ressortissants belges au Congo, a l'honneur d'attirer son attention sur l'état d'insécurité qui paraît régner à l'heure actuelle dans la région de Kilo-Moto.

D'après des renseignements récents, plusieurs agents de la Société des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto auraient été sévèrement malmenés tandis que d'autres, parmi lesquels le secrétaire général de la société, auraient été privés de leur liberté de mouvement.

Cette situation paraît extrêmement grave étant donné que les mines de Watsa, faisant partie de l'exploitation en question et qui travaillent sous la protection de l'ONU, ne pourront continuer leur travail si la région de Kilo, où se trouvent les centrales hydroélectriques, devait être abandonnée par suite de nouveaux désordres.

La Mission permanente de la Belgique prie donc le secrétariat général de vouloir intervenir auprès de ses représentants locaux dans la République du Congo afin de libérer les agents actuellement détenus et leur assurer la libre circulation dans la zone minière.

La Mission permanente remercie d'avance le secrétariat général de la suite qu'il voudra bien réserver à sa requête."

Belgians to-day gave verbal report which they will confirm Monday that they have heard rumors UN Force would be leaving Bunia. This they say would lead to Europeans quitting and factories coming to standstill. In same verbal report they request that you take necessary measures protect people who wish to reopen railroads between Albertville and Kabalo.

INCOMING CODE

To : GENERAL KETTANI, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date : 7 January 1961

No : 123

Ghana mission informs by note dated 6 January that "Ghana military authorities have approached ONUC Headquarters in Leopoldville with request that Brigadier Otu ; ; ; be released" as from April first, with indication of willingness to provide a replacement if ONUC desires it. Note asks Secretary-General's approval. Please advise.

OUTGOING CODE

To : BUNCHE, NEW YORK

From : DAYAL, MACEOIN, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 17 January 1961

No : D-109

Your 330 and 123 refer.

Agreeable to release Brigadier Otu on 1 April as requested. Replacement need not be a Brigadier and should Ghana have suitable Lt-Colonel same would be acceptable replacement for Otu.

cc: Mr. Dayal
Force Comdr
Chief Mil Pers.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, KETTANI, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 6 January 1961

No: 98

United Kingdom now considering same air supply assist to Nigeria as they have undertaken for Ghana. For planning purposes Wing Commander Craxton RAF wants to inspect Albertville airfield. He will arrive Leo from Accra on first scheduled Ghana Hastings flight. If you see no objection to this visit, please assist him on from Leo.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: CORDIER, NEW YORK

Date: 6 January 1961

No: 97

United States Mission has received request from US Embassy in Rome asking for airlift of fifty tons of seed from neighbouring countries to Luluabourg or Bakwanga. Before officially requesting this airlift from US Mission here, would like to know of which neighbouring countries are involved and whether aircraft now on charter to ONUC cannot be used for this airlift.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Dayal

From : Abbas

Date : 6 January 1961

Number :95

Reference my 94.

We fully appreciate press exaggerations and distortions but account transmitted to you created bad impression here.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: ABBAS, NEW YORK

Date: 6 January 1961

No: 94

I transmit herewith extracts from UPI story from Leo of yesterday. Further message follows.

"A mob of 100 Congolese rioted today outside in HQ where UN Secgen Dag Hammarskjold was conferring with Congolese officials. Rioters demanded immediate release from jail of deposed Premier Patrice Lumumba. While Congolese rioted off duty UN troops took snapshots of them but made no attempt to break up demonstration. Only time UN acted was when a Congolese Gendarme who was chasing a rioter tried to take shortcut through UN compound. A Moroccan officer of UN Force pointed a pistol at him and barked in French 'get out'. Moroccan guards raced up tommyguns at the ready and Gendarme left. By noon rioters, roused by a Congolese woman, has beaten up three men and had been dispersed by Gendarmes. Three were arrested. While rioters were kicking one man in the head, back and chest a Danish UN military policeman stood five feet away taking pictures. UN has been criticized by observers here and abroad for failure to protect Congolese from each other but UN officials here have said UN policy is never to use force where persuation will do. UN officials also recall Hammarskjold's last speech to UN General Assembly in which he said that if civil war broke out in Congo UN would have no mandate to intervene. Similarly UN does not intervene in lesser incidents of violence among Congolese. UN spokesman said today that UN personnel were ordered about three weeks ago to keep away from riots because their appearance attracted unfavourable attention to UN. It was Kasavubu's Secretary Philipbert Luyeye who was beaten up in riot at UN HQ yesterday. 'I regret that it was next to UN HQ that I was knocked down and mistreated while UN soldiers as usual remained passive though their mission here is to preserve life and property' Luyeye said today. Luyeye's head was patched in two places and he took off his shirt to show a bandaged shoulder".

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: ABBAS, NEW YORK

Date: 6 January 1961

No: 91

Gist of your D-18 and D-21 communicated to Greek and Belgian delegations respectively.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 5 January 1961

No: 71

Our 4307, 4385 and ONUC 3390. Malaya has agreed to reinforce their contingent in the Congo as follows:

First Party -- One full strength infantry company of 127 all ranks. Ready for departure from Malaya 21 January.

Second Party -- 96 other ranks to bring existing three infantry companies in the Congo up to full strength.

Also one reconnaissance squadron less one troop.

Malayan Government is considering possibility of sending ten three point five inch rocket launchers and four three inch mortars with second party. Brigadier Osman due to arrive Brazzaville 1200 hours Seven January. Government will await his report before giving date of readiness of second party. We are making travel arrangements for first party.

INCOMING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

To: DAYAL, KETTANI, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 5 January 1961

No: 70

Our 4595 and 32.

In order to avoid rescheduling and serious delay of Irish airlift, justification and breakdown of the 120,000 pounds of stores and your comments on Kamina MC Kindu as airfield MF departure are most urgently needed.

INCOMING CLEAR

To: DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 5 January 1961

No: 66

Your D-20. Canada requested accordingly.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Mr O
Pl discuss
PW
6/1.

To: Mr: R. Dayal, Mr. Olver.

From: Cordier.

No: 65

Date: Jan. 5th, 1961.

Para 1. What is your view of qualifications of Brzak or Wright as base administrator at Kamina following present interim appointment?

Para 2. On interim appointment, although Bloch was approved for post, understand Ahmed in letter to Field Service had designated Caprario. leave matter your judgement but please inform us.

Para 3. As for Mollet as successor to De Angelis Headquarters does not require his return. His administrative qualities best appraised in the field, since his post here did not give him administrative scope. Erian not available. Please inform us your decision.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Good
B/1

To: MR. R. Dayal, Maj. Gen. Kettani.

From: Bunche.

No: 64

Date: January 5th, 1961.

Re B-1629.

Sudan has informed they will replace their battalion now serving in the Congo with a fresh battalion of same strength in february. In accordance with your B-1629, we have requested Sudan to include a heavy weapon support company in their new battalion.

INCOMING CODE IMMEDIATE

To : DAYAL, KETTANI, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date : 5 January 1961

No : 62

Reference our 3869, 4008 and B-1632

US requests that same measures referred to in our 3869 be taken to secure aircraft and airfields used by US for rotating of Irish contingent. They also request that special UN officers be named as contactmen at Leopoldville and Kamina. Please advise urgently.

cc: Gen. Kettani.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: Mr. R. Dayal, Maj. Gen. Kettani.

From: Bunche.

No: 60

Date: Jan. 5th, 1961.

Acting permanent observer of federal republic of Germany to UN visited me on fifth to communicate request of his government that UN protection be extended to german nationals in Kivu province. I assured him that UN protection, to extent that it could be afforded, extends to all repeat all non-Congolese irrespective of national origin as well as to Congolese.

Yan 60. Your reply entirely correct; in fact Chargé d'Affaires of West Germany ~~to~~ is in contact with me and attended meeting on ~~Kivu~~ protection of Europeans in Kivu also with his other colleagues

Sent.

RD
6/1

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 5 JANUARY 1961
NUMBER: 59

Reference B-1769. Has reconnaissance party referred to in para 5 returned and, if so, has any decision been reached? Austrian Representative here still pressing on disposition of Austrian Medical Detachment not yet dispatched.

Reply
23 Bunche for Dayal
Your 59. Austrians not yet back; shall report immediately on their return

RD
6/1

INCOMING CLEAR IMMEDIATE

To: DAYAL, KETTANI LEOPOLDVILLE

From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK

Date: 5 January 1961

No: 49

Re our 3231, 4378, B-1381, ONUC 3487, 3633, 34, 36 and report from General Von Horn of 8 December 1960.

Aircraft and air personnel situation as we now understand it after careful review of numerous communications on aircraft needs, which do not always tally, follows:

1. Agree that the 11 C-119s presently in the Congo should be retained for time being and be made Italian responsibility. Italy has been requested accordingly. When a proper substitute is obtained, the C-119 squadrons should be disbanded. Approach on high level to USA made for 130s but possibility of getting them appears slight at present.

2. In addition to the 10 C-47s you now have, we are in the market for an additional 13 DC-3s. Agree that C-47s and DC-3s should be concentrated at Ndjili and maintenance and periodical inspections if possible be taken over by Air France at Brazzaville. C_47/DC_3s should be mainly responsibility of South American personnel.

3. Agree that light aircraft squadrons -- 4 Otters and 4 Beavers -- be disbanded when sufficient C-47/DC-3s are in operation.

4. Agree to retain your present sixteen helicopters with maintenance undertaken in the Congo. Helicopters should be Scandinavian personnel responsibility.

5. DC-3 personnel. In line with homogeneous group principle and on basis of additional aircraft, South American countries have already been requested to provide following personnel:

Argentina -- 3 complete air crews and adequate number of ground crews to operate 3 DC-3 planes;

Brazil -- 5 complete air crews and adequate number of ground crews to operate 5 DC-3 planes;

Chile -- 4 complete air crews to operate 4 DC-3 planes (no ground crews have been requested);

Peru -- 4 complete air crews and adequate number of ground crews to operate 4 DC-" planes.

No response yet received from any of these. Further on basis of ONUC 3111 we have requested Greece to provide following personnel qualified on DC-3: 1 Major and 7 Captains (pilots); 6 sergeants flight engineers; two flight sergeants aero engine mechanics; two sergeants air frame mechanics; two sergeants instrument technicians. Propose we await replies from the four South American countries and Greece. When we have itemized list of personnel these countries are willing to provide we will send it for your consideration and approval before dispatching personnel to Congo. Suggest we try Denmark, Norway and Sweden only if the five abovementioned countries are not repeat not able to fill our requirements. Please comment.

6. C-119 personnel. Italy has been requested to take full responsibility for second line maintenance and for provision of personnel. Italy has also been advised that if second line maintenance is agreed upon, Italian crews in the Congo, reduced by 18 maintenance personnel, can operate C-119 squadron by themselves. No reply yet received. Regarding shift over of Indian C-119 crews to DC-3 establishment, we await further word from you following DC-3 establishment build up with personnel from requested sources. Please comment. Our records indicate there are two Norwegian aircrews in present C-119 establishment. Is this correct? If so, are they to be repatriated now or on the expiry of their tour of duty? Please advise.

7. Light aircraft personnel. Should we now advise the countries providing light aircraft personnel not repeat not to send replacements for the present crews when their term of duty expires? As per our records Norway and Sweden have provided that type of personnel in the past. Is this correct?

8. Helicopter personnel. Please refer to ONUC 1428, 2316 and our 3057. In view of unsuccessful results in attempting to fill smaller requirements in the past with Scandinavian personnel would appreciate your considering

possibility of minimizing your present requirements. Denmark, Norway and Sweden seem to have reached their maximum capability for provision of helicopter personnel. Please advise.

9. Ndjili Base HQ personnel. Before approaching countries recommended for medical personnel, would it not be possible to obtain medical assistance needed at Ndjili from Leopoldville Hospital? Please advise.

Incoming Code Cable

Big R
We examining
Reply to go today.
JWD
4/1

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Mr. Cordier

Date : 5 January 1961

No. : 48

Ghanians now ask that Captain Dontoh be returned to Ghana for army service. Assume you agree. Please confirm. 148

Since other three requested by Von Horn for temporary return to Jerusalem are all Canadians will approach Canadian mission here regarding matter. It would also be helpful if you would discuss matter with top Canadian Officer there. Would appreciate a reply five January on these two matters so that I can inform Von Horn.

Fournier was released on 3/1

No 57

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal for the Secretary General

From : Mr. Abbas, New York

Date : 4 January 1961

No. : 46

We have received following note from Belgian mission. Please advise of any action taken that end.

" New York le 4 Janvier

La mission permanente de la Belgique presente ses compliments au Secretariat General des Nations Unies et a l'honneur d'attirer son attention sur la situation suivante:

Le gouvernement Belge vient d'etre informe des mesures d'arrestations arbitraires dont ont ete victimes nombre de ses ressortissants resident dans la region de Bukavu. C'est notamment le cas de M. Fournier, Directeur General du Comite Special du Kivu, et de plusieurs membres de cette administration qui ont ete brutalement apprehendes sans l'ombre d'une justification.

Le gourvernement Belge serait reconnaissant au Secretariat General de bien vouloir prendre toutes mesures en son pouvoir en vue d'obtenir la liberation immediate de ces personnes. Il tiens egalement a signaler les graves consequences que ces arrestations impliquent pour les activites economiques de la province du Kivu."