

ICFY

WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE AND
SECURITY - BUILDING AND VERIFICATION
MEASURES

10 SEPT - 2 DEC 1992

[4 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

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EL/WG JUNE 2012

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SERIES 5-1835

BOX 2

FILE 5

ACC. 2011/0195

NOTE FOR THE CO-CHAIRMEN

Subject: 22nd meeting on 3 December 1992 at 10.30 a.m. of the Working Group on Confidence and Security-Building and Verification Measures

Participants

- Italian Mission: Mr. SFARA
- French Mission: Mr. BESANCENOT
- German Mission: Col. ARNHOLD
- United Kingdom: Mr. CHAPLIN/Mr. McDADD
- U.S. Mission: Mr. WAGENSEIL
- Canadian Mission: Mr. LEGG
- Russian Federation Mission: Mr. KHABIROV
- For CSCE: Mr. VENERA
- For ECMM: Mr. VOGELAAR
- Bosnian Croat: Mr. CORIC
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: Mr. BIJEDIC
- Bosnian Serb: Mr. PLAVSIC/Dr. LUKIC
- Croatia: Mr. MADEY/Mr. CACOVIC
- FRY: Mr. CICANOVIC/Mr. SARAC
- Macedonia: Mrs. TASEVSKA
- Slovenia: Mr. BEBLER
- UNHCR: Mr. WEBB
- UNPROFOR: Mr. MBOGO

N.B. All parties in former Yugoslavia were present, though Mr. Bebler (Slovenia) did not stay long. The Chairman welcomed Mr. Vogelaar of the Netherlands, representing the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) as a member of the Working Group

1. The Chairman expressed his concern over yet another shooting with small arms of an aircraft operating a humanitarian flight, this time of a US aircraft on Tuesday, 1 December. He noted that similar attacks had taken place against other humanitarian flights and announced his intention to make public, from now on, the identity of the party responsible. He further stated that this kind of action constituted a threat not only to the crews, but also to the survival of the people receiving humanitarian aid. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France and the representative of the CSCE joined the Chairman in expressing their concern about the pattern of this type of attack and the risk, if continued, of a halt to the humanitarian airlift. The Russian Federation suggested that a press release be issued condemning these attacks and calling upon the parties to do their utmost to

halt them immediately. Mr. Bijedic (BiH) wanted the press release to clearly indicate the responsible party. Mr. Madey (Croatia) wanted to know if UNPROFOR had determined the responsible party, while Mr. Plavsic (Bosnian Serb) supported all efforts to conclude the investigation of the responsible party. The Chairman noted that the incident was being investigated and that he will report to the Working Group who was responsible for the shooting.

15 September Agreement (continuation of humanitarian flights)

2. The Chairman informed the Working Group that the three parties in BiH had given to him information on the location of their AAAs and SAMs, in accordance with CBM modality B.6, and that he was obtaining clarification from the parties on certain aspects which might not be in compliance with that agreement. It was agreed that this moderately sensitive information (already in the hands of the Co-Chairmen) would be distributed to all members of the Working Group soon.

Longer-term CBMs

3. While BiH, Croatia and the Bosnian Croat side again underlined the gap between the developments on the ground and the exercise the Working Group was engaged upon, the Western countries and Russia strongly supported the proposal of the Chairman to make progress in the Working Group by full implementation of the London Conference confidence-building document and the 15 September CBM agreement, as well as by any other proposals which could foster confidence in the military field.

4. The Chairman put forward an idea that, as a first step towards building confidence, an exchange of information be implemented among all the parties in former Yugoslavia on the types and numbers of their main conventional weapons systems. At first, this information, which does not imply disclosure of any military secret as it is already available from reliable academic sources, would be for the exclusive use of the Chairman. Eventually, it could be

exchanged among the parties themselves as a gesture of goodwill. The proposal was supported by the Western delegations and Russia. The parties in former Yugoslavia confirmed they would seek instructions from their respective authorities. In the meanwhile, the Chairman would develop a representative "list" of types for consideration by the parties.

5. The next meeting is scheduled for Monday, 7 December at 10.00 a.m.



Vicente Berasategui

cc. Ambassador Okun
Ambassador Hall
Mr. Mbogo ✓

MBOGO

REPUBLIC SRPSKA
PRESIDENCY
No. 05-11/ 92, 1992.
Geneva, November 16th, 1992.

Attn. H.E. Amb. V. Berasategui, Chairman of the Working Group for the Confidence and Security Building and Verification Measures

Your Excellency,

According to the Agreement of September 24th, 1992. and therein contained Art. B . 6, we are supplying the following information.

1. To facilitate a safe flight corridor for the humanitarian flights agreed upon by the all three parties to the conflict in former B-H, we have dislocated all AAA-s and SAM-s belonging to the Army of Republic Srpska out of the 90 km perimeter, with respect to the map previously supplied.

2. Present locations of the units and AA devices of the Army of Republic Srpska are as follows:

a. artillery and AA regiments:

- area Lukavica - Trebevic (now only one recon.-aquisit. radar)
- Bileca (20 mm and 30 mm AAA-s)
- Petrovac (20, 30 and 40 mm AAA-s)
- Banja Luka, Slatina Varos (7 km east of Zaluzani), Nova Topola, Ivanjska (20, 30 and 40 mm AAA-s, AA missile szstems of short and long range, RA radar)

b. artillery and AA squadrons

- Glamoc (20 and 40 mm AAA-s, AA missile systems of short range
- Banja Luka (30 mm AAA-s, AA missile systems of short range, RA radar)
- Modrica (20mm AAA-s and short range - AA missile systems)
- Derveta, Brod (30 and 57 mm AAA-s, short range AA missile systems)
- Brcko (20 and 30 mm AAA-s)
- Nevesinje - vill. Rabina and vill. Zulja (9 km north of Nevesinje) (20 and 30mm AAA-s)

c. battery units (20, 30, 40 and 57 mm AAA-s and AA missile systems, short range - SAM-s and long range)


- regions of: Jajce, Glamoc, Drvar, Grahovo, Bihac, Krupa, Mrkonjic Grad, Prijedor, Dubica, Odzak, Bijeljina, Sekovici, Trebinje and Foca.

3. Along the frontlines, most of the units of battalion- squadron size include the AAA and SAM platoons, except for the units within the flight-corridor.

4. Exact location points of the respective units and equipment are subject to the changes on the every-day bases,(particularly units of smaller size), within the respective region.

We trully hope that this our contribution to the confidence and security building, along with our other initiatives, will help in sense of accomplishing the seasation of hostilities in the B-H conflict.

Please accept the expressions of my special esteem,

Dr. Aleksa Buha,
Minister for the Foreign Affairs
of the Republic Srpska


**REPUBLIC SRPSKA
DELEGATION TO THE ICFY GENEVA**

No. 08-11/92, 1992.

Geneva, November 24th, 1992.

**Attn.: H.E. V. Berasategui, Chairman of the Working Group for the
Security and Confidence Building and Verification Measures**

Your Excellency,

**Concerning the previously submitted reports by the representatives of
UNHCR and F.R.Germany about lock on-s attached to the :**


- 1. British aircraft carrying humanitarian cargo on Sturday, Nov. 14th,
1992. (12:10 p.m.), in the region of Fojnica and**
- 2. German aircraft, aground on the Sarajevo Airport, ready to depart, on
Wednesday, Nov. 11th, 1992.**

**we have repported to the Headquarters of the Army of the Republic Srpska
in Sarajevo, and obtained an answer that no lock-on was attached to any
aircraft, on the reported days.**

**We are very satisfied to obtain such an information and to deliver it to the
Working Group. We shall continue to contribute to the work of the Group
and to support the serious and constructive efforts of it's Chairman, in every
way.**

Please, accept the expressions of my special esteem.

**Dr Aleksa Buha, Min. for Foreign Affairs
of Republic Srpska**



REPUBLIC SRPSKA
DELEGATION TO THE ICFY GENEVA

No. 01-12/92, 1992.
Geneva, December 1st, 1992.

Attn.: H.E. Amb. V. Berasategui, Chairman of the Working Group for the
Security and Confidence Building and Verification Measures

Your Excellency,

We are pleased to inform You that the highest authorities of the Republic Srpska have positively responded to Your repeated call for the complying with the provisions of the Sept. 15. and 24. agreements. Pursuant to that, the Presidency of the Republic Srpska, acting in it's cappacity as a supreme command of the Army of the Republic Srpska, issued an order on November 25th, to all of the commands of the Army in the field, to **maintain and make every step necessary to that effect, a strict compliance with the provisions of the Sept. 15. and 24. agreements, with special attention to those concerning:**

- 1. dislocation of the all AAA-s and SAM-s from the area agreed upon and**
- 2. ban on any radar lock-on to humanitarian flights and all UN authorized flights.**

As to the question of the level to which those, as well as previous, orders have been given, in case of the Army of the Republic Srpska, it is the level of the commander of the every unit of size of a company.


As far as the focal point on the ground is concerned, every accident possibly concerning Serb side, is to be discussed through Ms. Marina Ratkovic, tel.: 38-11-657-738.

In the same time, we are expressing our deep concern and disapproval in respect to the accident of the American aircraft on humanitarian mission being shot at, at November 30th and the mortar attack which resulted in the damage to the both, UNPROFOR and Sarajevo-Airport equipment, on December 1th.

As a party to conflict which by no means wishes and encourages the prolongation of the conflict, we cannot support any simmilar action in any aspect. We are very much looking forward to the Geneva Conference coordinators and other factors concerned, to start reconciling the familiar attitude of the different parties to the B-H conflict, with the eventual interest for such accidents to be repeated.

Please, accept the expressions of my special esteem,

Aleksa Buha
Minister for Foreign Affairs

P.A. 



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva

November 22, 1992

Working Group on Confidence Building Measures and Verification
Chairman , Mr. Berasategui

Mr. Chairman,

In accordance with the Agreement of the 15th of September 1992.
and the document relating to Criteria of 24th of September 1992.
and on the basis of instructions received on 22nd of November 1992
these are the information relating to identification of Headquarters
and names of commanders, as well as information relating to AAA and
SAMs:

1. Headquarters of Military Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina reiterates its report of 15th of September relating to identification of units and commanders as presented under B,1, 1.a), 1.b) and 1.c) of that Report.

2. As to the availability of AAA and SAMs, units of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not in a position of this kind of arms. Few numbers of anti-air-crafts arms captured from aggressor are distributed in the following way :

-In the area of Tuzla aeroport there are two guns of 20/3mm, one gun of 20/1mm and two "Strijela 2-m" launchers;


-In the region of Bihać there is one gun "Bofors 40mm", two guns 20/3mm and two "Strijela 2 m" launchers;

-In the region of Sarajevo there are two guns 20/3mm, one gun "Bofors 40mm" and one gun 20/1mm.

-In the region of Zenica there are three guns 20/1mm, two guns 20/3mm and two "Strijela 2m" launchers.

Please accept Mr. Chairman assurances of my highest consideration.

Charge d'affaires
minister counsellor


Mustafa B a j e d i c



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva

December 1, 1992

Dear Mr. Berasategui,

I refer to my communication to you of 22 November 1992, in which the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina responded to your request for further information in accordance with the 24 September agreed modalities for implementation of CBM measure B.4, B.5 and B.6.


I should like first of all to confirm herewith the information we had supplied on the location of the few captured AAAs in possession of the units of the Republic. I fully appreciate that the information forwarded with respect to the location of AAAs in the area of Sarajevo is not in conformity with the agreed CBM measure B.5, which stipulates that all AAAs and SAMs should be withdrawn from a 45km area on each side of the route agreed for humanitarian flights.

As you were informed, on 1 October 1992, the Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters of the High Command of the Republic issued an order for the withdrawal of all AAAs from the zone agreed. However, as will be readily understood, the forces of the Republic are not in a position to withdraw the AAAs declared from the region of Sarajevo as they are completely surrounded by hostile units. Thus, in order to comply as fully as its means allow with CBM measure B.5, the Republic hereby confirms that it will neutralize the AAAs declared in that region.

In respect of the CBM measure B.4, banning radar lock-ons to humanitarian flights and other flights authorized by UNPROFOR, the Republic hereby reaffirms the information that it has already forwarded to the Working Group, that it possesses no electronic means to carry out radar lock-ons. It is for this reason that my authorities are of the view that it is not necessary to appoint a focal point on the ground for clarification of any radar lock-on incidents.

I respectfully submit that these clarifications should erase any doubts as to compliance of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with CBM agreement of 15 September 1992 and its agreed modalities of 24 September.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Mustafa Bijedic
Chargé d'affaires
Minister Counsellor

Mr. V. Berasategui
Chairman of the Working Group
on Confidence and Security-Building
and Verification Measures



HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA

HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE

4 December 1992

TO: V. Berasategui, Chairman
Working Group on Confidence and Security-
Building and Verification Measures

FAX: 99-41-22-917-0034

FM: Mate Boban, President *George Rukh*
Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia

FAX: 38-58-841-774

MESSAGE: We are grateful and welcome your intent to bring peace and freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this sense, you can depend on our complete cooperation as has been demonstrated thus far. In regards to your communique of 11 November 1992, I would like to bring to your attention the following as an answer to your recent recommendations and requests:

- A.2: There are no changes to the information that we previously forwarded.
- B.4: We do not have any airplane flight-tracking radar nor any other devices to track airplane flights.
- B.5: We do not have anti-aircraft artillery nor surface-to-surface missiles in the area of 45 kilometers on each side of the flight path that was agreed by all sides for humanitarian flights.
- B.6: The little anti-aircraft means we have are now all found near the cities of Citluk, Capljina and Ljubuski. Any commission that you might send can visit these sights. Again, we confirm that we do not maintain any anti-aircraft means in an area 45 kilometers on each side of the agreed route for humanitarian flights. We welcome these humanitarian flights and you can definitely depend on security and support from our side. We are ready to exchange this data with the other parties.

<u>Definitions</u>	<u>Type</u> <u>and Calibre</u>	<u>Number</u>
3. <u>"Artillery"</u> means 50mm and above calibre systems capable of engaging ground targets by delivering primarily indirect fire. Such artillery systems provide the essential indirect fire support to combined arms formations. Artillery systems are guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems.		
4. <u>"Anti-aircraft artillery"</u> means 20 mm and above calibre systems capable of engaging both aircraft and ground targets with primarily direct fire.	<u>Type</u> <u>and Calibre</u>	
5. <u>"Surface-to-air missile"</u> means any mobile guided weapon system for use against aircraft.	<u>Type</u>	
6. <u>"Surface-to-surface missile"</u> means any guided weapon system for use against ground targets	<u>Type</u>	
7. <u>"Armoured vehicle launched bridge"</u> means a self-propelled armoured transporter-launcher vehicle capable of carrying and, through built-in mechanisms, of emplacing and retrieving a bridge structure. Such a vehicle with a bridge structure operates as an integrated system.	<u>Type</u>	
8. <u>"Combat aircraft"</u> means a fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs,	<u>Type</u>	

(LUNAR?)

<u>Definitions</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model or version of such an aircraft which performs other military functions, such as training, reconnaissance or electronic warfare.	<u>Type</u>	
9. <u>"Transport aircraft"</u> is a fixed wing aircraft whose primary purpose is the carriage of passengers and freight. It does not normally have an offensive capability, and does not engage in intelligence gathering activities. It may carry self-defensive equipment capable of detecting and analysing potential threats to its flight.		
10. <u>"Helicopter"</u> means a rotary wing aircraft equipped to perform any military function including combat, training, reconnaissance, electronic warfare and transport of military equipment and personnel.		
11. <u>"Armoured combat vehicle look-alike"</u> means an armoured vehicle based on the same chassis as, and externally similar to, an armoured combat vehicle, which has been constructed or modified in such a way as not to permit the transportation of a combat infantry squad.		
B. The parties shall provide to the Chairman and exchange among themselves information on the total personnel strength of:		
1. <u>Regular forces.</u>		
2. <u>Irregular forces.</u>		

NOTE FOR THE CO-CHAIRMEN

Subject: 21st meeting on 27 November 1992 at 10.30 a.m. of the Working Group on Confidence and Security-Building and Verification Measures

Participants

- Italian Mission: Mr. SFARA
- French Mission: Mr. BESANCENOT/Mr. PEREZ
- German Mission: Col. ARNHOLD
- United Kingdom: Mr. CHAPLIN/Mr. McDADD
- U.S. Mission: Mr. WAGENSEIL/Ms. DUNN
- Netherlands Mission: Mr. SMITS
- Canadian Mission: Mr. LEGG
- Russian Federation Mission: Mr. KHABIROV
- For CSCE: Mr. GASPAR
- Bosnian Serb: Mr. PLAVSIC/Dr. LUKIC
- Croatia: Mr. MADEY/Mr. CACOVIC
- FRY: Mr. CICANOVIC/Mr. SARAC
- Slovenia: Mr. BEBLER
- UNHCR: Mr. WEBB
- UNPROFOR: Mr. MBOGO

N.B. Bosnian Croat, BiH and Macedonia not present

1. France, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed regret at the absence of two sides in BiH and urged the Chairman to seek their participation in future meetings. The Chairman welcomed the representative of the Russian Federation, participating for the first time as member of the Working Group.

15 September CBM agreement

2. The Chairman expressed his concern over the second incident of small arms fire striking a French aircraft participating in the humanitarian airlift. He informed the meeting that the responsible party could not be identified as all sides involved in BiH had forces in the area. He urged the BiH parties to press their forces on the ground to exercise maximum restraint and prudence with regard to the humanitarian airlift.

3. The Chairman informed the Working Group that he was still evaluating the information submitted by the parties in respect of their declarations of locations of AAAs and SAMs throughout BiH. He would be speaking bilaterally to each delegation on this matter and would report at the next meeting on the results of his consultations.

4. No further information on the recent radar lock-ons to humanitarian flights was forwarded by the parties. The Chairman once again appealed for a cessation of this type of activity and clarification of the recorded incidents from the parties concerned.


5. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed disappointment that no information was being advanced on radar lock-ons in accordance with the 15 September CBM agreement and that activity which threatened the flight effort was still being conducted.

Longer-term CBMs

6. While Mr. Madey of Croatia stressed the need for genuine enforcement of existing Security Council decisions and measures, Mr. Plavsic of the Bosnian Serb side laid emphasis on the obstacles to creating confidence while developments on the ground were as they were. He cited two incidents in particular: a) the purported use of "nerve gas" on 24 November by "the other side" and b) a delivery of 3,000 apparent military uniforms into BiH on a humanitarian flight which had been sent back by UNHCR and UNPROFOR but reappeared being worn by soldiers of the other side. The Chairman took the opportunity to stress the need for the Working Group to concentrate its efforts on the issues within its competence and not to be diverted from its work on CBMs. He flatly rejected any implication that UNPROFOR or UNHCR were involved in any misdoings. Indeed the representative of UNHCR took the floor to explain that there were never any military uniforms involved in this particular incident and that in any case the Bosnian Serb side has been actively engaged in inspections of humanitarian shipments. In a second statement on the same subject, Mr. Plavsic tried to dispel the impression that he was blaming either UNPROFOR or UNHCR.

7. The Chairman announced that, at the next meeting, he intended to conduct an exchange of views on longer term CBMs, including those contained in the London agreement and any others relevant to the present situation. Germany also called for the Working Group to seek CBMs beyond those outlined in the London Conference document on confidence-building measures. France and the United States joined in inviting the Working Group to expand its search for CBMs beyond BiH to cover all of former Yugoslavia, in fulfillment of its mandate.

8. The next meeting will be on Thursday, 3 December 1992 at 10.30 a.m. Before that the Chairman will be holding private consultations on the implementation of the 15 September agreement and longer-term CBMs.


Vicente Berasategui

cc. Ambassador Okun
Ambassador Hall
Mr. Mbogo ✓

ULKOASIAINMINISTERIÖ

SAAPUNUT AVOSANOMA

Lähetijä UM LJUBLJANA				Kirjasto		Vast.yks.	
Saapunut 17.11.92				Klo 21.20	Lähtö 7h		Avattu Klo
Hoitaa: yks. POL-20				Nimi		Signum	
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TIEDOKSI: GEN - ATT. AHTISAARI
SL WIE

Republika Slovenija
Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve



Republic of Slovenia
Ministry for foreign affairs

TELEFAX

No.:

Datum / Date 17.11.1992

Od / From: DR. DIMITRIJ RUPEL, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Za / To: MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS - H.E.Mr. PAAVO VÄYRYNEN

Številka telefaksa / Fax No: 99 358 062 9840

To sporočilo obsega 3 strani, vključno s to stranjo

This message contains pages, including this one

Sporočilo / Message

Letter sent to the Finnish
Foreign Minister. Circulated
at the request of Mr. Ahtisaari.



DISTRIBUTION:

MR. MBOGO



Republika Slovenija
Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve
Minister

Ljubljana, 17 November 1992

Your Excellency, Dear Colleague,

Two days ago I returned from Sarajevo where I witnessed with my own eyes the continued dying of this important cultural centre of Europe. The attackers have destroyed all that is of cultural and European value in Sarajevo. Sarajevo has now become a concentration camp from which there is no escape and which, for several months already, hour after hour, has been subjected to shelling by soldiers of the occupying force. As you may imagine, even before my visit to Sarajevo, I was already acquainted with the material facts and human implications of this war; but what I saw with my own eyes differed substantially from what I had already known.


I am sure that you, too, share my feelings. The full horror of the events and the actual destruction can neither be conveyed by television and the press, nor by confidential reports. I spent the night awake in a half-ruined hotel with shattered window, listening to the bursts of machine gun fire and explosions. All my friends in Sarajevo now wear shirts two sizes too large for their necks; their children never see either meat or fruit and vegetables. The people of Sarajevo have become inured to the situation, so, too, has the rest of Europe enjoying peace and normal civilian life. The besieging of Sarajevo is understood as a political rather than a moral problem.

It is no longer enough for us to go on arranging conferences, to go on talking about the problems of ethnic problems or even of ethnic cleansing. The time has come for moral action and practical commitment. The public we represent will no longer tolerate our inefficacy and/or absence of any radical break-through. The London Conference yielded scant results: the conclusions came to nought. Although the UN Charter condones legitimate self-defence, nevertheless we have still not lifted the embargo on the import of arms. Despite the doubts we may have had about the efficacy of lifting the embargo, I today feel that it should be lifted: the people of Sarajevo are daily waiting, powerless and unarmed, for the moment when they are hit by a bullet or a shell.

I have been informed of the initiative of the French Foreign Minister, Monsieur Roland Dumas, regarding a new conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina. This initiative should be supported. Above all, I feel that Sarajevo should be visited by ministers from European States and other countries. This would make them realize in situ how ineffective have been the measures hitherto taken; their presence would send a clear signal to the attackers that the world has not forgotten Sarajevo.

The leading politicians of the world assure me that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not black and white. With this I can certainly agree. Nevertheless, the complexity of the situation can not be an excuse for non-action, for the situation in Sarajevo is, indeed, black and white: on the one side we have attackers, armed to their teeth, while on the other we have the empty-handed people. In addition to hundreds of thousands of those killed and missing, in the weeks to come - during the Christmas Holidays - we shall have to bear on our conscience further hundreds of thousands of dead and tortured people. I beg you for cooperation in the Plan for the salvation of Sarajevo. The city must be unblocked and the people must be allowed freely to leave the town if we are unable effectively to protect them. May I once more propose: Let us all go to Sarajevo!

Yours sincerely,


Dr. Dimitrij Rupel
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Slovenia

WORKING GROUP ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING
AND VERIFICATION MEASURES

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Mr. FOUINAT	Tel. 739.87.79
Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. WEBB	Tel. 739.81.26 Fax 739.86.69
Mr. SFARA	Tel. 734.93.50 Fax 734.67.02
Mr. FINAUD, Mr. BONNEVILLE, Mr. PEROZ	Tel. 758.21.23 Fax 758.24.49
Col. ARNHOLD, Mr. WAGNER	Tel. 730.11.11 Fax 734.30.43
Mr. CHAPLIN, Mr. McDADD	Tel. 734.38.00 Fax 734.52.54
Mr. WAGENSEIL, Mr. BIRD, Ms. DUNN	Tel. 749.46.20 Fax 749.47.17
Mr. DUBOIS	Tel. 733.90.00 Fax 734.79.19
Mr. SMITS	Tel. 797.50.30 Fax 797.51.86
Mr. VENERA, Mr. GASPAR	Tel. 798.91.81 Fax 788.09.19
Mr. MADEY, Mr. CACOVIC	Tel. 779.12.48 Fax 779.12.72 or 779.12.80
Mr. PAVICEVIC, Lt.Col.VOJVODIC, Mr. CICANOVIC	Tel. 346.44.33 Fax 346.44.36
Mr. SARAC	" "
Mr. CORIC	Tel. (031) 41.56.52 Fax (031) 42.12.48
Mr. BIJEDIC	Tel. 346.09.05 Fax 346.09.05
Mr. PLAVSIC, Mr. LUKIC	Tel. 752.17.40 Fax 758.14.17
Mr. BEBLER	Tel. 738.66.60 Fax 738.66.65
Mrs. TASEVSKA - <i>Representative</i>	Tel. 731.11.07 Fax 738.85.27
Mr. MBOGO <i>Ministry of Foreign Relations</i> <i>of Macedonia</i>	Tel. 734.88.71 Fax 733.58.80

Chairman: Mr. BERASATEGUI Tel. 734.60.11 Ext. 2280 Fax 917.0034 */
Assistant: Mr. CASSANDRA " Ext. 3038 "

*/ New fax number effective 19/11/92



HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA
HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE

4 December 1992

TO: V. Berasalegui, Chairman
Working Group on Confidence and Security-
Building and Verification Measures

FAX: 99-41-22-917-0034

FM: Mate Boban, President *Mate Boban*
Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia

FAX: 38-58-841-774

MESSAGE: We are grateful and welcome your intent to bring peace and freedom in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this sense, you can depend on our complete cooperation as has been demonstrated thus far. In regards to your communique of 11 November 1992, I would like to bring to your attention the following as an answer to your recent recommendations and requests:

- A.2: There are no changes to the information that we previously forwarded.
- B.4: We do not have any airplane flight-tracking radar nor any other devices to track airplane flights.
- B.5: We do not have anti-aircraft artillery nor surface-to-surface missiles in the area of 45 kilometers on each side of the flight path that was agreed by all sides for humanitarian flights.
- B.6: The little anti-aircraft means we have are now all found near the cities of Citluk, Capljina and Ljubuski. Any commission that you might send can visit these sights. Again, we confirm that we do not maintain any anti-aircraft means in an area 45 kilometers on each side of the agreed route for humanitarian flights. We welcome these humanitarian flights and you can definitely depend on security and support from our side. We are ready to exchange this data with the other parties.

C2N405
C2G 107

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

(C)
MOST IMMEDIATE

92 NO 16

11:00 5

Page 1 of 4

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNOG, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1992

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 333

SUBJECT: MEETING AT BILECA ON 15 NOVEMBER 1992

Clawit
nr Gen

(IMMEDIATE)

92 NOV 16 13:25

UNOG Inform Unit
Palais des Nations

1. A report on the above meeting received from SMO Dubrovnik is attached; we are awaiting a copy of Martinez's report.
2. Deployment details of UNMOs and SPABAT are being worked out by HQ BH Command and will be forwarded when finalised.

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UNPROFOR
UNMO

Page 1 of 3

MOST IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING FAX NO	DATE: 15 NOV 92
TO: HQ UNMO, ZAGREB	FROM: SMO, DUBROVNIK
FAX NO: 041-171-688	FAX NO: 050-412-801
ATTN: CMO, COO	DRAFTER: MAJ RASHID.
INFO: SMO, MOSTAR	
SUBJECT: SPL SITREP- RECORDS OF MEETING WITH HK AT BILECA	

~~MESSAGE~~

REF:

- A. TELCON BETWEEN CMO AND SMO, DUBROVNIK ON 14 NOV 92.
- B. TELCON BETWEEN SMO, MOSTAR AND SMO, DUBROVNIK ON 15 NOV 92.

1. The scheduled meeting started at 1430 hrs at BILECA. Following personalities attended the meeting:

a. HK Side.

- (1) Mr KOLJEVIC - Deputy of Dr KARADZIC
- (2) Mr VUCUREVIC - President of Serbs of Hercegovina
- (3) Col GRUBAC - Comd of HK
- (4) Col MILOSEVIC - Deputy of Col GRUBAC

b. UN Side.

- (1) Brig Gen MARTINEZ - Deputy Commander B-H
- (2) Maj RASHID - SMO, DUBROVNIK
- (3) Maj CAMERON - HQ UNMO, B-H
- (4) Maj COSTA - MAO, HQ UNMO, B-H
- (5) Capt HAUG - A/DSMO, DUBROVNIK

2. Agenda discussed.

- a. Deployment of UNMOs in Hercegovina.
- b. Arrangement for Meeting between NVU and HK.
- c. Opening of PLOCE-JABLANICA-SARAJEVO corridor for SPBAT's mission.

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3. Deployment of UNMOs. Mr KOLJEVIC suggested TRPATINA, NEVESINJ and LJUBINJE for immediate deployment of UNMOs. In this context, I have apprised him for consideration of following three specific requirements:

- a. A working place with complete communication facilities.
- b. Political and/or military leaders should be able to be contacted either physically or by telephone within short time for establishing efficient working system.
- c. Safety and security of the UNMOs to be guaranteed with complete freedom of movement.

I further suggested for another meeting with SMO, MOSTAR on Wednesday, 18 Nov 92 (as requested by SMO, MOSTAR 011- RUC B) for working out any other details prior to the deployment of UNMOs. This meeting is confirmed by Mr KOLJEVIC to be held at BILECA on 18 Nov 92 at 1400 hrs. He further opined that there is an immediate requirement of deployment of UNMOs. He would appreciate if on Wednesday at least 6 UNMOs are also brought along with SMO, MOSTAR then there could be minimum loss of time and efforts in deployment of UNMOs. He categorically mentioned that complete freedom of movement and safety of UNMOs would be guaranteed. He also mentioned all efforts will be made to fulfil the operational and administrative requirements for UNMO presence in the area. For the 6 UNMOs (if decided that they should come along with SMO) there will be no problem for accommodation at BILECA at least for 2 days prior to deployment in any other place.

4. Arrangement for Meeting Between HVO and HK. This was a long discussion to determine the location and time for the meeting. Gen MARTINEZ emphasised on a neutral location for the meeting. HK side proposed for meeting with HVO on 17 Nov 92 at 1400 hrs at BERKOVICI (East of STOLAC on the road to BILECA). I suggested the border between Montenegro and Croatia at DEBILIBRIEG (Map Sq 3604, scale 1:50,000) in the YELLOW ZONE. The central place (no man's land) between the custom posts of Montenegro and Croatia. Gen Martinez reconnoitered the area for consideration with HVO if BERKOVICI is not accepted by HVO.

5. Opening of PLOCE-JABLANICA-SARAJEVO Corridor. Gen MARTINEZ explained the humanitarian mission of SPBAT and requested for HK's cooperation to fulfil the mission of SPBAT. HK side explained that

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it is against the interest of HK and cannot allow regular convoys through the mentioned corridor. However, Mr KOLJEVIC stated that once a lasting ceasefire has been achieved then they can discuss about opening of NERETVA corridor. Request see special report of Gen MARTINEZ on this subject.

6. Forwarded as desired please. Regards.

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'92 NOV -9 18:25

192 NO -9 16 57Z

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA

DATE: 09 NOVEMBER 1992

(MOST IMMEDIATE)

NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2 294

SUBJECT: VISIT TO DUBROVNIK AND SPLIT ON 6-7 NOVEMBER 1992

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1. On 6 November at 1800 hours, I reached Dubrovnik after a four hour drive from Split. The aim of my visit was to meet the UNMOs on the ground and get an update on the situation there.
2. During his briefing soon after my arrival, Major Rashid, the Senior Military Observer, informed me that the general situation was calm and that the demilitarised status of the Blue and Yellow zones was being generally respected, except for some minor incidents which had been initiated on a few occasions, mostly by the Croatian side. These included the following:-
 - (a) The introduction of a road block, within the Blue Zone, manned by approximately five to ten Croatian policemen, armed with automatic rifles, on the lower coastal road leading to the Ostra Peninsula.
 - (b) Denial of access in the Konavle area outside the Yellow Zone, on the Croatian side, where the Croatian Army had even gone as far as confiscating binoculars and

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- 2 -

other equipment from an UNMO patrol on one occasion, before turning them away. In the same general area, a shot had been fired, presumably by the Croatian Army at an UNMO patrol on 6 November 1992;

- (c) Armed Croatian police patrols enter the Blue Zone regularly and on one occasion came right up to the entry gate at the Ostra peninsula. When informed by the UNMOs that they cannot enter these areas, they respond that they do not know of any such instructions.
3. Maj. Rashid informed me that he had protested these incidents to the Croatian Army commander and the Chief of Police who did not seem too concerned. The UNMOs have been getting an impression that the local civil authorities, especially the Chief of Police, did not recognise the Blue/Yellow Zone concept and hence, were deliberately disregarding the agreements reached with respect to these areas. They also had the impression that the restrictions on their movement in the Konavle Area may be related to Croatian army activities into BH, from that area. I was also informed that some inter-state meetings had been held between the Croatian and Montenegrin authorities, at the level of Chiefs of Police of Dubrovnik and Herceg Novi, with the aim of mutually addressing the aspect of controlling border violations, and that it had been agreed to establish a hot line between the two sides.
4. I had a meeting, the same evening, with General Bobetko, the Croatian army commander. I conveyed my concern about the violations of the withdrawal plan which had been agreed to by Presidents Tudjman and Cosic at Geneva on 20 October and stressed that only two to three customs personnel, with sidearms, could be present at the customs post in the Blue Zone and that the police had no authority at all to enter the Blue Zone.

5. In his response, General Bobetko stated that they agreed fully with the Geneva withdrawal plan which had been agreed to by President Tudjman, and that misunderstandings or incidents in the recent past have been caused by public statements by Montenegrin politicians that Prevlaka is a part of Montenegro. He informed me that interstate border committees have been constituted to meet regularly and resolve border control related problems between Croatia and Montenegro. He explained the incidents involving restrictions on freedom of movement of UNMOs as having been done in the interests of safety of the UNMOs, as "the battle positions are just four to five hundred metres away".
6. General Bobetko was quite incensed with the contents of President Cosic's letter of 24 October 1992 to Secretary Vance, and repeatedly stressed that all the allegations were untrue and unfair. He emphasised that the artillery firing incidents after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army were initiated by the Hercegovina Corps and any fire by the Croatian army was only retaliatory. He informed me that approximately 600 kgs of explosives had been extricated from pipes under the runway at Celipi airport and that action was underway to commission the airfield within the next ten days or so.
7. I asked him whether there was a possibility of providing accommodation for the Spanish battalion at Ploce, as it was relatively more convenient for the battalion, which was responsible for convoy operations in the Mostar area, to be based at Ploce than at Split. He responded that there was no accommodation whatsoever at Ploce and that was the reason why the Spanish battalion would have to operate out of Split.

8. From what I saw of Croatian Army equipment in the Dubrovnik area and an assessment of the briefing I received from the UNMOs, though they have not been able to witness any activity themselves due to denial of access, there is little doubt that the Croatian Army is operating well into the Trebinje municipality.
9. On 7 November, I visited the Prevlaka area and other parts of the Blue Zone. On my way out, driving through the Yellow Zone areas, I confirmed the impression that its demilitarised status is apparently being respected by the Croatian side. The Croats have a police checkpoint at the entry to the Blue Zone, which was manned by four armed "milicia". I did not see any Croatian personnel in the Blue Zone except for three armed "milicia" who were positioned on the lower road leading to the Ostra peninsula. (I have since been informed that the Croatian police patrols have resumed their incursions into the Blue Zone on 8 November 1992). Both Montenegrin and Croatian flags have been put up on either side of the border, but there are no personnel manning any post there. The road block, which had been established by Croatian police with concrete blocks since a few days, on the lower road, had been removed. I could conclude after my meetings with the UNMO team in the area that as of 7 November, the withdrawal agreement is being respected by both sides except that the few Croatian militia would have to be replaced by customs personnel, armed only with sidearms. Major Rashid has been instructed by me to contact General Bobetko on this aspect, as well as with regard to the incursions by police patrols. I have since written to the Croatian authorities; copy of my letter is attached.

10. On my way back, I drove through the Montenegrin side using the road which runs parallel to the state borders. At Debljebrieg, before crossing over to the Croatian side, I was met by a representative of the local authorities of Herceg Novi who conveyed the whole hearted agreement of the Montenegrin authorities to respecting the withdrawal plan.
11. On my return to Split, I visited the headquarters of the UK contingent of the BH command, at the Divulje barracks near the airport. Brigadier Andrew Cumming, who is the contingent commander, gave me a detailed briefing of his set up in Split as well as the deployment plans of the infantry battalion group and its support elements. I also met the commanding officer of the French helicopter unit and a representative of the Spanish infantry battalion. During my discussions there, a number of issues related to the status of the British contingent (other than the infantry battalion), how it could be utilised, and so on, came up. I shall discuss these with Morillon and his staff at Kiseljak tomorrow, then with my own staff here and revert to you in due course.

Endall

9 November 1992

SITUATION IN PREVLAKA AREA

My dear Mr. Milas,

1. You are possibly aware that I visited the Dubrovnik/Prevlaka area on 7 November 1992 to assess the situation there.
2. I was glad to note that the understandings arrived at are being generally observed, with the exception that your local authorities in the area have introduced three to five policemen armed with automatic rifles into the Blue Zone, whereas it was decided that you would have up to three "Customs" personnel with side arms only in the area of the proposed Joint Customs Control.
3. It would be appreciated if you could direct your authorities in the area to correct the above-mentioned situation so as not to give cause for any rise in tensions. I had spoken to General Bobetko on this matter when I met him at Dubrovnik on the evening of 6 November 1992.

*With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,*

Satish

~~Lt Gen Satish Nambiar~~
Force Commander

Mr. Ivan Milas
Deputy Prime Minister and
President of the Croatian
Government Commission
for UNPROFOR
Republic of Croatia
Zagreb

UNOG Telecomm. Unit 192 NO -5 18 17:53:51

Palais des Nations

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PAGE 1 OF 2

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 5 November 1992
TO: GOULDING UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: NAMBIAR UNPROFOR <i>Nambiar</i>
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA	FAX ZAGREB: 38-41-171-688
ATTN:	FILE REF:
SUBJECT: PREVLAKA	

1. UNPROFOR 236 dated 25 October 1992 refers.
2. Firing appeared to commence on 18 October 1992 when suspected Hercegovina Corps positions opened fire on CA forces attempting to repair the road in the Plat area. On 21 October 1992 CA did initiate fire from the Cavtat area into the Jesenica area and probably into Hercegovina.
3. UNMO Dubrovnik confirms that during the period 20 to 23 October there was artillery fire from Kupari, Cavtat and Konavle against the Municipality of Trebinje. We cannot confirm that the shelling was directed against Trebinje itself.
4. Para. 4 of UNPROFOR 236 outlines the events of 22 October concerning the detaining of ECMM monitors.
5. Water to Herceg Novi was cut on 21 October 1992 as stated by President Cosic, however, CA authorities have advised that this was necessary to effect road repairs in the Duboka Ljuta area. As of 5 November 1992, as far as we can ascertain, the water supply has been reconnected.

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Page 2 of 2

6. The village of Zvekovica is in Croatia. We are not fully aware of events of 24 October 1992 as our patrols have been repeatedly denied access to the North of Konavli and as of this date we have not achieved freedom of movement in that area.

7. Regards.



MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA R.S.F.
DE
YUGOSLAVIE
AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES
A GENÈVE

5, chemin Thury - Tél. 46 44 33

5 November 1992

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Dear Sirs,

I have the honour to transmit herein a copy of the letter of the President of the FR of Yugoslavia, Mr Dobrica Cosic, of 4 November 1992 transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, concerning the most recent violations by the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia of the Agreement on Prevlaka.

Please accept, dear Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

dr Vladimir Pavicevic
Dr. Vladimir Pavicevic
Deputy Head of Delegation of the
FR of Yugoslavia to the
Conference on Yugoslavia and
Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
of the FRY to the UNO at Geneva

Mr. Cyrus Vance and
Lord David Owen
Co-Chairmen of the Conference
on Yugoslavia
United Nations Office
G e n e v a

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I would like to ask you to devote full and immediate attention to my information because it regrettably seems to me that the latest aggressive acts of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia are rapidly jeopardizing the consolidation and achievement of peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

1. On November 3, 1992, at 3.00 p.m., a truck and a crane with two armed members of the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia and an unascertained number of workers from the hamlet of Gornji Kraj entered the "blue zone" and blocked the road Kobila - Oštro, north of the Cipavica bay, with three concrete pyramids, weighing some 600 kg each. These barriers prevent passage from Kobila towards Prevlaka, so that a detour must be made through the Croatian zone.

While the barriers were being erected, a UN observer patrol from Prevlaka kept warning the Croatian side that that was not allowed, but to no avail. According to the observer patrol leader, the UN representatives reacted strongly, warning the Croatian side that such an act constituted a violation of the armistice; he also stated that they had notified their superiors in Zagreb and Geneva of the placing of these barriers. The UN representatives expected to get a reply to their report by 10.00 a.m. today, but have not received one.

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
United Nations Secretary-General

NEW YORK

2. On November 4, 1992, about 11.00 a.m., members of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia opened machine gun fire from elevation 824 (Palimovo hill). Some 6 - 7 bursts were fired at the positions of the units of the Army of Yugoslavia, who did not return fire. A protest was lodged with UN representatives with a warning that this was the fifth time that the Croatian side was opening fire at and over our units. UN observers immediately went to inspect the site.

At 2.30 p.m., also on November 4, 1992, forces of the Croatian Army launched an infantry attack from the direction of Grude-Dubravka on the Debeli Brijeg border crossing, but the same was thwarted by the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of Montenegro.

Let me assure you that we would like to avoid at all costs being drawn by the Croatian armed forces into a situation where we would have to respond by force, which Croatia resorts to wantonly with no provocation whatsoever, in gross contravention of the provisions of the Agreement on Prevlaka, which we have fully honoured. Please take our warning to Croatia most seriously, and kindly invest your authority so that Croatia desist from any similar future action.

Please accept, dear Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dobrica Ćosić

Belgrade, November 4, 1992

Co.:

- Mr. Cyrus Vance and
Lord David Owen,
Co-chairmen of the
Conference on Yugoslavia
- Franjo Tudjman, President
of the Republic of Croatia

UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

92 NO -4 18 302

UNOG Telecommunications Unit
Palais des Nations

YZF 4562 11

92 NOV -4 23:17

51128

TO: Vance, ICFY, Geneva

DATE: 4 November 1992

FAX: (41-22) 733-58-61
(41-22) 733-58-80

FROM: *for* Petrovsky, UNATIONS, *mm*
New York

PAGE: 1 of 30

FAX NO: 011-212-963-5065

For Boothby, from Werner/Halim

Attached please find:

- A letter dated 31 October from the President of The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General as attachment I for your attention.
- A letter dated 2 November from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the Security Council as Attachment II for your attention.
- The Memorandum of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the violation of Security Council resolution 713 and 724 as Attachment III, for your information.

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Attachment I

Urgent



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held on 3 November 1992.

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PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
334 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK N. Y. 10021

No. 1116, 92

31 October 1992

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to transmit, enclosed herewith, the letter by His Excellency, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would inform other members of the Security Council of the contents of this letter.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dragomir Djokic

Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mr. Jean-Bernard Merimee
President of the Security Council
the United Nations
New York

3/30

YZF 4562 11

P3420

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
PRESIDENT

Belgrade, 31 October 1992

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

My concern for peace impels me to address you kindly asking you to devote your attention to the developments in the border area between Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, wherefrom the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has pulled out in its pursuit to carry out the Vance Plan.

Allow me to give you a chronological order of events:

The Croatian side, a signatory of the Agreement on the pulling out of the Army of Yugoslavia from the territories of the Communes of Dubrovnik and Prevlaka, has assumed the obligation to discontinue its attacks against Eastern Herzegovina, and to seek a peaceful solution to all disputes, namely by negotiations and political agreement.

The Croatian Army is continually piling up and organizing strong armoured-mechanized, infantry and artillery units in the Konavli (Cavtat-Grude) area, which is in contravention with the agreement on demilitarization (in the Yellow Zone: 5 km from the frontier only police forces are to be stationed, while 30 km from the frontier are to be free from heavy weapons).

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
United Nations
New York

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In the course of 28, 29 and 30 October, 1992, by opening fire from artillery weapons and by engaging their infantry units from the Cavtat and Grude region the Croatian forces attacked the area of Trebinje and that very town.

On 29 October, 1992 their artillery carried out a strong artillery attack from the region of Mostar against the town of Nevesinje, as the consequence of which there has been loss of life (two persons dead and a number wounded), and substantial material damage.

During the last three nights the Croatian side has intensively been engaged in bringing fresh units and supplies of ammunition by road into the region of Cavtat and Grude.

By such a way of transportation it has been avoiding the EC and UN monitors' control in the Yellow Zone, since the latter do not undertake any movement within the zone by night allegedly due to mine fields and laid mines.

In addition to the attacks against the territory of Herzegovina, there have been arrest of civilians and their subsequent detention in the village of Dubravka.

Herceg Novi and the part of Boka still have no water. The claim of the Croatian side that the water supply system at Plat had been damaged due to which the water had been turned off is untrue. Our offer to send a repair team has been turned down by the Croatian side, which apparently speaks in favour of the fact that it is not a matter of failure.

The presence of the members of the Croatian police in the Blue Zone at Prevlaka is ever more frequent which is also true of their crossing over into the territory of the FRY. Such a case occurred on 29 October 1992, when two heavily armed Croatian policemen crossed into the territory of FRY at the place called Robila.

YZF 4562 11 . 5/30

On 30 October 1992, five Croatian motor vehicles (two with high officials from Zagreb, two with journalists and a police car) arrived at Cape Oštra. Their objective for coming into the UNPROFOR Zone is unknown to us, but apparently - their constant disturbances of the UN Forces - are aimed at provoking an incident, for which they would blame the FRY, and then request withdrawal of the UN. However, this time they did not succeed.

On the morning of 31 October 1992, we were informed that an air raid was being prepared against the territory of Eastern Herzegovina.

The above arguments and facts illustrate that the Croatian side continues to ignore the agreements signed and the accords reached, as many times in the past, which might have serious consequences in the final period of the war and reaching of lasting peace in the territory of former Yugoslavia and beyond.

The Army of Yugoslavia is observing the agreement reached, however, unless the United Nations provide the forces to prevent the Croatian side from constant attacks against Herzegovina and provocations of the people of Montenegro, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall not be able to guarantee its control of the unpradicted reactions.

I therefore appeal to you, Mr. Secretary-General, to exert your influence on Croatia, by using your authority and mandate, in order to compel it to abandon the use of military force and opt for peace.

sgd.

Dobrica Ćosić
P R E S I D E N T

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

92 NO - 3 17 1971

92 NOV 18 50

CZV 344
CZG 62

CODE CABLE

To: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

Info: VANCE, GENEVA

From: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Date: 3 Nov 92

Number: UNPROFOR. Z 272

Subject: BLUE ZONE PREVLAKA

IMMEDIATE

1. Please find enclosed a translation of a letter from the Croatian Ministry of Interior to the Police Chief in Dubrovnik regarding the status of the demilitarized area of Prevlaka. This letter raises a number of issues related to the responsibilities of UNMOs operating in the Prevlaka area.

2. Firstly, there appears to have been a meeting of the respective Ministers of Interior at Cavtat on 20 Oct 92 at which agreements were made of which UNPROFOR is not aware. It is on the basis of this meeting that the Minister has directed his Police Chief to impose sovereignty over the Blue Zone. This is reinforced by the SMOs sitrep of 30 Oct 92 which reported an official of the Ministry of the Interior had entered, without UNMO authority, that part of the Peninsula barred to all non UN personnel. This event and the regular patrolling of Croatian Police in the other part of the Blue Zone is contrary to agreements reached by the parties in Geneva on 20 Oct 92.

3. On 31 Oct 92 SMO Dubrovnik advised that police had suspended their patrols, probably as a result of Vance raising this issue during his visit to Zagreb. However, on 2 Nov 1992 police patrols resumed and police placed a road block within the Blue Zone. It is intended to maintain existing restrictions on entry to the Blue Zone unless the parties inform UNPROFOR of a contrary agreement and seek advice from the respective authorities on the details of any agreement made at Cavtat.

4. Regards.

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MA	SM

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REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
NO: 511-01-20-22001/92
ZAGREB 24 OCT 92

VERY URGENT

POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN DUBROVNIK
C/O HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT, MR KUKULJAN

REF: YOUR FAX NO: SP-250/92 OF 23 OCT 92

WE RECONSIDERED THE ISSUES POINTED OUT BY YOU AND WE CAN GIVE FOLLOWING DIRECTIONS:

1. THE PROBLEM OF PREVLAKA PENINSULA WILL BE SOLVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED DURING THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS TUDZMAN AND COSIC OF 30- SEPTEMBER 1992 HELD IN GENEVA. AS PER ARTICLE 3 OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT THE YUGOSLAV ARMY WOULD WITHDRAW FROM PREVLAKA BY 20 OCTOBER 1992 AND THE SECURITY OF THE REGION WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY DEMILITARIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNMOs.

DEMILITARIZATION ONLY MEANS, THAT IN BOTH STATES, ARMY WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PREVLAKA AREA AND DOES NOT EXCLUDE OTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY.

DEMILITARIZATION ALSO MEANS THAT DEMILITARIZED ZONE HAS BEEN CREATED ON PREVLAKA AND THAT IT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO "YELLOW, BLUE OR RED" ZONES. IF THAT IS THE WAY IN WHICH UNMOs ARE DIVIDING IT, IT CAN ONLY BE THEIR INTERNAL DIVISION THAT AIMS AT EASING OPERATIONAL TASKS AS WELL AS MONITORING, REPORTING AND SUPERVISING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS.

PRESIDENTS ALSO AGREED THAT UNPROFOR MEMBERS WOULD BE OBSERVERS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THEREFORE, THE TASK AND AUTHORITY OF THE UNPROFOR MEMBERS ARE OBSERVING, MONITORING AND REPORTING. THE UNPROFOR MEMBERS DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO LIMIT THE SOVEREIGNTY NOR OBSTRUCTING IT ON EACH OF THE PARTIES.

2. AT THE MEETING OF 20 OCTOBER 1992, PRESIDENTS TUDZMAN AND COSIC AGREED THAT ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO POLICE CHECK POINTS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. OUR LAST CHECK POINT MUST BE AT A SHARP CURVE BETWEEN THE CIPAVICA BAY AND CAPE KOBILA.

3. AT THE MEETING OF MINISTERS OF INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND MONTENEGRO HELD AT CAVTAT ON 20 OCTOBER 1992, THE FOLLOWINGS HAVE BEEN AGREED:

"BOTH DELEGATIONS AGREED THAT THE SECURITY OPERATIONS, CONTROL OF BORDER CROSSINGS AND OTHER RELATED SECURITY ISSUES WITHIN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE SHOULD ONLY BE PERFORMED BY POLICE OF BOTH STATES.

C2N344 3/3

THESE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF BOTH STATES".

BY THIS AGREEMENT GUARANTEES HAVE BEEN GIVEN THAT THE
SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE WOULD NOT BE HAMPERED
EXCEPT FOR THE VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMY. AT THE SAME TIME
IT HAS BEEN GUARANTEED THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE DISPLAYED BY
APPROPRIATE SYMBOLS AND INSIGNIA.

4. ECMM AND UNMOs CAN WORK AND ORGANIZE THEIR OWN WAY IN THE CASE
WHEN THE WARRING PARTIES CANNOT REACH AN AGREEMENT ON CONFLICTING
ISSUES. WHEN THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT ARE ABLE TO REACH AN
AGREEMENT, OBSERVERS CAN ONLY OBSERVE, MONITOR AND REPORT AS WELL
AS GRANT THE VERIFICATION OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ON BEHALF
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

PRESIDENTS TUDZMAN AND COSIC AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLES,
MINISTERS OF INTERIOR SPECIFIED THE DETAILS OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THESE PRINCIPLES. THEREFORE, OBSERVERS MUST RESPECT THE AGREEMENT.
BY INSISTING ON THEIR SOLUTIONS MONITORS DENY THE BASIC GUIDELINES
OF THEIR MISSION.

5. MONITORS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO PREVENT ANYBODY TO MOVE FREELY
IN THE CROATIAN PART OF THE PREVLAKA PENINSULA. THEY HAVE TO
GUARANTEE THAT THE CROATIAN ARMY WILL NOT ENTER OR DEPLOY IN THIS
REGION.

6. MONITORS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO PREVENT RAISING OF CROATIAN
FLAG ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA.

7. MINISTERS OF INTERIOR AGREED THAT ISSUES OF STATE SYMBOLS AND
INSIGNIAS SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. THE RIGHT TO THIS
ACTION IS INHERENT TO LEGAL SYSTEM.

PLEASE CONTACT THE DEPUTY MINISTER MR. JOSKO MORIC IN THE CASE
OF ANY NEW PROBLEMS OR UNCERTAINTIES.

SEAL

SDXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
IVAN JARNJAK

'92 OCT 29 19:18

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO

OUTGOING FAX NO: 4122733580	DATE: 29 1720 OCT 1992
TO: VANCE ICFY GENVA	FROM: LNO UNPROFOR ZAGREB
FAX NO:	02 0201 60000
ATTN: LTCOL SM'BOGO	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER : JT TITLE :

INFO.:

SUBJECT: PREVLAKA - SITREP

MESSAGE

DISTRIBUTION:

SM

PLEASE FIND ATTACHED SITREP
FOR YOUR INFO.

Best Regards

'92 OCT 29 19:44

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

UNPROFOR
UNMO

C2G 46

OUTGOING FAX NO	DATE: 28 OCT 92
TO: HQ UNMO, ZAGREB	FROM: UNMO, DUBROVNIK
FAX NO: 041-171-688	FAX: 050-412-801
ATTN: OPS	DRAFTER: Capt Fiskum <i>Handwritten signature</i>
INFO:	
SUBJECT: DAILY SITREP FROM 280001 Z TO 282400 Z oct 92.	

PAGE 1 OF 4

1. Gen Sit.

Generally calm in all areas, but with increased restriction of movement for UN-personnel by Croatian army/military police.

2. Changes in Ops Sit.

PREVLAKA TEAM : Teams patrolled both the blue and yellow zones, some protests were lodged by the JA, but nothing was confirmed. There was an incident regarding one patrol and the protest is attached. There was a meeting held with the LO from the Montenegrin Authorities, the main points are as follows :

- a. They suggested a joint commission from both sides (inc UN) to view the damage to the water system. This was refused by the CA.
- b. They requested a statement from UNPROFOR with regards to the composition and application of the blue zone. It is recommended that the press and info centre in Belgrade take on this task to calm the feelings of the local population.

DUBROVNIK TEAM : One patrol was sent to try and gain access to the region of GLAVSKA, this was refused, even after the MPs were informed that we would lodge a protest accordingly. A sketch map is attached to indicate the routes taken. There was a meeting this morning with the Croatian Chief of Police from Dubrovnik he made 3 points, they are as follows :

- a. 3 man wandering patrols (pistols only) would start to patrol the roads inside the blue zone from the border to the narrowest tip of Prevlaka. This would start tomorrow morning. I was assured that they would not enter the Ostra Peninsula.
- b. He intended to block the road below the customs check point
- c. He intended to man a Maritime check point at the end of the Ostra Peninsula

He was informed that all the above points were not allowed, if he entered the blue zone he did so by force and we would protest accordingly (except the recognised road for customs control).

C 20 46

3. Continuing Affairs.4. Log.

ID card and flakjacket/helmet for the interpreter in Dubrovnik (see sitrep 16 Oct 1992).

5. Admin.


- a. UNMO Strength - 18
- b. In Dubrovnik - 06
- c. In Prevlaka - 07
- d. CTO - 05

6. Communications.

All equipment is serviceable, except for the set in the UAZ-jeep which was demolished by unknown people.

7. SMO's Assessment.

- a. The whole concept of the blue zone has been put into jeopardy by the intentions of the Croatian Chief of Police. Quite simply unless something is sorted out very quickly the zone will become impotent. Having spent the last 2 weeks on Prevlaka and working very closely with the Montenegro Local Authorities, I am very concerned that if the concept fails UNPROFOR will be the loser. I recommend that both sides be instructed to go firm on what has been agreed until the inter state commission can be organised.
- b. The restrictions that are being imposed upon us in my estimation are very serious indeed. It is imperative that we are allowed access and also find out what intentions the CA has. Observing troop and weapon movements tends to indicate that the CA TAOR is increasing.



UNPROFOR

UNMO

5/5
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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/HOST IMMEDIATE

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PAGE 1 OF

OUTGOING FAX NO	DATE: 28 OCT 92
TO: Croatian Army HQ	FROM: UNMO, DUBROVNIK PREVLAKA
FAX NO:	
ATTN:	DRAFTER: MAJ N J WILLSON
INFO:	
SUBJECT: PROTEST - RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT IN KONAVLE AND THREATENING BEHAVIOR TOWARDS UNMOs	

1. At 1300 hrs today 1 team from UNMO Dubrovnik was stopped by approx 30 CA Soldiers in the region of LOVORNO. The vehical keys, hand held radios, flak jackets and maps were taken from the patrol in a threatening manner. They were returned at a later stage. The patrol was then escorted back to GRUDE where no explanation was given as to the restriction of access.

2. This behavior is totally unacceptable and demand an explanation immediately.

3. We have informed our HQs in Zagreb accordingly.



CZN=283.

CZB=22

CRYPTO FAX

101 92 OCT 19 10:10

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, GENEVE

CODE RESTRICTED

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 17 OCT 1992

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-213

SUBJECT: YUGOSLAV ARMY (AJ) WITHDRAWAL FROM PREVLAKA PENINSULA

1. SMO Dubrovnik has reported that the AJ withdrawal from Croatian territory is now nearly completed. All heavy weapons appear to have been withdrawn and there is no observed presence of AJ forces in the former frontline positions around PLAT, nor CAVTAT.

2. He has, however, expressed concern that members of the Hercegovina Corps (Bosnia Serbs) are bringing observed small arms fire to bear on CA forces attempting to move forward to repair the main road in the vicinity of PLAT. It is also suspected, but not confirmed, that Bosnian Serb forces may have occupied former AJ positions in the PLAT area. That could lead to a conflict situation.

3. There were some indications today in the Dubrovnik area that the CA may be planning an operation for tonight to clear and secure the CAVTAT/PLAT area. A Croatian police boat with a large number of police was observed moving police to an island adjacent to CAVTAT. The CA have withdrawn their heavy weapons from UNMO monitoring and the SMO has been warned officially to avoid the area for the next couple of days for the safety of UNMO. This was later confirmed in a private discussion by CA officer. CA attempts to move forward to repair the road near PLAT are not unreasonable in terms of the unsigned implementing agreement.

4. Thornberry has contacted Vice President Milas' office and expressed our concern at mounting evidence of CA offensive action at this point in the AJ withdrawal. Such activity could be cited as provocation and lead to the AJ reoccupying Croatian territory and restraint was encouraged. Milas' staff agreed to take this matter up with General Tus. They later stated that, while concerned over the possibility of Bosnian Serbs moving in to take over areas vacated by JA, they did not propose, themselves, to move forward at this time. Thornberry told them that we would regard any such action by Bosnian Serbs as being in gross bad faith.

5. We are monitoring the situation and will keep you informed.

6. Regards.

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DATE: 11 December 1992

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12 PITCH - 85/12 → 10 PITCH - 88/10 →

MR. CYRUS VANCE
CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA
UNATIONS
GENEVA

MSC83


92 DE 12 - 6:15

Palais des Nations

ETATPRIORITE

I AM FORWARDING HERewith THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION
795 (1992) ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS
3147TH MEETING ON 11 DECEMBER 1992.

BEST REGARDS.

for 

VLADIMIR PETROVSKY
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS


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AUTHORIZED BY / AUTHORIZED PAR


Vladimir Petrovsky, Under-Secretary-General
for Political Affairs

DATE:
11 December 1992

NAME AND TITLE (PLEASE TYPE) / NOM ET QUALITE (A DACTYLOGRAPHIER)

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/795 (1992)
11 December 1992

RESOLUTION 795 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3147th meeting,
on 11 December 1992

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992,

Recalling the letter of the President of the Security Council dated 25 November/172 conveying its agreement to the Secretary-General's proposal to send an exploratory mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (S/24852),

Noting the report of the Secretary-General dated 9 December 1992 (S/24923),

Concerned about possible developments which could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its territory,

Welcoming the presence of a mission of the ^(CSCE) CSCE in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, *in f*

Considering the request by the Government in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for a United Nations presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Recalling Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/24923);
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as recommended by him in his report (S/24923), and so to inform the authorities of Albania and those of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

MSF 3241-12

S/24440
English
Page 2

3. Requests the Secretary-General to deploy immediately the military, civil affairs, and administrative personnel recommended in his report, and that he deploy the police monitors immediately upon receiving the consent of the Government in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to do so;

4. Urges the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to coordinate closely with the CSCE mission there;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the implementation of this resolution;

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P1/7
Palais des Nations

'92 NOV 18 -1 :06
OUTGOING CODE CABLE



TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 1992
NUMBER: MSC-1196
SUBJECT: Security Council Resolution 787

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172 NOV 17 P 6:59

1. Further to our MSC-1195, the full text of Security Council Resolution 787 is attached. Please note that operative paragraphs 16 and 19 require action by the Sec-Gen and input from UNPROFOR.

2. Re: Paragraph 16, your UNPROFOR Z-341 offers much food for thought. We would be grateful if, in the draft report we requested in our MSC-1195, you "wrote your own ticket," i.e. elaborated the mandate you found most useful and practicable, and provided estimates accordingly. We are not sure, in any case, whether the Council will proceed with such an expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate once it realizes what exactly would be involved.

3. With regard to paragraph 19, we are not yet sure whether the requirement to "study the possibility" necessarily

CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P2/7

involves the submission of a report, but we have asked UNHCR to take the lead, in consultation with you. It is for the humanitarian agencies to elaborate a workable concept, for UNPROFOR to determine what its implementation will require (your UNPROFOR-Z-315 was an excellent start) and for the SecGen to decide whether to recommend that the Council authorize this new task. Our own feeling at this stage, shared by one or two of the P-5, is that the notion of "safe areas" raises more problems than it solves, but we will await HCR's definition of a basic concept before formalizing our views. Please keep us informed of any approaches the humanitarian agencies may make directly to you in Zagreb on this question.

CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P3/7

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/787 (1992)
16 November 1992

RESOLUTION 787 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3137th meeting,
on 16 November 1992

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming its determination that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to the peace, and reaffirming that the provision of humanitarian assistance in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Security Council's effort to restore peace and security in the region,

Deeply concerned at the threats to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as a State Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also its full support for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia as the framework within which an overall political settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia may be achieved, and for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference,

Recalling the decision by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to examine the possibility of promoting safe areas for humanitarian purposes,

Recalling the commitments entered into by the parties and others concerned within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,

Reiterating its call on all parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee,

Noting the progress made so far within the framework of the International Conference, including the Joint Declarations signed at Geneva on

CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P4/7

S/RES/787 (1992)

Page 2

30 September 1992 1/ and 20 October 1992 2/ by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the Joint Statement made at Geneva on 19 October 1992 by the Presidents of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); 3/ the Joint Communiqué issued on 1 November 1992 at Zagreb by the Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 4/ the establishment of the Mixed Military Working Group in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the production of a draft outline constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5/

Noting with grave concern the report of the Special Rapporteur appointed following a special session of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, which makes clear that massive and systematic violations of human rights and grave violations of international humanitarian law continue in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Welcoming the deployment of additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force for the protection of humanitarian activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with its resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992,

Deeply concerned about reports of continuing violations of the embargo imposed by its resolutions 713 (1991) and 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991,

Deeply concerned also about reports of violations of the measures imposed by its resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992,

1. Calls upon the parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to consider the draft outline constitution as a basis for negotiating a political settlement of the conflict in that country and to continue negotiations for constitutional arrangements on the basis of the draft outline, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, these negotiations to be held in continuous and uninterrupted session;

2. Reaffirms that any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and unacceptable, and will not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on constitutional arrangements for the

1/ S/24476, annex.

2/ S/24704, annex.

3/ S/24702, annex.

4/ S/24748, annex.

5/ S/24795, annex VII.

CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P5/7

S/RES/787 (1992)

Page 3

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and insists that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to their former homes;

3. Strongly reaffirms its call on all parties and others concerned to respect strictly the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and affirms that any entities unilaterally declared or arrangements imposed in contravention thereof will not be accepted;

4. Condemns the refusal of all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, to comply with its previous resolutions, and demands that they and all other concerned parties in the former Yugoslavia fulfil immediately their obligations under those resolutions;

5. Demands that all forms of interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately, and reaffirms its determination to take measures against all parties and others concerned which fail to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) and its other relevant resolutions, including the requirement that all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian army, be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded or disarmed;

6. Calls upon all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfil their commitments to put into effect an immediate cessation of hostilities and to negotiate in the Mixed Military Working Group, continuously and in uninterrupted session, to end the blockades of Sarajevo and other towns and to demilitarize them, with heavy weapons under international supervision;

7. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms that those that commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

8. Welcomes the establishment of the Commission of Experts provided for in paragraph 2 of its resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, and requests the Commission to pursue actively its investigations with regard to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing";

9. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in order to ensure that commodities and products transshipped through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not diverted in violation of resolution 757 (1992), to prohibit the transshipment of crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tyres, vehicles, aircraft and motors of all types unless such transshipment is specifically authorized on a case-by-case basis

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CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P6/7

S/RES/787 (1992)

Page 4

by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) under its no-objection procedure;

10. Further decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that any vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be considered, for the purpose of implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails;

11. Calls upon all States to take all necessary steps to ensure that none of their exports are diverted to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in violation of resolution 757 (1992);

12. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992);

13. Commends the efforts of those riparian States which are acting to ensure compliance with resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992) with respect to shipments on the Danube, and reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance with resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992), including such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary to halt such shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992);

14. Requests the States concerned, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to coordinate with the Secretary-General inter alia on the submission of reports to the Security Council regarding actions taken in pursuance of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the present resolution to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests all States to provide in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations such assistance as may be required by those States acting nationally or through regional agencies and arrangements in pursuance of paragraphs 12 and 13 of the present resolution;

16. Considers that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requests the Secretary-General to present to the Council as soon as possible his recommendations on this matter;

/...

CNZ 401 CYZ 229 P7/7.

S/RES/787 (1992)

Page 5

17. Calls upon all international donors to contribute to the humanitarian relief efforts in the former Yugoslavia, to support the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Programme of Action and Appeal for the former Yugoslavia and to speed up the delivery of assistance under existing pledges;
18. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the humanitarian agencies and with the United Nations Protection Force to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need of it, and reiterates its demand that all parties and others concerned take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of United Nations and other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
19. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant international humanitarian agencies, to study the possibility of and the requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes;
20. Expresses its appreciation for the report presented to the Council by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Council regularly informed of developments and of the work of the Conference;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

92 NO - 9

12 OCT 7

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

92 NO: 9 14 20

1/18

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA

DATE: 09 NOVEMBER 1992

(MOST IMMEDIATE)

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR 2-291SUBJECT: DRAFT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Reference your MSC-1081 of 23 October 1992, draft report, covering peace-keeping aspects, is faxed herewith.
2. Secretary Vance spoke to me a short while ago to convey his reservations about the recommendations I had conveyed in UNPROFOR-2-290 of date. I understand he will be communicating with you on the subject.

DISTRIBUTION:

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C26 74
C2N 363

For: Further SG Report
(Res. 743, 762, 764, 769, 776, 779, 781)

2/18

[Introduction
etc.]

I. Deployment of UNPROFOR

1. Since my report of 28 September 1992 (S/24600) UNPROFOR has deployed further personnel in implementation of additional mandates conferred by the Security Council, as follows:-

- (a) Into Bosnia-Herzegovina, in accordance with Resolution 776, to perform the functions set out in my report to the Council of 10 September 1992 (S/24540);
- (b) Into the Prevlaka area of Croatia, in accordance with Resolution 779, to perform the monitoring functions in that area as set out in my report to the Council of 28 September 1992 (S/24600);
- (c) Into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to perform functions at airfields in accordance with Resolution 781;
- (d) To Peruca dam, situated in a "Pink Zone" of Croatia adjacent to Sector South of the United Nations Protected Areas, to perform functions there in accordance with action stated in my report of 28 September 1992 (S/24600) and approved by the Council in its Resolution 779.

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C2N 363

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4. Eleven United Nations' Military Observers (UNMOs), together with ECMM personnel, are deployed in the Dubrovnik - Prevlaka area.

5. 34 UNMOs began deploying at airfields in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and in Yugoslavia during the week beginning 2 November 1992.

6. At the Peruca dam, and its immediate vicinity, approximately one company of the Kenyan battalion is currently deployed. General Nambiar has appointed Sector South's sector engineer to be interim manager and the coordinator of UNPROFOR control over the dam.

7. Border control personnel have not yet been deployed to carry out immigration and customs functions on international borders which coincide with those of the UNPAs (see para. 18 below). Nor, as yet, pending conclusion of budgetary discussions which are still ongoing at the time of writing, and subsequent authorisation, have civilian personnel from the Secretariat been deployed to BHC in support of that Command in the areas of common services:- political, legal, information, administrative, logistical, etc. responsibilities.

8. Upon completion of the deployment of the above (including the troops assigned to BHC) UNPROFOR will comprise over 22,000 personnel.

II. Operational Matters

A. Violations of the Cease-Fire

9. Ceasefire violations with small arms and heavy machine guns continue to occur in all the sectors, on the UNPA boundaries and in the pink zones. These violations are reported to be increasing in

C36 74
C2N 363

5/8

frequency, particularly in Sector East and in the pink zones in Sector South. This has led to increased tension in these areas.

B. Demilitarization

10. As I reported on 28 September, while the first phases of demilitarization proceeded well, complete demilitarization of the UNPAs in accordance with the Vance Plan has been obstructed by a serious violation of the Plan by the so-called "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (hereinafter referred to as the "Knin authorities"). These authorities have replaced the JNA and the Territorial Defence Forces with a Serb militia, variously described as "Border Milicija", "Special Milicija", "Regional Milicija", etc. These usually comprise former members of JNA, the Territorial Defence Forces and irregular elements. They may total 16,000 personnel or more and are equipped with armoured personnel carriers, mortars, machine guns, etc. They are sometimes claimed by the Knin authorities to be police, but UNPROFOR does not accept this. Instead, they are often deployed along the borders of UNPAs and the edges of the Pink Zones, and constitute a blatant violation of the Plan. This Plan provides that, among the population, only the regular, civil police may bear sidearms (and no heavier weaponry). The Knin authorities continue to assert that these elements are needed to defend Serb-controlled areas from attack and infiltration by the Croatian army. As has been the case for several months, the Croatian army has, in consequence of the presence of these armed elements, maintained, or even brought back, some of its forces to the confrontation line. As a result, clashes, cease-fire violations and armed provocations continue to take place all along the line, raising tensions and provoking further militancy on both sides.

11. Despite many interventions at presidential and other levels in Belgrade by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, and with the various authorities by Mr. Goulding, the Force Commander, Deputy Chief of

6/8

Mission and other senior UNPROFOR personnel, no progress has been achieved towards the further demilitarization of these elements. Promises have been given by Presidents Cosic and Milosevic, and by Prime Minister Panic, to use all their influence and authority to secure this demilitarization. In doing so, they have, however, asserted that they exert no effective control over the Serb local authorities in the UNPAs. For their part, my representatives have insisted that the Security Council continues to hold them responsible for the implementation of the Vance Plan, to which they had earlier agreed. It seems evident that the Belgrade authorities could, should they so choose, take measures which would have a strongly persuasive effect upon the Serb local authorities, especially in view of the considerable economic dependence of much of the UNPA area upon Yugoslavia. Undertakings have also been given by the local authorities; but these, too, have not been fulfilled. Indeed, there is some evidence that these "special milicijas" have actually been strengthened in recent weeks. In Sector East, for example, UNPROFOR calculates that they now number at least 5,000 armed personnel. Nor is it entirely clear whether they are principally answerable to the authorities in Vukovar, in Knin, or in Belgrade. Indeed, senior members of the federal Government in Belgrade have told UNPROFOR that they also feel threatened by these milicijas, and press reports in Serbia have referred to their presence at various recent activities in and around the city. For its part, the Croatian Government, citing the inability of UNPROFOR to deal with the situation for lack of mandate and resources, has indicated its dissatisfaction and desire to have the mandate reviewed.

12. It should be emphasised that UNPROFOR's presence and purported role in the Sectors is based upon an agreement by the parties and others concerned to provide full cooperation in the achievement of a step-by-step normalisation. Its mandate, conferred under Chapter 6 of the Charter, is to be implemented by limited members of troops who are lightly armed, and authorised to use force only in self

C26 74
C2N 363

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7/18

defence. Were the Council to consider any change in that mandate, very much greater resources might have to be provided by Governments to ensure that it was successfully carried out. All other factors would also have to be considered, including the viability at this stage of the "peace-building" roles for UNPROFOR which lie at the heart of the Vance Plan.

III. Acts of Terrorism

13. While in Sector West, which is partly under Croatian and partly under Serb control, the situation continues to be relatively calm, with only isolated acts of ethnically-motivated terrorism, the same cannot be said of the other three Sectors. (It will be recalled that only in Sector West has full demilitarization taken place). Daily police reports from these sectors continue to show murders, house-burnings and demolitions, the destruction of churches, attacks on homes, the killing of cattle and other domestic animals, armed robberies and assaults - all, usually, aimed at members of national minorities. Because, in some areas, few minority members other than the very old have remained, an especially distressing feature is the number of armed attacks on the homes and property of very old women. They are often committed by groups of uniformed men, sometimes masked, carrying automatic weapons. In some parts of Sector South, UNCIVPOL reports that terror has become so prevalent that inhabitants are sleeping in woods or under trees, away from their homes. Perhaps the only positive feature in recent weeks has been a decline in the number of murders, and, in Sector East, of other forms of grossly coercive conduct aimed at "ethnic cleansing". While, within the areas of UNPROFOR deployment (which are mainly Serb-controlled), the vast majority of these crimes are perpetrated against Croats, acts of intimidation have also continued, though with somewhat diminishing frequency, against Serbs in the Croatian-controlled part of Sector West.

C26 74
C2N 364

8/18

7

14. A further feature of the current situation is that the local civil police in Serb-controlled areas of the UNPAs seem virtually powerless, and the process of law-enforcement has substantially disintegrated. UNCIVPOL does not, of course, have law-enforcement powers, its basic role being limited to monitoring the activities of the local police. These clearly comprise many thoroughly professional personnel, fully-trained policemen, and on several occasions they have told UNCIVPOL members of their frustration at the current situation. Indeed, some have pointed out that the "special milicija" is engaged in intimidation aimed not only at the remaining Croats, but also at themselves and at "moderate-minded" Serbs. The so-called "Minister of the Interior" among the Knin authorities, Mr. Milan Martić, on 2 November informed the Force Commander that the "special milicija" (who appear to be answerable to him) were fulfilling law enforcement duties, and that he felt it necessary to ensure the restoration of effective policing, prosecuting and judicial functions. Though the appearance of these areas, to the casual eye, seems peaceful enough, the underlying reality is that, a year after the effective end of hostilities there, the descent into anarchy continues. Neither the military component of UNPROFOR, nor UNCIVPOL, with their slim resources, were established to restore law and order; nor were they given any such mandate. However, as was reported on 28 September, the trend amongst the local population has increasingly been to treat UNCIVPOL as the legitimate source of legal authority, and confidence in them has continued to grow in all sections of the community, despite their lack of executive authority.

IV. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

13. Throughout three of the four UNPAs, no discernible return process has occurred, even though the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of origin lies at the heart of the Vance Plan. This has been a source of great concern, not only to the individuals concerned, but also to UNPROFOR, which has

C26 74
C2A 363

9/18

8

been obliged on many occasions to state that conditions are not appropriate for such return yet to take place. The lead role in the envisaged process is conferred upon the UNHCR which has sought to work with UNPROFOR, the Croatian Government and the local authorities, to secure such return. However, as indicated clearly above, the situation in the sectors does not provide the security which is necessary for return. The "special milicija" is still bent upon "ethnic cleansing", and Serb local authorities have not taken effective steps to put an end to these practices. As I stated on 28 September, the first essential step towards general return is progress towards the disarming and demobilising of these elements.

16. This thesis is confirmed by UNPROFOR's activities in Sector West, where the visitation programme by displaced persons to their villages and former homes has accelerated. (It will be recalled that disarmament has been completed in this sector, due to the cooperation of the two sets of local authorities). To date, nearly 2,000 people have been able to travel, under UNPROFOR protection, to their former homes in more than 50 villages, and a step-by-step rebuilding of confidence amongst present and former inhabitants is well under way. In some areas, reconstruction of damaged homes can soon begin and, in this connection, the Austrian Government has generously offered to provide 500 units of temporary housing for individuals engaged in this difficult and delicate process. It is also necessary, for the return process to continue, to rebuild infrastructure in these areas - water, electricity, other services - many of which have undergone serious damage in the recent conflict, and, for this, international assistance will be most important. It should be said, that extremist elements on both sides are still present in Sector West; the Croatian police have often played an intimidatory role which has been fully discussed with the Government. Where, however, local authorities see it in their interest to cooperate with UNPROFOR, even on such a complex question as return, and are supported by central Government, very

C2G 74

C2N 363

10/18

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much can be achieved, with the extremist fringe being isolated and rendered relatively powerless. It should be added, however, that few people have yet effected their final return, even under these relatively benign conditions, and it is still too early to say authoritatively how successful the Sector West return programme will be in the near future.

17. Mention has been made, above, of the destructive role that can be played by extremists in the complex process of returning people to their villages and homes, quite soon after the end of a tragic conflict. Such extremists feed upon one another's excesses, as has been seen by UNPROFOR on several occasions since my last report on 28 September. In each instance, the initiative has come from certain Croatian political leaders. It should be said, that Croatia, which is undergoing economic difficulties, has nevertheless absorbed several hundred thousand refugees and displaced persons. Understandably, these people want to return to their homes, and to leave the temporary conditions under which they have been living. Certain political leaders have sought to develop movements for return to the UNPAs within stated deadlines, and then to organise mass returns. UNPROFOR has explained the situation at all levels, and has emphasised that the basic conditions of security do not exist. It has had to state that such highly-publicised attempted mass returns exacerbated tensions and, if persisted in, could lead to fresh tragedies. On one occasion, the situation was made still worse by public statements by a Croatian senior army officer that the army would support such returns and move up behind the marching people. These events caused great tension in Sector East, which was the displaced persons' stated destination, and, indeed, fear among the Serb population in the sector (for fear, on both sides, is still a residual factor in the UNPAs). This, in turn, provided both reason and pretext for further mobilisation of the Serb special milicijas, and renewed outbursts of victimisation of remaining minorities. Finally, the situation was defused by UNPROFOR and the Croatian Government; but

these events were deeply counterproductive, leading to a regression in several sectors, and the unravelling of much patient work in which UNPROFOR had been engaged for several months. While lesser demonstrations have occurred since that time, the events which were narrowly averted in the Osijek area on 30 September could have caused a catastrophe.

V. Border Control

18. In my report of 27 July last (S/24353), I described the need which had arisen since the acceptance of the Vance Plan for UNPROFOR to control international crossing points along the boundaries of the UNPAs, and the Council endorsed my proposal to satisfy this need (Resolution 769). Since that time, I have instituted a full professional study of the means and modalities required to carry out this complex process, which will be without precedent in UN operations, and have received a detailed report on the subject (which shows that the project is viable and can, indeed, be carried out using much less resources than I had originally warned might be required). However, in the meantime, the Knin authorities have, themselves, placed control points at all major crossing points, including international crossings. It is impossible for UNPROFOR to conduct such functions in a satisfactory and visibly independent manner if co-located with positions of the Knin authorities. General Nambiar accordingly requested them to move their locations back 500 metres, and discussions ensued. On 2 November, at a meeting in Knin, the so-called "President" of the "Serb Republic of Krajina", Mr. Goran Hadzic, told UNPROFOR that, while he accepted its proposal regarding "95%" of the locations, he could not accept it as regards five bridges. On 4 November, however, the Knin authorities wrote to General Nambiar, stating that they would not accept any withdrawal of their control points. They also cited the issue of their supposed "sovereignty". It has again to be recalled that UNPROFOR has neither the mandate nor the resources to enforce the Council's resolution. General Nambiar

C26 74
C2A 43 12/18

11

will continue to discuss this question with the Knin authorities with a view to its resolution at the earliest opportunity. The Council might, however, wish to consider this matter and express, in a Resolution, its views.

VI. Peruca Dam

19. I described, in my report of 28 September (S/24600), the disturbing and dangerous situation at the Peruca Dam, of which the Kenyan battalion took control on 14 September. UNPROFOR maintains daily monitoring of conditions at the Dam. Two further inspections have taken place:- by civil engineering consultants, and by British military explosives' experts. It will be recalled that it was believed that the Dam had been prepared for demolition at some time in the recent past, and that UNPROFOR had approached the federal authorities in Belgrade for assistance in rendering the installation safe. These authorities, which had initially offered to assist, finally stated that they were unable to do so. However, the Knin authorities told the British military experts that substantial quantities of explosives were indeed present; that they had diagrams; and that they were willing to remove the charges. On 7 November UNPROFOR formally requested such assistance, to be conducted under its supervision, as soon as possible. Based on all reports available to it, UNPROFOR is deeply concerned about the situation at the Dam. Serb milicja units remain some distance away but in the general vicinity of the installation, which continues to be guarded by Kenyan troops. The Knin authorities have failed to deliver copy of the demolition diagrams, despite UNPROFOR's requests.

VII. Joint Commission

20. In my report of 28 September, I described the setting up and functioning of the Joint Commission which, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 762, comprises the Croatian Government,

C26 74
C26 363 13 1/18

12

the Knin authorities, the ECMM, and UNPROFOR, whose deputy chief of mission chairs the meetings. The Commission will hold its eighth meeting on 9 November. Though two sub-commissions which it has established, to deal with security and cease-fire, and economic and humanitarian matters, have met intermittently, and have, at the technical level, prepared the ground for further progress, the work of the Commission has been effectively stalled by a lack of political will to move forward. This will soon precipitate a crisis.

21. There can be no doubt that, while the Commission has identified a number of important areas in which normalisation of relations between the two communities can and should take place, there has been little or no progress towards the achievement of its basic objective, namely, that of overseeing and monitoring, in various fields, the restoration of the Croatian Government's authority in the "Pink Zones". Meanwhile, UNPROFOR's presence in the "Pink Zones" has helped to stabilise the situation there, somewhat; although on the one side acts of terrorism continue, and, on the other, cease-fire violations and provocations are frequent. Resolution 762 marked a compromise between the two sides, and helped defuse a situation which was, at the time the agreement was made, seriously jeopardising the continuance of the cease-fire. But, I believe, the Council had no intention, in adopting the Resolution, of consolidating the status quo in these areas of Serb control of Croatian territory; indeed, the essence of the Resolution was that of progressive and controlled reversion to Croatian authority. While both sides have, to some extent, failed to fulfil their basic obligation to maintain and strengthen peace in these areas through their provocative behaviour, I feel the time may have come for the Council to review the decision which it took in its earlier Resolution, unless clear and unequivocal progress is made, within a stated time-frame, to carry out its intentions. The Council's authority should be upheld, rather than undermined by prevarication and time-wasting. General Nambiar has now requested

C26 74
C2 N 363 14 1/8

13

my authorisation to withdraw elements of UNPROFOR as, operationally, becomes necessary:- and it should be repeated that UNPROFOR has very slender resources to carry out its many other tasks. While such withdrawal could destabilise the situation in these areas once again, the Council might wish to call upon the parties to settle the issues peacefully between themselves.

VIII. Comment

22. While the overall picture in the Sectors and Pink Zones is not unrelievedly sombre, it has not improved since, in my last report, I described the growing lack of cooperation in the realisation of the Vance Plan. While neither side has fully implemented its undertakings, and each has been guilty of irresponsible and provocative conduct, the root cause of UNPROFOR's inability to make further progress has been the failure of the Serb side to demilitarise the UNPAs. For this, there is no plausible excuse, and the peace process in these areas has now been brought to a virtual halt. Additionally, the refusal of the Serb side to cooperate in regard to a vital element of Resolution 769 on border control has jeopardised its implementation. It had appeared for a brief time as if the improving climate of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb might have enabled the various obstacles in the way of the effective realisation of the Vance Plan in the Sectors to be overcome. But the Knin authorities have recently, by word and deed, called the peace plan in question. It is almost as if the amelioration in relations between the two Governments had set off a counter-reaction in certain quarters. While it is perhaps too early to arrive at conclusions, clear failure of cooperation by either party raises the prospect of a new descent into war, with a repetition of its all too recent horror. The Council may already wish to consider the various options which it may need to examine should these serious obstructions continue. Meanwhile, UNPROFOR will continue to explore every possible avenue which could lead to the full implementation of its mandate.

C26 74
C2N 363 15/18

14

B. PREVLAKA

23. On 23-24 September 1992 the Chief Military Observer of UNPROFOR held discussions with the local commanders of the Croatian and Yugoslav armies on the modalities of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the Municipality of Dubrovnik. The discussions were based on a concept of establishing a demilitarised zone on either side of the Croatian/Montenegrin border and envisaged a 12-day withdrawal phase. An agreement was endorsed by the Croatian Commanders; however, the Yugoslav Commander was not authorised to endorse the agreement. Copies of the proposed agreement were passed to the Croatian and Yugoslav authorities on 26 September and UNPROFOR continued from that time to press the parties for approval of the implementing agreement.

24. The Yugoslav Army withdrawal appears to have commenced about 8 October in the absence of any formal agreement between the parties. It was not until 20 October, the date agreed for the completion of the withdrawal by President Tudjman and President Cosic in Geneva on 30 September 1992, that the parties sought to formalize security arrangements to follow the withdrawal. Boundaries for the United Nations demilitarized zone under SCR 779 were agreed on the night of 20 October 1992 by Presidents Cosic and Tudjman, meeting under the co-chairmanship of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen.

25. The withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army was successfully conducted in a professional manner. Unfortunately, elements from the Serb Forces in Eastern Herzegovina appear to have occupied Croatian territory in the wake of the Yugoslav Army withdrawal. Hostilities broke out between the Serb elements and the Croatian Army on 21 October 1992 when the Croatian Army attempted to move forward after the Yugoslav withdrawal. Fighting continued until 24 October 1992 when the local Croatian commander advised UNPROFOR representatives that Serb forces had been pushed from Croatian territory. The

C26 74
C24 363 16/18

15

fighting during this period spilled over into Bosnia and Herzegovina territory where, it is claimed by the Serb authorities, Croatian Forces have occupied some 39 Serb villages. The Croatian authorities have stated that the Forces fighting in Herzegovina are HVO Forces and not those of the Croatian Army.

26. The Yugoslav Army has now completed its withdrawal from all Croatian territory in compliance with the Vance Plan and UNPROFOR military observers are stationed on Prevlaka Peninsula where the UN flag is flying.

C. "NO FLY" ZONE

27. On 30 September 1992, President Tudjman and President Cosic, meeting under the co-chairmanship of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, agreed in principle to the deployment of observers at air fields in their respective republics for the purpose of monitoring airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was followed by Security Council Resolution 781 on 8 October 1992 and an offer by Dr. Karadzic, on 13 October 1992, to fly out, from Banja Luka to the FRY, military aircraft under his control. Attempts by UNPROFOR representatives to hold discussions on this movement with representatives of the Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb authorities were frustrated by an apparent lack of consensus within the Serb leadership on Dr. Karadzic's initiative. Finally, in discussions with Mr. Vance and Lord Owen on 28 October 1992, Dr. Karadzic withdrew his offer to fly out the aircraft. He advised that the aircraft would remain in their hangars and would fly only as authorised by UNPROFOR. It was also agreed in principle that UNPROFOR observers would be allowed to monitor airfields under the control of the Serb authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once the matter of the flyout had been resolved, the Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb authorities entered negotiations on an implementing agreement on the monitoring of the airfields under their control. Negotiations were held on 29 October 1992 and a draft agreement with the Yugoslav authorities

C2674
C2N 363

17/18

16

was endorsed on the same day, being formally signed on 2 November. Discussions with the Croatian authorities on the implementation agreement were successfully conducted on 27 and 31 October 1992 and signed on 1 November 1992. Agreements were signed on behalf of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency and on behalf of the Serb side in Geneva on 3 November.

28. To ensure speedy implementation of the agreements, military observers were deployed from existing United Nations observer missions during the period 28-30 October 1992 to commence observation of airfields. They will be replaced on 10 December 1992 by military observers provided directly by contributing countries. The combination of reporting by observers at airfields and UNPROFOR forces deployed on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and technical monitoring of BH airspace should allow effective implementation of the monitoring aspects of SCR 781. UNPROFOR guidelines for authorising non-military flights are that flights by military aircraft or other aircraft on military missions will not be approved while authorization of other flights will be limited to humanitarian purposes.

29. UNPROFOR provided, on 31 October 1992, its first reports, in accordance with resolution 781, on compliance with the Resolution. Subsequent daily reports have shown a number of apparent infringements of the ban by aircraft which appear to be seeking to avoid radar detection.

D. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

(Other than the deployment of forces allotted for the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the main operational aspects that have taken place there pertain to the commencement of escorts for UNHCR convoys from Belgrade to Sarajevo, some assistance to UNHCR in movement of convoys from Split to Sarajevo/Vitez and the periodic meetings of the Mixed Military Working Group under Major General

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17

Morillon which has been discussing aspects of "safe corridors", demilitarization and so on. Inputs under this head would possibly be better covered by details provided by Secretary Vance.)

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'92 DEC -5 -5 :09

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓

FROM: GOULDING, NEW YORK

DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1992

NUMBER: MSC-1295

SUBJECT: Letter from Dzakula

1992 DEC -4 P 8:25

OPERATIONS

1. We have received attached letter from Dzakula today. Grateful you respond to him directly, explaining limitations of your mandate outside the UNPAs but suggesting that he bring any documented evidence of human rights abuses against Serbs to the attention of Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki. If war crimes are involved, such evidence may also be of interest to the Commission of Experts.

2. In the event that Mr Dzakula wishes to pursue this approach, you may wish to offer to receive any evidence in his possession for onward transmittal to the appropriate addressee(s) in Geneva.

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION
WITH UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES

OUTGOING FAX NUMBER: 83/92	DATE: 4 Dec. 1992
TO: Mr. MARACK GOULDING Undersecretary of UN for Peace Operations	FROM: Mr. V. DŽAKULA President of Western Slavonia
FAX NO: 991212-9633386	FAX: 38 11 602674, 636775 TELEX: 11448, 12157 PHONE: 636465
ATTN:	PAGES (INCLUDING THIS ONE <u>3</u>)
INFO:	
FAX NUMBER:	
SUBJECT:	LETTER FOR MR. GOULDING

PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE LETTER OF MR. V. DŽAKULA, PRESIDENT
OF WESTERN SLAVONIA.

KIND REGARDS.

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saying it
outside a
mandate

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UNPROFOR
direct report
to Habitat

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(or his Commission?) have any
documentary evidence of
human rights abuses, shouldn't it?

⊕ (of course, what he
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change our work

1100
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Dear Mr. Goulding,

As you may recall you assured me during our meeting in Okučani (2 September 1992) that you would inform the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and relevant Human Rights organizations on the deteriorating situation experienced by the resident Serb population in areas outside of the UNPA Sector West.

In particular, I would like to bring again to your attention the region of Western Slavonia by emphasizing the daily problems of Serbs in most of the villages of the municipalities of Podravska Slatina and Slavonska Požega.

According to the information we have been receiving, the majority of the Croatian authorities, civil, military and local police, is carrying out, on a continuous basis, acts of aggression against the local, resident Serb population. Needless to underline that the Serb population of this area has been residing there for many centuries.

Besides the severe psychological hardship inflicted on the individuals, these blatant violations of basic human rights have generally also resulted in the loss of property, destruction and burning of houses, eviction of families from apartments, loss of employment opportunities, etc. The overall goal of this process of harassment, however, is evident, and subsequently will result in the achieving of a single-ethnic community.

While we are fully confident that any such negative process inside the UNPA would be fully controlled by UNPROFOR, no such preventive mechanism or monitoring machinery does exist outside the UNPA which naturally causes deep concern to the concerned population and its leaders who are presently in exile with no authority or possibility to assist.

In our opinion, it is, therefore, compulsory that the United Nations not only take note of this unacceptable behavior which appears to be fully supported by Croatian authorities, but in addition makes every effort to prevent the present situation to continue.

We completely understand your concern for possible unpleasant events in Republic of Macedonia, out of which the UN Secretary General Mr. Boutros Ghali has proposed the entry of UN forces to Macedonia.

But I express my amazement at the fact why till now there has not been given any protection to the whole area of Western Slavonia, which has experienced the first ethnic cleansing and total disaster by the Croatian army.

CNZ 453 CYZ 266 P4/4.

- 2 -

We estimate that S. Vance's Plan could be completely successful only on condition that the protection is provided in the whole area of Western Slavonia, what will guarantee a peaceful and safe return of the fled population and creation of prerequisites for normal life of all people in Western Slavonia who have suffered in the war.

We demand that you give a suggestion to the Security Council for an urgent and pressing protection of that part of Western Slavonia, which is outside of the UNPA, in the same way as it is protected the part of it which is inside of the UNPA.

It is for above reasons, Sir, that I in my capacity as President of Western Slavonia sincerely request you to explore the appropriate channels in order to put as soon as possible an end to the presently occurring, and in deed very disturbing practices of ethnic cleansing by the Croatian authorities.

Trusting your judgement we hope that you with the help of the United Nations system will assist us urgently in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

V. Džakula
President of Western Slavonia

C2N-482
C2G-164

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
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TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, UNOG GENEVA

FROM : *ju* NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 30 NOVEMBER 1992

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-411

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH KNIN AUTHORITIES

1. As discussed with Co-Chairmen and in parallel to their meetings at Brioni, Thornberry travelled to Knin to seek to repair some political bridges, in poor condition in recent months. He had four hours' private discussion with Col. Stojan Spanovic, "Minister of Defence" of "RSK", then dinner with him and "Minister of Energy", Bjegovic. The main direct consequence is that we are opening negotiations later this week with "RSK" on border controls. They have appreciated, as General Winter arrives and their economy dims still further, that there may be a good bit in it for them, in terms of commerce and trade. Overall tone excellent; they want us to run, ad interim, with the economic issues. They are ready to demine the dam.

2. In connection with the border control question, we should like to have authorisation to bring back our consultants, Tait and Collingridge, finally tracked down at Grand Hotel Skopje, for 4-5 days to participate in the negotiations which we have this evening in principle set up to start on Friday, 4 December. If we have your authority, CAO can administratively implement pending action in New York (there is a rather narrow window of their availability). We had the impression from Spanovic, confirmed today by our people in Knin in related discussions with more junior officials, that all may now be negotiable.

3. We shall have to talk to the Croats about Peruca. Knin wants to demine and start work on repair of the turbines at once, under our supervision and control. They say both sides will need that this part of the dam be operational by late spring. We shall seek an immediate meeting with Milas etc. to discuss this. We may need

Circ. :- FC, DCM, DFC, COS, CAO.

2/3

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- 2 -

to make a deal, and think that we have enough latitude to get some results. In (what seemed) very frank discussions, we explored many of their basic needs and political interests, and found much more need and flexibility than had appeared in recent months. Thus Maslenica, the western railway, Zadar and Drnis water, Obrovac, even the highway, were thrown into the hat by them. They also offered restoration of some telephone links in other sectors, and wanted to talk deals on quite a wide range of outstanding issues.

4. We also discussed the Joint Commission. They take the view that we will have to take a more active role in pursuing its objectives: - instead of being a benevolent referee-cum-facilitator, they think it best that we explore an issue at a time in a bilateral way, then task each side to undertake specific work, under our supervision, within a timeframe. They wondered if the Croats were really very interested in a number of these issues, as they did not seriously negotiate them; relying instead on publicised demands, but usually backing off when concrete proposals were presented (we think there is at least some substance in this viewpoint, though it is not the whole truth). It may be worth exploring this approach.

5. The issues of "sovereignty and independence etc." did not obtrude. Our interlocutors volunteered that they did not anticipate early recognition of the RSK by Croatia or, indeed, anybody else, and thought we should instead all get on with the job of diminishing tensions. Conceding that neither trusts the other more than "zero point one per cent", as Bjegovic said, they nevertheless believed that Tudjman and his "war party" were deliberately building destructive tension by their continuing clamour.

6. We kept clear of displaced persons' issues on this occasion, and said little about disarmament. But Spanovic volunteered that they were making a very big effort to clean up their act by arresting their bandits and making life hot for their gangsters (especially in Sector East). Clearly very sensitive to this matter, now, he agreed precisely with our analysis, and felt the "decline into anarchy" line we have been publicly taking could destroy any residual credibility they may have. Colleagues confirm that they are indeed attempting to crack down on at least some of their thugs, and that the serious crime rate has dropped appreciably.

7. Martić and Hadžić, unfortunately, were elsewhere, but Spanovic was pressing that we returned shortly to talk to Martić about outstanding issues. Colleagues had approached Babić, who was apparently keen to meet, but we felt it inappropriate, especially at this time.

C2N-482

3/3

- 3 -

8. The visit ended today with a 2-hour tour and CIVPOL briefing in the fraught Benkovac area, wherein there have recently been a number of especially nasty murders and ambushes; most of which, quite probably, have been committed by Croat infiltrators and others. A quite understandable, though not defensible, process of destabilisation by the Croats seems to focus on Benkovac, as well as one or two other areas in the Pink Zones.

9. We shall follow up. Spanovic is always the most intelligent of our interlocutors, and usually the most reasonable; that does not mean that he can always deliver. Bjegovic is honest, and often outspoken, and wants to get on with the many practical tasks of reconstruction. Unfortunately, some of their colleagues do not warrant any of the above adjectives, except "outspoken".

Endall

1992-11-13 16:18

5615

YUGOSLAVIA

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P1/3

CZN=393

C2G=095

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MSC 07-97

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, UNOG, GENEVA

DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 1992

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-232V

Dankil

15 Gen

(IMMEDIATE)

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

92 NOV 13 17:36

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF SERBS
OF WESTERN SLAVONIA

1. Yesterday, during a visit to Sector West, I had a meeting with Mr. Dzakula at his request. At the meeting, he expressed his appreciation for the progress achieved by UNPROFOR in Sector West with regard to the disarming of the militia on both sides and the visitation programme. He felt that the visitation programme was arousing a lot of interest among his people and could be considered as a concrete step towards return of peace and normalcy to the area. He opined that safety and security afforded by UNPROFOR presence and controls, was an adequate assurance for him and added that the militia strength in the Sector West area had been cut down by fifty percent. Mr. Dzakula, however, repeatedly stressed that the Knin authorities were not convinced about the judiciousness of his approach and that he was coming under increasing pressure from them "to take a tougher line". He added that he had had a hard time explaining his point of view to Milan Martić, during his recent visit to the area, and emphasised that, finally, he had disarmed Martić with the force of his arguments and convinced him of the increasing success of the visitation programme. He asked that we assist in his efforts by a) ensuring equally tight controls on the UNPA borders in the other three sectors, b) convincing the Knin authorities to accept early disarmament and demobilisation of the "militia"

C2N8393

P2/3

- 2 -

in all the sectors, c) convincing the Croatian authorities to stop provocations from their side, and d) giving maximum publicity to the success of the visitation and resettlement programme that has been undertaken in the sector.

2. With regard to the return of refugees, Mr. Dzakula emphasised that the problems in Sector West and Sector East were interlinked and explained that the return of non-Serbs to the UNPAs could be taken up only in conjunction with the return of Serbs to the Croatian areas. He highlighted the fact that 35,000 Serbs had left the area of Western and Central Slavonia and that many of them are currently staying in Beli Manastir, Vukovar, Ilok and other parts of Eastern Slavonia. He said that we should ask the Croatian authorities to create conditions for the return of these Serbs to their homes in Croatian areas, so that normalcy is restored in the region as a whole, and would facilitate the return of Croatsians displaced from Sector East. On the same subject, he reiterated that we could resolve the problems in Sectors South, North and East by convincing the Croatsians to first allow return to their homes Serbs displaced from Osijek, Zadar, Gospic, Sisak and Karlovac. He felt that mutually addressing the issue was the only way, and highlighted that the number of mixed marriages in these five areas was almost as high as fifty percent.
3. In my response, I expressed appreciation for his courageous and realistic approach and thanked him for his support in the implementation of the peacekeeping plan. I assured him of our support in his endeavours, and asserted that we will continue to pursue our efforts at demilitarising the armed elements within the UNPAs, as well as ensuring effective control at the check points on the UNPA boundaries. I also informed him that we would study how to pursue his suggestion of joint return of refugees with the Croatian authorities.

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1992-11-13

YUGOSLAVIA

C2N 595

P3/3

- 3 -

4. I must admit that the tone of the meeting was quite encouraging, notwithstanding my understanding that Mr. Dzakula's views are not shared by most of the Knin authorities. I intend to ask Thornberry to go to Knin within the next week, for further discussions to try and break the current impasse.

CZN 345

CZG 63

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

92 NOV -3 21:00

UNOG Information Unit
Palais des Nations

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO : VANCE, UNOG GENEVA
FLEISCHAUER, UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB
DATE : 3 NOVEMBER 1992
NUMBER : **UNPROFOR Z-273**
SUBJECT: "REPUBLIKA SRPSKA"

1. Reur MSC-1122, I hope you will not mind if I convey my dilemma. I do not, of course, know in what context legal advice was given in respect of Somalia, but wonder if the circumstances were precisely analogous.

2. Here, we are committed - as I understand it - to upholding the idea that borders cannot be changed by force; to a single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the context i.a. of the discussion in Geneva of possible constitutional arrangements; and everybody is watching how we deal with this issue, and will leap on us if we make a false move. I doubt if even the Cosic/Panic Government in Yugoslavia will accept Mladic's demand (which may become something else tomorrow, anyhow). Moreover, the RSK will be next in line; and we have been holding our position on this, despite many pressures.

3. I suppose what I am really asking is whether there is, indeed, much, if any, room for compromise at all on this issue in the present circumstances; or whether we don't just have to say, "take it or leave it"; or sign a separate but identical document (which was how we avoided the issue on Sarajevo airport - sending out separate copies which they could have signed any way they wanted)?

Endall

DISTRIBUTION:

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MA	SM



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

ROUTINE

CRYPTO FAX

TO : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FROM : VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

DATE : 8 JANUARY 1993

SUBJECT: Draft Report of the Secretary-General to
the General Assembly

J. B. Brigg
W

1. Enclosed is a preliminary draft of the subject report which ICFY staff are at present developing. The draft is being prepared in fulfillment of a request to the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly by 18 January 1993 on a resolution passed by the Assembly on the initiative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

2. The draft is forwarded for your information and for early warning as UNNY may seek your comments; particularly those outlined in Section III - Withdrawal of Foreign Forces on pages 4 and 5.

Regards.



CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE



Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO : FEISSEL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 8 JANUARY 1993

FAX : 212-963-5964

PAGES: 1 OF

FROM : RAMCHARAN, ICFY, GENEVA

FAX:
(41-22) 917-0080
917-0079

The attached is a trial run of how the report to the General Assembly could look like. The part on the continuation of the Peace talks would be added after Sunday. Any further Security Council activities would also be added. The two Agreements proposed by the Co-Chairmen, which are already in Security Council document S/25050, would be reproduced as Annexes to the report. They amount to 21 pages already translated. This would make the total document about 28 printed pages.

As regards the last section on the withdrawal of foreign forces, I have discussed it with Brigadier Wilson. He has alerted his colleagues in UNPROFOR that they may be invited to update it but he feels that they should be formally tasked by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Perhaps you could raise this with DPKO and get them to ask for the updating, with the text copied to us for inclusion in the report.

Regards.

cc: Brigadier Wilson

Preliminary draft

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/
-- January 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to
paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution A/

Introduction

In paragraph 12 of its resolution A/---, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 18 January on the implementation of the resolution. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. The attention of the General Assembly is also drawn to the following reports issued since the adoption of the resolution.

- Further report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/---, 24 December 1992).
- Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 787 (1992) (S/25000, 21 December 1992)
- Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina held within the framework of the International Conference from 2-4 January (S/25050, 6 January 1993).

- Report of the Secretary-General on the resumed Peace talks, 10---- January (S/---).

I. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

In paragraph 11 of its resolution, the General Assembly requested the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to conclude expeditiously the work of the Working Group on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to report on the reasons for the lack of progress, and to submit proposals to overcome obstacles in the fulfilment of their mandate by 18 January 1993.

On --- 1992, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference issued invitations to the three sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to Geneva from 2 January 1993 onward for talks on the following matters: "to discuss a sustainable cessation of hostilities; the demilitarization of Sarajevo; an agreement on a pull-back from the military front line in a way that reinforces and goes with the grain of an overall political settlement; ensuring free access of all citizens in and out of besieged cities and towns; and the free movement of humanitarian aid".

The proceedings of the Peace talks are related in the reports of the Secretary-General thereon, S/25050 and ... As will be seen from those reports, the Co-Chairmen on 4 January 1993 put to the delegations in the Peace talks a comprehensive package as the basis for a fair, just and lasting peace. They asked the delegations to sign an Agreement relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The text of these two documents are reproduced in Annex I and Annex II. The Co-Chairmen explained that the two documents were inextricably linked and indicated that if, at any time, the three parties proposed agreed changes in either of the two documents or the provincial map, those changes would be incorporated.

The Co-Chairmen expressed the hope that all three sides would sign the two documents. However, if any party wished to think about the issues involved overnight, they would be ready to hold another plenary session on Tuesday, 5 January. Alternatively, if one or more parties wished to take the document back for consultations, a further plenary meeting would be called in Geneva on Sunday, 10 January, at 11 a.m. after the recess for the Orthodox Christmas.

Some of the delegations accepted the documents and signed them immediately. Others asked for further discussions on parts of the two documents proposed by the Co-Chairmen. Accordingly, it was decided that the Conference would recess until Sunday, 10 January, at 11 a.m. The Co-Chairmen strongly urged that there be maximum military restraint in the intervening days. They also urged maximum restraint in participants' public statements.

In a report which the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on 6 January 1993, he stated:

"21. The peace talks represented a historic step forward in the pursuit of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discussions took place on the three critical components for achieving peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the constitutional principles; the delimitation of provinces; and arrangements for implementing and monitoring a cessation of hostilities.

"22. All the delegations participating in the talks pledged their cooperation with the Co-Chairmen in the search for peaceful solutions. The peace process has thus taken on a qualitatively new dimension. Henceforth it should be easier to establish clearly who is cooperating and who is not. I believe that the Security Council should let it be known clearly to all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina that it is their duty to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen in bringing the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end swiftly, and that there would be penalties for obstruction.

"23. In the view of the ongoing talks in Geneva, it remains my sincere belief that, if the Council decides to adopt a resolution enforcing the ban on non-authorized flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be helpful if its implementation could be

delayed for a reasonable period of time." (S/25050, paras. 21-23)

The peace talks resumed in Geneva on Sunday, 10 December, (to be continued).....

II. Actions of the Security Council

Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution A/---, the Security Council has undertaken the following actions with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(a) On 18 December 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 798 (1992) in which it stated that it was appalled by reports of massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It demanded that all the detention camps and, in particular, camps for women should be immediately closed. It strongly condemned "these acts of unspeakable brutality" and expressed its support for the initiative taken by the European Council to dispatch a delegation rapidly to investigate the facts. It requested the Secretary-General to provide such necessary means of support as were available to him in the area to enable the European Community delegation to have free and secure access to the places of detention. Furthermore, it requested the Member States of the European Community to inform the Secretary-General of the work of the delegation.

(b)

III. Withdrawal of foreign forces

General Assembly resolution A/--- contained various provisions pertaining to the withdrawal of foreign forces from

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Earlier, in its resolution 46/242, the General Assembly had requested that those units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and elements of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring. In his previous report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General had informed the General Assembly as follows:

"This provision of the resolution has not so far been fulfilled. While, since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution, UNPROFOR has so far been deployed only in Sarajevo and Bihac, it has received credible reports of extensive involvement of forces of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serb forces allegedly continue to receive supplies and support from elements in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). There are also journalistic accounts of foreign nationals fighting alongside Muslim and Croat forces. UNPROFOR is currently deploying throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to protect humanitarian convoys.

"Though JNA has withdrawn completely from Bosnia and Herzegovina, former members of Bosnian Serb origin have been left behind with their equipment, and constitute the Army of the 'Serb Republic'. Several brigades of the Croatian Army are also reliably reported to be actively engaged in the conflict. This provision of the General Assembly resolution also therefore appears not to have been fulfilled. The Secretary-General continues to use his good offices through the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as well as through UNPROFOR, to bring an end to this tragic conflict." (S/---)

(to be updated by UNPROFOR)

UNPROFOR MESSAGE FORM

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(security warning)

PRECEDENCE		DATE / TIME
PRIORITY ACTION	R** (INFO)	021350 B JULY 1992

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fm	FROM: HQ SECTOR NORTH	CLASSIFICATION UN RESTRICTED
to	TO: HQ UNPROFOR (ATTN FC)	
SMH00012	INFO: DFC KORENICA	INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CODE IDC 500

SUBJECT: PROGRAMME FOR PHASE II (1) ATTACHED
PLEASE FIND PROGRAMME IN RESPECT OF
DEMILITARISATION OF UNPA NORTH FOR
YOUR RETENTION (1) THE DETAILED OPOS WILL
FOLLOW IN DUE COURSE (1) STEP 1 IS
EXPECTED TO COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY ON
D+1 (1) YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF
PROGRESS AND EVENTS (1)

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UN RESTRICTED
PROGRAMME FOR PHASE II

ANNEX A TO
DETAILED PLAN PHASE II
DATED 02 JULY 1992

SERIAL (a)	STEP (b)	DATE (c)	ACTIVITIES (d)	RESPONSIBILITY (e)	REMARKS (f)
1.	<u>STEP 1.</u> Withdrawal of arty (including rocket arty), mors, tks behind Line of Withdrawal (LOW 1) (see appendix 1).	D-18 to D+3	a. Detailed recon of the Pink Zones.	UNMO, MBTs & UNCIVPOL	D-Day is 02 Jul 92
			b. Finalizing the deployment of troops at the CPs & OPs.	All units	
			c. Study of submitted UNMO recon report and adjustment of Sector's plan.	OPs Branch, Sector North	
			d. Removal of minefields in areas of influence in UNPA.	TDF/CA with Can Engr Bat inf battalion assistance	
			e. Deployment of the UNMOs, UNCIVPOL and ECOM to monitor and halt cease- fire violations.	Sector HQ and SMO	
			f. Withdrawal of tanks, arty, ORKAN, R65, Mors to not less than 30km from the UNPA (LOW 1) boundary into the for TDF.	TDF to be supervised by the battalions	a. For suggested storage areas, see appendix 3.
			g. Receipt of TDF withdrawal plans for demilitarisation of Sector North.	TDF to plan and implement their withdrawal while UNPROFOR supervises	b. Battalion comds to decide route of with- drawal and inform Sector HQ.

A-1
UN RESTRICTED.

UN RESTRICTED
PROGRAMME FOR PHASE II

ANNEX A TO
DETAILED PLAN PHASE II
DATED 02 JULY 1992

SERIAL (a)	STEP (b)	DATE (c)	ACTIVITIES (d)	RESPONSIBILITY (e)	REMARKS (f)
2.	<u>STEP 3.</u> Withdrawal of APCs and AA systems behind. (LOW 2)	D+3 to D+5	a. Withdrawal of APCs, long and short range anti-tank weapons and HMGs to not less than 10km from the UNPA boundary into the UNPA.	TDP battalions, UNMOS and MBTS.	a. For suggested storage areas, see appendix 2. b. Battalion comds to coordinate routes of withdrawal and inform Sector HQ.

UN RESTRICTED
PROGRAMME FOR PHASE II

ANNEX A TO
DETAILED PLAN PHASE II
DATED 02 JULY 1992

SERIAL (a)	STEP (b)	DATE (c)	ACTIVITIES (d)	RESPONSIBILITY (e)	REMARKS (f)
3.	STEP 4. Withdrawal of infantry behind (LOW 3) (see appendix 2) with engrs "on call" for mine clearance.	D+5 to D+10	a. Cross-checking the lifting of the minefields in areas of influence.	TDF/CA, to be monitored by UNPROFOR Engrs.	a. For suggested storage areas, see appendix 2.
		"	b. Withdrawal of the TDF and CA troops to LOW 3 (see appendix 2) from both the Pink Zones and the UNPA to 5km from the UNPA boundary into the UNPA	TDF/CA withdrawal to be supervised by UNPROFOR troops and UNMOs respectively.	b. Unit coms to decide route of withdrawal and inform Sector HQ.
		"	c. Detailing of unarmed Military Field Engineers for the lifting of mines in the frontline.	TDF/CA, to be supervised by UNPROFOR Engrs.	UNPROFOR Fd Engrs to ensure a thorough job is done to enhance safety.
		"	d. Denial of access into the Pink Zones to both parties until the situation improves, tempers cool down and the PC directs.	UNMOs, MBts and UNCIVPOL	For enhancement of peace. PC to direct /permit hand over of Pink Zones.

UN RESTRICTED
PROGRAMME FOR PHASE II

ANNEX A TO
DETAILED PLAN PHASE II
DATED 02 JULY 1992

SERIAL (a)	STEP (b)	DATE (c)	ACTIVITIES (d)	RESPONSIBILITY (e)	REMARKS (f)
4.	<u>STEP 2</u> . Disarming TDF, para-military groups and civilians.	D+5 to D+15	a. Submission of weapons records to UNPROFOR by TDF.	TDF and battalions	SHQ to monitor and supervise through OPS Branch.
			b. Disarming the para-military, volunteers and TDF within the UNPA. TDF to account for all the weapons for storage with UNPROFOR or under the double-lock system of storage.	TDF and battalions	SHQ to monitor progress and assist with negotiations for siting storage.
			c. Disbanding and demobilising the combatant units within the UNPA.	TDF and battalions	To be handled with respect, patience and great care.
			d. Promulgation of the Amnesty Law.	Government/PC	To safeguard against reprisals to groups and individuals.
			e. Further coordination of activities with the Civil Affairs, UNCIVPOL and liaison with the ECOM to stabilise the situation within the UNPA, accompanied by reinforced patrolling consciously aimed at reinforcing confidence.	SHQ, UNMO, MPT, ECOM and units.	

UN RESTRICTED
PROGRAMME FOR PHASE II

ANNEX A TO
DETAILED PLAN PHASE II
DATED 01 JULY 1992

SERIAL (a)	STEP (b)	DATE (c)	ACTIVITIES (d)	RESPONSIBILITY (e)	REMARKS (f)
---------------	-------------	-------------	-------------------	-----------------------	----------------

f. Implementation of the FC's further,
directives as may be issued from time
to time.

FC.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Opie

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1992
NUMBER:
SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
REF: MSG UNPROFOR -Z- 149

Handwritten signature
1st Gen

1. Preliminary recon reveals that the reservations of the UK representatives concerning the logistic support in the TUZLA area were well founded as the recon parties were not able to gain access to TUZLA despite having received assurances earlier.

2. After consultations with UNHCR representatives and with their agreement, I propose the initial deployment plan be modified as follows:


- a. France - BIHAC area
- b. Spain - MOSTAR area
- c. Canada - BANJA LUKA-DOBOJ area
- d. UK - JAJCE-VITEZ area

3. UNHCR would be in a position to supply TUZLA with the help of the BE Coy established in LOZNICA or with that of the UK out of VITEZ.

Endall.

ACTIVE AND POTENTIAL ACTIVE AREAS - SECTOR SARAJEVO.

(SIT. as at 142400 SEP 92.)



LEGEND.

- ① ACTIVE AREAS
- POTENTIAL ACTIVE AREAS.

AIRPORT AREA

1) AFTER A RELATIVELY QUIET NIGHT, THE COMBAT ACTIVITIES INCREASED INTENSELY AS THE DAY PROGRESSED, WITH HEAVY FIGHTING IN NUMEROUS AREAS BY LATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING. AREAS OF FIGHTING INCLUDED: DOGLODI, STUP, OTES, ILIDZA, BUTMIR, STUPSKO BRDO AND NEDARICI.

2) AT LAST LIGHT 10 TSY TANKS WERE REPORTED FIRING FROM THE WESTERN END OF THE AIRPORT TOWARDS BUTMIR.

3) THERE WAS ALSO SHELLING ON THE PRESIDENCY.

SECTOR SARAJEVO

9/14/92

SECTOR SARAJEVO

CODE	NAME	GRID	SECTOR	UNIT	HELIPAD
	BEAVER CAMP	2756	SA		
	BISTRIK BARRACKS	350570	SA		
	BRIJESKO BRDO	271251	SA		
	BUTARANA	362591	SA		
	BUTMIR	268532	SA	STORAG AREA FRE	
	CUSTOMS WAREHOUSE	317572	SA	STORAG AREA UKR	
	D. BIOSKO	3761	SA		
	D.KOTORVAC	2951	SA		
	DOBRINJA	2953	SA	STORAG AREA FRE	
	GRBAVICA	352564	SA	STORAG AREA EGY	
	HADZICI	1753	SA		
	HQ SARAJEVO	2855	SA		
	IGMAN MOUNTAINS AREA	210530	SA		
	ILIDZA	2453	SA		
	ILIJAS	2267	SA		
	KISELJAK	070665	SA	STORAG AREA FRE	
	KOBLIJA GLAVA	3261	SA		
	KONSUM	282557	SA	STORAG AREA EGY	
	KOTORAC	2852	SA		
	LUKAVICA	3153	SA		
	MOJMILO	280555	SA		
	NEDARICI	2754	SA		
	NISICI	400801	SA		
	NOVI GRAD AREA	280550	SA		
	OSMICE	2549	SA		
	OTES	2454	SA		
	RAINBOW HOTEL	273554	SA		
	RAJLOVAC	256581	SA	STORAG AREA EGY	
	RED CROSS WAREHOUSE	298565	SA	STORAG AREA UKR	
	SA AIRPORT	2753	SA		
	SEDRENIC	354591	SA		
	SKOLOVIC KOLNJIJA	2751	SA		
	STUP	2554	SA		
	STUPSKO BRDO	270554	SA		
	TITO BARRACKS	3357	SA		
	VOGKOVICI	2950	SA		
	VOGOSCA	2862	SA		
	ZETRA WAREHOUSE	334592	SA	STORAG AREA UKR	

28
T

1014

Information Brief 8

10th Sep 92SITUATION REPORT OPPOSING FORCES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

GOOD MORNING AMBASSADOR, GENTLEMEN.

1. THIS MORNINGS INFORMATION SECTION BRIEFING IS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON OPPOSING FORCES AND AREAS OF OPERATION.

2. THERE ARE THREE MAIN FORCES FIGHTING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:

- a. THE SERBIAN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE FORCES (SERBIAN TDF)
- b. THE CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL (HVO)
- c. THE BOSNIAN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE FORCES (BOSNIAN TDF)

SERBIAN TDF

3. THE SERBIAN TDF ARE DEPLOYED IN AREAS THAT RELATE TO THE SERBIAN POPULATION IN BOSNIA ITSELF. THE MAIN AREAS OF SERBIAN POPULATION ARE IN THE SELF DECLARED SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS OF:

- a. SEMBERIJA.
- b. ROMANSKO BERCANSKA.
- c. HERZEGOVINA.
- d. KRAJINA.

4. A CORPS SIZED UNIT OPERATES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT HAVE ACCURATE FIGURES ON THE SIZE OF EACH CORPS IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE 70,000 SOLDIERS IN THE SERBIAN TDF, OF WHICH 20,000 TRANSFERRED DIRECTLY FROM THE JNA. THE CORPS IDENTIFIED SO FAR ARE:

- a. THE BANJA LUKA CORPS
- b. THE BIHAC CORPS
- c. THE SEMBERIJA/TUZLA CORPS
- d. THE HERZEGOVINA CORPS

5. THESE CORPS ARE WELL EQUIPPED WITH A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 300 TANKS, AND 600 ARTILLERY PIECES. THEY ALSO HAVE AIR ASSETS. THEIR MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT INCLUDES M-84 TANKS, FROG-7 SHORT RANGE BALISTIC MISSILES AND MIG-21 AIRCRAFT.

6. THE COMMANDER OF THE SERBIAN TDF IS GENERAL MILAN MLADIC WHO WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE JNA KNIN CORPS. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT ZELKO RAZNJATOVIC, OR "ARKAN" HAS NOW BECOME THE COMMANDER OF THE SERBIAN SPECIAL FORCES IN BOSNIA.

7. ARKAN WAS THE LEADER OF THE MAIN SERBIAN IRREGULAR FORCES FIGHTING IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA. HIS FORCES HAD PREVIOUSLY CLASHED WITH JA AND OTHER SERBIAN UNITS, BUT NOW APPEAR TO HAVE GAINED SOME FORM OF LEGITIMACY.

8. "ARKANS TIGERS" ARE NOT NOTED FOR ABIDING BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION WHICH HAS LED TO COMPLAINTS BEING MADE AGAINST HIM EVEN FROM THE SERBIAN SIDE IN THE PAST. HIS UNIT MAY CONSIST OF UP TO 8,000 SOLDIERS EQUIPPED WITH SMALL NUMBERS OF TANKS AND ARTILLERY PIECES.

9. THE SERBIAN TDF IS CONTROLLED FROM BANJA LUKA. THIS WAS THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE OLD JNA 5 CORPS. WHEN THE JNA WITHDREW FROM BOSNIA LEAVING ITS EQUIPMENT BEHIND IT WAS RENAMED THE 1st KRAJINA CORPS, BUT IS MORE COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE BANJA LUKA CORPS.

10. THE SERBIAN TDF IS FIGHTING IN THE FOLLOWING MAIN AREAS:

- a. AGAINST THE MOSLEM BIHAC POCKET
- b. AGAINST THE HVO AND BOSNIAN TDF TO KEEP THE DERVENTA-BIJELINIA CORRIDOR OPEN TO SERBIA
- c. AGAINST THE BOSNIAN TDF IN THE FOCA, GORAZDE VISEGRAD AND SARAJEVO AREAS.
- d. AGAINST THE HVO IN THE WESTERN HERZEGOVINA AREA FROM MOSTAR TO TREBINJE.

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

11. THE CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL OR HVO STILL OPERATE IN TWO MAIN AREAS, NORTHERN BOSNIA AND WESTERN HERZEGOVINA. THE AIM OF THE HVO IS TO CUT THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES THAT LINK THE TWO KRAJINA AREAS IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA WITH SERBIA. THIS ALSO HAS THE ADDED BENEFIT OF EXPORTING THE CONFLICT FROM CROATIA TO BOSNIA.

12. THE STRENGTH OF THE HVO IN BOSNIA IS ASSESSED TO BE BETWEEN 45-50,000 SOLDIERS. THEY ARE WELL EQUIPPED WITH BOTH ARMOUR AND ARTILLERY BUT NOT AS WELL AS SERBAIN FORCES. THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT MANY OF THE UNITS FIGHTING FOR THE HVO ARE CROATIAN ARMY UNITS, COMMANDED BY CROATIAN ARMY SENIOR OFFICERS.

13. THE HVO IN NORTHERN BOSNIA HAVE NOW BEEN PUSHED BACK FROM DERVENTA, DOBOJ, TUZLA AND BRCKO TO TWO AREAS, THE DERVENTA POCKET AND THE ORASJE POCKET. HERE THEY ARE UNDER STRONG ATTACK FROM THE BANJA LUKA CORPS AND UNIDENTIFIED SERBIAN UNITS.

14. IN WESTERN HERZEGOVINA THE HVO CONTROLS A LARGE AREA FROM LIVNO TO MOSTAR AND THE OUTSKIRTS OF TREBINJE. THIS AREA IS MOSTLY POPULATED BY ETHNIC CROATIANS.

15. THE HVO STILL OPERATE WITH THE BOSNIAN TDF BUT THIS IS MORE A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE AND THERE IS TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF CLASHES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE PAST ON A LOCAL LEVEL.

16. THE ONLY CROATIAN PARAMILITARY FORCE, THE HOS ALSO OPERATE WITH THE HVO IN THE MOSTAR AREA. THEIR STRENGTH IS ASSESSED TO BE ABOUT 2,000 ARMED WITH LIGHT INFANTRY WEAPONS. BOSNIA IS THE ONLY AREA IN WHICH THE HOS OPERATE SEPARATLY FROM THE CROATIAN FORCES. IN CROATIA HOS TROOPS HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO CROATIAN ARMY UNITS.

BOSNIAN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE

17. THE THIRD AND LAST FORCE IS THE BOSNIAN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE. THEY ARE ESTIMATED TO BE 50,000 STRONG. THE BOSNIAN TDF IS BASED ON THE TERRITORIAL FORCES OF OLD YUGOSLAVIA AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTIZAN OPERATIONS. THE BOSNIAN TDF IS MAINLY MADE UP OF MUSLIMS BUT DOES HAVE CROATIAN AND SOME SERBIAN SOLDIERS IN ITS RANKS.

18. REPORTS HAVE ALSO BEEN RECEIVED OF A NEW FORMATION, THE MUSLIM FORCES ARMY WHICH ONLY ACCEPTS ISLAMIC SOLDIERS FROM BOSNIA AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES. THIS FORCE OPERATES FROM JAJCE TO VISOKO AND IS APPROXIMATELY 1-2,000 STRONG.

19. THE BOSNIAN TDF IS EQUIPPED WITH ARMOUR AND ARTILLERY BUT NOT IN THE NUMBERS AVAILABLE TO SERBIAN AND CROATIAN FORCES. REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THEY MAY HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED NEW WEAPONS, AND THEY HAVE MANAGED TO HOLD LARGE AREAS OF BOSNIA AGAINST CONCENTRATED SERBIAN ASSAULTS.

20. THE BOSNIAN TDF IS CURRENTLY FIGHTING IN THE FOLLOWING MAIN AREAS:

a. THE BIAHC POCKET. FOUR BOSNIAN BRIGADES, THE VELIKA Kladusa, CAZIN, BOSANSKI KRUPA AND BUZIM BRIGADES HOLD THIS POCKET AGAINST CONTINUED SERBIAN ATTACKS. THESE BRIGADES HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO BE QUITE WEAK WHICH MAY BE AN EXPLANATION FOR LAST WEEKS ATTEMPTED REINFORCEMENT ACROSS THE KRAJINA.

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b. CENTRAL BOSNIA. BOSNIAN TDF ARE PARTICULARLY STRONG SOUTH OF BRCKO, IN TUZLA, JAJCE, TRAVNIK, ZENIKA AND VISOKO. AGAIN THEY ARE UNDER CONSTANT SERBIAN ATTACK IN THESE AREAS.

c. GORAZDE. DESPITE BEING UNDER SIEGE FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS THE BOSNIAN TDF HAS HELD THIS AREA.

21. THAT CONCLUDES MY BRIEFING, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS ?

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'M. G. G.', with a long horizontal line extending from the left side of the signature.

Information Section
HQ ECMM
ZAGREB