

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDOVILLE
Date : 23 November 1960
No : B-1497, 1498, 1499, 1500

1. In this cable, I propose to round up events of yesterday and review the period of last three weeks.
2. In connection with the incident of 21st night and connected events, I regret the omission of informing you that the Commissaire of Communications attempted to close Ndjili airport. Yesterday morning, he arrived at the airfield together with an officer from the Sûreté and ordered the control tower to close the airport for two hours. Learning this, we sent a UN Air Force officer with necessary instructions to take any desirable action to reopen the airport. The Congolese personnel in the control tower could not but obey orders of their own superiors. While this was being debated, three UN aircraft scheduled for departure took off after some delay disregarding the instructions from the control tower. Meanwhile, negotiations continued between Nussbaumer and ourselves as international traffic was still being diverted to Brazzaville and no commercial planes were being permitted to take off. Nussbaumer said that this measure had been enforced to ensure that the UN command would not fly in any reinforcements. I told him that part of the arrangements of cease-fire between Mobutu and himself was maintenance of status quo as of on the morning of 21 November. Therefore there was no question on my part to fly in reinforcements for a situation which already had been settled. I finally warned him that if by 3 p.m. the airport is not officially opened to UN traffic, I would accuse the Commissaires of attempting to paralyse UN's logistical operations including airlift for thousands of Congolese refugees in Kasai and Katanga. This worked. I did not include this in the report to the General Assembly as although an attempt had been

made on the part of the Commissaires to prevent UN flights, we took no notice of it and continued with our air operations.

3. Kasavubu-Mobutu followers are supposedly hatching plots to provoke trouble for the UN personnel in Leo before the return of Kasa-Vubu. This is to enable Kasa-Vubu to claim that as the UN is incapable of maintaining law and order and protect its own personnel, the UN forces are no longer required. As the Congolese army according to their view is capable of taking over all responsibility, Kasa-Vubu will call upon the UN to withdraw UN forces.

4. Since 20 November, mixed UN Congolese police patrols in Leo have ceased to function. The Congolese police just failed to turn up to join the patrols and Ghana police is obliged to continue alone. We have not been able to elicit a satisfactory answer from Kamitatu.

5. On 21 November, Madame Hodi, wife of a senior Belgian adviser in the Collège des Commissaires, who lives in an apartment in the Royal refused to show her papers to the UN sentry as she entered our compound. As our sentry insisted, Madame struck the soldier with a newspaper at which the soldier pushed her back and unfortunately she fell down. A complaint has been received. This brings us back to the continued presence of non UN personnel in the Royal. However, Olver has been successful in evicting many of them and the process will continue.

6. Abako and its affiliated groups like Puna are believed to be working out plans to organise demonstrations against the Conciliation Commission. These are likely to take the form of demonstrations, organised press campaign and attacks against the UN personnel and so on.

7. Kamitatu has been in constant touch and fears a plot against Lumumba and that group. He believes that Mobutu will attempt to arrest the more important opposition leaders before the arrival of the Conciliation Commission. However as these personalities are fairly well guarded by us, I am not concerned.

8. Reports from Orientale indicate continued tension between Gendarmerie and the ANC and Gizenga's return to power is not yet the end of the story. One of Mobutu's colonels Yanogie in Stanley has been released by the ANC. Gizenga has sent a telegram to the Ethiopian Brigade addressed to you with copies to

Kasa-Vubu, Lumumba and Mobutu. He declares himself on behalf of the Lumumba Government, in favour of the arrival of the Conciliation Commission. He warns Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu that if they try to stop the Commission, Gizenga would be obliged to react violently. The cable when received from Stanley will be forwarded to you by mail.

9. In Kivu, Gizenga is continuing his efforts to consolidate the support of this province to his cause. Mobutu however is not lagging far behind with his attempts to keep the ANC under his control by sending several personal emissaries probably with advances of pay.

10. In Katanga, the security situation has not shown any marked improvement. In Kabolo, the airport is still controlled by the Balubakats as they had heard that Tshombe was likely to pay a visit there. Kabongo is now completely under the hands of the Gendarmerie. There was a clash between a Gendarmerie patrol and Balubakats at Mowala, 85 kilometers from Albertville; five Balubakats are believed to be killed. Reports indicate that Balubakats are slowly moving from Niemba towards Albertville.

11. In reviewing the events of last three weeks our main political and security problems have continued to be centred round Leo and Stanley, North Katanga and South Kasai. In South Kasai, Kalonji made yet another attempt to further his aims of dominating the Lulus, Kaniokas and Basongos by the use of force. We have succeeded in ensuring the new cease-fire and are making progress towards the finalization of arrangements of a neutral zone. With the arrival of the Malayan contingent in South Kasai, the Ghana Brigade will be able to enforce these arrangements. Albert Kalonji is probably beginning to lose some hold over his followers. He is still to show up in what he calls his mining state. Ngalula and his colleagues who actually are running the administration of this erstwhile state are willing to co-operate with us in spite of Albert Kalonji's wishes to the contrary. The Baluba opposite group under Isaac Kalonji has thrown their whole weight in our support. The opposing tribes equally share our desire to prevent further bloodshed.

12. In Katanga, there is a clear split between Tshombe and his colleagues on the one side and Sendwe and Balubakats on the other. This indeed is a terrible blow to the prestige and hopes of Tshombe, his Conakat supporters and of the Belgians. Katanga will have to join the centre or have a further division which from every point of view is unsatisfactory. The law and order situation in Katanga generally has deteriorated. In the neutral zones, the Balubakat Jeunesses showed greater indications of independent action and are further slipping from the control of their chiefs. This perhaps is due to some of the minor chiefs being attracted away by Tshombe. I believe our policy of meeting the situation through peaceful means is correct. The setback of the Irish patrol incident and two or probably three massacres of Congolese by the Balubakats should be considered as incidents requiring firm handling and improved system of military action. The situation in the neighbourhood of the neutral zones has definitely deteriorated. Tshombe has shown that he has learnt his lesson in handling such situations, and in his use of the Gendarmerie, he has been gentle but firm. These areas may have to be included if situation further deteriorates but only when we have adequate forces. Von Horn is going to set up three new commands. Kivu will remain Irish after the rotation of the Irish contingent. North Katanga with headquarters at Albertville with Nigerian Brigade with additional troops under command, South Katanga with headquarters at E'ville under the Swedish colonel with his own unit and additional troops under command. So far a warning order has been issued along these lines as Von Horn will not be able to enforce these arrangements for another week or so.

13. The situation in Stanley became very confused but remains unaltered as Gizenga with assistance of Lumumba followers continues to be the main authority.

14. Leo being the capital has of course been the most important centre but mainly in the field of political activity with resultant effects on the situation of law and order in the city. It has been a period of

consolidation for Kasa-Vubu, the Collège of Commissaires and Mobutu. They all have in their own fields made definite gains. As it appears to us from Leo, Kasa-Vubu's departure for New York was dramatic and his seating in the General Assembly has achieved a decisive gain on the part of his group. The Collège of Commissaires with time and experience have gained confidence, have become more effective in administration and have begun to exercise their authority. They have tasted power and by themselves would like to continue to remain in a dominant position to which end they are supported by their Belgian advisers and all the other Belgians who hope to take advantage through them. Intelligent they may be but they are immature, rash and in a crisis have shown the same characteristics which exist in the other Congolese leaders.

15. Mobutu has perhaps profited of them all. He has received tremendous support from Kasa-Vubu and the Collège of Commissaires. Kasa-Vubu in particular like all other important Congolese has realised that support of the army is the easiest weapon with which he can dominate the capital and thereby the rest of the Republic. USA in particular and other great Western powers have come openly in the field to hang their coats on Mobutu's peg since they consider him to be the only steady factor and hope that by their support he will gain strength and remain the most dominant factor in the Congo. Mobutu on the other hand has shown no desire for personal political ambition but nevertheless has shown greater interest in the use of his authority over all and sundry. Within the Army, Mobutu has decidedly the support of Bombozo with his Thysville garrison, Matadi and almost all the garrison in Leo which was under command of late Kokolo. Latter's death removes a strong contestant but would increase his responsibility to control Leo garrison. He has some supporters in Stanley, Luluebourg is more in his favour than against, Kindu remains doubtful and Coquilhatville is fully with him. However his hold over those who support him has consolidated and improved. His parade was more a reply to our Second Report. He has certainly convinced those who saw it that the Congolese army was good at ceremonial and the press finding a good story have paid added tribute.

This parade made some gain towards the political ambitions of their group as it showed to the people of Leo that Mobutu was the commander of the army, an army which is the instrument of power at present. Mobutu has received a great deal of direct advice from Belgians who are in and out of his house, who organised the parade for him, who are training his troops in Thysville and generally are readily available at his beck and call. I have no doubt in my mind that the willingness to use force if necessary to evict Welbeck, diplomat of a country who has continuously opposed Mobutu's regime, was deliberate. I am sure that Mobutu himself did not commit himself to the use of force but was prepared to make a show of force, a tactics which he had learnt from the UN. Force was used through the insistence of the College of Commissaires under Belgian influence. However, what Mobutu and company and the Belgians did not expect was the resistance offered by the UN. As Ghana decided to withdraw Welbeck, in the eyes of Leo, Mobutu has gained irrespective of the fact that from the military point of view he had lost the action. It was possible for us to encircle his forces committed at the Ghana Embassy and to inflict heavy casualties but this would have increased the area of hostilities and besides the use of more force than necessary to defend ourselves would have been contrary to the UN principles. So, in final balance, Mobutu has decidedly gained.

16. In the opposite camp, Lumumba's neutralisation has been fairly effective. Gizenga is apparently working towards the grouping of provinces which can be used as a threat in case Kasavubu-Mobutu combination becomes so strong that they try and form a government of their own. Kamitatu continues to be the shrewd political leader. While he has not completely moved in unison with Mobutu, he appears willing enough to mark time and await the course of events.

17. I believe it is difficult to predict exactly the future course of events. We will have to continue to put out the bush fires of the Congo as they appear here in Leo or elsewhere in the provinces. We will find increasing

opposition and hostility towards us from those who are in power to-day and particularly from the ANC. The task of the Conciliation Commission will be more difficult and therefore less effective. I will therefore be glad to hand over the screaming baby to Dayal at mid-day; it has grown and has learnt to kick.

OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen, New York
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville
Date: 22 November 1960
No: B- 1494

Nussbaumer had requested on the morning of 22 November for an appointment with me early today. As I had already arranged to see Mobutu, I asked Linner and Berthoud to see him.

2. The purpose of Nussbaumer's visit was obviously to explain, and justify himself for, his actions the day before. He insisted he had all day yesterday handled Welbeck with utmost correctness. He repeatedly called on us to secure testimony of the Tunisian officers who had been at the Ghanaian Embassy. He alleged that tension was created in the area only by ONUC, which had gathered around the house 30 Tunisians at a time when there were only 4 Congolese soldiers there. He said indiscriminate reinforcement of the Tunisians, at a time when Welbeck was not the object of any threat, was the only cause for the incident which occurred later. Nussbaumer ascribed the responsibility for this action to me personally, and even questioned my motives in use of Tunisian troops whose Government was normally an ally of the Congolese. He was told of our attitude to such complaints. On Nussbaumer's insistence that Welbeck had been treated in accordance with diplomatic usages, Berthoud pointed out that the armed attack against the Embassy of a country with which diplomatic relations were maintained was absolutely unprecedented in diplomatic history.

3. However, Berthoud added that what was important now was for Nussbaumer immediately to take all steps in his

power to release all UN personnel, detained by ANC or other Congolese authorities. While agreeing, Nussbaumer first wanted to condition this action on his receiving the reasons why we had seen fit to reinforce our guard at the Ghana Embassy at a time when Welbeck was not in any personal danger. It was again explained to him that the immediate release of all UN personnel should be unconditional. Nussbaumer acknowledged the point, and indicated he would act immediately, but again sought credit for his pacific attitude of yesterday by claiming he had been instrumental during the evening in obtaining the release of Colonel Berthiaume from Camp Leopold, a statement which Berthiaume's continued detention seemed to belie.

4. Meantime, I returned to ONUC HQ and briefly saw Nussbaumer to insist on immediate release of all UN personnel, stating that their detention could not be connected with the military events of last night, and could only be very harmful to the position of the Congolese authorities. Linner also asked Nussbaumer to consider the possibility of making a radio appeal to calm the population of Leo and alleviate tension. Nussbaumer unconvincingly agreed.

OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville
Date: 22 November 1960
No: B- 1495

Reur 3641.

1. Killed
Private 1256 DJELLOUL BEN MEFTAH BEN HAFSIA
2. Seriously wounded
LT MAHMOUD GANNOUNI
Private 1238 TOUHAMI BEN ABDALLAH
3. Wounded and hospitalised
Sergeant Chef 1085 AMOR BEN BECHIR
Corporal 1109 BECHIR BEN MOHAMED
Private 1198 HAMADI BEN AMMAR
Private 1270 MOHAMED SEGHAIR BEN SALEM
Private 1179 BECHIR BEN MOHAMED SEGAIER
Corporal 1133 SAHBI BEN HADJ NAOUI
4. Wounded and not hospitalised
LT ABDELMALEK ALLANI
Private 1276 RABAH BEN MAHMOUD
Private 1240 DJILANI BEN ABDALLAH

OUTGOING CODE


TO: Secgen
FROM: Rikhye
DATE: 22 November 1960
NUMBER: B-1496

Follwing receipt of your cable 3538 we are making urgent reevaluation of purchasing requirements Kamina Base in consultation with Roy and Ahmed. This will require consultations with Dayal on his return and will make impracticable the deadline of November 30 for presentation to you of our final requirements ^{as} indicated in our B-1393. Ahmed, Roy will necessarily have to have informal discussions with Belgians at Kamina Base regarding reduced requirements and we will inform you of our considered recommendations as soon as possible. Assume you will inform Belgians New York of new line and unavoidable delay in finalization of requirements.

OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen, New York
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville
Date: 22 November 1960
No: B- 1493



Appreciate your cabling confirmation of both English and French texts of report as soon as released to General Assembly today. This will enable release of text here as well tomorrow.

LEOPOLDVILLE
22 November 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

B-1491, 1492 SEC GEN FROM RIKHYE

The situation in the Republic of the Congo
Report to the Secretary-General from his Acting Special
Representative in the Republic of the Congo, General
Rikhye

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen
From: Rikhye
Date: 22 November 1960
Number: B-1490

Further my B-1489. Mobutu and senior officers came to take away Kokolo's body from ONUC Hospital at about one p.m.. I had posted a LO there who, on my behalf, demanded the immediate release of all UN personnel and detention and removal of the ANC from Parc Hambise area.

Mobutu accompanied by our LO visited area and has arranged release of our personnel. Meanwhile, a Malayan patrol proceeded to Parc Hambise area and found that Mobutu had already withdrawn his troops.

Mobutu is attempting to pacify his troops. It would appear from last night's incidents that the ANC had, in fact, declared what would be tantamount to war against the UN. Mobutu explains that all the incidents should be treated as one whole and not as separate issues.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLVILLE
Date : 22 November 1960
No : B-1489

I met Mobutu at 1030 a.m. and told him that the full facts of the circumstances in which the fighting started were not yet available to me but I was absolutely clear that the inexperienced young Commissaires had been rash and too impatient. Instead of waiting for Alexander and Quarshie's arrival they acted rashly and tried to use force against a diplomat. Mobutu replied that the UN had opened fire first when Colonel Kokolo who was unarmed had tried to enter the house to talk to Welbeck with three or four men also unarmed. I am verifying this claim.

As little would have been gained out of pin-pricking, I stressed that the main object of my visit was that he use his influence to ease the situation which, though difficult, was not impossible. I demanded that all UN personnel and cars in custody must be released immediately. I protested against acts of arbitrary arrests, confiscation and manhandling. He said he had already ordered the return of all UN personnel under detention. But when I returned to the Royal I found it was not true. I have sent a Liaison Officer to Mobutu to demand immediate release.

Mobutu replied that he understood we were sending another of our hostile reports to New York about the incident in order to influence world public opinion. He said that the Tunisian Chargé and Colonel Lasmar were in full accord with him and I must take their views into consideration. I assured him that we always attempted to have a balanced attitude towards any problem and that I would give due consideration to his views. He then demanded that Ghana and Guinea troops should be withdrawn from the UN and that Ghana police must leave Leo immediately. I advised him that he should take this up through his President at New York. He then asked if we would provide protection to Guinea and the UAR embassies whom he called "communistic propagandists". I reminded him of our duty to maintain law and order and the privileges enjoyed by diplomats.

While pointing out that the UN also had several casualties, I extended our heartfelt condolences at the death of Colonel Kokolo. Mobutu said that he had tried to hush the news by summoning his superior officers to his house and keeping them there but he was afraid that the population as well as the Army might react violently to the news of Kokolo's death. I asked him that he must control his Army and order his troops to remain in their camps. I advised him that it was essential that all acts of indiscipline and violence must cease.

OUTGOING CLEAR

TO: PROTITCH UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM: MCDIARMID
DATE: 22 November 1960
NUMBER: B-1488

Issue
Jma

YOUR LATEST CABLE TO MWAMI OF RUANDA CANNOT BE DELIVERED TO
HIM AS WE KNOW OF NO CONTACT PERSON AND BELIEVE HE HAS LEFT
CONGO NEW YORK BOUND COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDOVILLE
Date : 22 November 1960
No : B-1487

1. Cease-fire finally enforced by about 7 a.m. and as agreed ANC and own troops withdrew from the Embassy leaving a detachment of the Ghana police as before. At 7.30 a.m. Alexander went to the Ghana Embassy together with UN officers and ANC escort. No incident occurred enroute and accompanied by Welbeck the party immediately left for N'Djili airport. A slight delay was caused in departure as the Congolese authorities insisted that Quarshie who was being left behind as the Acting Chargé d'affaires must also leave on the same plane as his papers were not in order. The Ghana aircraft left N'Djili at 1020 a.m.

2. The ANC had put up a few roadblocks which prevented many of our staff from reaching the Royal. In several instances UN cars have been confiscated since yesterday evening and ONU plates removed. A number of people were detained since last night, some of whom have been released while Colonel Berthiaume and about fifteen others are still detained in Camp Leo. We are in Motorola touch with Berthiaume and they appear to be treated satisfactorily. Air Commodore Chapman and another nine are virtually confined to their house. We have received reports of searches of UN houses and a few instances where our personnel have been manhandled.

3. I have just been to see Mobutu and he said that he has given orders for the immediate release of all UN personnel under detention. A more detailed report on my conversation with him will follow.

4. Mobutu and senior officers are collecting the body of Kokolo from ONUC hospital shortly. The news of Kokolo's death has caused great consternation. I only hope that Mobutu can prevent any further acts of violence.

A.S. Tunisian casualties are one OR dead and wounded are one officer, two NCO's, six OR's.

OUTGOING CODE

Imed

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 22 November 1960

No : B-1486

IMMEDIATE

Further my B-1485. Mobutu has agreed that he will issue orders at first light to withdraw his troops. In any case, we have arranged that if conditions permit Alexander will take Welbeck out to N'Djili airport at about 6 a.m. and fly him to Accra.

Have just finished long session with Nussbaumer who obviously is most concerned about international opinion of the Congolese action against Welbeck. I categorically stated that they will be accused of committing violence against the person of a diplomat. I enjoined upon him the necessity of a cease-fire in order to facilitate the arrangements made by the Ghana Government to withdraw Welbeck.

OUT M 92 to Corbin 6:00 AM, 22/11

I have your message and will try to get exact answer your queries as soon as possible. Generally speaking, situation is quiet with both sides still facing each other but with Mobutu having promised send two officers just about now to arrange withdrawal and permit evacuation Welbeck by General Alexander who is now with our operations. I understand there was one burst of fire some two hours ago but otherwise it has been quiet since about 2 AM local time. I just checked with operations five minutes ago and their figure on casualties was still one Tunisian killed and seven wounded on our side with more uncertainty regarding Congolese wounded which they reported one dead and some half dozen or so wounded. I believe these figures will need rechecking now that it is daylight.

Secgen's cable regarding report in course of Tuesday just received a while ago. No more code at the moment.

I understand we had around 200 troops at Ghana Embassy last night with Congolese having an estimated similar numbers plus two armoured cars. I have just checked with Ops again and they are still waiting for arrival of Mobutu's men to arrange withdrawal of the ANC. Nothing much more. Will inform Rikhye of requested report immediately.

I should have added that report of one Congolese dead was based on information our hospital and no doubt additional casualties on Congolese side will be reported later.

IN

Concluded mcd
6:00 AM, 22/11

In addition to information in Rikhye's clear cable, the second cable is now being processed will have information contained in it in a short time. How many ANC troops were deployed around Ghana Embassy? How many Tunisian and other UN troops are deployed there? Were the Ghana police used? Has the number of troops declined during the night or are all of them holding firm in tense contact with each other? Did Mobutu take any steps to control his troops and achieve cease fire? Is it correct that firing continued over Indian Ambulance efforts to remove the dead and wounded?

We now have first two paras here of your 1486. General Assembly meeting concluded tonight with point of order by Bulgaria demanding report of incident. Secgen had already sent you cable some hours ago asking for full report for circulation assembly tomorrow that is Tuesday. Issue naturally most explosive and will play important role in final stages debate now underway. Most important therefore that report should not only be factually correct but judgments if any should be cautions and rest on solid basis.

I hope contact with you will be good tomorrow so that we can check text with you if necessary.

Secgen is now having a meeting with Slim and had a meeting with Kasavubu this evening. He has brought to Kasavubu's attention extreme gravity of ANC action. Kasavubu around six O'clock sent message to the Tunisian Government and to the Secgen. We will send you copy of Kasavubu's message. John all of the above is written by Andy over to you.

Latest info on UN casualties as well as Congolese. Was Kokolo killed? Has Secgen's cable been received regarding report?

Report is urgently needed here. Staff should be so deployed there for quick drafting. It should be circulated afternoon Tuesday.

I know this is very fast schedule but situation here requires it; in any case the report should be short. No need to elaborate beyond sheer facts the Congolese here of course have their own version. They were in extended teletype contact with Mobutu this evening.

12

SG in consultation will reply in two minutes.

We will immediately take the matter up with Kasavubu through Dayal on the following lines:

1. The diplomatic move of this kind has to be taken by the Chief of State and not by any other authority anticipating his decision.
2. The decision of Kasavubu when taken, should be communicated in accordance with the normal rules of diplomacy to Ghana Government.
3. It is to our knowledge unheard of that short of war a non-grata declaration on foreign diplomatic representative is implemented by use of military force and the consequences would undoubtedly be very grave both for the international respect for the Congo and in practical action.
4. If the President takes the decision indicated by the Commssaires we feel therefore that authorities should use presence of Foreign Office Secretary General to negotiate matter in orderly way and in that context to withdraw the troops and cancel all threat of use of force maintaining the minimum of international diplomatic decorum. If so, the UN protection would simultaneously be reduced to minimum related to normal maintenance of law and order. We are insisting only that accepted proper procedures be followed in this matter of expulsion. We do not stand in the way when the procedures are correct. We are just now seeking contact with Kasavubu and will inform you immediately after talk with him. In the meanwhile you should at once inform Mobutu and Commissaires about this initiative on our side expressing firm expectation on our side that absolutely nothing is done by Congolese in pursuit of their line of action pending results of contact with Kasavubu and of course Bomboko. You can use these points as background for explanation of our general stand although they have not been dictated for that purpose but only as notes for Dayal.

We cannot help feeling that you should avoid any suggestions as to actions to be taken by Welbeck. But if as you say Foreign Office Secretary is coming to you any minute you might without suggestions discuss with him need to save face of other party if he himself then arrives at some such conclusion as ~~xxxxxxx~~ the one you mentioned that is their affair but it should not be on your record that you have in a sense put Welbeck in house arrest.

Here Dayal:

You have all my sympathies for holding the screaming baby in my absence and I hope you will be able to quieten it before my arrival on Wednesday morning.

OUT

ANC surrounded Welbeck's house early this afternoon and demanded that we permit them to remove him to the airport. We have a company of Tunisians there and we said that we could not permit this and will resist if the ANC use force. Mobutu was informed and he has alerted the Leo Garrison. He called me up and requested for my cooperation in permitting him to expel Welbeck. I informed him that I was unable to agree to this and advised him to use diplomatic means to expel Welbeck. Since then, the ANC has built up strength at Welbeck's house which will shortly be a Battalion. We have counteracted and have about a Battalion ready to move in if necessary. I have just received a delegation of four Commisaires who have requested that we permit expulsion of Welbeck and that the UN should not resist. They say that the Congolese will be obliged to act. Meanwhile Mobutu has a meeting going on with the other Commissaires where I believe they have agreed to break off relations with Ghana. I understand that they are likely to cable Kasavubu to put the official stamp but meanwhile they will expel Welbeck with force if necessary. Alexander and Foreign Office Secretary have landed just now at Leo. They will be coming up to see me any minute.

McDiarmid is with me and Cox and rest of the team is on the Sixth floor taking care of various callers and delegates as we have a full house. The Tunisians Chargé d'Affaires has just telephoned that he is most unhappy that his troops are involved in this awkward task and requests that we find a peaceful solution. I will call him back. As you well know our friends here do not understand niceties of diplomacy. They have made an issue over Welbeck, have made several announcements on their radio and the world press. The latter are all outside Welbeck's house now. They may be forced to do something silly to save face and I believe I ~~ma~~ will have to suggest something to that end. Do you think it is advisable to suggest that Welbeck remain in his house till final decision. Mensah is also in the same house and is to be expelled.

and

I understand/will handle this carefully. I will await the result of your approach to Kasavubu. I hope to make use of this to advantage as his office they certainly respect. Best wishes from all of us to you all and we are eagerly awaiting Dayal's return who I expect will be leaving later on this evening.

LEOPOLDVILLE
21 November 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

B-1485 SEC GEN FROM RIKHYE YOUR 3605 RECEIVED STOP AS SOON AS WE FELT THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS ADEQUATELY EFFECTIVE EYE LEFT FOR THE GHANA EMBASSY ACCOMPANIED BY ALEXANDER AND QUARSHIE STOP AS WE REACHED THE AREA A LITTLE BEYOND ONUC HOSPITAL WE CAME UNDER HEAVY FIRING WHICH WE DISCOVERED HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE MOVE OF THE INDIAN HOSPITAL AMBULANCE CAR EVACUATING CASUALTIES STOP AFTER LYING ABOUT FOR ONE HOUR UNDER COVER AND PREVENTING SEVERAL MAD UN CARS FROM GETTING SHOT UP WHO HAD LITTLE IDEA OF WHAT WAS GOING ON BUT WERE EAGER TO LOOK CMA WE MOST RELUCTANTLY GAVE UP OUR PLAN TO GET WELBECK OUT TONIGHT STOP PARA IN SPITE OF THE HEAVY FIRE AS EYE FEARED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES EYE ORDERED THE INDIAN HOSPITAL TO RECOVER CASUALTIES WHICH THEY DID UNDER HEAVY FIRE STOP THE COUNT SO FAR IS ~~TWO~~ ONE TUNISIAN~~S~~ KILLED SEVEN WOUNDED INCLUDING TWO SERIOUS STOP ALL THE WOUNDED HAVE BEEN OPERATED UPON AND ARE UNDER BEST CARE STOP UNFORTUNATELY THE HOSPITAL IS CLOSE TO THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT AND ITSELF IS UNDER FIRE ONE BULLET HAVING BEEN EXTRICATED OUT OF THE MATTRESS OF AYE PATIENT STOP HOWEVER THE HOSPITAL STAFF ARE WONDERFUL AND GOING AHEAD WITH THEIR JOB STOP THERE IS ONE CONGOLESE DEAD IN THE HOSPITAL AND HE IS COLONEL KOKOLO THE COMMANDANT OF THE LED BRIGADE AND SECOND IN COMMAND TO MOBUTU HIMSELF STOP HE HAS DIED FROM A BURST OF MACHINE GUN ACROSS HIS BODY STOP APPARENTLY HE LED THE INITIAL CHARGE AGAINST UN TROOPS STOP EYE DO NOT THINK MOBUTU EVEN KNOWS ~~YYMM~~ THAT KOKOLO DID THIS AND IS DEAD ^{STOP} ~~BECAUSE~~ REGRETTABLY ENOUGH THIS IS TYPICAL OF THE ANC OVER WHICH HE HAS ONLY EXERCISED NOMINAL CONTROL BUT KOKOLO'S ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE OF WHAT EYE EXPECTED OF HIM STOP WE HAVE BEEN CONSTANTLY IN TOUCH WITH MOBUTU WHO IS WILLING TO DO ANYTHING BUT WITH LITTLE EFFECT ON HIS OWN ARMY STOP MOBUTU IS MOST DESIROUS TO EFFECT AYE CEASEFIRE STOP HIS PARACOMMANDO LIEUTENANT WHO ACCOMPANIED US ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE AND EYE UNDERSTAND HE IS SENDING ANOTHER OFFICER OUT STOP HOWEVER EYE DOUBT VERY MUCH IF DURING THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT EITHER OF US WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING WORTHWHILE STOP EYE HAVE INFORMED THE COMMISSAIRES AND MOBUTU THAT IF BY EARLY TOMORROW THE ANC DOES NOT WITHDRAW FROM THE SCENE

of the incident EYE WILL BE FREE TO TAKE ANY ACTION REQUIRED BY THE
CIRCUMSTANCES STOP PARA MEANWHILE WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO ALTER THE
MALAYAN CONTINGENT CEREMONIAL PARADE TOMORROW BECAUSE IF CANCELLED IT WILL
ONLY PLAY THE INCIDENT OF THIS EVENING OUT OF PROPORTION STOP YET ON THE
OTHER HAND WE WILL HAVE THE WHOLE MALAYAN CONTINGENT CONCENTRATED AND
READILY AVAILABLE TO BE SWITCHED TO ANY OPERATION DESIRED STOP EYE ALSO
WISH TO SHOW TO PEOPLE IN LEO WHAT AYE REGULAR ARMY^{UNIT} IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING
AT AYE CEREMONIAL PARADE AND EYE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE MALAYAN CONTINGENT
WILL SHOW OFF THEIR BEST STOP

LEOPOLDVILLE
21 November 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

PRIORITENATIONS

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

B-1484 SEC GEN FROM RIKHYE THE FIRING HAS SUBSIDED WITH OCCASIONAL
SHORT BURSTS OF RIFLE FIRE STOP ALEXANDER AND QUARSHIE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GHANA ARE WITH ME STOP THEY HAVE SUGGESTED
THAT THEY TAKE WELBECK BACK TO ACCRA AS SOON AS THEY CAN GET HIM OUT STOP
THEY HAVE ALERTED THEIR AIRCRAFT AT N'DJILI TO BE READY TO TAKE OFF AT
ONE HOUR NOTICE STOP PARA WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH MOBUTU WHO STATES THAT THE
USE OF FORCE WAS DEFINITELY CONTRARY TO HIS ORDERS STOP HIS SIDE OF THE
STORY IS THAT THE TWO GHANA POLICEMEN OPENED FIRE FIRST BUT WE WILL SOON
KNOW STOP NDELE NUSSBAUMER AND LASMAR HAVE PROCEEDED TO THE GHANA EMBASSY
TO TRY AND ENSURE AYE CEASEFIRE STOP PARA EYE SUGGESTED TO MOBUTU THAT IT
WOULD BE PREFERABLE THAT HE MEETS ME IMMEDIATELY AT THE ROYAL AS IT WAS
IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO QUIT THE COMMAND POST STOP HE IS SHAKING LIKE AYE LEAF
AND SCARED AS HELL OF THE TUNISIANS WHO HAVE THEIR BILLETS ALONG THE ROAD
FROM HIS HOUSE AND SUGGESTED THAT HE AWAIT THE RETURN OF TWO OFFICERS THAT
HE HAS DESPATCHED TO THE SCENE OF INCIDENT STOP PARA THE TUNISIAN CHARGE
CALLED AND SAID THAT HE WAS REPORTING TO HIS GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY THAT
HIS CONTINGENT COULD NOT CONTINUE TO PROTECT A DIPLOMAT TO THE EXTENT OF
INVOLVING THEM IN AYE BATTLE WITH THE CONGOLESE WITH RESULTANT CASUALTIES
TO BOTH SIDES WHEN THE DIPLOMAT HAD BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA BY THE
CHIEF OF THE STATE STOP EYE HAVE PERSUADED HIM TO VISIT ME BEFORE HE FINALLY
SENDS HIS CABLE STOP END

CONFIRMATION COPY -

OUTGOING CLEAR


MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: Secgen
FROM: Rikhye
DATE: 21 November 1960
NUMBER: B- (unnumbered)

AT 19:30 Hours while I was in middle of meeting with Ndele, Nussbaumer and others, firing started at Ghana Embassy. I believe it was fresh ANC troops led by a major who attempted to force entry. I have just reached Mobutu and he has agreed to order cease fire. Firing seems to have died down now at 19:55 hours. Ndele and company have left to pacify troops and so has Col. Lasmar. End of Message

OUTGOING CODE

To: SecGen
From: Rikhye/Linner
Date: 21 November 1960
Number: B-1483



Following received from Berendsen:


"Wright has been informed by Buisseret, Attaché de Cabinet du Ministre des Finances, that the Government of Katanga with approval Belgian Government has taken over Comité spécial du Katanga with all assets and liabilities. The decision reached by the Government last week and orders to be published in Moniteur Katangais given Thursday but issue has not appeared as yet. Further information will follow. See Wright's report 7 October. Date of issue of new Katanga currency has been postponed until 15 December."

Wright's report is awaited. Will keep you informed.

OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLOVILLE
Date : 21 November 1960
No : B-1482



1. Further my B-1478 and B-1479. Nussbaumer and Pongo called on Welbeck and as he declined to sign agreement to leave within 24 hours they have warned him that he must leave 4 p.m. to-day for which they have booked air passage. I am reminding the Congolese authorities that we must protect the Embassy against any incursion or act of force against the person of the Ambassador.
2. Capt. Peel, Ghana British Liaison Officer at ONUC, has confirmed arrival Alexander and Ghana Permanent Foreign Secretary at 5 p.m. to-day in an RAF Hastings. They may be coming with a mandate from N'Krumah to see situation and, if required, take Welbeck away with them.

OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen
From: Rikhye
Date: 21 November 1960
Number: B-1481

Handwritten signature

Your 3600. Scott requests, in order to avoid publicity, Roberts be permitted to travel RCF aircraft on Friday to Pisa connecting with another RCF aircraft which will land at Langar, England. Roberts' arrival at quiet airfield desirable.

Cable Code

To : SecGen
From : Rikhya/Linner
Date : 21 November 1960
Number : B-1480

Reour B-1465 Doctor Pierret visited Dumontet again Saturday. He said "démarche" originated from Secrétaire Général Affaires d'Afrique, Ministère d'Etat. Approach was made here rather than New York in order "keep politics out." Baron Albert Greindl Directeur Bureau Office Belge du Commerce Extérieur au Congo et Ruanda Urundi, residing Léopoldville, 10 years experience in Africa, might function as Belgian "interlocuteur" attached informally either to Congolese Government or to ONUC to arrange cooperation Belgian and ONUC technicians. No commitment whatever from our side.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 21 November 1960
No : B-1479

IMMEDIATE

Understand from reliable sources that Welbeck has received instructions to remain in Leo. We cannot help but be involved in an affair which is entirely between the Congolese and Ghana since we have taken over the responsibility of the protection of the Ghanaian Embassy and its personnel, and particularly its Ambassador. We have succeeded in averting this morning's clash merely by taking advantage of the present friendly atmosphere that exists between Mobutu and ourselves. Mobutu has given another 24 hours only on direct personal request from me. They are determined to expel Welbeck and say that, since he has not behaved like a gentleman by refusing to comply with Kasa-Vubu's order of 4 October, therefore they will be obliged to use methods which they would not like to employ.

Welbeck has told the Tunisian Guard Commander that if any Congolese police attempt to take him away, he would fight them with his own pistol.

We have been placed in a most embarrassing situation and I can see that our efforts over the last many days to create peaceful conditions and an atmosphere in which the Conciliation Commission can start their work, are going to be wrecked by one man - Welbeck. We are heading for a definite clash with the ANC. I therefore urgently request instructions.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 20 November 1960
No : B-1478

MOST IMMEDIATE

Otu informs that Alexander and permanent secretary Foreign Office Ghana arriving Leo 10 a.m. Alexander has ordered cancellation move Ghana Police 8 a.m. to-morrow on USAF aircraft. I have said hold move for a few hours. Welbeck confirms these arrangements but says he not addressed directly. Suggest you take no action till I see Alexander and report to you. Welbeck expects ANC action 7 a.m. to-morrow. We have taken precautions.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 20 November 1960
No : B-1476, 1477

1. Situation in Stanleyville remains confused. This morning Gizenga was still under our protection but during the day there has been a reversal of position and the Gendarmerie has the upper hand. Several ANC officers under Ngoma have come to our headquarters to ask for protection. Gizenga has left our protection and is likely to regain power in the province which would mean a continuation of the Gendarmerie terror in Stanleyville. I am sending instructions that we must not under any circumstances provide shelter to either Gizenga or ANC officers in UN precincts. They must be kept in residences outside UN compounds and guarded. As for Gizenga, I would not like the UN to continue to play mother for him after he has played truant. But before he is given such a warning, I would appreciate your views.

2. I had a very fruitful meeting with Mobutu this morning. We talked about Stanley and Mobutu indicated some plans of recovering his position there with the assistance of two battalions and a squadron of armoured cars which are at present deployed in the province. I advised him against any use of force. He is however getting quite desperate about the state of the ANC in Stanley.

3. Mobutu took up the case of Welbeck. I explained the UN stand. Mobutu wanted to know our attitude in case Welbeck did not agree to leave after the expiration of 48 hours. I advised him that he must take various factors like availability of an aircraft, communications between Accra and Leo and that today was a Sunday. He assured me that Welbeck will be treated properly but he must leave the country and Ghana should send another Ambassador.

4. We continued with our discussion on the Conciliation Commission where we left off yesterday. I explained the UN view and Mobutu appeared to have a greater appreciation of it than before. I told him that his stand concerning the Conciliation Commission was of extreme importance to all concerned. Mobutu in reply reiterated his statement of the past few days expressing sole concern to keep the ANC in hand, continue its training and reorganisation. He added that he had to interfere in the political field at some stages as there was no other alternative. He said that he had set up the Collège with one aim of re-establishing suitable administrative system in the country while he could devote his attention to the work of the ANC in the hope that when history of the Congo was written, he would be remembered as the Colonel who had made sacrifices to make the ANC into what it would be -- good, efficient, and a disciplined army. He added that if he had any political aims and indeed at one time he was urged by some of his officers to make a military dictatorship, all he would have had to do on 14 September was to set himself up as the Chairman of the Collège of Commissaires. But he did not do it and he has no intention of doing it.

5. I believe he meant every word of it and has categorically stated that he has no ambition to attain political power.

(B-1477) 6. In regard to the Commission he said that his officers have closely followed the press and radio reports concerning decisions of the GA and believe countries like Ghana, Guinea, UAR, Morocco and India are enemies of the Congo. Morocco's inclusion in the eight power resolution led to deterioration of relations at Thysville between Bombozo and the Moroccan troops. I advised Mobutu that he must make his army understand that the actions of the governments could be and are in many cases different to the finally adopted policy of the United Nations. He must teach his men to know that contingents in the UN act in accordance with orders of the UN command alone. I again cornered him to make known his stand vis-à-vis the Conciliation Commission and I again received the answer that he did not wish to concern himself with politics and his main preoccupation was his

army alone. Mobutu has agreed to provide us assistance for accommodation and generally facilitate our task in handling Commission's affairs.

I told him that the Commission must have full freedom to deal with various party leaders including Lumumba. He agreed that the UN could control visitors to Lumumba when the Commission arrives.

7. Mobutu was very pleased to hear of your approval of a military mission to Ethiopia. He wishes to send Major Kiembe, Deputy Chief of Staff and will comprise of one captain, four lieutenants and a second lieutenant. Mobutu selected these officers when I advised him that he should send only those who would make suitable instructors for his army. They wish to visit Military institutions i.e. the Military Academy, Schools of Military Instruction and the Air Training School. I explained to Mobutu that this mission could learn a lot as Ethiopia would be the first African country being visited by them. He went on to say that he would like this group be afforded an opportunity to visit some neutral countries, the whole tour not exceeding one month. If the Government of India is agreeable, I would strongly recommend that after Ethiopia this mission visits India. Their trip could be timed with the passing out parade at the Indian Military Academy which is due probably early next month and is a spectacular military event in India. A visit to Sweden should also be considered if this is not unsuitable time of the year. In view of the distances involved, we could send this mission to Ethiopia in a RCAF external airlift plane which on its return trip could bring back mail for the Ethiopian contingent or any other necessities. Thereafter they should fly commercial.

8. Your 3586 para 1. Ghaleb and Rahman wanted the UN to arrange everything i.e. approach to Tshombe, arranged transport and so on. In view of the existing relations with Tshombe, you would agree with me that this would hardly be the time for us to arrange all this.

9. I have been in constant touch with Welbeck and the UAR Ambassador in that context. I must say that Ghaleb has shown himself to be the outstanding Afro-Asian diplomat in Leo, certainly for the period of the last three weeks, and has sobering influence over all his other sometimes rash colleagues. Welbeck came to see me this morning together with Ghaleb and the Ambassador of Guinea. Welbeck was sober and had a balanced approach to his difficult problem. The first regular plane to Accra is available on Tuesday. Meanwhile, Welbeck has not received any instructions from Nkrumah. I counselled him that as his 48 hours expire at about 11 a.m. to-morrow, his staff should get in touch with the senior permanent official at the Foreign Office and inform him of his difficulties. Ghaleb agreed with this view and is being a useful friend and philosopher to Welbeck. Meanwhile, we are adequately guarding the Ghana Embassy and residences.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
From : RIKHYE, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 20 November 1960
No : B-1475

Further my B-1473 para 6.

I sent liaison officer to see Mobutu who immediately telephoned Bombozo at Thysville and asked him to proceed to Stanley. As Bombozo is of different tribe and also not sure of his strength he said he would only go if his brigade was ordered there. Mobutu equally unsure of his strength there and College has still less.

We cannot continue to put out fires lit by Gizenga and at the same time protect him from being killed. If he is still under our protection we cannot continue to keep him in UN precincts. His continued presence in Stanley remains threat to peace. Possible solution is to fly him to Leo and guard him at his residence. We could try arrange Songolo's release which should not be too difficult and also try get Finant out from grateful Mobutu. Another advantage would be release of important leaders before arrival Commission.

Will appreciate guidance before I meet Mobutu 9.30 a.m. to-morrow.

OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen, New York,
From: Rikhye, Leopoldville
Date: 19 November 1960
No: B-1472-73-74

Ndele telephoned to request that we meet to discuss the Ghana Embassy episode. As Von Horn and I were meeting Mobutu, I asked Cox to meet Ndele on my behalf. Ndele went over the same ground as covered by Marothi earlier in the morning. He gave Cox a copy of a press communiqué formally denying the contrary implication which had arisen out of the press conference of Nussbaumer. He stated that Welbeck must leave the country but offered the assurance that the Collège would not use force to that end. His manner was correct and courteous throughout. Cox briefly explained the UN position and again counselled him against the use of force in any circumstance and restated that our responsibilities in the domain of law and order would oblige us to protect the Ghanain premises from incursion by force or from an act of violence against the person of the Ambassador. Ndele asked whether we could advise Welbeck concerning his duty to depart. Cox repeated that this was a matter between the two governments but acknowledged the possibility that if I had conversations with Welbeck, I may use the occasion on a purely unofficial basis to pass along the observations of Ndele.

2. Just before 12 noon, Pongo served a notice on Welbeck to leave the country within 48 hours. Welbeck who had been steadily drinking since early this morning and his Dutch courage increasing with the quantity of alcohol consumed by this afternoon, was somewhat incoherent and loud in his determination in remaining at his post. Since Otu is in all round disfavour, a harassed young Ghana British officer has been scurrying between

the Ghana Embassy and our Headquarters. Although Welbeck even sought his counsel, there is little more this officer could do than to send a cable to Alexander. Welbeck is determined to stay to meet the Conciliation Commission and give them what he calls his evidence. He said that he would be willing to depart after that. I have not been able to contact either Ghaleb or Rahman to find out what transpired at Welbeck's. My last attempt to find out from Welbeck raised declamations on his part "that blood must be shed and he was personally going to make Mobutu walk behind him through the streets of Leo like a dog and he was going to die to liberate Lumumba". I am sure he will contact me tomorrow when he has recovered from today's drinking bout. Adequate guard has been provided on the premises of Ghana Embassy and residential area.

3. Von Horn and I had a cordial lunch with Mobutu who reiterated his desire to improve his army and that his main work lay with the army. He edged out of my efforts to make him definitely admit that he was going to remain above politics. Bombozo of Thysville has already taken his troops back. I understand that he met Kamitatu and has assured him that he would use all his influence to keep the army out of politics. This is an encouraging sign. On the other hand, Kokolo seems to be easily influenced by the three Western Military Attachés to support Mobutu for military dictatorship. I believe Mobutu is still vacillating between his idealistic views to serve his country as a true patriot by remaining out of politics on the one hand and his ego being fed with grandiose ideas of what he could do for himself ^{and} his country if he assumed military dictatorship on the other. I therefore believe that it is possible to influence him in our favour if we can nullify the influence of those who wish to see him as a military dictator. This in my opinion can be achieved firstly by dealing with him from a position of strength, i.e. from the military point of view we must achieve adequate concentration of troops in Leo who should make a discreet

show of force at every possible opportunity preferably without coming in direct clash with the ANC; Secondly, we must handle him with tact and give him the necessary support to reorganise his army in the way of training and equipment and not adopt any measures which would undermine his authority as Chief of Staff.

(8-1473) 4. I have asked Mobutu's assistance in facilitating our administrative arrangements for the Conciliation Commission. He readily agreed to look into the matter. Mobutu himself started the conversation on the present political crisis and said that since 31 December, his declared target for arriving at a political solution, was not very far off, he was at odds to find suitable solution. I suggested he should assist the Conciliation Commission which after all was being sent by the UN whose sole aim in the Congo was to help the Congolese. After discussing it for a while, we agreed to meet again to-morrow to resume our conversation.

5. I spoke to Mobutu about Welbeck. He assured me that he will be well treated but insisted that he leave the country within 48 hours in keeping with Kasa-Vubu's wishes. I again asked that Mensah be released at which Mobutu said that he had been allowed to sort out his personal affairs, had been allowed to visit the Ghana Embassy and to see his family in the African Quarter. Mobutu however could not release him as Mensah had been a resident of Leo for the last 15 years and considered him to be a criminal. He however had decided to expel him and put him on the same plane which transports Welbeck to Accra.

6. The ANC and the Gendarmerie in Stanleyville nearly started a battle amongst themselves. After an exchange of few shots causing one slightly wounded, the Ethiopian Brigade was able to arrange a truce. Gizenga came to our Headquarters for assistance and I believe is under our protection. Discussions in regard to the release of Songolo and other parliamentarians and Lakosa and other ANC officers are proceeding smoothly. It is likely that the Collège of Commissaires will be invited

to send some representatives to Stanleyville to finalise arrangements. I have advised the Ethiopian Brigade to discourage this move and instead I am advising Mobutu that he should send one of his officers to Stanley to arrange settlement. I think it would be better to keep the Collège out and decide the issues on a military plane.

7. The situation in North Katanga continues to cause anxiety. The move of the Nigerian Brigade is encouraging and I feel confident that once they are all in with their essential equipment and vehicles, we will be able to sort out the mess. Meanwhile, Tshombe is touring the area and adding fuel to the fire. He has been to Albertville and Kongolo so far. In the latter town 40 armed volunteers from Konakat have arrived and another 40 are expected. At Kabalo the airstrip is occupied by the Balubakat who are demanding that all Belgians leave the town. At Kabongo, the situation still remains serious and the airstrip is occupied by Balubakats.

8. Berendsen has returned from his visit to Luena. He and the Moroccan Commander agreed that our present directives should be enforced rigidly to improve the present situation. Leaders of Baluba Jeunesse were warned to abide by our orders for neutral zone and when a group of 50 with arms managed to enter the European quarter, they were surrounded and immediately disarmed. For the moment, the coal mines are precariously open but BCK is determined to stand firm. We are also providing additional protection to the railways.

(8-1474) 9. I am awaiting your advice on my 8-1451.

10. Field contacts with tribal leaders are continuing satisfactorily in South Kasai. In view of your 3568, I have postponed Berthoud's departure for Luluabourg and have also advised our representatives in the field not to make any commitments in regard to the neutral zone described in my 8-1456 and 59. However, we are continuing with the ground work so that without loss of time we can commence negotiations after receiving instructions from Dayal when he returns.

11. Lumumba telephoned me directly this morning to report that his car had been confiscated and his driver beaten by the ANC. He said that his servants were afraid to go out of the house for fear of the ANC. I spoke to Mobutu about this and he assured me that he will take the officer responsible to task. He stated that he had given specific instructions that movement of Lumumba's servants, doctors who are attending on his family and so on must not be interfered with. I also sent an operational officer to Lumumba's residence who has made the necessary arrangements.

12. The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires called this morning to exchange views. He believes that the Collège are consolidating their position and there is also a move to persuade Mobutu to carry out another coup which will place Bomboko as the Prime Minister. While he generally accepted my views and recent actions in respect to the ANC, he felt that nothing should be done which would improve Mobutu's political position. He was not sure that Mobutu had any political ambitions but feared that if his position was further consolidated with the army, he might be used as a weapon by such powers who are determined to keep Lumumba out of power. I sounded Mobutu in regard to the future of the Collège. He said that he had created the Collège to get the administration of the country going and to prevent it from falling into further chaos. The Collège was there for that purpose alone and had no other political value. If this be true, the Conciliation Commission would only be faced with the individual ambitions of those in the Collège who once having tasted power would not wish to give it up.

13. We are doing all we can to continue to maintain quiet in Leo and so far our efforts have been fruitful. I hope it continues to remain like this which should facilitate the task of the Conciliation Commission. The Collège put out a special communiqué to the effect that Nussbaumer's declaration in regard to the arrival of the Conciliation Commission in Ndjili airport stated in my B-1463 had been misconstrued by the press and was without authority of Mobutu and the Collège. At lunch, Mobutu confirmed this and assured me that there would be no interference with the Conciliation Commission.

LED

UNATIONS

NEWYORK

1471 CORDIER FROM [REDACTED] RIKHYE STOP REUR 3575 REGARDING SHIPMENT
aircraft spare parts STOP DESPITE OUR CONTINUED PERSONNEL DEFICIENCIES WE DO
HAVE COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS AND ITEMS RECEIVED STOP AS
MATTER OF INTEREST ON 11 NOVEMBER 34 DEMANDS REPRESENTING 297 ITEMS ONLY HAD BEEN
FILLED OUT OF AYE TOTAL REQUIREMENT OF 107 DEMANDS REPRESENTING 2319 ITEMS STOP
SUGGEST YOU REFER TO OLVERS LETTER TO VAUGHAN DATED 11 NOVEMBER AND PREVIOUS
CORRESPONDENCE TO FIELD SERVICE STOP APPROVAL OF OUR ELECTRONIC MACHINE
ACCOUNTING PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WILL MATERIALLY ASSIST IN PROVIDING
INSTANT INVENTORIES STOP REQUEST YOU EXPEDITE STOP PARA TWO STOP FAIL TO
UNDERSTAND YOUR INFERENCE THAT SPARES REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY SUPPLIED
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF BUNCHES INDICATION THAT SPARE PARTS SOURCES IN THE UNITED
STATES HAD DRIED UP DUE TO USAF PHASING OUT OF C119 A/C STOP

cc: Supreme Commander
Brig Rikhye
Air Operations
Mr Oliver, CAG